Process Safety for Engineers E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 850

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022

Beschreibung

Process Safety for Engineers

Familiarizes an engineer new to process safety with the concept of process safety management

In this significantly revised second edition of Process Safety for Engineers: An Introduction, CCPS delivers a comprehensive book showing how Process Safety concepts are used to reduce operational risks. Students, new engineers, and others new to process safety will benefit from this book.

In this updated edition, each chapter begins with a detailed incident case study, provides steps that help address issues, and contains problem sets which can be assigned to students.

The second edition covers:

• Process Safety: including an overview of CCPS’ Risk Based Process Safety
• Hazards: specifically fire and explosion, reactive chemical, and toxicity
• Design considerations for hazard control: including Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis
• Management of operational risk: including management of change

In addition, the book presents how Process Safety performance is monitored and sustained. The associated online resources are linked to the latest online CCPS resources and lectures.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

Title Page

Copyright

Dedication

List of Figures

List of Tables

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Glossary

Acknowledgements

Project Writer:

Subcommittee Members:

Peer Reviewers:

Online Materials Accompanying This Book

Preface

1 Introduction and Regulatory Overview

1.1 Purpose of this Book

1.2 Target Audience

1.3 Process Safety – What Is It?

1.4 Process Safety, Occupational Safety, and Environmental Impact

1.5 History of Process Safety

1.6 Basic Process Safety Definitions

1.7 Organization of the Book

1.8 Use of this Book in University Courses

1.9 Exercises

1.10 References

2 Risk Based Process Safety

2.1 Learning Objectives

2.2 Incident: BP Refinery Explosion, Texas City, Texas, 2005

2.3 Risk Based Process Safety

2.4 Pillar: Commit to Process Safety

2.5 Pillar: Understand Hazards and Risk

2.6 Pillar: Manage Risk

2.7 Pillar: Learn from Experience

2.8 What a New Engineer Might Do

2.9 Summary

2.10 Exercises

2.11 References

3 Process Safety Regulations, Codes, and Standards

3.1 Learning Objectives

3.2 Incident: Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Derailment and Fire, Quebec, Canada, 2013

3.3 Regulations, Codes and Standards

3.4 What a New Engineer Might Do

3.5 Tools

3.6 Summary

3.7 Other Incidents

3.8 Exercises

3.9 References

4 Fire and Explosion Hazards

4.1 Learning Objectives

4.2 Incident: Imperial Sugar Dust Explosion, Port Wentworth, Georgia, 2008

4.3 Introduction to Fires

4.4 Types of Fires

4.5 Types of Explosions

4.6 Fire and Explosion Prevention

4.7 What a New Engineer Might Do

4.8 Tools

4.9 Summary

4.10 Other Incidents

4.11 Exercises

4.12 References

5 Reactive Chemical Hazards

5.1 Learning Objectives

5.2 Incident: T‐2 Laboratories Reactive Chemicals Explosion, Jacksonville, Florida, 2007

5.3 Introduction to Chemical Reactivity

5.4 Reactive Chemicals Testing

5.5 Reactive Chemicals Hazard Screening and Evaluation

5.6 Reactive Chemical Incident Prevention and Mitigation

5.7 What a New Engineer Might Do

5.8 Tools

5.9 Summary

5.10 Other incidents

5.11 Exercises

5.12 References

6 Toxic Hazards

6.1 Learning Objectives

6.2 Incident: Methyl Isocyanate Release Bhopal, India, 1984

6.3 Toxins and Pathways

6.4 Exposure and concentration limits

6.5 Toxic Incident Prevention and Mitigation

6.6 What a New Engineer Might Do

6.7 Tools

6.8 Summary

6.9 Other Incidents

6.10 Exercises

6.11 References

7 Chemical Hazards Data Sources

7.1 Learning Objectives

7.2 Incident: Concept Sciences Explosion, Allentown, Pennsylvania, 1999

7.3 Chemical Hazards Data

7.4 What a New Engineer Might Do

7.5 Tools

7.6 Summary

7.7 Exercises

7.8 References

8 Other Hazards

8.1 Learning Objectives

8.2 Incident: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Release, Japan, 2011

8.3 Types of Hazards (Beyond Chemical Hazards)

8.4 What a New Engineer Might Do

8.5 Tools

8.6 Summary

8.7 Other Incidents

8.8 Exercises

8.9 References

9 Process Safety Incident Classification

9.1 Learning Objectives

9.2 Incident: Petrobras P‐36 Sinking, Brazil, 2001

9.3 Introduction to Metrics

9.4 What a New Engineer Might Do

9.5 Tools

9.6 Summary

9.7 Exercises

9.8 References

10 Project Design Basics

10.1 Learning Objectives

10.2 Incident: Mars Climate Orbiter lost contact, 1999

10.3 Introduction to Engineering Documentation

10.4 Common Engineering Documentation

10.5 Phases of a Project

10.6 Important Pieces of Process Safety Information

10.7 Methods to Prevent and Mitigate Process Safety Risks During Project Design

10.8 What a New Engineer Might Do

10.9 Tools

10.10 Summary

10.11 Other incidents

10.12 Exercises

10.13 References

11 Equipment Failure

11.1 Learning Objectives

11.2 Incident: Buncefield Storage Tank Overflow and Explosion, Hemel Hempstead, England, 2005

11.3 Typical Process Equipment

11.4 Asset Integrity and Reliability

11.5 What a New Engineer Might Do

11.6 Tools

11.7 Summary

11.8 Other Incidents

11.9 Exercises

11.10 References

12 Hazard Identification

12.1 Learning Objectives

12.2 Incident: Esso Longford Gas Plant Explosion, Victoria, Australia, 1998

12.3 Hazard Identification Introduction

12.4 What a New Engineer Might Do

12.5 Tools

12.6 Summary

12.7 Other Incidents

12.8 Exercises

12.9 References

13 Consequence Analysis

13.1 Learning Objectives

13.2 Incident: DPC Enterprises L.P. Chlorine Release, Festus, Missouri, 2002

13.3 Consequence Analysis Overview

13.4 Source Term Models

13.5 Transport Models

13.6 Consequence Effect Modeling

13.7 Outcome Models

13.8 Data and Uncertainties

13.9 What a New Engineer Might Do

13.10 Tools

13.11 Summary

13.12 Other Incidents

13.13 Exercises

13.14 References

14 Risk Assessment

14.1 Learning Objectives

14.2 Incident: Phillips 66 Explosion Pasadena, Texas, 1989

14.3 Risk Analysis Overview

14.4 Frequency Analysis

14.5 Risk Analysis

14.6 Risk Criteria

14.7 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

14.8 What a New Engineer Might Do

14.9 Tools

14.10 Summary

14.11 Other Incidents

14.12 Exercises

14.13 References

15 Risk Mitigation

15.1 Learning Objectives

15.2 Incident: Celanese Explosion, Pampa, Texas, 1987

15.3 Safeguards, Barriers, IPLs, and Other Layers of Protection

15.4 Risk Reduction Measures

15.5 What a New Engineer Might Do

15.6 Tools

15.7 Summary

15.8 Other Incidents

15.9 Exercises

15.10 References

16 Human Factors

16.1 Learning Objectives

16.2 Incident: Formosa Plastics VCM Explosion, Illiopolis, Illinois, 2004

16.3 Introduction to Human Factors

16.4 The Human Individual

16.5 The Work Team

16.6 Human Factors in the Process Workplace

16.7 What a New Engineer Might Do

16.8 Tools

16.9 Summary

16.10 Other Incidents

16.11 Exercises

16.12 References

17 Operational Readiness

17.1 Learning Objectives

17.2 Incident: Piper Alpha Explosion and Fire, Scotland, 1988

17.3 Introduction to Operational Readiness

17.4 What a New Engineer Might Do

17.5 Tools

17.6 Summary

17.7 Other Incidents

17.8 Exercises

17.9 References

18 Management of Change

18.1 Learning Objectives

18.2 Incident: Nypro Explosion, Flixborough, England, 1974

18.3 Introduction to Management of Change

18.4 What a New Engineer Might Do

18.5 Tools

18.6 Summary

18.7 Other Incidents

18.8 Exercises

18.9 References

19 Operating Procedures, Safe Work Practices, Conduct of Operations, and Operational Discipline

19.1 Learning Objectives

19.2 Incident: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Alaska, 1989

19.3 Operating Procedures

19.4 Safe Work Practices

19.5 Conduct of Operations and Operational Discipline

19.6 What a New Engineer Might Do

19.7 Tools

19.8 Summary

19.9 Other Incidents

19.10 Exercises

19.11 References

20 Emergency Management

20.1 Learning Objectives

20.2 Incident: West Fertilizer Explosion, West, Texas, 2013

20.3 Introduction to Emergency Management

20.4 Recovery and Recommissioning

20.5 What a new Engineer Might Do

20.6 Tools

20.7 Summary

20.8 Other Incidents

20.9 Exercises

20.10 References

21 People Management Aspects of Process Safety Management

21.1 Learning Objectives

21.2 Incident: Deepwater Horizon Well Blowout, Gulf of Mexico, 2010

21.3 Overview

21.4 Process Safety Competency

21.5 Training and Performance Assurance

21.6 Process Knowledge Management

21.7 Contractor Management

21.8 Workforce Involvement

21.9 Stakeholder outreach

21.10 What a New Engineer Might Do

21.11 Tools

21.12 Summary

21.13 Other Incidents

21.14 Exercises

21.15 References

22 Sustaining Process Safety Performance

22.1 Learning Objectives

22.2 Incident: Space Shuttle Columbia, 2003

22.3 Overview

22.4 Incident investigation

22.5 Measurement and metrics

22.6 Auditing

22.7 Management review and continuous improvement

22.8 What a New Engineer Might Do

22.9 Tools

22.10 Summary

22.11 Other Incidents

22.12 Exercises

22.13 References

23 Process Safety Culture

23.1 Learning Objectives

23.2 Overview

23.3 Beyond the Management of Process Safety

23.4 What a New Engineer Might Do

23.5 Tools

23.6 Exercises

23.7 References

Appendix A – Concluding Exercises

Exercise 1: LNG Value Chain

Exercise 2: Polymerization Reactor

Exercise 3: Ethylene Buffer Tank

Exercise 4: Wastewater Equalization Tank

Appendix B – Relationship Between Book Content and Typical Engineering Courses

Appendix C – Example RAGAGEP List

Appendix D – Reactive Chemicals Checklist

D.1 Chemical Reaction Hazard Identification

D.2 Reaction Process Design Considerations

Appendix E – Classifying Process Safety Events Using API RP 754 3

nd

Edition

E.1 Criterion for PSE

E.2 Criterion for Classification

E.3 PSE Tier 1 and Tier 2 Threshold Quantities

E.4 Classifying PSE Tier 1 and Tier 2 Events

E.4 References

Appendix F – Example Process Operations Readings and Evaluations

Example Process Equipment Evaluations.

Appendix G – List of CSB Videos

Appendix H – Major Process Safety Incident Vs Root Cause Map

Reference

Index

Wiley End User License Agreement

List of Tables

Chapter 2

Table 2.1 Process safety activities for new engineers

Chapter 3

Table 3.1 Examples and sources of process safety related regulations

Table 3.2 Sources of process safety related codes and standards and selecte...

Table 3.3 Comparison of RBPS elements with U.S. OSHA PSM and U.S. EPA RMP e...

Chapter 4

Table 4.1 Flammability properties

Table 4.2 Minimum ignition energies for selected materials

Table 4.3 Examples of various types of explosions (adapted from Crowl 2003)...

Table 4.4 Selected combustible dust properties (OSHA c)

Table 4.5 Ignition sources and control methods

Chapter 5

Table 5.1 Chemical Reactivity types and examples

Table 5.2 Some Reactive Functional Groups

Table 5.3 Example form to document screening of chemical reactivity hazards...

Chapter 6

Table 6.1 Example chemical exposure effects (CDC)

Table 6.2 Effects of oxygen depletion (HSE)

Chapter 7

Table 7.1 Safety data sheet sections and content

Table 7.2 NFPA 704 hazards and rating

Chapter 9

Table 9.1 Tier 1 Process Safety Event Severity Weighting

Table 9.2 Typical Tier 3 and Tier 4 process safety metrics (derived from CCP...

Chapter 10

Table 10.1 Asset life cycle stages including project phases (modified from ...

Chapter 11

Table 11.1 Failure modes and design considerations for fluid transfer equip...

Table 11.2 Common failure modes and design considerations for heat exchange...

Table 11.3 Common failure modes and design considerations for reactors

Chapter 12

Table 12.1 Preliminary hazard identification study overview

Table 12.2 Checklist analysis overview

Table 12.3 What‐If analysis overview

Table 12.4 HAZOP overview

Table 12.5 FMEA overview

Table 12.5 Typical hazard evaluation objectives at different stages of a pro...

Chapter 13

Table 13.1 Typical discharge scenarios

Table 13.2 Input and output for flash models

Table 13.3 Input and output for evaporation models

Table 13.4 Input and output for pool spread models

Table 13.5 Input and output for neutral and positively buoyant plume and puf...

Table 13.6 Input and output for dispersion models

Table 13.7 Input and output for dense gas dispersion models

Table 13.8 Types of fires and explosions

Table 13.9 Input and output for pool fire models

Table 13.10 Input and output for jet fire models

Table 13.11 Input and output for VCE models

Table 13.12 Input and output for toxic impact models

Table 13.13 Effects of thermal radiation (CCPS 2012)

Table 13.14 Selected overpressure levels and damage (CCPS 1999) (Clancy 197...

Table 13.15 Typical industry building damage level descriptions (Baker 2002...

Table 13.16 Selected consequence analysis models

Chapter 15

Table 15.1 Typical risk reduction measures

Table 15.2 Safety integrity levels (IEC 61508)

Chapter 17

Table 17.1 Typical construction, pre‐commissioning, and commissioning tasks...

Chapter 18

Table 18.1 Types of changes and examples (adapted from CCPS 2005)

Chapter 19

Table 19.1 Example Safe Work Practices

Chapter 21

Table 21.1 Example process safety training course list

Chapter 23

Table 23.1 CCPS Vision 20/20 industry tenets and societal themes

Appendix A

Table A.1 HAZOP Log Sheet

Table A.2 Ethylene Chemical Properties

Table A.3 Node 1 – T‐1 Intention, Boundary, Design Conditions and Parameter...

Table A.4 HAZOP Worksheet Node 1 – T‐1 WWT Equalization Tank

Table A.5 Risk Matrix Severity

Table A.6 Risk Matrix Likelihood

Appendix B

Table B.1 Typical engineering course relationship with book contents

Appendix C

Table C.1 Example RAGAGEP list

Appendix E

Table E.1 Tier 1 Level and Tier 2 Level Consequences (CCPS 2018)

Table E.2 Threshold quantity relationship

Table E.3 Material Release Threshold Quantities (reformatted from API RP 75...

Table E.4 Examples for material categories

Appendix G

Table G.1 CSB videos (as of January 2021)

List of Illustrations

Chapter 1

Figure 1.1 Nitroglycerine reactor in the 19th century

Figure 1.2 Continuous nitroglycerine reactor

Figure 1.3 Number of fatal work injuries, by industry sector, 2019

Figure 1.4 Fatal work injury rate by industry sector, 2019

Chapter 2

Figure 2.1 Process flow diagram of the raffinate column and blowdown drum...

Figure 2.2 Texas City isomerization unit aftermath

Figure 2.3 Destroyed trailers west of the blowdown drum

Figure 2.4 RBPS structure

Chapter 3

Figure 3.1 Lac‐Megantic tank cars with breaches to their shells

Figure 3.2 DOT‐117 train car

Figure 3.3 ExxonMobil Operations Integrity Management System

Figure 3.4 DuPont Process Safety and Risk Management model

Chapter 4

Figure 4.1 Imperial Sugar refinery after the explosion

Figure 4.2 Imperial Sugar packing buildings first floor plan

Figure 4.3 Imperial Sugar Refinery after the explosion

Figure 4.4 Motor cooling fins and fan guard with sugar dust, piles of sugar ...

Figure 4.5 Secondary dust explosion

Figure 4.6 Fire Triangle

Figure 4.7 Relationship between flammability properties

Figure 4.8 Flammability diagram

Figure 4.9 Pool fire

Figure 4.10 Jet fire

Figure 4.11 Fireball

Figure 4.12 Explosion pressure‐time curve

Figure 4.13 Degrees of congestion from low to high (left to right)

Figure 4.14 Relationships between the different types of explosions

Figure 4.15 Dust explosions in industry

Figure 4.16 Fire triangle and dust pentagon

Figure 4.17 Bonding and grounding

Figure 4.18 Methane flammability diagram (For Problem 4.9)

Chapter 5

Figure 5.1 Portion of 7.6 cm (3 in)‐thick reactor

Figure 5.2 T2 Laboratories control room

Figure 5.3 T2 Reactor cross‐section

Figure 5.4 Equipment involved in reactive chemistry incidents

Figure 5.5 Consequences of reactive chemistry incidents

Figure 5.6 Temperature and pressure vs. time for T2 Laboratories explosion...

Figure 5.7 Preliminary screening for chemical reactivity hazard analysis

Figure 5.8 – CRW for strong acid strong base pair

Chapter 6

Figure 6.1 Overview map of the Bhopal vicinity

Figure 6.2 Emergency relief effluent treatment with scrubber and flare tower...

Figure 6.3 Toxic pathways

Figure 6.4 Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) concentration

Chapter 7

Figure 7.1 Damage to Concept Sciences Hanover facility Courtesy Tom Volk, Th...

Figure 7.2 Simplified process flow diagram of the CSI HA vacuum distillation...

Figure 7.3 Example NFPA 704

Figure 7.4 Pictograms included in chemical shipping labels

Chapter 8

Figure 8.1 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor design

Figure 8.2 Fukushima Daiichi incident progression

Figure 8.3 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant elevations

Figure 8.4 Damage in the generator hall at the Sayano‐Shusenskaya hydroelect...

Figure 8.5 Iceland volcano ash plume on May 2, 2010

Figure 8.6 Coffeyville Refinery 2007 flood

Chapter 9

Figure 9.1 P 36 Platform shown during dry tow

Figure 9.2 P 36 attempted salvage operations

Figure 9.3 Process safety pyramid

Chapter 10

Figure 10.1 Example refinery block flow diagram

Figure 10.2 Example process flow diagram

Figure 10.3 Example piping and instrumentation diagram

Figure 10.4 Typical P&ID symbols

Figure 10.5 Example isometric drawing

Figure 10.6 Example process unit plot plan

Figure 10.7 Asset life cycle stages including project phases

Figure 10.8 Relationship between operating zones and limits

Figure 10.9 Inherently safer design principles

Figure 10.10 Hierarchy of controls

Figure 10.11 Combining ISD and hierarchy of controls

Chapter 11

Figure 11.1 Buncefield storage depot after the explosion and fires

Figure 11.2 Buncefield storage depot before the explosion

Figure 11.3 Buncefield Terminal site and wider area after explosion

Figure 11.4 Breakup of liquid into drops spilling from tank top

Figure 11.5 Damage from fire caused by mechanical seal failure

Figure 11.6 Pump explosion from running isolated

Figure 11.7 Schematic of centrifugal pump

Figure 11.8 Single and double mechanical seals

Figure 11.9 Two‐screw type PD pump

Figure 11.10 Rotary gear PD pump

Figure 11.11 Example application data sheet

Figure 11.12 Ruptured pipe from reaction with heat transfer fluid

Figure 11.13 Shell and tube heat exchanger

Figure 11.14 Principle of plate pack arrangement, gaskets facing the frame p...

Figure 11.15 Schematic of air‐cooled heat exchanger

Figure 11.16.A Example distillation column schematic

Figure 11.16.B Typical industrial distillation column

Figure 11.17 Schematic of carbon bed adsorber system

Figure 11.18 Damage to dust collector bags

Figure 11.19 Tube sheet of dust collector

Figure 11.20 Horizontal peeler centrifuge with clean‐in‐place system and dis...

Figure 11.21 Cross sectional view of a continuous pusher centrifuge

Figure 11.22 Schematic of baghouse

Figure 11.23 Dust collector explosion venting

Figure 11.24 Seveso reactor

Figure 11.25 T2 Laboratories site before and after the explosion

Figure 11.26 Damaged heater

Figure 11.27 Heater and adjacent column at NOVA Bayport plant

Figure 11.28 Molasses tank failure; before and after

Figure 11.29 1 ‐ Pipe connections in panel 2 and Chemfos 700; 2 ‐ Liq. Add l...

Figure 11.30 Cloud of nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide

Figure 11.31 Tank collapsed by vacuum

Figure 11.32 Schematic diagram of UST leak detection methods

Figure 11.33 Mounded underground tank

Figure 11.34 a. Schematics of external internal floating roof tank

Figure 11.34 b. Schematics of internal floating roof tank

Figure 11.35 Pressurized gas storage tank

Figure 11.36 Piping rupture

Figure 11.37 Comparison of HF Unit incident scene pre‐and post‐incident

Chapter 12

Figure 12.1 Photograph of the failed end of GP905 reboiler

Figure 12.2 Simplified schematic of absorber

Figure 12.3 Simplified schematic of the gas plant

Figure 12.4 HAZOP analysis method flowchart

Figure 12.5 Example HAZOP analysis worksheet

Figure 12.6 Example fault tree analysis diagram

Figure 12.7 Example event tree diagram

Chapter 13

Figure 13.1 Failed chlorine transfer hose and release

Figure 13.2 Consequence analysis stages

Figure 13.3 Logic diagram for consequence models for volatile hazardous rele...

Figure 13.4 Block Diagram showing relationship between consequence models...

Figure 13.5 Selected discharge scenarios

Figure 13.6 Two common liquid‐release situations

Figure 13.7 Atmospheric stability effects

Figure 13.8 Typical dispersion model output

Figure 13.9 Effect of initial acceleration and buoyancy on a dense gas relea...

Figure 13.10 Degrees of confinement

Figure 13.11 Levels of obstacle density

Figure 13.12 Interaction of a blast wave with a rigid structure

Figure 13.13 Pre‐engineered metal building BDL1

Figure 13.14 Pre‐engineered metal building BDL3

Figure 13.15 Wind roses

Chapter 14

Figure 14.1 Phillips 66 Company Houston Chemical Complex explosion

Figure 14.2 Illustration of a plugged settling leg prepared for maintenance...

Figure 14.3 Risk analysis flowchart

Figure 14.4 Event tree supporting frequency calculations

Figure 14.5 Risk assessment matrix (DOD 2012)

Figure 14.6 Severity categories

Figure 14.7 Probability levels

Figure 14.8 Example individual risk contours

Figure 14.9 Example societal risk F‐N curve

Figure 14.10 Hong Kong societal risk criteria

Figure 14.11 Types of ALARP demonstration

Figure 14.12 Typical layers of protection

Figure 14.13 Frequency of hole sizes

Figure 14.14 Risk Matrix

Chapter 15

Figure 15.1 Oxidation reactor after explosion

Figure 15.2 One of several units impacted by explosion

Figure 15.3 Schematic of oxidation reactor

Figure 15.4 Predicted flammable vapor cloud from reactor explosion

Figure 15.5 Terminology describing layers of protection

Figure 15.6 Swiss cheese model

Figure 15.7 Example bow tie model

Figure 15.8 Steps in constructing a bow tie model

Figure 15.9a The left side (threat legs) of a bow tie for loss of containmen...

Figure 15.9b The right side (consequence legs) of a bow tie for loss of cont...

Chapter 16

Figure 16.1 Smoke plumes from Formosa plant

Figure 16.2 Formosa reactor building elevation view

Figure 16.3 Cutaway of the Formosa reactor building

Figure 16.4 Model for human factors

Figure 16.5 Human factors topics related to the human individual

Figure 16.6 Human failure types

Figure 16.7 Decision making continuum

Figure 16.8 Factors impacting work team performance

Figure 16.9 Task Improvement Plan steps

Chapter 17

Figure 17.1 Piper Alpha platform

Figure 17.2 Piper Alpha platform after the incident

Figure 17.3 Schematic of Piper Alpha platform

Figure 17.4 An operational readiness review should follow these activities

Chapter 18

Figure 18.1 Flixborough Reactors

Figure 18.2 Schematic of Flixborough piping replacement

Figure 18.3 Flixborough site after explosion

Figure 18.4 MOC system flowchart

Chapter 19

Figure 19.1 Exxon Valdez tanker leaking oil

Figure 19.2 Shoreline cleanup operations in Northwest Bay, west arm, June 19...

Figure 19.3 Conduct of operations model

Figure 19.4 Car seal on a valve handle

Figure 19.5 Example valve line‐up

Figure 19.6 OSHA QuickCard on permit‐required confined spaces

Chapter 20

Figure 20.1 Video stills of WFC fire and explosion

Figure 20.2 Fertilizer building overview

Figure 20.3 WFC and community growth (left ‐ 1970; right ‐ 2010)

Figure 20.4 Overview of damaged WFC

Figure 20.5 Apartment complex damage

Figure 20.6 Coffeyville Refinery 2007 flood

Figure 20.7 Incident command structure

Chapter 21

Figure 21.1 Fire on Deepwater Horizon

Figure 21.2 Macondo Well blowout preventer

Figure 21.3 The diverter system on a rig

Figure 21.4 Key company relationships associated with the Deepwater Horizon ...

Chapter 22

Figure 22.1 Columbia breaking up

Figure 22.2 A shower of foam debris after the impact on Columbia's left wing...

Figure 22.3 Example of 5 Whys technique

Figure 22.4 Crude oil price versus upstream losses by year

Chapter 23

Figure 23.1 CCPS Vision 20/20

Appendix A

Figure A.1 Polymerization Reactor P&ID

Figure A.2 Ethylene Buffer Tank

Figure A.3 Chemical Reactivity Worksheet for Ethylene and water compatibilit...

Figure A.4 Node 1 – T‐1 WWT Equalization Tank

Figure A.5 Risk Matrix

Appendix E

Figure E.1 PSE Tier 1and Tier 2 classification flowchart

Guide

Cover

Table of Contents

Title Page

Copyright

Dedication

List of Figures

List of Tables

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Glossary

Acknowledgements

Online Materials Accompanying This Book

Preface

Begin Reading

Appendix A – Concluding Exercises

Appendix B – Relationship Between Book Content and Typical Engineering Courses

Appendix C – Example RAGAGEP List

Appendix D – Reactive Chemicals Checklist

Appendix E – Classifying Process Safety Events Using API RP 754 3nd Edition

Appendix F – Example Process Operations Readings and Evaluations

Appendix G – List of CSB Videos

Appendix H – Major Process Safety Incident Vs Root Cause Map

Index

Wiley End User License Agreement

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This book is one in a series of process safety guidelines and concept books published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Please go to www.wiley.com/go/ccps or www.aiche.org/ccps/publications for a full list of titles in this series. A few are listed below.

Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures

Guidelines for Revalidating Process Hazard Analysis

Layer of Protection Analysis ‐ Simplified Process Risk Assessment

Guidelines for Consequence Analysis of Chemical Releases

Bow Ties in Risk Management

Guidelines for Safe Process Operations and Maintenance

Conduct of Operations and Operational Discipline

Management of Change for Process Safety

Guidelines for Asset Integrity Management

Guidelines for Chemical Reactivity Evaluation and Application to Process Design

Guidelines for Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach

Guidelines for Integrating Process Safety into Engineering Projects

Performing Effective Pre‐Startup Safety Reviews

Guidelines for Investigating Process Safety Incidents

Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety

Guidelines for Defining Process Safety Competency Requirements

Incidents that Define Process Safety

More Incidents that Define Process Safety

Recognizing and Responding to Normalization of Deviance

Essential Practices for Creating, Strengthening, and Sustaining Process Safety Culture

Process Safety Leadership from the Boardroom to the Frontlines

Process Safety for Engineers:

An Introduction

Second Edition

CENTER FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETYof theAMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS

120 Wall Street, 23rd Floor • New York, NY 10005

This edition first published 2022© 2022 the American Institute of Chemical Engineers

A Joint Publication of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.

The rights of CCPS to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work have been asserted in accordance with law.

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Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of WarrantyWhile the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this work, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this work and specifically disclaim all warranties, including without limitation any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives, written sales materials or promotional statements for this work. The fact that an organization, website, or product is referred to in this work as a citation and/or potential source of further information does not mean that the publisher and authors endorse the information or services the organization, website, or product may provide or recommendations it may make. This work is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a specialist where appropriate. Further, readers should be aware that websites listed in this work may have changed or disappeared between when this work was written and when it is read. Neither the publisher nor authors shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidential, consequential, or other damages.

Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data is Applied for:ISBN: 9781119830986

Cover Design: WileyCover Image: © US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) video, public domain

Process Safety for Engineers: An Introduction

Is dedicated to

Pete Lodal

Pete has supported CCPS for thirty‐four years, and counting, through his forty‐two year career at Eastman Chemical Company and currently as a CCPS Staff Consultant. He has been recognized as a Fellow of Eastman Chemical Company, a CCPS Fellow, and an AIChE Fellow in addition to being a registered PE in the state of Tennessee and a CCPSC. Pete is the author of many papers and we all look forward to his honest, enlightening, and humorous presentations at the Global Congress on Process Safety. He has supported many CCPS and AIChE committees. His leadership of the CCPS Planning Committee has been instrumental in creating impactful products to further process safety understanding. Through his current membership on the AIChE Board of Directors, Pete is an influential advocate for process safety.

Has the realm of process safety benefited from Pete's insightful support? In the words of Pete's hero, Curly Howard, “Why soitenly!”

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Picture of a nitroglycerine reactor in the 19th century

Figure 1.2. Continuous nitroglycerine reactor

Figure 1.3. Number of fatal work injuries, by industry sector, 2019

Figure 1.4. Fatal work injury rate by industry sector, 2019

Figure 2.1. Process flow diagram of the raffinate column and blowdown drum

Figure 2.2. Texas City isomerization unit aftermath

Figure 2.3. Destroyed trailers west of the blowdown drum

Figure 2.4. RBPS structure

Figure 3.1. Lac‐Megantic tank cars with breaches to their shells

Figure 3.2. DOT‐117 train car

Figure 3.3. ExxonMobil Operations Integrity Management System

Figure 3.4. DuPont Process Safety and Risk Management model

Figure 4.1. Imperial Sugar refinery after the explosion

Figure 4.2. Imperial Sugar packing buildings first floor plan

Figure 4.3. Imperial Sugar Refinery after the explosion

Figure 4.4. Motor cooling fins and fan guard with sugar dust, piles of sugar on floor

Figure 4.5. Secondary dust explosion

Figure 4.6. Fire Triangle

Figure 4.7. Relationship between flammability properties

Figure 4.8. Flammability diagram

Figure 4.9. Pool fire

Figure 4.10. Jet fire

Figure 4.11. Fireball

Figure 4.12. Explosion pressure‐time curve

Figure 4.13. Degrees of congestion from low to high (left to right)

Figure 4.14. Relationships between the different types of explosions

Figure 4.15. Dust explosions in industry

Figure 4.16. Fire triangle and dust pentagon

Figure 4.17. Bonding and grounding

Figure 4.18. Methane flammability diagram (For Problem 4.9)

Figure 5.1. Portion of 7.6 cm (3 in)‐thick reactor

Figure 5.2. T2 Laboratories control room

Figure 5.3. T2 Reactor cross‐section

Figure 5.4. Equipment involved in reactive chemistry incidents

Figure 5.5. Consequences of reactive chemistry incidents

Figure 5.6. Temperature and pressure vs. time for T2 Laboratories explosion

Figure 5.7. Preliminary screening for chemical reactivity hazard analysis

Figure 5.8. – CRW for strong acid strong base pair

Figure 6.1. Overview map of the Bhopal vicinity

Figure 6.2. Emergency relief effluent treatment with scrubber and flare tower in series

Figure 6.3. Toxic pathways

Figure 6.4 Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) concentration

Figure 7.1. Damage to Concept Sciences Hanover facility

Figure 7.2. Simplified process flow diagram of the CSI HA vacuum distillation process

Figure 7.3. Example NFPA 704

Figure 7.4. Pictograms included in chemical shipping labels

Figure 8.1. Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor design

Figure 8.2. Fukushima Daiichi incident progression

Figure 8.3. Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant elevations

Figure 8.4. Damage in the generator hall at the Sayano‐Shusenskaya hydroelectric plant

Figure 8.5. Iceland volcano ash plume on May 2, 2010

Figure 8.6. Coffeyville Refinery 2007 flood

Figure 9.1. P 36 Platform shown during dry tow

Figure 9.2. P 36 attempted salvage operations

Figure 9.3. Process safety pyramid

Figure 10.1. Example refinery block flow diagram

Figure 10.2. Example process flow diagram

Figure 10.3. Example piping and instrumentation diagram

Figure 10.4. Typical P&ID symbols

Figure 10.5. Example isometric drawing

Figure 10.6. Example process unit plot plan

Figure 10.7. Asset life cycle stages including project phases

Figure 10.8. Relationship between operating zones and limits

Figure 10.9 Inherently safer design principles

Figure 10.10. Hierarchy of controls

Figure 10.11. Combining ISD and hierarchy of controls

Figure 11.1. Buncefield storage depot after the explosion and fires

Figure 11.2. Buncefield storage depot before the explosion

Figure 11.3. Buncefield Terminal site and wider area after explosion

Figure 11.4. Breakup of liquid into drops spilling from tank top

Figure 11.5. Damage from fire caused by mechanical seal failure

Figure 11.6. Pump explosion from running isolated

Figure 11.7. Schematic of centrifugal pump

Figure 11.8. Single and double mechanical seals

Figure 11.9. Two‐screw type PD pump

Figure 11.10. Rotary gear PD pump

Figure 11.11. Example application data sheet

Figure 11.12. Ruptured pipe from reaction with heat transfer fluid

Figure 11.13. Shell and tube heat exchanger

Figure 11.14. Principle of plate pack arrangement, gaskets facing the frame plate

Figure 11.15. Schematic of air‐cooled heat exchanger

Figure 11.16.A. Example distillation column schematic

Figure 11.16.B. Typical industrial distillation column

Figure 11.17. Schematic of carbon bed adsorber system

Figure 11.18. Damage to dust collector bags

Figure 11.19. Tube sheet of dust collector

Figure 11.20. Horizontal peeler centrifuge with clean‐in‐place system and discharge chute

Figure 11.21. Cross sectional view of a continuous pusher centrifuge

Figure 11.22. Schematic of baghouse

Figure 11.23. Dust collector explosion venting

Figure 11.24. Seveso reactor

Figure 11.25. T2 Laboratories site before and after the explosion

Figure 11.26. Damaged heater

Figure 11.27. Heater and adjacent column at NOVA Bayport plant

Figure 11.28. Molasses tank failure; before and after

Figure 11.29 1 ‐ Pipe connections in panel 2 and Chemfos 700; 2 ‐ Liq. Add lines

Figure 11.30. Cloud of nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide

Figure 11.31. Tank collapsed by vacuum

Figure 11.32. Schematic diagram of UST leak detection methods

Figure 11.33. Mounded underground tank

Figure 11.34 a. Schematics of external internal floating roof tank

Figure 11.34 b. Schematics of internal floating roof tank

Figure 11.35. Pressurized gas storage tank

Figure 11.36. Piping rupture

Figure 11.37. Comparison of HF Unit incident scene pre‐and post‐incident

Figure 12.1. Photograph of the failed end of GP905 reboiler

Figure 12.2. Simplified schematic of absorber

Figure 12.3. Simplified schematic of the gas plant

Figure 12.4. HAZOP analysis method flowchart

Figure 12.5. Example HAZOP analysis worksheet

Figure 12.6. Example fault tree analysis diagram

Figure 12.7. Example event tree diagram

Figure 13.1. Failed chlorine transfer hose and release

Figure 13.2. Consequence analysis stages

Figure 13.3. Logic diagram for consequence models for volatile hazardous releases

Figure 13.4. Block Diagram showing relationship between consequence models

Figure 13.5. Selected discharge scenarios

Figure 13.6. Two common liquid‐release situations

Figure 13.7. Atmospheric stability effects

Figure 13.8. Typical dispersion model output

Figure 13.9. Effect of initial acceleration and buoyancy on a dense gas release

Figure 13.10. Degrees of confinement

Figure 13.11. Levels of obstacle density

Figure 13.12. Interaction of a blast wave with a rigid structure

Figure 13.13. Pre‐engineered metal building BDL1

Figure 13.14. Pre‐engineered metal building BDL3

Figure 13.15 Wind roses

Figure 14.1. Phillips 66 Company Houston Chemical Complex explosion

Figure 14.2. Illustration of a plugged settling leg prepared for maintenance

Figure 14.3. Risk analysis flowchart

Figure 14.4. Event tree supporting frequency calculations

Figure 14.5. Risk assessment matrix

Figure 14.6. Severity categories

Figure 14.7. Probability levels

Figure 14.8. Example individual risk contours

Figure 14.9. Example societal risk F‐N curve

Figure 14.10. Hong Kong societal risk criteria

Figure 14.11. Types of ALARP demonstration

Figure 14.12. Typical layers of protection

Figure 14.13. Frequency of hole sizes

Figure 14.14. Risk Matrix

Figure 15.1. Oxidation reactor after explosion

Figure 15.2. One of several units impacted by explosion

Figure 15.3. Schematic of oxidation reactor

Figure 15.4. Predicted flammable vapor cloud from reactor explosion

Figure 15.5. Terminology describing layers of protection

Figure 15.6. Swiss cheese model

Figure 15.7. Example bow tie model

Figure 15.8. Steps in constructing a bow tie model

Figure 15.9 a. The left side (threat legs) of a bow tie for loss of containment

Figure 15.9 b. The right side (consequence legs) of a bow tie for loss of containment

Figure 16.1. Smoke plumes from Formosa plant

Figure 16.2. Formosa reactor building elevation view

Figure 16.3. Cutaway of the Formosa reactor building

Figure 16.4. Model for human factors

Figure 16.5. Human factors topics related to the human individual

Figure 16.6. Human failure types

Figure 16.7. Decision making continuum

Figure 16.8. Factors impacting work team performance

Figure 16.9. Task Improvement Plan steps

Figure 17.1. Piper Alpha platform

Figure 17.2. Piper Alpha platform after the incident

Figure 17.3. Schematic of Piper Alpha platform

Figure 17.4. An operational readiness review should follow these activities

Figure 18.1. Flixborough Reactors

Figure 18.2. Schematic of Flixborough piping replacement

Figure 18.3. Flixborough site after explosion

Figure 18.4. MOC system flowchart

Figure 19.1. Exxon Valdez tanker leaking oil

Figure 19.2. Shoreline cleanup operations in Northwest Bay, west arm, June 1989

Figure 19.3. Conduct of operations model

Figure 19.4. Car seal on a valve handle

Figure 19.5. Example valve line‐up

Figure 19.6. OSHA QuickCard on permit‐required confined spaces

Figure 20.1. Video stills of WFC fire and explosion

Figure 20.2. Fertilizer building overview

Figure 20.3. WFC and community growth (left ‐ 1970; right ‐ 2010)

Figure 20.4. Overview of damaged WFC

Figure 20.5. Apartment complex damage

Figure 20.6. Coffeyville Refinery 2007 flood

Figure 20.7. Incident command structure

Figure 21.1. Fire on Deepwater Horizon

Figure 21.2. Macondo Well blowout preventer

Figure 21.3. The diverter system on a rig

Figure 21.4. Key company relationships associated with the Deepwater Horizon accident

Figure 22.1. Columbia breaking up

Figure 22.2. A shower of foam debris after the impact on Columbia's left wing.

Figure 22.3. Example of 5 Whys technique

Figure 22.4. Crude oil price versus upstream losses by year

Figure 23.1. CCPS Vision 20/20

Figure A.1. Polymerization Reactor P&ID

Figure A.2. Ethylene Buffer Tank

Figure A.3. Chemical Reactivity Worksheet for Ethylene and water compatibility

Figure A.4. Node 1 – T‐1 WWT Equalization Tank

Figure A.5. Risk Matrix

Figure E.1. PSE Tier 1and Tier 2 classification flowchart

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1. Process safety activities for new engineers

Table 3.1. Examples and sources of process safety related regulations

Table 3.2. Sources of process safety related codes and standards and selected examples

Table 3.3. Comparison of RBPS elements with U.S. OSHA PSM and U.S. EPA RMP elements

Table 4.1. Flammability properties

Table 4.2. Minimum ignition energies for selected materials

Table 4.3. Examples of various types of explosions

Table 4.4. Selected combustible dust properties

Table 4.5. Ignition sources and control methods

Table 5.1. Chemical Reactivity types and examples

Table 5.2. Some Reactive Functional Groups

Table 5.3. Example form to document screening of chemical reactivity hazards

Table 6.1. Example chemical exposure effects

Table 6.2. Effects of oxygen depletion

Table 7.1. Safety data sheet sections and content

Table 7.2. NFPA 704 hazards and rating

Table 9.1 Tier 1 Process Safety Event Severity Weighting

Table 9.2. Typical Tier 3 and Tier 4 process safety metrics

Table 10.1. Asset life cycle stages including project phases

Table 11.1. Failure modes and design considerations for fluid transfer equipment

Table 11.2. Common failure modes and design considerations for heat exchangers

Table 11.3. Common failure modes and design considerations for reactors

Table 12.1. Preliminary hazard identification study overview

Table 12.2. Checklist analysis overview

Table 12.3. What‐If analysis overview

Table 12.4. HAZOP overview

Table 12.5. FMEA overview

Table 12.5. Typical hazard evaluation objectives at different stages of a process life cycle

Table 13.1. Typical discharge scenarios

Table 13.2. Input and output for flash models

Table 13.3. Input and output for evaporation models

Table 13.4. Input and output for pool spread models

Table 13.5. Input and output for neutral and positively buoyant plume and puff models

Table 13.6. Input and output for dispersion models

Table 13.7. Input and output for dense gas dispersion models

Table 13.8. Types of fires and explosions

Table 13.9. Input and output for pool fire models

Table 13.10. Input and output for jet fire models

Table 13.11. Input and output for VCE models

Table 13.12. Input and output for toxic impact models

Table 13.13. Effects of thermal radiation

Table 13.14. Selected overpressure levels and damage

Table 13.15. Typical industry building damage level descriptions

Table 13.16. Selected consequence analysis models

Table 15.1. Typical risk reduction measures

Table 15.2. Safety integrity levels

Table 17.1. Typical construction, pre‐commissioning, and commissioning tasks

Table 18.1. Types of changes and examples

Table 19.1. Example Safe Work Practices

Table 21.1. Example process safety training course list

Table 23.1. CCPS Vision 20/20 industry tenets and societal themes

Table A.1. HAZOP Log Sheet

Table A.2. Ethylene Chemical Properties

Table A.3. Node 1 – T‐1 Intention, Boundary, Design Conditions and Parameters

Table A.4. HAZOP Worksheet Node 1 – T‐1 WWT Equalization Tank

Table A.5 Risk Matrix Severity

Table A.6 Risk Matrix Likelihood

Table B.1. Typical engineering course relationship with book contents

Table C.1. Example RAGAGEP list

Table E.1. Tier 1 Level and Tier 2 Level Consequences

Table E.2. Threshold quantity relationship

Table E.3. Material Release Threshold Quantities

Table E.4. Examples for material categories

Table G.1. CSB videos (as of January 2021)

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACC

American Chemistry Council

AEGL

Acute Exposure Guideline Level

AIChE

American Institute of Chemical Engineers

ALARP

As Low as Reasonably Practicable

API

American Petroleum Institute

ASME

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

BLEVE

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

BMS

Burner Management System

CCPS

Center for Chemical Process Safety (of AIChE)

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CMA

Chemical Manufacturers Association

COMAH

Control of Major Accident Hazards (U.K. Regulation incorporating the EU Seveso Directive requirements)

COO

Conduct of Operations

CPQRA

Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Assessment

CSB

Chemical Safety Board (US)

DDT

Deflagration to Detonation Transition

DIERS

Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems

EHS

Environmental, Health, and Safety (sometimes written as SHE or HSE)

ERS

Emergency Relief System

EPA

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ERPG

Emergency Response Planning Guideline

ESD

Emergency Shutdown System

EU

European Union

FCCU

Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit

FEL

Front End Loading

FFS

Fitness For Service

FMEA

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

FMECA

Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis

FTA

Fault Tree Analysis

GHS

Globally Harmonized System

HAZID

Hazard Identification Study

HAZMAT

Hazardous Materials

HAZOP

Hazard and Operability Study

HEART

Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique

HIRA

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis

HRA

Human Reliability Analysis

HSE

Health and Safety Executive (U.K.)

HTHA

High Temperature Hydrogen Attack

HRO

High Reliability Organization

I&E

Instrument and Electrical

IDLH

Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health

IEC

International Electrotechnical Commission

IOGP

International Association of Oil & Gas Producers

IOW

Integrity Operating Window

IPL

Independent Protection Layer

ISD

Inherently Safer Design

ISO

International Organization for Standardization

Isom

Isomerization Unit

ITPM

Inspection Testing, and Preventive Maintenance

JSA

Job Safety Analysis

KPI

Key Performance Indicator

LFL

Lower Flammable Limit

LNG

Liquefied Natural Gas

LOPA

Layer of Protection Analysis

LOPC

Loss of Primary Containment

LOTO

Lock Out Tag Out

LPG

Liquefied Petroleum Gas

LSIR

Location Specific Individual Risk

MAWP

Maximum Allowable Working Pressure

MCC

Motor Control Center

MIE

Minimum Ignition Energy

MOC

Management of Change

MOC

Minimum Oxygen Concentration

MOOC

Management of Organizational Change

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NDT

Nondestructive Testing

NFPA

National Fire Protection Association

OD

Operational Discipline

OIMS

Operational Integrity Management System (ExxonMobil)

OSHA

U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PAC

Protective Action Criteria

PFD

Process Flow Diagram

PFD

Probability of Failure on Demand

PHA

Process Hazard Analysis

P&ID

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

PLC

Programmable Logic Controller

PRA

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

PRD

Pressure Relief Device

PRV

Pressure Relief Valve

PSE

Process Safety Event

PSI

Process Safety Information

PSI

Process Safety Incident

PSM

Process Safety Management

PSO

Process Safety Officer

PSSR

Pre‐Startup Safety Review

QRA

Quantitative Risk Analysis

RAGAGEP

Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice

RBPS

Risk Based Process Safety

RMP

Risk Management Plan

RP

Recommended Practice

SACHE

Safety and Chemical Engineering Education

SCAI

Safety Controls Alarms and Interlocks

SDS

Safety Data Sheet

SHIB

Safety Hazard Information Bulletin

SIF

Safety Instrumented Function

SIL

Safety Integrity Level (as per IEC 61508 / 61511 standards)

SIS

Safety Instrumented System

SOL

Safe Operating Limits

TEEL

Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit

THERP

Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction

TQ

Threshold Quantity

UFL

Upper Flammable Limit

U.K.

United Kingdom

U.S.

United States

UST

Underground Storage Tank

VCE

Vapor Cloud Explosion

GLOSSARY

ALARP

As Low As Reasonably Practicable – As low as reasonably practicable; the concept that efforts to reduce risk should be continued until the incremental sacrifice (in terms of cost, time, effort, or other expenditure of resources) is grossly disproportionate to the incremental risk reduction achieved. The term as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) is often used synonymously.

Asset integrity

The condition of an asset that is properly designed and installed in accordance with specifications and remains fit for purpose.

Atmospheric storage tank

A storage tank designed to operate at any pressure between ambient pressure and 3.45kPa gage (0.5 psig).

Audit

A systematic, independent review to verify conformance with prescribed standards of care using a well‐defined review process to ensure consistency and to allow the auditor to reach defensible conclusions.

Autoignition temperature

The lowest temperature at which a fuel/oxidant mixture will spontaneously ignite under specified test conditions.

Barrier

A control measure or grouping of control elements that on its own can prevent a threat developing into a top event (prevention barrier) or can mitigate the consequences of a top event once it has occurred (mitigation barrier). A barrier must be effective, independent, and auditable. See also Degradation Control. (Other possible names: Control, Independent Protection Layer, Risk Reduction Measure).

Block flow diagram

A simplified drawing representing a process. It typically shows major equipment and piping and can include major valves.

Boiling‐Liquid‐Expanding‐Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)

A type of rapid phase transition in which a liquid contained above its atmospheric boiling point is rapidly depressurized, causing a nearly instantaneous transition from liquid to vapor with a corresponding energy release. A BLEVE of flammable material is often accompanied by a large aerosol fireball, since an external fire impinging on the vapor space of a pressure vessel is a common cause. However, it is not necessary for the liquid to be flammable to have a BLEVE occur.

Bow tie model

A risk diagram showing how various threats can lead to a loss of control of a hazard and allow this unsafe condition to develop into a number of undesired consequences. The diagram can show all the barriers and degradation controls deployed.

Change

Any addition, process modification, or substitute item (e.g. person or thing) that is not a replacement‐in‐kind.

Checklist analysis

A hazard evaluation procedure using one or more pre‐prepared lists of process safety considerations to prompt team discussions of whether the existing safeguards are adequate.

Chemical process industry

The phrase is used loosely to include facilities which manufacture, handle, and use chemicals.

Chemical reactivity

The tendency of substances to undergo chemical change.

Combustible dust

A finely divided combustible particulate solid that presents a flash fire hazard or explosion hazard when suspended in air or the process specific oxidizing medium over a range of concentrations.

Conduct of Operations (COO)

The embodiment of an organization's values and principles in management systems that are developed, implemented, and maintained to (1) structure operational tasks in a manner consistent with the organization's risk tolerance, (2) ensure that every task is performed deliberately and correctly, and (3) minimize variations in performance.

Consequence

The undesirable result of a loss event, usually measured in health and safety effects, environmental impacts, loss of property, and business interruption costs.

Deflagration

A combustion that propagates by heat and mass transfer through the un‐reacted medium at a velocity less than the speed of sound.

Degradation factor

A situation, condition, defect, or error that compromises the function of a main pathway barrier, through either defeating it or reducing its effectiveness. If a barrier degrades then the risks from the pathway on which it lies increase or escalate, hence the alternative name of escalation factor. (Other possible names:

Barrier Decay Mechanism, Escalation Factor, Defeating Factor

).

Degradation control

Measures which help prevent the degradation factor impairing the barrier. They lie on the pathway connecting the degradation threat to the main pathway barrier. Degradation controls may not meet the full requirements for barrier validity. (Other possible names:

Degradation Safeguard

,

Defeating Factor Control, Escalation Factor Control, Escalation Factor Barrier

).

Detonation

A release of energy caused by the propagation of a chemical reaction in which the reaction front advances into the unreacted substance at greater than sonic velocity in the unreacted material.

Endothermic chemical reaction

A reaction involving one or more chemicals resulting in one or more new chemical species and the absorption of heat.

Exothermic chemical reaction

A reaction involving one or more chemicals resulting in one or more new chemical species and the evolution of heat.

Explosion

A release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuity or blast wave.

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

A hazard identification technique in which all known failure modes of components or features of a system are considered in turn, and undesired outcomes are noted.

Fireball

The atmospheric burning of a fuel‐air cloud in which the energy is in the form of radiant and convective heat. The inner core of the fuel release consists of almost pure fuel whereas the outer layer in which ignition first occurs is a flammable fuel‐air mixture. As buoyancy forces of the hot gases begin to dominate, the burning cloud rises and becomes more spherical in shape.

Fitness for Service (FFS)

A systematic approach for evaluating the current condition of a piece of equipment in order to determine if the equipment item is capable of operating at defined operating conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure).

Flammability limits

The range of gas or vapor amounts in air that will burn or explode if a flame or other ignition source is present. Importance: The range represents a gas or vapor mixture with air that may ignite or explode. Generally, the wider the range the greater the fire potential. See also Lower Explosive Limit / Lower Flammable Limit and Upper Explosive Limit / Upper Flammable Limit.

Flammable liquids

“An ignitable liquid that is classified as a Class I liquid. A Class I liquid is a liquid that has a closed‐cup flash point below 100 °F (37.8 °C), as determined by the test procedures described in NFPA 30 and a Reid vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psia (2068.6 mm Hg) at 100°F (37.8 °C), as determined by ASTM D323, Standard Method of Test for Vapor Pressure of Petroleum Products (Reid Method). Class IA liquids include those liquids that have flash points below 73 °F (22.8 °C) and boiling points below 100 °F (37.8 °C). Class IB liquids include those liquids that have flash points below 73°F (22.8 °C) and boiling points at or above 100 °F (37.8 °C). Class IC liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points at or above 73 °F (22.8 °C), but below 100 °F (37.8 °C).” (adapted from NFPA 30).

Flash fire

A fire that spreads by means of a flame front rapidly through a diffuse fuel, such as a dust, gas, or the vapors of an ignitable liquid, without the production of damaging pressure.

Flash point temperature

The minimum temperature at which a liquid gives off sufficient vapor to form an ignitable mixture with air within the test vessel used (Methods: ASTM 502). The flash point is less than the fire point at which the liquid evolves vapor at a sufficient rate for indefinite burning.

Frequency

Number of occurrences of an event per unit time (e.g., 1 event in 1000 yr = 1 x 10

‐3

events/yr).

Front End Loading (FEL)