In legal defense of national rights E-Book

Derya Yalimcan

• Herausgeber: BoD - Books on Demand
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Deutsch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025

Beschreibung

A Democracy would not endorse a system that would abolish and render obsolete those very democratic institutions. But how can a resilient Democracy defend itself against multifaced unlawful attacks?

Leseprobe

Contents:

PART I. - STATE OF ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

PART II. LITIGATIONS AND LEGAL MATTERS

PART III. - LUCIUS CASSIUS

PART IV. IN DEFENSE OF NATIONAL RIGHTS

TEIL I. - STAAT ISRAEL UND ZIONISMUS

TEIL II. PROZESSE UND RECHTSANGELEGENHEITEN

TEIL III. - LUCIUS CASSIUS

TEIL IV. ZUR VERTEIDIGUNG DES NATIONALEN RECHTS

IN LEGAL DEFENSEOFNATIONAL RIGHTS

THE STATE OF ISRAEL’S EFFORTS TO COUNTERACT THE

|English |German | Edition © Derya Yalimcan September 2025

" Those who do not know their history are doomed to repeat it."

– often attributed to George Santayana, a Spanish-American philosopher.

Preface

In the very first weeks of law studies, every law student will learn the concept of “Pacta Sund Servanda.” “Agreements must be kept”. This holistic framework of law is the foundation of our entire civilization.

Is it just a phrase of law simulation, or can we rely on that? Are war and politics superior to law? The Hague Convention on Land Warfare is a regulatory framework for war on Land.1

There are many challenges to master, but one that stands out is the mistreatment of our civilization's consensus regarding law.

The so-called enlightened Christian world which is rooted by the ethical values of the Jewish law but also the Islamic world is confronted with this, where certain segments of human civilization believe public international law is not applicable to them and that they can exist in parallel structures to law, where law enforcement is obsolete since power is superior to law.

This step backwards in the direction of the non-ethical Hammurabi Codex makes mankind become a very endangered species.2 lawlessness is equal to no civilization and anarchy.

Derya Yalimcan, Berlin, September 16, 2025

1 Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907 https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp?utm_source=chatgpt.com

2 The Code of Hammurabi is one of the earliest and most complete written legal codes in human history, dating to around 1754 BCE in ancient Mesopotamia. It was enacted by King Hammurabi of Babylon, who ruled from 1792 to 1750 BCE.

PART I. - STATE OF ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

CURRENT EVENTS AND PARADIGM SHIFT

A Democracy would not endorse a system that would abolish and render obsolete those very democratic institutions. But how can a resilient Democracy defend itself against multifaced unlawful attacks? 3

The Self-Perception of the Leftist Fascist: A Paradox of Belonging and Displacement

The ideological posture of the leftist fascist is marked by a distinct self-perception; wherein certain narratives of historical guilt and postcolonial critique are rigidly upheld:

Jews and the State of Israel are framed as colonial usurpers, whose presence is deemed illegitimate even in the very territories of their ancestral and natal origins.

Americans are depicted as occupiers, having seized and retained the lands of Indigenous peoples for over five centuries.

White South Africans, despite having resided on the continent for four centuries, are similarly delegitimized as foreign settlers with no rightful claim to their place of birth.

Given these premises, a striking and unavoidable question arises:

If such long-term habitation and historical rootedness are insufficient to establish belonging, then by what logic are walk-in refugees - many of whom arrived within the last decade - immediately and unquestionably regarded as integral members of the Western world?

Are we to assume that automatic entitlement to residency, citizenship, and full participation in Western civic and cultural life is to be granted-irrespective of legal status, documentation, or mode of entry? Is their presence in Europe and North America to be considered inviolable, even in cases of illegal immigration? Moreover, does this ideological framework permit the establishment of parallel cultural and religious infrastructures by those who have not formally entered the social contract through recognized legal or democratic processes?

This profound asymmetry invites critical examination-not only of the inconsistencies within leftist anti-colonial rhetoric, but also of the deeper contradictions in contemporary Western identity politics and border ethics.

These questions are not borne of racism-they stem from realism. They challenge the internal contradictions of modern discourse, wherein centuries-long presences are delegitimized, yet recent arrivals are granted immediate and unquestioned legitimacy. This is not a matter of ethnic bias, but rather of coherence in the principles of citizenship, sovereignty, and civic belonging.

Why do leftist authoritarians and religious fundamentalists-often aligning under strange ideological alliances-assume that their worldview is the sole legitimate moral framework? Why is dissent from their orthodoxy so often met not with dialogue, but with denunciation?

As democrats, we must not be cowed into silence by ideological absolutism-whether it comes in the garb of postcolonial rhetoric or religious zealotry. Instead, we are called to reflect seriously on the institutional mechanisms of democratic nations:

What constitutes lawful and meaningful belonging?

What are the boundaries of tolerance without undermining the rule of law?

Can a society remain democratic if it is shamed into forfeiting its legal and cultural foundations?

To sustain the integrity of democratic systems, we must protect both the spirit of openness and the sovereignty of law. Realism, not romanticism, must guide our response to the complex challenges of integration, migration, and collective identity. As democrats, we are compelled to reflect deeply on the mechanisms that sustain democratic nations. Democracy, contrary to some prevailing dogmas, does not mean the annihilation of one’s own legal order, national identity, or cultural continuity. Rather, it is a system rooted in law, pluralism, and sovereign self-determination - not in self-erasure. In this context, special attention must be paid to the resistance movements in Poland, Hungary, and Israel - nations that have chosen to safeguard their unique cultural identity in the face of mounting pressures to conform to a homogenized global ideology. Is it truly a crime for Israel to defend its population, its territorial integrity, and its cultural heritage against non-democratic actors - whether through armed incursions, ideological subversion, or economic coercion? To suggest that national self-preservation is inherently reactionary or unjust is to misunderstand the very essence of democracy. Democracy is not the surrender of sovereignty. It is the right of a people to govern themselves, protect their values, and chart their future - without external imposition, and without being shamed for existing.

German Basic Law § 20(4) it states:

Article 20 – Constitutional Principles:

(4)

“All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.

Many democratic nations have similar paragraphs enshrined in their Constitution.

The following provides a legal-philosophical analysis of the question whether, in a predominantly socio-anthropologically shaped, secularized society, secular state law and its philosophical justification should be regarded as superior to legally binding religious orders and their respective philosophy. It examines which normative hierarchy can be justified within modern constitutional and human rights regimes and the associated public reason.

Secularity and Social Anthropology: Fundamental Assumptions In modern pluralistic democracies, state sovereignty is typically founded on the principle of a public legal order that does not rely directly on religious dogmas but on reasons accessible to all and anthropological insights into human coexistence. Secularity in this sense does not connote rejection of religion but rather the separation between religious justification and state legitimacy of political action. From a socio-anthropological perspective, legal norms are understood as expressions of cultural, historical, and social practices developed from experiences of human social life.

Foundations of Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Natural Law, and Legitimacy

Within legal philosophy, three fundamental positions can be distinguished: legal positivism, natural law, and discoursetheoretical models.

Legal positivism primarily conceives law as a system of norms enacted by a legitimately constituted legislator, whose validity depends not on moral or religious content but on formal legislation and institutions.

Natural law approaches postulate a supra-positive, morally normative order that precedes positive law and can condition or critique its validity. Modern secular variants often refer to human dignity, equality, and liberty as anthropological fundamental rights.

Discourse-theoretical and deliberative models emphasize that legitimacy of political norms arises from a public-rational discourse. Religious arguments may enter this discourse but must be translated into generally comprehensible form to hold within public reason.

In a secular constitutional order, a synthesis often occurs law is formally based on democratic processes yet refers to suprapositive fundamental rights grounded in anthropological or universal legal reasoning.

Constitutional Order in Modern States

In modern constitutional states, typically: the constitution and fundamental rights stand at the apex; legislation is enacted by democratic institutions bound by constitutional provisions; the judiciary safeguards constitutional conformity and human rights standards, which are generally justified on secularanthropological grounds. Religious communities often enjoy rights to free exercise of religion and self-administration, provided they do not contravene constitutional principles.

International Order and Human Rights

International human rights instruments establish secular foundational principles. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims universal rights without direct religious’ justification and guarantees freedom of religion, while ensuring that no right (including religious rights) may undermine existing human rights.

Legal Pluralism and Coexistence of Orders

Legal pluralism recognizes that alongside state law, social norms and religious prescriptions exist. However, in secular democracies, the primacy of state law in public affairs prevails, while religious norms operate subsidiarily in the private sphere.

Public Reason and Inclusion of Religious Arguments Deliberative democratic theories require that arguments in public debates be presented in a way comprehensible to all reasonable citizens. Religious convictions may motivate but must be translated into secular terms to secure legitimacy.

Conflict Cases and Priority of Secular Law

When conflict arises between religious prescriptions and state norms, secular states generally enforce state law, as it is democratically legitimized and protects fundamental rights.

Practical Implications for Multilateral Structures

In multilateral forums, a secular, universal human rights order predominates. Religion is recognized as an individual freedom but not as a basis for binding global norms.

Evaluation

Formal primacy of secular law: state law is primary; religious norms operate subsidiarily in private. Religious norms primarily impose obligations of conscience and may supply impulses but cannot replace public norm-setting. Human rights are grounded in secular-anthropological reasoning; many religious values correspond substantively yet remain subject to democraticlegislative and judicial scrutiny. Deliberative inclusion of religious arguments requires translation into generally accessible reasons. Global institutions rely on secular human rights principles.

On these statements we all may agree in the West.

But...

In the face of current events, where propaganda suppress law and jurisprudence, it becomes imperative to elucidate a few concepts of Islamic law and methodology about war and peace to the audience.

The issue at hand is a structural one, and the clash of civilizations, as posited by Huntington, is not a mere academic discourse.

Facts and definitions:

Territorial History

1250-1516: Mamluk4 Sultanate

Jerusalem was ruled by the Mamluk Sultanate, based in Cairo. It was not a provincial capital but part of the larger Damascus province. The Mamluks appointed a local governor in Jerusalem and emphasized the city's Islamic character by building and restoring religious institutions. Non-Muslims, such as Jews and Christians, were allowed to live in the city under protected but restricted status.

1187–1250: Ayyubid Dynasty

The Ayyubids, founded by Saladin5, recaptured Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187. They allowed Jews to return and Eastern Christians to remain. Jerusalem was under Ayyubid control and linked administratively to Damascus and Cairo.

1099-1187: Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem

Established after the First Crusade, this Latin Christian kingdom made Jerusalem its capital. The Crusaders expelled or killed most Muslims and Jews when they took the city in 1099. The city was governed by Latin kings and bishops, with Roman Catholicism as the state religion.

638–1099: Early Islamic Caliphates

Jerusalem came under Muslim control in 638 under Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab. The city was part of the military district of Palestine (Jund Filastin)6, with administrative centers elsewhere, such as Ramla. The Umayyads built the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque. Later, the Abbasid and Fatimid caliphates ruled the city with varying degrees of control.

Before 638: Byzantine Empire

Jerusalem was part of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire. It was a Christian city under imperial rule and part of the province of Palaestina Prima.7 Christianity was dominant, especially after Emperor Constantine. Important churches like the Church of the Holy Sepulchre were built during this time.

Summary Timeline:

Before 638: Byzantine Empire 638–1099: Islamic Caliphates (Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid)

1099–1187: Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem

1187–1250: Ayyubid Dynasty

1250–1516: Mamluk Sultanate

1516 onward: Ottoman Empire

From 1516 to 1864, Jerusalem belonged to the Eyalet of Damascus. This was after the Ottomans conquered the Mamluk Sultanate. Jerusalem functioned as a district (called a sanjak) within this province. It was administered by sub-governors under the authority of the governor in Damascus.

In 1864, the Ottoman Empire introduced the Vilayet Law as part of the Tanzimat reforms. The Eyalet of Damascus was reorganized into the Vilayet of Syria (also known as the Vilayet of Damascus). Jerusalem remained a sanjak within this new administrative structure and continued to report to the provincial capital in Damascus.

However, due to the increasing importance of Jerusalem on the international stage-especially because of Christian pilgrimages, growing European consular presence, missionary activities, and the rise of Jewish immigration-the Ottoman government decided to reorganize its status.

In 1872, Jerusalem was separated from the Vilayet of Syria and made into its own mutasarrifate (a special administrative district). This new district was governed directly from Istanbul. The aim was to reduce interference from regional authorities and to allow the central government to manage foreign influence and religious tensions more directly.

Summary: 1516–1864: Jerusalem was part of the Eyalet of Damascus as a district (sanjak).

1864–1872: Jerusalem was part of the Vilayet of Syria (Damascus) as a district.

From 1872 onward: Jerusalem became a separate mutasarrifate reporting directly to Istanbul.

The Ottoman Province of Jerusalem (Kudüs-i Şerif Mutasarrıflığı) was a special administrative district of the Ottoman Empire, established in 1872. It held unique importance due to the religious and political significance of Jerusalem.

1. Administrative Structure: The province was called a “mutasarrifate,” which means it was governed by a mutasarrıf (district governor). Unlike other districts, it did not report to a provincial governor but was directly under the authority of the central government in Istanbul. This made it a strategically autonomous region.

Territory: It included the cities of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Bethlehem, Hebron, Gaza, and Beersheba. The province bordered the Vilayet of Beirut to the north, the Vilayet of Damascus to the northeast, and Egypt (under British control after 1882) to the southwest. It also had a coastline along the Mediterranean Sea.

3. Religious and International Importance: Jerusalem was one of the four holy cities of Islam, and also sacred to Jews and Christians. Because of this, many European powers had religious and political interests in the area. France protected Catholic interests, Russia backed Orthodox Christians, Britain and Germany supported Protestant missions, and the Jewish population began to grow due to immigration.

Population: During Ottoman times (1516–1917), the inhabitants of the region historically known as Palestine (largely corresponding to the area of the mutasarrifate of Jerusalem, as well as parts of the Vilayets of Damascus and Beirut) were not referred to by a single ethnicnational term like “Palestinians” in the modern sense. Instead, identification was primarily religious, local, and administrative. By Religion and Community

The primary identifier under the Ottoman system was religious affiliation, not ethnicity or nationality. This system was known as the Millet system.

Inhabitants were typically referred to as: Muslim subjects (ahl al-Islam, or more specifically Arab Muslims, if needed)

Greek Orthodox Christians (Rum millet)

Armenians (Ermeni millet)

Jews (Yahudi millet)

Catholics (Latin millet, often under French protection)

So someone might be called a Muslim from Jerusalem, a Christian from Nablus, or a Jew from Hebron - not a "Palestinian" in the modern national sense.

The population was diverse, including Muslims, Christians (of many denominations), and Jews. By the late 19th century, Jewish re-immigration increased, especially from Eastern Europe and

North Africa.

The Term “Filastini” (Palestinian)

The adjective “Filastini” existed in classical Arabic and was used culturally or geographically, e.g., a scholar from Filastin, or dates from Filastin.

However, “Filastini” was not used as a common identity term for the people themselves until the late 19th to early 20th century, as Arab nationalism and anti-colonial identity movements began to take shape.

Before that, the idea of a Palestinian national identity did not exist in a modern sense.

Special Status:

The Ottoman government kept this province under close control to manage foreign influence and religious tensions. It was too politically sensitive to be part of a larger province like Damascus or Beirut.

End of Ottoman Rule:

Ottoman control ended in December 1917 when British forces under General Allenby captured Jerusalem during World War I. The province was later replaced by the British Mandate for Palestine under the League of Nations.

Late Ottoman Period (1870s–1917): Early Local Patriotism Newspapers, literary journals, and local associations began using terms like ahl Filastin (people of Palestine) or Filastini to describe people from the region.

The first known use of “Filastini” in a self-referential sense appears in Arabic-language newspapers like Falastin (founded in Jaffa in 1911).

However, the term still functioned more geographically than nationally-similar to saying "Syrian" (Shami) or "Egyptian" (Masri) at the time.

Arab intellectuals within the Nahda (Arab cultural renaissance) promoted regional pride, including for Bilad al-Sham and Filastin, especially in cities like Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Nablus.

The term “Filastini” began appearing in local newspapers and literature in the late 19th century, especially from the 1870s onward, as part of a growing cultural and regional consciousness. However, it did not yet imply a distinct national identity. A clearly defined Palestinian national identity began to emerge between 1917 and 1922, during the British Mandate, as a response to political developments like Zionism, colonial rule, and the Balfour Declaration. From this period onward, “Filastini” came to signify not just geographic origin, but a politically and culturally distinct Arab identity.

Question of Territorial Legitimacy in Historical Palestine:

To what extent can it be asserted that Arab populations possess superior or exclusive rights to the land historically known as Palestine, relative to other ethnic, religious, or national communities that have inhabited the territory across millennia? On what historical, legal, moral, or political grounds-if any-might such a preferential claim be substantiated?

This question invites rigorous examination of several dimensions:

Historical Continuity: While Arab presence in the region dates back to the 7th-century Islamic conquest, Jewish, Samaritan, and Christian communities preceded it by centuries, with welldocumented civilizational and cultural roots in the land.

Demographic Majority: Arab-Muslim populations did constitute a demographic majority from the early Islamic period through the Ottoman era. However, demographic shifts - especially in the 19th and 20th centuries - complicate claims based solely on majority status.

Legal Sovereignty: Under Ottoman rule (1516–1917), the region was not recognized as a sovereign Arab entity. Following World War I, the British Mandate incorporated the Balfour Declaration, recognizing Jewish national aspirations. The legal status of Arab claims must therefore be weighed against evolving international law, including League of Nations instruments and subsequent UN resolutions.

Cultural and Linguistic Integration: The Arab identity in Palestine is undeniably deep-rooted, reflected in language, traditions, and religious institutions. However, the land has also hosted significant Jewish, Christian, Armenian, and Druze, as well as Bahai heritages-all of which contribute to its plural character.