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- Herausgeber: DigiCat
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022
Aristotle's 'Posterior Analytics' is a foundational text in the field of logical theory and epistemology. Written in a concise and systematic style, the book explores the nature of scientific knowledge and the process of acquiring it through demonstration. Aristotle delves into the theory of demonstration, the structure of scientific explanations, and the role of syllogistic reasoning in knowledge acquisition. Drawing on his vast knowledge of natural sciences and metaphysics, Aristotle presents a rigorous and insightful account of the principles of scientific inquiry. His logical analysis of the nature of knowledge continues to be a vital contribution to the history of philosophy. Aristotle, one of the greatest thinkers of ancient Greece, was a student of Plato and a teacher of Alexander the Great. His extensive works encompass philosophy, logic, ethics, politics, metaphysics, and natural sciences. 'Posterior Analytics' is a testament to his profound intellect and enduring influence on Western thought. I highly recommend 'Posterior Analytics' to readers interested in delving into the foundational principles of scientific knowledge and logical reasoning. Aristotle's insightful analysis and systematic approach provide a valuable resource for scholars and students of philosophy and logic.
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Posterior Analytics
Table of Contents
Book I.
Chap. I.
: Whether a Demonstrative Science exists
Chap. II.
: What Knowing is, what Demonstration is, and of what it consists
Chap. III.
: A refutation of the error into which some have fallen concerning Science and Demonstration
Chap. IV.
: The meaning of ‘Distributive,’ ‘Essential,’ ‘Universal’
Chap. V.
: From what causes mistakes arise with regard to the discovery of the Universal. How they may be avoided
Chap. VI.
: Demonstration is founded on Necessary and Essential Principles
Chap. VII.
: The Premises and the Conclusion of a Demonstration must belong to the same genus
Chap. VIII.
: Demonstration is concerned only with what is eternal
Chap. IX.
: Demonstration is founded not on general, but on special and indemonstrable principles; nor is it easy to know whether one really possesses knowledge drawn from these principles
Chap. X.
: The Definition and Division of Principles
Chap. XI.
: On certain Principles which are common to all Sciences
Chap. XII.
: On Questions, and, in passing, on the way in which Sciences are extended
Chap. XIII.
: The difference between the Demonstration and Science of a thing’s Nature and those of its Cause
Chap. XIV.
: The figure proper to Demonstrate Syllogism
Chap. XV.
: On immediate negative propositions
Chap. XVI.
: On ignorance resulting from a defective arrangement of terms in mediate propositions
Chap. XVII.
: On ignorance resulting from a defective arrangement of terms in immediate propositions
Chap. XVIII.
: On ignorance as resulting from defective sense perception
Chap. XIX.
: Whether the Principles of Demonstration are finite or infinite
Chap. XX.
: Middle terms are not infinite
Chap. XXI.
: In Negations some final and ultimate point is reached where the series must cease
Chap. XXII.
: In Affirmations some final and ultimate point is reached where the series must cease
Chap. XXIII.
: Certain Corollaries
Chap. XXIV.
: Whether Universal or Particular Demonstration is superior
Chap. XXV.
: That Affirmative is superior to Negative Demonstration
Chap. XXVI.
: Direct Demonstration is superior to Reduction per impossible
Chap. XXVII.
: What science is more certain and prior, and what less certain and inferior
Chap. XXVIII.
: What constitutes one or many Sciences
Chap. XXIX.
: Concerning many Demonstrations of the same thing
Chap. XXX.
: On fortuitous occurrences
Chap. XXXI.
: Sense perception cannot give Demonstrative Science
Chap. XXXII.
: On the difference of Principles corresponding to the difference of Syllogisms
Chap. XXXIII.
: The distinction between Science and Opinion
Chap. XXXIV.
: On Sagacity
Book II.
Chap. I.
: On the number and arrangements of Questions
Chap. II.
: Every question is concerned with the discovery of a Middle Term
Chap. III.
: The distinction between Definition and Demonstration
Chap. IV.
: The Essence of a thing cannot be attained by Syllogism
Chap. V.
: Knowledge of the Essence cannot be attained by Division
Chap. VI.
: The Essence cannot be proved by the Definition of the thing itself or by that of its opposite
Chap. VII.
: Whether the Essence can in any way be proved
Chap. VIII.
: How the Essence can be proved
Chap. IX.
: What Essences can and what cannot be proved
Chap. X.
: The nature and forms of Definition
Chap. XI.
: The kinds of Causes used in Demonstration
Chap. XII.
: On the Causes of events which exist, are in process, have happened, or will happen
Chap. XIII.
: On the search for a Definition
Chap. XIV.
: On the discovery of Questions for Demonstration
Chap. XV.
: How far the same Middle Term is employed for demonstrating different Questions
Chap. XVI.
: On inferring the Cause from the Effect
Chap. XVII.
: Whether there can be several causes of the same thing
Chap. XVIII.
: Which is the prior cause, that which is nearer the particular, or the more universal?
Chap. XIX.
: On the attainment of Primary Principles
Appendix.
Chapter I: Whether a Demonstrative Science exists
Previous knowledge is required for all scientific studies or methods of instruction. Examples from Mathematics, Dialectic and Rhetoric. Previous knowledge as variously expressed in theses concerning either the existence of a thing or the meaning of the word denoting it. Learning consists in the conversion of universal into particular knowledge.
All communications of knowledge from teacher to pupil by way of reasoning pre-suppose some pre-existing knowledge. The truth of this statement may be seen from a complete enumeration of instances:—it is thus that the mathematical sciences are attained and every art also. The same is the case with dialectical arguments whether proceeding by means of the syllogism or of induction, for the former kind makes such assumptions as people who understand the meaning admit, the latter uses the recognized clearness of the particular as an indication of the universal, so that both convey their information by means of things already known. So too orators produce conviction in a like manner, using either Example, which is equivalent to induction, or Enthymeme, which corresponds to syllogism.
Pre-existing knowledge of two kinds is required: one must either assume beforehand that something exists, or one must understand what the word means, while sometimes both sorts of knowledge are required. As an example of the first case we may take the necessity for previously knowing the proposition ‘everything must be either affirmed or denied.’ Of the second case an instance would be the knowledge of the meaning conveyed by the word ‘triangle’; of the combination of both kinds, the knowledge both of what ‘Unit’ means, and of the fact that ‘Unit’ exists. The distinction is necessary, since the grounds of certainty differ in the two cases.
Some facts become known as a result of previously acquired knowledge, while others are learned at the moment of perceiving the object. This latter happens in the case of all things comprised under a universal, with which one is already acquainted. It is known to the pupil, before perceiving any particular triangle, that the interior angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles; but it is only at the moment of sense-perception that he learns that this figure inscribed in the semi-circle is a triangle.
In some cases knowledge is only acquired in this latter way, and the particular is not learned by means of a middle term: that is to say, in the cases where we touch the concrete particular, that is in the case of things which are not predicable of any subject. We ought to admit that, even before arriving at particulars, and so obtaining a syllogism, we do, from one point of view perhaps, possess knowledge, although from another we do not. For how, it may be asked, when he did not know whether the thing existed at all or not, could he have known absolutely that it contains two right angles? The answer is that he knows it from a particular point of view, in that he knows the universal, but he does not know it absolutely. On any other view we shall have the dilemma of the Meno—a man will either learn nothing at all or only what he knows before. This difficulty must not be solved as some try to do. The question is asked, ‘Do you or do you not know every dyad to be even?’ On receiving an affirmative reply they bring forward some dyad of the existence of which the other was ignorant, and so could not have known it to be even. The solution suggested is to say that one does not know every dyad to be even, but only that which one knows to be a dyad. On the other hand one knows that of which one possesses or has received a demonstration, and no demonstration concerns merely (e.g.) every triangle, or number, one may happen to know, but every possible triangle or number. No demonstrative proposition is taken as referring to ‘any number you may know of,’ or ‘any straight line you may know of,’ but to the entire subject. Nothing, however, I should suppose, precludes our knowing already what we learn from one point of view and not knowing it from another. The absurdity would consist not in having some sort of knowledge of what one learns, but in having knowledge of it in a certain respect—I mean in the very same respect and manner in which one learns it.
Chapter II: What Knowing is, what Demonstration is, and of what it consists
Scientific knowledge of a thing consists in knowing its cause demonstratively. The principles required for Demonstration. Meaning of ‘Thesis,’ ‘Hypothesis,’ ‘Axiom,’ ‘Definition.’
We suppose ourselves to know anything absolutely and not accidentally after the manner of the sophists, when we consider ourselves to know that the ground from which the thing arises is the ground of it, and that the fact cannot be otherwise. Science must clearly consist in this, for those who suppose themselves to have scientific knowledge of anything without really having it imagine that they are in the position described above, while those who do possess such knowledge are actually in that position in relation to the object.
Hence it follows that everything which admits of absolute knowledge is necessary. We will discuss later the question as to whether there is any other manner of knowing a thing, but at any rate we hold that that ‘knowledge comes through demonstration.’ By ‘demonstration’ I mean a scientific syllogism, and by ‘scientific’ a syllogism the mere possession of which makes us know.
If then the definition of knowledge be such as we have stated, the premises of demonstrative knowledge must needs be true, primary, immediate, better known than, anterior to, and the cause of, the conclusion, for under these conditions the principles will also be appropriate to the conclusion. One may, indeed, have a syllogism without these conditions, but not demonstration, for it will not produce scientific knowledge. The premises must be true, because it is impossible to know that which is not, e.g. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side. The conclusion must proceed from primary premises that are indemonstrable premises, for one cannot know things of which one can give no demonstration, since to know demonstrable things in any real sense is just to have a demonstration of them. The premises must be Causal, Better known and Anterior; Causal, because we only know a thing when we have learned its cause, Anterior because anteriority is implied by causation, previously known not only in our second sense, viz. that their meaning is understood, but that one knows that they exist.
Now the expressions ‘anterior’ and ‘better known’ have each a double meaning; things which are naturally anterior are not the same as things anterior to us, nor yet are things naturally better known better known to us. I mean by things anterior, or better known, ‘to us,’ such as are nearer our sense-perception, while things which are absolutely anterior or better known are such as are more removed from it. Those things are the furthest removed from it which are most Universal, nearest to it stands the Particular, and these two are diametrically opposed.
The phrase ‘the conclusion must result from primary principles’ means that it must come from elements appropriate to itself, (for I attach the same meaning to primary principle [πρτον] and to element [ρχή]). Now the element of demonstration is an immediate proposition; ‘immediate’ meaning a proposition with no other proposition anterior to it. A premise is either of the two parts of a predication, wherein one predicate is asserted of one subject. A dialectical premise is one which offers an alternative between the two parts of the predication, a demonstrative premise is one which lays down definitely that one of them is true.
Predication is either part of a Contradiction. Contradiction is an opposition of propositions which excludes any intermediate proposition. That part of a Contradiction which affirms one thing of another is Affirmation, that which denies one thing of another is Negation.
I apply the name Thesis to an immediate syllogistic principle which cannot be proved, and the previous possession of which is a necessary condition for learning something, but not all. That which is an indispensable antecedent to the acquisition of any knowledge I call an Axiom; for there are some principles of this kind, and ‘axiom’ is the name generally applied to them.
A Thesis which embodies one or other part of a predication (that is that the subject does, or does not, exist) is a Hypothesis; one which makes no such assertion a Definition. Definition is really a kind of Thesis; e.g. the arithmetician ‘lays it down’ that Unity is indivisibility in respect to quantity, but this is not a Hypothesis, for the nature of unity and the fact of its existence are not one and the same question.
Since then belief and knowledge with regard to any subject result from the possession of a demonstrative syllogism, and since a syllogism is demonstrative when the principles from which it is drawn are true, we must not merely have a previous knowledge of some or all of these primary principles, but have a higher knowledge of them than of the conclusion.
The Cause always possesses the quality which it impresses on a subject in a higher degree than that subject; thus, that for which we love anything is dear in a higher degree than the actual object of our love. Hence if our knowledge and belief is due to its primary principles, we have a higher knowledge of these latter and believe more firmly in them, because the thing itself is a consequence of them. Now it is not possible to believe less in what one knows than in what one neither knows nor has attained to by some higher faculty than knowledge. But this will happen unless he whose belief is produced by demonstration has a previous knowledge of the primary principles, for it is more needful to believe in these principles, either all or some, than in the conclusion to which they lead.
Now in order to attain to that knowledge which comes by demonstration one must not only be better acquainted with and believe more firmly in the elementary principles than in the conclusion, but nothing must be better known nor more firmly believed in than the opposites of those principles from which a false conclusion contrary to the science itself can be educed; that is to say if he who possesses absolute knowledge is to be quite immovable in his opinions.
