Wartime on the Railways E-Book

David Wragg

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Lebensstil
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2012

Beschreibung

From the American Civil War onwards, railways have been an important aspect of war. So important were the railways that in the First World War, the state took control of the railways, and then repeated this exercise in the Second World War.Wartime on the Railways describes the part played by Britain's railways during the Second World War, dealing not simply with operational matters or the impact of enemy actions on the railways, but also looking at financial arrangements, the part played by railway workshops in producing equipment for the military, the wartime experience of the railways' ships, with the narrative augmented by personal accounts from railwaymen, and women as the war years saw much change. The book includes chapters on the railways during the final years of peace, and on each of the 'Big Four' companies, London Transport's underground system, the impact of wartime restrictions on travel and scheduling, the role of the railway workshops, and ports and shipping, as many railway ships were lost during the battle for France and at Dunkirk.

Leseprobe

CONTENTS

Title

List of Illustrations

Introduction

1 One Night in May

2 Railways and Warfare

3 Peace and Poverty

4 The Railways in 1939

5 The Storm Clouds Gather

6 Whose Railway is it?

7 Evacuation upon Evacuation

8 Operations in Wartime

9 Expanding the Railway

10 In the Front Line

11 Keeping the Home Fires Burning

12 Replacing the Coasters

13 ‘Oh What a Mess – the LMS’

14 Through the Heart of the Blitz

15 Counting the Cost

16 An Ungrateful Nation

Chronology

Bibliography

Plates

Copyright

LISTOF ILLUSTRATIONS

Air-raid drill, London Midland & Scottish temporary headquarters, Watford.

Signalwoman Daisy Cook.

Air-raid damage at Liverpool Street station, London.

Evacuees, Euston station.

Bomb damage, Paddington station, London.

Aftermath of an air-raid, Bank station, London, 1941.

Blackout on the Underground.

Air-raid shelter at Elephant & Castle Underground station.

Southern Railway steamer SS Isle of Jersey as a hospital ship.

Gun production at Southern Railway’s Eastleigh Works.

Wearing gas masks at work.

Spitfire MkV, Flying Scotsman.

Evacuees, Surbiton, 1944.

ABBREVIATIONS

IWM

Imperial War Museum

NRM

National Railway Museum

INTRODUCTION

There comes a time when locomotives are more important than guns.

General Erich von Ludendorff, 1918

From the American Civil War onwards, railways have always played an important part in warfare. While the first interest taken by the military in railways in Britain during the mid-nineteenth century was primarily for internal security purposes, by the end of that century the Boer War in southern Africa saw a massive movement of men and their horses via the London & South Western Railway and its port at Southampton. So important were the railways that in the First World War the state took control of them, and then repeated this exercise under somewhat more controversial arrangements on the outbreak of the Second World War.

Wartime on the Railways is an account of the part played by Britain’s railways during the Second World War, dealing not simply with operational matters or the impact of enemy action on the railways, but also looking at financial arrangements, the part played by railway workshops in producing equipment for the military and the wartime experience of the railways’ ships, with the narrative augmented by personal accounts from railwaymen. It also shows how the war years saw many jobs traditionally handled by men taken over by women. Not forgotten is the role played by the London Underground, not least in providing air-raid shelters at its deep-level Tube stations, although even these were not as safe from the Luftwaffe’s bombs as the many Londoners using them believed.

CHAPTER 1

ONE NIGHTIN MAY

On the morning of 11 May 1941, Mr Greenfield, station master at Waterloo, London’s largest railway terminus, walked along the line from his station to Clapham Junction. It was a bright and sunny spring morning, but not in London. The heavy pall of smoke that hung in the air masked the sunshine, and everywhere there fluttered fragments of burned paper from the many fires. Overwhelming everything was the choking stench of burning. Earlier, trains carrying the national morning newspapers, that were such a feature of night working at Waterloo, had had to start from the suburban main-line stations of Wimbledon and Surbiton. The daily rush of commuters had to alight at Clapham Junction and use a special replacement bus service, but this could not cope as the road leading to Waterloo was cluttered with fire hoses; at one stage, the queue for the railway replacement buses stretched for more than a mile.

The previous night, the Luftwaffe had managed to close not only Waterloo, but also the other Southern Railway termini at Victoria, London Bridge, Charing Cross and Cannon Street, as well as King’s Cross and St Pancras, the Waterloo & City Line, the Bakerloo Line, and the West End branch of the Northern Line.

In earlier centuries, warfare usually paused during the winter months as the belligerents turned their attention to surviving the worst of the weather. Growing mechanisation and new armaments meant that this changed during the twentieth century. Certainly, the winter of 1940–1 saw some of the worst weather in living memory, but it also saw the Germans continue to attack British towns and cities with unprecedented ferocity, for this was a modern war, and the prime component was air power. The German Luftwaffe had maintained its blitz of British cities from September, only missing a night if the weather intervened.

AIR RAIDS

Once spring arrived, with better weather, the prospect was of more and worse air raids, the only hope being that the shorter nights might make it more difficult for the Luftwaffe to mount heavy bombing raids over the entire country. Naturally enough, as the nation’s capital and a vital point in the transport network, London had suffered most, but the Luftwaffe had also managed to pay a visit to most other major British cities. It had even reached those that pre-war had been regarded as relatively safe, such as Belfast. On the outbreak of war, children had been evacuated from the cities seen as being most at risk – even those in the west such as Glasgow, neighbouring Clydebank, and Liverpool – which showed considerable foresight on the part of the authorities, as the Luftwaffe attacked all of these places as well.

Aerial warfare had not come as a surprise. During the years between the two world wars, the belief had grown that ‘the bomber would always get through’. Extensive air-raid precautions, or ‘ARP’ as they were commonly known, had been put in place well before the outbreak of hostilities, urged on by the fear that war might break out suddenly, with a surprise attack without a formal declaration of war. Under public pressure, the deep-level Tube stations of the London Underground had been opened up as additional air-raid shelters where people felt safe, but ‘incidents’, as serious damage by bombing was referred to in the official language of wartime, during October 1940 and January 1941 showed the public to have been over-optimistic. As early as October 1940, a bomb penetrated the Northern Line tube station at Balham in south London, bringing down part of the tunnel and killing seventy-two people, of whom sixty-eight had been seeking shelter. In January 1941, another bomb pierced the road surface outside the Bank of England and the Royal Exchange in the heart of the City of London and exploded at the top of the escalators at Bank station, blowing out the windows of two Central Line tube trains and wrecking the three escalators. Despite it being a Saturday evening and therefore quieter than on a busy week day, the explosion killed fifty-seven people and injured another sixty-nine. Other tube stations also suffered. It seemed that nowhere was safe, and that the railways were the main target after the Luftwaffe had tried, and failed, to eliminate the Royal Air Force during the Battle of Britain.

Modern warfare soon showed that it was no respecter of status or rank. Lord Stamp, President of the London Midland & Scottish, the largest business in the British Empire, who had been leading the Railway Companies Association in their negotiations with the government, which wanted to revise its arrangements for the control and use of the railways in wartime, was killed with his family in an air raid during April. Indeed, the night of 16/17 April 1941 was one of the worst of the bombing campaign. In addition to the deaths of Lord and Lady Stamp and their eldest son, there were numerous other ‘incidents’, many of them on the railways.

This was the night that a landmine fell on the Hungerford Bridge, which carried the lines from Kent from what is now known as Waterloo East across the River Thames and into the Southern Railway terminus at Charing Cross, which itself was also badly damaged by bombs. Further east along the north bank of the River Thames, the lines into two other Southern termini, Blackfriars and Holborn Viaduct, were cut when a bomb demolished the bridge over Southwark Street on the south bank. A party of men working on the bridge sought refuge in a small metal shelter, but this was caught by the blast and three of them were killed.

The direct link between Waterloo station and the City of London was the Waterloo & City Line, the only deep-level Tube line owned and operated by a railway company by this time, but this too was put out of action when a bomb damaged an electricity sub-station at the Waterloo end. Popularly known by both its regular passengers and railwaymen as ‘The Drain’, the Waterloo & City was having a bad war, despite finally being favoured with new rolling stock specially built for it. It had already been closed after being flooded.

Further north on the other side of the City, the London Passenger Transport Board’s Circle Line between Euston Square and King’s Cross, shared with the Metropolitan Line at this point, was so badly damaged by bombing that it was put out of action for five months. Further west, near Marylebone station, the London goods depot of the former Great Central Railway was razed to the ground by incendiaries.

Given the growing use of parachute mines by the Luftwaffe, as well as their usual fare of high-explosive bombs and incendiaries, it was understandable that the Royal Navy feared that acoustic mines may have been laid on the bottom of the River Thames. On 19 April, all Underground lines running beneath the Thames had to be closed for a short period and shut off from the rest of the Tube network while the river was swept for mines. It was an oversight on the part of the Germans that they didn’t find any.

THE WORST NIGHT

Waterloo station was Britain’s largest railway terminus and also headquarters of the Southern Railway, a company whose business was overwhelmingly passenger traffic. Between 1910 and 1920 the station had been extensively rebuilt, becoming the world’s first major terminus designed around the needs and the potential of the electric train.

In 1941, Waterloo handled trains for the south coast of England from Hampshire through to Devon, and then for the north coasts of both Devon and Cornwall, as well as suburban services to the western end of Surrey, Middlesex and Berkshire. Waterloo was the station for the soldier wishing to reach Aldershot, the home of the British Army, or its training grounds on Salisbury Plain. It was also the station for the sailor heading for Portsmouth or Gosport, although the matelot would have had the choice of the Southern or the Great Western if he was travelling to Portland or Plymouth. Waterloo was much less concerned with the airman, unless, of course, he was a naval one.

Approached from the road, Waterloo soared high above the surrounding buildings. It was reached by lines running mainly on viaduct and itself sat on top of large storage arches. It was a passenger station, with its goods traffic handled a short distance away at Nine Elms. Even in peacetime, not all of Waterloo’s ‘passengers’ were alive; Waterloo included a Necropolis station for trains carrying the dead to Brookwood, a nineteenth-century development brought about as the growing metropolis outgrew its traditional burial grounds. In London, even the dead had to commute.

On the night of 10/11 May 1941, Waterloo was hit by at least fifty-one high-explosive and incendiary bombs and parachute mines. These set fires blazing and destroyed the Necropolis station. Worse, they penetrated the station floor and went down into the basement arches which were being used as a store for spirits. The resulting conflagration was such that the station was soon closed. The spirit store was not the only loss, as post office vans, motor horse boxes and even the chairman’s car were all lost. The fire began soon after midnight and burned uncontrolled for two hours, as there was no water because the mains in Waterloo Road and York Road had burst. Some water was obtained from the locomotive supply at the station, but by 9 a.m. this was dry. When a fire brigade fire-fighting barge in the River Thames tried to direct its water jets towards the station, the supply proved intermittent. Another supply was discovered in the Waterloo & City Line sidings, and a pump was found, but it proved difficult to get the pump to the water. Eventually a crane was found and the pump was lowered from the surface workshops for the Waterloo & City. The water was pumped up 30ft, and then other pumps had to relay the water to the fire. Even then, while the fires in and around the station were gradually subdued, those in the arches continued and were not finally dampened down until 15 May. In the meantime, the station remained closed. It could only be partially reopened on 15 May, and it was mid-July before the terminus was fully operational again.

Far beneath the station, burst water mains meant that the Waterloo & City Line did not simply close with the terminus above. It was flooded so badly that it remained closed until 22 May.

On the other side of the river, Charing Cross had also had an eventful night. It all started when a high-explosive bomb landed on the Charing Cross Hotel at 1.50 a.m. and around a hundred incendiaries landed on the station itself, setting off fires everywhere with three trains blazing in the station and another on fire on Hungerford Bridge. Anticipating trouble, the station’s fire-fighting team already had their pump armed up and ready, but they then had to climb on the roofs of the carriages of the trains in the station to fight the fires. They managed to douse all the flames by 3.10 a.m.

In the meantime, between 2 a.m. and 3 a.m., a porter had discovered a landmine hanging with its parachute entangled in the ironwork of the Hungerford Bridge, close to the signal-box with the signalman still working inside it. At around the same time, a fresh fire was noticed under platform 4. The telephones were out of action and a messenger had to be sent to fetch the fire brigade. While they were waiting for the fire brigade, the fire under platform 4 started to edge towards the landmine. The order was given to evacuate the station, but the railwaymen fighting the fire decided to press on. Meanwhile, the signalman, a man of 67 years with fifty-two years’ service on the railway, stuck to his post, returning to the box after extinguishing two incendiaries on the bridge. Eventually, the fire brigade arrived and by the time they had extinguished the blaze it was just 12ft from the landmine.

The landmine itself was dealt with by a naval officer who arrived with three ratings. The officer needed to communicate with the Admiralty at one point, and had to walk there and back! The landmine was defused by 10.30 a.m., and then was lifted by crane and taken away. At this stage they discovered that it weighed more than 3,100lb.

While this was going on, Cannon Street, the Southern Railway’s main terminus for the City, was also being bombed. The station had restricted opening hours during the war, and at night was used to store rolling stock. Here, the bombs had started to fall at about 11 p.m., again with a combination of high explosive and incendiaries. The station foreman and a lineman had to step onto the bridge over the River Thames to put out incendiaries. On their return, they discovered that two bombs had fallen by a platform and incendiaries had set the station roof alight, while the station hotel was also on fire. The bombs destroyed the station’s all-over roof, and so damaged the supporting walls that later the roof could not be reinstated. Railwaymen had to brave pieces of the roof falling onto them to rescue locomotives and carriages, but as one of the locomotives, St Lawrence, steamed out to the comparative safety of the bridge over the Thames, it too was caught by a bomb and destroyed. Another bomb missed the bridge and exploded in the river, sending water spurting over the signal-box.

Also in the City, another Southern terminus, Holborn Viaduct, was hit by bombs. They hit both the station itself and the adjoining hotel building, which by this time was being used as offices. The resultant fire completely gutted the station and, despite the normal frantic wartime pace of repair and reconstruction, including a temporary booking office, it could not be used again by trains until 1 June.

THE SOUTHERNWASNOT ALONE

The Southern Railway was not the only victim that night. Two of the other main-line companies, the London Midland & Scottish (LMS) and the London & North Eastern Railway (LNER), also suffered.

The main LNER terminus at King’s Cross was struck early in the morning of 11 May by two 1,000lb bombs chained together. These hit the west side of the station, demolishing part of the general offices, a grill room and a bar, completely destroying the booking hall. Twelve men were killed. Despite this destruction, it was a Sunday and fewer trains than usual were running, so it was not necessary to close the station. In addition to clearing up the rubble and making repairs, temporary booking and refreshment facilities were soon ready.

The situation at St Pancras across the road separating it from King’s Cross was far worse. The LMS terminus had already lost a large part of its roof in an earlier landmine explosion, but during the night of 10/11 May, a bomb penetrated the floor of the station at the inner end of platform 3, passed through the vaults used for storing beer, and exploded close to the railway tunnel below. The main-line station itself was closed for eight days, but platforms 2 and 3 could not be used again until early June.

The damage that night was not confined to the major London termini. Elsewhere on the Southern Railway, the station at Elephant & Castle was badly damaged, with the island platform and up local platforms burned out. Repairs here were given a lower priority than at the major termini, so it was not until a temporary up main platform was built that the station could reopen on 1 September.

At Waterloo, the damage also had an impact on the London Underground, closing the Bakerloo Line and the West End branch of the Northern Line.

Those involved were not to know that relief was at hand. The period of nightly heavy bombing was coming to an end, as the bulk of the Luftwaffe was diverted eastwards for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 2

RAILWAYSAND WARFARE

Someone once declared that the railways were the sole invention that had been of unquestioned benefit to mankind. The contrast was being made with the aeroplane, as much an instrument of war as a mode of transport in peacetime. It was certainly true that the railways did not seek a role for themselves in warfare, while the Admiralty and the War Office were initially deliberately hostile to the approach of the railways at Portsmouth and Shoeburyness respectively. On the other hand, a straw in the wind was that as early as 1842 legislation was passed that allowed the government emergency powers over the railways.

At the time, the primary reason for this growing government interest in the railways was internal security. It was not until invasion fears arose again in 1859 that consideration was given to the use of the railways in wartime. There was even the proposal that London should have a circular line built around it so that armoured trains carrying artillery could defend the capital. Sadly, this proposal for an ‘iron road M25’ came to nothing, as it could have been very useful in peacetime as well as during war. The nation’s capital might have North, South, Western Extension and East London lines, but these do not interconnect, and, except for the East and North London lines, would have difficulty in doing so.

None of this should be too surprising as the American Civil War raged between 1861 and 1865, and showed that the railways were of supreme importance to army commanders. One reason why this was America’s bloodiest war – apart from the obvious one that it was Americans fighting Americans – was that army commanders could have the men and the materiel that they wanted, wherever they wanted it and when they wanted it. What was more, troops arrived ready to fight, rather than tired from a lengthy forced march. It was easier to keep armies supplied, and the size of armies grew as it became possible to cope with their massive appetites for food and ammunition. On the plus side, the wounded could also be moved away more speedily and with less risk of further injury from being bounced around in a wagon over indifferent roads.

Before long, Parliamentary scrutiny of legislation authorising new lines began to take defence requirements into account. Having originally rejected the London Tilbury & Southend Railway’s extension to Shoeburyness in 1877, the War Office accepted the extension in 1882. The military was anxious that its ability to move men and war materiel rapidly would not be hampered by unnecessary problems on the railways, such as a break of gauge. This meant that the War Office joined those opposed to the Great Western Railway’s broad gauge, which had upset many, mainly freight shippers, over the years. However, by this time not only were the days of the broad gauge already numbered, but the GWR also had a growing standard gauge network as well.

This concept of a standard gauge did not stop a British army engineer giving the railways in Ireland a different gauge, however. The story goes that he had to choose between a gauge of 5ft, as on the Great Eastern initially, and one of 5ft 6in, and decided to compromise at 5ft 3in. The mainland standard gauge seems to have been completely overlooked. The best one can say about this decision was that it was taken before the days of train ferries!

Even so, the emergency powers available at this time simply gave the government of the day the authority to direct how the railways should be run, leaving operational control in the hands of the companies. This remained the case with the legislation of 1844 and 1867, and even with the Regulation of the Forces Act 1871. Further recognition of the importance of the railways to the military included the creation of the Engineer & Railway Staff Volunteer Corps in 1865, so that experienced railwaymen would be on hand when needed. In 1896, an Army Railway Council was established, which later became the War Railway Council.

When war eventually did come, it was far off and no real threat was posed to the security of the United Kingdom. The railways had played a minor role in the Crimean War, although its supply needs swallowed up shipping. It was the Boer War that saw the British Army make extensive use of the railways, but this was confined to the workings of one company, the London & South Western Railway (LSWR), with the majority of troops sent to Southampton to embark for South Africa between 1899 and 1902 travelling through London’s Waterloo station, while the cavalry took their horses with them through Nine Elms. This was no light task. Over three years, no fewer than 528,000 men were moved over the LSWR to Southampton, and in one of the first highly mobile wars, fought before the internal combustion engine achieved reliability, a substantial number of horses were carried as well.

Nevertheless, in contrast with the two global conflicts of the twentieth century, throughout the Boer War the LSWR remained under the control of its own management.

The big lesson of the Boer War was that concentrating so much traffic on London was inefficient, and in the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the railway links between the coast and the military training and rear concentration areas on Salisbury Plain were improved.

While wartime demands could place a major strain on the railways, it was also the case that railway companies with major defence installations along their lines benefited from the traffic so generated. A good example was the so-called ‘Portsmouth Direct’, the line running between Waterloo and Portsmouth via Guildford. As weekenders returned to Waterloo on a Sunday evening, their trains were eagerly awaited by naval personnel returning to their ships after a weekend in town. It was rare, and remains so, for any railway to have its trains fully occupied in both directions at the same time of day.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

War in Europe was unwelcome, while the manner of its coming was not anticipated but was widely expected. In political as well as business life it was an interruption to the normal state of affairs. The Liberal government had begun to consider nationalisation of the railways, but this was put aside as war loomed. Nevertheless, the state took far more extensive powers over the railways than had ever been anticipated, with the President of the Board of Trade, whose department was responsible for the railways, as well as ports and shipping, taking control of the railways and acting as nominal chairman of the Railway Executive Committee (REC), formed as early as 1912, to run the railways on behalf of the government. Membership of the REC included the general managers of the ten most important railway companies, and one of their number, Herbert Ashcombe Walker, general manager of the London & South Western Railway since 1910, was chosen as acting chairman, despite being one of the youngest general managers. It could have been the LSWR’s experience of the demands of the military during the Boer War that had resulted in Walker becoming acting chairman, or it could have been the common-sense argument that since so much traffic would travel over the company’s metals and it owned the port of Southampton, that it would be best placed to coordinate matters and liaise with both the Army and the Royal Navy. Either way, everything suggests that Walker was a great success in this post, for which he received a knighthood in 1917.

The REC’s remit initially only covered railways in Great Britain, and it was not until 1917 that the Irish railway companies also came under its control – Ireland at that time being united and all of it part of the United Kingdom. Only one of the Irish railways, the Northern Counties Committee, was owned by a ‘mainland’ railway, the Midland Railway. The Great Southern & Western had a close relationship with the Great Western Railway, but it was a working relationship, not a financial arrangement. Control of the railways in Ireland was necessary not just for the war effort, but also because of the deteriorating internal security situation.

Of course, the LSWR had no monopoly of cross-Channel traffic, which was also shared with three other railway companies, the Great Eastern (GER), the South Eastern & Chatham (SECR), with its ports at Dover and Folkestone, and the London, Brighton & South Coast Railway (LBSCR), with its port at Newhaven. The LSWR operated cross-Channel and Channel Islands services from Southampton, while the Great Western also operated to the Channel Islands from Weymouth. While these cross-Channel routes put the companies in the front line, it was also important to remember that other shipping services were bringing men and horses across the Irish Sea, with Ireland an important source for both at the time, while the entire railway network was pressed into service to meet the needs of industry as well as the armed forces. There was some innovation during the First World War, with train ferries introduced between a new port at Richborough in Kent and France to help speed deliveries of rolling stock. This was not the first train ferry, as the concept had been pioneered many years earlier with a short-lived service between Hayling Island and Bembridge on the Isle of Wight, but it was the first practical application.

Few had any real idea of how modern warfare would affect the railways. The shelling of east coast towns by German naval forces was not unexpected, although no one had really considered by just how much naval gunnery had increased in potency over the previous century. Only a few considered attack from the air to be a serious threat, but as early as October 1914 the SECR had a lookout posted on Hungerford Bridge, carrying the line from London Bridge and what is now Waterloo East (then known as Waterloo Junction) into Charing Cross. The lookout was not expecting bombers but raiding Zeppelin airships, and if one was spotted no trains were to be allowed onto the bridge.

In fact, there was little damage to the railways from bombing during the First World War, despite their being recognised by both sides as legitimate and significant targets. Aircraft were in their infancy, and even a Zeppelin could only carry a limited load. Most of the action affected Liverpool Street. On the night of 8/9 September 1915, several bombs fell on the station, damaging the suburban and through lines, and fracturing a water main that flooded the suburban tracks. Nevertheless, partly because of the small size of the bombs, repairs were put in hand and a full service was restored by 11 a.m. on 9 September. The bombs also demolished a wall and shattered glass at Broad Street next door, where some horses were injured.

From the railway point of view, the most significant incident was in London during the air raid of 13 June 1917. The City of London was the target that day, and again three bombs landed on the Great Eastern’s terminus at Liverpool Street: one of the bombs was a dud and failed to explode, another exploded on a platform and a third hit the dining car of the noon express to King’s Lynn and Hunstanton, setting it alight. Two carriages between platforms 8 and 9 were being used for medical examinations, and these were smashed. All in all, sixteen people were killed and another thirty-six wounded, making it one of the worst bombing casualty rates in England during the First World War.

With commendable forethought, during the First World War the Great Northern Railway at King’s Cross used Gas Works Tunnel as a shelter for main-line trains whenever enemy aircraft approached. This was perhaps the only benefit that the tunnel bestowed on the station, and, as would happen, the station was untroubled by German bombing during the war. This was just as well, as a massive volume of freight traffic passed through the station on its way to the SECR, including trainloads of explosives for the British forces fighting in France. A bomb hitting an ammunition train in the centre of a crowded metropolis was not something to have been taken lightly.

While we are concerned with Britain’s railways, it is worth noting that the situation here was in complete contrast to the air raids on German marshalling yards in northern France and Belgium. Being situated closer to the enemy railway system, the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps were able to inflict considerable damage on German communications in the final year of the war.

QUINTINSHILL

Unfortunately, accidents were a far more serious threat to the railways and those using them than enemy action. On 22 May 1915, Britain suffered its worst-ever railway disaster, with five trains involved, at least 227 people killed and another 245 injured. Most of those who died were soldiers on their way to France from Scotland, and as their unit records were destroyed in the fire that engulfed the wreckage, completely accurate figures have never become available.

The accident occurred at Quintinshill, near Carlisle, on the Caledonian Railway, although this was just another company within the ambit of the REC at the time. At Quintinshill, the signal-box covered not just the main line but also two passing loops to allow expresses to overtake the slower goods trains and local stopping trains. At the time both loops were occupied by goods trains, so that a northbound local train had to be reversed onto the southbound main line to allow what was in effect two expresses, running as one long train double-headed, to pass it on their way to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Unfortunately the local train was promptly forgotten about by the signalman. Towards this unhappy scene, a crowded troop train raced downhill from Beattock, with twenty-one carriages, mainly elderly six-wheelers largely of wooden construction and with gas lighting. It struck the local train with such force that it was compressed to a quarter of its original length. Worse was to follow, as the double-headed northbound expresses ran into the wreckage before they could stop. Glowing coals from the locomotive fireboxes created an inferno as they ignited the ruptured gas pipes for the lighting of the troop train. The resultant fire was so severe that it did not die down for twenty-four hours.

The background to the accident was that the night signalman had been due to hand over to his relief at 6 a.m., but the relief travelled on the local passenger train from Gretna and did not arrive until 6.30 a.m. The relief signalman had in fact arrived in the box at the time of the accident, but instead of taking over his duties he was busily engaged in writing up the register of train movements from 6 a.m. onwards in his own hand to hide the fact that he had been late for duty. The signal-box was also by this time fairly crowded with some of the crews of the two goods trains, while the fireman from the local train was there to sign the register to state that his train was standing on the upline. Unfortunately, the fireman omitted to ensure that the signalman had put reminder collars on the lever of the signal protecting the train. The signalman also failed to send a signal, using a bell code, to the next signal-box to the north at Kirkpatrick, which could have stopped the troop train. Worse, he accepted the troop train and then offered it to Gretna. The stage was set for a major accident.

The accident did little to endear the railways to the public. The troop train was composed of obsolete rolling stock set aside for the purpose with little protection for the occupants in even a minor accident. While both signalmen were negligent and convicted of manslaughter, the real culprit was the railway company, which had failed to pay for any form of automatic train control.

STATE CONTROL

The objective of state control of the railways was to ensure that the system operated as one. In one sense, this was an excessive measure as the pre-war railways had coordinated themselves very well indeed, partly through the workings of the Railway Clearing House, which did more than simply balance inter-company tickets and freight receipts. Several companies could, and did, collaborate, especially to ensure the smooth through running of the Anglo-Scottish expresses, of which the most complicated was that from Aberdeen to Penzance, a distance of well over 800 miles.

What did emerge, however, was a system that enabled resources to be directed to wherever they might be most needed, rather than companies keeping their equipment to themselves while another part of the system suffered under wartime pressures. One of these pressures was, of course, the fact that many railwaymen had volunteered to join the armed forces, while others were mobilised because of their reserve obligations. In fact, during the First World War, no fewer than 184,475, 45 per cent of railwaymen of military age, had enlisted. The military had also helped itself to locomotives and rolling stock for service as far away as Mesopotamia.

Despite cutting or reducing many ordinary services to free men and equipment for military use, there were increased pressures on the system over and above the obvious need for troop trains. Unforeseen by the planners on the outbreak of war was that the role of coastal shipping, in peacetime so important for the movement of bulk commodities such as coal, was severely restricted by enemy activity in the North Sea and the English Channel.

Few warships were fuelled by oil at this stage in the Royal Navy’s history, because of fears that sufficient oil might not be available in wartime. The Grand Fleet had moved to its forward wartime base at Scapa Flow in Orkney, not the most convenient location for supply by railway, and so coal had to be carried from South Wales to Grangemouth, where it was transferred to coastal shipping, on the so-called ‘Jellicoe Specials’, named after the commanding admiral. No fewer than 13,630 coal trains were run for this purpose alone between August 1914 and March 1919, with Pontypool Road on the Great Western Railway being the main loading point. Grangemouth had to be the main trans-shipment point because further north the railways, with most of the route mileage single track, could not have coped, and there were insufficient port facilities in the far north of Scotland. Despite the shortcomings of the largely single-tracked line north of Perth, naval manpower was moved further north by rail, putting the Highland Railway under great strain between Perth and Inverness and then north to Thurso. This required ‘naval specials’ to be operated every night, covering the 717 miles from Euston to Thurso in twenty-one and a half hours, an average speed of just over 33 miles per hour!

Such was the volume of traffic across the Channel that a new port had to be built at Richborough, close to Sandwich in Kent, despite the closure to civilian traffic of both Dover and Folkestone. Train ferries were introduced to carry war materiel across the Channel, and also to help move locomotives and rolling stock. More than 600 locomotives were pressed into military service overseas, as the half inch or so difference between British and French track gauges mattered little. Routine operations were severely affected as railway workshops were converted to help with the war effort, including the manufacture of armaments, while rolling stock was converted to provide ambulance trains. Some minor railway lines, as far apart as near Dumfries in the south-west of Scotland and at Southsea on the south coast, were closed in wartime never to reopen, but the creation of new manufacturing plant, such as an ordnance factory near Gretna close to the border between Scotland and England, also meant that additional facilities had to be created quickly.

The number of line closures was in fact relatively limited and the impact on the community very slight, but economy in manpower, fuel and materials all meant that services elsewhere had to be reduced. There were fewer trains, and as the Gretna accident showed, many were lengthened or combined, while overall speeds were reduced, although none of these measures was as restrictive as those imposed during the Second World War. Dining car and sleeping car provision was also reduced, but again, the cuts were not as severe as those that came in the early 1940s and these facilities never quite disappeared completely. First-class travel survived the war years, even on inner suburban lines and those parts of the London Underground offering this facility, but eventually cheap day return tickets were withdrawn to discourage leisure travel.

New, rebuilt or reconditioned steam locomotives appeared in a drab grey colour scheme, or perhaps ‘colourless scheme’, although one would have thought that all-over black would have been just as utilitarian and perhaps more serviceable.

Despite it being a truly global war, the main centre of activity was in Europe, and the greatest pressure fell on the Channel ports, with first Dover and then Folkestone closed to civilian traffic. The South Eastern & Chatham Railway became Britain’s front-line railway, with the heaviest responsibility for the movement of men and materials to the coast. In London, Charing Cross also had the role of being Westminster’s local station, and a special train, code-named Imperial A, was held ready at all times for VIP journeys to the coast, being used for 283 journeys during the war years. This was a short-formed but luxurious operation, usually consisting of just a Pullman car and a brake composite. A military staff officers’ train operated daily from Charing Cross to Folkestone, leaving at 12.20.

At the other end of the scale, Charing Cross was the arrival point for many of the casualties of war. Perhaps the best example of this was on 7 June 1917. After the start of the Battle of Messines at dawn, the first wounded arrived at Charing Cross at 2.15 p.m. the same day.

Nevertheless, the state was in the position of having power over the railways, but without any long-term responsibility for their technical or financial health. It was to prove to be a short-sighted and improvident proprietor. Had the state been an active operator with the interest of the railway network in mind, it could have diverted resources to easing many of the bottlenecks emerging on the system under wartime pressures.

Financially, the war years were a disaster for the railway companies. This was despite the levels of compensation being based on pre-war earnings, as the years immediately before the outbreak of war had been ones of prosperity for the United Kingdom, and the railways had shared in this. Post-war, one general manager noted that the combined profits for the railway companies in 1913 had totalled £45 million, but that by 1920 these had dropped to less than £7 million, owing to improved rates of pay during First World War when the railways were under direct government control. By 1921, immediately before government control ceased, the railways were running at a loss overall of around £9 million. Part of the reason was almost certainly the cost of manpower. Railway wages in 1913 had totalled £47 million, but by 1920 had risen to £160 million. This was a clear example of the state having power without responsibility. It is also possible that this poor financial position was one reason why calls for nationalisation were dropped.

LONGMOOR MILITARY RAILWAY

The importance of the railways during the First World War was such that the military built a network of narrow-gauge lines behind the Western Front to move supplies and troops. The lessons were learned by all the belligerents, but post-war only the victors were in a position to do anything about it, even though funds were short.

Almost as a postscript to the British Army’s experience of railway operation and the importance of railways in wartime was the Longmoor Military Railway (LMR). This was one of the most significant military railways to survive between the two wars. Originally founded as the Woolmer Instructional Railway for training members of the Royal Engineers in railway operation and maintenance, the LMR also had the potential to serve the large base area around Bordon in Hampshire. It linked the Waterloo to Portsmouth main line, known in railway circles as the ‘Portsmouth Direct’, at Liss with a branch line at Bordon, and in between a substantial network developed. The line was sufficiently important to have been kept open by the British Army, which by this time had created a Royal Corps of Transport, until 1970.

In its heyday the LMR operated a stud of tender locomotives and a number of 0–6–0ST, or saddle tanks, with ex-civilian railway passenger carriages painted blue. All of the locomotives, no matter how humble, were named. Many of them were bargains, including 0–6–2T Thisbe, acquired by the Woolmer Instructional Railway in 1914 after its original owners, the Shropshire Light Railway, found it too heavy for their needs.

Other military railways included one on Salisbury Plain.