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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Serie: ISTE Consignment
- Sprache: Englisch
Once scientists discovered radioactivity, they soon recognized its dangers. However, the assessment of radioactive risk to humans is still the subject of heated debate.
In this book, the authors present a summary of past and recent scientific work on estimating radioactivity in the anthroposphere and the radioactive contamination of human beings. They describe the various sources of exposure to ionizing radiation (external, internal and dietary) and estimate the irradiation doses suffered by humans under various conditions (both naturally occurring for the general public and professionals, and from accidents). The harmful effects of ionizing radiation at various biological levels (molecular, cellular and tissue) and health effects at the individual level are also discussed.
Particular focus will be placed on radiation-induced occupational illnesses. The relationship between doses of ionizing radiation and its harmful effects is discussed with reference to high, medium and low doses. The controversies on this subject are outlined, and international and French regulatory values are provided. Finally, an estimate of the radioactive risk for humans is suggested.
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Table of Contents
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Preface
P.1. Our beliefs
P.2. Public opinion
P.3. The expert and the biases of scientific expertise
P.4. Project objectives
P.5. Drafting the manuscript
P.6. References
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Introduction Methodology in Radioactive Risk Assessment
I.1. Radioactive risk assessment method
I.2. International institutions responsible for nuclear safety
I.3. National nuclear safety institutions
I.4. References
1 Radioactive Danger
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Radionuclides and radioelements
1.3. Radionuclide-related dangers
1.4. Elements of nuclear physics
1.5. References
2 Radioactive Contamination of the Anthroposphere
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Sources of radioactive contamination of the anthroposphere
2.3. Natural radioactive contamination of the anthroposphere
2.4. Anthropogenic radioactive contamination
2.5. Conclusions
2.6. References
3 Human Exposure to Radionuclides
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Types of exposure to ionizing radiation
3.3. External exposure pathways
3.4. Internal exposure pathways
3.5. Conclusions
3.6. References
4 Radioactive Contamination of Food and Trophic Transfer
4.1. Introduction
4.2. Transfer of radionuclides from food to humans
4.3. Transfers from the environment to animal products consumed by humans
4.4. Transfers from the environment to plant products consumed by humans
4.5. Transfer from drinking water to humans
4.6. Environmental monitoring of products consumed by humans
4.7. References
5 Human Bioaccumulation of Radionuclides
5.1. Human bioaccumulation of radionuclides
5.2. Protecting people from radionuclides
5.3. Therapeutic removal of radionuclides from humans
5.4. Conclusions
5.5. References
6 Estimates of Human Radiation Doses
6.1. Introduction: from exposure to dose
6.2. Expressing exposure
6.3. Limits to the estimation of effective doses
6.4. Dose rates
6.5. Occupational doses
6.6. Collective doses
6.7. References
7 Estimating Human Radiation Doses
7.1. Natural external radiation doses
7.2. Natural internal radiation doses
7.3. Estimates of artificial radiation doses to humans
7.4. Some cases of human exposure
7.5. References
8 The Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation at the Molecular and Cellular Level
8.1. Physico-chemical processes responsible for biological effects
8.2. The effects of ionizing radiation at the molecular level
8.3. The effects of ionizing radiation at the sub-cellular level
8.4. The consequences of irradiation at cellular level
8.5. Quantifying the effects of ionizing radiation using biomarkers
8.6. Conclusions
8.7. References
9 Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation at the Individual Level
9.1. Introduction
9.2. The adverse effects of ionizing radiation depend on the age at exposure
9.3. Radiation-induced cancers in adults
9.4. Adverse effects of ionizing radiation on different tissues and organs
9.5. The transgenerational effects of ionizing radiation
9.6. Individual variability in the adverse effects of ionizing radiation
9.7. Conclusions
9.8. References
10 Occupational Diseases Caused by Ionizing Radiation
10.1. History of the first radiation injuries caused by X-rays and radium
10.2. The creation and difficult development of the occupational disease recognition system
10.3. Radiation-induced occupational diseases recognized in France since 1948
10.4. Diseases recognized in Europe
10.5. Conclusions
10.6. References
11 The Dose–Response Relationship to the Effects of Ionizing Radiation
11.1. Introduction: the dose–response relationship
11.2. Dose–response relationships for high doses
11.3. Dose–response relationships for low doses
11.4. Conclusions
11.5. References
12 International and French Regulatory Values
12.1. Introduction
12.2. International expertise and organization
12.3. International and European recommendations and their evolution
12.4. Radiation protection standards and regulatory limits
12.5. Radionuclide toxicity and radiotoxicity
12.6. Food standards
12.7. References
13 General Conclusions and Perspectives
13.1. Introduction
13.2. Knowledge of the effects of ionizing radiation on humans
13.3. Strengths and weaknesses of the radioactive risk assessment method
13.4. Towards a new approach to estimating radioactive risk
13.5. Conclusions
13.6. References
Glossary
Index
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End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Introduction
Table I.1. National authorities in charge of nuclear safety and radiation pr...
Chapter 1
Table 1.1. Half-layer values (HLV) in biological tissue
Table 1.2. Energy of the Compton electron and the photon scattered at 90° (a...
Table 1.3. Dose rate and photon attenuation of a gamma point source
Table 1.4. Penetration and ionization power of various types of radiation
Chapter 2
Table 2.1. Origin of the main radionuclides
Table 2.2. Radioactivity of various natural environments (modified from [GAM...
Table 2.3. Radon-222 concentrations in groundwater as a function of aquifer ...
Table 2.4. Concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides in various so...
Table 2.5. Concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides in building m...
Table 2.6. Contribution of different radon sources in a building. Examples g...
Table 2.7. Latitudinal distribution of atmospheric fallout from atomic testi...
Table 2.8. Average concentrations of artificial radionuclides in Bikini Atol...
Table 2.9. Activities measured in water (3H in Bq.L-1) and settled suspended...
Table 2.10. Mass and volume activities of radionuclides in samples from Nord...
Chapter 3
Table 3.1. Average radioactivity of the Earth’s crust over time (modified fr...
Chapter 4
Table 4.1. Activities of uranium and thorium radionuclides in the diet (modi...
Table 4.2. Maximum values for the absorbed fraction (fA) following ingestion...
Table 4.3. Food transfer coefficients from animal products (j.kg
-1
or j.L
-1
)
Table 4.4. Example values for absorbable fractions of various radionuclides ...
Table 4.5. Average, minimum and maximum values for the annual quantities of ...
Chapter 5
Table 5.1. Reference values for uranium and thorium series radionuclide conc...
Chapter 6
Table 6.1. Weighting factors (W
R
) (according to [ICR 91])
Table 6.2. Tissue weighting factor (WT) from [ICR 07] (ICRP Publication 60 v...
Chapter 7
Table 7.1. Comparison of changes in the external dosimetry of all workers ex...
Chapter 8
Table 8.1. Average number of lesions of various types, induced by a 1 Gy dos...
Chapter 9
Table 9.1. Impact (mortality–morbidity) of exposure to ionizing radiation in...
Table 9.2. Members of the initial LSS cohort alive in October 1950, accordin...
Table 9.3. Members of the LSS cohort on January 1, 1958, by dosimetric statu...
Table 9.4. Doses received by women in the LSS cohort alive on January 1, 195...
Table 9.5. Acute dose thresholds recommended in 2012 by the ICRP [ICR 12]
Table 9.6. Incidence and mortality of radiation-induced cancers as a functio...
Chapter 10
Table 10.1. Relative balances to recognized occupational diseases from 1968 ...
Table 10.2. Change in the number of recognized radiation-induced cancers fro...
Table 10.3. Comparison of risk rates for all occupational cancers, asbestos-...
Table 10.4. General data on occupational cancers in Europe in 2016 (from [EU...
Chapter 11
Table 11.1. Weighted colon dose for subjects in the LSS (Life Span Study) co...
Table 11.2. Comparison of ex utero exposure levels from different sources in...
Table 11.3. Comparison of average risk estimates attributed to routine relea...
Chapter 12
Table 12.1. Exemption value for various radionuclides (activity below which ...
Table 12.2. Permissible limits for food activity in accidental situations (F...
Table 12.3. Maximum permissible levels of radioactive contamination for food...
Table 12.4. Maximum permissible levels of radioactive contamination for read...
Chapter 13
Table 13.1. Summary of immune effects described by radiation exposure (accor...
List of Illustrations
Introduction
Figure I.1. The general principle of human radioactive risk estimation (accord...
Figure I.2. Conceptual overview of an integrated risk assessment (IRA) (accord...
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1. Nuclear structure, symbolism and electrical charges of the three t...
Figure 1.2. Comparison of nuclide stability as a function of mass number and a...
Figure 1.3. Diagram of cobalt-60 decay
Figure 1.4. The three types of ionizing radiation produced by nuclear reaction...
Figure 1.5. Spectrum of electromagnetic waves.
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1. The various stages of radiological risk assessment, the parameters...
Figure 2.2. The main transfers of radionuclides of natural and anthropogenic o...
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1. Distinction between irradiation and external and internal contamin...
Figure 3.2. Schematic representation of human exposure to radionuclides from t...
Figure 3.3. The various exposure pathways for the population of the Beaumont-H...
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1. The main digestive factors influencing radionuclide absorption
Figure 4.2. Potential bioavailability of metals and radionuclides in meat prod...
Figure 4.3. Bioaccessibility and bioavailability of metals and radionuclides d...
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1. Radionuclide transmembrane pathways
Figure 5.2. Influence of molecule solubility on two cases of passive transport...
Figure 5.3. General diagram of radionuclide fate in humans
Figure 5.4. Radionuclide bioaccumulation in the human body
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1. Steps in calculating effective dose
Figure 6.2. Estimating the risk of leukemia in young people according to the m...
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1. Uranium-238 parentage chain. Physical half-lives taken from [CEA 1...
Figure 7.2. Map of the distribution of uranium content in mg.kg-1 of rock in t...
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1. Cellular responses and consequences of exposure to ionizing radiat...
Figure 8.2. Cellular response to genotoxic stress (according to Bertrand et al...
Figure 8.3. Epigenetics. Nature of the adaptive predictive response (APR) dete...
Figure 8.4. The various mechanisms of heritable alterations in gene expression
Chapter 11
Figure 11.1. Diagram illustrating the principle of dose–response extrapolation...
Chapter 12
Figure 12.1. Simplified, theoretical diagram of the international organization...
Chapter 13
Figure 13.1. Schematic representation of the human immune system and its main ...
Figure 13.2. Schematic representation of the most important immune and inflamm...
Figure 13.3. Illustration of the stages of a complete mechanistic response mod...
Figure 13.4. Gaps in human radioactive risk estimation. The color of the stars...
Figure 13.5. Classification of ionizing radiation effects and radiation protec...
Guide
Cover Page
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Preface
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Introduction Methodology in Radioactive Risk Assessment
Begin Reading
Glossary
Index
Other titles from iSTE in Ecological Science
WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
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Radioactive Risk Set
coordinated byJean-Claude Amiard
Volume 7
Radioactive Risk for Humans
Jean-Claude Amiard
Jean-Claude Zerbib
First published 2024 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address:
ISTE Ltd27-37 St George’s RoadLondon SW19 4EUUK
www.iste.co.uk
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.111 River StreetHoboken, NJ 07030USA
www.wiley.com
© ISTE Ltd 2024The rights of Jean-Claude Amiard and Jean-Claude Zerbib to be identified as the authors of this work have been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s), contributor(s) or editor(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of ISTE Group.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2024944826
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA CIP record for this book is available from the British LibraryISBN 978-1-78630-884-9
Preface
P.1. Our beliefs
When writing this book, we were guided by a certain number of convictions: independence, freedom of spirit, competence, transparency, scientific rigor, absence of conflict of interest and the right to err in all sincerity.
P.1.1. Independence
Our book aims to be scientific and therefore neither pro- nor anti-nuclear, detailing our current scientific knowledge with its strengths and shortcomings. To be independent and responsible, it soon became clear that we needed a limited number of authors. They assume full responsibility for their texts.
P.1.2. Freedom of spirit
There is a big difference between fundamental research organizations such as the CNRS, which until recently was one of our employers, and institutional organizations such as the CEA or IRSN, where the hierarchy is very strong. In the former case, researchers are totally free to publish under their own responsibility, whereas in the latter, the hierarchy controls the writings of its employees, resulting in the risk of censorship or self-censorship.
P.1.3. Competence
Both authors can legitimately claim competence in this field. One of them has completed two theses (specialist doctorate and state doctorate) involving research in marine radioecology. He has produced some 50 scientific publications in this field, most of them in international peer-reviewed journals. He did not abandon the field altogether, however, as he worked as an expert for CNRS Life Sciences division of the GRNC (Groupe Radioécologie Nord Cotentin) from 1997 to 2010. The GRNC has published numerous reports. Since then, he has joined the Scientific Committee, then the Expert Group of ANCCLI (Association Nationale des Comités et Commissions Locales d’Information). The Scientific Committee’s missions include advising and assisting Local Information Commissions, Local Committees and the ANCCLI in their expert appraisals, acting as an advisory body for Local Information Commissions and ANCCLI actions and publications, and acting as a point of contact for expert committees set up by various French and foreign bodies.
The other author was an engineer at the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique
(CEA) at the Saclay center. He has devoted his career to protection against ionizing radiation (radioactive measurements, radiation protection of X-ray generators and particle gas accelerators, remediation of contaminated sites). He took part in teaching radiation protection at INSTN (1980–1998) and in the IAEA’s international radiation protection courses (1994–1996). In 1996, he was appointed “Senior Expert” at the CEA on the advice of an external scientific commission.
He has taken part in a number of national commissions, including the Castaing commission on the reprocessing of irradiated fuels (1981–1984), the Jean Bernard commission on cancers at the Pasteur Institute (1986–1990), the Radioecology group of the North Cotentin region (GRNC) on the dosimetric impact of radioactive releases from plants (1997–2008), the pluralistic expert group (GEP) on uranium mines in the Limousin region (2006–2013), and the Ministry of Labor commissions on occupational diseases and chemical, physical and biological hazards (1983–1998). He is the author of around 100 articles and co-author of several books on nuclear and occupational health issues.
P.1.4. Transparency
Among the multitude of books, scientific publications and gray literature, a choice had to be made. This choice was dictated by scientific quality. Our choices were based on a hierarchy, with French-language publications being the most accessible to the majority. Secondly, work published in peer-reviewed scientific journals, i.e. where peers, other scientists, evaluate and criticize the work before deciding whether its quality justifies publication. As all experts are fallible, this does not certify an absolute value of veracity and quality, but it does contribute significantly to it. Next, all information from official national and international bodies directed our choice. Finally, when we feel that it reinforces information, we include so-called “gray literature”, i.e. documents that are much less easily accessible to the public, especially if this literature is old and in the form of printed reports. In this way, anyone can return to most of the sources used in this book.
P.1.5. Scientific rigor
Scientific rigor obviously depends on the choice of information and the way in which it is presented. We read a large part of the literature published on this subject, both pro- and anti-nuclear, as well as literature considered to be scientific. We then formed our own opinion. This is what appears in this book.
P.1.6. Conflicts of interest
The authors have no conflict of interest in the nuclear field, as they have not carried out any research in this area for many years, and have no shareholdings in companies operating in this niche.
P.1.7. The right to err in all sincerity
On such a vast subject, two authors cannot master everything, and they must necessarily trust their peers and the information published. They have not necessarily assimilated all the information correctly, and may therefore have made biased interpretations. All these deviations, if they exist, have been made in all sincerity and the authors apologize in advance to the reader. We undertake to correct them should a second version of this book be published.
P.2. Public opinion
Public opinion on the nuclear phenomenon has evolved over time. Initially, the public’s enthusiasm for radium was very strong, and the most far-fetched applications, even dangerous for consumers, were developed, such as the addition of radium-226 to toothpaste, beauty creams and chocolate, alongside more “useful” applications such as luminescent paints. The next applications were military, with the military bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This is associated with the use of “defense secrecy” for the majority of nuclear applications. The result is strong public distrust and even opposition. The various accidents that have occurred, particularly the most serious ones such as Three Mile Island in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011, have accentuated the opposition that now arises whenever a new basic nuclear infrastructure (BNI) is created or modified.
P.2.1. Public perception of radioactive risk
The public generally fails to distinguish between danger and risk. Furthermore, risk is measured in terms of probability. As a result, the hazard–risk pair is perceived very differently from one individual to another. Some hazards with uncertain risk potential will be perceived as paramount by the public. Conversely, hazards associated with proven risks will be considered derisory by the public. In the first group we find GMOs, and in the second group alcohol, road accidents, tobacco, etc.
In 2021, the rising concern of the French population was the management of nuclear waste in France: 41% of French people believe that nuclear power plants are a source of high risk, and 48% have the same perception of nuclear waste. This is in line with the 31% of French people who believe that the leading cause of accidental risk is that of a major nuclear accident, such as those at Chernobyl and Fukushima, and that this is the main obstacle to the use of nuclear energy. The second most important potential risk is the storage of radioactive waste (21% of opinions) [IRS 21].
P.2.2. People trust science, not researchers
Do you trust scientists to tell the truth about the results and consequences of their work on nuclear energy? The image of scientific experts remains positive for 50% of French people surveyed. The main qualities sought are competence, honesty and independence. Five organizations – the CNRS, ASN, IRSN, HCTISN and CEA – working in the nuclear field had a public confidence rating of over 70% in November 2020 [IRS 21].
P.2.3. The creation of independent official bodies
In the past, the protection of humanity and the environment, as well as nuclear safety, were ensured by various services that were too closely linked to industrial interests, such as the CEA. Others, such as OPRI, had had a critical attitude during the Chernobyl accident, and were therefore completely disqualified in the eyes of the public. To compensate for these serious drawbacks, the French government created a number of new bodies that were dependent on the state but independent of the nuclear lobby. These included the IRSN and ASN. The qualities expected of these organizations are competence, independence, rigor and transparency. The gamble has largely paid off.
Alongside institutional experts, there are independent experts who often work for various associations (ANCCLI, ACRO, Global Chance, etc.). Unfortunately, their perfectly independent work is largely neglected, even denigrated or scorned. This is probably due to the fact that independent experts are very often volunteers, and that unpaid work is undervalued.
P.3. The expert and the biases of scientific expertise
P.3.1. Choice of experts
The selection of experts for scientific appraisals varies from one field to another. In some cases, experts are co-opted, as in the case of the ICRP, while in others, as in the case of UNSCEAR, the choice is made by political leaders. In all cases, however, scientific criteria are not the only ones involved, but political, industrial and other criteria may also be taken into account.
P.3.2. The expert’s competence
The scientific subject under discussion in an expert group is generally very broad, and no individual expert can possibly have a complete scientific knowledge of the field. Expertise is therefore necessarily collective, and each expert must at one time or another have confidence in their colleagues.
P.3.3. The expert’s integrity
Scientific experts are first and foremost people with their own limitations and weaknesses. Before being an expert, a scientific researcher’s primary mission (in principle) is to carry out fundamental or applied research. To this end, they are paid employees of a public or private organization. In addition, either to finance their research or to enrich themselves personally, they may accept funding from various public or private organizations. It is therefore not uncommon for conflicts of interest to arise between these institutional or occasional funders and the expert’s mission. In the latter case, their “good faith” and independence are far from total.
P.3.4. Selecting scientific information
For a long time, the only sources of scientific literature in the nuclear field were the organizations directly involved, which were therefore “biased”. It was only after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 that university scientists began to invest in this field of research. The subjects addressed were much more diversified and the concepts renewed. In order to eliminate these independent sources of information, it became common practice in many fields of physical and chemical risk assessment to retain only publications based on “Good Laboratory Practice” (GLP). These standards had been imposed on laboratories dependent on industry to limit scientific drift. However, while academics respect GLP in spirit, they do not apply it sensu stricto. As a result, not all their publications are taken into account. This is particularly true of the summaries produced by the European Food Security Authority (EFSA) [AMI 17].
P.3.5. Censorship of scientific publications
P.3.5.1. Control of nuclear organizations
Most organizations working in the nuclear field have a pyramid-shaped management structure, and all publications are subject to authorization by the management. As a result, any “disturbing” information can be blocked. Few organizations allow their staff to publish without constraint.
P.3.5.2. “Defense secrets” and “industrial secrets”
In the nuclear field, many organizations are military or industrial. They can therefore censor information that could embarrass them on the grounds of “defense secrecy” or “industrial secrecy”.
In France, the enactment of the “Transparency, Nuclear Safety” (transparence et sécurité en matière nucléaire – TSN) law has considerably changed attitudes (at least for the majority) and made it easier to obtain information about nuclear energy and, in particular, safety. However, there are still a number of gray areas, particularly where national defense is concerned, which are covered by “defense secrecy”. We can hope for a positive change in the future, as much of the information retained has no military value, and some of it is an open secret published in specialized journals, but of course cannot be verified.
P.3.6. Scientific truth
Scientific truth is by definition provisional, since new scientific advances can call into question our current certainties. In this book, the authors have taken into account the most recent findings.
In many areas, especially those where economic interests are at stake, we can observe divergent interpretations. This is particularly true of human health issues. For example, the toxicity of tobacco has long been denied by scientists, often linked to the tobacco industry. This is still the case in some countries for asbestos. How can this attitude be explained? Knowledge – and this is no different for toxicology – is gradually gaining ground. So, at the outset, there is a period of time that can unfortunately extend for years, when an isolated piece of information reveals a certain phenomenon, such as the toxicity of tobacco. But does this single result represent an exception or a general phenomenon? New results are often divided between confirming and refuting the first result. This is because, in order to occur, the phenomenon must meet certain conditions (e.g. inter-individual variations in susceptibility to carcinogens, dietary habits).
In science, contrary to popular belief, results are rarely perfectly clear-cut (black and white, yes and no), but are associated with uncertainties. These uncertainties are expressed by a range within which the true answer may lie, associated with a certain probability of being true (95%, 99%). This means that the answer is not absolute; there are 5% or 1% of cases where the answer may be different. Our certainties are therefore only probabilities.
As with any human activity, research involves a number of researchers who lack rigor, and are capable of biasing the interpretation of their observations, or even inventing their results, often in line with the interests of the funders of their work. Limited though it may be, this type of behavior is enough to cause a significant proportion of the population to lose confidence in the profession as a whole. As is the case with the political class, the result for the public is “that we are being lied to”, “that serious things are being hidden from us”. Internet culture allows all kinds of rumors to be spread quickly and widely.
Biological responses are generally highly variable and often follow a normal (or Gaussian) distribution. The same applies to the responses of organisms to radionuclides, whether in terms of bioaccumulation, elimination or damage caused by ionizing radiation. This is true for all living beings, including humans. As a result, it is extremely difficult to identify the main laws and predict the real impact of this type of aggression.
P.3.7. Our conception of the expert’s role
A researcher must make available to society, in an accessible form, scientific knowledge concerning the health and environmental benefits, dangers and risks associated with major societal choices, such as the use of nuclear energy.
Our view of the expert’s role is that they are not a substitute for decision-makers or society as a whole, but have a duty to enable as many people as possible to make informed choices.
The expert must be able to keep their distance from the generally preconceived opinions of the protagonists, and must assess the case without preconceived ideas and with complete serenity.
P.4. Project objectives
The aim of this book is to estimate the radioactive risk to humans. To do this, the authors will follow the steps of the classic approach presented above. On the one hand, radioactive danger was recognized at the same time as the discovery of radioactivity. On the other hand, the estimation of the radioactive risk to humans is still the subject of lively debate. In this volume, the authors will summarize the scientific work, past and present, that has made it possible to estimate the radioactivity of the anthroposphere and the radioactive contamination of humans. They will list the various routes of exposure to ionizing radiation (external, internal, dietary) and estimate the radiation doses suffered by humans under various conditions (natural for the public and professionals, accidental). Also, the harmful effects of ionizing radiation at various biological levels (molecular, cellular, tissue) and the health effects at the individual level will be reported. The focus will be on occupational diseases caused by radiation. The relationship between doses and adverse effects of ionizing radiation will be discussed for high, medium and low doses. Controversies on this subject will be explained. International and French regulatory values will be provided. Finally, an estimate of the radioactive risk to humans will be proposed.
P.5. Drafting the manuscript
The Preface, Introduction and Chapters 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12 and 13 were written by Jean-Claude Amiard, and Chapters 1, 3, 6, 7, 9 and 10 by Jean-Claude Zerbib. Each chapter has been reviewed, corrected, amended, completed and approved by the other co-author.
We wish to thank Professor Philip Rainbow (former Keeper of Zoology, Natural History Museum, London, UK) for reading the English version of the book. We warmly thank him for his time and efforts.
P.6. References
[AMI 17] AMIARD J.C.,
Les risques chimiques environnementaux. Méthodes d’évaluation et impacts sur les organismes
, 2nd edition, Lavoisier, Tec&Doc, Paris, 2017.
[IRS 21] IRSN, Baromètre IRSN 2021 sur la perception des risques et de la sécurité par les Français, IRSN, 26/05/2021.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ABCC: Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission
AChE: Acetyl Choline Esterase
ACRO:
Association pour le Contrôle de la Radioactivité dans l’Ouest
(French Association for the Control of Radioactivity in the West)
AFCN:
Agence Fédérale de Contrôle Nucléaire
(Belgian Federal Nuclear Control Agency)
ALARA: As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ALL: Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia
AMAD: Activity Median Aerodynamic Diameter
AML: Acute Myelogenous Leukemia
ANCCLI:
Association National des Comités et Commissions Locales d’Information
(French National Association of Local Information Committees and Commissions)
ANDRA:
Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs
(French National Radioactive Waste Management Agency)
ARNA: Argentine Nuclear Regulatory Authority
ARPANSA: Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
ASN:
Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire
(French Nuclear Safety Authority)
ASND:
Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire Défense
(French Defense Nuclear Safety Authority)
BBB: Blood–Brain Barrier
BE: Bystander Effect
BEPN: Binding Energy Per Nucleon
BER: Base Excision Repair
BIOMASS: Biosphere Modelling and Assessment
BIR: Break-Induced Replication
BNI: Basic Nuclear Infrastructure
CCHEN:
Comisión Chilena de Energía Nuclear
(Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission)
CCSN:
Commission Canadienne de Sûreté Nucléaire
(French name of the CNSC)
CDF: Cation Diffusion Facilitator
CEA:
Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives
(French Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies Commission)
CLL: Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia
CNAM:
Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie
(French National Health Insurance Fund)
CNEN:
Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear
(Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission)
CNSC: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
COGEMA:
Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires
CSN: Spanish Council for Nuclear Safety
CVD: Cerebrovascular Disease
DAM:
Direction des Applications Militaires
(French Directorate of Military Applications)
DCN:
Direction des Constructions Navales
(French Directorate of Shipbuilding)
DDR: DNA Damage Response
DDREF: Dose and Dose-Rate Effectiveness Factor
DFD:
Deutsch-Französischer Direktionausschuss
(German-French Management Committee)
DNA: Deoxyribonucleic Acid
DS86: Dosimetry System from 1986
DSB: Double Strand Break
DTPA: Diethylene Triamine Penta-acetic Acid
DU: Depleted Uranium
EDF:
Électricité de France
(French multinational electric utility company owned by the government of France)
EMRAS: Environmental Modelling for RAdiation Safety
ENSI: Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate
ERR: Excess Relative Risk
EU: European Union
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
GRNC:
Groupe Radioécologie Nord-Cotentin
(Radioecology Group of the North Cotentin Region)
GRS:
Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit
(Society for Device and Reactor Safety)
HAEA: Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority
HBNRA: High Background Natural Radiation Areas
HCTISN:
Haut Comité pour la Transparence et l’Information sur la Sécurité Nucléaire
(French High Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Safety)
HLNRA: High-Level Natural Radiation Areas
HOS: Human Osteoblast Cells
HR: Hazard Ratio
HTO: Tritiated Water
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEC: Israel Atomic Energy Commission
ICRP: International Commission on Radiological Protection
ICRU: International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements
IHD: Ischemic Heart Disease
ILO: International Labour Organization
INFN:
Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare
ING: Incorporation by Ingestion
INH: Incorporation by Inhalation
INJ: Incorporation by Injection
INRS:
Institut National de Recherche et de Sécurité pour la Prévention des Accidents du Travail et des Maladies Professionnelles
(French National Research and Safety Institute for the Prevention of Occupational Accidents and Diseases)
INSERM:
Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médical
(French National Institute for Health and Medical Research)
INSTN:
Institut National des Sciences et Techniques Nucléaires
(French National Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology)
INWORKS: International Nuclear Workers Study
IPSN:
Institut de Protection et de Sûreté Nucléaire
(French Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety)
IR: Ionizing Radiation
IRA
:
Integrated Risk Assessment
IRSN:
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire
(French Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety)
ITER: International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
KI: Potassium iodide
KINS: Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety
LDIR: Low-Dose Ionizing Radiation
LDRIR: Low-Dose-Rate Ionizing Radiation
LET: Linear Energy Transfer
LNT: Linear Non-Threshold
LRWT: Linear Relationship Without Threshold
LSS: Life Span Study
MAAD: Median Active Aerodynamic Diameter
MRCP: Mesh-type Reference Computational Phantoms
NAS: US National Academy of Sciences
NDK:
Nükleer Düzenleme Kurumu
(Turkish Nuclear Regulatory Authority)
NEA: Nuclear Energy Agency
NNSA: China’s National Nuclear Safety Administration
NRA: Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency
NRA: Japanese Nuclear Regulation Authority
Nramp: Natural resistance-associated macrophage proteins
NRC: National Research Council
NCRP: National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
NTE: Non-Targeted Effects
OAP: Thai Office of Atoms for Peace
OBT: Organically Bound Tritium
OD: Occupational Diseases
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONR: UK Office for Nuclear Regulation
OPT: Oligo Peptide Transporters
OR: Odds Ratio
PAH: Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons
PAR: Population Attributable Risk
PCB: Polychlorobiphenyl
RBE: Relative Biological Effectiveness
RERF: Radiation Effect Research Foundation
RIBE: Radiation-Induced Bystander Effect
RIFE: Radioactivity in Food and the Environment
RIGI: Radiation-Induced Genomic Instability
RNA: Ribonucleic Acid
ROS: Reactive Oxygen Species
RPL: Radio-Photo-Luminescent
RR: Risk Ratio
SAF: Specific Absorbed Fractions
SCE: Sister Chromatid Exchanges
SFRP:
Société Française de Radioprotection
(French Radiation Protection Society)
SIR: Standardized Incidence Ratio
SMR: Standardized Mortality Ratio
SSA: Single-Strand Annealing
SSB: Single-Strand Break
STUK: Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
SUJB: Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety
SY: Systemic Sector
TB: Tracheobronchial
TEL: Linear Energy Transfer
UJD: Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic
UN: United Nations
UNSCEAR: United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
USAEC: US Atomic Energy Commission
USTUR: United States Transuranium and Uranium Registries
VARAM: Latvian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development
VARANS: Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety
VATEST: Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate
WHO: World Health Organization
WLM: Working Level Months
ZIP: Zinc–Iron Permease family
IntroductionMethodology in Radioactive Risk Assessment
I.1. Radioactive risk assessment method
The radioactive risk assessment method has already been developed in Volumes 3 [AMI 20] and 6 [AMI 22] of the “Radioactive Risk” series. This method, which is applied to all physical and chemical risk assessments [AMI 17], is developed in four stages (Figure I.1). The first step is hazard identification. The second step is to establish the radiation dose to humans, based on the estimated contamination of the anthroposphere and the multiple routes of exposure. The third step is to assess the harmful effects of ionizing radiation on humans, the relationship between doses received and harmful effects for various exposures (low, medium and high), and the selection of doses with no effect on human health. Steps 2 and 3 are carried out in parallel. The final step is to characterize the radioactive risk.
As with all physical and chemical hazards, particularly those that exist naturally outside human activity, it is not easy to provide doses that have no effect on human health, or on the health of all living beings. This explains why, as scientific knowledge of harmful effects increases, the choice of doses recognized as having no effect is evolving. For the vast majority of physical and chemical hazards, the trend is towards low doses. This is particularly true for ionizing radiation, and also for mercury and cadmium.
Figure I.1.The general principle of human radioactive risk estimation (according to [AMI 21])
Risk assessment is part of a wider picture (Figure I.2) that includes consideration of socio-economic and socio-behavioral impacts. These two aspects run in parallel and inform problem formulation as well as risk management and risk communication processes [SUC 18].
Figure I.2.Conceptual overview of an integrated risk assessment (IRA) (according to [SUC 18])
I.2. International institutions responsible for nuclear safety
Mainly three international institutions, the IAEA, ICRP and UNSCEAR, are responsible for making recommendations on nuclear safety. Each state is independent in its use of nuclear energy, and may or may not adopt these recommendations in their entirety, or adapt them to its own needs.
The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR, United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1955. Its mandate within the UN system is to assess and report on the levels and effects of radiation exposure. For governments and organizations around the world, the Committee’s estimates provide the scientific basis for assessing radiation risks and establishing safety measures. The General Assembly has designated 27 countries to delegate scientists as members of the Committee. France’s designated member is currently D. Laurier (with A. Lebaron-Jacobs as alternate). The Committee comprises a Chairman, three Vice-Chairmen and a Rapporteur. Since its creation, UNSCEAR has published 25 major studies. These reports are highly regarded as fundamental sources of authoritative information.
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) is an independent international organization that advances the science of radiation protection for the public good, in particular by providing recommendations and advice on all aspects of protection against ionizing radiation. It is a charity registered with the Charity Commission of England and Wales (registration number 1166304).
The ICRP is a community of over 250 recognized experts in radiation protection science, policy and practice in more than 30 countries. The ICRP’s head office and scientific secretariat are located in Ottawa, Canada. The structure of the ICRP comprises the Main Commission, the Scientific Secretariat, four Standing Committees (Committee 1 on the Effects of Radiation, Committee 2 on Doses from Radiation Exposure, Committee 3 on Radiation Protection in the Medical Field, Committee 4 on the Application of ICRP Recommendations) and a series of Working Groups. Committee 5 on Environmental Protection, set up in 2005, was dissolved in 2017.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is part of the United Nations (UN). Its Statute was approved on October 23, 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the IAEA, held at UN Headquarters. It came into force on July 29, 1957. The Statute has been amended three times in accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraphs A and C of Article XVIII.
Historically, the IAEA was created in 1957 in response to the great concerns and hopes raised by the discoveries and diverse uses of nuclear technology. Its genesis can be traced back to President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech to the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953. President Eisenhower’s ratification of the Statute on July 29, 1957 marked the official birth of the IAEA.
The IAEA is closely linked to nuclear technology and its controversial applications, either as a weapon or as a practical and useful tool. The ideas expressed by President Eisenhower in his 1953 speech led to the Statute of the IAEA, unanimously approved by 81 nations in October 1956. The Agency was created as a global “atom for peace” organization within the UN system. From the outset, its mandate has been to work with its Member States and its many partners around the world to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The objectives of the IAEA’s dual mission – to promote and control the atom – are defined in Article II of its Statute. There are currently three distinct themes in the IAEA’s work. These are 1) all nuclear technology applications in various fields (agriculture, health, sterilization, industry, water desalination, research, etc.), 2) the safety of nuclear infrastructures (reactors and plants), and 3) proliferation and safeguards compliance (with rogue states such as Iran, which has been playing cat-and-mouse with IAEA inspectors for two decades)1.
In October 1957, delegates at the first General Conference decided to establish the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Until the opening of the Vienna International Centre in August 1979, the former Grand Hotel next to the Vienna Opera House served as the Agency’s temporary headquarters. The IAEA also has two regional offices, one in Toronto (Canada) (since 1979) and the other in Tokyo (Japan) (since 1984), as well as two liaison offices, one in New York (USA) (since 1957) and the other in Geneva (Switzerland) (since 1965). The Agency operates specialized nuclear technology laboratories in Vienna and Seibersdorf (Austria), inaugurated in 1961, and, since 1961, in Monaco.
The IAEA’s governing bodies decide on the Agency’s programs and budgets. They comprise the General Conference, which brings together all Member States (in 2022, 173 members or states), and the Board of Governors, made up of 35 members. The General Conference meets annually at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, usually in September. The Board meets five times a year, also in Vienna.
Unlike the cases of various physical and/or chemical hazards affecting human health, the World Health Organization (WHO) has no involvement in radioactive hazards. This is because, on May 28, 1959, the WHO signed the “WHA12-40” agreement with the IAEA. This agreement sets out the responsibilities, consultation and cooperation arrangements between the two agencies. In particular, it stipulates that both agencies recognize that they may be called upon to take certain restrictive measures to safeguard the confidentiality of information supplied to them. In practice, the WHO has done very little to combat the danger of radioactivity. For example, the WHO abolished its radiation department a few years ago [ARC 14, p. 1784]. The confidentiality clause is a cross-cutting provision of UN agreements, and it is indeed the WHO that is responsible for assessing health risk, including in the event of a nuclear accident. Furthermore, in 1986, the IAEA’s control was reinforced by a number of conventions. This situation is not reassuring in terms of transparency concerning the health consequences of radioactivity [ROS 14, p. 6962]. It is also curious that a UN agency such as the IAEA should have a “commercial” character. In fact, the IAEA’s prime objective is to promote the safe use of nuclear energy. The latest report by its Director [IEA 21] makes repeated use of the term “commercial”. On May 5, 2022, the IAEA launched a new roadmap for the commercial deployment of nuclear-powered hydrogen (see: https://www.sfen.org/rgn/laiea-prepare-une-feuille-de-route-pour-un-deploiement-commercial-de-lhydrogene-grace-au-nucleaire/). The IAEA has created a structure (INIR, Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review) whose mission is to help first-licensing states in the development of nuclear infrastructure.
I.3. National nuclear safety institutions
Each country has its own regulatory body (Table I.1). In France, these are the ASN, ASND and IRSN. According to IAEA recommendations, these bodies must be independent. However, following the Fukushima accident, the Japanese authorities were obliged to create a new institution to make it more independent of the Japanese nuclear industry. Each state defines its own rules, generally following the recommendations of international institutions, but there are differences.
In conclusion, radioactive risk assessment does not follow the same procedures as for all other physical and chemical hazards. In particular, the international and national bodies in charge of this risk are specific to the nuclear sector. However, the fact that the organization of safety in the face of the danger presented by ionizing radiation has been able, thanks to the existence of several international and European organizations, to develop in a relatively homogeneous way throughout the world is a significant and widespread development that many other chemical, physical or biological hazards have not experienced.
Table I.1.National authorities in charge of nuclear safety and radiation protection
State
Code
Institution
Germany
GRS
Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit
DFD
Deutsch-Französischer Direktionausschuss
Argentina
ARN
Argentine Nuclear Regulatory Authority
Australia
ARPANSA
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
Belgium
AFCN
Agence Fédérale de Contrôle Nucléaire
Brazil
CNEN
Brazilian Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear
Bulgaria
NRA
Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency
Canada
CNSC
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Chile
CCHEN
Comisión Chilena de Energía Nuclear
China
NNSA
China’s National Nuclear Safety Administration
South Korea
KINS
Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety
Spain
CSN
Spanish Council for Nuclear Safety
United States
NRC
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Finland
STUK
Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
France
ASN
Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire
ASND
Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire Défense
IRSN
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire
Hungary
HAEA
Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority
Israel
IAEC
Israel Atomic Energy Commission
Italy
INFN
Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare
Japan
NRA
Nuclear Regulation Authority, Japan
Latvia
VARAM
Latvian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development
Lithuania
VATEST
Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate
Russia
Rostekhnadzor
Rostechnadzor
Slovak Republic
UJD
Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic
Czech Republic
SUJB
Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety
United Kingdom
ONR
UK Office for Nuclear Regulation
Sweden
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
Switzerland
ENSI
Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate
Thailand
OAP
Thai Office of Atoms for Peace
Turkey
NDK
Nükleer Düzenleme Kurumu
Vietnam
VARANS
Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety
I.4. References
[AIE 21] AIEA, Rapport d’ensemble sur la technologie nucléaire 2021. Rapport du Directeur général, IAEA/NTR/2021 report, IAEA, Vienna, 2021.
[AMI 17] AMIARD J.C.,
Les risques chimiques environnementaux. Méthodes d’évaluation et impacts sur les organismes
, 2nd edition, Lavoisier, Tec&Doc, Paris, 2017.
[AMI 20] AMIARD J.C.,
Nuclear Accidents: Prevention and Management of an Accidental Crisis
, vol. 3, ISTE, London, and John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2020.
[AMI 22] AMIARD J.C.,
Marine Radioecology
, vol. 6, ISTE, London, and John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2022.
[ARC 14] ARCHIMBAUD A., “Question orale no. 0847S”,
Journal officiel du Sénat de la république française,
31 July 2014.
[IRS 21] IRSN, Baromètre IRSN 2021 sur la perception des risques et de la sécurité par les Français, IRSN, 26 May 2021.
[ROS 14] ROSSIGNOL L., “Réponse du Secrétariat d’État, auprès du ministère des affaires sociales, de la santé et des droits des femmes, chargé de la famille, des personnes âgées et de l’autonomie à la question orale no. 0847S de Mme Aline ARCHIMBAUD (Seine-Saint-Denis - ECOLO)”,
Journal Officiel du Sénat de la République française
, 15 October 2014.
[SUC 18] SUCIU N.A., PANIZZI S., CIFFROY P. et al., “Evolution and future of human health and environmental risk assessment”, in P. CIFFROY, A. TEDIOSI, E. CAPRI (eds),
Modelling the Fate of Chemicals in the Environment and the Human Body, The Handbook of Environmental Chemistry
, vol. 57, Springer, Cham, pp. 1–21, 2018.
Note
1
In February 2003, during IAEA visits to the workshops of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, inspectors discovered that these premises had been used to produce enriched uranium using centrifuges. Other major violations (secret nuclear facilities) were discovered in the following months.
1Radioactive Danger
1.1. Introduction
The concept of the atom1, the unbreakable unit of matter, was first put forward over 24 centuries ago by Leucippus (460–370 BC) and his disciple Democritus (460–370 BC). That atoms are the ultimate constituents of matter was cast into doubt with the discovery of radioactivity in 1896 by Henri Becquerel (1852–1908), followed by the Curies’ work on uranium ore processing residues. In 1900, Marie Curie (1867–1934) wrote: “radioactive matter is not an ordinary chemical state; atoms are not constituted in a stable state, since particles smaller than the atom are radiated. The chemically indivisible atom is divisible here, and the sub-atoms are in motion”.
In 1903, Frédéric Soddy (1877–1956) and William Ramsay (1852–1916) enclosed a 20 mg sample of radium bromide in a closed container, and after a few months discovered that it contained helium. This proved that the radium atom had split by expelling a helium atom. The residue is necessarily another element [FER 06, p. 50]. In her thesis, Marie Curie shows that radioactive decay (known as the law of deactivation) is an exponential law [CUR 04, pp. 118, 162]. She underlined the importance of Soddy and Ramsay’s discovery of helium and confirmed that radium and thorium emanations2 do not seem to be altered by various energetic chemical agents, and for this reason, Rutherford and Soddy assimilated them to gases of the argon family.
Several physicists began to suggest that atoms might themselves be compound objects. They also drew up structural diagrams of the atom. Jean Perrin (1870–1942), in February 1900, imagined a structure that is striking in retrospect:
Each atom would be made up, on the one hand, of one or more masses charged with positive electricity…and on the other hand, a multitude of corpuscles, a kind of small negative planet, all the masses gravitating under the action of electrical forces and the total charge being exactly equivalent to the total positive charge, so that the atom would be electrically neutral…the negative corpuscles always appear identical to each other, whatever the chemical nature of the atom from which they are detached.
The text of his lecture was published, but Jean Perrin did not develop this luminous hypothesis and never returned to the subject.
In contrast, Rutherford (1871–1937) specified a structure on March 7, 1911, in a two-page note. His model of the atom consisted of a central electric charge concentrated in one point and surrounded by a uniform spherical distribution of electricity of opposite sign in equal quantity. In an article dated August 16, 1912, he even used the Latin word nucleus [FER 06, p. 92], the nucleus of the atom. However, Niels Bohr (1885–1962) reminded us that there could be no static equilibrium between the nucleus and the electrons, and that they therefore rotate (1912). The blueprint became clearer.
When moving from one element to another in Mendeleev’s classification (1834–1907), a fundamental quantity increases by a constant amount. For the English physicist Henry Moseley (1887–1915), this quantity could only be the charge of the positive central nucleus. He thus discovered that what was known as the atomic number corresponded to the number of elementary charges in the atom’s nucleus [FER 06, p. 96].
The dangers presented by ionizing radiation were highlighted by Henri Becquerel and Marie Curie at the very time of their discovery. In a note to the Académie des Sciences (French Academy of Sciences) in 1901, Henri Becquerel and Pierre Curie (1859–1906) [BEC 01] recount the story of the first illnesses that affected scientists working with radium, who were not yet aware of the deleterious effects of extensive exposure to ionizing radiation.
It was two German researchers, the physicist Otto Walkoff and the chemist Friedrich Giesel (1852–1927), who published their first observations in October 1900. After placing radium wrapped in a sheet of celluloid on his arm for two hours, Mr. Giesel observed a slight reddening which increased and, after three weeks, caused the skin to “inflame” and then fall off. It was the first voluntary radiodermatitis!
Pierre Curie [CUR 01] then decided to reproduce Giesel’s experiment, placing a thin sheet of gutta-percha on his arm for 10 hours, on which he had deposited “radiferous barium chloride”. The skin became red over an area of 6 cm2, a burn-like redness that increased in intensity and on the 20th day turned into a sore. After 42 days, the epidermis began to reform, but 52 days later, a 1 cm2 wound remained, with a grayish appearance, indicating deep damage to the epidermis and dermis. This was the first severe radiological burn.
Henri Becquerel’s experiment was “involuntary”. For around six hours, he placed a box containing a small sealed glass tube3 that contained radiferous barium chloride in his vest pocket. Ten days later, he noticed a reddening of the tube’s oblong shape on his skin at the bottom of the pocket. Three weeks after exposure, a wound formed. It closed seven weeks after exposure, leaving a scar. While this burn was being treated, a second oblong red spot appeared, opposite the other corner of his vest pocket. The vial, which had been moved in the pocket, had produced a second erythema.
The authors also recall in this note that Marie Curie, carrying for less than half an hour a small sealed glass tube containing a few centigrams4 of “the same very active material”, enclosed in a thin metal box, had “after 15 days a red stain which gave a blister similar to that of a superficial burn”. Henri Becquerel and Pierre Curie concluded by noting that the duration of the alterations varies with the intensity of the active rays and the duration of the excitatory action, and that the extremities of the fingers, which have held tubes or capsules containing highly active products, become hard and sometimes very painful. In one case, the inflammation of the fingertips lasted a fortnight before the skin fell off, but the painful sensitivity had not completely disappeared after two months.
As we shall see in Chapter 10, in addition to these short-term effects, caused by high local doses and dose rates5 of ionizing radiation, radiation-induced diseases can be caused by doses and dose rates much lower than those producing radiation burns, administered to all or part of the whole organism. These conditions often develop late in life, with latency periods measured in years or even decades.
For more than a century, our knowledge of the dangers of radioactivity has made great strides forward. Protecting people and the environment requires knowledge of the harmful effects of the different types of radiation emitted by radionuclides and by electrical ionizing radiation generators.
1.2. Radionuclides and radioelements
Chemical elements frequently have several isotopes, the majority of which are stable, while others are radioactive. Some chemical elements have a radioactive isotope, such as carbon with isotope 14 (14C) or potassium with 40K, while the two heaviest natural elements, uranium and thorium, produce a chain of radioactive isotopes. Natural uranium is made up of three radioactive isotopes, uranium 234 (234U), uranium 235 (235U) and uranium 238 (238U), which are, respectively, in the following proportions: 0.0055%, 0.720% and 99.2745%, while thorium has only one nuclide, thorium 232 (232Th), and is radioactive. 234U is a descendant of 238U, while 235U is the origin of a family of descendants independent of 238U. As uranium and thorium are naturally occurring chemical elements consisting only of radioactive isotopes, they are referred to as radioelements. The radioactive isotope of an element is called a radionuclide or radioisotope. Hydrogen, for example, has three isotopes, two stable (hydrogen and deuterium) and one radioactive (tritium). In the case of carbon, carbon-14 is a radionuclide, while carbons-12 and 13 are stable isotopes.
