Guidelines for Combustible Dust Hazard Analysis E-Book
114,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Sprache: Englisch
This book describes how to conduct a Combustible Dust Hazard Analysis (CDHA) for processes handling combustible solids. The book explains how to do a dust hazard analysis by using either an approach based on compliance with existing consensus standards, or by using a risk based approach. Worked examples in the book help the user understand how to do a combustible dust hazards analysis.
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 305
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017
Ähnliche
This book is one in a series of process safety and guideline and concept books published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Please go to www.wiley.com/go/ccps for a full list of titles in this series.
GUIDELINES FOR COMBUSTIBLE DUST HAZARD ANALYSIS
CENTER FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS NEW YORK, NY
Copyright © 2017 by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Inc. All rights reserved.
Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.
A Joint Publication of the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Published simultaneously in Canada.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, fax (978) 750-4470, or on the web at www.copyright.com. Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, (201) 748-6011, fax (201) 748-6008, or online at http://www.wiley.com/go/permission.
Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and author have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives or written sales materials. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a professional where appropriate. Neither the publisher nor author shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
For general information on our other products and services or for technical support, please contact our Customer Care Department within the United States at (800) 762-2974, outside the United States at (317) 572-3993 or fax (317) 572-4002.
Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic formats. For more information about Wiley products, visit our web site at www.wiley.com.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.
ISBN: 978-1-119-01016-6
It is our sincere intention that the information presented in this document will lead to an even more impressive safety record for the entire industry; however, neither the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers officers and directors, warrant or represent, expressly or by implication, the correctness or accuracy of the content of the information presented in this document. As between (1) AIChE, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers officers and directors, and (2) the user of this document, the user accepts any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequence of its use or misuse.
Contents
Cover
Series
Title
Copyright
Information
Contents
List of Tables
List of Figures
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Glossary
Acknowledgments
Preface
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose of Book
1.2 Book Road Map
1.3 References
2. Background
2.1 Nature of the Dust Fire and Explosion Problem
2.1.1 Dust Explosion Statistics
2.1.2 Case Study: Hoeganaes Corporation
Findings and Lessons
2.2 Requirements for Dust Fires and Explosions
2.2.1 Layer Fire.
2.2.2 Flash Fires and Explosions
2.3 Combustibility and Explosivity Parameters
2.3.1 Explosibility Screening Test
2.3.2 Deflagration Index, K
St
(bar-m/sec)
2.3.3 Maximum Pressure, P
max
(Bar)
2.3.4 Minimum Explosible Concentration, MEC (g/m
3
)
2.3.5 Minimum Ignition Energy, MIE (mJoules, mJ)
2.3.6 Minimum Auto Ignition Temperature, Cloud, MAIT (°C)
2.3.7 Layer Ignition Temperature, LIT (°C)
2.3.8 Limiting Oxygen Concentration, LOC (vol% O
2
)
2.3.9 Volume Resistivity (Ohm-m)
2.4 Comparison to Combustible Vapors
2.5 Effect of Parameters
2.6 Summary
2.7 References
3. The Hazards Within – Dust Inside Equipment
3.1 Methods of Prevention, Protection, Mitigation
3.1.1 Ignition Control
3.1.2 Inerting/Oxidant Control
3.1.3 Combustible Concentration Control
3.1.4 Deflagration Venting
3.1.5 Deflagration Suppression
3.1.6 Containment
3.1.7 Deflagration Isolation
3.2 Issues
3.2.1 Air/Material Separators
3.2.2 Size Reduction Equipment (grinders, mills, etc.)
3.2.3 Dryers
3.2.4 Silos/Hoppers
3.2.5 Portable Containers
3.2.6 Conveyors
3.2.7 Blenders/Mixers
3.2.8 Feeding into Vessels Having Flammable Vapor Atmospheres
3.3 Summary
3.4 References
4. Hazards of Dust External to Equipment
4.1 Case Study – Imperial Sugar
4.2 Issues Inside a Room or Building
4.3 Methods of Prevention and Protection
4.3.1 Control of Dust Deposits Outside of Equipment
4.3.2 Ignition Control
4.3.3 Damage Limiting Construction
4.4 Summary
4.5 References
5. Traditional Approach to Hazard Assessment and Control
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Process Safety Information (PSI)
5.1.2 Competent Team
5.2 Steps to the Traditional Approach
5.2.1 Step 1 – Is a combustible dust involved?
5.2.2 Step 2 – Determine Which Standards Apply
5.2.3 Step 3 - Determine Where Fire/Explosion Hazards Exist
5.2.4 Step 4 – Review Unit Operation vs. Standard Requirements for Prevention and Mitigation of Fires/Explosions
5.2.5 Step 5 – Make Recommendations
5.2.6 Step 6 – Document the DHA
5.2.7 Step 7 – Implement the Recommendations
5.3 Summary
5.4 References
6. Risk-based Approach to Dust Hazard Analysis
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Technique for a Risk-based DHA
6.2.1 Step 1: Identify Failure Scenarios
6.2.2 Step 2: Evaluate the Consequences
6.2.3 Step 3: Are the Consequences Tolerable?
6.2.4 Step 4: Estimate Likelihood and Risk
6.2.5 Step 5: Is the Risk Tolerable
6.2.6 Step 6: Recommend and Evaluate Solutions
6.2.7 Step 7: Is the Mitigated Risk Tolerable?
6.2.8 Step 8: Document Results
6.3 DHA Risk Assessment, Additional Requirements
6.3.1 DHA Leader Competency
6.3.2 Documentation
6.4 Managing Change and Updating Risk Assessment
6.5 Summary
6.6 References
7. Special Considerations: Combustible Dust Issues in Existing Facilities
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Existing Facilities and Combustible Dusts
7.2.1 Potential Issues
7.2.2 Issues Impact
7.2.3 Precautions
7.3 Summary
7.4 References
8. Worked Examples
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Example 1
8.2.1 Process Description – Example 1
8.2.2 Traditional DHA – Example 1
8.2.3 Risk-based DHA – Example 1
8.2.4 Comparison of Traditional vs. Risk-based Approach – Example 1
8.3 Example 2
8.3.1 Process Description 2
8.3.2 Traditional DHA
8.3.3 Risk-based DHA
8.3.4 Comparison of Traditional vs. Risk-based Approach – Example 2
8.4 Example 3
8.4.1 Process Description – Example 3
8.4.2 Traditional DHA – Example 3
8.4.3 Risk-based DHA – Example 3
8.5 Summary
8.6 References
Appendix A Regulations and Codes
A.1 Regulations
A.1.1 U.S.
A.1.2 International
A.2 Codes
References
Appendix B Additional Resources
B.1 Books
B.2 U.S. Chemical Safety Board Reports
B.3 Journal Articles
B.4 Other
Appendix C Data for Risk-based DHA
C.1 Probability Assessment of Process Unit Fire or Dust Explosion
C.1.1 Initiating Event Frequencies
C.1.2 Ignition Probabilities
C.1.3 Protection Layer PFDs
C.2 References
Appendix D Good Practices
D.1 Self Assessment
D.2 Housekeeping
D.2.1 Combustible Dust Housekeeping Inspection Checklist
D.3 Explosion Protection Methods
Appendix E DHA Roadmap
Notes for Figure E.1
Index
Eula
Guide
Cover
Contents
1 Introduction
Pages
C1
ii
iii
iv
v
xiii
xiv
xv
xvii
xviii
xix
xx
xxi
xxii
xxiii
xxiv
xxv
xxvi
xxvii
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
219
220
221
223
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
GLOSSARY
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PREFACE
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose of Book
1.2 Book Road Map
1.3 References
2. Background
2.1 Nature of the Dust Fire and Explosion Problem
2.1.1 Dust Explosion Statistics
2.1.2 Case Study: Hoeganaes Corporation
Findings and Lessons
2.2 Requirements for Dust Fires and Explosions
2.2.1 Layer Fire.
2.2.2 Flash Fires and Explosions
2.3 Combustibility and Explosivity Parameters
2.3.1 Explosibility Screening Test
2.3.2 Deflagration Index, K
St
(bar-m/sec)
2.3.3 Maximum Pressure, P
max
(Bar)
2.3.4 Minimum Explosible Concentration, MEC (g/m
3
)
2.3.5 Minimum Ignition Energy, MIE (mJoules, mJ)
2.3.6 Minimum Auto Ignition Temperature, Cloud, MAIT (°C)
2.3.7 Layer Ignition Temperature, LIT (°C)
2.3.8 Limiting Oxygen Concentration, LOC (vol% O
2
)
2.3.9 Volume Resistivity (Ohm-m)
2.4 Comparison to Combustible Vapors
2.5 Effect of Parameters
2.6 Summary
2.7 References
3. The Hazards Within – Dust Inside Equipment
3.1 Methods of Prevention, Protection, Mitigation
3.1.1 Ignition Control
3.1.2 Inerting/Oxidant Control
3.1.3 Combustible Concentration Control
3.1.4 Deflagration Venting
3.1.5 Deflagration Suppression
3.1.6 Containment
3.1.7 Deflagration Isolation
3.2 Issues
3.2.1 Air/Material Separators
3.2.2 Size Reduction Equipment (grinders, mills, etc.)
3.2.3 Dryers
3.2.4 Silos/Hoppers
3.2.5 Portable Containers
3.2.6 Conveyors
3.2.7 Blenders/Mixers
3.2.8 Feeding into Vessels Having Flammable Vapor Atmospheres
3.3 Summary
3.4 References
4. Hazards of Dust External to Equipment
4.1 Case Study – Imperial Sugar
4.2 Issues Inside a Room or Building
4.3 Methods of Prevention and Protection
4.3.1 Control of Dust Deposits Outside of Equipment
4.3.2 Ignition Control
4.3.3 Damage Limiting Construction
4.4 Summary
4.5 References
5. Traditional Approach to Hazard Assessment and Control
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Process Safety Information (PSI)
5.1.2 Competent Team
5.2 Steps to the Traditional Approach
5.2.1 Step 1 – Is a combustible dust involved?
5.2.2 Step 2 – Determine Which Standards Apply
5.2.3 Step 3 - Determine Where Fire/Explosion Hazards Exist
5.2.4 Step 4 – Review Unit Operation vs. Standard Requirements for Prevention and Mitigation of Fires/Explosions
5.2.5 Step 5 – Make Recommendations
5.2.6 Step 6 – Document the DHA
5.2.7 Step 7 – Implement the Recommendations
5.3 Summary
5.4 References
6. Risk-based Approach to Dust Hazard Analysis
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Technique for a Risk-based DHA
6.2.1 Step 1: Identify Failure Scenarios
6.2.2 Step 2: Evaluate the Consequences
6.2.3 Step 3: Are the Consequences Tolerable?
6.2.4 Step 4: Estimate Likelihood and Risk
6.2.5 Step 5: Is the Risk Tolerable
6.2.6 Step 6: Recommend and Evaluate Solutions
6.2.7 Step 7: Is the Mitigated Risk Tolerable?
6.2.8 Step 8: Document Results
6.3 DHA Risk Assessment, Additional Requirements
6.3.1 DHA Leader Competency
6.3.2 Documentation
6.4 Managing Change and Updating Risk Assessment
6.5 Summary
6.6 References
7. Special Considerations: Combustible Dust Issues in Existing Facilities
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Existing Facilities and Combustible Dusts
7.2.1 Potential Issues
7.2.2 Issues Impact
7.2.3 Precautions
7.3 Summary
7.4 References
8. Worked Examples
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Example 1
8.2.1 Process Description – Example 1
8.2.2 Traditional DHA – Example 1
8.2.3 Risk-based DHA – Example 1
8.2.4 Comparison of Traditional vs. Risk-based Approach – Example 1
8.3 Example 2
8.3.1 Process Description 2
8.3.2 Traditional DHA
8.3.3 Risk-based DHA
8.3.4 Comparison of Traditional vs. Risk-based Approach – Example 2
8.4 Example 3
8.4.1 Process Description – Example 3
8.4.2 Traditional DHA – Example 3
8.4.3 Risk-based DHA – Example 3
8.5 Summary
8.6 References
Appendix A Regulations and Codes
A.1 Regulations
A.1.1 U.S.
A.1.2 International
A.2 Codes
References
Appendix B Additional Resources
B.1 Books
B.2 U.S. Chemical Safety Board Reports
B.3 Journal Articles
B.4 Other
Appendix C Data for Risk-based DHA
C.1 Probability Assessment of Process Unit Fire or Dust Explosion
C.1.1 Initiating Event Frequencies
C.1.2 Ignition Probabilities
C.1.3 Protection Layer PFDs
C.2 References
Appendix D Good Practices
D.1 Self Assessment
D.2 Housekeeping
D.2.1 Combustible Dust Housekeeping Inspection Checklist
D.3 Explosion Protection Methods
Appendix E DHA Roadmap
Notes for Figure E.1
INDEX
List of Tables
Appendix C
Table C.1.
Table C2.
Table C.3.
Table C.4.
Table C.5.
Table C.6.
Table C.7.
Table C.8.
Appendix D
Table D.1.
Chapter 2
Table 2.1
Table 2.2.
Table 2.3.
Table 2.4.
Chapter 3
Table 3.1.
Chapter 4
Table 4.1
Table 4.2.
Chapter 6
Table 6.1.
TABLE 6.3.
Table 6.5.
Chapter 8
Table 8.1.
Table 8.2.
Table 8.3.
Table 8.4.
Table 8.5.
Table 8.6.
Table 8.7.
Table 8.8.
Table 8.9
Table 8.10
Table 8.11.
Table 8.12.
Table 8.13.
Table 8.14.
Table 8.15.
Table 8.16.
Table 8.17
Table 8.18
Table 8.19
Table 8.20.
Table 8.21.
Table 8.22.
Table 8.23.
Table 8.24.
Table 8.25.
Table 8.26.
Table 8.27.
Table 8.28.
Table 8.29.
Table 8.30.
Table 8.31.
Table 8.32.
Table 8.33.
Table 8.34.
Table 8.35.
Table 8.36.
Table 8.37.
Table 8.38.
Table 8.39.
Table 8.40.
Table 8.41.
Table 8.42.
Table 8.43.
Table 8.44.
Table 8.45.
Table 8.46.
Table 8.47.
List of Illustrations
Appendix D
Figure D.1
Example Housekeeping Data Collection Sheet (source, Rodgers, Sam, Application of the NFPA 654 Dust Layer Thickness Criteria—Recognizing the Hazard, Process Safety Progress, V. 31, No. 1, March 2012.)
Figure D.2
Selection method for explosion protection
Appendix E
Figure E.1.
Roadmap through DHA process
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1.
Dust Incidents, injuries and fatalities, 1980–2005 (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.2.
Percent of incidents by industry (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.3.
Fine product collected from the Hoeganaes plant (penny shown for scale) (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.4.
Scene of January 2011 incident. (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.5.
Mounds of iron dust along elevated surfaces at the Hoeganaes plant, February 3, 2011. (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.6.
Iron dust on rafters and overhead surfaces, February 3, 2011. (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.7.
Hole in 4-inch piping after the May 27, 2011 incident. (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.8.
The fire triangle (Crowl 2011)
Figure 2.9.
Effect of surface area-to-mass ratios (Courtesy PSP)
Figure 2.10.
Flash fire square.
Figure 2.11.
Dust Explosion Pentagon (PSP, CEP)
Figure 2.12.
Secondary dust explosion (Courtesy OSHA)
Figure 2.13.
Dust accumulations at Imperial Sugar (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.14.
Damage at Imperial sugar (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.15.
DeBruce grain elevator after explosion (Taveau 2012)
Figure 2.16.
Schematic of 20 L Sphere (Courtesy Kuhner AG)
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1.
Motor cooling fins and fan guard covered with sugar dust, large piles of sugar cover the floor, Courtesy CSB
Figure 4.2.
Imperial Sugar Refinery. Courtesy CSB
Figure 4.3.
Imperial Sugar refinery after the explosion
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1a.
GESTIS Database search results for paraformaldehyde.
Figure 5.1b.
GESTIS Database search results for paraformaldehyde, < 23 µm.
Figure 5.1c.
GESTIS Database search results for paraformaldehyde, 560 µm.
Figure 5.2.
Example Process Flow Diagram
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1.
Technique for Selecting the Design Bases for Process Safety Systems (adapted from
Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures
(CCPS 1998)).
Figure 6.2.
Example Qualitative Risk Matrix Example (CCPS 2008)
Chapter 6
Figure 8.1.
Example 1, Simple grinding process.
Figure 8.2.
Example 1, Simple grinding process with nodes identified
Figure 8.3.
Risk Matrix for worked examples (CCPS 2008).
Figure 8.3.
Grinder line feeding stirred vessel.
Figure 8.4.
Spray Dryer PFD
Pages
C1
ii
iii
iv
v
xiii
xv
xvii
xviii
xix
xx
xxi
xxii
xxiii
xxiv
xxv
xxvi
xxvii
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
47
48
50
51
52
53
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
74
75
76
77
80
81
82
83
84
85
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
183
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
219
220
221
223
224
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1 Particulate Materials involved in Reported Dust Explosions
Table 2.2. Secondary explosion incidents (Frank 2004 and Taveau 2006)
Table 2.3 Dust Hazard classes
Table 2.4 Parameter/Property Influence on Risk of Dust Explosibility
Table 3.1. Equipment Involved in Dust Explosions
Table 4.1 Division Determination Guidelines Based on Dust Layer Thickness
Table 4.2. Unscheduled Housekeeping
Table 6.1. Losses by Cause (Ignition Source)
TABLE 6.2. Consequence Categories for Qualitative Risk Matrix in Figure 6.2
TABLE 6.3. Frequency Categories for Qualitative Risk Matrix in Figure 6.2
TABLE 6.4. Risk Ranking/Response Categories for Qualitative Risk Matrix in Figure 6.2
Table 6.5. Example Risk Assessment documentation
Table 8.1. Hazard Properties for Example 1
Table 8.2. Node 1 – Traditional DHA, Bulk Bag Unloading
Table 8.3. Node 2 – Traditional DHA, Feed Hopper
Table 8.4. Node 3 - Traditional DHA, Hammer Mill
Table 8.5. Node 4 - Traditional DHA, Cyclone
Table 8.6. Node 5 – Traditional DHA, Dust Collector
Table 8.7. Node 6 – Traditional DHA, Product Hopper
Table 8.8. Node 7 – Traditional DHA, Packaging Unit
Table 8.9 Node 8 – Traditional DHA, Fugitive Dust Collector
Table 8.10 Node 9 – Traditional DHA, Enclosures/Rooms
Figure 8.3. Risk Matrix for worked examples (CCPS 2008).
Table 8.11. Consequence Categories for Risk Matrix Example in Figure 8.3.
Table 8.12. Frequency Categories for Risk Matrix Example in Figure 8.3.
Table 8.13. Node 1A - Risk-based DHA, Bulk Bag unloading
Table 8.14. Node 1B - Risk-based DHA, Bulk Bag unloading
Table 8.15. Node 2A - Risk-based DHA, Feed Hopper
Table 8.16. Node 2B - Risk-based DHA, Feed Hopper
Table 8.17 - Node 3A - Risk-based DHA, Hammer Mill
Table 8.18 - Node 3B - Risk-based DHA, Hammer Mill
Table 8.19 - Node 3C - Risk-based DHA, Hammer Mill
Table 8.20. Node 4A - Risk-based DHA, Cyclone
Table 8.21. Node 4B - Risk-based DHA, Cyclone
Table 8.22. Node 4C - Risk-based DHA, Cyclone
Table 8.23. Node 4D - Risk-based DHA, Cyclone
Table 8.24. Node 5A - Risk-based DHA, Dust Collector
Table 8.25. Node 5B - Risk-based DHA, Dust Collector
Table 8.26. Node 5C - Risk-based DHA, Dust Collector
Table 8.27. Node 5D - Risk-based DHA, Dust Collector
Table 8.28. Node 5E - Risk-based DHA, Dust Collector
Table 8.29. Node 6A - Risk-based DHA, Product Hopper
Table 8.30. Node 6B - Risk-based DHA, Product Hopper
Table 8.31. Node 7A - Risk-based DHA, Packaging Unit
Table 8.32. Node 7B - Risk-based DHA, Packaging Unit
Table 8.33. Node 7C - Risk-based DHA of Packaging Unit
Table 8.34. Node 8A - Risk-based DHA, Fugitive Dust Collector
Table 8.35. Node 8B - Risk-based DHA, Fugitive Dust Collector
Table 8.36. Node 9A - Risk-based DHA, Feed Hopper Room
Table 8.37. Node 9B, Risk-based DHA - Feed Hopper Room
Table 8.38. Selected Physical Properties of Methanol
Table 8.39. Node 6 - Traditional DHA, Product Hopper
Table 8.40. Node 7 - Traditional DHA, Mix Tank
Table 8.41. Node 6C - Risk-based DHA, Product Hopper
Table 8.42. Node 7A - Risk-based DHA, Mix Tank
Table 8.43. Node 1 - Traditional DHA of Spray Dryer
Table 8.44. Node 1A - Risk-based DHA of Spray Dryer
Table 8.45. Node 1B, Risk-based DHA, Spray Dryer
Table 8.46. Node 1C - Risk-based DHA, Spray Dryer
Table 8.47. Node 1D - Risk-based DHA, Spray Dryer
Table C.1. Probability Assessment of Fire or Explosion in a Process Unit (adapted from Dahn et al. 2000)
Table C2. Probability Matrix for Table C.1
Table C.3. Initiating Event Frequencies
Table C.4. Effectiveness of ignition source controls. (Daycock and Rew 2004)
Table C.5. Ignition probability vs. MIE (Howat 2006)
Table C.6 Ignition sensitivity guidance (VDI 2007)
Table C.7. Ignition ease criteria (Dahn, et al, 2000)
Table C.8. Protection layer PFDs
Table D.1. Combustible Dust Housekeeping Inspection Checklist
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1. Dust Incidents, injuries and fatalities, 1980–2005 (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.2. Percent of incidents by industry (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.3. Fine product collected from the Hoeganaes plant (penny shown for scale) (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.4. Scene of January 2011 incident. (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.5. Mounds of iron dust along elevated surfaces at the Hoeganaes plant, February 3, 2011. (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.6. Iron dust on rafters and overhead surfaces, February 2011. (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.7. Hole in 4-inch piping after the May 27, 2011 incident. (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.8. The fire triangle (Crowl 2011)
Figure 2.9. Effect of surface area-to-mass ratios (Courtesy PSP)
Figure 2.10. Flash fire square
Figure 2.11. Dust Explosion Pentagon (PSP, CEP)
Figure 2.12. Secondary dust explosion (Courtesy of OSHA)
Figure 2.13. Dust accumulations at Imperial Sugar (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.14. Damage at Imperial sugar (Courtesy CSB)
Figure 2.15. DeBruce grain elevator after explosion (Taveau 2012)
Figure 2.16. Schematic of 20 L Sphere (Courtesy Kuhner AG)
Figure 4.1. Motor cooling fins and fan guard covered with sugar dust, large piles of sugar cover the floor, Courtesy CSB
Figure 4.2. Imperial Sugar Refinery. Courtesy CSB
Figure 4.3. Imperial Sugar refinery after the explosion
Figure 5.1a. GESTIS Database search results for paraformaldehyde.
Figure 5.1b. GESTIS Database search results for paraformaldehyde, < 23 µm
Figure 5.1c. GESTIS Database search results for paraformaldehyde, 560 µm
Figure 5.2. Example Process Flow Diagram
Figure 6.1 Technique for Selecting the Design Bases for Process Safety Systems (adapted from
Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures
(CCPS 1998))
Figure 8.1. Example 1, Simple grinding process
Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.3.
Figure 8.3. Grinder line feeding stirred vessel
Figure 8.4. Spray Dryer PFD
Figure D.1.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AIChE
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
ALARP
As Low as Reasonably Practicable
ASTM
American Society for Testing and Materials
BPCS
Basic Process Control System
CSB
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
CCPS
Center for Chemical Process Safety
DHA
Dust Hazard Analysis
FIBC
Flexible Intermediate Bulk Container
FRPPE
Fire Retardant Personnel Protective Equipment
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability Study
HIRA
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
LFL
Lower Flammable Limit
LOC
Limiting Oxygen Concentration
LOPA
Layer of Protection Analysis
MEC
Minimum Explosible Concentration
MIE
Minimum Ignition Energy
MAIT
Minimum Auto Ignition Temperature of a Dust Cloud
MOC
Management of Change
MOOC
Management of Organizational Change
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association
OSHA
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PFD
Probability of Failure on Demand
PFD
Process Flow Diagram
PHA
Process Hazard Analysis
PSI
Process Safety Information
PSM
Process Safety Management
RBPS
Risk-based Process Safety
RIBC
Rigid Intermediate Bulk Container
SCAI
Safety Controls Alarms and Interlocks
SDS
Safety Data Sheet
SHE
Safety, Health and Environmental
SFPE
Society of Fire Protection Engineers
SHIB
Safety Hazard Information Bulletin
SIS
Safety Instrumented Systems
SME
Subject Matter Expert
UFL
Upper Flammable Limit
UK
United Kingdom
U.S.
United States
