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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
- Sprache: Englisch
Today’s global energy system faces two major challenges: how to secure the supply of reliable and affordable energy; and how to rapidly transform to a low-carbon, efficient and environmentally harmless energy supply. In this rigorous and illuminating book, Michael Bradshaw explores the key aspects of the current global energy dilemma and examines how it is playing out across the major regions and countries of the world.
The book begins by charting the development of the current global energy system - exploring its key characteristics with a focus upon energy security and the relationship between energy, economic development and climate change. The next four chapters offer in-depth analyses of four distinct global energy dilemmas in different parts of the world: the challenge of sustaining affluence and decarbonising energy services in the high-energy economies of the developed world; the legacies of the centrally planned economy and the consequences of liberalisation in the post-socialist world; growing energy demand and emissions growth associated with the emerging regions; and finally, the quest to provide universal access to modern energy services in the developing world in a manner that is both economically and environmentally sustainable.
Identifying the governance structures and policy options available to tackle the global energy dilemma, the book concludes that only an integrated approach - sensitive to regional issues - can reconcile the interests and needs of those facing differing energy challenges across the world today.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013
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Table of Contents
Cover
Dedication
Title
Copyright
Figures, Tables, and Boxes
Acronyms
Preface
Chapter One: Introduction
The Fossil-Fuel Energy System
Energy and Economic Development
Energy and Climate Change
Putting it all Together: The Kaya Identity
Conclusions: The Triple Challenge
Chapter Two: The Global Energy Dilemmas Nexus
Challenges to Global Energy Security
Dimensions of Energy Scarcity
Climate Change and the New Energy Paradigm
Globalization as the Missing Link
Conclusion: the Global Energy Dilemmas Nexus
Chapter Three: Sustaining Affluence: Energy Dilemmas in High-Energy Societies
Introduction
A Changing Relationship between Energy and Economy
Fossil Fuels Remain Dominant
The United States: Energy Independence and Climate Change Intransigence
Essential Characteristics of the US Energy System
The Pursuit of Energy Independence
Unconventional Solutions and Extreme Energy
Climate Change Policy by Stealth
The European Union: 20/20/20 Vision
On Target for Kyoto and Beyond?
Conclusions: A Transatlantic Divide
Chapter Four: Legacies and Liberalization: Energy Dilemmas in the Post-Socialist States
Introduction
The Characteristics and Legacies of the Soviet Planned Economy
Post-Socialist Transition, Recession, and Recovery
Russian Energy at the Crossroads
Gazprom Seeks Security of Demand
Russia Remains a Kyoto Skeptic
Conclusion: Does Post-Socialism Still Matter?
Chapter Five: Fueling Growth: Energy Dilemmas in the Emerging Economies
Introduction
Fueling the “Southern Engines of Growth”
China: Securing Energy for the Workshop of the World
MENA, Saudi Arabia and the Challenges to “Autocratic Oil'
Conclusions: Decarbonizing Demand Growth
Chapter Six: Energizing Development: Energy Dilemmas in the Developing World
Introduction
The Critical Role of Population Change
Big Issues rather than Key Countries
Energy Access: The Missing Millennium Goal
The Curse of the Oil-Rich Developing Economies
Conclusions: Energy for Development
Chapter Seven: Conclusions
Global Energy Dilemmas
Global Policy and Governance Challenges
Appendix: Country Classification
Bibliography
Index
End User License Agreement
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
List of Illustrations
Chapter One: Introduction
Figure 1.1 Global energy transitions, 1800–2008
Figure 1.2 The changing scale and structure of global energy
Figure 1.3 The relationship between energy use and GDP in 2008
Figure 1.4 Greenhouse gas emissions by sector and by activity
Figure 1.5 Changes in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, 1744–2008
Figure 1.6 Changes in average global temperature at the Earth's surface, 1880–2008
Figure 1.7 EIA analysis of impacts of the four Kaya factors on world carbon dioxide emissions, 1990–2035
Chapter Two: The Global Energy Dilemmas Nexus
Figure 2.1 Past and projected energy demand OECD and non-OECD
Figure 2.2 Historical trends in the world for crude oil price, 1861–2010
Figure 2.3 Cumulative carbon dioxide emissions, 1990–2007
Chapter Three: Sustaining Affluence: Energy Dilemmas in High-Energy Societies
Figure 3.1 OECD change in energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy use, 1980–2007
Figure 3.2 OECD oil balance, 1970–2010
Figure 3.3 The relationship between energy and economy in high-income and high-energy societies (2007)
Figure 3.4 Total primary energy supply per unit of GDP: US, OECD and EU
Figure 3.5 European gas pipelines
Chapter Four: Legacies and Liberalization: Energy Dilemmas in the Post-Socialist States
Figure 4.1 Trends in GDP per capita, CO
2
emissions per capita, and CO
2
intensity of the economy in the transition economies, 1990–2007
Figure 4.2 Annual GDP growth rates in CEBS and the CIS, 1989–2010
Figure 4.3 Changing energy intensity of selected transition economies, 1990–2008
Figure 4.4 Changing carbon intensity of energy use in selected transition economies, 1990–2007
Figure 4.5 The relationship between energy consumption and GDP per capita in the post-socialist states (2007)
Figure 4.6 Trends in GDP per capita, CO
2
emissions per capita, and CO
2
intensity of the economy in Russia, 1990–2008
Figure 4.7 Dynamics of Russian oil and gas production, 1985–2011
Chapter Five: Fueling Growth: Energy Dilemmas in the Emerging Economies
Figure 5.1 The relationship between energy consumption and GDP per capita, 2007
Figure 5.2 Population growth in CIBS, 1970–2050
Figure 5.3 Trends in the Human Development Index of CIBS, 1980–2011
Figure 5.4 Change in energy intensity in CIBS, 1990–2009
Figure 5.5 China's oil production and consumption, 1970--2011
Chapter Six: Energizing Development: Energy Dilemmas in the Developing World
Figure 6.1 The relationship between energy consumption and GDP per capita in the developing economies, 2007
Figure 6.2 Incremental levels of access to energy services
Figure 6.3 The Energy Development Index, 2011
Chapter Seven: Conclusions
Figure 7.1 The global governance challenge
List of Tables
Chapter One: Introduction
Table 1.1 Components of the contemporary energy system
Table 1.2 Regional variations in the global energy mix in 2006
Table 1.3 Greenhouse gases: sources and warming potential
Chapter Two: The Global Energy Dilemmas Nexus
Table 2.1 Current and future demographic trends
Table 2.2 Global energy dilemmas: a typology
Chapter Three: Sustaining Affluence: Energy Dilemmas in High-Energy Societies
Table 3.1 Kaya characteristics of high-energy societies
Chapter Four: Legacies and Liberalization: Energy Dilemmas in the Post-Socialist States
Table 4.1 The regional groupings of the EBRD
Table 4.2 Post-socialist states' Kyoto targets versus actual emissions in 2008
Table 4.3 Policy response to reduce high-energy intensity and unsustainable energy uses in the post-socialist states of the EU
Table 4.4 Central Europe and Baltics States' dependence on Russian natural gas imports, 2010
Table 4.5 Kaya characteristics of the post-socialist states
Table 4.6 Key energy-related indicators for Russia
Chapter Five: Fueling Growth: Energy Dilemmas in the Emerging Economies
Table 5.1 The Kaya characteristics of the emerging economies
Table 5.2 The changing global role of CIBS, 2000–2008 (percentage of global total)
Table 5.3 Change in per capita income in the CIBS group, 1980–2010 (GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $))
Table 5.4 Structure of GDP in CIBS, 1995 and 2009 (Percentage of GDP)
Table 5.5 Trends in per capita energy consumption in CIBS, 1980–2009 (kg of oil equivalent)
Table 5.6 CIBS total primary-energy consumption by fuel, 2011 (percentage of total consumption)
Table 5.7 The changing geography of China's oil imports
Table 5.8 The demographic characteristics of the MENA's oil-exporting states
Chapter Six: Energizing Development: Energy Dilemmas in the Developing World
Table 6.1 Share of key indicators by macro-region
Table 6.2 Kaya characteristics for selected developing economies
Table 6.3 Number and share of people without access to modern energy services in selected countries, 2009
Table 6.4 Oil-producing developing countries in 2011
Table 6.5 Oil- and gas-dependent developing economies
Chapter Seven: Conclusions
Table 7.1 Policy prescriptions for a low-carbon energy transition
Pages
cover
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For Sally and Lily
Global Energy Dilemmas
Energy Security, Globalization, and Climate Change
MICHAEL J. BRADSHAW
Copyright © Michael J. Bradshaw 2014
The right of Michael J. Bradshaw to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2014 by Polity Press
Polity Press
65 Bridge Street
Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press
350 Main Street
Malden, MA 02148, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-5064-7
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-5065-4(pb)
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-7214-4(epub)
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-7215-1(mobi)
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.politybooks.com
Figures, Tables, and Boxes
Figures
1.1
Global energy transitions, 1800–2008
1.2
The changing scale and structure of global energy
1.3
The relationship between energy use and GDP in 2008
1.4
Greenhouse gas emissions by sector and by activity
1.5
Changes in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, 1744–2008
1.6
Changes in average global temperature at the Earth's surface, 1880–2008
1.7
EIA analysis of impacts of the four Kaya factors on world carbon dioxide emissions, 1990–2035
2.1
Past and projected energy demand OECD and non-OECD
2.2
Historical trends in the world for crude oil price, 1861–2010
2.3
Cumulative carbon dioxide emissions, 1990–2007
3.1
OECD change in energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy use, 1980–2007
3.2
OECD oil balance, 1970–2010
3.3
The relationship between energy and economy in high-income and high-energy societies (2007)
3.4
Total primary energy supply per unit of GDP: US, OECD and EU
3.5
European gas pipelines
4.1
Trends in GDP per capita, CO
2
emissions per capita, and CO
2
intensity of the economy in the transition economies, 1990–2007
4.2
Annual GDP growth rates in CEBS and the CIS, 1989–2010
4.3
Changing energy intensity of selected transition economies, 1990–2008
4.4
Changing carbon intensity of energy use in selected transition economies, 1990–2007
4.5
The relationship between energy consumption and GDP per capita in the post-socialist states (2007)
4.6
Trends in GDP per capita, CO
2
emissions per capita, and CO
2
intensity of the economy in Russia, 1990–2008
4.7
Dynamics of Russian oil and gas production, 1985–2011
5.1
The relationship between energy consumption and GDP per capita, 2007
5.2
Population growth in CIBS, 1970–2050
5.3
Trends in the Human Development Index of CIBS, 1980–2011
5.4
Change in energy intensity in CIBS, 1990–2009
5.5
China's oil production and consumption, 1970--2011
6.1
The relationship between energy consumption and GDP per capita in the developing economies, 2007
6.2
Incremental levels of access to energy services
6.3
The Energy Development Index, 2011
7.1
The global governance challenge
Tables
1.1
Components of the contemporary energy system
1.2
Regional variations in the global energy mix in 2006
1.3
Greenhouse gases: sources and warming potential
2.1
Current and future demographic trends
2.2
Global energy dilemmas: a typology
3.1
Kaya characteristics of high-energy societies
4.1
The regional groupings of the EBRD
4.2
Post-socialist states' Kyoto targets versus actual emissions in 2008
4.3
Policy response to reduce high-energy intensity and unsustainable energy uses in the post-socialist states of the EU
4.4
Central Europe and Baltics States' dependence on Russian natural gas imports, 2010
4.5
Kaya characteristics of the post-socialist states
4.6
Key energy-related indicators for Russia
5.1
The Kaya characteristics of the emerging economies
5.2
The changing global role of CIBS, 2000–2008
5.3
Change in per capita income in the CIBS group, 1980–2010
5.4
Structure of GDP in CIBS, 1995 and 2009
5.5
Trends in per capita energy consumption in CIBS, 1980–2009
5.6
CIBS total primary-energy consumption by fuel, 2011
5.7
The changing geography of China's oil imports
5.8
The demographic characteristics of the MENA's oil-exporting states
6.1
Share of key indicators by macro-region
6.2
Kaya characteristics for selected developing economies
6.3
Number and share of people without access to modern energy services in selected countries, 2009
6.4
Oil-producing developing countries in 2011
6.5
Oil- and gas-dependent developing economies
7.1
Policy prescriptions for a low-carbon energy transition
Boxes
1.1
The Kaya Identity
Acronyms
BASIC
Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BRICS
Group of emerging economies consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, and China
CAIT
Climate Analysis Indicator Tools
CCS
Carbon Capture and Storage
CIBS
China, India, Brazil, and South Africa
CIS
Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPE
Centrally Planned Economy
EBRD
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ETS
Emissions Trading System
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
IOC
International Oil Companies
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
MENA
Middle East and North African states
NOC
National Oil Companies
OECD
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
OPEC
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PPP
Purchasing Power Parity
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WDI
World Development Indicators
Units
bcm
billion cubic metres
btu
British thermal units
mb/d
millions of barrels per day
mtCO
2
e
metric tons of CO
2
equivalent
ppm
parts per million
tcf
trillion cubic feet
tcm
trillion cubic metres
tCO
2
/toe
tons of carbon dioxide per ton of oil equivalent
Preface
My interest in energy issues goes back to my PhD studies at the University of British Columbia in the early 1980s. My PhD examined the relationship between East–West trade and the economic development of Siberia. The so-called “gas-for-pipe” deals that enabled the export of Siberia's natural gas to Western Europe and that became a source of disagreement between the US and Europe formed a major part of my study. At the time, Washington's concern was that Moscow would use Western Europe's growing reliance on Soviet gas imports for geopolitical gain. And 30 years later the Cold War is over, the Soviet Union is gone, and the map of Europe has been redrawn, but concerns still remain about the geopolitical manipulation of Russia's gas exports. While anxiety about energy security is not new, there are now two additional challenges that complicate the secure and affordable supply of energy. The first is the acceleration of globalization that has changed the geography of energy consumption and that is creating new sources of competition. The second is climate change that demands a dramatic reduction in the volume of greenhouse gas emissions from the global energy system to constrain global warming.
This book develops the global energy dilemmas framework to examine the interrelationship between energy security, globalization, and climate change. There is a large, and ever-expanding, literature on all three of these issues; but it is fair to say that the three knowledge communities still remain relatively isolated from one another. The emphasis in this book is upon the relationship between energy and economic development and its implications for climate change policy. This is not a detailed analysis of globalization; nor is it a study of climate change. Rather, it examines how the changing geopolitical economy of the global energy system is being driven by economic globalization, and explains how the changing geographies of the energy system are complicating climate change mitigation. A fundamental proposition of the analysis is that while the world faces a single global energy dilemma, which is explained in the introductory chapter, it is being played out in different ways across the globe. Thus, the challenges that face energy consumers in what I call the high-energy societies of the developed world are very different from those in the developing world who lack access to basic energy services. The analysis adopts a geographical perspective which maps out how the global energy dilemma varies across the major regions of the world, but which also seeks to explain how that geography complicates the interaction between energy security and climate change. Thus, geography is not just an outcome; an understanding of the spatial dimensions of the global energy dilemma is essential to overcoming the current gridlock in the negotiations on a global agreement for climate change policy.
Although the book presents a geographical analysis, it draws on a wide range of literature from a variety of disciplines. The aim is to draw together a breadth of analysis to generate new insights into the relationship of energy, economy, and environment. Thus, the originality lies in its breadth of coverage and intent to integrate analysis of some of the key challenges that confront human society today. The focus of the analysis is upon developments since 1990, which is the base year for the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the beginnings of the post-socialist transition. It also marks the beginnings of a step change in the rate of China's economic development.
I started work on this research project in the autumn of 2008, just months after the price of oil peaked at $147 a barrel, and just as the full extent of the global financial crisis was becoming apparent. These events were soon followed by the failure of the Copenhagen Summit to deliver a post-Kyoto agreement on climate change. Three further climate summits – Cancun, Durban, and Doha – have passed without agreement, as well as the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. Meanwhile, energy demand continues to grow and greenhouse gas emissions are increasing on a trajectory that will result in global warming well above the 2°C recognized as the desirable maximum. There have also been a number of events that have highlighted the vulnerability of the energy system. In January 2009, the second Russia–Ukraine gas dispute resulted in major supply disruptions in parts of Central and Southern Europe, and reinforced concerns about Russia's manipulation of energy exports for geopolitical gain. In April 2010, the blowout at BP's Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico highlighted the environmental risks associated with deep-water oil production. Less than a year later, in March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake triggered a tsunami that struck the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station on the northeastern coast of Japan. This disaster resulted in the eventual shutdown of all of Japan's 54 nuclear reactors that together account for about a third of Japan's electricity supply. Although a small number of power stations are now coming back online, the disaster has had global consequences – first, because Japan has had to import additional supplies of fossil fuels, and, second, because it has resulted in a worldwide rethink on the role of nuclear power as a low-carbon source of electricity for the future. Also in 2011, the so-called “Arab Spring” triggered renewed concerns about the stability of the political regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, many of whom are major oil and gas exporters. The widespread unrest brought regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, and a civil war in Libya that culminated in the death of Colonel Gadaffi. But the conflict in Syria continues and tensions remain as a result of Iran's nuclear ambitions. Furthermore, events in Algeria, in January 2013, have brought the world's attention to the continuing instability of much of North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, it is clear that the traditional concerns relating to fossil-fuel energy security remain and, one could argue, continue to take precedence over the need to address climate change. Furthermore, as the unconventional oil and gas revolution gathers pace in North America – with its less than positive implications for climate change – there is now a growing realization that increased US energy self-sufficiency may leave the emerging economies of Asia more reliant on their own diplomacy (and possibly military power) to secure oil and gas imports. Equally, the consequences of the global financial crisis have resulted in a renewed obsession with economic growth on the part of the developed economies, and recession has reduced the willingness and ability of governments to make investments to address climate change at home, let alone finance low-carbon development abroad. Understandably, the emerging and developing economies remain concerned that climate change mitigation will impose economic costs on them that might damage their prospects for economic development. But all the while the gap between the politics and economics of business as usual and what the climate change scientists tell us is required to mitigate climate change continues to grow. All of this suggests a need for new thinking about the relationship of energy security, globalization, and climate change. This is the research gap that this book seeks to fill.
The analysis presented here draws on a wide range of information sources and it is necessary to say a few words about the sources of statistical data that are used. Inevitably, research on energy and climate change relies on a lot of information about reserves, production, consumption, and emissions. Equally, analysis of economic development requires information on economic performance and standards of living. But any analysis that is global in scope runs into the problem that reliable and comparable data are not available for all of the countries of the world. To minimize these problems, information has been drawn from a few key sources and the reader is advised to visit the websites of these organizations to access the most recent data. Four online databases provide the bulk of the information presented in the various tables and discussed in the text. First is the World Bank Development Indicators database that can be accessed at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator>. Second is the World Resources Institute's Climate Analysis Indicators (CAIT) database that was available at: <http://www.wri.org/tools/cait/>. Unfortunately, in late 2012, the CAIT website suffered a malicious attack that took the site offline and resulted in a near-total loss of its file system and database. Hopefully, the damage will be repaired, as the CAIT database was an indispensable resource for the analysis of the Kaya characteristics used in the four regional studies. Third is the OECD's online OECD Factbook that is available at <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org>. The final publication is BP's Statistical Review of World Energythat is published on an annual basis and is available at <www.bp.com>, along with an associated workbook of historical statistics. The reference list provides further information on all the sources consulted in the conduct of this analysis.
Like the majority of the literature on energy security and climate change, reliance upon official statistics means that this analysis is overly state-centric. The tendency to see the global energy system in terms of energy-exporting and energy-importing states overstates the role of government and understates the role of companies. While the energy companies are not totally anonymous in the analysis, there is no doubt that more could be said about the role of the business sector in the provision and consumption of energy services. Equally, a lot more work needs to be done on understanding how government policy aimed at climate change mitigation can be translated into action on the part of the private sector, or in many cases state-owned enterprises. Such an approach to understanding energy and climate governance beyond a state-centric framework remains a work in progress that is essential to creating a more sustainable energy system.
The idea of “global energy dilemmas” was first conceived in the late 1990s in a first-year undergraduate course on global issues that I taught at the University of Birmingham. In my experience, good research ideas often originate in the classroom when seeking to explain complicated issues through robust frameworks. I thank all of the students at Birmingham, and Leicester, and, in the summer of 2012, the University of Oslo Social Studies Summer School for providing a sounding board for my ideas and analysis. The award of a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship in 2007 afforded me the time to embark on a major program of research and writing that has turned the global energy dilemmas framework into the current book, and I thank the Leverhulme Trust for their support. I would also like to thank Peter Daniels, Emeritus Professor of Geography at the University of Birmingham, Mick Dunford, Professor of Economic Geography at the University of Sussex, and Jonathan Stern, Professor and Chairman of the Natural Gas Programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, all of whom supported my Leverhulme application. I also acknowledge additional study leave granted by the University of Leicester when the Fellowship ran out and the book wasn't finished. More generally, I thank my colleagues in the Department of Geography at Leicester, particularly Ann and Vanessa. Now they can all see what I have been doing for the last five years when, most of the time, I wasn't in the department.
Many individuals have helped me in thinking through this project and in writing the book. Catherine Mitchell and Jim Watson, and the participants in the Energy Security in a Multipolar World Research Cluster, provided a stimulating forum for discussing energy issues. A late introduction to the UK Energy Research Centre has also proved interesting. My fellow geographers Gavin Bridge and Stefan Bouzarovski continue to provide intellectual support in our ongoing mission to convince geographers that energy is interesting. I thank Bill Tompson for his assistance with accessing key information sources, and Benjamin Sovacool for sharing his extensive e-library of articles on energy security. I also thank Michael Klare, who I met twice during the development of this project; during that time he wrote two books in less time than it has taken me to write one! The next one won't take me as long, but it's already late. Equally, I thank those outside of academe working on energy issues who have had to suffer me convincing them that geography really matters; John Mitchell and Anthony Froggatt at Chatham House, and Cho Khong at Shell, have all been willing to listen. I have also benefited from research support to help me pull together the materials used in this analysis. I thank Saska Petrova for her help on the energy dimensions of post-socialist transition and Murtala Chindo for his help with the energy and development literature. Over the final year of the project, Charlotte Nagy-Baker assisted by doing all those jobs that authors' tend to forget, creating the list of contents, checking the bibliography, proofreading, and producing the list of acronyms, etc. All of these tasks are time-consuming and her dedication to detail is much appreciated. Thank you also to Kerry Allen, Cartographic and Design Technician in the Department of Geography at Leicester, who drew all of the figures for the book. Louise Knight and David Winters at Polity Press provided support right through the writing and production process and did not complain as deadlines frequently passed. Although apprehensive of what they might say, I thank the reviewers who provided encouragement and some critical insights just when they were needed. Finally, I thank Sally and Lily for all their love and support, and apologize for all the lost weekends; I promise that I will finally sort out my office.
Chapter OneIntroduction
In 2007 the United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007a: 2 and 5) concluded that “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal” and that “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely [emphasis in original] due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHG) concentrations.” A year later in the introduction to their annual World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency (IEA 2008: 37) stated that “It is no exaggeration to claim that the future of human prosperity depends on how successfully we tackle two central energy challenges facing us today: securing the supply of reliable and affordable energy; and effecting a rapid transformation to a low-carbon, efficient and environmentally benign system of energy supply.” This book examines the interrelationships between energy security, globalization, and climate change. It proposes that we face a global energy dilemma: can we have secure, affordable, and equitable supplies of energy that are also environmentally benign? The starting point for this analysis is recognition that the way the global energy dilemma plays out differs greatly around the world and that globalization is a major reason for this geographical variation in the relationship between energy security and climate change. In the world in which we live access to energy services – for heating, lighting, cooking, cooling, transforming, transporting, and so on – is essential for survival. However, as we shall see, how we satisfy those energy needs and the absolute level of energy consumption varies greatly. Consequently, there is an increasingly complex relationship between energy consumption and economic development. There is also a more straightforward relationship between the number of people on the planet and the demand for energy services; put simply, more people means more demand for energy.
In combination, population growth and economic development are resulting in an ever-increasing demand for energy and at present the largest part of that demand is being met by burning fossil fuels. According to Baumert et al. (2005: 41), almost 61 percent of total anthropogenic GHG gas emissions (and almost 75 percent of carbon dioxide [CO2] emissions) come from energy-related activities, with the majority coming from fossil-fuel combustion. It is for this reason that energy policy is central to climate-change mitigation policies that aim to stabilize and then reduce the level of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. John P. Holden, Science and Technology Advisor to President Obama, explains the intimate relationship between energy, economy, and environment:
Without energy there is no economy. Without climate there is no environment. Without economy and environment there is no material wealth, no civil society, no personal or national security. And the problem is that we have been getting the energy our economy needs in ways that are wrecking the climate that our environment needs. (John P. Holdren, quoted in Ladislaw et al. 2009: 9)
This chapter provides the background needed to understand why we must confront the global energy dilemma and find ways of providing secure, affordable, and equitable access to energy supplies that do not promote further climate change or result in other forms of environmental degradation, such as oil spills, air and water scarcity and pollution, habitat destruction and the loss of biodiversity. The chapter begins by exploring the history of the fossil-fuel energy system. This is important for two reasons. First, in order to change the current system it is necessary to understand how it has developed. Second, there have already been a number of “energy transitions” within the fossil-fuel system and if we are to bring about a purposeful transition to a low carbon-energy system it is important to understand the nature of those earlier transitions. The second section examines the relationship between energy consumption and economic development, and introduces some of the key concepts and measures that are used in subsequent analysis. This is not a book about the science of climate change; however, the third section presents a brief review of our current understanding of the relationship between energy and climate change. The final section explains how the key “drivers” of population growth, economic development, and energy consumption interact to make energy strategy a key element of climate-change policy.
The Fossil-Fuel Energy System
Energy systems have five essential components: the primary energy sources that form the base of the system and that have not been subject to any conversion or transformation process, the range of technologies that are used to convert primary energy into secondary energy products and useful and usable energy, and the eventual energy services that are provided to the energy consumer (see table 1.1). It is demand for energy services that drives overall demand, but a range of different primary resources and secondary energy products can supply those services. Thus, for example, electricity can be generated on the basis of all of the primary energy resources listed in table 1.1 that comprise the current energy system. The process of decarbonization that requires that fossil fuels be replaced by low carbon sources, namely, nuclear power and renewable energy, lies at the heart of policies aimed at resolving the global energy dilemma.
Table 1.1 Components of the contemporary energy system
The current fossil-fuel energy system is a recent invention of human society. It was not until the seventeenth century that coal started to be substituted for wood to provide heat. Before then society was dependent on biomass and human muscle power and, following the invention of agriculture and the domestication of animals, certain animals, together with wind and water power. The resulting “somatic energy system” was basically a solar energy system managed by humans (Sieferle 2001). In this system the only important energy converters were biological ones (McNeil 2000). The system remained essentially unchanged for centuries and the development of society was linked to the fertility of arable land, access to water, and the productivity of the forest. Podobnik (2006: 21) maintains that the Industrial Revolution happened first in Britain because the increasing scarcity and cost of wood and charcoal made coal an economically viable alternative. Smil (2010: 29) adds that the falling cost of coal production was also an important part of the picture. Whatever the case, two limiting factors were that the coalmines were not located in close proximity to major markets and that mining activity was restricted by the problem of flooding. At the time, coal could only be moved short distances by horsepower and over longer distances by river, canal, and sea. Then a series of mutually reinforcing technological and social changes triggered the Industrial Revolution that fundamentally and permanently changed the relationship between energy, society, and the natural environment (Wrigley 2010).
In 1712, Thomas Newcomen invented a steam engine, which although incredibly inefficient, provided a solution to the problem of how to drain the coalmines. It was so inefficient, however, that it could only really be located at or very close to coalmines; thus, it could not provide motive power to the wider economy. That came with the further refinement of the steam engine, most famously by James Watt who patented his new steam engine in 1769. This more efficient engine gained wider application, particularly in the cotton industry. Parallel advances in ferrous metallurgy were also part of the story as they increased demand for coal to produce coke and the resultant steel provided the raw materials with which to build ever more efficient steam engines. In 1830, the first public railway from Liverpool to Manchester was opened, along which ran Stephenson's Rocket. The rapid expansion of the railway system provided more efficient and economic ways of moving coal and other raw materials that in turn further increased the demand for coal and made industry more mobile as it could now move away from its raw material sources, a process that spawned the industrial city. Authors such as Podobnik (2006) and Huber (2009) warn us against “energy determinism” and point out that this transition was only made possible by major changes in society. In the case of Britain, Podobnik argues that the emergence of a capitalist elite – individuals such as Matthew Boulton, the business partner of James Watt – was essential as it provided the capital needed to finance industrialization; at the same time, the expulsion of peasants from rural land provided the workforce for the new towns and factories. Thus, industrialization and urbanization went hand in hand and new cities grew to prominence, all of which drove ever-increasing demand not only for energy, but also raw materials, much of which were imported from Britain's colonies.
In 1800, Britain accounted for more than four fifths of the world's coal production and was the location of over 70 percent of the horsepower generated by steam engines, but the Industrial Revolution soon spread to Europe and then overseas to the colonies and Britain's prominence declined. According to Smil (2008), the tipping point in the transition to fossil fuels came in 1882, the year when the United States burned more oil than coal. The introduction of “town gas” as an alternative source of lighting to expensive whale oil, and also of coal and wood for heating and cooking, further increased demand for coal as the world's capitals turned to gas in 1812–25 (Davis 1984: 3). Just as coal and the steam engine were establishing themselves as the predominant energy source and prime mover, so oil emerged as a competing primary energy source. The oil age began on August 27, 1859, at Oil Creek, Pennsylvania, when “Colonel” E. L. Drake's workers penetrated 10 metres of rock and completed the world's first oil-producing well. As with coal, the industry soon spread and new centers emerged in places like Baku, the capital of modern-day Azerbaijan. Oil had a number of benefits over coal; its energy density (the amount of energy stored per unit of volume) is about 50 percent higher than standard coal, and it is also cleaner to use and easier to transport than coal. Its primacy was guaranteed at the end of the nineteenth century by the invention of the internal combustion engine. Both petrol and diesel engines fast became the prime movers of the automotive age and the lighter engines also made possible powered flight. But this did not mean that the age of coal was over. The invention of electricity and the steam turbine, which used coal to heat water to generate steam to drive turbines which generated electricity, meant that the process of electrification sustained demand for coal. Later developments and innovations saw the introduction of natural gas into the fossil-fuel energy mix, first in the United States in the 1930s and then in Europe in the 1970s. Alternatives to fossil-fuel power also emerged in the form of industrial-scale hydroelectric power and then nuclear power, the latter being used to drive steam turbines to generate electricity. Figure 1.1 shows how the global energy mix changed with the introduction of new sources of primary energy, as the resulting energy transitions brought about a relative change in the contribution of the different sources of energy, but in no case did the absolute amount of energy produced decline.
Figure 1.1 Global energy transitions, 1800–2008
Source: Data from Smil, V. (2010), Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Denver, CO: Praeger, p. 154.
The pace and scale of the fossil-fuel energy revolution is difficult to comprehend. Grübler (2004) has estimated that, in 1800, the world's population was roughly 1 billion people and total global energy use was approximately 20 exajoules (EJs). By 1900, world energy use had increased to 50 EJs and the population to 1.6 billion people; by the end of the twentieth century, energy use had raced to 430 EJ and the population to 6.1 billion. Thus, in 200 years, the population increased sixfold and energy use twentyfold. Figure 1.2 charts this exponential growth in energy use and the associated transitions in the energy mix from a coal-based system in the nineteenth century to petroleum-based system (oil and gas) in the twentieth century. Today, the world's primary energy mix is divided between oil, gas, coal, hydro, and nuclear power.
Figure 1.2 The changing scale and structure of global energy
Source: Data from Smil, V. (2010), Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Denver, CO: Praeger, p. 154.
The history of the energy system is usually described in terms of the concept of “energy transitions” that is based on the idea that a single energy source, or group of related energy sources, dominates the market during a particular period, eventually to be challenged and then replaced by a different source or group of related sources (Melosi 2010: 45; Grübler et al. 2012). From figure 1.2, we can see that the first transition involved the replacement of biomass (primarily wood) by coal as the dominant source of energy. The second transition involved the emergence of oil as the dominant energy source, which was later supplemented by natural gas. More recently, an increasingly diverse energy mix has emerged that is dominated by the three fossil fuels. According to table 1.2, these three fossil fuels accounted for 83.3 percent of total global primary energy supply in 2006. This table is particularly useful as it combines commercial energy sources with biomass and waste and the latter is usually excluded in energy statistics.
Table 1.2 Regional variations in the global energy mix in 2006 (Percentage of total primary energy supply)
The next energy transition should see those fossil fuels replaced by a variety of low carbon and renewable energy sources. However, for many years to come fossil fuels will still play an important role in the global energy mix. The other fact to consider is that this stylized history of the evolution of the global energy system is based on the experience of the developed economies. As is clear from table 1.2, there are considerable regional variations in the energy mix. In fact, one could argue that many of the low-income economies have yet to pass through the first energy transition, as biomass is still the dominant source of energy supply. Equally, some of the fastest-growing middle-income economies have an energy mix that is still dominated by coal; for example, in China in 2011 coal accounted for 70.3 percent of total primary energy consumption, and in India coal's share was 52.9 percent (BP 2012b: 41). These regional variations suggest that there is a relationship between the level of economic development, the amount of energy consumed, and the structure of the energy mix.
Energy and Economic Development
In general, it is accepted that there is a clear positive relationship between the level of economic development in a national economy or region and the amount of energy consumed (Yeager et al. 2012). Put simply, higher levels of economic activity drive higher levels of energy consumption. This relationship between energy and economic development is captured in a measure known as energy intensity, which represents the ratio between the total energy consumption of a region or country to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is important to remember that energy intensity is not a direct measure of energy efficiency, though improvements in efficiency obviously impact on energy intensity.
Figure 1.3 suggests a relatively straightforward relationship between energy and economic development; however, the relative position of countries, particularly the outliers, requires further investigation. Before delving into the detail, it is necessary to spend some time thinking about the exact nature and reliability of these two measures, particularly when looking at change over time and when making cross-country comparisons. The measure of energy used in calculations of energy intensity is usually primary commercial energy consumption, which by definition does not include the non-commercial use of biomass. As demonstrated by table 1.2, biomass and waste are important sources of energy in low-income economies; thus, this measure tends to underestimate the level of energy consumption in the developing world. That said, the absolute levels of energy consumption are very low compared to the developed world and therefore this has limited impact on the overall global level of energy consumption. There are also concerns about the use of GDP as a measure of the level of economic activity in a region or country. The World Energy Council (2010a: 12) maintains that it is very important to use a purchasing parity measure (PPP) of GDP that is based on the cost of a standard basket of goods and thus reduces the impact of exchange-rate distortions when converting national data into $US. This produces a more realistic measure of the level of economic activity in a given country and has the overall effect of increasing the relative level of activity in developing economies. That said, GDP is a measure of the formal economic activity that is captured by national accounting systems and, therefore, it does not include informal activity that can be very significant in many countries. The net result of these issues is that official data and the resultant measure of energy intensity may systematically understate both the level of energy consumption and economic activity in the developing world; but not to the extent that it would close the gap between the developed and developing economies. With these caveats in mind, what do the trends in energy intensity tell us about the relationship between energy and development?
Figure 1.3 The relationship between energy use and GDP in 2008
Source: World Bank Development Indicators Database.
There are sufficient outliers in figure 1.3 to suggest that at a given level of energy use or economic activity there is considerable cross-country variation; nonetheless, in general, there is a fairly robust relationship between the two variables. Figure 1.3 tells us nothing about the direction of the causality in the relationship; is it high levels of economic activity that drive higher energy consumption or vice versa? A review of economic research on this issue suggests that there is no consensus on the direction of causality, but that there is a clear positive relationship between the level of electricity consumption and the rate of economic growth in a given country (Ozturk 2010: 347). One of the reasons for the lack of clarity is the fact that a range of variables influences the energy intensity of a particular country or region. Smil (2003: 72) has suggested six variables that might explain energy intensity:
The degree of energy self-sufficiency.
The composition of primary energy supply.
Differences in economic structure.
Differences in discretionary personal consumption of energy.
Country size.
Climate.
Returning to figure 1.3, we can use these variables to explain the position of individual countries. The three outliers that have very high levels of energy consumption – Trinidad and Tobago, UAE, and Qatar – are all exporters of energy. Qatar, for example, is the world's leading exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), but it also has a small population and a high level of GDP. The liquefaction of LNG is itself an energy-intensive process, which, coupled with small population size, explains the high-energy consumption per capita of these energy-exporting countries. Luxembourg, by comparison, lacks indigenous energy resources, but is the most energy-intensive economy in the OECD, a position that is explained by its small population and a high standard of living. The other developed economies above the OECD average in terms of energy use are all energy- and resource-intensive economies, while the high levels of personal energy consumption and the size of the country can explain the position of the US. The group of OECD countries below the average in terms of energy consumption relative to GDP are all known to be relatively energy efficient, are net energy importers (particularly Japan), and some have a limited amount of heavy industry and manufacturing in their national economies. Countries such as Russia and Ukraine have a higher amount of energy consumption than their level of economic activity would suggest. This situation is a legacy of the Soviet centrally planned economy that was notoriously energy intensive (the reasons for this are discussed in chapter 4). In the bottom corner, we see a group of developing and emerging economies that have low levels of energy use per capita and correspondingly low levels of economic activity. However, the very large population of some of these economies means that their absolute levels of energy consumption are high. The variation along the vertical axis provides a measure of relative levels of per capita energy use. The ratio to the global average is +4:1 for North America compared to almost +2:1 for the European Union and −0.02 for sub-Saharan Africa.
By combining the analyses of energy transitions and patterns of energy intensity it is possible to suggest a simple stage model that relates energy to economic development. Elias and Victor (2005: 8) identify four stages. At an early stage of economic development, the dominance of relatively inefficient fuels and technology means that large inputs of energy are required for the production of output. The initial phase of the Industrial Revolution is representative of this stage. In the second stage, as economic development proceeds, more efficient fuels and technologies are adopted and the energy input per unit of output begins to decline. However, in the following third stage, a focus upon energy-intensive heavy industry and manufacturing may actually slow the reduction in energy intensity. As the result of de-industrialization, in the fourth stage there is a relative “de-coupling” of the relationship between energy use and economic growth. However, these so-called post-industrial economies have also benefited from the relocation of energy-intensive industries offshore and then the import of energy-intensive goods. Again, it is necessary to warn against being deterministic: this four-stage model, like the energy-transition concept, is a stylization based on the experience of the developed OECD economies, but there is no reason to assume that emerging and developing economies will follow the same path. Indeed, as explained in the following section, there is good reason to hope that they will not. Despite this health warning, BP (2012a: 13), in their Energy Outlook to 2030, suggest that there is a common pattern in relation to energy intensity: it increases as countries industrialize and the share of energy-intensive industry in GDP rises relative to other sectors; it then peaks and starts to decline as the nature of industry changes (from heavy and energy-intensive to lighter and higher value-added) and it becomes more energy efficient. Finally, it converges across countries as a result of energy trade, the use of common technologies, and similarities in consumption patterns.
It is true that year on year the global economy becomes more efficient at using energy to generate economic outputs. As Smil (2003: 68) has noted, it is not possible to construct a reliable historical trend for global energy intensity, but there is ample evidence of the processes that drive declining energy intensities in the developed economies. In the United States, the most energy profligate of all countries, energy intensity fell by more than half between 1949 and 2004 (US Department of Energy 2012). In the European Union (EU-25), between 1990 and 2008, total energy intensity fell at an average rate of 1.6 percent, though there are substantial national differences (European Environment Agency 2010). What these trends suggest is that once an economy reaches the post-industrial stage its energy demand tends to level off and, if it sustains economic growth, its energy intensity declines; in some cases the total amount of energy consumed is also starting to decline. But, as noted above, countries can only do this if they are able to move energy-intensive industries offshore and import energy-intensive goods instead. The production of those energy-intensive goods has relocated to countries like China and India, and is one of the reasons why they are in a more energy-intensive phase of development (Peters et al. 2011).
Given what has been said about the relationship between energy consumption and economic development, it follows that the energy intensity of countries varies in large part in relation to the level of economic development (measured as GDP) or the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI). Just as there are huge variations in the level of wealth and income across the globe, so there are variations in the level of energy consumption. According to Gaye (2007: 2), “on average, the poorest 2.5 billion people in the world use only 0.2 toe per capita annually, while the billion richest people use 5 toe per capita a year, which is 25 times more.” At present, about 2.5 billion people, mostly in developing countries, still rely on traditional biomass fuels for cooking and 1.6 billion people lack access to electricity. Thus, the lack of access to energy services – energy poverty – is seen as a key aspect of the development challenge (this is the subject of chapter 6) and it highlights the fact that the relationship between energy and development is very different across the countries and regions that comprise the global energy system.
Energy and Climate Change
From the discussion so far, it is evident that over the last two centuries there has been a dramatic change in the relationship between energy and the development of human society. The harnessing of a geological storehouse of the sun's energy via the evolution of the fossil-fuel system has enabled unimaginable advances in the quality of living for many on the planet. Unfortunately, this fossil-fueled economic miracle has come at considerable ecological cost; so much so that many scientists now describe the current era as a new geological epoch known as the “Anthropocene,” as the scale of human impact on the environment is such that it is now reshaping the planet (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Syvitski 2012).
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, “we have been getting the energy our economy needs in ways that are wrecking the climate that our environment needs” (Holdren, in Ladislaw et al. 2009: 9). Climate change is not the only environmental problem related to energy production and consumption, but most of the others are limited to relatively small areas of the planet, though challenges such as acid rain are international in their impact. Climate change, by comparison, is global in its causes and consequences and therefore requires global action to combat it (Barnett 2007). While a minority remains skeptical, the vast majority of the scientific and policymaking community accepts that anthropogenic climate change is real, already happening, and that immediate action is required to mitigate its causes and to adapt to its consequences. This is not a book about the science of climate change; nor does it delve into the detail of climate-change policy and its economics (Stern 2007) and politics (see Giddens 2012); rather, it is concerned with the relationship between energy production and consumption, on the one hand, and economic development, on the other hand, and the ways that both contribute to climate change and are influenced by policies introduced to mitigate the causes of climate change. This approach is explained in more detail in the next chapter. For the moment, our concern is with the role of the energy system as a source of the greenhouse gases (hereafter GHGs) that are a major cause of climate change.
In their Synthesis Report, the IPCC (2007b: 30) defines climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.” They note that this general definition, which includes natural variations in climate, differs from that adopted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) where Article 1 states that climate change is “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is additional to nature’s climate variability observed over comparable time period.” Thus, the UNFCCC defines “climate change” as being anthropogenic, the result of human actions, which is seen as distinct from “climate variability” that is attributable to natural causes (Dow and Downing 2007: 15). Hereafter, the term “climate change” follows the UNFCCC convention and refers to climate change that results from human activity. The term “global warming” is often used as an alternative to “climate change,” but a warming climate has quite different consequences across the globe. The IPCC
