Guidelines for Siting and Layout of Facilities E-Book
152,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Sprache: Englisch
This book has been written to address many of the developments since the 1st Edition which have improved how companies survey and select new sites, evaluate acquisitions, or expand their existing facilities. This book updates the appendices containing both the recommended separation distances and the checklists to help the teams obtain the information they need when locating the facility within a community, when arranging the processes within the facility, and when arranging the equipment within the process units.
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 486
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018
Ähnliche
PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE FROM THECENTER FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY OFTHEAMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICALENGINEERS
GUIDELINES FOR SITING AND LAYOUT OF FACILITIES
SECOND EDITION
CENTER FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS New York, NY
This edition first published 2018 © 2018 the American Institute of Chemical Engineers
Edition HistoryThe American Institute of Chemical Engineers (1e, 2003)
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
The right of CCPS to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with law.
Registered OfficeJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USA
Editorial Office111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USA
For details of our global editorial offices, customer services, and more information about Wiley products visit us at www.wiley.com.
Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats and by print-on-demand. Some content that appears in standard print versions of this book may not be available in other formats.
Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of WarrantyWhile the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this work, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this work and specifically disclaim all warranties, including without limitation any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives, written sales materials or promotional statements for this work. The fact that an organization, website, or product is referred to in this work as a citation and/or potential source of further information does not mean that the publisher and authors endorse the information or services the organization, website, or product may provide or recommendations it may make. This work is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a specialist where appropriate. Further, readers should be aware that websites listed in this work may have changed or disappeared between when this work was written and when it is read. Neither the publisher nor authors shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.
ISBN: 978-1-119-47463-0
Cover images: Silhouette, oil refinery ©manyx31/iStockphoto; Stainless steel ©Creativ Studio Heinemann/Getty Images, Inc.; Dow Chemical Operations, Stade, Germany/Courtesy of The Dow Chemical Company
Cover design by Wiley
This book is one in a series of process safety guidelines and concept books published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Please go to www.wiley.com/go/ccps for a full list of titles in this series.
It is sincerely hoped that the information presented in this document will lead to an even more impressive process safety record for industry; however, neither the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers officers and directors, nor BakerRisk® and its employees warrant or represent, expressly or by implication, the correctness or accuracy of the content of the information presented in this document. As between (1) American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers officers and directors, and BakerRisk® and its employees, and (2) the user of this document, the user accepts any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequence of its use or misuse.
CONTENTS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
GLOSSARY
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
FOREWORD
PREFACE
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVES
1.2 A SITING AND LAYOUT APPROACH
1.3 HOW TO USE THIS GUIDELINE
1.4 THE PROTECTION LAYERS
1.5 TERMINOLOGY
1.6 GUIDELINE REFERENCES
1.7 SEPARATION DISTANCES BASED PRIMARILY ON FIRE CONSEQUENCES
2 OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS
2.1 IMPLICATIONS OF SITING AND LAYOUT
2.2 MANAGEMENT OF RISKS
2.3 IMPLEMENTING A STEP-WISE APPROACH FOR THE SITING AND LAYOUT OF FACILITIES
2.4 ANTICIPATING THE CHANGING WORLD
2.5 SUMMARIZING THE BUSINESS CASE FOR PROPER SITING OF A FACILITY
3 IDENTIFYING THE PROCESS HAZARDS AND RISKS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.2 DESCRIBING THE FACILITY’S SCOPE
3.3 SCREENING FOR PRELIMINARY HAZARDS
3.4 EVALUATING THE RISKS
3.5 CHECKLIST FOR IDENTIFYING THE PROCESS HAZARDS AND RISKS
3.6 SUMMARY
4 SELECTING A FACILITY LOCATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.2 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE FACILITY
4.3 SELECTING A TEAM TO LOCATE THE FACILITY
4.4 GUIDELINES WHEN SURVEYING POTENTIAL FACILITY LOCATIONS
4.5 DETERMINING THE LOCATION PLOT SIZE
4.6 CONSTRUCTION AND TURNAROUND ISSUES
4.7 MAPS AND INFORMATION
4.8 GEOLOGICAL ISSUES
4.9 WEATHER ISSUES
4.10 SEISMIC ISSUES
4.11 OFF-SITE ISSUES
4.12 SECURITY ISSUES
4.13 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
4.14 INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES
4.15 BUILDING AND STRUCTURE ISSUES
4.16 MATERIAL HANDLING ISSUES
4.17 COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES
4.18 ENGINEERING DESIGN ISSUES
4.19 UTILITIES ISSUES
4.20 OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
4.21 PREPARING THE INFORMATION WHEN COMPARING LOCATIONS
4.22 A SITING AND LAYOUT ILLUSTRATION
4.23 CHECKLIST FOR SELECTING A FACILITY LOCATION
4.24 SUMMARY
5 SELECTING THE PROCESS UNIT LAYOUT WITHIN A FACILITY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.2 BLOCK LAYOUT METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW
5.3 HOW THE BLOCK LAYOUT INTEGRATES WITH THE FACILITY LOCATION
5.4 APPLYING PREVENTIVE MEASURES WHEN ARRANGING PROCESS UNITS
5.5 APPLYING MITIGATIVE MEASURES WHEN ARRANGING PROCESS UNITS
5.6 CONSTRUCTION AND TURNAROUNDS
5.7 THE BLOCK LAYOUT APPROACH: STEP 1 - EVALUATING THE LOCATION’S CHARACTERISTICS
5.8 OFF-SITE ISSUES
5.9 SECURITY ISSUES
5.10 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
5.11 INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES
5.12 THE BLOCK LAYOUT APPROACH: STEP 2 - EVALUATING THE SEPARATION DISTANCES BETWEEN BLOCKS
5.13 CRITICAL AND OCCUPIED STRUCTURES
5.14 MATERIAL HANDLING
5.15 PROCESS UNITS
5.16 TANK FARMS
5.17 OTHER AREAS
5.18 UTILITIES
5.19 OPTIMIZING THE LOCATIONS OF THE PROCESS UNITS
5.20 RESOLVING BLOCK LAYOUT OPTIMIZATION ISSUES
5.21 CONTINUING THE SITING AND LAYOUT ILLUSTRATION
5.22 CHECKLIST FOR SELECTING THE LAYOUT OF PROCESS UNITS WITHIN A FACILITY
5.23 SUMMARY
6 SELECTING THE EQUIPMENT LAYOUT WITHIN A PROCESS UNIT
6.1 INTRODUCTION
6.2 EQUIPMENT LAYOUT METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW
6.3 HOW THE EQUIPMENT LAYOUT INTEGRATES WITH THE BLOCK LAYOUT
6.4 APPLYING PREVENTIVE MEASURES WHEN ARRANGING EQUIPMENT
6.5 APPLYING MITIGATIVE MEASURES WHEN ARRANGING EQUIPMENT
6.6 CRITICAL AND OCCUPIED STRUCTURE DESIGN
6.7 EQUIPMENT
6.8 RESOLVING EQUIPMENT LAYOUT OPTIMIZATION ISSUES
6.9 CONTINUING THE SITING AND LAYOUT ILLUSTRATION
6.10 CHECKLIST FOR SELECTING THE EQUIPMENT LAYOUT WITHIN A PROCESS UNIT
6.11 SUMMARY
7 MANAGING CHANGES
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.2 ADDRESSING SURROUNDING COMMUNITY AND INDUSTRIAL EXPANSIONS
7.3 A SITING AND LAYOUT APPROACH WHEN MANAGING CHANGES
7.4 MAINTAINING FACILITY INTEGRITY DURING ITS LIFE CYCLE
7.5 MANAGING EXPANSIONS AT AN EXISTING FACILITY
7.6 MANAGING PURCHASES OF EXISTING FACILITIES
7.7 MONITORING CHANGES WITH PERIODIC REVIEWS
7.8 ADDRESSING SITING AND LAYOUT ISSUES WHICH ARE IDENTIFIED DURING EXPANSIONS
7.9 SUMMARY
8 CASE HISTORIES
9 REFERENCES
10 APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL SITING AND LAYOUT REFERENCES
APPENDIX B. CCPS RECOMMENDED DISTANCE TABLES FOR SITING AND LAYOUT OF FACILITIES
APPENDIX C. CHECKLIST FOR IDENTIFYING THE PROCESS HAZARDS AND RISKS
APPENDIX D. CHECKLIST FOR SELECTING A FACILITY LOCATION
APPENDIX E. CHECKLIST FOR SELECTING THE PROCESS UNIT LAYOUT WITHIN A FACILITY
APPENDIX F. CHECKLIST FOR SELECTING THE EQUIPMENT LAYOUT WITHIN A PROCESS UNIT
INDEX
EULA
List of Tables
Chapter 1
Table 1.1
Table 1.2
Chapter 3
Table 3.1
Chapter 4
Table 4.1
Table 4.1
Chapter 5
Table 5.1
Table 5.2
Table 5.3
Table 5.4
Table 5.5
Table 5.6
Table 5.7
Table 5.8
Table 5.9
Table 5.10
Chapter 6
Table 6.1
Chapter 7
Table 7.1
Table 7.2
Chapter 8
Table 8.1
Appendices
Table 10.1
Appendix A
Table A.1
Table A.2
Table A.3
Table A.4
Table A.5
Table A.6
Table A.7
Table A.8
Appendix C
Table C.1
Appendix D
Table D.1
Appendix E
Table E.1
Appendix F
Table F.1
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1
. A Siting and Layout Approach
Figure 1.2
. A Facility’s Protection Layers
Figure 1.3
. Guideline Terminology
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1
. The Effect of Time on the Options for Reducing Process Safety Risks
Figure 2.2
. Life cycle Phases for a Facility, a Process Unit, or the Equipment
Figure 2.3
. The Chapters Corresponding to the Steps for Siting and Laying out of Facilities
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1
. An illustration of potential flammability limit contours for flash fires
Figure 3.2
. An illustration of potential thermal radiation contours from pool or jet fires
Figure 3.3
. An illustration of potential blast overpressure contours
Figure 3.4
. An illustration of potential toxic release endpoint contours from a small leak using the ERPG guidance
Figure 3.5
. An illustration of potential toxic release endpoint contours from a small leak using probits
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1
. Typical Land Use Guidance for the Land Surrounding a Facility
Figure 4.2
. Characteristics Considered when Selecting a Facility Location
Figure 4.3
. A Southeast “Prevailing Wind” Direction shown on a Wind Rose Diagram
Figure 4.4
. Location 1-Proposed Inland Site in Remote Area
Figure 4.5
. Location 2-Proposed Inland Site with Nearby Development
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1
. Flowchart used to Determine the Process Unit Layout Distances at a Facility
Figure 5.2
. An Example of a Modeled Dispersion Profile
Figure 5.3
. How Layout Distances are Measured at a Facility
Figure 5.4
. Blast Overpressure Contours for the Proposed Site
Figure 5.5
. Block Layout Diagram for the New Low Hazard Operation
Figure 5.6
. Block Layout Diagram with Layout Distances for the New Low Hazard Operation
Figure 5.7
. Building Damage Levels as a Function of Pressure-Impulse Curves
Figure 5.8
. Rail Car Fragment thrown from the Crescent City BLEVE
Figure 5.9
. Location 3 Facility Layout for its Structures and Process Unit Blocks
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1
. Flowchart used to Determine Equipment Layout Distances within a Process Unit
Figure 6.2
. Computer Aided Design (CAD) Image Depicting a Proposed Layout of Equipment within a Process Unit
Figure 6.3
. Traditional Pump Row / Pipeway Arrangement when Transferring Materials in Overhead Piping
Figure 6.4
. A Safer Process Unit Pump Row / Pipeway Arrangement when Transferring Flammable Materials in Overhead Piping
Figure 6.5
. An Example Hazardous Area / Zone Classification Drawing using a 3D Facility Plot Plan
Figure 6.6
. The DuPont Brandywine Powder Mills
Figure 6.7
. Layout of the Ethylene Unit’s Process Unit Blocks for Location 3
Figure 6.8
. Layout of the Equipment in the Cracking Furnace Unit for Location 3
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1
. A Siting and Layout Approach when Managing Changes
Figure 7.2
. Managing Siting and Layout Changes within the Equipment, Process Unit, and Facility Life Cycles
Figure 7.3
. The Separation Distances at the Existing Process Unit
Figure 7.4
. The Proposed Layout for the Expansion Project at an Existing Facility
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1
. Layout of the area surrounding the ISOM unit at Texas City
Figure 8.2
. Image of PEPCON after Initial Explosion
Figure 8.3
. Aerial View of the Explosion Damage in Danvers
Figure 8.4
. Area Plot Plan and Impacted Areas Surrounding the PEMEX LPG Facility
Figure 8.5
. Growth of the Community Surrounding the PEMEX LPG Facility
Figure 8.6
. Images after the Explosion at the Little General Store
Figure 8.7
. Flames Developing and Impinging on valero’s No. 1 Extractor Piping
Figure 8.8
. The Pipe Bridge after the Incident at Valero
Figure 8.9
. Range of Off-site Damage at Praxair in St. Louis
Figure 8.10
. Range of the Vapor Cloud at Amuay
Figure 8.11
. Range of the Blast Radius at West Fertilizer Company
Figure 8.12
. Image of Damage from the West Fertilizer Company Explosion
Figure 8.13
. Damage to the Concept Sciences Inc. Facility
Figure 8.14
. T2 Laboratories, Inc., after the Explosion
Figure 8.15
. Fragment of the T2 Laboratories 3-inch (7.6 cm) Thick Reactor
Figure 8.16
. The Imperial Sugar Facility after the Explosions and Fires
Appendix D
Figure D.1
. The Conservation Balance Across a Facility’’’s Property Line
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Preface
Pages
xix
xxi
xxii
xxiii
xxiv
xxv
xxvi
xxvii
xxviii
xxix
xxx
xxxi
xxxiii
xxxiv
xxxv
xxxvii
xxxviii
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
55
56
58
59
60
61
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
73
74
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
91
92
93
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
319
320
321
322
323
324
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
Acronyms and Abbreviations
AIChE
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
AIHA
American Institute of Industrial Hygienists
ALARA
As Low As Reasonably Available
ALARP
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AOTC
Associated Overseas Countries and Territories
API
American Petroleum Institute
ARS
Alternative Release Scenario
ASME
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ATEX
European Directives 1999/92/EC and 2014/34/EU
BPCS
Basic Process Control System
BPV
Bursting Pressure Vessel
BSI
British Standards Institution
BST
Baker-Strehlow-Tang blast model
CCPS
Center for Chemical Process Safety
CFD
Computational Fluid Dynamics
CFR
United States Code of Federal Regulations
COMAH
United Kingdom HSE Control of Major Accident Hazards
CSB
United States Chemical Safety Board
DHA
Dust Hazards Analysis
DHS
United States Department of Homeland Security
DIN
Deutsches Institut für Normung
DOT
United States Department of Transportation
EN
European Union Standards
EPA
United States Environmental Protection Agency
ERPG
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (AIHA)
EU
European Union
GB
China standards annotation
HAC
Hazardous Area Classification (electrical)
IChemE
Institution of Chemical Engineers
ISD
Inherently Safer Design
ISO
International Organization for Standardization
ITPM
Inspection, Testing, and Preventative Maintenance program
LEL
Lower Explosivity Limit
LFG
Liquefied Flammable Gas
LFL
Lower Flammability Limit
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MEC
Minimum Explosible Concentration (i.e., combustible dusts)
MCE
Maximum Credible Event
NFPA
National Fire Protection Agency
OSHA
United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PED
Pressure Equipment Directive
POTW
Publically Owned Treatment Works
PSM
Process Safety Management
PSS
Process Safety System
RBI
Risk Based Inspection program
RBPS
Risk Based Process Safety
RCM
Reliability Centered Maintenance
RCRA
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (United States EPA)
RMP
Risk Management Program (United States EPA)
RP
Recommended Practice (i.e., API guidance)
UK
United Kingdom
UK HSE
United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive
US
United States
VCE
Vapor Cloud Explosion
WCS
Worst Case Scenario
Glossary
This Glossary contains the terms specific to this Guideline and process safety related terms from the CCPS Process Safety Glossary. The specific CCPS process safety related terms in this Guideline are current at the time of publication; please access the CCPS website for potential updates to the CCPS Glossary.
Term
Definition
Access Ways
Travel ways that provide occasional access to equipment or congested areas of a facility for maintenance, security, and firefighting vehicles. Also known as tertiary roadways.
Alternative Release Scenario (ARS)
The basis for an off-site consequence analysis required by the United States EPA Risk Management Program (RMP) Rule. This release scenario has less adverse consequences, but is more likely than the Worst Case Scenario. See Maximum Credible Event (MCE) and Worst Case Scenario (WCS).
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
The concept that efforts to reduce risk should be continued until the incremental sacrifice (cost, time, effort, or other expenditure of resources) is grossly disproportionate to the incremental risk reduction achieved. The term as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) is often used synonymously.
Barrier
See Safeguard.
Boilover
A violent expulsion of contents caused by a heat wave from the surface burning at the top of the tank reaching the water layer at the bottom of the tank.
Brownfield
An industrial or commercial property that is abandoned or underused and is being considered as a location for a new facility or for redevelopment.
Buffer Zone
Additional undeveloped land surrounding the facility, often purchased to provide additional distance between the hazards and the surrounding community, which helps reduce the likelihood or severity of potential off-site impact, or helps reduce the likelihood of future community growth next to the facility.
Building
A rigid, enclosed structure.
Chambering
Enclosing a hazardous process unit within a building such that toxic materials are confined during a loss of containment (risk is unacceptable if the toxic material escapes).
Combustible Material
Materials that cause fires.
Combustible dust
A finely divided combustible particulate solid that presents a flash fire hazard or explosion hazard when suspended in air or the process-specific oxidizing medium over a range of concentrations [NFPA 652, NFPA 654].
Complex
A collection of facilities that may or may not be owned by the same company, but are located within the contiguous boundaries of a specific geographic location, such as an industrial or chemical park. A facility within a complex may feed or take raw materials from another facility in the complex or may be totally independent of its industrial neighbors.
Confinement
Obstacles such as walls and ceilings of a building, vessel, pipe, etc. that serve to limit the expansion of a dispersing burning vapor cloud.
Congestion
Obstacles in the path of the flame that generate turbulence and compression.
Containment
A system characteristic which prevents reactants or products from being exchanged between the chemical system and its environment.
Critical Equipment
Equipment, instrumentation, controls, or systems whose malfunction or failure would likely result in a catastrophic release of highly hazardous chemicals, or whose proper operation is required to mitigate the consequences of such release.
Critical Infrastructure
Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital that the loss, interruption, incapacity, or destruction of which (1) would have a negative or debilitating effect on the security, economic security, public health, or safety of a nation, region, or any local government, or (2) cause national or regional catastrophic effects.
Domino Effect
The triggering of secondary events, such as toxic releases, by a primary event, such as an explosion, such that the result is an increase in consequences or area of an effect zone. Generally only considered when a significant escalation of the original incident results.
Emergency Planning Response Guidelines (ERPG)
A system of guidelines for airborne concentrations of toxic materials prepared by the AIHA. For example, ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair an individual’s ability to take protective action.
Equipment
A piece of hardware which can be defined in terms of mechanical, electrical or instrumentation components contained within its boundaries.
Facility
Sometimes also called a plant. The physical location where a management system activity is performed. In early life cycle stages, a facility may be the company’s central research laboratory, pilot plant, or the engineering offices of a technology vendor. In later stages, the facility may be a typical chemical plant, storage terminal, distribution center, or corporate office. In the context of this document, a facility is a portion of or a complete plant, unit, site, complex or offshore platform or any combination thereof.
Fixed facility
A portion of or a complete plant, unit, site, complex or any combination thereof that is generally not moveable. In contrast, mobile facilities, such as ships (e.g., transport vessels, floating platform storage and offloading vessels, drilling platforms), trucks, and trains, are designed to be movable.
Flammable Material
Materials that cause fires.
Grassroots
Totally new facility that may be built upon a greenfield or brownfield location.
Greenfield
Undeveloped property that has not been used before for either commercial or industrial purposes and is being considered as a location for a new facility.
Hazard
An inherent chemical or physical characteristic that has the potential for causing damage to people, property, or the environment. (Note:
This guideline refers to “process safety” chemical hazards, such as their toxicity, flammability, and reactivity, and physical hazards, such as extreme processing conditions such as high pressures and temperatures.)
Hazardous Area Classification (HAC)
Locations which are classified depending on the properties of the flammable gas, flammable liquid-produced vapor, combustible liquid-produced vapors, combustible dusts, or fibers/flyings that may be present, and the likelihood that a flammable or combustible concentration or quantity is present [adapted from Article 500 of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code]. See
Zone
.
Hazardous Process Area or Unit
An area containing equipment (e.g., pipes, pumps, valves, vessels, reactors, and supporting structures) intended to process or store materials. Hazardous process areas/units have the potential for explosion, fire, or toxic material releases.
Hazard Zone
For an incident that produces an outcome such as toxic release, the hazard zone is the area over which the airborne concentration equals or exceeds some level of concern. For a flammable release, the area of effect is based on a specified level of thermal radiation. For a release that results in explosion, this is the area defined by specified overpressure levels.
Infrastructure
The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a site such as transportation and communications systems, water and power lines, and public institutions including emergency response organizations.
Inherently Safer
A condition in which the hazards associated with the materials and operations used in the process have been reduced or eliminated, and this reduction or elimination is permanent and inseparable from the process.
Knock-on Effect
See Domino Effect.
Layer of Protection
A concept whereby a device, system, orhuman action is provided to reduce the likelihood and/or severity of a specific loss event.
Layout
The relative location of equipment or buildings within a given site.
Life Cycle
The stages that a physical process or a management system goes through as it proceeds from birth to death. These stages include conception, design, deployment, acquisition, operation, maintenance, decommissioning, and disposal. (Note: This guideline refers to these stages as eight distinct phases: design, fabricate, install, commission, operate, maintain, change, and decommission.)
Lower Explosivity Limit (LEL)
See Lower Flammability Limit (LFL). (Note: This guideline refers to LFL, only.)
Lower Flammability Limit (LFL)
That concentration of a combustible material in air below which ignition will not occur. It is often, interchangeably called Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and for dusts, the Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC).
Maximum Credible Event (MCE)
A hypothetical explosion, fire, or toxic material release event that has the potential maximum consequence to the occupants under consideration from among the major scenarios evaluated. The major scenarios are realistic and have a reasonable probability of occurrence considering the chemicals, inventories, equipment and piping design, operating conditions, fuel reactivity, process unit geometry, industry incident history, and other factors. Each building may have its own set of MCEs for potential explosion, fire, or toxic material release impacts [API RP 752]. See Worst Case Scenario (WCS) or Alternative Release Scenario (ARS).
Mitigative Safeguard
A safeguard that is designed to reduce the severity of a loss event. Mitigative safeguards can be divided into detection safeguards and correction safeguards. See Safeguard.
Off-Site
Outside of the facility’s property line - represents the adjacent area external to the company’s boundary limits, with the “off-site consequences” representing the impact, if any, on industrial neighbors, the surrounding community or environment.
On-site
Inside the facility’s property line - the processes and support operations within the company’s boundary or property limits (this may be the “fence line” if the adjacent land is not owned by the company).
On-Site Personnel
Employees, contractors, visitors, service providers, and others present at the facility.
Permanent Building
Rigid structures intended for permanent use in fixed locations.
Piperack, Pipeway, Pipeband
A structure that supports pipes, power leads, and instrument cable trays.
Plant
See Facility.
Pool Fire
The combustion of material evaporating from a layer of liquid at the base of the fire.
Portable Building
Rigid structure that can be easily moved to another location within the facility. Portable buildings include temporary buildings or trailers used to house people or store equipment.
Preventive Safeguard
A safeguard that prevents the occurrence of a particular loss event, given that an initiating cause has occurred; i.e., a safeguard that intervenes between an initiating cause and a loss event in an incident sequence. See Safeguard.
Probit
A random variable with a mean of 5 and a variance of 1, which is used in various effect models. Probit-based models derived from experimental dose-response data, are often used to estimate the health effect that might result based upon the intensity and duration of an exposure to a harmful substance or condition (e.g., exposure to a toxic atmosphere, or a thermal radiation exposure).
Process Safety Hazard
See Hazard.
Process Section (or Train)
A “process section” or “train” is an area within a process unit containing combination of processing equipment that is focused on a single operation.
Property Line
The perimeter of a facility surrounded by the community, other industrial facilities, or undeveloped land owned by someone external to the company. Sometimes called a property boundary.
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)
The systematic development of numerical estimates of the expected frequency and severity of potential incidents associated with a facility or operation based on engineering evaluation and mathematical techniques.
Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS)
The Center for Chemical Process Safety’s process safety management system approach that uses risk based strategies and implementation tactics that are commensurate with the risk based need for process safety activities, availability of resources, and existing process safety culture to design, correct, and improve process safety management activities.
Safeguard
Design features, equipment, procedures, etc. in place to decrease the probability or mitigate the severity of a cause-consequence scenario. Also known as a protective layer.
Safe Haven
A building or enclosure that is designed to provide protection to its occupants from exposure to outside hazards
Sheltering
Physical protection (such as an enclosed building) against the outcome of an incident.
Siting
The process of locating a complex, site, plant, or unit.
Stakeholder
Individuals or organizations that can (or believe they can) be affected by the facility’s operations, or who are involved with assisting or monitoring facility operation.
Structure
Something (such as a building, bridge or pipe rack) that is constructed to support equipment, piping, or personnel and is usually designed to stand on its own.
Tent
A term used to describe a wide range of structures, such as traditional tents with or without sides (a “canopy”), air inflated structures, air supported structures, tensioned membrane structures, scaffold structures, or structures that use a combination of fabric and rigid panels (API RP 756).
Turnaround
A scheduled shutdown period when planned inspection, testing, and preventative maintenance, as well as corrective maintenance such as modifications, replacements, or repairs are performed.
Utility
Supplies services to the facility such as electricity, instrument air, steam or heating medium, fuels (oil, gas, etc.), refrigeration, cooling water or cooling medium, or inert gases.
Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)
The explosion resulting from the ignition of a cloud of flammable vapor, gas, or mist in which flame speeds accelerate to sufficiently high velocities to produce significant overpressure.
Wind Rose Diagram
A plan view diagram that shows the percentage of time the wind is blowing in a particular direction. Often used as a symbol to indicate the "prevailing wind" direction (e.g., on a drawing or map).
Worst Case Scenario (WCS)
The basis for an off-site consequence analysis required by the EPA RMP Rule. This intentionally conservative accident scenario assumes the release of the entire inventory of a vessel, under the most unfavorable conditions, and with the failure of most protective features. See Maximum Credible Event (MCE) and Alternative Release Scenario (ARS).
Zone
Zone (per Article 500 of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code): The classification system for electrical and electronic equipment and wiring for all voltages in locations where fire or explosion hazards may exist. (Also the area defined through a “Hazardous Area Classification” (HAC).)
Zone (per European electrical classification): The “zone” is equivalent to the “area” noted in Hazardous Area Classifications in the United States.
Acknowledgments
The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) express their appreciation and gratitude to all members of this CCPS Subcommittee for Project 246 and their CCPS member companies for their generous support and technical contributions in the preparation of these guidelines. The AIChE and CCPS also express their gratitude to the team of authors from BakerRisk®.
CCPS Subcommittee Members:
Martin Timm
Chair, Praxair
Don Connolley
Vice Chair, BP
Susan Bayley
Linde
Chris Buchwald
ExxonMobil
Bruce Bullough
Corden Pharma (Retired)
Andrew Carpenter
Exponent
Andy Crerand
Shell
Chris Devlin
Celanese
Randy Hawkins
Philips66
Dave Herrmann
DuPont (Retired)
Manuel Herce
DuPont
David Hill
OxyChem (Retired)
Casey Johnson
Bayer / Covestro
Jayant Kulkarni
Aon
Bill Lindberg
Air Liquide
Reid McPhail
CNRL
Tim Murphy
Arkema
Pamela Nelson
Cytec
Eric Peterson
MMI Engineering
Ray Qi
Huntsman
Mark Saunders
Koch Industries
Florine Vincik
BASF
Jonas Duarte
Chemtura
Charles Cowley
CCPS Staff Consultant
CCPS wishes to acknowledge the many contributions of the BakerRisk® staff members who contributed to this edition, especially the principal author Bruce K. Vaughen and his colleagues who contributed to portions of this manuscript (listed in alphabetical order): Ray Bennett, David Black, David Bogosian, Mike Broadribb, Adam Connor, Philip Hodge, David Kirby, John Lira, Michael Moosemiller, Joe Natale (Co-author of the 2003 Edition), Doug Olson, Phil Parsons, Adrian Pierorazio, Kelly Thomas, Karen Vilas, David Wechsler, and Joe Zanoni. Editing assistance from Moira Woodhouse, BakerRisk®, is gratefully acknowledged, as well.
Additional acknowledgement is extended to Reid McPhail, CNRL, for his significant and thorough reviews of the manuscript and updating of the tables provided in Appendix B, and to Annette Kyle, for her contributions during the initial stages of this work.
Before publication, all CCPS books are subjected to a thorough peer review process. CCPS gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful comments and suggestions of the peer reviewers. Their work enhanced the accuracy and clarity of these guidelines.
Peer Reviewers:
Jordi Costa Sala
Celanese
Curtis Clements
Chemours
Cheryl Grounds
BP; Co-author of the 2003 Edition
Michael Hiam
BP
Pete Lodal
Eastman
Louisa Nara
CCPS
Keith Noll
Cytec
John Remy
Lyondell-Basel
Renato Sampaio
Dow
Jan Windhorst
Nova Chemicals (Retired); peer reviewer of 2003 Edition
Foreword
I appreciate the leadership of the Center for Chemical Process Safety and their work with process safety professionals to advance a culture of ongoing improvement to process safety. It is important to ensure that lessons learned regarding proper siting of facilities, and the layout of process units and equipment within the facility, are identified to enable better evaluations and decisions. As a tri-chair of the Obama Administration Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, these issues were raised during listening sessions held across the United States. Much progress can be made in this area by improving safety, and reducing the impact of incidents and the loss of lives, if facility siting is done in a responsible and effective manner.
Mathy Stanislaus - December 2016
Assistant Administrator in EPA’s Office of Land and Emergency Management
Preface
The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) has been closely involved with process safety, environmental and loss control issues in the chemical, petrochemical and allied industries for more than four decades. Through its strong ties with process designers, constructors, operators, safety professionals, and members of academia, AIChE has enhanced communications and fostered continuous improvement between these groups. AIChE publications and symposia have become information resources for those devoted to process safety, environmental protection and loss prevention.
AIChE created the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) in 1985 soon after the major industrial disasters in Mexico City, Mexico, and Bhopal, India in 1984. The CCPS is chartered to develop and disseminate technical information for use in the prevention of accidents. The CCPS is supported by more than 190 industry sponsors who provide the necessary funding and professional guidance to its technical steering committees. The major product of CCPS activities has been a series of guidelines to assist those implementing various elements of the Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) approach. This book is part of that series.
The CCPS Technical Steering Subcommittee overseeing this guideline was chartered to review and update the 2003 CCPS book, Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout. This new edition has been written to address the many developments in the last decade which have improved how companies survey and select new sites, evaluate acquisitions or expand their existing facilities. By updating the title, it has been emphasized that this book focuses not only on siting of buildings and unit operations within a facility, but also on siting of facilities within a community.
This guideline addresses issues for those involved in business and project development of hazardous materials and processes, provides guidance for facility layout experts, and provides information for authorities and the public involved in any planning approval consultation process. In addition, this edition notes improvements since the last edition for modeling toxic release dispersions, for modeling explosion overpressure blast effects, for addressing the life cycle and long-term risks of the facility, and for selecting optimal distances between processes and equipment when arranging them within the facility.
You can access the latest versions of the tools, templates and documents for Guidelines for Siting and Layout of Facilities at the CCPS Website:
www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/Siting-tools
1INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVES
This guideline describes in sequence how the risks associated with hazardous materials and processes are managed when siting a facility, when arranging new or modified process units within a facility, and then when arranging the new or modified equipment within the process unit. It provides a starting point for companies to help make decisions on how to select a facility’s location, how to recognize and assess the facility’s long-term risks, and how to lay out the processing units and the equipment within the facility. The location of and the arrangement of process units and associated equipment for a petrochemical facility is described to help illustrate how on-site and off-site risks can be reduced when locating the facility, and how on-site risks can be reduced when arranging process units within a facility or equipment within a process unit. This guideline’s appendices include additional references, tables listing recommended process unit and equipment separation distances for fire scenarios compiled from industry practices, guidelines, checklists, and standards for selecting the location of facilities (their siting) and for selecting the distances between processes and equipment (their layout within the selected location).
The objectives of this guideline include:
Applying a Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) approach [CCPS 2007a] and providing guidance when selecting the location of a facility handling hazardous materials and energies, when arranging the process units within the facility, and when arranging the equipment within the process units (the “siting” and the “layout” of the facility),
Providing guidance for selecting the location selection team, taking into account the type of facility and the local conditions (e.g., geographical, weather, etc.)
Applying inherently safer design principles when selecting a facility location, when locating process units within a facility (their “blocks”) and when locating the equipment within the process units,
Providing guidance on reducing the risks associated with both the potential off-site and on-site consequences, helping reduce a facility’s life cycle costs, and
Providing guidance when making changes to existing facilities.
The scope of this guideline is for onshore, outside (“open air”) refining, petrochemical and chemical operations that handle, process, or store hazardous materials, including:
Large and small facilities
New and existing facilities
Although this guideline addresses some of the design issues for structures that enclose process units, it beyond the scope to address the distances between process equipment within these enclosed structures. In addition, this guideline refers to but does not detail the quantitative methods designed to evaluate the impacts on personnel and structures after an outside loss of containment of hazardous materials. These methods are described in more detail in other references [e.g., API RP 752, API RP 753, API RP 756, CCPS 1999b, CCPS 2009a, and CCPS 2012b].
The information provided in this guideline will help those deciding: 1) on locations for new facilities (a “location selection” team); and, 2) on the layout and separation distances of process units and their associated equipment within the facility (“process unit layout” and “equipment layout” teams). It is important that the decisions made by these teams are consistent with the company’s risk tolerance levels, since locating facilities and the processes within a facility may affect potential risks to the facility’s infrastructure, to the facility’s security, to the surrounding community, and to the environment.
The costs, complexity and safety of process operations and maintenance are highly dependent on the location of the facility and the layout of the process units and their equipment within the facility. Since building inherently safer design into a facility’s layout can help reduce both the operational costs and the process complexity, it makes sense to locate a facility and choose the layout for the equipment using inherently safer design principles early when designing the process. Note that changing the process design may not be feasible once the project is approved since such changes may delay the approved project schedule and business objectives to meet the projected market demand. Although it is beyond the scope of this guideline to address cost-benefit analyses, there may be costly design changes once the facility is constructed if the siting and layout issues are not addressed early. Optimal siting of facilities, and subsequent process unit and equipment layout within them, helps minimize material and construction costs, and more importantly, helps minimize losses throughout the facility’s life cycle with potentially less physical/structural damages and decreased business interruption time.
1.2 A SITING AND LAYOUT APPROACH
This guideline describes a preferred approach used to ensure that new or modified facilities consider essential issues early in the process of searching for the location. This can help avoid issues that may become costly short-term project-related design changes, may involve costly changes during construction, or may become costly long term operating and maintenance issues once the facility is built. This siting philosophy begins first with a review of the material and processing hazards, such as toxicity, flammability, explosivity, reactivity, or a combination of these hazards. Other potential hazards should also be considered since they may be unacceptable to the surrounding community, such as odors, loud noises, or the light from flares.
Once the types of hazards have been identified, their potential off-site and on-site impacts can be addressed. This step includes determining how the local terrain affects the release scenarios (the ultimate impact on the surrounding community), emergency responder accessibility, and security accessibility (the risks at the facility’s boundary). At the same time, the layout of the process units and associated areas within the facility, such as storage tank areas or flares, should be arranged to reduce risks. The layout of the equipment, including both their orientation and the separation distances between them, may affect both off-site and on-site consequences, as well. Since the layout of equipment can affect day-to-day operations, it is important to address the balance between reduced or increased distances and the impact on accessibility when evaluating the on-site consequences. The illustration in Figure 1.1 provides a high level view of this inter- related approach, beginning with understanding the hazards and potential consequences, understanding the effects of the location’s terrain, and then understanding both the potential off- site and on-site impacts due to process unit and equipment layout and accessibility.
Figure 1.1. A Siting and Layout Approach
1.3 HOW TO USE THIS GUIDELINE
This guideline is written to provide a starting point when deciding on locations for new facilities. Once the location has been determined, guidance is provided when evaluating and determining the layout of, and separation distances between, process units and their associated equipment within the new location, as well the locations of buildings intended for personnel occupancy or for housing critical equipment. The preferred sequence for these decision-making steps is shown in the chapter chronology outlined in
Table 1.1, with the objectives of the corresponding appendices (including the checklists) for each of these chapters noted in Table 1.2.
Table 1.1. Objectives for the Guideline Chapters
Guideline Chapter
Chapter Objective
1
Introduction
Describes the scope of this Guideline: to provide information on how to select a facility's location, how to identify and assess potential long-term risks, and how to layout the process units and equipment within the new facility location.
2
Benefits Overview
Describes the benefits of combining and applying inherently safer principles and the barrier concepts when addressing the siting and layout of facilities.
3
Identifying the Process Hazards and Risks
Describes what process safety information is needed when performing preliminary hazards analyses of the new process or processes. The hazards and their risks are then used by the location selection team (Chapter 4), the process unit layout team (Chapter 5), and the equipment layout team (Chapter 6).
4
Selecting a Facility Location
Describes who should be included on the location selection team, some potential project-related issues, and how to select a facility location when evaluating and comparing both the pros and cons of the potential location and its surroundings.
5
Selecting Process Unit Layout within a Facility
Describes how the process hazards and risks and the proposed facility's topography, environment and surroundings influence the layout of the process units within the facility.
6
Selecting Equipment Layout within a Process Unit
Describes how the process hazards and risks and the potential operating and maintenance accessibility issues influence the layout of the equipment within the process units.
7
Managing Changes
Describes how to manage process and equipment layout changes.
8
Case Studies
Shares examples of incidents which had severe consequences due, in part, to inadequate consideration and handling of siting and layout issues.
Table 1.2. Objectives for the Guideline’s Appendices and Checklists
Appendix
Appendix Objective
A
Additional Siting and Layout References
Provides list of potential resources for additional information on siting and layout of facilities (Chapter 1)
B
CCPS Recommended Distance Tables for Siting and Layout of Facilities
Helps provide distance guidance for fire consequences between equipment and is based on compiled industry data (Chapters 2 through 8)
C
Checklist When Identifying the Process Hazards and Risks
Helps the selection and layout teams identify the types of process hazards and risks associated with the new or expanded facility (Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6)
D
Checklist When Selecting a Facility Location
Helps the location selection team assess and compare both the pros and cons of the potential location and its surroundings (Chapter 4)
E
Checklist When Selecting the Process Unit Layout within a Facility
Helps the process unit layout team assess potential geographical and environmental issues at the new location (Chapter 5)
F
Checklist When Selecting the Equipment Layout within a Process Unit
Helps the equipment layout team assess potential operating and maintenance accessibility issues within the process unit (Chapter 6)
This guideline is written to help answer these questions:
What principles are used to decide on the location and layout of a new or expanded facility?
What critical information is required to select an appropriate location for a facility?
How is the siting of a facility chosen based on both its location and its surroundings?
How are security concerns addressed at a new facility?
How does the facility’s topography, environment and its surroundings, combined with the process hazards and risks, affect the layout of the process units within the facility?
How are the operations and maintenance affected by the layout of the equipment within the process units?
How can the equipment layout within the process unit be optimized?
How are new equipment layout issues managed when space is limited at an existing facility?
What steps ensure that future process and equipment changes do not increase the overall operating risks?
1.4 THE PROTECTION LAYERS
The layout of process units at a facility, the layout of the equipment within a process unit, and the siting of a facility provide different safeguards (barriers) when managing process safety risks. The process unit and equipment layout can be considered a part of the processing design, with the distances between processes and equipment used to separate hazardous material and energy sources from one another. These distances may help reduce the impact of fires and explosions by separating the hazards and helping prevent them from propagating into adjacent areas, subsequently worsening the consequences of the event. The facility’s location can also be considered as a barrier when evaluating potential off-site consequences. For example, the location can be selected to help reduce the likelihood of potential receptors in the surrounding communities “ people, environment, and property ” from being exposed to the hazardous consequences of toxic releases.
The siting and layout related protection layers for “facility siting,” “process unit layout,” and “equipment layout” are illustrated by the enhanced barrier image shown in Figure 1.2. The sequencing of these protection layers, from inside the facility to the surrounding community (Barriers 1 through 10), begins with applying inherently safer design principles, addresses the equipment and process unit layout, addresses both the preventive and mitigative engineering and administrative controls, and then finishes with the facility’s location.
Figure 1.2. A Facility’s Protection Layers
Inherent in Barrier 1 is the final process chemistry which is used to determine the types of equipment needed to convert the materials, handle the energies, and monitor and respond to the processing conditions. The inherently safer design principles, such as using a less hazardous conditions or ensuring proper separation distances between equipment, are a part of Barrier 1 shown in Figure 1.2. The process design influences the equipment designed to manage the hazards with this ultimate goal: to keep the hazardous materials under control and prevent their loss of containment. Note that a passive safeguard against incident escalation (the domino effect) includes selecting less hazardous processes and the layout of and separation distances between hazardous process units (noted as part of Barrier 7).
The “Process Safety Systems,” noted as Barrier 2, are the administrative controls of the management systems in a typical process safety and risk management program that help prevent systemic failures in the safeguards identified to help reduce the process safety risks. These management systems, in part, focus on sustaining the equipment design integrity with protocols that address the basic elements in a Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) program [CCPS 2007a]. The objectives of these elements include identifying and assessing process hazards, designing and operating safe processes, analyzing and managing process hazards and risks, maintaining reliable equipment and facilities, anticipating and responding to incidents, ensuring organizational capabilities, monitoring process safety system performance, and planning and implementing changes safely [Klein 2017]. Barrier 2 includes the inspection, testing, and maintenance plans and procedures to ensure that the engineered barriers are in place and that they do not degrade over time, and that the equipment integrity is not jeopardized during the facility’s life span. Barrier 2 also includes the training and development of people to ensure their competencies when doing their tasks.
Preventive and mitigative engineered and administrative controls, shown in Barriers 3 through 7, include control systems, procedures, alarms, interlocks, and both active and passive physical protection systems [CCPS 2001, CCPS 2014a, FM Global 7-43, and UK HSE 2015]. Although the most effective process and equipment design should prevent the initiation of a hazardous event, applying inherently safer designs can also reduce the potential for such an event to escalate. Fewer, and most likely simpler, engineering and administrative controls will be needed in Barriers 3 through 7. The separation distances between process units can be considered as a part of Barrier 7, with the distance between the hazardous process units being a passive “physical” barrier. Thus, applied inherently safer design principles can limit the event sequence across the barriers before there are major impacts on people, property, or the environment, both on-site and off-site [CCPS 2008a].
The facility’s internal and external emergency response systems reflect implementation of its emergency response plan (Barriers 8 and 9 in Figure 1.2). The location of the facility (its siting) helps reduce off-site consequences by selecting an inherently safer location (Barrier 10). Hence, the location of the facility is an important barrier, helping to protect the surrounding community from potential impacts of the facility’s hazards. Further discussion on land use guidance for Barrier 10 is provided in Chapter 4, Section 4.7.
There are many preventive, mitigative, and damage limiting strategies used to reduce process safety risks of fires, explosions, toxic releases, and hazardous reactions. These strategies include, but are not limited to:
selecting inherently safer designs,
selecting safe distances to reduce congestion and confinement,
preventing hazardous conditions,
mitigating hazardous consequences,
eliminating ignition sources,
establishing Hazardous Area / Zone Classification boundaries,
providing fire protection,
providing hazardous atmosphere detection systems,
providing explosion suppression systems,
providing enclosures for processes and equipment handling highly toxic materials
providing overpressure relief and venting,
providing purging systems (i.e., to reduce the oxygen concentration in areas with potentially flammable, combustible dust or explosive atmospheres), and
providing remotely operated controls for emergency response.
It is worth noting at this point, that many companies have developed upon and applied the concept that efforts to reduce risk should be continued until the incremental sacrifice (cost, time, effort, or other expenditure of resources) is grossly disproportionate to the incremental risk reduction achieved. The terms As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), have been used to describe this concept. Since the development, adoption and application of ALARP by a company is beyond the scope of this guideline; the reader should reference the literature for more guidance [e.g., UK HSE 2001, Ellis 2003, Baybutt 2014, UK HSE 2016a, and UK HSE 2016b].
1.5 TERMINOLOGY
The terminology used in this guideline is defined as follows:
A “complex” is a collection of facilities that may or may not be owned by the same company, but are located within the contiguous boundaries of a specific geographic location, such as an industrial or chemical park. A facility within a complex may feed or take raw materials from another facility in the complex or may be totally independent of its industrial neighbors.
A “facility” contains one or more process units and other manufacturing areas within a single geographical location – within the company’s boundary limit or property line. In context of this guideline, a “facility” may also be referred to as an “establishment” in some jurisdictions. It is the physical location where the manufacturing process is performed, such as a chemical or refining facility, or where materials are handled, transferred or stored, such as terminals, wharves, or distribution centers. Areas within the facility may have their own support groups or they may share support groups with other areas. Support groups may include administrative or engineering offices, maintenance, warehousing, shipping, fire station, medical, and security. Areas for employee and contractor parking should be addressed at the facility, as well, with larger facilities using dedicated buses to transport them within the facility (i.e., during outages and turnarounds with extensive process unit work). Different processing areas within a facility may have different hazards and risks, such as a chemical processing area which is connected directly to a refining area.
A “process unit” is a part of a “process area” dedicated to a common purpose. The process area contains equipment (e.g., pipes, pumps, valves, vessels, reactors, and supporting structures) intended to transfer, process or store materials [CCPS Glossary]. Hazardous process units have the potential for runaway reactions, toxic releases, fires, and explosions. For example: a fuels process unit that produces materials for blending gasoline; a lubricating oil blending process unit; a tank farm area supporting a refinery, chemical operation or both; a pier, dock, jetty, or wharf receiving raw materials and loading products; a processing and pellet silo storage area; or a pipeline pumping station. An illustration of process units in different process areas is shown in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3. Guideline Terminology
A “train” or “process section” is an area within a process unit containing combination of processing equipment that is focused on a single operation (see Figure 1.3.) For example, a refrigeration system that supplies a frozen food operation; a crude distillation tower; a water treatment system that chlorinates waste-water effluent from a waste disposal facility; a polyethylene unit; or a batch reactor train.
A “utility” is an energy or services supplier, including electricity, instrument air, lubricating systems, steam or heating medium, fuels (oil, gas, etc.), refrigeration, cooling water or cooling medium, and inert gases. Some facilities may also include waste treatment facilities in this category, as they may supply energy and are connected to portions of the facility (i.e., incinerators).
The term “greenfield” describes undeveloped property being considered as a location for a new facility that has not been used before for either commercial or industrial purposes.
The term “brownfield” describes an industrial or commercial property being considered as a location for a new facility or for redevelopment. This is land that has been previously used, abandoned, and now awaits a new use. If the brownfield property has older structures or existing contamination issues, they will need to be addressed before renovation or new construction occurs. If the brownfield land is adjacent to an operating process unit, simultaneous operations (SimOps) issues will need to be addressed, as well. Additional SimOps discussion is provided in Chapter 5, Section 5.6.2, Planning for phased construction.
The term “grassroots” describes a totally new facility that may be built on a greenfield or a brownfield.
The term
