Lifeline Across the Sea E-Book

David L. Williams

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Lebensstil
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 220

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015

Beschreibung

The safe exchange of wounded or gravely ill prisoners of war, 'protected personnel' – medical staff and clergy – and diplomats, civilians and alien internees is a little known dimension of the Second World War, yet it was highly dangerous work. Here, David L. Williams tells the gripping story of some fifty mercy ships engaged in these repatriation voyages, each of the exchanges arranged individually between Allied nations and the Axis belligerents, through neutral intermediaries, and often conducted under the supervision of the International Red Cross. Sailing alone and undefended through hostile waters, and conspicuously illuminated at night, the ships were constantly in danger from submarine and aircraft, their safety depending totally on the transmission and receipt of 'safe passage' commands to the armed units in their paths. However, despite the risk of attack and severe loss of life, these exchange operations were essential for providing a lifeline to thousands of people caught up in a cruel and brutal war.

Leseprobe

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It would not have been possible to complete a project such as this, which draws on archive material distributed all around the world, without assistance from many correspondents, colleagues and enthusiasts, and I would like here to acknowledge those persons and organisations for their valued contributions. It is thanks to their generosity with photographs that would otherwise have been difficult to locate, and the benefit of their specialised and detailed knowledge of the careers of some of the less well-known ships, that this extensive account of the wartime mercy ships has been made possible.

Accordingly, I would like to put on record my warmest appreciation of the help I received from: Jean-Yves Brouard, Michael Cassar, Nereo Castelli, Luis Miguel Correia, Mario Cicogna, Lars Hemingstam, Richard de Kerbrech, Anibal José Maffeo, Carlos Mey, Peter Newall, the late Luca Ruffato, and Paolo Valenti.

Besides those individuals, a number of institutions have graciously supported my efforts, among them the following, with recognition of their members of staff who assisted me: British Pathé (Ruth Cahir), British Red Cross HQ, London (Jane High), Bündesarchiv (Martina Caspers), Deutsches Schiffahrtsmuseum (Klaus Fuest), East Asiatic Co. (Erik Ljunggren), Guildhall Library, Histarmar, Museu Maritim di Barcelona (Javier Aznar), National Archives, News UK Group Publishing Services (Nick Mays), NYK Maritime Museum (Hakuei Wakiya), International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva (Daniel Palmieri and his staff), Sjöfartsmuseet Akvariet (Cilla Ingvarsson), Swedish Red Cross (Sonja Sjöstrand), United States National Archives & Records Administration (Kim McKeithan), World Ship Society (Jim McFaul and Tony Smith) and WZ-Bilddienst Bildarchiv (Sibylle Jaspers).

Last but not least, I would like to express my thanks to Amy Rigg of The History Press for her invaluable support and guidance.

CONTENTS

Title

Acknowledgements

Introduction

1    The Mercy Ships

2    The Mercy Missions

3    The Fates and Subsequent Careers of the Mercy Ships

Bibliography and Sources

Plates

Copyright

INTRODUCTION

Behind the scenes during the Second World War, a series of agreements were concluded through negotiations between the combatants whereby prisoners, usually wounded or gravely ill, ‘protected personnel’ – doctors, nurses, stretcher bearers, ambulance crews and other medical personnel, as well as chaplains – and diplomats, civilians and alien internees could be safely exchanged. It is a dimension of the war at sea about which, with few exceptions, little is widely known. Working through neutral intermediaries and conducted under the auspices of the International Red Cross, deals were reached individually between the United Kingdom and each of the Axis belligerents, Germany, Italy and Japan. Likewise, such exchanges were also arranged with the Axis by the United States and other Allied nations.

Some thirty or so repatriation missions, derived primarily from the rules of the Geneva Convention, took place during the war, while more than fifty ships, both Allied and Axis, defined as specific types of ‘Safe-passage’ vessels by the Hague Convention and other maritime law, were engaged in the highly dangerous work of sailing undefended and invariably alone through hostile waters to deliver their precious human cargoes. Mainly former passenger liners, they were supported by short-sea vessels and train ferries as well as some cargo ships, many of them adorned in unique livery. At night, they were required to be brightly illuminated, making them strangely conspicuous when most ships were seeking concealment. The ships were constantly at risk of erroneous attack by submarine or aircraft, their safety and security depending totally on the transmission and receipt of unambiguous commands to the armed units in their paths stipulating that they should be allowed to proceed unharmed. The vagaries of war circumstances, the possibility of misidentification in inclement weather and the still relatively primitive nature of radio equipment at that time, prone to interference and restricted in its use to prevent detection, all combined together to magnify the hazards. The prospect of attack and severe loss of life were a constant cause of anxiety for those involved in these operations.

To set the scene, in order to appreciate the complexities and potential issues that surrounded these humanitarian efforts, some of the legal and organisational framework requires explanation – the nature and work of the facilitating institutions, the types of protected ship and the criteria and mechanisms whereby persons qualifying for exchange were selected.

Those endangered persons from whom potential repatriates could be drawn were both numerous and various in character. Warfare, no matter what its intensity or duration, can throw up thousands, even millions, of displaced persons of a variety of descriptions. In the Second World War, within all the belligerent countries, there were countless numbers of those who were either directly affected by the conflict or who became victims of security clampdowns on the outbreak of hostilities. Quite apart from refugees seeking shelter from the violence, there were many other civilian categories at threat, either trapped or incarcerated. Among them were enemy aliens, ex-patriot and domiciled foreigners who previously had been accepted by a domestic population but who, at the onset of hostilities, were rounded-up and interned. In Britain around 80,000 aliens were identified who potentially presented a security risk. The vast majority were interned in camps on the Isle of Man. Over 7,000 were subsequently deported to Australia and Canada, a risky business as substantiated by several high-profile losses to U-boat attack, among them the Arandora Star with 805 casualties, the majority Italians, and the Empress of Canada from which another 392 were killed.

The Arandora Star was sunk west of the Bloody Foreland on 2 July 1940 while bound from Liverpool to Canada with Italian and German internees. Lacking safe-conduct protection, she was a legitimate target for U-47. Maritime Photo Library

In the case of the Empress of Canada, sunk on 14 March 1943, she was loaded with both refugees and Italian prisoners, many of whom perished. Author’s collection

In Germany, millions of Jewish civilians were sent to concentration camps along with the political opponents of the Nazis and members of minority religious orders. When war broke out in the Far East, the American Government implemented a major programme of arrest and internment of 100,000 Japanese-Americans, often in poor conditions, and between 1941 and 1942 more than 130,000 civilians of British, American, Dutch and Commonwealth origin who were living and working in invaded territories were incarcerated by the Japanese. Last, but not least, arising from the normal process of exchange of embassy and consular staff, there were the diplomats located in foreign embassies and consulates, along with their families. Often the last to leave because their essential services were required to the end, they were frequently and unavoidably left stranded within enemy borders when diplomatic relations were severed or war was declared.

Where service personnel were concerned, by far the most numerous category were the countless prisoners of war (POW) taken during combat, mainly men – soldiers captured on the battlefield, crew members taken as survivors of sunken warships or air crews shot down over enemy territory – all imprisoned in camps. Significantly, many of these persons qualified for repatriation to their homelands, but the formal provisions for doing this really only existed in respect of seriously sick or invalided POW, under the auspices of the Geneva Convention of 1929. The rights of these persons to repatriation, if any, can be summarised as follows:

The only POW entitled to be repatriated were those selected by medical boards (see below) in accordance with the rules agreed bilaterally by the opposing nations. Governed by the directives of the Geneva Convention, it was not essential for there to be equivalence in the numbers exchanged.

Protected personnel were entitled by right to repatriation under the Geneva Convention but could be refused if the power holding them considered that, by releasing them, there would be insufficient medical personnel left to tend the remaining sick and injured prisoners.

Merchant seamen, taken off ships seized in foreign ports or arrested on the high seas, were an anomalous group given their strategic value, serving either on auxiliaries or crewing vital convoy supply ships. Germany treated them as civilians and sought to have parity of numbers in exchanges. Great Britain, in contrast, treated them as either POW or civilians depending on whether they were apprehended by military or civil authorities.

Civilians, including internees, who desired to be repatriated had no basic rights of return. The decision to make such exchanges depended on negotiation and agreement through diplomatic channels between the opposing nations, conducted via nominated intermediaries. The numbers of persons for exchange were intended to be equal, i.e. on a head-for-head basis, although that was not always the case. As a point of interest, those non-governmental civilians who were repatriated were expected to pay for their passage. The United States, as an example, arranged a flat-rate fare, something which proved rather contentious because the standard of accommodation on the ships, as in peacetime, varied considerably by class.

For civilians, it was a question of persuading the combatants to apply the principles of military repatriation to non-military candidates, and in that respect the influence and involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was both fundamental and critical in order to make any sort of progress. From the outset, the ICRC in Geneva made it known that it intended to proactively pursue the implementation of repatriation programmes both for military prisoners and civilians. ‘The Work of the International Committee of the Red Cross during the Second World War’ states:

From the outbreak of hostilities, the repatriation of seriously wounded or sick POW formed part of the main activities which the ICRC set itself to carry out in behalf of war victims. This intention was notified to the belligerent states on September 4, 1939, in the first circular letter addressed to them.

Repeatedly thereafter, the ICRC alerted combatants to their responsibilities in respect of POW, called for reciprocal treatment of civilian internees and worked to have humanitarian provision extended to embrace older and long-term prisoners who otherwise were in good health. Much praise and credit must go to that organisation for the successful achievement of most of those aims.

Much the same applies to the various national Red Cross organisations as well as to the governments of those neutral countries that made their port facilities available as safe havens where exchanges of personnel could be conducted without fear of military intervention. Principal among them were Sweden, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

Few, if any, of the exchange and repatriation missions that took place were without complications of one sort or another, if only beset by protracted and sensitive negotiations. Even where repatriations of service personnel were concerned, there was often a measure of distrust between the parties involved that could potentially hamper the process of exchange, difficulties that were eased by the delicate intervention of intermediaries who encouraged and assisted negotiations and who strove to ensure the continuation of sustainable exchange mechanisms. In principle those that involved military personnel stood a better chance of succeeding, being aided by the preordained rules and conditions of the Geneva Convention of 1929, which were intended to smooth the process. The Convention had been signed by four of the main combatants, namely Great Britain, the USA, Germany and Italy. While Japan had signed the agreement but declined to ratify it, the country had indicated a preparedness to observe the spirit of its intentions and to implement it in practice. In many respects, subsequent events would rightly challenge the integrity of those declarations, but it has to be said that Japan did participate actively, albeit minimally, in the ICRC-led programme of repatriation.

Articles 68 to 74 of the Geneva Convention are the ones that specifically relate to wartime repatriation, outlining the internationally agreed rights and responsibilities of the belligerent signatories (referred to as the Detaining Powers) in respect of the return to their home country or a neutral state of those prisoners-of-war who qualified for repatriation. Article 68 states:

Belligerents shall be required to send back to their own country, without regard to rank or numbers, after rendering them in a fit condition for transport, prisoners-of-war who are seriously ill or seriously wounded. Agreements between the belligerents should determine as soon as possible, the forms of disablement or sickness requiring direct repatriation and cases which may necessitate accommodation in a neutral country.

The post-war report of the ICRC (‘Rapport du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge sur son activité pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, 1 septembre 1939 – 30 juin 1947’), hereafter referred to as ICRC-1948, is valuable in explaining how the repatriation of civilians was also pursued, drawing on the principles and practices of the relevant Geneva Convention articles wherever appropriate. ICRC-1948 highlights these efforts under the section ‘Repatriation During Hostilities’:

During hostilities, the repatriation of civilians, whether interned or not, was generally through diplomatic channels, that is to say, through the Protecting Powers [see below]. The ICRC had sometimes, however, to take action in this field, either because diplomatic negotiations seemed to lead to no result, or because its intervention had been asked for, or because it availed itself of the initiative accorded by custom in humanitarian questions, and thought fit to act in cases that seemed especially to merit its attention.

Repeated circulars were transmitted to the warring nations urging the general repatriation of civilians, proposing that the benefits of Articles 68 to 74 of the Geneva Convention, often referred to as the ‘Prisoner-of-War Code’, should also be applied to non-combatants and internees, in particular the provisions of Article 72, which dealt with cases of captivity of long duration.

To facilitate the implementation of such operations and, where exchanges of non-military nationals did occur, the ICRC offered and provided escorts for ships and trains carrying civilian internee repatriates. It should be borne in mind that the Geneva Convention bestowed a special role upon the ICRC whereby it became the internationally recognised body responsible for matters relating to the handling of service prisoners in wartime, including being granted access to the sick and wounded as well as stewardship in cases of exchange and transfer. It was reasonable for the organisation to endeavour to extend this role to embrace civilians as well as military personnel, and it is as well that it did.

The provisions of the Geneva Convention like other similar agreements constitute international law insofar as the treatment of prisoners in wartime is concerned. Therefore, it is useful to provide definitions of some of the terms used in the Convention:

Protecting Powers

Formalised in the Convention, these are the nation states that represent the interests of the Detaining Powers (the belligerents – otherwise referred to as the Protected States or Host States) where normal diplomatic relations have been severed. Each Protecting Power was appointed by a Detaining Power but had to be acceptable to the opposing Detaining Power. In all cases they were required to be neutral countries, neither engaged in any way in the conflict nor party to any treaties with a Detaining Power that could compromise their impartiality. As an example, the USA was initially appointed, in agreement with Germany, as the Protecting Power for Great Britain. However, when America entered the war in December 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it relinquished this role and from that time Switzerland assumed the position of Protecting Power for Great Britain. In particular Protecting Powers acted as go-betweens where the welfare of prisoners was concerned.

Mixed Medical Commissions (MMC)

These were the bodies responsible for determining on medical grounds those who would be approved or declined for repatriation. Their composition and function are detailed in Articles 69 and 70 respectively. They were to comprise three members, two from a neutral country and one appointed by the Detaining Power. The precise procedures for the implementation and conduct of MMC were not explicitly defined in the Convention, but it was anticipated that, aided by the Protecting Powers and the ICRC, satisfactory arrangements would be agreed between the opposing Detaining Powers. The preference was for all MMC delegates to be practising doctors, but this could not be achieved in all instances. Likewise, it was not always possible to appoint two delegates of neutral citizenship, especially where a belligerent was remote (e.g. Australia). Under the auspices of the ICRC, acceptable Swiss doctors were frequently co-opted onto MMC in place of neutral delegates.

Draft Model Agreement (full and correct title: Model Agreement Concerning Direct Repatriation of Prisoners-of-War for Reasons of Health)

Outlined in an annex to Article 68 of the Geneva Convention, this provided the governing principles as to the medical conditions, their gravity and duration that would qualify those so affected for repatriation. It was intended to provide the framework from which an agreement could be reached between Detaining Powers and its use was recommended by the ICRC.

Protected Ship Types

Central to the contents of this volume, these are the categories of ship employed for the physical conveyance of repatriates to and from the ports of exchange under protected, safe-conduct or safe-passage status. Vessels of each type were nominated, registered and endorsed by the relevant Detaining Powers although the rules regarding their function and mode of operation were not defined in the Geneva Convention. There were two categories involved in the performance of repatriation and exchange missions in the Second World War:

The first category was hospital ships, as defined under Article 4 of the Hague Convention of 1907. All hospital ships had to be registered with the ICRC at Geneva, which also notified all concerned parties of the identity of these ships, providing details of their names, their general appearance and distinctive characteristics. They were to be unarmed and were not to be used for any military purpose, nor were they permitted to interfere in any way with enemy combatant vessels. While belligerents had the right to investigate suspected violations of the restrictions under which hospital ships were operated, to deliberately attack or sink any such ship that complied with the agreed regulations was deemed to be a war crime. Where the wartime repatriation operations were concerned some already-designated hospital ships were utilised, either wholly or part-time, for certain exchanges, temporarily withdrawn from their defined role of tending to and transporting the sick and wounded military personnel of their flag nationality. While they became subject to modified rules of conduct to those normally applicable to hospital ships, for all practical purposes their status and appearance remained unchanged. Hospital ships were painted in standard colours, regardless of the national flag they were operating under. These colours are described in Chapter 2, The Mercy Missions.

The majority of the vessels that undertook ‘mercy’ repatriation missions during the Second World War fell in the category of cartel ships. Defined under international maritime law, this was a type of ship recognised as being engaged in the transportation of prisoners on specially arranged humanitarian voyages between named ports at which exchanges were to take place. Accordingly, they were afforded protection, that is they were temporarily exempted from capture or attack, with their inviolability extended to both outward and return voyages in each instance as well as to their time in port. They included neutral ships taken up under charter. The cartel from which the ships’ designation was derived was a form of agreement entered into by parties engaged in armed conflict for the exchange of POW or humanitarian aid, effectively a mechanism in its broadest sense whereby actions and relations of a non-hostile nature could be arranged, regulated and conducted between otherwise belligerent powers.

A complication of the cartel ship category which can be somewhat confusing is that, whereas its existence was usually the result of a bilateral arrangement, it may have and often did require additional ‘safe-passage’ or ‘safe-conduct’ clearance from third-party belligerents or neutral countries through whose waters or a recognised war zone it had reason to pass in the execution of its mission. Typically, cartel ships did not adopt a standard mode of livery. The majority were painted in distinctive colour schemes that were largely unique in character, in many cases variations on a theme in that they frequently displayed the ‘Cross’ symbol though not always red in colour. These markings are also described later in the Missions chapter.

Certain of the ships that participated in the repatriation missions, and which are described in the following pages, may not have been in either of the categories defined above. In the absence of detailed records or contemporary photographs it is impossible to say for certain whether or not they were protected ships, but without acknowledged protection their occupants would have been placed at considerable risk for the duration of the voyages concerned. The ships that fall into this grey area generally participated in an ancillary capacity, either operating between ports on short-sea routes as part of the actual exchanges or, indirectly, by conveying interned aliens to deep-sea ports where they could be embarked upon designated repatriation ships.

Unlike those that applied normally to hospital ships, the rules of engagement for cartel ships and hospital ships while temporarily deployed on repatriation missions were agreed individually by the Detaining Powers party to each exchange agreement. Like hospital ships, cartel ships had to be illuminated at night to highlight their special protective markings and prevent misidentification. Generally, all repatriation ships were required to sail independently and alone on pre-determined courses, entering and leaving ports of call on stipulated dates. All such details were relayed to the combatant vessels operating in the sea areas to be crossed. They were also required not to zigzag but to navigate a steady course and maintain a steady speed, and they were required to transmit their midday position over a selected international frequency daily. The attention to detail that was given to every aspect of the repatriation voyages, as the contents of the files in the National Archives reveals, was astonishing. Everything from the precise routes to be navigated, by compass bearing and distance, the victualling and bunkering arrangements (a particularly acute concern was replenishment of water supplies while operating in the tropics), and the careful adjudication of every passenger – their number, gender and condition as well as, based on intelligence, any threat they may have posed.

Such precise control measures were typical but perfectly understandable. Deviations from agreed arrangements were not, for the most part, tolerated, simply because of the massive effort required to re-plan every minute detail, taking into consideration tide, weather and technical issues, besides the impact of continuing or imminent military action in areas to where the ships were travelling or destined. There was always the concern, too, that any deviation, deliberate or otherwise, could undermine trust and the willingness to continue with repatriation missions, as well as potentially place those en route in heightened danger. An incident that occurred during the September 1944 exchange at Gothenburg highlights this particularly well.

When two or three British soldiers who had escaped from Germany and managed to reach Sweden stowed away aboard the Arundel Castle, almost certainly with the connivance of the soldiers being repatriated, their misguided though well-intentioned action threatened serious consequences. Having made the mistake of leaving their hiding place and declaring themselves soon after the ship left port, though she was still in Swedish waters, they did not get the reception they had anticipated. They had unintentionally put the ship and all aboard her at serious risk because the agreed arrangement had been to exchange a precise number of service personnel, no more, no less. The unofficial presence of these extra men potentially rendered void the ship’s protected status and had it become known to the German authorities, they could have seized the ship and everybody aboard her. There was no alternative but to hand the British soldiers over to the escorting Swedish destroyer for internment in Sweden.

Nonetheless, despite this unpopular but essential action there were still repercussions. As the transfer to the Swedish destroyer had been observed, the very moment the ship left Swedish waters it was boarded by a German naval party and a contingent of German troops. All the POW aboard the Arundel Castle, as well as her entire crew, were mustered on deck for a roll call and head count. Stretcher cases were allowed to remain below, but otherwise the accommodation areas were completely vacated while a thorough search took place. After a long delay, but to the relief of the ship’s company, the count was pronounced correct and the ship was eventually allowed to proceed.

For both sides in the war, there were potential downsides to the participation in ‘mercy voyages’ despite the worthiness of these missions. For one thing, it meant a commitment of limited shipping resources that were preferably needed for other essential wartime employment while it could also reveal to an enemy a measure of a combatant’s shipping strength. In the greater scheme of things, national efforts were primarily concentrated on securing victory and these humanitarian operations were probably considered little more than a sideshow to the main business of the day. The reluctance of service chiefs to release valuable tonnage, particularly at a time when major amphibious landings were planned, is understandable.

Of course, there were other matters of concern associated with running repatriation exchanges besides stowaways, among them smuggling, especially of small-scale high-value war materials, and espionage, the gathering of sensitive military information through observations at ports of call. The primary mechanism for managing these risks was the system of Contraband Control operated at strategic locations under the general implementation of blockade measures. Under these, all merchant vessels were liable to examination and, if found aboard them, the confiscation of ammunition, explosives, chemicals, fuel, communication equipment, machinery, tools, foodstuffs, animal feed, bullion, currency, gemstones and so on. This presented difficulties where some repatriation ships were concerned, potentially interfering with strict voyage plans or creating delays. To overcome such problems, Britain introduced the issue of warrants or NaviCerts (Navigational Certificates) for neutral flagships and certain Allied vessels, a system that originated in the First World War, whereby they could be examined and cleared for passage in their port of origin.

Despite the hazards and inconveniences, there were tangible benefits for those nations engaged in repatriation, not least of which, quite apart from the obvious one of getting citizens and sick servicemen home, was the positive contribution to morale on the home front, which could not be underestimated.