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In Statu Nascendi is a peer-reviewed journal that aspires to be a world-class scholarly platform encompassing original academic research dedicated to the circle of Political Philosophy, Cultural Studies, Theory of International Relations, Foreign Policy, and the political Decision-making process. The journal investigates specific issues through a socio-cultural, philosophical, and anthropological approach to raise a new type of civic awareness about the complexity of contemporary crisis, instability, and warfare situations, where the “stage-of-becoming” plays a vital role. Issue 2021:2 comprises, amongst others, the following articles: · Culture as Understood in the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Hans-Georg Gadamer · Literature as a Modern Art (Letërsiasi art modern) · Aristotle’s Phronesis and Socratic Skepticism: A Starting Point for the Development of Applied Ethics · The 30th Anniversary of the Visegrád Group (V4) Seen through the Perspective of Selected Integrationist Theories · Book Review: Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm Evolving Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria by Philip Gamaghelyan
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Seitenzahl: 361
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2021
ibidem Press, Stuttgart
In Statu Nascendi (ISN) is a peer-reviewed journal that aspires to be a world-class scholarly platform encompassing original academic research dedicated to the circle of Political Philosophy, Cultural Studies, Theory of International Relations, Foreign Policy, and the political Decision-making process. The journal investigates specific issues through a socio-cultural, philosophical, and anthropological approach to raise a new type of civic awareness about the complexity of contemporary crisis, instability, and warfare situations, where the “stage-of-becoming” plays a vital role.
Any views expressed in this publication are the views of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the editorial board of this journal. In Statu Nascendi is committed to freedom, liberty, and pluralism of opinions and endeavors to contribute to unconstrained public discourse and debate on relevant social, political and philosophical matters.
ISN welcomes all types of partnership and collaboration for fostering a knowledge-based society, organizing events and framing new projects. If you are an academic institution, research institute andinvestigation team or group, a non-profitorganization, research center, research funder and you are willing to become a long-term partner for ISN’s activities, please contact us on [email protected], and we will get back to you as soon as we can.
More information about ISN, including information on the editorial board, membership information, and on all our initiatives can be found on the ISN website at
https://irinstatunascendi.wixsite.com/journal
Editor of this volume:
PIOTR PIETRZAK,In Statu Nascendi (Editor-in-chief)
ISN Editorial Board:
KOUMPAROUDIS EVANGELOS, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria
MARCIN GRABOWSKI, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
ZORAN KOJCIC, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria
JOSEPH THOMAS MILBURN, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria
STAVROS S. PANAGIOTOU, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria
PIOTR PIETRZAK,In Statu Nascendi (Editor-in-chief)
GALINA RAYKOVA, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria
VENERA RUSSO, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria
MAGDALENA TOMALA, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland
BÁLINT LÁSZLÓ TÓTH Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
KRZYSZTOF ŻĘGOTA, University of Warmia and Mazury, Olsztyn, Poland
ISN Advisory Board:
TAMARA ALBERTINI, University of Hawaii, US
ABIOLA BAMIJOKO-OKANGBAYE, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria
SOPHIE GRACE CHAPPELL, The Open University, UK
DIMITRIS M. MOSCHOS, Panteion University, Greece
SAMI MEHMETI, Southeast European University, North Macedonia
ANAK AGUNG BANYU PERWITA, President University, Indonesia
IVAN SIMIĆ, Charles University, Czech Republic
In statu nascendi (Latin)
In the process of creation, emerging, becoming
In statu nascendi (Latin)
In the process of creation, emerging, becoming
Contents
Editorial
Part I: Humanitarianism, Conflict Response, International Political and Economic Relations
Elise Varrey United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Haiti (1993–2019)
Piotr Pietrzak Immanuel Kant and Niccolò Machiavelli’s Traditions and the Limits of Approaching Contemporary Conflicts—the Case Study of the Syrian Conflict (2011–Present)
Justyna Stańska The Mental Health of UCAV Drone Operators and Deployed Soldiers: a Comparative Study of PTSD and Moral Injury Using an Example of US Soldiers
Baba Seidu Abdul Rahman The Economic Partnership Agreement in the Context of Globalization and Africa’s Development the Opportunities and the Threats
Bálint L. Tóth Spillover-effects in International Railway Cooperation: The Case of V4 Countries
Piotr Pietrzak Book Review: Philip Gamaghelyan. Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm Evolving Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria
Part II: Philosophy
Stavros S. Panayiotou Aristotle’s Phronesis and Socratic Skepticism: A Starting Point for the Development of Applied Ethics
Saranda Buzhala Literature as a Modern Art (Letërsia si art modern)
Joseph Thomas Milburn Culture as Understood in the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Hans-Georg Gadamer
Stavros S. Panayiotou Hegel’s Notion of Recollection in Comparison to Agnes Heller’s Notion of Imagination
Call for Papers
Previous Editions of the Journal
What We Stand for in Nineteen Different Languages
Dear readers,
Welcome to the second part of the fourth volume of our journal (2021 edition), which accounts for a natural continuation of the previous editions and revisits several recurring themes related to IR theory, politics, philosophy, and literature, which have undoubtedly dominated most of our previous deliberations. It also incorporates a number of important debates related to humanitarianism, conflict response, and international political and economic relations. This volume’s main message is borrowed from King College’s creed “veritas et utilitas”, meaning “truth and usefulness”, which is traditionally intended to be In Statu Nascendi’s principles, for it seems only fair, especially considering all of the authors who have decided to publish with us so far, both in this edition and it the previous ones.
Our Humanitarianism, Conflict Response, and International Political and Economic Relations section begins with the exceptionally fascinating and comprehensive piece on the United Nations peacekeeping missions in Haiti (1993–2019) by Elise Varrey, followed by my short piece that accounts for a brief introduction to Immanuel Kant’s and Niccolò Machiavelli’s traditions while investigating the limits of approaching contemporary conflicts from the perspective of the Syrian conflict (2011–present). This is followed by a very thought-provoking and informative insight into the mental health of UCAV drone operators and deployed soldiers: a comparative study of PTSD and moral injury using an example of US soldiers, by Justyna Stańska. Consequently, Baba Seidu Abdul Rahman offers us a remarkable opportunity to investigate the economic partnership agreement in the context of globalization and Africa’s development. This is followed by Bálint L. Tóth,who touches upon a very critical issue of spillover effects in international railway cooperation: the case of the Vysehrad Four countries. Finally, in the last pages of this section, the author of this editorial offers a brief review of a very exceptional and thought-provoking book written by Philip Gamaghelyan entitled Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm Evolving Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria.
The philosophical part is opened up with very wide-ranging insights into Aristotle’s phronesis and Socratic skepticism: a starting point for the development of applied ethics, by Stavros S. Panayiotou, followed by a noteworthy paper discussing literature as modern art, by Saranda Buzhala. Subsequently, Joseph Thomas Milburn launches a very attention-grabbing philosophical debate into the notion of culture as understood by Emmanuel Levinas and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The section concludes with Hegel’s very important notion of recollection in comparison to Agnes Heller’s notion of imagination, discussed by Stavros S. Panayiotou.
Thank you for contributing to our project.This incredible collection of papers and the final composition of this edition was possible thanks to the valuable help and suggestions of: Zoran Kojcic, Joseph Thomas Milburn, Koumparoudis Evangelos, Marcin Grabowski, Stavros S. Panayiotou, Galina Raykova, Venera Russo, Magdalena Tomala, Bálint Tóth, and Krzysztof Żęgota. Thanks to their work In Statu Nascendi(ISN)1can realistically hope to become a nexus of pioneering minds, breaking free of conventions, challenging old dogmas, marking our breakthroughs by presenting posterity and future generations with our own ideas and paradigms that offer diamantine inspiration to all our readers. I really appreciate the opportunity to have worked with the people who make up the Editorial Team of our periodical, for what we have managed to achieve together for the last four years has surpassed my wildest expectations. I am very grateful for your dedication, hard work, and expertise that you bring to this project. I see greatness in each and every one of you. You are exceptional academics in your own right who are perfectly capable of assuming the roles of independent editors of any future editions of this journal.
As a matter of fact, this process has already begun, for there is new blood in our organization, people who are already driving our initiative in completely new directions, for as we speak, Joseph Milburn is working tirelessly to prepare ISN’s special issue, “The Work of Haruki Murakami” (forthcoming in 2022), which will approach the work of this highly influential author in a philosophical manner to create a valuable interdisciplinary dialogue about his extensive and highly important project. I am certain that it will be a great success, so I want to give Joseph a big round of applause for launching this initiative. Naturally, I keep my fingers crossed for Galina Raykova, Venera Russo, and Zoran Kojcic’s forthcomingprojects, but at this stage I am still not at liberty to discuss it in detail.
Let me also take this opportunity to congratulate Koumparoudis Evangelos and Stavros S. Panayiotou for defending their doctoral theses in recent months. I had a great privilege and honor of attending their Ph.D.’s vivas at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski” and I hope that their post-doctorate publications will be published soon, for the research that they have just completed is truly outstanding. Well done to Bálint Tóth for securing a research position at Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Budapest and launching a very influential and informative podcast called “Votes & Seats” that discusses outcomes and voting patterns in recent European parliamentary elections across Europe. I would like to pass on good wishes to Magdalena Tomala and Marcin Grabowski, who are to be congratulated for launching a series of incredible research initiatives at their universities. We will all keep our fingers crossed for the successful completion of Krzysztof Żęgota’s habilitation procedure in November 2021.
My next thank you is reserved for Matthew Gill for his exceptional support with various proofreading jobs over last few years, his professionalism, his honest opinions, and most importantly for the breathtaking speed with which he normally responds. Thanks to Matthew our communication with our readers is becoming much clearer than in 2017 when we embarked on this journey. If you are a writer who needs some support with your papers or dissertations, I strongly recommend you contact him.
I would like to dedicate this volume to Hristiyana Stoyanova, former deputy editor (2019–2021) of our journal, and In Statu Nascendi’s most outstanding performer in 2020. Her level of commitment to helping others remains unprecedented in our organization. We were all very fortunate to have such an inspirational young individual among us for the last four years as she continued to exceed every expectation that we set, and we were always left astounded at her dedication and hard work. Thanks to her commitment to our peer review process, many young academics got their first papers published with us. So, without any further ado, on behalf of our editorial board, I would like to congratulate you on securing the position of support officer at the European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament; we are immensely proud of your achievement.
Finally, my special gratitude goes to Valerie Lange and Christian Schön from ibidem-Verlag, and the unyielding support of their respective teams, and especially to Malisa Mahler, for thanks to their kindness, patience, and professionalism, we can reach out to so many readers in so many remote places all over the world.
Let me reassure you that our initiative will continue to surprise you, for we have already started collecting scholarly papers, book reviews, political commentaries, and polemics for the next issues in 2022 and 2023. We encourage our prospective authors to take part in our great adventure and submit their proposals by the end of the autumn of 2021. So please don’t hesitate to email us with your proposals; I promise that we will get back to you within a reasonable amount of time.
Thank you for purchasing this volume. We hope that you enjoy it.
Yours sincerely,
Piotr Pietrzak
Editor-in-chief
In Statu Nascendi
Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations
Proofread by Matthew Gill
Style: American English
1In Statu Nascendi’s primary objective is to educate, to support the development of scientific and academic research, culture, education, art, international understanding, and environmental protection, and to support the strengthening of civil society in Bulgaria, the European Union, and the world as a whole by giving visibility to people in need, disadvantaged people, stateless persons, people with disabilities, young people and the elderly, communities, and other groups of people who do not enjoy enough presence in this academic discourse. We also hope to develop and promote the activity of the association at the national level. ISN is by the people, for the people, and of the people, which is why we hope to attract more leading experts in their respective fields, as we want to be the first point of reference for academics from the best institutions in the world where they can share the fruits of their work with the outside world.
Abstract: Despite almost twenty-three years of UN presence and six UN peacekeeping operations (1993–2000; 2004–2019), Haiti—the state with the highest number of peacekeeping operations on its territory—remains a failed and weak state, unable to exercise its monopoly of legitimate violence. The country has been plagued by multiple foreign interventions since its independence in 1804. Haiti has since emerged as a nation under siege from outside powers. We will see that the succession of different peacekeeping mandates and their various extensions may have ruled out long-term strategies to help build sustainable and stable institutions. These successions may have reflected a lack of strategic vision, and/or, the expression of power rivalries within the United Nations Security Council.
These peacekeeping operations have focused on primarily political and security imperatives. The objective of establishing a stable and secure environment has remained the watchword for guaranteeing Human Rights and democracy since 1993. While trying to provide a critical assessment of these operations and the notion of security, this article supports the limits of a political-security approach to restore peace in the long term.
Finally, this article demonstrates that the successive political crises and the climate of lasting insecurity have only been symptoms of the conflict. Indeed, this article postulates that Haiti’s chronic instability has mainly been due to the country’s unresolved socio-economic problems. We will try to understand why the socio-economic aspects have been neglected by peacekeeping in favor of the strengthening of national institutions and security. It will also identify the extent to which the UN is resilient and adapts its strategies.
BINUH: United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti
CVR: Community Violence Reduction
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council
HNP: Haitian National Police
MICAH: International Civilian Support Mission to Haiti
MICIVIH: International Civilian Mission in Haiti (UN-OAS)
MINUJUSTH: United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (sixth PKO)
MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (fifth PKO)
MIPONUH: United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (fourth PKO)
OAS: Organization of American States
PKOs: Peacekeeping Operations
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNMIH: United Nations Mission in Haiti (first PKO)
UNOVEH: United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Haitian Elections
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
UNSG: United Nations Secretary-General
UNTMIH: United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (third PKO)
UNSMIH: United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (second PKO)
1990: First democratic elections in the history of Haiti, a process supported by United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Haitian Elections, UNOVEH. Jean-Bertrand Aristide elected president of the Haitian Republic.
September 30, 1991: A military coup in Haiti led by General Raoul Cédras overthrew Aristide.
February 1993–October 1994 (then until April 2000): MICIVIH, a joint OAS/UN mission, International Civilian Mission in Haiti.
September 23, 1993–June 1996: UNMIH, United Nations Mission in Haiti.
July 1996–July 1997: UNSMIH, United Nations Support Mission in Haiti.
August 1997–November 1997: UNTMIH, United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti.
December 1997–March 2000: MIPONUH, United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti.
March 2000–April 2004: No UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti.
February 29, 2004: Insurrections of armed groups, departure of J.B. Aristide.
April 2004–October 2017: MINUSTAH, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.
October 2017–October 15, 2019: MINUJUSTH, United Nations Mission for Justice Support.
October 2019–present: BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, UN special political office in Haiti.
“Union makes strength”: Haiti’s motto seems antinomic in the face of the socio-political unrest that has been tearing the country apart for more than two centuries. The poorest country in the Americas, Haiti, has been plagued by long political turmoil and foreign intervention since its independence on January 1, 1804. Since then, Haiti was deeply marked by authoritarian political regimes until 1990. Yet this small piece of Caribbean Island, then called Santo Domingo, was one of the symbols of the Revolution of the Enlightenment. As the first independent Black Republic, the former French colony of the West Indies has a rich history. In the 18th century, while the French Revolution was in full swing, at the same time, the dream of the Enlightenment enchanted the black slaves and freedmen of the Caribbean Island. On the night of August 22nd to 23rd 1791, a revolt broke out in Santo Domingo. The slaves demanded their freedom and their equality with white citizens; it was the beginning of a long war of independence. The symbol of this struggle was Toussaint Louverture, a freed and literate slave. He dared to defy the First Consul Bonaparte by sending him a letter entitled: “From the First of the Blacks to the First of the Whites.”1 The War of Independence of the colony of Santo Domingo is the only slave revolt that achieved its ends. As M.J. Fanfil rightly notes: “On the scale of the American continent, two centuries of independence cannot be considered a drop in the ocean of time.”2 In this sense, this avant-garde Republic, freed very early from the slave system, has a singular history.
However, despite this unique destiny, the French colonization (1626–1804), the American occupation (1915–1934), the succession of authoritarian regimes, corruption, armed gangs, and drug trafficking are all factors that have contributed to Haiti’s instability over the centuries. Indeed, the revolution did not eradicate tyranny from the Haitian society. Instead, Haiti replicated colonial authoritarian mechanisms and has been perpetuating them ever since. The American author Robert Fatton, a professor at the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, has taken a special interest in the subject. For him, the monarchy and the French colonization are partly responsible for Haiti’s lasting political unrest. Haitian authoritarianism is said to stem from a “complex repertoire of practices, attitudes and behaviors (…) rooted in the material foundations of society” and is said to stem from “the legacy of slavery and the plantation economy inherited from the predatory French colonial system.”3 This legacy is said to have shaped Haitian politics and the form of government in the country over the past two centuries, described by the author as “monarchic presidentialism.” Power struggles and violence have remained the norm in Haiti. Since its independence, thirty coups d’état have destabilized the country.4 The bloody dictatorships of François Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier between 1957 and 1987 illustrate the centuries of authoritarianism that Haiti has experienced. During the Cold War, François Duvalier, alias “Papa Doc,” presented himself as a bulwark against the Castro Cuban regime and could thus count on the support of the United States. However, when François Duvalier proclaimed himself “President for life” in 1965, the United States withdrew its support for the regime.
Against all expectations, a popular revolt overthrew the Duvalierist dictatorship in 1986. This event, unprecedented in Haitian history and almost abnormal5, heralded a new beginning for Haiti. In 1987, a new Constitution was massively adopted. Nevertheless, years of political turbulence and unsuccessful coups d’état followed this event. In 1990, faced with a highly unstable political situation, the Provisional Government, under the leadership of Ertha Pascale Trouillot, requested the United Nations (UN) assistance in organizing democratic elections in a secure environment.6
After a long process, in December 1990, Haiti’s first democratic elections were held under the aegis of the United Nations. The social program of the priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide enabled him to win the elections. A revolution quickly caught up with his past, a military coup d’état led by General Raoul Cédras was successfully completed on September 30, 1991. Imposing a reign of terror, five thousand people died in three years. In exile in the United States, the deposed president demanded action by the United Nations to depose the military junta. With the joint assistance of the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS), the diplomatic process culminated in the signing of the Governors Island Agreement (near New York) on July 3, 1993. This agreement between General Cédras and Jean-Bertrand Aristide provided for a return to constitutional order. In this context, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted in September 1993 the mandate of the first Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) in Haiti: The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Nevertheless, the military junta in power quickly reneged on its commitments. Noting the military’s reversal of position, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a U.S.-led Multinational Force to “Restore Democracy.” 20,000 American soldiers landed in Port-au-Prince to restore President Aristide. It was a success, despite the fact that UNMIH was only able to fully assume its functions when the Multinational Force left in March 1995.
Since then, six peacekeeping operations have been deployed in the country, in two distinct phases: from 1993 to 2000, and, from 2004 to 2019.
During the first phase (1993 to 2000), the Security Council authorized four missions:
The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH, September 23, 1993; March 1995–June 1996);
The United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH, July 1996–July 1997);
The United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH, August–November 1997);
The United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH, December 1997–March 2000).
The second phase began in 2004, the year of the bicentennial of the Haitian Republic, following two armed insurrections. Organized by armed gangs, they led to the fall of President Aristide while he was serving his second term. These events were indicative of the institutional instability that Haiti was experiencing at the time. The Parliament was no longer functional, the authority of the state was becoming increasingly limited, and the Haitian National Police (HNP) was disintegrating. Impunity and massive Human Rights violations dominated the daily lives of Haitians. Faced with this climate close to civil war, the United States and France took up the gauntlet. Under the aegis of the UN Security Council, an Multinational Interim Force led by the United States intervened in Haiti to restore order, while a Haitian transitional government was appointed by international officials. In this context, the UN Security Council inaugurated the second phase of peacekeeping in Haiti by voting the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, April 2004–October 2017), the most well-known PKO in Haiti. This mission was rather unprecedented since it intervened in a country that has experienced neither civil war nor a peace agreement. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan insisted that the operation should go beyond the traditional framework and contribute to nation-building and sustainable development. While the four previous missions were characterized by a relatively short presence (from a few months to less than three years), the MINUSTAH has been deployed for thirteen consecutive years. This operation had to deal with the terrible earthquake of January 12, 2010, a cholera epidemic, and Hurricane Matthew in 2016.
After the MINUSTAH withdrawal, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH, October 2017–October 2019) was the latest PKO deployed in the country. Its departure on October 15, 2019, turned the page on peacekeeping in Haiti and gave way to an integrated political office (BINUH), authorized by the UN Security Council for an initial period of twelve months (October 16, 2019–October 16, 2020).
Between 1948 and 2019, Haiti was the state with the highest number of peacekeeping operations on its territory. Certain states or regions (India and Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, or Western Sahara, for example) have also experienced and are still experiencing missions in the long term. However, Haiti breaks the record numerically, ahead of Angola. One can wonder why, given that Haiti has never experienced a civil war—strictly speaking—on its territory. Did the particularity of the Haitian crises require so many peace operations? In total, thirty-one UN Security Council resolutions have authorized or renewed peacekeeping operations in Haiti from 1993 to 2019.
UN peacekeeping operations, despite their common name, encompass a wide range of activities. The concept of peacekeeping has become increasingly complex since its creation in 1948.7 Two generations of PKOs can be clearly delineated: the first is characterized by traditional missions (during the Cold War) and the second is characterized by multidimensional missions (in the aftermath of the Cold War). With the end of bipolarity between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), peacekeeping underwent a qualitative, quantitative, and normative transformation. 44 operations were deployed in 19 years (1990–2009), compared to 18 operations in 41 years (1948–1989). In this context, we assisted in the multiplication of PKOs but also increasingly complex missions. Sovereignty as a norm appears to be declining in the face of the emergence of the responsibility to protect. The 1990s were a time of hope but also of disillusionment.8 Faced with the multiplication of operations, a new taxonomy of peacekeeping emerged. Taking note of this new environment, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (1992)9 theorized these new activities. It was no longer simply a matter of peacekeeping or even peacemaking, but rather of peace enforcement and peacebuilding. In 2008, The Capstone Doctrine (an internal UN document) summarized the different approaches to peacekeeping.10 With this publication the UN has taken the ambitious step of attempting to capture the experiences of six decades of UN peacekeeping, and more than sixty peacekeeping operations.
According to this document Peacemaking “generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.” Peacemaking in Haiti took place in 1994 when, under the auspices of the UN and the OAS, the Governors Island Agreement was signed. It failed, however Peacekeeping is “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements—military, police and civilian—working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.” In this sense, all Haitian PKOs have integrated peacekeeping elements.
Peace enforcement “involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.” In the Haitian context, coercive action has been used twice: in 1994 with the deployment of the U.S.-led Multinational Force to restore democracy, and in 2004 with the deployment of the Multinational Interim Force, to prevent the outbreak of civil war in the country.
Peacebuilding: the last of the components mentioned by Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 typology, has become the key antidote to long-term peace. This approach “involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner.” By placing the PKOs in Haiti under the banner of development, each PKO has integrated new elements to build a sustainable peace. Each Haitian mission presented the characteristics of an “integrated mission” that is, a mission that coordinates the objectives of all UN agencies on the ground. It should be noted that the boundaries between these different approaches are becoming increasingly blurred and overlapping.11
The first peace operations in Haiti began in 1993, in the aftermath of the Cold War. They were then deployed at a pivotal moment in UN peacekeeping. As part of the first second-generation missions, they were, to some extent, experimental for the United Nations. Thus, we will see that they inaugurated new practices. In this regard, the unprecedented emphasis placed on the security sector reform (SSR) and the privileged place given to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are noticeable. Likewise, in their second phase, the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) Program was innovative. Given its undoubted success, this latest approach has been replicated in other operations and is now a model for the United Nations. Besides, MINUSTAH was the first UN peace operation with a majority of personnel from Latin America.
Patterns can be observed throughout the three decades of PKOs in Haiti. Each of them has been involved in state-building and institution-building. We will demonstrate that the strengthening of the Haitian state and public institutions has been the keystone of peace operations in Haiti from 1993 to 2019. Each of the missions aimed to create, support, and professionalize the Haitian National Police—the only security institution in the country since the dissolution of the Haitian Army in April 1995. Each of the operations also supported the Haitian political process, helping to organize the country’s democratic elections and promoting political dialogue. In this sense, they have all focused on the political-security aspect of Haiti, to the detriment of other aspects.
Changes in the approach to peacekeeping during the various missions are noteworthy. Mainly focused on public security during the first phase, the approach of the last two missions, the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Mission for Justice Support (MINUJUSTH), stands out. The protection of Human Rights was added to the mandate of those last two operations. Prior to 2004, the Human Rights component was carried out by a joint mission of the UN and the OAS, the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH 1993–2000). In addition, the mandates of the MINUSTAH and the MINUJUSTH have generated renewed interest in the reform of the Haitian justice system. The peace efforts of the 1900s had left the justice system reform behind. Finally, we will see that they both combined the “top-down” approach (activities focused on national institutions) and the “bottom-up” approach (activities focused on the grassroots, with the community). In this sense, the MINUSTAH and the MINUJUSTH reflect the evolution of the peacekeeping doctrine since the 1990s and its application in the field.
Moreover, the study of these six operations amounts to an analysis of Haitian politics from 1986 to 2020. During these four decades, the Haitian political turmoil contributed to the chronic instability of the country. Six Presidents have succeeded one another since the establishment of democracy in 1991: Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1991; 1994–1996); René Préval (1996–2001); Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1996–2004), Boniface Alexandre as a provisional President (2004–2006); René Préval (2006–2011); Michel Martelly (2011–2016); Jocelerme Privert as a provisional President (2016–2017); and Jovenel Moïse since February 7, 2017.12 Peacekeeping operations in Haiti, through their electoral support and focus on security, have enabled the first peaceful transition between two democratically elected Presidents, as well as the first democratic transition to an opposition President in 2011.
Despite these achievements, serious political crises have paralyzed Haiti during these decades. From 1997 to 2000, the country was bogged down in a deep political stalemate. From June 1997 to March 1999, Haiti had no Prime Minister or Government. President René Préval refused to extend the mandate of parliamentarians. He ruled the country by decree. Contested elections followed in 2000, bringing Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his new Lanfami Lavalas party to power. Widely criticized and isolated within the international community, J-B Aristide has stalled the Haiti’s democratic process. Moreover, since March 21, 2019, a new unresolved political crisis threatens the stability of the country. Partially mitigated by agreements between the opposition and the ruling government, Haiti has no longer had a functional parliament since January 13, 2020. No government has been authorized within a constitutional framework since March 21, 2019. The current president, Jovenel Moïse, is currently ruling the country by decree. Jovenel Moïse’s continued rule is highly controversial and many Haitians fear a return to autocracy in 2021.
In the face of a process that has failed to improve the lives of most Haitians, these peace operations seem to have led to a sense of disillusionment among the local population. Billions have been invested in Haitian peace for nearly thirty years. Yet the numbers speak for themselves. In 2012, 6 million people, or 60% of the population, were living below the poverty line (World Bank). Haiti is one of the most unequal countries in the world (Gini coefficient) and the poorest of the America. The UN estimates that more than 4.4 million Haitians, or about 40% of the population, will require humanitarian assistance and will be food insecure in 2021.13 Since the summer of 2019, riots and street clashes have become the norm in the country. Haiti’s socio-political crisis is on the verge of exploding.The year 2020 was marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, tropical storm Laura and yet, in April 2021, Haiti still has no COVID-19 vaccines despites its candidacy to the COVAX facility.
The First Phase of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti & the abrupt transition from authoritarian rule to democracy: Haitian political unrest as the driving force behind the UN’s intervention in Haiti to ensure peace (1993 to 2000).
On December 16, 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President of the Haitian Republic in the first round thanks to the assistance of the United Nations Observers for Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH). However, a military putsch overthrew President Aristide on September 30, 1991. In his place, a violent military junta held power until October 1994. The international community strongly condemned the coup, “one of the bloodiest in the history of Haiti.”14
Four months before the coup, on June 5, 1991, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a measure on representative democracy in Santiago. This measure provided for “the intervention of the OAS, in case of interruption of a democratic process.”15 Therefore, in the face of the Haitian coup d’état, the OAS could not remain inactive. An International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) was created in February 1993 to monitor the Human Rights situation and investigate violations. By Resolution A/RES/47/20/B of April 20, 1993, the MICIVIH became a joint mission of the OAS and the UN. The protection of Human Rights remained, throughout its mandate, at the heart of this mission. In the face of persistent violations, it was extended until February 2000. In June 1993, US President Clinton, frustrated by failed attempts to negotiate a return to democracy in Haiti, called on the United Nations to impose worldwide economic sanctions on Haiti while diplomatic mediation efforts continued. On June 18, 1993, two days after the UN oil and arms embargo (UN Resolution 841)16, General Cédras affirmed his firm decision to facilitate any search for a solution to the Haitian crisis. Three days later, he confirmed his willingness to meet with Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in exchange for postponing the entry into force of the sanctions creating the embargo.
Thus, negotiations for the Governors Island Agreement17 could begin. This meeting was in fact a “missed meeting.” In a very tense atmosphere, J-B Aristide and General Cédras met on 27 June 1993 on the American island of Governors Island (in New York) without any physical meeting taking place. Two separate copies, accompanied by the “New York Pact” on civil and political rights, were signed on 3 July 1993. This agreement provided for the date of President Aristide’s return (30 October 1994), the departure of the military junta, the suspension of sanctions adopted by UN Resolution 841, and the deployment of “international cooperation” (point 5). In line with this agreement, on July 24, 1993, President Aristide addressed two letters to the UN Secretary-General. Among them, an official request for the deployment of the first UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti.
Under point 5 of the Governors Island Agreement, the UN Security Council prepared its mandate for the first PKO, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). UNMIH’s mandate was established by Security Council Resolution 867 on September 23, 1993, for an initial period of six months. The primary objective was to enforce the Governors Island Agreement. Nevertheless, this first mission had to face many twists and turns, starting with its refusal by General Cédras. The problem was significant: the consent of the local parties to the conflict is one of the three fundamental principles of peacekeeping (along with impartiality and the limitation of the use of force to cases of self-defense). On September 29, 1993, General Cédras addressed the UN General Assembly, explaining that the assistance agreed on was not within the purview of the UN Security Council and did not involve the deployment of a PKO. Without openly opposing the UNMIH, he called for consultation and respect for the Haitian Constitution. When UNMIH’s mandate was approved by the UN Security Council, the army quickly refused to implement the measures. Far from being pacified by this Agreement, Haiti remained the scene of multiple Human Rights violations. The UN Security Council deplored an upsurge in violence. On the eve of UNMIH’s deployment, tensions remained high. Demonstrations were organized against the UN intervention. Faced with a Haitian military junta in bad faith and uncooperative, the situation led to the deployment of an UN-mandated armed Multinational Force led by the United States. Operation Restore Democracy was established on July 31, 1994, by UN Security Council Resolution 940. It marked the lasting return of the United States in Haiti after their occupation of the country from 1915 to 1934.
The deployment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was then interrupted by the refusal of the Haitian military to cooperate. Rebounding from this failure, UNMIH II was re-established at the end of 1994. In total, the mission was renewed and slightly amended five times by UN Security Council Resolutions 867 (1993); 905, 993, 940, and 964 (1994); 1007 (1995); and 1048 (1996). Resolution 94018 marks a new beginning for UNMIH. Following Aristide’s return to the presidency in October 1994, the mission was mandated to support the U.S. Multinational Force in establishing a secure and stable environment. Relatively small at the beginning (567 police officers), the mission reached its peak in June 1995. By then it comprised 847 civilian police officers and 6,065 soldiers.19 The personnel came mainly from the United States, Canada, and France, three countries that were very influential in the decision-making process in Haiti due to historic ties.
In this context, in April 1995, President Aristide disbanded the Army to avoid another military coup attempt.20 This dissolution was not legally enacted because no text amended the 1987 Constitution or the 220 pieces of legislation founding the Haitian Armed Forces21, but, as a matter of fact, the state security rested on a single institution, the new Haitian National Police (HNP). UNMIH II personnel trained and supervised this reformed Police Force. Thousands of military personnel found themselves unemployed. Having become indispensable to local security, the UN mission organized and financed the presidential election of December 1995.22 René Préval, appointed by J-B Aristide, emerged victorious. February 1996 marked the first democratic and peaceful transition of power in Haiti. The objective was to complete the operation once the new government was in power. However, it was illusory to imagine that democratic elections and a new Police Force could erase two centuries of authoritarianism and oppression. As soon as UNMIH’s mandate ended, following the request of the new President Préval, the UN Security Council authorized a new operation: The United Nations Support Mission in Haiti—UNSMIH.
When the UNMIH II ended, the UN Security Council agreed to maintain the UN’s engagement in the country, including addressing the issue of the security of Haitian public institutions. However, this debate took place in a tense atmosphere. Latin American countries expressed reservations about the use of Chapter VII in the region (see the PKO in Central America—ONUCA—and in El Salvador—ONUSAL—at the same time). China and Russia wanted the mission to shrink, especially China, because of Haiti’s recognition of Taiwan. Russia was concerned about the financing of a prolonged UN presence in Haiti. The budget for the previous mission was already US$320 million. The Western powers, for their part, agreed on the need for a new mission given the fragility of the new Haitian National Police.23 A compromise was reached by Resolution 1063 of June 28, 1996 creating the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti. 300 police officers and 600 soldiers were authorized to enter Haiti, on the condition that the Secretary-General remained “ready to consider new possibilities to reduce the size of the mission so that it can carry out its functions at the lowest cost.”24 The personnel came from a wide range of countries: Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, France, India, Mali, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, and the United Kingdom.25
The mission was mandated to professionalize the Haitian National Police and assist the Haitian Government in maintaining a safe and stable environment. It was also to support the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in coordinating the activities of the various UN agencies present in Haiti (notably the United Nations Development Programme—UNDP). Then, it was no longer just a matter of keeping the peace, but also of building it. The UN, therefore, recognized the need for a “professional, autonomous, fully operational” police force for the consolidation of democracy, economic growth, and long-term development in Haiti.26 This reason would have justified the two renewals of the mission (UN Security Council Resolutions 1085 and 1086 of 1996). When UNSMIH’s mandate came to an end in July 1997, the Secretary-General recommended the deployment of a new mission to consolidate the professionalization of the Haitian National Police, despite the positive effects of UNSMIH on the stability of Haiti.
The United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1123.27 It was deployed from August to November 1997 to assist the Haitian National Government in maintaining a stable and secure environment and to consolidate the Haitian National Police as a civilian and non-political force. As a more technical mission, composed of 250 civilian police and 50 soldiers, it was designed as a transitional mechanism to gradually reduce the UN military presence on the ground. The personnel came from Argentina, Benin, France, Mali, Senegal, Togo, India, Niger, Tunisia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. MITNUH was deployed in a context where the international community was becoming increasingly reluctant to engage abroad.28 “The setbacks of the early and mid-1990s led the Security Council to limit the number of new peacekeeping missions and to undertake a process of reflection to avoid a repetition of such failures—Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia.”29With the number of PKOs declining, UNTMIH was clearly an exit strategy. Far from being a break from previous missions, importance was once again given to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). By their emphasis on Security Sector Reform, Haitian peacekeeping operations would have set a precedent in the general practice of PKOs.30 In other words, placing Security Sector Reform as an integral component of peacekeeping and peacebuilding was a new trend within the UN.
