Irrealism in Ethics E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Ratio Special Issues
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 250

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2014

Beschreibung

Irrealism in Ethics presents a collection of six original essays contributed by prominent moral philosophers that address various forms of the philosophical position of ethical irrealism. 

• Addresses various forms of the philosophical position of ethical irrealism
• Presents arguments both for and against the two major versions of ethical irrealism—the error theory and expressivism
• Offers innovative new arguments on topics relating to ethical irrealism
• Features original contributions from internationally prominent moral philosophers

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Series page

Title page

Copyright page

Notes on Contributors

1: Irrealism and the Genealogy of Morals

1. Introduction to moral debunking arguments

2. Epistemological debunking

3. Error theoretic debunking

4. Non-cognitivist debunking

Conclusion

Notes

References

2: A Distinction Without a Difference? Good Advice for Moral Error Theorists

1. Error theories and skeptical puzzles

2. Moral Error theories

3. Moral uncertainty, epistemic asymmetries and good advice

4. Putting error theories in their place

5. Six objections

6. A distinction without a difference?

Notes

3: Ethics Without Errors

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Notes

References

4: Faultless Moral Disagreement

Introduction

Faultless disagreement

Realist Semantics and the alternatives

Moral conscience

Moral Knowledge and Moral Disagreement

A different aim

Conclusion

Notes

5: Revolutionary Expressivism

Introduction

I. What is the Error Theory?

II. Methodological Problems

III. The Case for Revolutionary Expressivism

Notes

References

6: Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?

1. Cognitivism, non-cognitivism and minimalism

2. Asymmetry

3. Three simple attempts

4. A quasi-realist attempt

5. A plan-expressivist attempt

6. Non-cognitivism and the error theory

7. Conclusion

Notes

References

Index

End User License Agreement

Guide

Cover

Table of Contents

Start Reading

CHAPTER 1

Index

Pages

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Ratio Book Series

Each book in the series is devoted to a philosophical topic of particular contemporary interest, and features invited contributions from leading authorities in the chosen field.

Volumes published so far:

Irrealism in Ethics

, edited by Bart Streumer

Classifying Reality

, edited by David S. Oderberg

Developing Deontology: New Essays in Ethical Theory

, edited by Brad Hooker

Agents and Their Actions

, edited by Maximilian de Gaynesford

Philosophy of Literature

, edited by Severin Schroeder

Essays on Derek Parfit's

On What Matters, edited by Jussi Suikkanen and John Cottingham

Justice, Equality and Constructivism

, edited by Brian Feltham

Wittgenstein and Reason

, edited by John Preston

The Meaning of Theism

, edited by John Cottingham

Metaphysics in Science

, edited by Alice Drewery

The Self?

, edited by Galen Strawson

On What We Owe to Each Other

, edited by Philip Stratton-Lake

The Philosophy of Body

, edited by Mike Proudfoot

Meaning and Representation

, edited by Emma Borg

Arguing with Derrida

, edited by Simon Glendinning

Normativity

, edited by Jonathan Dancy

This edition first published 2014

Originally published as Volume 26, Issue 4 of Ratio

Chapters © 2014 The Authors

Book compilation © 2014 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data is available for this book.

ISBN 9781118837412

(paperback)

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Notes on Contributors

Richard Joyce, Department of Philosophy, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

Hallvard Lillehammer, Birkbeck, University of London, London

James Lenman, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield

Alison Hills, St John's College, Oxford

Sebastian Köhler, c/o Postgraduate Office, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh

Michael Ridge, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh

Bart Streumer, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

1Irrealism and the Genealogy of Morals

Richard Joyce

Abstract

Facts about the evolutionary origins of morality may have some kind of undermining effect on morality, yet the arguments that advocate this view are varied not only in their strategies but in their conclusions. The most promising such argument is modest: it attempts to shift the burden of proof in the service of an epistemological conclusion. This paper principally focuses on two other debunking arguments. First, I outline the prospects of trying to establish an error theory on genealogical grounds. Second, I discuss how a debunking strategy can work even under the assumption that non-cognitivism is true.

1. Introduction to moral debunking arguments

A genealogical debunking argument of morality takes data about the origin of moral thinking and uses them to undermine morality. The genealogy could be ontogenetic (like Freud’s) or socio-historical (like Nietzsche’s or Marx’s), but the focus of recent attention has been the evolutionary perspective. ‘Debunking’ and ‘undermining’ are intentionally broad terms, designed to accommodate a number of different strategies and conclusions. Sharon Street’s debunking argument, for example, aims to overthrow moral realism, while leaving intact the possibility of non-objective moral facts (e.g. those recognized by a constructivist) (Street 2006). Michael Ruse’s earlier debunking argument often looks like it has the same aim as Street’s, though on occasions he appears to try for a stronger conclusion: that all moral judgements are false (Ruse 1986, 2006, 2009). My own debunking argument has an epistemological conclusion: that all moral judgements are unjustified (Joyce 2006, 2014).