Failed Bridges E-Book

Joachim Scheer

• Herausgeber: Wiley-VCH
• Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 315

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

Beschreibung

When bridges fail, often with loss of human life, those involved may be unwilling to speak openly about the cause. Yet it is possible to learn from mistakes. The lessons gained lead to greater safety and are a source of innovation.
This book contains a systematic, unprecedented overview of more than 400 bridge failures assigned to the time of their occurrence in the bridges' life cycle and to the releasing events. Primary causes are identified. Many of the cases investigated are published here for the first time and previous interpretations are shown to be incomplete or incorrect. A catalogue of rules that can help to avoid future mistakes in design analysis, planning and erection is included.
A lifetime's work brilliantly compiled and courageously presented - a wealth of knowledge and experience for every structural engineer.

Leseprobe

Contents

Foreword

Preface to the English edition 2010

Preface to the German edition 2000

1 Introduction

1.1 Retrospect

1.2 Aim

1.3 Structure

1.4 Earlier publications on the failure of load-bearing structures

1.5 Estimated numbers of bridges in Germany and USA

2 Failure of bridges, general information

3 Failure during construction

3.1 General observations

3.2 Buckling of compression members in truss bridges

3.3 Deflection of steel compression struts or chords out of the plane of a truss or beam - a trough bridge problem

3.4 Failure of steel bridges with box girders

3.5 Failure of cantilever prestressed concrete bridge beams

3.6 Failure of bridges constructed by incremental launching [54]

3.7 Collapse of the Frankenthal Rhine bridge

3.8 Damage during construction of the Heidingsfeld motorway bridge

3.9 Failure during demolition or reconstruction

3.10 Remarks on cantilever erection

3.11 Remarks on the collapse of a steel truss bridge over the Mississippi (Case 3.103)

4 Failure in service without external action

4.1 General observations

4.2 Remarks on the Nienburg “cable”-stayed bridge over the River Saale, Case 4.87

4.3 Failure of suspension bridges

4.4 Collapse of the Dee Bridge

4.5 Collapse due to wind action, excluding suspension bridges

4.6 Collapse through overload, excluding suspension bridges

4.7 Collapse of the Mönchenstein Bridge (Case 4.28)

4.8 Collapse or damage due to material defects: brittle fracture

4.9 Damage resulting from fatigue or bad maintenance

4.10 Collapse of the Elbow Grade Bridge (Case 4.48)

4.11 Collapse of the Connecticut Turnpike Bridge over the Mianus River and the Sungsu truss bridge over the Han River in Seoul

5 Failure due to impact of ship collision

5.1 General observations

5.2 Conclusions from Table 5

6 Failure due to impact from traffic under the bridge

6.1 General observations

6.2 Impact due to failure to observe the loading height

6.3 Collision with bridge supports by derailed trains or vehicles leaving the road

7 Failure due to impact from traffic on the bridge

8 Failure due to flooding, ice floes, floating timber and hurricane

9 Failure due to fire or explosion

10 Failure due to seismic activity

11 Failure of falsework

11.1 General observations

11.2 Failure due to inadequate lateral stiffness

11.3 Failure due to poor foundations

11.4 Failure due to inadequate coordination between design and construction

11.5 Failure due to errors in design, construction and operation

11.6 Three particular cases

12 Lessons for the practice

12.1 General observations

12.2 Design

12.3 Structural safety calculations and design detailing

12.4 Construction management

12.5 Inspection and maintenance of structures

12.6 Rules and formulations in engineering literature

12.7 My own summary

13 Lessons for teaching

14 Literature

15 Geographical Index

16 Sources of drawings and photographs

Index

The Author

Univ.-Professor em. Dr.-Ing.

Dr.-Ing. E. h. Joachim Scheer

Wartheweg 20

30559 Hannover

Germany

Translated by Linda Wilharm, Hannover, Germany

Cover

Scaffolding collapse during construction of the Laubach valley viaduct.

Photo: © Professor Joachim Scheer

All books published by Ernst & Sohn are carefully produced. Nevertheless, authors, editors, and publisher do not warrant the information contained in these books, including this book, to be free of errors. Readers are advised to keep in mind that statements, data, illustrations, procedural details or other items may inadvertently be inaccurate.

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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

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The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

© 2010 Wilhelm Ernst & Sohn,

Verlag für Architektur und technische Wissenschaften GmbH & Co. KG, Rotherstraße 21, 10245 Berlin, Germany

All rights reserved (including those of translation into other languages). No part of this book may be reproduced in any form – by photoprinting, microfilm, or any other means – nor transmitted or translated into a machine language without written permission from the publishers. Registered names, trademarks, etc. used in this book, even when not specifically marked as such, are not to be considered unprotected by law.

Coverdesign: Sonja Frank, Berlin

Typesetting: Hagedorn Kommunikation, Viernheim

Printing and Binding: Scheel Print-Medien GmbH, Waiblingen

ISBN: 978-3-433-02951-0

Foreword

The first edition of Professor Scheer’s book “Failure of Structures”, Volume 1, “Bridges”, was published 10 years ago at the end of the year 2000. It is highly commendable that in the second edition he also highlights bridge failures that have occurred during the last 10 years caused by inadequate inspection and maintenance of old bridges, external action, unsuitable construction methods and flaws in new structures.

Failure of structures almost always results in injury and loss of life. Structural safety is therefore of primary importance right from the beginning of conceptual design and should not be influenced or affected by other objectives such as cost, aesthetic shaping etc.

Structural failures – and many partial failures – are often caused by one careless mistake arising because a vital problem has not been recognized, has been underestimated or carelessly treated. Joachim Scheer’s book combines text with tables, photographs and technical drawings to present an impressive and extremely valuable overview of serious accidents involving structures. Every student and practitioner concerned with structural engineering is recommended to study his well selected examples very carefully because they demonstrate the huge responsibility that is involved with the work of bridge building.

University laboratory loading tests are usually displacement controlled. When the behaviour of the test specimen is not brittle, the ultimate load is hardly evident because testing can be smoothly continued into the de-strengthening stage and the failure process appears to be quite harmless. In reality, structures are mostly “load controlled” and the collapse of scaffolding or of an entire structure is always a dramatic and tragic event with very serious consequences. The photographs contained in this book clearly illustrate the difference between a laboratory test and a real-life bridge failure.

Practising engineers can also learn a lot. The book serves as a reminder that analysis of the ground foundation structure is practically always necessary, that stability problems are critical and that temporary structures require particularly careful detailing because here the design load is at the same time the effective load. External events such as high water or earthquake must also be considered even if they have not occurred in living memory. They are also well advised to use the book to make check lists with clear instructions in order to guarantee sufficient safety, correct service use and adequate maintenance and inspection.

A bridge is never designed and built by one single engineer. A competent team is a fundamental requirement for the successful completion of a structure. Everyone concerned must cooperate and be absolutely willing to cooperate. Any conflict or misunderstanding between the professionals involved can be critical and must be resolved before the project is continued and construction commences. Every stage of every job must be carefully organised with clear definition of the areas of responsibility and the boundaries between different activities. At the same time every person involved must be prepared to support his colleagues even beyond his own particular field of action.

Standardized safety is the basis of design. It must cope with shortcomings in design and construction, the development of the live load, the material strength and finally, the loss of resistance due to potential corrosion.

Standards are established for “normal” cases but can sometimes lead to results that are not suitable for a particular project. Obviously, the safety requirements are different for a simple, well-protected structure than for a sensitive, exposed structure. For example, essential safety may be carefully modified for the assessment of an existing construction provided that any new parameters are considered and the condition of the construction is thoroughly inspected. Any structure in which local failure could lead to a total collapse must be subjected to a higher degree of design safety.

Joachim Scheer also reports on the failure of bridges built after the early 19th century. Old bridges often collapse because of flaws in the building materials or incorrect assessment of stability problems. Failures in newer bridges are frequently connected with complicated construction methods and dynamic influences.

In his book Joachim Scheer distinguishes between failure of bridges under construction and in service, failure due to unusual external influences such as vehicle and ship impact, high water and ice, fire and explosions. One chapter is devoted to the collapse of scaffolding. This second edition now also includes an important new section on bridge collapse due to earthquake and describes a number of serious failure occurrences. More information about this type of incident is desirable because bridges will not only continue to be threatened by seismic event but may well become targets for vandalism or terrorist attack – in particular exposed cable suspension bridges.

The closing chapters contain suggestions and rules for engineering practice and teaching developed by Professor Scheer during his long career. I sincerely hope that this book gains a wide readership: it will certainly help to avoid repeating past mistakes that have led to bridge failure.

Professor Dr. sc. ETH, ZürichDr.-Ing.E.h. Christian Menn, Chur (Switzerland)

Preface to the German edition 2000

My intention is to consult experience first and then by means of reasoning show why such experiment is bound to work in such a way.

Leonardo da Vinci

More than 100 years ago, George Frost, then editor of Engineering News in the USA, commented: “We could easily, if we had the facilities, publish the most interesting, the most instructive and the most valued engineering journal in the world, by devoting it to only one particular class of facts, the records of failures….For the whole science of engineering, properly so-called, has been built up from such records.”

The intention of this book is to contribute to engineering science in this way and to help prevent the repetition of disastrous mistakes in the design and construction of load-bearing structures.

A collection of structural accidents might easily lead to the conclusion that construction work very frequently involves failure. There is no doubt that accidents happen too often and it cannot be denied that certain catastrophes could have been avoided. Nevertheless, the number of failure occurrences must be measured against the huge number of structures. To relate this to bridge construction, some details on the number of bridges in Germany and the USA are given in Section 1.5.

The book draws on the contents of 9 tables in which facts about failures have been put together from the literature available – after critical appraisal – and supplemented by valuable information from many colleagues and my own experience, for example from my work as an expert witness for courts and insurance companies and as a member of committees and panels. This also included the development of codes and building regulations as a reaction to actual cases of damage.

When discussing the individual cases of bridge failure, I have mostly deliberately refrained from repeating well-documented investigations. I merely make reference to them except in cases where my own deliberations have caused me to reach different conclusions. The photographs and detail drawings supporting the text are intended to aid easy understanding of the technical subject matter.

When describing and commenting on failure occurrences I have always born in mind that in general it is easy to understand how the collapse of a structure could have been prevented – after the event.

This book is not only intended for my fellow engineers but is also directed at architects, builders and building authorities. They, together, bear the responsibility for design, detailing, the construction process including erection, supervision and maintenance. If it comes to the worst they will share the responsibility for failure. Many cases serve to indicate that global deregulation with its abolishment of the generally useful work of supervisory engineers should not be implemented in Germany: two engineers have more information at their disposal than one engineer alone or, in the words of the saying: “two heads are better than one” – always presuming of course that they are the heads of wise, experienced and dedicated structural or civil engineers.

“Failure” in most cases means collapse but it also includes cases of severe damage or “near-failure”. Many bridge collapses have been prevented only by the fact that the circumstances happened to be fortunate and we can often learn as much from these cases as from major disasters.

I hope that professors and lecturers will be motivated to include examples from this book in their lectures and seminars and that students will learn from them and thereby help to reduce the failure quota in load-bearing structures.

My thanks go to all colleagues and friends for their support in collecting material for this book and for their advice and assistance in the preparation of illustrations and photographs. I especially mention Dipl.-Ing. Ehrlichmann, Dortmund, who placed his extensive and very well ordered collection of publications, press reports etc. on bridge failures at my disposal, thereby providing me with a wealth of information. The same applies to my colleagues at the University of Braunschweig, Professors Duddeck und Peil, who gave me their material on construction accidents and Professor Nather, University of Munich, who provided me with valuable documentation from his practice.

Dipl.-Ing. Behrens of the Institute for Steel Construction, Braunschweig, was a great help in finding the books needed for my research. I thank him very much.

My wife took on the task of reading the text critically and carefully and helped to remove weak formulations and many spelling mistakes before the manuscript went to the publisher. My special thanks to her for her painstaking work in a subject unfamiliar to her.

I greatly enjoyed working with Ms Herr and Ms Herrmann in the editorial office of my publishers W. Ernst & Sohn, Berlin, and Ms Grossl in the production department. Thanks to their experience they gave me valuable suggestions and contributed greatly to the final form of my book.

Hannover/Braunschweig, October 2000

Joachim Scheer

1

Introduction

1.1 Retrospect

My career in construction began in 1946. This was shortly after the end of World War II and I was unable to find a place to study in a faculty for civil engineering because the German universities were overcrowded and older applicants, many of them returning from the long war years, were rightly given preference over us school-leavers.

I therefore started an 18-month building apprenticeship with the aim of becoming a skilled construction worker. At that time I was living in Bremen on the right bank of the Weser and my work took me to a building site in Neustadt on the left bank. It was there, on 18 March 1947, that I witnessed the Bremen bridge catastrophe [1]; surging ice masses swept in by floodwater, together with unmanned boats and barges torn from their moorings, destroyed all the bridges in the town in the space of only a few hours. In the morning I had crossed over a road bridge from the right to the left bank and in the late afternoon I returned to the right bank of the city on one of the last trains over one of the last bridges still standing. This bridge too had been swept away by late evening. The lesson I learned from this disaster was that even with consideration of the fact that immediately after the war the conditions on the river Weser in the city of Bremen were provisional and unusual in many ways, in the end human beings can often only do little in the face of the forces of nature and sometimes nothing at all.