Power and Identity in the Post-Soviet Realm E-Book

• Herausgeber: ibidem
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 511

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2021

Beschreibung

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Cold War’s bipolar world order, Soviet successor states on the Russian periphery found themselves in a geopolitical vacuum, and gradually evolved into a specific buffer zone throughout the 1990s. The establishment of a new system of relations became evident in the wake of the Baltic States’ accession to the European Union in 2004, resulting in the fragmentation of this buffer zone. In addition to the nations that are more directly connected to Zwischeneuropa (i.e. ‘In-Between Europe’) historically and culturally (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), countries beyond the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia), as well as the states of former Soviet Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan) have also become characterized by particular developmental pathways. Focusing on these areas of the post-Soviet realm, this collected volume examines how they have faced multidimensional challenges while pursuing both geopolitics and their place in the world economy. From a conceptual point of view, the chapters pay close attention not only to issues of ethnicity (which are literally intertwined with a number of social problems in these regions), but also to the various socio-spatial contexts of ethnic processes. Having emerged after the collapse of Soviet authority, the so-called ‘post-Soviet realm’ might serve as a crucial testing ground for such studies, as the specific social and regional patterns of ethnicity are widely recognized here. Accordingly, the phenomena covered in the volume are rather diverse. The first section reviews the fundamental elements of the formation of national identity in light of the geopolitical situation both past and present. This includes an examination of the relative strength and shifting dynamics of statehood, the impacts of imperial nationalism, and the changes in language use from the early-modern period onwards. The second section examines the (trans)formation of the identities of small nations living at the forefront of Tsarist Russian geopolitical expansion, in particular in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Southern Steppe. Finally, in the third section, the contributors discuss the fate of groups whose settlement space was divided by the external boundaries of the Soviet Union, a reality that resulted in the diverging developmental trajectories of the otherwise culturally similar communities on both sides of the border. In these imperial peripheries, Soviet authority gave rise to specifically Soviet national identities amongst groups such as the Azeris, Tajiks, Karelians, Moldavians, and others. The book also includes more than 30 primarily original maps, graphs, and tables and will be of great use not only for human geographers (particularly political and cultural geographers) and historians, but also for those interested in contemporary issues in social science.

Leseprobe

ibidem-Press, Stuttgart

Contents

Introduction

Formation of National Identity

The Historical Roots of Regional Inequalities and Their Relationship with Present – Day Peripheries and Conflict Zones in the Post-Soviet Realm (1897–2010)

The Faces of Russian Nationalism

Geopolitics and Language in the European Post-Soviet Realm

Russian and Soviet Censuses in Ethnic-National Context

Local Identities under Russian Rule

The Layers of Post-Soviet Central Asian “Nations”

Tatars in Russia and the Post-Soviet Realm

In the Net of Power: Small Nations and Ethnicities on the Black Sea Coast

Living on the Edge: The Origins and Evolution of the Kalmyk Ethno-Religious Enclave along the Southern Russian Frontier

“Constructed” (Soviet) Ethnicities

In the Contact Zone of In-Between Europe and the Post-Soviet Realm Notions of Karelian Spaces

Rescaling Moldovan Identities

The Post-Soviet Azerbaijani National Identity

Tajik Identities: Ageless Alternatives to an Unborn Nation

Bibliography

Sources

References

Introduction

On the European continent, which includes also the Russian sphere of power, the establishment and consolidation of today’s political units can be connected mostly to the formation of modern nations. However, these processes unfolded along strikingly different trajectories, characterized by diverse causes and consequences. One of the latter is the marked difference in terms of the spatial patterns of ethnic groups, more or less along the Szczecin–Trieste dividing line. To the west of this imaginary line, one can find relatively sharp ethnic boundaries, usually aligned with national borders, whereas to the east of it, ethnic spatial patterns are highly heterogeneous despite a long history of war, (forced) waves of migration, and the ethnic homogenization efforts of the 20th century.

“Ethnicity” has undoubtedly been one of the cornerstones of social problems and conflicts in the eastern part of Europe throughout the 20th century, but it is also a crucial issue today. In addition to the societal transformation that has accompanied the change of political regimes over the last three decades, the societies of these countries have also had to deal with the difficulties of the transition to a market economy. After the turn of the millennium, and with the accession to the EU, some of these countries are now part of the European integration effort. For the time being, however, a part of the Balkans, as well as several countries of the post-Soviet realm, have been left out of European enlargement. At the same time, ethnic-related problems have not been fully addressed by the integration process, since it is organized mostly on an economic basis, and thus faces new challenges amidst the changing geopolitical situation and the globalizing economy of the past two decades. Owing to the inherent spatiality of these processes, it is evident that geographers should also focus on these issues.

Our research group has been dealing with the study of these areas and the ethnic background of economic transition processes for several years, and in so doing has engaged with topics that are not unknown to the international scholarly community. As we argue, this region deserves particular attention due to the inextricable entanglement of its complex social, economic, and political fault lines. In addition to internal societal contradictions, in many cases the region is also characterized by cross-border conflicts that often manifest as armed struggles. Evidence of these clashes also includes the numerous “frozen conflicts” and geopolitical deadlocks that pervade the region. Given the difficult and often uneasy task that newly-independent countries have faced in trying to reposition themselves both economically and geopolitically within post-Soviet space, the challenges they face are of strategic importance, not only to Europe, but also to the globalized world.

In light of the above-mentioned considerations, our research focuses primarily on the issues of ethnicity that underlie social problems in the region. These issues range from the tensions between groups that have the potential to form nations, through the difficulties of economic transformation that accompany political transition and the possibilities of leveling regional disparities, to integration efforts that seek to address current global challenges. Though we do not consider the formulation of solutions to be the main goal of our research, we nevertheless feel that the exploration of the processes surrounding existing conflicts may help us in articulating possible future strategies.

The geographical focus

Due to its large territorial extent and its divergent historical trajectories, the region in question can be further divided into sub-regions, of which our volume focuses on the post-Soviet realm (Figure 0.0.1). With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world order, non-Russian parts of these territories suddenly found themselves in a geopolitical vacuum, and then gradually formed a particular kind of geopolitical buffer zone during the 1990s. Stuck between European integration, on the one hand, and the reorganized Russian state, on the other, post-Soviet territories in Europe were reduced to two sub-regions after the accession of the Baltic States to the EU. The first sub-region includes the South Caucasian states of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, which are considered to be European according to the European Neighborhood Policy. The second includes Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, countries that are historically and culturally more closely tied to “In-Between Europe”, or Zwischeneuropa. In addition to these two sub-regions, our third geographical focus is on former “Soviet Central Asia.” Constituted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, this sub-region is comprised by countries that are also striving to find their place in the altered geopolitical landscape of the post-Soviet era.

Though the situation in all three of these post-Soviet sub-regions is of course unique to the contemporary period, the buffer-zone nature of the countries themselves is far from new. The eastward expansion of German, Polish, and Swedish states in the past, for example, as well as repeated Russian attempts to expand westward, have repeatedly redrawn the political, demographic and economic map of the region that now falls within the European post-Soviet realm. Similarly, tsarist and later Soviet aspirations in the Caucasus and Central Asia during the 19th and the 20th centuries resulted in significant changes in power, and profound transformations of existing social and cultural connections.

Figure 0.0.1 The geopolitical situation in the post-Soviet realm; (Sources: [2]; [3]; [4]; [5]; [9]; [10]; [15]; [19]; [21]; [22]; [30]; [31]; [32]; [33]; [34]; [35]; [36]; [38]; [40]; [41])

Expansionist projects in these historic buffer zones resulted in the imposition of new structures that simultaneously erased and built upon the old ones. The borderland position of the sub-regions under examination has fundamentally determined the political culture and economic organization of local societies, with their buffer-zone nature contributing directly to their high levels of complexity. Social, political, and economic discourses pertaining to the region are, however, often based on oversimplified dichotomies such as West vs. East, developed vs. underdeveloped, and democratic vs. authoritarian. Reducing underlying dynamics to oversimplified binaries like these render local conflicts and crises difficult to interpret.

The three sub-regions that we explore in this volume consist of former Soviet republics that have experienced significant social tensions and economic problems since the political turn in 1989. Against the backdrop of a heightened geopolitical situation, the social, economic, and political instability has even led in some cases to the outbreak of armed conflicts. Our research examines some of the perspectives and also social groups that have played and continue to play a key role in the region’s social and economic processes. A full appreciation of the role played by these perspectives and social groups presupposes not only studies on multiple geographical scales, but also an exploration of how geographical and social space are intertwined in the processes of the region.

Throughout this volume, we emphasize the importance of identities (and their formation) in the processes that shape the everyday life of societies. These processes and their impact on the events of recent years, however, can only be grasped in historical context. Out of the multiplicity of narratives defining the identity of certain peoples and local communities, we wanted to accentuate, compile, and geographically systematize the ones that have explicitly determined and continue to define the geopolitical situation of the region under investigation, as well as the interrelationship of local peoples and their economic attitudes.

The effort at various points in history to establish independent state structures has been a more or less characteristic feature within all three sub-regions. As much as this factor has shaped the lives of the people, an even greater role has been played by external forces whose geopolitical aims have often run counter to the aspirations of local populations. Though regional leaders and their followers have sought to create nation-states in the past, external powers have generally stood opposed to these intentions. In many ways, therefore, current state formations were already determined in earlier historical periods as a result of their buffer-zone situation.

The historical dimension of current state structures in the region cannot be underestimated. Following the collapse of Kievan Rus in the mid-13th century, for example, Eastern European powers such as the Tatars, the Polish and Hungarian Kingdoms, and later the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire, were either too weak or otherwise unable to permanently integrate the former territories of the Rus’. At the same time, however, the impact of these Eastern European state formations on local societies in the region was by no means minimal, and in fact had a pronounced influence on social, political, and economic developments. During the 18th and 19th centuries, moreover, this region became the target of Russian imperial aspirations, which also coincided with the process of modern nation-building (in the case of Belarus, this latter process continues to this day). Although the peoples of Eastern Europe were characterized by many specificities and differences, their languages, cultures, and political traditions were not markedly different from those of the Russian population (which itself was characterized by an imperial identity). During the state-socialist period, these similarities were emphasized by Soviet authorities, so that independent identities could not be developed on the peripheries of the Soviet empire.

The situation was, of course, slightly different in the Caucasus region, where, from the outset, Russian expansion often resulted in aggressive counter-responses. Similarly, in the sparsely populated Turkestani territories acquired by the tsar in the 19th century, the organization of local societies rested on different foundations than in Russia, though it is important to keep in mind that, like the societies of Central Asia, Russia was not on a fully European pathway either. These historical factors had a profound impact on local populations, and in many ways shaped the divergent attitudes of those with different cultural and linguistic traditions. Forged in the context of complex historical and geographical processes, these attitudes were difficult, and in some cases impossible, to transform, either by the Soviet integration efforts of the 1950s, or by the formation and propagation of the “homo Sovieticus” ideal.

Conceptual aims

The most important conceptual aim of our volume is to provide a general overview of how the factors that determine ethnicity have developed in the region, and what role(s) these factors play in the region’s current social conflicts. In the eastern part of Europe (including our study area), ideas regarding national characteristics, as well as group consciousness and perceived differences with respect to neighboring peoples, have stemmed primarily from a common sense of origin, and from customs rooted in a shared sense of culture, language, and sometimes also religion. In addition, in many cases, the historical memory of states and proto-states that existed in the Middle Ages has also been important, and has often provided stronger frameworks than the dynastic empires they may have been a part of, such as tsarist Russia, which had been steadily gaining Great Power status from the 18th century onwards. On the peripheries of tsarist Russia, the most important political goal of Russian power was to integrate these regions into the structure of the empire. The main focus in this light was on economic reinvigoration and the creation of public administration. The process of integration was to be strengthened by the pursuit of cultural and linguistic homogenization as well. However, several ethnic groups that became part of the empire in the 18th and 19th centuries opposed these attempts. This opposition was fueled not only by the fact that many ethnic groups had different cultural backgrounds, traditions and languages (as was the case in the Caucasus and Turkestan), but also because some of the states that were integrated into the Russian Empire had previously enjoyed middle power status (as was the case with the Polish state).

Fundamental differences like the ones outlined above proved to be of crucial importance for the national movements that emerged in the 19th century, as well as for the creation of local factors of identity formation that have remained important in the post-Soviet realm to this day. Given this dynamic, the first section of our volume reviews the elements that have facilitated the social cohesion of the peoples living in the region. The basic tone is set by outlining the historical background of the current economic and cultural fault lines at three points in time. The first chapter employs quantitative methods to provide an historical analysis of a GIS database to support our hypothesis that previous fault lines have not been significantly reshaped by changing state borders, even over a longer time frame. Thus, in addition to the imperial frameworks that gradually developed from the 18th century onwards, the earlier state formations found in the region have also determined cultural and linguistic orientations.

The political frameworks that emerged in the region were of course key to identity formation. For some groups, these emergent frameworks provided a positive basis for national self-definition, while for others they served as unwelcome impositions against which a competing sense of community was constructed. In this light, the conditions for the development of an imperial attitude are also important in the region, as these conditions not only determined the fate of state formation for local groups since the 18th century, but also shaped Russian imperial nationalism. Amongst other consequences, these broader factors and processes resulted in the continuous evolution of the language of local groups, and gave rise to notable particularities in language use that are obvious even today.

The nuanced nature of identity formation in the region has been notoriously difficult to trace, primarily because of the data that scholars have had at their disposal. For more than a hundred years, maps showing the region’s ethnic patterns and their dynamics have been based on official census data that was itself produced with frequently changing methodologies and/or in completely different political contexts. Although the figures of our volume also rely predominantly on this data, we have considered it important to present and critically analyze the contexts of these censuses.

The second and third sections of the volume present four case studies each. Some of these case studies focus on local groups that formed in alignment with Russian imperial interests. Other case studies examine how ethnic self-consciousness emerged as a direct result of Russian intervention. Intentionally separating certain groups from one another, Russian authorities shaped new identities amongst imperial populations that typically had a long history of shared cultural traits and practices.

In each of these case studies, three distinct historical periods are taken into consideration: the imperial, the Soviet, and the post-Soviet. The period of national awakening took place within a framework determined by tsarist Russia, while after World War I, identity formation was shaped by policies and structures implemented by the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, nation-building processes unfolded within the successor states established according to the borders of the USSR’s former member republics. Events that have taken place since the collapse of communism must be interpreted, of course, within a context that has been further complicated by globalization. At the same time, many of the elites of post-Soviet states have reinvested in national(ist) sentiments that are often imbued with the soviet frameworks of the preceding decades.

The second section of the volume begins with an examination of the former Turkestani territories of imperial Russia. The homeland of nomadic Turkic-speaking groups and agrarian Iranian peoples, this region provides an excellent example of how local identity constructions were influenced by, and interacted with, the intentions and attitudes of the Russian center. The classification of Tatars as a single, monolithic ethnic group can also be considered a Russian construct, since the relative cohesion among both smaller and larger groups scattered over this vast area was itself very much a reflection of the changing attitudes of Russian power. As with our other case studies, the case of the Tatars highlights how different groups can be characterized by highly diverse sets of relationships, not only towards each other, but also towards the Russian majority. Several smaller ethnic groups that have found themselves at the forefront of the Russian frontier, moreover, may owe their distinct identities to the imperial attitude of “divide et impera”. Apt examples of these are the histories of the Gagauz and the Bulgarians of the Budzhak, groups that stood in the way of Russian expansion into the Balkans. In the case of the Caucasus, the history of the Kalmyks stands as another example.

Our third section explores the distinct identities of Karelians, Moldovans, Azeris, and Tajiks, groups whose more or less compact settlement spaces were divided by the changing Russian borders in the 19th century. The border itself thus formed a significant barrier between linguistically and culturally similar communities. Trapped in different state frameworks and moving along diverging trajectories, former relations were weakened and transformed, despite the fact that, in the case of the Karelians and Moldavians at least, efforts were made to establish and maintain meaningful contact with the more stable Finnish and Romanian national communities emerging on the other side of the border. In the case of these groups, a particular communist nation-building process prevailed during the Soviet period as well. This project achieved its goal only partially, however. As a result, highly ambiguous local identity constructs have only amplified the social problems that have unfolded since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The principal aim of our volume is to provide an overview of the ethnic background of social processes in the post-Soviet realm, pointing to both regional specificities and to temporal particularities stemming from the different historical cross-sections we investigated. These studies, we hope, will serve both as a background to, and a starting point for, further empirical research in various social scientific fields.

The research results presented in this volume can, of course, be further refined. Since the conflicts we examine are of a multidimensional nature, they can be approached from several perspectives. In addition to presenting ethnic patterns based on static census data from various points of time, the exploration and refinement of meso- and micro-level ethnic processes can also be aided by ethnographic research on the relationship within and between different ethnic groups. This may shed light on the processes connected to the use and appropriation of space by ethnic groups. The historical development and the current strength of their identities obviously also play a role in these processes. Additionally, exploring the ethnic dimension of social structures may also help us in avoiding (or at least mitigating) conflict.

Expanding our GIS database could also be a step forward, either by including additional economic datasets or by carrying out further investigations on lower (sub-national) geographical scales. Such research would be necessary in order to have a greater understanding of the local specificities influencing both the economic situation and social differences. In building on these results, and at the same time also going further, greater emphasis can and should be placed on exploring other dimensions of existing conflicts. Such investigations could include, but by no means should be limited to, explorations of underlying social-economic factors, and studies grounded in the more recent approaches of cultural geography.

 

 

Formation of National Identity

The Historical Roots of Regional Inequalities and Their Relationship with Present – Day Peripheries and Conflict Zones in the Post-Soviet Realm (1897–2010)

Gábor Demeter

The series of political conflicts that developed in the post-Soviet realm just decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union have highlighted the internal tensions within newly emergent political entities. These tensions were partly the result of economic shocks imposed on transforming economies, and partly the result of unresolved social problems. Beyond these factors, the conflicts also show a clear territorial pattern that is itself the result of the re – emergence of nationalism throughout the region (Brubaker, R. 1996, Kolstø, P. 2016, Anderson, B. 2016). Having been strengthened during the Soviet era, persistent and even revitalized forms of nationalism have re-emerged along historical fault lines and fractures. The instability of political entities, from the Republic of Moldova to the Baltic region, is partly caused by the fact that these states conform neither to the concept of the nation-state, nor to the concept of the state-nation (citizenship-nation). The instability is also partly due to the often changing political-ideological circumstances over the last hundred years. In other words, the old-new boundaries that were established after 1990 cannot fulfill ― or just barely fulfill ― their homogenizing and identity-forming functions, and thus have largely failed in regard to the political unification of the post-Soviet territory. Like the old imperial and Soviet boundaries before them, the borders created after 1990 have not been able to overcome historical differences in development and culture. As a consequence, historically determined structures in the European post-Soviet region still influence present political behavior (Bottlik Zs. 2008, 2016, Kará­csonyi D. et al. 2014a, 2014b, KarácsonyiD. and Bottlik Zs. 2018). Problems in the region therefore become more obvious and understandable not only by tracing existing social and political fault lines, but also by examining current and historical spatial patterns through the lens of “phantom boundaries” (Hirschhausen, B. et al., 2015). Employed alongside political science, geography contributes to a better understanding of these “frozen conflicts” (Dembinska, M. and Campana, A. 2017, Tudoroiu, T. 2012, 2016).

Researchers such as Bottlik, Dembinska and Campana, Hirschhausen, Karácsonyi, and Tudoroiu have highlighted the significant parallel between political protest, economic development and the old political boundaries in East Central Europe and the post-Soviet region, and have stressed the clear spatial aspects of these social phenomena. Jańczak (2015) and Zarycki (2015) have proven that there is a significant correlation between the historical boundaries from 1795 to 1920 between Prussia, Austria, and Russia, on the one hand, and the spatial patterns of Polish parliamentary and presidential elections, on the other (Kaczynski vs Tusk, then Kaczynski vs Komorowski in 2010 and Komorowski vs Duda in 2015). Of course, one may argue that this political pattern has nothing to do with “historical roots,” and instead simply reflects the present-day economic-structural differences in Poland, such as the ratio of people employed in the private sector, or the ratio of industrial employees compared to the agrarian population, or the spatial pattern of foreign investments and private entrepreneurship (Pütz, R. 1998). However, it is clear these patterns coincide not only with the historical borders, but also with the spatial pattern of railway density as well. As most of the railways were constructed before 1945, it is more likely that it was the old features that determined the development of present economic differences than to think of them developing in this pattern merely by coincidence, or as the result of differentiated regional development after 1990 (Barta G., Illés T. and Bottlik Zs. 2018). This also suggests that neither conditions in interwar Poland, which resulted in regional differences between illiteracy rates and agrarian outputs, nor the “egalitarianist” communist policies, were able to overcome regional differences that were established between 1795 and 1920. The Polish example demonstrates that historically-determined differences may persist over centuries, even in an ethnically and religiously functioning political entity.

In Belarus, the spatial pattern of the Belarusian language shows great similarity to the location of the old Polish-Russian border that existed between 1920 and 1939 (Bottlik Zs. 2016). Electoral geography exhibits the same pattern. Lukashenko’s opponents are always more popular in the western fringes of the country. As can be seen in the third chapter of this volume, language use in this region can be considered as an act of political protest, as both the Belarusian language, as well as Greek Catholicism, were banned during the Soviet era. The territorial and cultural expression of this political behavior suggests that, despite the ostensible ethnic homogeneity of Belarus, latent dividing lines can still be identified. When a crisis hits, a renewal of these historical “frontlines” can be expected (Radzik, R. 2002). The Belarusian-Polish boundary represents a transitional zone between the Polish-Catholic and Russian-Orthodox ideologies. This transitional zone has manifested itself in cultural differences as well, and has resulted in an entangled, and selective, interpretation of the historical past, and the emergence of a regional identity in Belarus.

Whereas present-day Poland is a good example of the persistence of phantom borders generated by political boundaries that lasted from 1795 to 1920 where these phantom borders managed to divide or split an ethnically and religiously homogeneous state, by contrast, Belarus is an example of the persistence of differences along political borders that lasted only a short time — from 1920 to 1939 — and endured despite long-running imperial efforts at homogenization (when the country was incorporated into historical Poland or into the Soviet Union, Bottlik Zs. 2013, 2016). This also implies that differences observed in present-day Belarus can be traced back well before the establishment of the 1920 boundaries. And, unlike in Poland, the different development pattern has manifested itself in language preferences in Belarus.

Political behavior and ethnic consciousness have a strong correlation and a clear territorial pattern in Montenegro as well. Those who claim themselves to be Montenegrins, and who supported Milo Djukanović in 1997 and the secession from Serbia in 2006, live in the core area of the republic within the pre-1912 borders (Bottlik Zs. 2008, Demeter G. 2010). Those who identify themselves as Serbs live on the fringes that were occupied after 1912. The persistence of these historical structures is not only reflected in self-determination, but also was strengthened by the selection of new symbols. These symbols included a new national anthem and flag ― which signaled a denial of the Yugoslavian era ― as well as the codification of the new Montenegrin language, which differs only slightly from the Serbian language.

Despite the codification of the new Montenegrin language, its everyday use has been of secondary importance in ethnic identity and self-definition. Most Montenegrins speak Serbian, not Montenegrin. In Ukraine, however, the Ukrainian language is in everyday use, and does not corelate with identity, but rather has a strong correlation with political behavior. This phenomenon also has historical roots and has manifested itself in a spatial pattern, and East-West division. It also coincides with differences in physical geographical conditions, such as steppe areas versus woodland areas. These physical geographical features have influenced the history of the region, as well as its socio-economic conditions (Karácsonyi D. et al. 2014a-b, Karácsonyi D. 2006, 2008, 2009, Karácsonyi D. and Bott­lik Zs. 2018). The conquest of the Crimean Tatars, and the vacuum created by the fleeing of Muslims, attracted hundreds of thousands of people who were drawn to the promise of economic prosperity, which was in turn influenced by free trade on the Black Sea from 1783, and also by western demand for grain. The colonization process supported by the state reshaped both the economic and ethnic characteristics of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and led to the acceleration of industrialization, urbanization, and Russification. This was further triggered by industrialization during the Soviet era when the state depended on coal and iron ore from the Donets basin. The persistence of old privileges enjoyed by the Don Cossacks also contributed to the maintenance of an east-west division. It is therefore not surprising that present-day Ukraine still exhibits these historical divisions.

Recent elections in Italy, Turkey (2018)1, and Romania proved that this spatiality is not confined to the “transitional” regions of East Central Europe, which includes the European post-Soviet region. Instead, this spatiality seems to be a more general phenomenon. Italy’s Five Star Movement is deeply rooted in the poorer, southern Mezzogiorno region, which is the former Kingdom of Naples and Sicily. Supporters of President Erdoğan in Turkey, moreover, can be defined not only on a social basis, but spatially as well. In turn, the 2014 election of Claus Johannis as president of Romania is apparently due to the votes in Transylvania and Bucovina, an electoral result that corresponds to the old borders.2 These still-traceable internal fault lines and fractures that relied on former cultural or political boundaries, and which have been identified in Western literature as “phantom boundaries”, have only come into focus through resent research (Hirschhausen, B. et al. 2015, Hirschhausen, B. 2017a, 2017b, see also the German project Phantomgrenzen in Ostmitteleuropa: www.phantomgrenzen.eu).3

This chapter will focus on whether present fault lines in the post-Soviet realm can be considered historically determined (that is, inherited from the past). In order to trace these fault lines, regions need to be identified with the aid of historical statistical analysis. Then, boundaries need to be studied to determine if they coincide with any previous, or present, political boundaries or conflict zones. Differences in levels of development, or other features or characteristics, between the identified historical regions also need to be identified and examined. Historical differences between urban and rural environs need to be traced and compared as well with the results of regional planning in the Soviet era. Finally, a description and illustration of regional inequalities in the post-Soviet area in 2010 needs to be compared to the pattern of inequalities in the existing conflict zones, as well as to the location of the newly identified historical regions.

Aims and methods

The Western literature that deals with phantom borders has focused primarily on case studies (Löwis, S. 2015b, 2017, Zamfira 2015), while macroregional, historical, and statistical approaches have rarely been applied together (Löwis, S. 2015a). This chapter investigates how, and to what extent, the ethnic and regional policy first of the Russian Empire and then of the Soviet Union was both willing and able to overcome the cultural differences of the formerly incorporated areas. Simple administrative readjustments made by the state were not always enough to eliminate entrenched regional differences. With this in mind, the working hypothesis of the present chapter is threefold: 1) If regional patterns at the end of the nineteenth century coincide with old political boundaries,this implies that the Russian Empire’s national and regional policy was not aimed at homogenization at all, or alternatively, that its attempt to homogenize the region had failed. 2) If the boundaries of this region at the end of the nineteenth century coincide with present-day fault lines, then this would suggest that the Soviets were also unsuccessful at eliminating existing differences. 3) If both of these assumptions are correct, then present-day fractures and conflict zones are the result of historical boundaries that are more than 200 years old.

If current tensions in the post-Soviet region are the result of ethnic and cultural divisions that have existed for two centuries, then this is interesting in two respects. First, communism in the Soviet Union lasted for more than 70 years, whereas collective memories and traditions based on oral history begin to fade after two generations, then quickly vanish (Herrschel, T. 2007). This means that collective memory and traditions based on oral history, which are contributors to the persistence of phantom boundaries, did not have an effect, because they would have faded before the end of Soviet rule. If phantom boundaries still persist, despite the lack of these collective memories, their existence is a result of political factors and other cultural determinants.

Secondly, although both tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union can be described as empires, there were significant differences between their regional and ethnic policies. The administrative uniformity of tsarist Russia was increasing by the end of the 19th century as a result of the simultaneous strengthening of nationalism and the centralizing efforts of the empire (for details see the next chapter). The creation of guberniyas and uyezds as new admi­nistrative territorial units was partly based on historical traditions; however, establishing boundaries based on ethnic differences was not the goal. Special privileges such as tax exemption for Germans settled at the Volga River, military exemption for the peasants in Bessarabia, or special development policy as in the case of the Caucasus, Crimea, or the constitution for Finland, were unique to the recently occupied frontier zones, and assisted in the colonization, pacification, and integration of these regions (Kőszegi M. 2018).

When the communists came to power in 1918, they abandoned the idea of establishing a homogeneous Russian nation. In addition to the enormous social differences across the Soviet Union, which made the nationalization of the region impossible, the communists were also aware of other regional differences and inequalities. As a result, the Soviet leadership allowed the formation of territorial (collective) autonomies based on ethnicity, as well as the use of local languages. They believed that a supranational dictatorship of the proletariat, as outlined by Karl Marx, could be achieved through the establishment of national self-government as an intermediary stage (Tolz, V. 2005).

If the homogenization efforts of both imperial Russia and the communists were unsuccessful, then the present-day fault lines, which correspond to former cultural boundaries, are a result of the limited viability of the political boundaries inherited from the Soviet era. Therefore, they suggest a failure of the administrative, regional, and national policies of the Soviet Union.

The Russian imperial census of 1897 covered most of the region that is now referred to as European Post-Soviet. This census enables us to examine the whole area by using the same indicators and there is no need for data harmonization which would be unavoidable if numerous countries are involved in such investigations. Up to now, this source has not been utilized for its regional aspects. Mironov’s (2000) research relying on this source mainly focused on vertical structures (social stratification) and not on the identification of regional patterns.

The examination of regional differences after the collapse of the Soviet Union was based on the census data from the 2000s and 2010s. For the investigation a fine resolution raion-level territorial approach was used (covering 740 territorial entities), which is more sophisticated than the usually applied approach in the literature (Karácsonyi D. and Kocsis K. and Bottlik Zs. 2017, Kocsis K. and Rudenko, L. and Schweitzer F. 2008). It is also finer than the resolution of the investigation on 1897 (composed of 340 entities). The investigation of regional patterns after the turn of the millennium required the harmonization of Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian national censuses (Karácsonyi D. 2014, Karácsonyi, D. and Bottlik Zs. 2018), and this was a limiting factor for the selection of available indicators. Thus, the indicators used in the two investigations were not the same, not only because of the above outlined problem, but also because the structure of censuses also changed in the last 100 years. Nor was the territorial coverage the same. The investigation of 1897 did not cover the Austrian part of Galicia, whereas the investigation of the situation in 2010 did not contain the Baltic states and Poland. Moreover, although the methods were the same, these li­miting factors noted above should be taken into consideration during the interpretation of the results, that is the location of the fault lines in 1897 and in 2010. Despite all these constraints, it is remarkable that many fault lines in 2010 coincided with former (and in 2010 no longer existing) political boundaries and with the socio-economic fault lines identified in 1897.

Regional inequalities in 1897

The connection between historical regions, administrative systems, and present-day hot-spots

This section investigates the results of imperial homogenization efforts, the outcome of which is illustrated through the identification of historical regions, the differences in their development, and the relationship between the boundaries of historical regions and present-day hot-spots. It is important to point out that language-based national consciousness and homogenization are not the specific features of empires (Anderson, B. 2016). As in other empires, in the Russian Empire it was loyalty to the imperial state, or “Mother Russia”, not to the nation, that was of prime significance (Osterhammel, J. 1997). Nevertheless, hybrid and entangled systems did exist, especially if an empire wanted to increase its level of integration, or if the elite wanted to preserve its power by utilizing nationalism as a tool. Even the Russian empire attempted to adopt nationalism to increase the level of homogenization. On the one hand, it had the option of choosing a supranational approach, which involved the creation of the “citizenship nation” (this was the path chosen in the Ottoman Empire, though pan-Osmanism ultimately failed). On the other, it could have chosen a language-based, nationalist approach, but this option was hampered by the fact that only 45% of the population spoke Russian as their mother tongue. The tools for national homogenization in an empire were the reshaping of territorial administration, education, and imperial administration.

For this investigation, several variables from the 1897 Russian imperial census were selected. The proportion of migrants was chosen, as it is generally accepted that modernization processes trigger mobility. State interventionist policies pursued by imperial Russia (such as those linked to the colonization of conquered areas) also increased migration. Therefore, the proportion of migrants can function as an indicator of the impact of modernization and/or state interventionist policies. A rise in literacy rates, as a result of compulsory education, can also be an indicator of the effects of modernization and state intervention. The proportion of merchants, and of urban dwellers, are two different features according to this hypothesis. Although both can indicate a level of modernization, it is also assumed that a non-urban merchant population existed in Russia because of the significant Jewish population in rural areas. The correlation matrix later confirmed the assumption that the share of urban population, and the proportion of merchants, refer to different aspects. The ratio of (bureaucratic) nobility and clergy measured to merchants symbolizes the relationship between the “old” and “new” elites, which also has a territorial pattern. The assumption was that religion also has an impact on socio-cultural and economic behavior. As a result, the proportion of Pravoslavs (Orthodox people) was also used (our presumption was later confirmed by the correlation matrix). The high proportion of Orthodox people, and the prevalence of Russian as a mother-tongue, may refer to the penetration of the central power into local spheres, and the impact of centralization (Kőszegi M. and Pete M. 2018). The difference between the proportion of the Orthodox population, and the proportion of Russian speakers, indicates the level of homogenization. A map illustrating the distribution of the Russian mother-tongue in the peripheries shows the Crimean and Don-Kuban regions as target areas of Russian colonization. A map of non-Russian Orthodox people indirectly indicates Russian infiltration, or the level of Russian assimilation, in Belarus and Ukraine. The proportion of households with servants can be used as a proxy for family economic potential and social prestige. The proportion of households with more than six persons, including both family members and servants, represents a traditional behavior that is characteristic of agrarian societies in the case of values above the country average. Thus, the two indicators are not equivalent (which was confirmed by the correlation matrix). Finally, the ageing index, which indicates the proportion of the population above 60 years of age, shows the same pattern. It is not considered a sign of demographic decline when applied to the late 19th century, but is rather considered a positive feature which may indicate improvements in health care. Due to the constraints of the population census, it was impossible to include additional indicators. As a result, these data related to demographics and social behavior can only indirectly refer to development level.

The goal of this study was to identify community characteristics other than language to delineate the regions, so the use of ethnic categories as variables was avoided. Also, the 1897 census exaggerated the proportion of Russians in the region (Bottlik Zs. 2016). After indicators were selected the relationship between the variables was analyzed. This highlighted the region’s socio-economic cha­racteristics, allowing for the elimination of variables that proved to be irrelevant for the study of development levels. The investigation was carried out at the uyezd level.

A strong correlation was measured between the percentage of merchants and the proportion of traditional elite, but the negative coefficient refers to territorial separation of the two social layers. The higher the proportion of the local-born population was in European Russia, the less likely they were able to read and write. In other words, the migrants of that era were educated, which indicates a higher level of capitalization (merchants, freelance professions), and also highlights the empire’s efforts to colonize the area (some social layers were immobile: peasants were allowed to move only after 1861, while Jews had to live in pre-designated districts). The higher the proportion of Pravoslavs, the lower the rate of literacy. Higher education was a privilege for those who were born under the influence of western culture. Despite the colonization efforts of the state, migration was not a common behavior for Orthodox people in general. (Orthodox people were thought to be loyal, therefore one may suppose that they were overrepresented in this process. This might be true, but the large numbers of immobile rural Orthodox people decrease the possible correlation between migration and Orthodoxy). The proportion of servants was also low among Pravoslavs, and among the less-mobile autochtonous population in general. This suggests a correlation between economic potential and religion, or economic potential and education levels. The higher the proportion of servants in the population, the higher the rate of literacy as well. Large family size correlated to low literacy, and low family economic potential, and it had a relatively strong connection to Orthodoxy.

After an analysis and historical interpretation of the relationship between the selected variables, the spatial pattern of the single indicators was investigated. These individual maps are then overlain on one another. This created a complex map which indicated development levels (the values of the single variables were normalized and aggregated), and allowed for the delimitation of regions based on differences in development.

In addition to the reconstruction of development levels, cluster analysis was used in an attempt to identify regions with similar features and characteristics in order to delimit and map homogeneous regions. The territorial extent ― or number ― of regions delimited based on development levels, as well as regions defined by their relative similarity, do not necessarily match. The 1897 census data also provided a possibility to trace differences in the level of development between urban and rural zones within administrative units. As a result, internal inequalities could be measured and mapped.

The number of servants employed by a household, as a measure of family prestige and economic potential, was high in former Polish and Lithuanian regions, and in the southern parts of Ukraine (Fig. 1.1.1-3). Literacy rates (Fig. 1.1.1-1) showed a similar pattern. It was high in the conquered Crimea and Southern Ukraine. This was a result of the proportion of newcomers in the area, and is confirmed by the territorial distribution of the Russian-speaking population in the region. Interestingly, the proportion of merchants, as a new social class of capitalism, was low in the Polish-Lithuanian area, but relatively high in Belarus and Crimea. This suggests that the connection between Jews and trade was somewhat weaker than originally believed. An 1804 decree had forbidden Jewish people from settling east of Kiev (Pándi L. 1997). However, a relatively high proportion of merchants was measured in the region, and was likely a result of increasing grain exports from southern Russia. At the same time, in the region of Warsaw, where the proportion of Jews was over 10% (Bottlik Zs. 2016), the proportion of merchants was low (Fig. 1.1.2-1). The ageing index was favorable in Volhynia and Crimea, but was very unfavorable in the Baltic region. The proportion of urban dwellers (Fig. 1.1.2-2) was higher in the west, but showed a gradual decrease with a broad transitional zone towards the east. The bulk of urbanized areas coincided with the boundary of Congress Poland in 1815 and the Baltic region. Finally, the map illustrating the ratio of the old and new elite ― the number of priests + nobles measured to the number of merchants ― shows the Polish-Lithuanian region, which up to then showed favorable tendencies, also had some retrograde features (Fig. 1.1.1-4). The old elite was overrepresented compared to the new bourgeoisie in the region of the Don River as well, because the Cossacks had managed to preserve their privileges collectively. Households larger than six, which suggested traditional structures and underdevelopment, were dominant in future Belarus and central Ukraine. At the same time, the proportion of locally-born individuals was over 90% in the areas that would become Belarus, northern Ukraine, Bessarabia, and the southern part of the Baltic region, which also suggests the maintenance of traditional structures (Fig. 1.1.1-2).

As the figures illustrate, homogeneity was not characteristic for the investigated region in 1897, despite the passing of more than a century after the partition of Poland (between 1772 and 1795) and the acquisition of the Baltic region and Crimea in 1783. As most of the single variables (cartograms) showed regional patterns and not fragmented, mosaic-like structures, we therefore attempted to identify homogeneous sub-regions with common or similar features and special characteristics (which makes them discernable from other regions) using the above analyzed indicators. For the identification of these so-called “formal regions” (regional geography usually makes a distinction between these mainly preindustrial formations and “functional regions” which are characterized by cooperation and interdependence between the territorial constituents, therefore their features are heterogeneous and may vary within small distance), cluster analysis was carried out (Fig. 1.1.2-4). The historical regional structure appears distinct even at setting only five clusters (that refers to five predicted regions). The external and internal boundaries of old Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska) were still visible 100 years after its dismemberment. The indicator values for Latvia and Estonia, which were under Swedish rule for centuries, were also different from that of the Polish-Lithuanian bloc in terms of characteristics. The Orthodox regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth also constituted a separate group (detached from the Polish core areas along the future Curzon line), and differed significantly from the Voronezh-Smolensk region located in the Russian frontier zone. The bimodality of present-day Ukraine was evident even at that time. If Crimea and its surrounding area is included, it was grouped into three clusters in 1897, which generally resembled the former Polish-Russian-Ottoman border prior to 1772.

Figure 1.1.1. Regional differences in the Russian Empire based on the variables of the 1897 census I (Source: [29])

The investigation was repeated by increasing the number of clusters (that is the number of predicted regions) to ten. This resulted not in large new patches (with the exception of Lithuania and the Don Cossacks), but rather caused fragmentation along the borders of the formerly defined clusters. In other words, a continuous buffer zone evolved along these “splinters” split off from the core regions. This means that the previously defined cluster (region) boundaries (when the cluster number was set at five) can be considered structurally stable. Thus these five regions have relatively stable and well-discernable borders.

In order to test the working hypothesis, the present-day boundaries and the map by Rónai in 1945, which illustrates the long-term stability of historical borders in East Central Europe, were overlain in Fig. 1.1.2-4. Present-day hot-spots were also marked. The result was clear: the boundaries of the pre-defined clusters for 1897 match present-day administrative-political boundaries only in Poland and the Baltic region. The boundaries of these clusters, which delineate the population of Crimean Tartars, the Don Cossacks, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Estonia-Livonia, coincide with older political boundaries. The pre-1772 boundary of the Polish Commonwealth coincided with the boundary of one of the clusters in 1897, and the boundaries of the developed Crimean cluster matched the old Ottoman boundary. It is also clear that the present-day fault lines in Ukraine, Crimea, and Belarus already existed in 1897.

Furthermore, the identified historical clusters not only varied in their characteristics, but there is also clearly a difference in their development levels as well (Fig. 1.1.2-3). Present-day southern Ukraine, which demonstrated five indicators with values above the regional average, as well as Crimea, were very developed then thanks to fertile lands, western demand for grain exports, and state intervention policies, which included the development of the military and heavy industry. Areas north of this region were found to be underdeveloped in 1897. The east-west division of the future Ukraine was evident with respect to development as well, but at that time eastern Ukraine was more underdeveloped. This situation only changed due to the industrial developments of the Soviet era. Furthermore, both zones extended beyond the present-day boundaries of Ukraine to the north, towards present-day Belarus.

Figure 1.1.2 Regional differences in the Russian Empire based on the variables of the 1897 census II. (Source: [29])

The surrounding area of Warsaw showed a similar level of development to Crimea. The area of present-day Lithuania was also developed, but had only two indicators showing values above the regional average. The Baltic region demonstrated five favorable indicators, but had a low level of urbanization and a high ageing index. The area of Congress Poland was behind them, but demonstrated more favorable indicators than western Ukraine, whose development level was around the average. Present-day eastern Belarus, eastern Ukraine, and the Russian borderland were considered the most backward. In other words, the geographical peripheries of the Russian Empire experienced the highest levels of development, while the core areas were considered economic peripheries. As a result, it is not surprising that separatism grew within the peri­pheries, leading to the loss of these regions after 1920.

What were the main distinctive features responsible for the different characteristics in the 1897 clusters? In present-day southern Ukraine, for example, the proportion of migrants, merchants, and urban population was higher than in western Ukraine, where the low level of literacy and the low proportion of household servants was characteristic regionally, similarly to eastern Ukraine, but here three more indicators showed values under the regional average.

Internal inequalities: The urban-rural dichotomy in 1897

The census of 1897 can also be used to examine regional patterns of urban development. It is possible to calculate sub-regional differences, and to also measure inequalities within the uyezds. Cluster analysis can pinpoint typical differences and urban-rural relationships. An investigation of internal inequalities within districts is important because the dynamic and programmed urbanization of the Soviet era resulted in the increase, as well as the uniformization, of urban-rural differences, regardless of their original character and patterns of difference.

Indicators used to assess the development level and characteristics of towns were the same as those used in previous investigations. The literacy rate was seen to correlate with the proportion of migrants, as well as with social status (which was represented by the share of priests and noblemen from total earners). Strong negative correlation was observed between household size and literacy. The proportion of merchants did not correlate with religion. Calculations showed that greater household size in urban environments decreased the probability of migration. However, as migration was more characteristic for urban environs, this also suggests that household size in towns was smaller than in the countryside. The proportion of nobles and priests in towns correlated with the proportion of households with servants. In the case of merchants, a correlation with households with servants was not as evident. In other words, the connection between indicators in urban environments hardly differed from their connection at the sub-regional level. Only one remarkable difference was identified. As the literacy rate in towns was usually higher than in the district itself, it did not correlate with the number of households with servants, or with the proportion of non-Orthodox, which is in contrast to the situation observed during the investigations at the regional level.

The 500 towns investigated were not equally distributed throughout the region. Polish regions were characterized by high town-density, but in areas east of this region, in the moorland of Pripyaty, the population density was very low. The physical geo­graphy not only influenced the number of towns, but also their characteristics, though this was not always verified in our examinations. Based on their rich historical past, we supposed different urban types abundant in the Baltic region, from those that characterized the plains of Russia. We also assumed that the urban centres around the Black Sea (recently established or colonized) also constituted a separate type. These assumptions were tested through the analysis of the territorial patterns of single indicators.

With respect to literacy rates, the Pripyaty functioned as a real barrier towards the south (the future Ukraine), where literacy dropped below 40%, while this tendency in the east was not observable. However, the dispersion of values was great in the Polish areas. The regional pattern was colored further by the towns around the Black Sea, which were characterized by higher literacy rates again due to the economic and military functions of the towns. The differences in literacy rates between towns and their rural surroundings was small in the Baltic region and in today’s southern Ukraine, while in the central and eastern half of the area studied, differences between towns and their hinterlands was great (Fig. 1.1.3).

Figure 1.1.3 Regional patterns of literacy rate ― literacy in towns and difference between towns and rural areas (1897) (Source: [29])

The share of the non-autochtonous population in towns (those who migrated to their dwelling place in 1897) was the highest on the fringes, in southern Ukraine, and in Crimea. This was a result of attempts by the state to colonize the region. It was high in the Baltic region as a result of trade routes and proximity to the capital of St. Petersburg. It was also high in Poland as a result of the industrial revolution, although there were large local differences. In the central parts of the area studied, the proportion of migrants was lower, and there was less of a difference between the proportion of migrants in urban and rural areas. The same was true for the Caucasus. The difference between towns and rural regions was surprisingly high on the Black Sea coast, which suggests that colonization occurred in St. Petersburg and other urban areas first, as these areas were more appealing to settlers.

When considering the pattern of religious affiliation, the relationship between towns and their hinterland areas was very instructive (Fig. 1.1.4). In the Baltic and Polish areas, Orthodox urban dwellers were, not surprisingly, in the minority. However, in the central parts of the area studied, Orthodox inhabitants were in the majority in rural regions, while in urban areas, Greek Catholics (a heritage of Polish rule) constituted a relative majority of 40% to 50%, even in 1897, a hundred years after the dismemberment of Poland. This large contact area, which encompassed the future Belarus, was therefore characterized by an urban-rural dichotomy with respect to religion. Further east, away from the former area of the Rzeczpospolita Polska, the difference between the proportion of Orthodox urban dwellers and their corresponding rural population gradually lessened and Orthodoxy became predominant.

The ratio of the traditional elite, including nobles and priests, and the modern elite, including merchants, was similar in the rural and urban regions of Lithuania and present-day northern Belarus. In other regions, the traditional elite was more predominant in towns. This does not mean that merchants were absent from these towns (this variable gives the ratio of two layers), but rather that, in these regions, merchants were abundant in rural hinterlands too, while nobles were missing.

Considering the proportion of households with servants, the difference between rural and urban environments was small in the Baltic region, in the area of the former Congress Poland, and in Crimea. In the future Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Russian territories, the greater difference between urban and rural communities was a result of the weaker economic potential of the countryside in 1897.

When the values of the single variable are aggregated in order to obtain a general overview of the complex development level of towns (Fig. 1.1.5), the pattern we see is very similar to the pattern shown by the uyezds. The most developed towns in 1897 were found in the Baltic region area of Congress Poland, and in Crimea. In the case of Crimea, targeted state intervention contributed to the favorable picture. In the case of the Congress Poland, it was the industrial revolution in the textile industry (primarily in Lódz), while in the Baltic region it was the closeness of the capital, in addition to historical traditions, that contributed to the high level of development. In the case of the Polish areas, the picture was very versatile: minor towns showed weak progress, and their level of development was similar to that of towns in eastern Ukraine and the Danube delta. With respect to the difference between the level of development of urban centers and their rural hinterlands (Fig. 1.1.5), the central areas displayed the greatest difference (where the countryside was characterized by Orthodoxy, but towns were not). In contrast, Polish, Baltic, and southern towns, were not only more developed, but the level of development of their hinterlands was similar to that of the towns.

Figure 1.1.4 Regional pattern of the Orthodox population in towns and the rural hinterland (1897); (Source: [29])

Figure 1.1.5 Regional pattern of the aggregated development level of towns in 1897 and the differences of development between urban centres and their rural hinterland; (Source: [29])

If development levels are disregarded, and the focus is aimed at similarities in the value of indicators, and town groups are created according to this using cluster analysis (Fig. 1.1.6), then the group of “southern” towns was characterized by low levels of literacy, low migration rates, and the predominance of traditional elite over the capitalist formations, while the proportion of households with servants was low. In the “eastern” bloc these values were significantly higher. The proportion of households with servants was above the average, as was the proportion of merchants. These two groups overlapped in the southeast. In the third urban type characteristic for the “Polish areas”, and for the future Belarus, the proportion of noblemen and merchants was low among urban dwellers, but the previous layer was more significant. This cluster was characterized by a low proportion of Orthodox people.

The “Baltic type” was characterized by high literacy rates. The numeric difference between the old elite of nobles and priests, and the new elite of merchants, was smaller than in Polish towns. The urban population was relatively old, whereas the population in the cluster of coastal towns was relatively young. The proportion of migrants was high in these coastal towns which suggested smaller households. The literacy rate was also high, and the proportion of priests and nobles was among the highest, as these two layers were the representatives of state power. The aggregated level of development in the Polish-Belarusian urban type in 1897 was above the regional average. The cumulative development value in the Lithuanian-Galician group and in southern Ukrainian towns was below the regional average.

The spatial pattern of urban-rural differences did not always follow the pattern of urban clusters (Fig. 1.1.6). The development level of the Baltic, Crimean, and Polish countryside was close to that of the urban cluster. However, the development level of the rural hinterland is always relative. The difference was small between developed towns and developed hinterland, but it was also small between underdeveloped towns and backward hinterlands. Clusterization made it possible to differentiate between them. Areas reclassed into rural cluster nr. 3, that was also abundant in the above described areas, was moderately developed measured to towns in its area, whereas rural clusters 6 and 7 were lagging behind the towns in their area. Their distinctive features (that separated clusters 6 and 7) were also well identifiable.

Figure 1.1.6 Rural cluster types based on the character of differences between towns and their hinterland and urban clusters based on the difference in urban features; (Source: [29])

To sum up, at the beginning of the Soviet era, most of the old historical structures still prevailed despite the administrative reorganization of imperial Russia. The area encompassed by the former boundaries of the Rzeczpospolita Polska