RAF Handbook 1939-1945 E-Book

David Wragg

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2007

Beschreibung

It opens with a brief history of the service, followed by a chapter that reviews its situation on the outbreak of war. The chapters that follow look at the structure of the RAF, from the Air Ministry and Chief of the Air Staff down to squadron level, to include each of the Commands, including Transport Command (a creation of the war years). The main aircraft types used are listed, as well as a full listing of squadrons and airfields in the British Isles. The training of personnel, and such matters as uniforms, rank insignia, medals and life on a typical airfield, are also covered. The main battles or campaigns in which the service was involved are also described.

Leseprobe

RAF

Handbook

1939–1945

RAF

Handbook

1939–1945

DAVID WRAGG

First published in 2007

The History Press The Mill, Brimscombe Port Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QGwww.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2013

All rights reserved © David Wragg, 2007, 2013

The right of David Wragg to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUB ISBN 978 0 7524 9599 6

Original typesetting by The History Press

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Glossary

1

THE WORLD’S FIRST AIR FORCE

2

THE RAF IN 1939

3

DEFEAT AND RETREAT

4

TAKING THE WAR TO THE ENEMY

5

THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

6

THE MEDITERRANEAN, NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

7

THE WAR IN THE EAST

8

THE WAR IN EUROPE

9

THE WAR AND THE RAF

10

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

11

PERSONAL AND PERSONNEL

12

WARTIME SQUADRONS

13

THE MAIN UK RAF STATIONS

Appendix1:

Comparison of Ranks – RAF, Royal Navy and Army

Appendix2:

The Air Council in 1940

Appendix3:

Main Aircraft Types Operated, 1939–45

Appendix4:

German Towns and Cities Subjected to RAF Area Attack, 1942–5

Appendix5:

RAF Victoria Crosses

Appendix6:

Medals and Decorations

Chronology

Bibliography

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In researching and compiling any such book as this, an author is heavily dependent on the help and assistance of many others. In particular, I am grateful to the Photographic Archive team at the Imperial War Museum and to Jonathan Falconer of Sutton Publishing for help with the illustrations.

No work on a subject as vast as the Royal Air Force during the Second World War can cover every inch of ground, and for those whose appetite is whetted by this book, I would draw their attention to the bibliography at the back. There are accounts of the war in the air from every perspective, including the all-important personal accounts, as well as volumes of sheer factual matter.

David Wragg Edinburgh 15 November 2006

INTRODUCTION

The Royal Air Force in 1939 had the advantage of having been the world’s first autonomous air force, and the intuition to concentrate most of its often scant resources on the concept of strategic air power, based on fighter defences and bomber offensives. It had been starved of resources for most of the period between the two world wars, but in the three years running up to the Second World War, it underwent dramatic expansion, aided by the growth of the reserve squadrons of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

In wartime, its record was mixed, providing a valiant fighter defence in the Battle of Britain, but taking some time before the accuracy of its bombing reached an acceptable standard, while early losses among bomber crews were unsustainable. The war years saw a number of controversies, including that over the strategic bombing campaign, but also in the struggle between Coastal and Bomber Commands for long-range aircraft. One innovation of the war years was the formation of a dedicated Transport Command, empha-sising the importance of air transport in support of ground forces and in the liberation of Europe and reconquest of Asia. The creation of such commands as the Western Desert Air Force and the Second Tactical Air Force strengthened and vastly improved coordination with ground forces.

This is the story of the RAF during the war years, with the situation set in context by a brief history of the period from the formation of the RAF in 1918 to the outbreak of war in 1939. The structure of the service is explained, along with a narrative of its wartime record, followed by brief details of each squadron and the main UK air stations during the war. There is information on recruitment and training, and on life in the RAF for the men and women who served at a time when the nation’s future was in doubt.

British defence policy between the wars was undermined by the ‘Ten Year Rule’, which decreed that there would be ten years in which to prepare for war. In fact just six years elapsed between Hitler gaining absolute power in Germany and the outbreak of war in 1939. Today, something akin to the ‘Ten Year Rule’ is in place once again and – another chilling thought – development of the Eurofighter Typhoon has taken as long as the interval between the two world wars.

GLOSSARY

AA

Anti-aircraft fire

AA Co-op

Exercising with AA units, providing target tugs, simulated attacks, etc.

AAEE

Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment

AASF

Advanced Air Striking Force

ABC

‘Airborne Cigar’ radio jamming device

ACM

Air Chief Marshal

ADGB

Air Defence of Great Britain (a name used until the command structure was introduced in 1936, but readopted by RAF Fighter Command later in the war)

AEAF

Allied Expeditionary Air Force

AI

Airborne interception (radar)

Air Cdre

Air Commodore

ALG

Advanced landing ground, a forward and temporary airfield, usually in the south-east of England, to support the Normandy landings and often used for a month or so, or even less

AM

Air Marshal

AOC

Air Officer Commanding

AOP

Air observation post – artillery spotting for the army

Army Co-op

AOP duties, tactical reconnaissance and close support

ASR

Air-Sea Rescue, now known as SAR, search and rescue

ASV

Air-to-surface vessel radar

AVM

Air Vice-Marshal

BEF

British Expeditionary Force

Boozer

Anti-fighter radar warning device used on bombers

CAS

Chief of the Air Staff

Circus

Fighter escort for daylight bombers

Clarion

US plan to disrupt German communications

Corona

False orders broadcast to German fighters by aircraft of the RAF’s 100 Group

Crossbow

V-weapon countermeasures

DR

Dead reckoning navigation

Erk

Airman below the rank of corporal (slang)

ETA

Estimated time of arrival

FAA

Fleet Air Arm

Fishpond

Bomber anti-fighter radar warning device

Flak

AA fire (Fliegerabwehrkanonen)

Flg Off

Flying Officer

Flt Lt

Flight Lieutenant

Flt Sgt

Flight Sergeant

Gardening

Aerial minelaying operations in coastal waters and in German ports, rivers and canals

Gee

British radar navigating device

G-H

British blind-bombing device using signals transmitted from ground stations

glycol

Aircraft-engine coolant

Gp Capt

Group Captain

Grand Slam

22,000lb ‘earthquake’ bomb

H2S

RAF radar navigation and blind-bombing aid

HCU

Heavy Conversion Unit

Husky

Allied invasion of Sicily

IFF

Identification friend or foe, information transmitted to British radar screens

Mandrel

Swamping of German radar by 100 Group

Monica

Fighter warning device fitted to RAF bombers

Newhaven

Pathfinder code-name for H2S combined with visual support

Nickel

Name for RAF propaganda leaflet-dropping operations over Germany

Oboe

British blind-bombing device fitted to Pathfinders

OTU

Operational training unit

Overlord

Code-name for Normandy landings

Paramatta

Pathfinder code-name for target-fixing using Oboe

Plt Off

Pilot Officer

Pointblank

June 1943 directive from the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff for a Combined Bomber Offensive

PRU

Photographic Reconnaissance Unit

RAAF

Royal Australian Air Force

Ramrod

Strafing fighter patrol

RAuxAF

Royal Auxiliary Air Force

Razzles

Incendiary bomb for igniting forests and crops

RCAF

Royal Canadian Air Force

Rhubarb

Fighter-bomber mission

RNZAF

Royal New Zealand Air Force

R/T

Radio-telephone, i.e. voice rather than morse

SAAF

South African Air Force

SASO

Senior Air Staff Officer

SBA

Standard blind approach

Second TAF

Second Tactical Air Force

SHAEF

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

Shaker

Precursor of Pathfinder

Technique

methods, with aircraft dropping flares followed by target markers in advance of the main bombing force

Sqn Ldr

Squadron Leader

Tallboy

12,000lb ‘earthquake’ bomb

Thunderclap

Allied plan to deliver overwhelming assault on major German cities

Tinsel

Jamming of German fighter communications by radio operators on RAF bombers

Torch

Allied invasion of Vichy French North Africa

USAAF

United States Army Air Force

VCAS

Vice-Chief of the Air Staff

Wg Cdr

Wing Commander

Window

Tinfoil strips used by British bombers to confuse German radar

Wingco

Wing commander (slang)

W/T

Wireless transmission using Morse, rather than voice

CHAPTER ONE

THE WORLD’S FIRST AIR FORCE

The time will come, when thou shalt lift thine eyes

To watch a long-drawn battle in the skies,

While aged peasants, too amazed for words,

Stare at the flying fleets of wond’rous birds.

Gray’s Luna Habitabilis,1737

The military had taken an interest in air power as early as the Battle of Fleurus in 1794, in which a captive or tethered balloon was used for artillery spotting just eleven years after the first balloon ascents. During the following 100 years, balloons were used during the American Civil War, while in the United Kingdom the Royal Engineers started to experiment with balloons at Woolwich Arsenal in 1878, and these were used in expeditions to Bechuanaland in 1884 and to the Sudan in 1885. A balloon section was established within the Royal Engineers in 1890. It was an officer in the British Army, Col John Capper, who accorded the Wright brothers their first official recognition.

This was the pattern established in all countries with an early interest in aviation. The lead was always taken by the armies, simply because the first and most obvious use of the balloon lay in artillery spotting. When the airship and the aeroplane came, reconnaissance remained one of the most important elements in their role. The limitations of the balloon and its support needs meant that navies were slow to take an interest in the air until the advent of the aeroplane, with the Royal Navy starting flying in 1909.

Unification of British air power had come as early as 1912 on the formation of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) with the amalgamation of the Air Battalion, Royal Engineers, and the Air Branch of the Royal Navy. The new service had a Military and a Naval Wing, but it was not truly autonomous, remaining part of the British Army, while naval officers were essentially on secondment. Dissatisfaction with the situation saw the Royal Navy withdraw on 1 July 1914, and establish the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS). Essentially, the Royal Navy felt that mixing military and naval aviation did not work. On the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, the RNAS had 100 aircraft plus some airships, while the RFC, commanded by Lt Col Hugh Trenchard, had 180 aircraft. On 19 November 1914, the now superfluous title of the Military Wing of the RFC was replaced by a number of wings, each attached to an army formation.

The two services were engaged in every theatre of the First World War. The RNAS was present at Gallipoli, and also took over responsibility for the air defence of the United Kingdom, as well as using airships for convoy protection. The RFC fought over the Western Front. The procurement policies of the two air arms differed, with the RFC preferring the designs from its own Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough, while the RNAS favoured the designs of commercial concerns.

Women’s Companies existed in the RFC by 1917. At first, many of these lived at home and simply worked at their nearest RFC station, but terms of service changed as the war continued, and eventually personnel were classified either as ‘mobiles’ or ‘immobiles’, depending on whether or not they could be posted. There were also members of the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps, the Women’s Legion Motor Drivers and the Women Civilian Subordinates, as well as the Women’s Royal Naval Service. Women were not employed in the front line, and not allowed to fly (despite one naval officer having been taught to fly by his mother), but they did free men from many ground duties, including working on the fabric covering of aircraft.

The distinctive RAF roundel dated from 1915, before which aircraft had carried the Union flag. As the French had introduced the roundel, the RFC and RNAS chose to reverse the order of the colours.

Wartime saw the fighter and the bomber evolve. The RNAS bombed Zeppelin sheds at Hamburg, Friedrichshafen and Cologne, and torpedoed a Turkish warship in the Mediterranean. Reconnaissance missions were flown from seaplane carriers. The RFC engaged in fighter combat with the German Military Air Service, which gained aerial superiority over the Western Front in 1916 with its Fokker fighters with propeller-synchronised machine guns, and the balance was not fully restored until the arrival of Bristol Scouts and Sopwith 1½-Strutters. The bomber evolved with first the Royal Aircraft Factory DH4 and DH9 aircraft, and then the Handley Page O/400 and V/1500, and, by the end of the war, the Vickers Vimy. The largest bombs used during the war were 1,650lb, but most were much smaller, having developed from artillery shells fitted with stabilising fins. The primary target for the RFC during the war years was German railways and marshalling yards.

THE RAF IS BORN

This was progress, but at a cost. The two services competed and overlapped, with much duplication of effort. The British government asked the South African statesman FM Jan Smuts to report on the matter, and he recommended a single, autonomous, integrated air service. This was initially to become the Air Service, although legislation laid before parliament was drafted as the Air Force (Constitution) Act in October 1917, so the service emerged as the Royal Air Force on 1 April 1918. It comprised some 360,000 personnel, including around 25,000 members of the Women’s Royal Air Force, which disbanded in 1920, although not before a substantial number had served with the occupation forces in Germany.

It was not a happy birth. Trenchard, in command of the RFC units in France, believed in a unified air service, but wanted it to be created later, not while the country was fighting a war of unprecedented ferocity. In the event, when he was recalled from France to prepare for the creation of the Royal Air Force and to be its first Chief of the Air Staff, he found Lord Rothermere, the Secretary of State for Air, so devious and difficult to work with that on 19 March he resigned. Nevertheless, for the sake of appearances, his resignation did not take effect until 13 April.

Naturally enough, the new service was finding its way at first, while playing its part in the greatest conflict thus far. A new rank structure was needed, and while that of the RNAS provided the basis of officer ranks up to and including Air Commodore, for other ranks and very senior officers, a much modified form of army ranks was chosen. Even so, when the most senior, five-star rank was being decided, it was initially going to be ‘Marshal of the Air’. As the Sovereign automatically held the most senior rank in each of the armed services, this proposal was put to him and rejected, with the response that the Almighty had this already. So, Marshal of the Royal Air Force became the most senior rank.

This may have seemed academic to the former members of the RNAS and RFC trying to find their feet in the new organisation. Once the ranks were announced along with a new uniform, many paid for these out of their own pockets, hoping to ensure that in the much-slimmed-down postwar service, there would still be a place for them. The new uniform was pale blue, reputedly using material ordered by the Tsar for his troops before the Bolshevik Revolution. This, the classic ‘frustrated export order’, was to prove vexing in other ways: it was thought to be too pale and impractical and, when something darker was chosen in its stead, the would-be first generation of RAF officers, having already changed their uniforms once, had to do it yet again.

That apart, with an example now set, there were many in other countries disheartened at seeing air power dominated by the traditions of the armies, and in some cases the navies. Such people saw the British model as the way forward. Yet, even in the British Empire, when new air forces were formed, they remained part of the army initially, as in Canada. Even at home, the new service was controversial when it became clear that it included all military and naval aviation. In the end, a compromise was agreed. The fleet spotting aircraft flown from battleships and cruisers would continue to be flown by naval officers, and RAF units attached to the fleet would include a small number of naval aircrew.

Meanwhile, the new RAF continued to fight the war. In France, the units were known collectively as the Independent Air Force, and continued to operate effectively over German lines as resistance began to crumble, aided by the blockade of German ports. Aircraft from the first aircraft carrier, the converted battlecruiser HMS Furious, bombed the airship sheds at Tondern in August 1918, destroying two airships.

A strong indication of the way in which the future Royal Air Force would operate was also emerging before the Armistice in November 1918. In Norfolk, the RAF was working up a group of four-engined bombers that were intended to attack targets that were beyond the range of existing aircraft. After the German air raids on London, this must have been a tempting proposition, but even though these aircraft would have flown from forward bases in France, the experience of the Second World War with vastly superior aircraft was to show that lengthy flights over enemy territory on the way to and from a target were fraught with hazard.

THE PROBLEMS OF PEACETIME

At the end of the First World War, the RAF had around 360,000 men and 23,000 aircraft spread over more than 200 squadrons. The bulk of the personnel and aircraft had come from the RFC, with the RNAS contributing a relatively modest 55,000. The squadron strength of the RFC had been a nominal figure inasmuch as many of the squadrons with numbers above 150 never became operational.

At the end of the war, the government soon embarked on a programme of cutbacks. Reductions in defence spending follow the end of any major conflict, but the nation’s dire financial state, to be followed by the years of recession and depression, lent a particular severity to these. In one sense, the cuts were not unwelcome at the Air Ministry, where the objective was to submerge the old RFC and RNAS rivalries and create a completely new service with its own traditions and esprit de corps. From more than 200 squadrons, the service was shrunk quickly to just twelve: one in Germany with the occupying British Army of the Rhine, two at home and the remaining nine in the Middle East and India. It was in the Middle East, as the Ottoman Empire imploded, that most action was seen. In Mesopotamia, present-day Iraq, a policy of ‘air control’ was developed using bomber-transports to curb dissident groups. It soon became apparent that air power on its own was no substitute for forces on the ground.

The new autonomous air force saw its own ministry merged with that of the army, and after the postwar general election, the new Secretary of State for War and Air, Winston Churchill, immediately invited Trenchard to return. He accepted, and stayed for ten years, earning the title ‘Father of the Royal Air Force’. Having been conceived in haste, the new RAF took some time to settle down. Both the British Army and the Royal Navy were pressing for their own air power, and as early as 1921, the former stated that aircraft were auxiliary arms to the two traditional services. Lord Balfour, chairman of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1921, investigated, and the strategic significance of creating an autonomous service was emphasised when Balfour was forced to produce an independent report because of the intransigence of the older services. Balfour accepted that, while the new service must either work in close cooperation with the older services or even be subordinate to them in many situations, it had to be autonomous in such matters as fighter defence or long-range bombing.

One of the more far-sighted decisions taken at this low point in the RAF’s history was to establish a reserve formation, despite the prevailing feeling that the nation had just fought ‘the war to end all wars’. This recognised that no country can afford to maintain its armed services at a wartime level in peacetime, and yet no peacetime strength is ever sufficient for wartime. The RAF’s first reserves were formed in 1924 as the Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF), primarily to provide a reserve of both manpower and air squadrons. As war approached in the late 1930s, it was also to provide the manpower for the urgently needed barrage balloon squadrons. The RAuxAF squadrons were equipped with aircraft, initially obsolete types, to enable training to take place, and between the wars acquired the reputation of being somewhat exclusive and even clublike organisations, nicknamed the ‘weekend fliers’, rather as the RNVR consisted of ‘weekend sailors’, and the territorial army ‘Friday-night soldiers’. This was, perhaps, not too surprising, as the educational requirements of flying meant that they needed the brighter elements of society, while the physical ones meant that they were usually young men.

From the small core of twelve squadrons, it was finally decided that the peacetime RAF should have an overall strength of seventy-four squadrons. Most of these would be based in the UK, where there would be fifteen fighter and thirty-seven bomber squadrons, with another twenty-two squadrons based overseas. The home squadrons of the new service were formed into a single command, Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB), and included both fighter and bomber squadrons.

The onset of the Great Depression meant that seventy-four squadrons did not appear until 1936. The country’s poor financial state was not the only problem, as defence policy was also constrained by the ‘Ten Year Rule’, which stipulated that there would be ten years in which to prepare for a major conflict. Aircraft procurement was piecemeal with little standardisation, and it was not unknown for a particular aircraft type to equip just one squadron.

Before the creation of Imperial Airways in 1924, the RAF maintained a number of important airmail services in the colonies and those countries under British protection. That year was also important for the creation of the Fleet Air Arm, comprising those RAF units operating from aircraft carriers. The Fleet Air Arm was part of what had become known as RAF Coastal Area, and was under naval control while the units were at sea, and RAF control when ashore. Rather than form as squadrons, at first the carrier units were organised as flights in the 400 series, with numbers 401–39 as spotter flights attached to battleships and cruisers, 440–59 as reconnaissance flights, and 460 onwards as torpedo flights. It was not until 1936 that these were organised into squadrons, and numbers in the 700 series given to second-line or support units, and in the 800 series to combat squadrons.

No doubt anxious to promote its autonomy, the RAF soon showed a certain penchant for publicity. In 1919, two former RFC officers, Alcock and Brown, made the first non-stop crossing of the North Atlantic in a Vickers Vimy bomber. Later, a High Speed Flight was established, and this provided the pilots for the spectacular run of Schneider Trophy victories that eventually won it outright for the United Kingdom in 1931.

ORGANISING FOR WAR

Having reached its official strength in 1936, the service was reorganised into Bomber, Fighter, Coastal, Maintenance and Training Commands. Balloon Command was created in 1938 when it was realised that the balloon barrage would have to be extended beyond London. Army Cooperation Command was created in December 1940, too late for the Norwegian campaign or for the Battle of France, and only survived until June 1943, when it was broken up, although army cooperation wings remained in the RAF, and a new Second Tactical Air Force was formed shortly afterwards. Transport Command was not established until March 1943, created from the former Ferry Command that had been set up on the outbreak of war in 1939 and had provided air transport and ferried aircraft from manufacturers to operational units.

Fighter Command itself was divided in mid-1943 into the Air Defence of Great Britain, an old title resurrected, and the Second Tactical Air Force, which absorbed around half of Fighter Command’s squadrons and provided strikes against enemy-occupied Europe before the Normandy landings. Afterwards, Second TAF moved as quickly as possible to France and then followed the Allied armies as they advanced into the Low Countries and finally Germany. Before war broke out, a Reserve Command was created to control the RAuxAF, the more recently formed Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR) units and the civilian-operated elementary flying schools. However, in 1940 this was merged with Training Command, which in turn was later divided into Flying Training Command and Technical Training Command.

In 1937, it was decided to return naval aviation to the Admiralty, although the formal transfer did not follow until 1939. The exception to this transfer was that longrange maritime reconnaissance remained with the RAF, in contrast to the practice in France and the United States, for example, where this task was, and still is, handled by the navies.

Even so, in 1937, it was realised that the existing organisation was insufficient for wartime needs, and the RAFVR was created to establish a pool of aircrew that could be called up as soon as war came. In the event, the Reserve was to provide a welcome 10,000 personnel in 1939. The RAuxAF not only provided squadrons, but also manpower for such innovations as the barrage balloon units.

No sooner had the RAF reached its planned strength in 1936 than it was decided to increase its strength once more, to 134 regular squadrons, which were to be backed up in an emergency by 138 squadrons of the RAuxAF. At the same time, there was considerable development and production of new aircraft, some of which, such as the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire fighters, Short Sunderland maritime reconnaissance aircraft and Vickers Wellington bombers, were to become highly regarded classics, while others, such as the Fairey Battle and Bristol Blenheim bomber, were to be outclassed. During the early days of the RAuxAF, this was seen as a reserve that could add to the broad spread of the RAF’s capability in an emergency, but by the early 1930s, bombers and maritime-reconnaissance aircraft were already becoming increasingly complex, so it was decided that the RAuxAF squadrons should be confined to single-engined aircraft. Nevertheless, as Chapter Twelve makes clear, by the outbreak of war many of these squadrons did have up-to-date aircraft, or received them shortly afterwards.

The service’s medical personnel had already included Princess Mary’s RAF Nursing Service but, as another war loomed, a Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) was also established, at first largely to free manpower for front-line duties. The WAAF members were to provide considerable support for administration and work in such areas as catering and accommodation, but they also assumed many highly technical roles, including plotters in the operational control rooms, radar operators and in the Y-service, eavesdropping on Luftwaffe communications.

The mid-1930s expansion plans for the Royal Air Force can be seen in hindsight as a blessing and, if anything, not ambitious enough. This was not the attitude at the time. The expansion was controversial and much heated debate and questioning started. For every one person who saw the emerging threat from Germany, and even from Italy and far-off Japan (these last two were, after all, First World War allies), another nine could not conceive that there could be another war and, for many, peace at all costs did not sound unreasonable.

Despite the growing menace emerging in Europe, it was not until 1938, the year of the Munich Crisis, that industrial capacity rather than finance became the limiting factor in procurement. The inevitable result was that, by the time war came in 1939, the RAF only had one-eighth of the manpower and two-sevenths of the equipment of the German Luftwaffe. Much of its equipment, especially in the Middle East and India, was obsolete. The Munich Agreement, so often derided as a ‘sell-out’, had in fact bought invaluable extra time for Britain’s armed forces. While there was to be no ‘phoney war’ for much of the Royal Air Force, with operations over Germany from the first day of war, the relative lack of action during the first seven months of war also provided a further much-needed breathing space. Again, looking at Chapter Twelve, many units entered the war operating obsolescent biplanes that were no match for the latest enemy bombers, let alone fighters, and this situation continued beyond 1940 in the Middle East and India.

Nevertheless, the United Kingdom had one ace up its sleeve – radar. Before the war, the main hope of detecting approaching enemy aircraft had been to use large sound detectors, but Sir Robert Watson-Watt had pressed ahead with radio direction finding, or RDF. By early 1939, the ‘Chain Home’ network of radar stations stretched along the south and east coasts of England. It was not to be known as ‘radar’ (radio detection and ranging) until 1942, when the United States Navy adopted this term. It was radar that was to provide early warning of German bomber formations and ensure that the RAF fighters were homed in on the attackers.

CHAPTER TWO

THE RAF IN 1939

Let him who desires peace, prepare for war.

Vegetius, c. 530–610

In common with the British Army, but unlike the Royal Navy, the headquarters for the Royal Air Force was completely separate from the operational commands. From its inception until the 1960s, the RAF had its own department of state, the Air Ministry, with a minister of cabinet rank, the Secretary of State for Air. Nevertheless, there were points in common between all three services, with each run by a board or council comprised of senior officers, politicians and civil servants.

In the case of the RAF, the ruling body was the Air Council, presided over by the Secretary of State for Air, while the head uniformed member was the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), who was commander-in-chief of the Royal Air Force, as well as having intelligence, planning and operations under his control. Two other uniformed members were the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS), who concentrated on planning, and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS), who was the link between the Air Ministry and the operational commands. The other uniformed members were the Air Member for Personnel (AMP), Air Member for Supply and Organisation (AMSO), Air Member for Training (AMT), and the Vice Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS), who was the deputy to the Chief of the Air Staff. A civilian member was the Air Member for Development and Production, but this post disappeared in May 1940 with the creation of the Ministry of Aircraft Production under Lord Beaverbrook. However, in the guise of Controller of Research and Development, this post re-emerged in 1941, its incumbent also performing the vital role of representing the Ministry of Aircraft Production on the Air Council.

The Air Council in 1939 was chaired by the Rt Hon Kingsley Wood, MP, as President of the Council, with Capt H.H. Balfour as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air, ACM Sir Cyril Newall as Chief of the Air Staff, AVM C.F.A. Portal as Air Member for Personnel, AM Sir Wilfred Freeman as Air Member for Development and Production, AVM W.L. Welsh as Air Member for Supply and Organisation, E.J.H. Lemon as Director-General of Production, and Sir Arthur Street as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Air. Deputy Chief of the Air Staff was AVM R.E.C. Peirse.

The 1936 reorganisation had split the RAF into Bomber, Fighter, Coastal, Reserve and Training Commands, but Reserve Command was absorbed by Training Command, which in turn split into Flying Training and Technical Training Commands early in the war. Wartime demands meant that new commands were established, including Army Cooperation, Balloon, Maintenance and Ferry Commands, with the last-named and the Air Transport Auxiliary together responsible for the delivery of aircraft from factories to operational units. Ferry Command was absorbed into Transport Command when that was established in 1943. Army Cooperation Command dated from 1940 to coordinate and direct air operations that were in direct support of ground forces, but disappeared in June 1943 into the Second Tactical Air Force as preparations for the Normandy landings began in earnest. While Coastal Command was very much an RAF organisation, from 1941, it was tasked to a greater or lesser extent by the Admiralty to ensure effective coordination between naval and air elements of the war at sea. On the other hand, the army’s Anti-Aircraft Command was under the operational control of Fighter Command for the air defence of the UK. The fact that Balloon Command belonged entirely to the RAF reflected the thinking that had led to the creation of the RAF in the first place, which was that if it flew, it belonged to them, and this was only starting to disappear with the return of the Fleet Air Arm to the Admiralty.

Bomber Command comprised Nos 1–6 Groups, later joined by Nos 7, 8, 80 and 100 Groups; Fighter Command had Nos 10–13 Groups; Coastal Command, Nos 15–19 Groups; Balloon Command, Nos 30–3 Groups; and Army Cooperation Command, Nos 70 and 71 Groups.

This was very much the UK headquarters structure, with another set of organisations, the overseas air forces, responsible for many day-to-day operational matters. The overseas commands included RAF Middle East, based on Cairo; RAF Mediterranean, based on Valletta; RAF Far East, based on Singapore; the Royal Air Force in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, based on Jerusalem; British Forces in Iraq, based on Habbaniya; and air forces in India (covering both RAF units and Royal Indian Air Force units), based on Simla, as well as British Forces in Aden. These differed from the home commands in that they were all-embracing, having their own fighter, bomber, army cooperation and maritime reconnaissance elements, and air transport as well, which had been an important function from the earliest days of the RAF, although for many years hybrid ‘bomber-transports’ were the mainstay. This was a marked difference from the Luftwaffe practice, in which there were no dedicated transport pilots. Instead, whenever a major airlift was needed, instructors were taken from the flying training schools.

Each command had its own air officer commanding or AOC (though if the command was substantial enough he might be an air officer commanding-in-chief), who applied the policies and priorities laid down by the Air Ministry, but was free to use his resources as he saw fit to achieve the desired results. Below him came the operational groups, usually spread over a number of stations, each with its own commanding officer, and each station had its squadrons. In Fighter Command, wings were usually interposed between the group and the squadron, essentially with three squadrons to a wing and two wings to a group. Fighter Command also had a sector structure.

There were some blurred edges. In addition to the above, there was an Air Ministry Directorate of Air-Sea Rescue within Fighter Command, but in August 1941 such operations in open waters passed to Coastal Command, while Fighter Command retained control of operations around the coast. Initially the army had responsibility for airfield security, but an RAF Regiment was formed in February 1942, although for the first two years of its existence its members wore khaki uniforms rather than air force blue. At first, they were also looked down on by the air and ground crews, who saw themselves as technical specialists and so ‘true RAF’. The formation of the RAF Regiment was largely prompted by the loss of Crete, with the invasion led by German Luftwaffe paratroops and glider-landed troops. The new organisation expanded rapidly, so that by the end of the war there were more than 220 RAF Regiment Squadrons, although the armoured car squadrons remained with the army until 1946.

CHAPTER THREE

DEFEAT AND RETREAT

We felt we had to stop the Germans if they tried to invade. I did talk to several of my [No.] 264 [Squadron] friends and comrades about that. ‘What are we going to do if the Germans do get here?’ And most of them said, ‘We have got to stop them from getting here. . . . We’ve just got to stop them.’

Sgt Frederick Gash, RAF

Unless he is defeated completely and overrun at the outset, it is an unpleasant aspect of warfare that the victor normally suffers severe setbacks in the beginning, and it can be some time before the tide turns. The Second World War was no exception to this rule. The British armed forces suffered heavy defeats in first Norway, then France, and later in Greece and North Africa. It can even be argued that while the Luftwaffe failed to destroy the Royal Air Force during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe itself chose to discontinue the battle and instead concentrate on the nightly blitz of British towns and cities throughout the autumn, winter and spring of 1940–1. Even here, given the limitations of the night-fighters of the period, lacking airborne radar at first, salvation came from Hitler’s decision to fight the war on two fronts and invade the Soviet Union, dividing and stretching his forces in the process.

War had been expected for some time, and it was widely anticipated that it would break out in late 1938, until the impasse over Czechoslovakia was resolved by the Munich Agreement. This brought a breathing space which was put to good use in re-equipping and expanding Britain’s armed forces. Unfortunately, even though it was expected that an expeditionary force would have to be dispatched to France on the outbreak of war, there were no joint exercises. Worse still, although the Belgians knew that in any future war, their country would be likely to be invaded and would depend on British and French support for survival, there were no plans prepared for Anglo-French–Belgian cooperation and, again, no exercises. The Netherlands and Norway both believed that their neutrality would be respected, as in the First World War.

History repeats itself, but it never repeats itself exactly.

THE NORWEGIAN CAMPAIGN

During the first winter of war, Bomber Command sent its aircraft on leaflet-dropping raids over Germany. Any hopes that the Germans might change their minds were dashed when Germany invaded Norway and Denmark on 9 April 1940. This was the end of the ‘phoney war’. Denmark, with a land border with Germany, was overrun quickly, but in Norway, despite the Germans’ use of air-and sea-landed troops, bad luck and the greater size of the country meant that the government was able to escape and mobilise the armed forces to resist the invaders.

The country was of immense strategic importance to both sides. Seizing both Norway and Denmark gave the Germans far easier movement between the Baltic and the Atlantic and meant that a repeat of the First World War British naval blockade became far more difficult. No less important, securing Norwegian ports meant that iron ore from Sweden could be moved all year round, which otherwise would have been difficult during the winter months when the Gulf of Bothnia froze. Norwegian airfields and naval bases meant that operations against British shipping in the North Atlantic became far easier and, although this was not apparent at the time, it would make support of the Soviet Union by British and American forces far more difficult once Operation Barbarossa got under way.

Appreciating the importance of Narvik for the movement of Swedish iron ore, the British and French governments had been planning an invasion of the port during the Russo-Finnish War of 1939–40 – the so-called ‘Winter War’. This was to be done under the guise of aiding Finland, but the plans had to be dropped after an armistice came into effect. Nevertheless, the Germans had obtained intelligence about the plans which made them determined to seize Norway, especially after the Altmark incident, in which the pocket battleship Graf Spee’s supply ship was boarded in Norwegian waters and British prisoners released by the Royal Navy. Meanwhile, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council, under pressure to do something as the ‘phoney war’ dragged on, decided that if a pretext to establish a presence in Norway could not be found, then mines should be laid in Norwegian waters to force German merchant shipping out of territorial waters and on to the high seas, where they could be legally attacked by British and French forces. While the first mines were being laid on 8 April, it became clear to the Allies that the Germans were themselves planning a major move against the two Scandinavian countries.

The invasion, when it came the following day, was a textbook example of how to mount an assault, especially on territory over which land communications could be difficult, even in high summer. Despite the loss of the cruiser Blücher to Norwegian shore batteries at Oslo, by noon the Germans were in control of Bergen, Kristiansand, Narvik, Stavanger and Trondheim.

After the Norwegian government accepted British and French promises of support, an Anglo-French expeditionary force was immediately dispatched. Before the advance formations of British and Free Polish troops arrived at Narvik on 12 April, the Royal Navy had already enjoyed success in the First Battle of Narvik and had used shore-based aircraft to sink the light cruiser Königsberg. Improvised airstrips and frozen lakes were all that the country could offer by way of airfields. With few airfields ashore and the country deep in snow, the campaign would have been well suited to the use of carrier-borne air power, had sufficient ships and high-performance aircraft been available. As it was, aircraft had to be moved by sea aboard the aircraft carrier Glorious, which took the Hurricanes of No. 46 Squadron to Norway. When the aircraft were flown off, two crashed on the soft landing ground, so the rest were moved north to Bardufoss, where they provided fighter cover for Narvik. Meanwhile, No. 263 Squadron arrived with its Gloster Gladiator biplanes, but all of these obsolete aircraft were either destroyed or badly damaged within three days. The squadron returned home to re-equip, but again still with Gladiators, so that when it returned, the outcome was much the same.

Bombing sorties were mounted from Lossiemouth by the Wellingtons of No. 9 Squadron, while No. 224 from Leuchars mounted anti-shipping strikes with its Lockheed Hudsons.

Nevertheless, these were small forces with which to contest the well-equipped Germans and clearly, British equipment was insufficient and dated. Apart from the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) already deployed to France, many fighter units were being held back in the UK in expectation of German aerial attack. Although British and French troops pushed the German forces back towards the Swedish border, it soon became clear that the air and ground forces deployed in Norway were more urgently needed in France as the German assault on the Low Countries and then France forged ahead. On 7 June, the members of Nos 46 and 263 Squadrons were ordered to destroy their remaining aircraft and join the aircraft carriers HMS Glorious and Ark Royal for the passage home. Believing that their Hurricanes were too valuable to destroy, the pilots of No. 46, without arrester hooks or carrier deck-landing training, succeeded in flying their aircraft aboard Glorious by the expedient of fitting sandbags to the tail wheels. The carrier had been chosen because her larger lifts meant that the aircraft could be ‘struck down’ safely into her hangar deck. The next day, while the ship was steaming at a leisurely pace towards Scapa Flow in Orkney, she was caught by the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, shelled and sunk. Many members of the RAF were among more than 1,500 men who died, either during the action or in the cold seas afterwards.

THE FALL OF FRANCE

In 1938 and 1939, the general expectation was that any war in Europe would follow the pattern of the First World War, with rapid German advances followed by stalemate on a new front. The French put much faith into the Maginot Line, a series of strongly defended positions stretching from the border with Switzerland to the Belgian frontier. This was part of its inherent weakness, as Belgium was exposed and weakly armed, while there had been no effective coordination of training or exercising with British and French forces. Added to this, in contrast with the previous conflict, the Germans had ignored Dutch neutrality and invaded the Netherlands.

On the day after war was declared, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had started its move to France, with an initial 152,000 men supported by an air component of twelve RAF squadrons and 9,393 personnel. In addition, the BEF was supported by the AASF drawn from No. 1 Group, Bomber Command, with ten squadrons of Fairey Battles, to which were added two squadrons of Bristol Blenheims and, later, two squadrons of Gladiators. Eventually, the BEF’s air component was to rise to four squadrons of Hurricanes, four squadrons of Blenheims and five Lysander army cooperation squadrons. When the German advance started on 10 May 1940, an additional ten Hurricane squadrons were moved to France within hours.

The force deployed was completely inadequate: not only was it numerically inferior to the forces at the disposal of the Luftwaffe, but the aircraft were all hopelessly outclassed. Although highly manoeuvrable, the Hurricane lacked the speed of the Messerschmitt Bf 109, while the Gladiator was almost a museum piece. The design of the Battle stemmed from a belief that a single-engined bomber could have the manoeuvrability of a fighter and much of its speed – but it did not. Worse yet, it had still to be appreciated that bombing raids were best conducted by a concen-tration of as many aircraft as possible to force the defences to divide their fire. Surprise was also often lacking.

As in Norway, the odds were once again stacked against the defenders. The Luftwaffe had 3,834 aircraft, including 1,482 bombers and dive-bombers, 42 ground attack aircraft, 248 fighter-destroyers or Zerstörer, and 1,016 fighters. By contrast, the RAF had 456 aircraft, of which 261 were fighters, 135 bombers and 60 reconnais-sance aircraft. Somewhat larger, the French Armée de l’Air had 1,604 aircraft, many of them also obsolete or obsolescent, of which 260 were bombers, 764 fighters, 180 reconnaissance aircraft and another 400 or so operated in army support duties. Belgium had just 180 aircraft, of which 81 were fighters, while the Netherlands had 132 aircraft, of which 35 were fighters and 23 were fighter-destroyers.

The Germans scored in both quality and quantity, and through having combat-hardened aircrew. The situation was not helped by the French insisting that neither of the two Allied air forces should press heavy bombing raids against German industry for fear of German reprisals against French targets.

It took just two days for the RAF’s bomber strength in France to be cut from 135 aircraft to 72, and of these another 40 were shot down by the third day. Bomber squadrons based in southern England also attacked the advancing German forces, but to little effect and at great cost. Typical of the actions that took place was on 12 May, when six AASF Battles, with an escort of two Hurricane fighters, were sent against the Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt bridges, across which the German forces were streaming. Four of the aircraft were shot down as they approached the targets, which were left undamaged. One of the Battles was burning ‘like a torch’ as it dropped its bombs, but its pilot, Flg Off McIntosh, managed to land it safely behind enemy lines, and the crew spent the rest of the war as prisoners. One German officer pointed out to McIntosh that they had taken the bridges early on the Friday morning, but the Germans had been left with the whole of Friday and Saturday to build up AA defences before the RAF had arrived on the Sunday.

By 21 May, the air component of the BEF was down to its last few Lysanders, while the few surviving Battles were limited to night operations to keep losses to an acceptable level. As the Germans swept through Belgium and the Netherlands, forcing British units which had ventured into Belgium back into France, the British soon started to husband scarce resources and trained aircrew for the defence of the British Isles. Two more Hurricane squadrons had been dispatched to France in response to desperate pleas from the army, but ACM Sir Hugh Dowding, AOC-in-C, Fighter Command, successfully opposed sending more, arguing that to do so would ‘bleed white’ the air defences of the United Kingdom. During the withdrawal and then the evacuation from Dunkirk, the RAF used units based in the south of England to provide air cover. Hitler had been persuaded to let the Luftwaffe finish off the British troops with their backs to the sea at Dunkirk, but at huge cost Fighter Command expended valuable resources in an attempt to ward off the Luftwaffe, even obtaining local air superiority at times, but at a heavy cost. This was despite the difficulty of providing constant fighter cover given the short range of fighter aircraft at this stage of the war. While Fighter Command could not always stop ships being bombed as they loaded troops, Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm helped by ensuring that enemy U-boats and E-boats (fast motor gunboats and torpedo-boats) were prevented from attacking the evacuation fleet.

Once Italy entered the war on 10 June, Wellingtons and Whitleys based in the south of France mounted some limited attacks against Genoa and Turin.

The aircraft of the AASF remained in France after the evacuation of Dunkirk ended, with its Blenheims and Battles continuing to make offensive sorties as the remnants of the BEF and French forces were squeezed into the Cherbourg peninsula. Only as these, too, were evacuated did the aircraft return to the UK, with the fighter squadrons acting as a rear-guard and being last to return.

In all, during the Battle of France, RAF losses totalled 931 aircraft with 1,526 casualties. Of these aircraft, 229 were from the AASF and a further 279 were from the BEF’s air component, with around 200 from Fighter Command and more than 150 from Bomber Command, while around 60 were from Coastal Command.

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

After Dunkirk, the RAF had a total of some 2,600 aircraft in the UK, facing the Luftwaffe, which had almost twice that number. The Germans also expected to be able to call upon the Italian Regia Aeronautica, although few of its squadrons did engage in operations over the UK. The planners had expected French territory to provide a buffer zone, but instead it now gave the Luftwaffe a large number of advanced bases within easy striking distance of southern England. Fighter Command used the interval between the withdrawal from France and the start of the Battle of Britain, generally regarded as being 10 August 1940, to redeploy its forces.

It was feared that Germany might next attempt an invasion of the British Isles, and this was soon confirmed when photographic reconnaissance produced evidence of a build-up of invasion barges in Channel ports. Clearly, the invasion would be preceded by an attack attempting to destroy Britain’s defences, of which the RAF was the most important part. The interlude was also used to take the war to the enemy. In May, Bomber Command had made an average of just over fifty sorties each night against airfields and other strategic targets, with another 802 daytime sorties during the month. This rose to more than eighty sorties each night during June, with another 812 daytime sorties, dropping to an average of around sixty sorties per night during July, with 616 daytime sorties for the month. Already it was becoming clear that day sorties were far costlier than those at night. In May, out of 1,617 night sorties, twenty-one aircraft were lost, while out of 802 day sorties, forty-nine aircraft were lost. In July, night sortie losses rose to forty out of 1,722 sorties, but the day sortie losses were thirty-two out of 616 sorties. The problem was that with the navigational aids available, night sorties were less likely to be successful. The landing accident rate was far higher at night.

The Luftwaffe at this time was busy settling into its newly captured bases in France, but during June, July and early August it concentrated on attacking British coastal shipping and raids on the south coast ports. Around 30,000 tons of shipping were sunk during the period, but this was out of almost a million tons using the English Channel weekly. It was some time before the Channel and the North Sea became too dangerous for British coastal convoys.

Meanwhile, Fighter Command also sent aircraft on anti-shipping strikes and attacked the closer enemy airfields. The Command had suffered from the inter-war stress on the supremacy of the bomber, which was seen at first as a deterrent against German ambitions. It was not until 1938 that Fighter Command’s needs were given the priority that they deserved, while Hurricane and Spitfire fighters only began to enter service in large numbers in 1939. Nevertheless, the mobilisation of industry and the ‘shadow’ factory system that saw many engineering firms diverted from their normal production to produce war matériel, was sufficiently successful for Fighter Command to have some sixty squadrons ready by September 1940, although many calculated that twice this number would be necessary for security, while it had some 900 aircraft, although only around 600 of these would be available at any one time. The problem was that Dowding could not risk exposing his flanks by bringing all of the squadrons deployed in Scotland and the north of England, or in the southwest of England, to protect London, the south and the Midlands. He had to make the maximum use of resources, and hope that his opponents might make mistakes, even though he was facing three of the most successful and, thanks to their earlier operations and the experience gained in the Spanish Civil War, most experienced air force commanders of the day. His one ace was the Chain Home radar network of fifty stations stretching from the east of Scotland to Cornwall, which meant that early warning was received of incoming enemy formations, together with their location up to a maximum of around 110 miles away. On the other hand, while a shortage of aircraft was never really a problem in 1940, the time taken to train pilots was to be the Achilles heel of the RAF, even with a number of Fleet Air Arm pilots seconded to RAF squadrons.

Field Marshals Kesselring and Sperrle and Gen Stumpff commanded Luftflotten 2, 3 and 5 respectively, with a total of 800 single-engined and 280 twin-engined fighters, a number of reconnaissance aircraft, 320 dive-bombers and 1,260 medium bombers. Based in Norway and Denmark, Luftflotte 5 was further away, so that its Bf 109 fighters could not escort its bombers, which would need to concentrate on the east and north-east of England. This reduced the number of fighters that the Luftwaffe could put into the air over the south of England by around a quarter.

The Luftwaffe’s basic operational unit was the Gruppe, with thirty aircraft, while Fighter Command at the time generally had twelve aircraft per squadron.

The problems for the Germans were also strategic. The Luftwaffe had not encoun-tered an enemy as well equipped as the RAF before, and had in its previous campaigns depended on close cooperation between ground and air forces to achieve the desired blitzkrieg effect. Never before had it depended on using air power in the strategic sense. During the late 1930s, development of long-range heavy bombers had been neglected in favour of larger numbers of dive-bombers and medium bombers. The Messerschmitt Bf 109 was the fastest fighter available in 1939 and 1940, and heavily armed with a cannon firing through the propeller boss, but it suffered from short range, was not as manoeuvrable as the Hurricane and Spitfire, and had a weak tail section. The Me 110 twin-engined fighter was not as agile in combat as its opponents.

In fact, the Luftwaffe failed to concentrate its full firepower on Fighter Command, its bases and its control centres, and paid little attention to the all-important radar stations. Time spent attacking Bomber Command and Coastal Command bases was wasted, as neither of these contributed to aerial supremacy in a defensive battle, and could have been picked off at leisure once Fighter Command was finished.

Nevertheless, the reality at the time was that the RAF knew that the Luftwaffe would be across the Channel in just six minutes and be over the first of Fighter Command’s No. 11 Group airfields – in south-east England – in a quarter of an hour, and while German aircraft would be picked up by radar as they massed over the French coast, it took four minutes for information from the radar station to reach the airfields, and thirteen minutes for a Spitfire to reach 20,000ft. Fears that No. 11 Group’s aircraft would be lured away by diversionary raids, and that the Luftwaffe would then destroy its airfields, were countered by No. 12 Group, covering an area stretching from Norfolk to North Yorkshire, being tasked with protecting No. 11’s airfields. It also meant that massive concentrations of fighters were not possible in case the fighters found themselves tackling a diversionary raid, so most Luftwaffe formations were met by a single squadron of fighters initially, and it was not until September that No. 11 Group started to mount attacks on the bombers with two or more squadrons, eventually building up to No. 12 Group’s ‘Big Wing’ of five squadrons with sixty aircraft, able to deploy Hurricanes to counter the German bombers and Spitfires to counter the fighter escorts.

The other two groups were No. 13 in the north of England and Scotland, and No. 10 in south-west England.

Starting on 10 August, the Battle of Britain quickly reached a peak on 12 August, with the first concerted attacks on British airfields, and the Chain Home radar station at Ventnor on the Isle of Wight being put out of action. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe failed to press home attacks on the Chain Home network. On 13 August, the operation was hit by bad weather, and it was not until 15 August that all three Luftflotten managed to coodinate their attacks, but in twenty-four hours the Luftwaffe lost seventy-five aircraft compared with thirty-four for Fighter Command. Most of the losses were from Luftflotte 5, with its Me 110 twin-engined fighters no match for the Spitfire and subsequently withdrawn from the battle.