Guidelines for Managing Abnormal Situations E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 335

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022

Beschreibung

The book discusses why management of abnormal situations is important to process safety. The book provides guidance on practical steps to avoid or mitigate an accident or incident before it escalates into a more dangerous and costly issues which can include downtime, lost production, equipment damage, injuries, and external/ environmental damage. Through the use of case studies the book illustrates the impact these deviant occurrences can have on operating facilities. Management principles that can be established before an issue occurs are presented while case studies are used to illustrate the impact that an abnormal situation can have on an operating facility. The impact of plant design are detailed, with separate focus points on new plant design and retrofits to existing plants. A section on writing plant procedures and plant policies so that they incorporate the principles of managing abnormal situations is also included. Training content is provided on how to manage deviant situations, with guidance on presenting the information to specific target populations, such as front-line operators, operations managers, plant engineers, and process safety engineers. Readers are also shown tools that are currently available for recognizing and responding to abnormal situations, and actions that process safety engineers can use during Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA).

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

TITLE PAGE

COPYRIGHT

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF EXAMPLE INCIDENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS:

GLOSSARY

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

PREFACE

DEDICATION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE BOOK

1.2 WHAT ARE ABNORMAL SITUATIONS?

1.3 THE BUSINESS CASE FOR MANAGING ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

1.4 CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

2 PROCESS SAFETY AND MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

2.1 IMPACT ON PROCESS SAFETY

2.2 THE CASE FOR POSITIVE MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

2.3 ADVERSE OUTCOMES OF ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

2.4 IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING FOR ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

2.5 SAFETY CULTURE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

3 ABNORMAL SITUATIONS AND KEY RELEVANCE TO PROCESS PLANT OPERATIONS

3.1 FOCUS AREAS FOR ABNORMAL SITUATION MANAGEMENT

3.2 ABNORMAL SITUATIONS AFFECTING PROCESS PLANT OPERATIONS

3.3 MANAGEMENT OF ABNORMAL SITUATIONS AND LINKS TO RISK BASED PROCESS SAFETY

3.4 PROCEDURES AND OPERATING MODES FOR MANAGING ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

4 EDUCATION FOR MANAGING ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

4.1 EDUCATING THE TRAINER

4.2 PRIMARY TARGET POPULATIONS FOR TRAINING

4.3 GUIDANCE FOR ORGANIZING AND STRUCTURING TRAINING

4.4 SUMMARY

5 TOOLS AND METHODS FOR MANAGING ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

5.1 TOOLS AND METHODS FOR CONTROL OF ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

5.2 PREDICTIVE HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

5.3 PROCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS

5.4 POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

5.5 OPERATING PROCEDURES

5.6 TRAINING AND DRILLS

5.7 ERGONOMICS AND OTHER HUMAN FACTORS

5.8 LEARNING FROM ABNORMAL SITUATION INCIDENTS

5.9 CHANGE MANAGEMENT

6 CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT FOR MANAGING ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

6.1 GENERAL

6.2 LANDSCAPE OF AVAILABLE METRICS FOR IMPROVEMENT

6.3 ABNORMAL SITUATIONS AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

6.4 AUDITING

6.5 MANAGEMENT REVIEW AND CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT

6.6 SUMMARY

7 CASE STUDIES/LESSONS LEARNED

7.1 CASE STUDY 7.1 – AIR FRANCE, 2009

7.2 CASE STUDY 7.2 – TEXACO REFINERY, MILFORD HAVEN, WALES, JULY 1994

7.3 CASE STUDY 7.3 – THE HICKSON AND WELCH FIRE, 1992, CASTLEFORD, UK

Note

APPENDIX A MANAGING ABNORMAL SITUATIONS –TRAINING MATERIALS

APPENDIX B ASM JOINT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONSORTIUM: BACKGROUND

REFERENCES

INDEX

END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT

List of Tables

Chapter 3

Table 3.1 Process Safety Accident Prevention Pillars and RBPS Elements

Chapter 5

Table 5.1 Abnormal Situation Subject Areas, Tools and Methods

Table 5.2 Hazard Identification Tools

Table 5.3 Process Control Systems

Table 5.4 Policies and Administrative Procedures

Table 5.5 Techniques for Reviewing Operating Procedures

Table 5.6 Training and Drills.

Table 5.7 Ergonomics and Other Human Factors

Table 5.8 Non‐Technical Skills, Categories and Elements

Table 5.9 Learning from Abnormal Situation Incidents

Table 5.10 Change Management

Chapter 7

Table 7.1 Flight Control Computers

List of Illustrations

Chapter 2

Figure 2.1 Relationship of Abnormal Situations to Process Safety

Figure 2.2 Operating Ranges and Limits

Figure 2.3 Breakdown by Loss Type

Figure 2.4 Breakdown of Operations Losses by Operating Mode

Figure 2.5 Polyamide Unit Process Flow Diagram

Chapter 3

Figure 3.1 BP Texas City Raffinate Splitter

Chapter 4

Figure 4.1 NASA Control Room – Engine Research Building

Chapter 5

Figure 5.1 Protection and Their Impact on the Process

Figure 5.2 Model of Mental and Physical Processes in Process Control

Chapter 7

Figure 7.1 The Three Pitot Tubes on the A330 Aircraft

Figure 7.2 Aircraft Pitch Commands and Pitch Attitude from 02:10:05 to 02:10...

Figure 7.3 Airspeed Indication from 02:10:06 to 02:11:46

*

Figure 7.4 FCCU Separation Section

Figure 7.5 Texaco Refinery Control Room DCS Screens

Figure 7.6 Source of the Jet Fire with Destroyed Control and Office Block

Figure 7.7 Manway at the End of 60 Still Base ‐ Source of the Jet Fire

Figure 7.8 Schematic Drawing of the Separation Stages

Figure 7.9 Schematic Drawing of 60 Still Base

Guide

Cover Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SERIES PAGE

TITLE PAGE

COPYRIGHT

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF EXAMPLE INCIDENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

GLOSSARY

DEDICATION

Begin Reading

APPENDIX A MANAGING ABNORMAL SITUATIONS –TRAINING MATERIALS

APPENDIX B ASM JOINT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONSORTIUM: BACKGROUND

REFERENCES

INDEX

WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT

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This book is one in a series of process safety guidelines and concept books published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Please go to www.wiley.com/go/ccps for a full list of titles in this series.

It is sincerely hoped that the information presented in this document will lead to an even more impressive safety record for the entire industry. However, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants, the CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers’ officers and directors, the Abnormal Situation Management® Consortium (ASMC) and its members, and Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc. (BakerRisk®), and its employees do not warrant or represent, expressly or by implication, the correctness or accuracy of the content of the information presented in this document. As between (1) American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers’ officers and directors, the ASMC members, and BakerRisk, and its employees and (2) the user of this document, the user accepts any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequences of its use or misuse.

Guidelines for Managing Abnormal Situations

Center for Chemical Process SafetyOf TheAmerican Institute of Chemical EngineersNew York, NY

This edition first published 2023

© 2023 the American Institute of Chemical Engineers

A Joint Publication of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.

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In view of ongoing research, equipment modifications, changes in governmental regulations, and the constant flow of information relating to the use of experimental reagents, equipment, and devices, the reader is urged to review and evaluate the information provided in the package insert or instructions for each chemical, piece of equipment, reagent, or device for, among other things, any changes in the instructions or indication of usage and for added warnings and precautions. While the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this work, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this work and specifically disclaim all warranties, including without limitation any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives, written sales materials or promotional statements for this work. The fact that an organization, website, or product is referred to in this work as a citation and/or potential source of further information does not mean that the publisher and authors endorse the information or services the organization, website, or product may provide or recommendations it may make. This work is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a specialist where appropriate. Further, readers should be aware that websites listed in this work may have changed or disappeared between when this work was written and when it is read. Neither the publisher nor authors shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.

Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data Applied for:

Hardback ISBN: 9781119862871

Cover Images: Dow Chemical Operations, Stade, Germany/

Courtesy of Dow Chemical Company

manyx31/Getty Images;

Creativ Studio Heinemann/Getty Images

 

Figure 2.1

Relationship of Abnormal Situations to Process Safety

Figure 2.2

Operating Ranges and Limits

Figure 2.3

Breakdown by Loss Type

Figure 2.4

Breakdown of Operations Losses by Operating Mode

Figure 2.5

Polyamide Unit Process Flow Diagram

Figure 3.1

BP Texas City Raffinate Splitter

Figure 4.1

NASA Control Room – Engine Research Building

Figure 5.1

Protection and Their Impact on the Process

Figure 5.2

Model of Mental and Physical Processes in Process Control

Figure 7.1

The Three Pitot Tubes on the A330 Aircraft

Figure 7.2

Aircraft Pitch Commands and Pitch Attitude from 02:10:05 to 02:10:26

Figure 7.3

Airspeed Indication from 02:10:06 to 02:11:46

*

Figure 7.4

FCCU Separation Section

Figure 7.5

Texaco Refinery Control Room DCS Screens

Figure 7.6

Source of the Jet Fire with Destroyed Control and Office Block

Figure 7.7

Manway at the End of 60 Still Base ‐ Source of the Jet Fire

Figure 7.8

Schematic Drawing of the Separation Stages

Figure 7.9

Schematic Drawing of 60 Still Base

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1

Process Safety Accident Prevention Pillars and RBPS Elements

Table 5.1

Abnormal Situation Subject Areas, Tools and Methods

Table 5.2

Hazard Identification Tools

Table 5.3

Process Control Systems

Table 5.4

Policies and Administrative Procedures

Table 5.5

Techniques for Reviewing Operating Procedures

Table 5.6

Training and Drills

Table 5.7

Ergonomics and Other Human Factors

Table 5.8

Non‐Technical Skills, Categories and Elements

Table 5.9

Learning from Abnormal Situation Incidents

Table 5.10

Change Management

Table 7.1

Flight Control Computers

 LIST OF EXAMPLE INCIDENTS

Example Incident 2.1 – BP Amoco Polymers, Augusta, GA, 2001

Example Incident 2.2 – Bayer Crop Science Plant, Institute, WV, 2008

Example Incident 2.3 – Texaco Refinery, Milford Haven, Wales, 1994

Example Incident 3.1 – Control System Power Failure

Example Incident 3.2 – Union Carbide, Bhopal, India 1984

Example Incident 3.3 – BP Texas City 2005

Example Incident 3.4 – Oklahoma Well Blowout2018

Example Incident 3.5 – Buncefield Explosion, 2005

Example Incident 3.6 – Relief Valve Opening

Example Incident 3.7 – Hyperactive Catalyst Runaway

Example Incident 3.8 – Distillation Column Startup

Example Incident 3.9 – Hydrocracker Operations

Example Incident 3.10 – Tower Flooding

Example Incident 3.11 – Control Panel Differences on Two Similar Units

Example Incident 3.12 – Loss of Site Power Supply

Example Incident 3.13 – Styrene Runaway Reaction and Release, 2020

Example Incident 3.14 – Reboiler Decommissioning

Example Incident 3.15 – Batch Reaction Alarms Ignored

Example Incident 3.16 – Oklahoma Well Blowout 2018

Example Incident 3.17 – Polystyrene Reactor

Example Incident 3.18 ‐ Unreliable Interface Detector

Example Incident 3.19 – Phase Concentration

Example Incident 3.20 – Physical Property Differences

Example Incident 4.1 – BP Texas City, 2005 (2)

Example Incident 4.2 – Chernobyl Disaster, April 1986

Example Incident 4.3 – Boeing B‐17 Bomber, 1940s

Example Incident 4.4 – Air France AF 447 Crash, June 2009

Example Incident 4.5 ‐ Chlorine Pipeline Support ‐ 1992

Example Incident 5.1 – Ring Drier Control

Example Incident 5.2 – Three Mile Island Reactor Core Meltdown, 1979

Example Incident 5.3 – Hydrogen‐in‐Chlorine Explosion

Example Incident 5.4 – Flight 173 DC‐8 Crash in Portland, 1978

Example Incident 5.5 – Caribbean Petroleum Tank Farm Explosion and Fire

Example Incident 6.1 – Fire Protection System Found Disabled

Example Incident 6.2 – The Dike That Wasn’t

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADIRU Air Data Inertial Reference Units

(Ch. 7)

AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers

(Preface)

AIM Asset Integrity Management

(Ch. 3)

AOA Angle of Attack

(Ch. 7)

AOPS Automatic Overfill Protection Systems

(Ch. 3)

APC Advanced Process Control

(Ch. 3)

API American Petroleum Institute

(Ch. 2)

ASM

®

Abnormal Situation Management

®

(Ch. 1)

ASMC Abnormal Situation Management

®

Consortium

(Ch. 1)

BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

(Ch. 3)

CAS Computerized Air Speed

(Ch. 7)

CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety

(Preface)

CDU Crude Distillation Unit

(Ch. 7)

CIMAH Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards

(Ch. 7)

COMAH Control of Major Accident Hazards

(Ch. 7)

COO Conduct of Operations

(Ch. 2)

CPC Critical Process Controller

(Ch. 7)

CSB Chemical Safety Board

(Ch. 3)

DCS Distributed Control Systems

(Ch. 2)

ECAM Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring

(Ch. 7)

EFCS Electronic Flight Control System

(Ch. 7)

EHSS Environmental Health, Safety and Security

(Ch. 4)

FCCU Fluidized Catalytic Cracker Unit

(Ch. 7)

FCPC Flight Control Primary Computer [aka PRIM]

(Ch. 7)

FCSC Flight Control Secondary Computer [aka SEC]

(Ch. 7)

FDR Flight Data Recorder

(Ch. 7)

FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

(Ch. 5)

GCPS Global Congress on Process Safety

(Ch. 5)

GEMS Generic Error‐modelling System

(Ch. 3)

GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System

(Ch. 7)

HAZID Hazard Identification

(Ch. 5)

HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study

(Ch. 3)

HF Hydrogen Fluoride

(Ch. 3)

HIRA Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis

(Ch. 3)

HMA Highly Managed Alarm

(Ch. 4)

HMI Human Machine Interface

(Ch. 3)

HRA Human Reliability Analysis

(Ch. 3)

IOGP International Association of Oil and Gas Producers

(Ch. 5)

IOW Integrity Operating Window

(Ch. 4)

ITCZ Inter‐Tropical Convergence Zone

(Ch. 7)

ITPM Inspection, Testing, and Preventive Maintenance

(Ch. 6)

LCN Light Cycle Naphtha

(Ch. 7)

LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis

(Ch. 4)

LOPC Loss of Primary Containment

(Ch. 6)

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

(Ch. 3)

MCAS Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System

(Ch7)

MIC Methyl Isocyanate

(Ch. 3)

MOC Management of Change

(Ch. 3)

MOOC Management of Organizational Change

(Ch. 5)

ND Navigation Display

(Ch. 7)

OD Operational Discipline

(Ch. 2)

PF Pilot (who is) Flying

(Ch. 7)

PFD Primary Flight Display

(Ch. 7)

PHA Process Hazards Analysis

(Ch. 3)

PNF Pilot Not Flying

(Ch. 7)

PORV Pilot Operated [Pressure] Relief Valve

(Ch. 5)

PSID Process Safety Incident Database

(Ch. 3)

PSM Process Safety Management

(Ch. 7)

PSSR Pre‐Startup Safety Review

(Ch. 5)

PSV Pressure Safety Valve

(Ch. 6)

RAGAGEP Recognized And Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice

(Ch. 3)

RBI Risk Based Inspection

(Ch. 3)

RBPS Risk Based Process Safety

(Ch. 1)

RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance

(Ch. 3)

SA Situational Awareness

(Ch. 3)

SIS Safety Instrumented System

(Ch. 3)

SME Subject Matter Expert

(Ch. 4)

SMS Safety Management Systems

(Ch. 7)

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

(Ch. 4)

TOH Transient Operation HAZOP

(Ch. 5)

UCDS User Centered Design Services

(Ch. 1)

VCE Vapor Cloud Explosion

(Ch. 2)

VDU Vacuum Distillation Unit

(Ch. 7)

GLOSSARY

Abnormal Situation

A disturbance in an industrial process with which the basic process control system of the process cannot cope.

Note: In the context of a hazard evaluation, synonymous with deviation.

Abnormal Situation Management

Abnormal Situation Management, or Managing Abnormal Situations, refers to a comprehensive process for improving performance which addresses the entire plant population. It promotes effective utilization of all available resources—i.e., hardware, software, and people, including the proactive or reactive intervention activities of members of the operations team, to achieve safe and efficient operations. Abnormal Situation Management is achieved through prevention, early detection, and mitigation of abnormal situations.

Advanced Process Control

Advanced process control refers to techniques including multi‐variable control, inferential control, feedforward, and decoupling. Multiple single‐loop controllers are adjusted in unison, to satisfy constraints and attain optimization objectives while adhering to safe operating limits. Advanced process control techniques often use model‐based software to direct the process operation. These applications require that the process model created accurately represents the process dynamics.

Asset Integrity Management

A process safety management system for ensuring the integrity of assets throughout their life cycle.

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)

A type of rapid phase transition in which a liquid contained above its atmospheric boiling point is rapidly depressurized, causing a nearly instantaneous transition from liquid to vapor with a corresponding energy release. A BLEVE of flammable material is often accompanied by a large aerosol fireball, since an external fire impinging on the vapor space of a pressure vessel is a common cause. However, it is not necessary for the liquid to be flammable to have a BLEVE occur.

Bow Tie Model

A risk diagram showing how various threats can lead to a loss of control of a hazard and allow this unsafe condition to develop into a number of undesired consequences. The diagram can also show all the barriers and degradation controls deployed.

Conduct of Operations

The embodiment of an organization's values and principles in management systems that are developed, implemented, and maintained to (1) structure operational tasks in a manner consistent with the organization's risk tolerance, (2) ensure that every task is performed deliberately and correctly, and (3) minimize variations in performance.

Distributed Control System

A system which divides process control functions into specific areas interconnected by communications (normally data highways), to form a single entity. It is characterized by digital controllers and typically by central operation interfaces. Distributed control systems consist of subsystems that are functionally integrated but may be physically separated and remotely located from one another. Distributed control systems generally have at least one shared function within the system. This may be the controller, the communication link or the display device. All three of these functions maybe shared. A system of dividing plant or process control into several areas of responsibility, each managed by its own CPU, with the whole interconnected to form a single entity usually by communication buses of various kinds.

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

A systematic method of evaluating an item or process to identify the ways in which it might potentially fail, and the effects of the mode of failure upon the performance of the item or process and on the surrounding environment and personnel.

Hazard and Operability Study

A systematic qualitative technique to identify process hazards and potential operating problems using a series of guide words to study process deviations. A HAZOP is used to question every part of a process to discover what deviations from the intention of the design can occur and what their causes and consequences may be. This is done systematically by applying suitable guide words. This is a systematic detailed review technique, for both batch and continuous plants, which can be applied to new or existing processes to identify hazards.

Hazard Identification

Part of the Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) method in which the material and energy hazards of the process, along with the siting and layout of the facility, are identified so that a risk analysis can be performed on potential incident scenarios.

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA): A collective term that encompasses all activities involved in identifying hazards and evaluating risk at facilities, throughout their life cycle, to make certain that risks to employees, the public, and/or the environment are consistently controlled within the organization's risk tolerance.

Highly Managed Alarm

An alarm belonging to a class with additional requirements (e.g., regulatory requirements) above general alarms.

Human Machine Interface

The means by which human interaction with the control system is accomplished

Human Reliability Analysis

A method used to evaluate whether system‐required human actions, tasks, or jobs will be completed successfully within a required time period. Also used to determine the probability that no extraneous human actions detrimental to the system will be performed.

Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance

Scheduled proactive maintenance activities intended to (1) assess the current condition and/or rate of degradation of equipment, (2) test the operation/functionality of equipment, and/or (3) prevent equipment failure by restoring equipment condition.

Integrity Operating Window

An Integrity Operating Window (IOW) is a set of limits used to determine the different variables that could affect the integrity and reliability of a process unit. An IOW is the set of limits under which a process, piece of equipment, or unit operation can operate safely. Working outside of IOWs may cause otherwise preventable damage or failure.

Lagging Metric

A retrospective set of metrics based on incidents that meet an established threshold of severity.

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

An approach that analyzes one incident scenario (cause‐consequence pair) at a time, using predefined values for the initiating event frequency, independent protection layer failure probabilities, and consequence severity, in order to compare a scenario risk estimate to risk criteria for determining where additional risk reduction or more detailed analysis is needed. Scenarios are identified elsewhere, typically using a scenario‐based hazard evaluation procedure such as a HAZOP Study.

Leading Metric

A forward‐looking set of metrics that indicate the performance of the key work processes, operating discipline, or layers of protection that prevent incidents.

Loss of Primary Containment

An unplanned or uncontrolled release of material from primary containment, including non‐toxic and non‐flammable materials (e.g., steam, hot condensate, nitrogen, compressed CO

2

or compressed air).

Management of Change

A management system to identify, review, and approve all modifications to equipment, procedures, raw materials, and processing conditions, other than replacement in kind, prior to implementation to help ensure that changes to processes are properly analyzed (for example, for potential adverse impacts), documented, and communicated to employees affected.

Management of Organizational Change

Management of organizational change (MOOC) is a framework for managing the effect of new business processes, changes in organizational structure or cultural changes within an enterprise. MOOC addresses the people side of change management.

Normalization of Deviance

A gradual erosion of standards of performance as a result of increased tolerance of nonconformance.

Pressure Safety Valve

A pressure relief device which is designed to reclose and prevent the further flow of fluid after normal conditions have been restored.

Pre‐Startup Safety Review

A systematic and thorough check of a process prior to the introduction of a highly hazardous chemical to a process. The PSSR must confirm the following: Construction and equipment are in accordance with design specifications; Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate; A process hazard analysis has been performed for new facilities and recommendations have been resolved or implemented before startup, and modified facilities meet the management of change requirements; and training of each employee involved in operating a process has been completed.

Process Hazard Analysis

An organized effort to identify and evaluate hazards associated with processes and operations to enable their control. This review normally involves the use of qualitative techniques to identify and assess the significance of hazards. Conclusions and appropriate recommendations are developed. Occasionally, quantitative methods are used to help prioritize risk reduction.

Process Safety Incident Database

A database that is used to collect and record information from past process safety incidents.

Process Safety Management

A management system that is focused on prevention of, preparedness for, mitigation of, response to, and restoration from catastrophic releases of chemicals or energy from a process associated with a facility.

RAGAGEP

"Recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice", a term originally used by OSHA, stems from the selection and application of appropriate engineering, operating, and maintenance knowledge when designing, operating and maintaining chemical facilities with the purpose of ensuring safety and preventing process safety incidents. It involves the application of engineering, operating or maintenance activities derived from engineering knowledge and industry experience based upon the evaluation and analyses of appropriate internal and external standards, applicable codes, technical reports, guidance, or recommended practices or documents of a similar nature. RAGAGEP can be derived from singular or multiple sources and will vary based upon individual facility processes, materials, service, and other engineering considerations.

Risk Based Process Safety

The Center for Chemical Process Safety's process safety management system approach that uses risk‐based strategies and implementation tactics that are commensurate with the risk‐based need for process safety activities, availability of resources, and existing process safety culture to design, correct, and improve process safety management activities.

Reliability Centered Maintenance

A systematic analysis approach for evaluating equipment failure impacts on system performance and determining specific strategies for managing the identified equipment failures. The failure management strategies may include preventive maintenance, predictive maintenance, inspections, testing, and/or one‐time changes (e.g., design improvements, operational changes).

Risk Based Inspection