Securing Transportation Systems E-Book
88,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Sprache: Englisch
Addresses a variety of challenges and solutions within the transportation security sphere in order to protect our transportation systems
• Provides innovative solutions to improved communication and creating joint operations centers to manage response to threats
• Details technological measures to protect our transportation infrastructure, and explains their feasibility and economic costs
• Discusses changes in travel behavior as a response to terrorism and natural disaster
• Explains the role of transportation systems in supporting response operations in large disasters
• Written with a worldwide scope
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 801
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015
Ähnliche
CONTENTS
COVER
TITLE PAGE
CONTRIBUTORS LIST
FOREWORD
PREFACE
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 OVERVIEW
1.2 MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS TARGETING TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
1.3 THE ROLE OF TRANSPORTATION IN EVACUATION
1.4 MARKET FAILURE LEADING TO A NEW MODEL OF PPP
1.5 SECURITY STRATEGY
1.6 BOOK STRUCTURE AND CHAPTERS
1.7 CONCLUSION: RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND POLICY IMPLICATION
REFERENCES
SECTION I: MOTIVATION AND CHALLENGES
2 TERRORIST TARGETING OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION: IDEOLOGY AND TACTICS
2.1 BACKGROUND
2.2 THE HISTORY OF TERRORIST-MOTIVATED HIJACKING
2.3 ISLAMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR ATTACKS ON MASS TRANSPORTATION
2.4 CONCLUSION
REFERENCE
FURTHER READING
3 ON THE RATIONALITY AND OPTIMALITY OF TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS DEFENSE: A NETWORK CENTRALITY APPROACH
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.2 RELATED WORK
3.3 TRANSPORTATION NETWORK DATASET
3.4 BC
VERSUS
TRAFFIC FLOW
3.5 OPTIMIZING THE LOCATIONS OF SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING STATIONS
3.6 APPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKERS
3.7 CASE STUDY: ATTACK SCENARIOS IN THE ISRAELI NETWORK
3.8 CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
4 ADAPTIVE RESILIENCE AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: EMERGENT CHALLENGES FOR TRANSPORTATION AND CYBERPHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
4.1 INTRODUCTION: ADAPTIVE RESILIENCE
4.2 TRANSPORTATION SECTOR SECURITY
4.3 EMERGENT THREATS AND COMPLEX CHALLENGES FOR TRANSPORTATION
4.4 CONCLUSION: TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AT A CROSSROADS
REFERENCES
5 TRAVELERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY FOR LONG-DISTANCE TRAVEL: AN EXPLORATORY ITALIAN STUDY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
5.3 METHODOLOGY
5.4 THE ITALIAN CASE STUDY
5.5 CONCLUSION
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REFERENCES
6 SECURING TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS FROM RADIOLOGICAL THREATS
6.1 THE THREAT
6.2 RADIATION SOURCES AND THEIR DETECTION
6.3 RADIATION THREAT SCENARIOS
6.4 POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE
6.5 TECHNOLOGY AND ASSOCIATED CONOPS
6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
7 PROTECTING TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL THREAT
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.2 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
7.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
7.4 SUMMARY
REFERENCES
SECTION II: SECURITY CONSIDERATION FOR MODES OF TRANSPORTATION
8 SECURING PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEMS
8.1 INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSIT SECURITY
8.2 TYPOLOGY OF TRANSIT TERRORISM
8.3 INCIDENCE OF TRANSIT TERRORISM
8.4 SECURING TRANSIT FROM TERRORISM
8.5 COMPATIBILITY OF ANTITERROR AND ANTICRIME STRATEGIES
8.6 CONCLUSION
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REFERENCES
9 RAILROAD INFRASTRUCTURE: PROTECTING AN INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE ASSET
9.1 INTRODUCTION
9.2 RAIL VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
9.3 SECURING RAIL OPERATIONS
9.4 STEPS TO ENHANCE SECURITY
9.5 CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
10 FREIGHT RAILROAD SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF POST-9/11 EFFECTIVENESS
10.1 INTRODUCTION
10.2 RESEARCH METHOD
10.3 FINDINGS
10.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
10.5 CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
11 COST-EFFECTIVE AIRPORT SECURITY POLICY
11.1 INTRODUCTION
11.2 ANALYZING AVIATION SECURITY MEASURES
11.3 HOW RISK BASED ARE CURRENT SECURITY POLICIES?
11.4 TOWARD A MORE RISK-BASED APPROACH
11.5 ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF PROVIDING AIRPORT SECURITY
11.6 PAYING FOR AIRPORT SECURITY
11.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
12 SEAPORT OPERATIONS AND SECURITY
12.1 SEAPORTS IN THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN
12.2 SEAPORT INFRASTRUCTURE
12.3 SEAPORT SECURITY STRATEGY
12.4 SECURITY TECHNOLOGY
12.5 SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY
12.6 RESEARCH NEEDS
REFERENCES
13 PATHOLOGIES OF PRIVATIZATION IN THE TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL PROGRAM
13.1 INTRODUCTION
13.2 PATHOLOGIES OF PRIVATIZATION
13.3 EVALUATION
13.4 CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
14 TRAVELER’S SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND PORT CHOICES
14.1 INTRODUCTION
14.2 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
14.3 CASE STUDY: THE PORT OF CHIOS
14.4 A PORT CHOICE MODEL
14.5 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
REFERENCES
15 PIPELINE SECURITY
15.1 INTRODUCTION
15.2 INTENTIONAL ACTS
15.3 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR PIPELINE SECURITY
15.4 SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES
15.5 SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT AND COUNTERMEASURES SELECTION
15.6 CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
SECTION III: THE ROLE OF TRANSPORTATION IN EVACUATION
16 EVACUATION FROM DISASTER ZONES: LESSONS FROM RECENT DISASTERS IN AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN
16.1 INTRODUCTION
16.2 EMERGENCY EVACUATION: PLANNING AND PRACTICE
16.3 CASE 1: RISING HEAT IN AUSTRALIA (2009)
16.4 CASE 2: MULTIHAZARDS STRIKE SEQUENTIALLY AND WITHOUT WARNING IN JAPAN (2011)
16.5 SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
REFERENCES
17 EVACUATION PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS IN THE AFTERMATH OF KATRINA, RITA, IRENE, AND SANDY: LESSONS LEARNED
17.1 INTRODUCTION
17.2 COMPONENTS OF A PREFERRED EVACUATION PLAN
17.3 EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY PLANS AND ACTIVITIES
17.4 SUGGESTIONS ON IMPROVEMENTS, NEW METHODS, AND MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
17.5 CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
18 RURAL EVACUATION AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
18.1 INTRODUCTION
18.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
18.3 SACRAMENTO REGION EMERGENCY RESPONSE CASE STUDY
18.4 HURRICANE SANDY COASTAL COUNTIES EVACUATION CASE STUDY
18.5 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER DISCUSSION
REFERENCES
INDEX
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
List of Tables
Chapter 03
TABLE 3.1 Structural properties (Israeli transportation network)
Chapter 04
TABLE 4.1 DHS 7 US transportation system subsectors
TABLE 4.2 DHS Critical Infrastructure Resource Center: Responsible federal agency and critical infrastructure (CI) sector
Chapter 05
TABLE 5.1 Overview of socioeconomic data
TABLE 5.2 Frequency of transport mode use
Chapter 06
TABLE 6.1 Comparison of radiation detector properties
TABLE 6.2 Neutron detector materials
TABLE 6.3 Radiation units
Chapter 07
TABLE 7.1 The most common radioactive materials used in the world, their most common applications, and their nuclear properties
TABLE 7.2 Activities corresponding to selected radiation source D value categories
Chapter 08
TABLE 8.1 Security-oriented design strategies for transit stations
Chapter 09
TABLE 9.1 Classification of threats to railroads
Chapter 10
TABLE 10.1 Findings from direct observations
Chapter 11
TABLE 11.1 Airport screening provision in Europe, 2011
Chapter 14
TABLE 14.1 Port choice stated preference scenarios
TABLE 14.2 Discrete choice model estimation results.
Chapter 15
TABLE 15.1 Geographical distribution of terroristic attacks to oil pipelines
TABLE 15.2 Available countermeasures
Chapter 17
TABLE 17.1 The components of a successful evacuation plan
Chapter 18
TABLE 18.1 Hurricane Sandy evacuation operation of coastal counties of New Jersey
List of Illustrations
Chapter 03
FIGURE 3.1 Power law distribution of congestion.
FIGURE 3.2 Incoming versus outgoing flow for each node.
FIGURE 3.3 Exponential distribution of traffic flow through nodes.
FIGURE 3.4 Power law distribution of betweenness centrality.
FIGURE 3.5 Correlation of flow through nodes and betweenness centrality showing a consistent positive correlation between increase in the betweenness centrality and the outgoing flow. (a) BC classical definition. (b) BC w.r.t. OD matrix. (c) BC w.r.t. OD matrix and free-flow travel time. (d) BC w.r.t. OD matrix, free-flow, and congested travel time.
FIGURE 3.6 Squared error (
R
2
) as the function of the free-flow traffic fraction (
α
).
FIGURE 3.7 Correlation of flow through nodes and betweenness computed separately for different
types
of links.
FIGURE 3.8 The total net traffic flow that passes by monitors as a functions of the number of monitors. As expected, the marginal value of additional monitors gradually decreases as more of them are added, reaching potential traffic coverage of 30% when 39 monitoring stations are deployed.
FIGURE 3.9 The time (in seconds) that the search algorithms were executed as a function of the number of monitors.
FIGURE 3.10 The minimal quality of the solution (fraction of the upper bound) as a function of the number of monitors.
FIGURE 3.11 The figure presents the results of deployment optimization performed on the Israeli transportation network with average travel times computed using state-of-the-art traffic assignment model. The flows and the utility of the deployment were estimated using
betweenness centrality
(BC) and
group betweenness centrality
(GBC) models and compared also to the random deployment model. Whereas the
BC
algorithm had chosen the locations for monitoring units according to the most central intersection based on their BC values, the
GBC
deployment was a greedy algorithm that tried to maximize the net number of vehicles passing by the monitors. The benefits of the
GBC
strategy are clearly shown, as well as the ability to extrapolate this correlation between the number of monitoring units and monitored traffic percentage, in order to find the minimal number of monitoring units required in order to guarantee certain levels of coverage.
FIGURE 3.12 An illustration of the function that may be used as a model of the simulative results that are presented in Figure 3.11.
FIGURE 3.13 The optimal number of monitoring units as a function of the ratio between the cost of a single monitoring unit and the cost of a successful attack (assuming the regression of the traffic coverage function to the function ).
FIGURE 3.14 The optimal number of monitoring units for three different types of units, ranging from $1000 through $5000 to $20,000 in price, using the normalized benefit model. The charts illustrate the results of the model for five different attack scenarios of $500,000, $5,000,000, $50,000,000, $500,000,000, and $5,000,000,000 in total damages. Notice that both charts are in log scale in the
X
-axes. However, the top chart depicts the results in linear scale, whereas the bottom charts uses a double-log scale. The horizontal dashed line on the upper chart represents the
investment rationality threshold
, below which the normalized benefit on investing in a monitoring system would be negative. This chart assumes that the increase in monitoring coverage as a function of the number of monitoring units can be approximated using the function .
FIGURE 3.15 The
normalized benefit
of the monitoring system using the GBC method for three different types of units, ranging from $1000 through $5000 to $20,000 in price. The chart illustrates the results of the model for five different attack scenarios of $500,000, $5,000,000, $50,000,000, $500,000,000, and $5,000,000,000 in total damages.
Chapter 04
FIGURE 4.1 DHS as portion of US defense spending 2006–2010.
FIGURE 4.2 SIGIR report on total IRRF, ISSF, and CERP infrastructure expenditures as of September 30, 2012.
FIGURE 4.3 US government federal discretionary spending budget FY 2013.
Chapter 05
FIGURE 5.1 Map of respondents
FIGURE 5.2 Last/current long-distance travel—interaction between mode used and purpose
FIGURE 5.3 Respondents’ perceptions of the security level of transport modes
FIGURE 5.4 Respondents’ perceptions and attitudes toward security issues (average score for all five-point scale)
FIGURE 5.5 Respondents’ perceptions and attitudes toward security issues (score for each five-point scale)
FIGURE 5.6 Overview of the last/current long-distance travel
Chapter 06
FIGURE 6.1 Drawing showing the relative penetration power of alpha (α), beta (β), and gamma rays (γ). Note that even though alpha and beta particles are stopped very quickly, often X-rays are produced in the process, which are as penetrating as gamma rays.
Chapter 07
FIGURE 7.1 Fireball–ground interaction zone snapshots taken by the high-speed camera.
FIGURE 7.2 Activity distribution inside the GZ area, given in counts per second (cps) and corrected to the radioactive decay.
FIGURE 7.3 Downwind measurements of the ground contamination after a 0.25 and 2.5 kg TNT charges detonated at ground level. The measurements, taken using a shielded and a nonshielded LaBr
3
detector, are given in units of counts per second (cps), corrected for source radioactive decay.
FIGURE 7.4 The activity on the ground after a 2.5 kg test, measured with the SPARCS. The results are given in units of μCi/m
2
.
FIGURE 7.5 High-speed camera shots of the simultaneously indoor and outdoor explosions. The time after detonation in which every picture was taken is written inside every frame.
FIGURE 7.6 Video camera shots of the simultaneously indoor and outdoor explosions. The time after detonation in which every picture was taken is written inside every frame.
FIGURE 7.7 The IDF CBRN building where the “Red House” experiment was conducted.
FIGURE 7.8 Spatial distribution of the floor surface deposition in (a) cps and (b) µrem/h.
FIGURE 7.9 Air activity concentrations (cps/m
3
) at a height of 1 m, as measured at the (a) first and (b) second floor.
Chapter 08
FIGURE 8.1 Clear lines of sight from a surrounding establishment of a Stockholm tram stop.
FIGURE 8.2 Litter in the vicinity of a Los Angeles bus stop.
Chapter 12
FIGURE 12.1 Maersk container ship.
FIGURE 12.2 Port security boat.
FIGURE 12.3 Fixed security portal.
FIGURE 12.4 Movable security portal.
Chapter 14
FIGURE 14.1 Methodological framework.
Chapter 16
FIGURE 16.1 Map of 2009 bushfire sites in Australia.
FIGURE 16.2 Timeline of events in Australia.
FIGURE 16.3 Emergency response structure.
FIGURE 16.4 Study area map.
FIGURE 16.5 Japan nuclear emergency response structure.
FIGURE 16.6 Timeline of events in Japan.
Chapter 18
FIGURE 18.1 Transit services and population density in the Sacramento region
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
Pages
iii
iv
v
ix
x
xi
xv
xiv
xv
xvi
xvii
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
23
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
149
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
313
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
PREFACE
Beginning in mid-2014, the world learned about ISIS, which aggressively joined other Islamic terrorist organizations and has been successful inspiring and recruiting many young Muslims from the United States and other Westerner nations. It is clear that the war will not remain just in Iraq and Syria, but the jihad will expand into terrorist activities in the Western world.
The main problem in defending against terrorism is inherent in its asymmetric nature. Terrorists can attack any specific target, at any place and time and with any means. Given limited budgets, this makes practically impossible effectively protecting against all such options. Also, terrorists have initiated new methods or attack, while homeland security efforts simply react to them by implementing specific defense. Airlines responded to smuggling weapons into aircrafts by implementing extensive body and luggage checks. Then, a terrorist tried to smuggle explosives in the soles of his shoes, which resulted in requiring all passengers to take off their shoes to be examined with other carry-on items. Unfortunately, it is difficult, if not impossible, for security forces to initiate effective measures before terrorists apply innovative attacks. Given the wide range of options available and the innovative methods that terrorist can apply, it is difficult for law enforcement agencies to effectively “harden” targets as is done against criminal activities. Law enforcement deterring activities are effective in lowering crimes but are ineffective in lowering terrorist activities. Without concrete intelligence or going on the offensive, it is impossible for law enforcement using “thin” efforts to effectively protect all possible targets. Clearly, a well-planned professional terrorist attack could usually overcome most such routine and “thin” protective measures.
The surprised attacks on the World Trade Centers, the Boston Marathon, and the Cercanías train system of Madrid, Spain, among others, showed that effective budgeting should center more on response and recovery than on preventing activities. In general, the expected costs of an attack on any infrastructure equates to the probability of such an attack times the magnitude of the damages. The higher the expected costs, the greater should be the total amount allotted for its security. For a given total amount spent on securing a specific target, the allocation among prevention, response, and recovery activities could differ. The lower is the probability of an attack on a specific infrastructure, the greater the share to be spent on response and recovery activities. For, efficient budget allocation, the greater the probability of an attack, the more should be spent on preventive activities.
Terrorist attacks are aimed at causing large numbers of casualties with detrimental impacts in short as well as long run. Terrorists choose targets with low chance of their being identified and apprehended. Attacking transportation systems including major rail and airport terminals, subways, airlines, or passenger ships is attractive since the number of casualties can be large, and the consequent reduction in the use of these transportation systems often yields an economic slowdown. The September 11 attack caused over 3000 deaths and many injuries and led to a lengthy recession among airlines, hotels, tourist services, and many other related industries. These indirect adverse effects often last longer and are higher in magnitude than the direct damages.
It is quite easy for terrorists to carry concealed explosives or even a dirty bomb into a major rail or subway terminal. Technological means that “smell” nuclear, chemical, or biological emissions in crowded areas could help detect such attempts but unfortunately have not yet become practical. A cyberattack adds a new dimension to terrorism where an attack can be executed from a remote site by penetrating the computer network of the railroads, subways, or air controllers, causing disasters without endangering terrorist lives and with higher probability of success. Deploying massive law enforcement personnel at such infrastructures would be unlikely to prevent an attack but would entail a high cost. However, an effective regional response and recovery team that can be deployed to any site in the region, at any time, and deal with any situation and employ any method of response would probably be effective.
Public choice theory teaches us that political leaders will allocate few public funds toward activities of low probability of occurrence but involve high damages. On the other hand, for high probability of occurrence events with lower damages, more resources will be allocated even though the total expected costs for both may be the same. Elected government decision makers need public support and therefore prefer to support activities that induce short-term achievement. The same is true for private corporate executives that need to show profits in the short run and are less concerned with long-term consequences. Therefore, both public and private executives will spend less than desired on homeland security activities and are even less likely to devote sufficient funding to protecting against low probability attacks with high damages. Government intervention may be necessary to encourage such spending in order to protect both private and social interests.
Public administration theories on federalism suggest that the balance of power between the federal government and the 50 state governments is beneficial. When activities are shifted from the federal to state governments, there is greater chance for innovations and entrepreneurial activities at the lower “less conventional” level than with the monopolistic federal government. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 showed that the remote management of FEMA and the state government, both in distance and familiarity, contributed to ineffective response and recovery activities. Also, terrorist-initiated and natural disasters often affect several local and even state political jurisdictions. Thus, homeland security activities should be consolidated for all levels of government to a regional entity and become a public–private partnership.
This book suggests that because of self-interest of both public and for-profit executives, the budget for homeland security activities, including the protection of transportation infrastructure and activities, is likely to be below the socially desired level. Introduction of volunteers to the PPP can add flexibility, adaptive behavior, innovations, and more efficient resource allocation. To be successful, this team must control the budget, the “peacetime” political agencies and leader must relinquish their power to the team for all homeland security efforts, and if a disaster occurs, the team must control the entire affected area regardless of jurisdictional boundaries.
The premise of this proposed restructuring of homeland security management is that existing political leaders and other administrative executives in the public sector who currently manage homeland security services are usually trained and experience in “peacetime” activities and are less equipped for dealing with disasters. However, in most regions, there are former highly ranked military commanders or business executives who have the expertise and interest in leading, preparing, and managing unexpected and large-scale homeland security events. Usually, such leaders volunteer their services and are able to attract other executives to join the team. Volunteers who served the public in leadership capacities include former Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York City who led the city for 12 years for $1 a year salary. Other successful leaders are the late five-term US Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey and Mitt Romney who saved the Winter Olympics and later was governor of Massachusetts. Such volunteers could contribute to effective preparation, response, and recovery and usually would do so without self-interest that could cause the allocation of resources to deviate from the social optima.
The editors of this book and the Center for Competitive Government of Temple University have studied the issue of securing critical infrastructure and are preparing detailed programs of implementing the above approach. Hopefully, such changes in preparation, response, and recovery from disasters could minimize possible consequences of future terrorist activities.
1INTRODUCTION
GILA ALBERT1,2, ERWIN A. BLACKSTONE3, SIMON HAKIM3, AND YORAM SHIFTAN4
1 The Ran Naor Foundation for the Advancement of Road Safety Research, Hod Hasharon, Israel
2 Faculty of Technology Management, HIT – Holon Institute of Technology, Holon, Israel
3 Center for Competitive Government, Fox School of Business & Management, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
4 Transportation Research Institute, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel
1.1 OVERVIEW
Transportation systems are essential infrastructures for economic vitality, growth, and well-being throughout a country. These systems including airports, water ports, highways, tunnels and bridges, rail, and mass transit are inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks, which dreadfully became an agonizing reality in the post-9/11 era. They might face various threats, namely, biological, chemical, nuclear (dirty bombs), cyber, and natural disaster. In fact, transportation systems continue to be a prime terrorist target (Carafano 2012).
Surface transportation is a soft target, offering terrorists relatively uncomplicated access and easily penetrable security measures. In addition, the large crowds at surface transportation facilities guarantee the attackers effectiveness and anonymity and facilitate their escape (Jenkins 2003; Potoglou et al. 2010). Therefore, terrorist attacks on various transportation systems are perceived an “efficient” means to hurt any civilization at its “soft belly.”
Transportation systems are also essential for evacuation when a natural disaster, a terrorist attack, or a man-made failure occurs. All types of emergency response depend on the availability of functional roads and transportation assets (Edwards and Goodrich 2014). Efficient and effective evacuation can significantly mitigate the catastrophe consequences and therefore serves as one of the most promising means for response and recovery from such destructive incidents.
Terrorist attacks could lead to immediate and long-term catastrophic consequences. Terror, like other forms of disaster, could trigger adaptive behavior that reduces the risk of being involved in such a tragedy (Elias et al. 2013; Floyd et al. 2004; Kirschenbaum 2006). However, the changes in travel behavior may have broad and short- and long-term effects. In the short run, travelers may adopt new behavior, including changes in travel mode, routes, and destinations and even canceling some activities and postponing others (Elias et al. 2013; Exel and Rietveld 2001; Floyd et al. 2004; Holguin-Veras et al. 2003; Kirschenbaum 2006; Potoglou et al. 2010). Long-term effects may include a decrease in the market share of specific travel modes that are perceived as less secure (e.g., public bus transportation) and thereby may indirectly affect land-use patterns (Exel and Rietveld 2001; Holguin-Veras et al. 2003; Polzin 2002). Such changes can also impact ancillary industries dependent upon the affected modes of travel.
Security considerations may result in a multitude of changes in the planning, design, implementation, and operation of transportation systems (Holguin-Veras et al. 2003; Polzin 2002; Potoglou et al. 2010). In addition, they may affect financing and investments in transportation system security, which are an important tool available to decision- and policy makers in response to terrorist incidents (Polzin 2002; Sandler and Enders 2004). In this regard, the aviation security model and its security procedure in the post-9/11 era are not applicable to surface transportation, which cannot be protected in the way commercial aviation is protected. Trains and buses must remain readily accessible, convenient, and inexpensive (Jenkins 2001; Potoglou et al. 2010).
The objective of security procedures is to reach the level of security that will maximize net social benefits from the use of each transportation mode. It is recognized that various security procedures that relate to surface transportation may affect travelers’ privacy and freedom (Potoglou et al. 2010). Therefore, transit agencies and security authorities have to consider the trade-off between security, mobility, and freedom and the expected negative effects of an attack. Policy-maker should evaluate the overall costs of security precautions, the decline in service, and the adverse privacy consequences in comparison to the expected damage of an attack. The latter may be evaluated by the cost of various potential attacks multiplied by their probability of occurrence. No doubt, planning for prevention, deterring, response, and recovery of transportation infrastructures as well as resource allocation and priority setting is a major consideration of professionals and decision makers.
This chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of timely and challenging issues in securing transportation systems against various types of terror attacks and deals with the role of transportation networks in evacuation. It presents “state-of-the-art” efforts to improve technological and managerial security during and after natural disasters and incorporates some insights from this book.
The chapter reviews recent terror incidents targeting transportation modes and infrastructure. It also incorporates research findings on terrorist motivation and response to terrorist attacks. Then, the chapter discusses the role of efficient transportation in large-scale evacuation. The following section presents potential solutions, mainly technological and managerial improvements of how to deter, prevent, and detect these attacks and recover from severe consequences. Then, we discuss the role of not-for-profit volunteers and the private sector in securing transportation systems. The chapter concludes with evaluation issues and policy implications.
1.2 MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS TARGETING TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
Terror threats to transport systems and related infrastructure have become an agonizing reality. Before 9/11, isolated incidents all over the world may have appeared to be random: major terrorist attacks between the years 1920 and 2000 targeted surface transportation, mainly trains and buses, with bombing being the most common tactic (Jenkins 2003 ). This trend significantly increased after 9/11.
Lethal terror attacks on public transportation facilities occurred in the post-9/11 era in various countries. The March 2004 Madrid train bombing, the July 2005 London Underground and double-decker bus bombing, the July 2006 Mumbai train bombing, and the Moscow Metro bombing in March 2010 are all examples of the vulnerability of public transportation system and the catastrophic consequences of these attacks. At the end of 2013, three bomb attacks targeting mass transportation occurred in the city of Volgograd in southern Russia. In October 2013, suicide bombing took place on a bus; on December 29, 2013, at a railway station; and a day later, on a trolley bus. Overall, at least 40 innocent people were killed in these three attacks on Russian transportation.
Fortunately, some terrorist plots targeting subways and trains were averted: London in 2002 and 2003, Sydney in 2005, Milan in 2006, and Barcelona in 2008. New York City prevented two alleged terror attempts in recent years. In July 2006, the FBI announced that it had foiled a plot by foreign militants that was in its “talking phase” to detonate explosives in tunnels connecting New Jersey and Manhattan; and on May 1, 2010, a car bomb was discovered in Times Square. Indeed, New York’s subway system, which is uniquely attractive to terrorists, has repeatedly been the focus of briefings by counterterrorism agencies.
Israel’s surface transportation has continuously been a main target of terror attacks since the establishment of the state in 1948. In the period 1994–2006, 17 severe terror attacks occurred on Israeli public buses and such related infrastructures as bus stations, with each attack resulting in 10 or more fatalities and dozens of injuries (Butterworth et al. 2012; Johnston 2010). In Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, 117 citizens were killed in transportation-related terror attacks, and more than 770 were injured between 2001 and 2003. However, the Israeli experience especially during the Second Uprising (Intifada), which started in September 2000 and lasted through the end of 2006, enabled training drivers and employees in preventing disasters and minimizing damages and caused changes in traveler behavior. Damages were also mitigated because the terrorists employed poor tactics and lacked professional bomb-making skills (Butterworth et al. 2012).
1.2.1 Terrorist Ideology and Tactics
Review of major terror attacks suggests that certain types of attacks are “preferred” by terrorists since they are considered “more fit” or “more legal.” Conventional wisdom asserts that terror acts stem from political, social, and economics causes. However, as Bar (2004 ) stated, it cannot be ignored that most devastating global terrorist attacks have been perpetrated in the name of Islam (Bar 2004). Moreover, as Bar further discusses in Chapter 2, the body of Islamic rulings relating to justification of modern mass killing of civilians serves as the guideline for many Islamic terror acts.
The Islamic terrorism takes into account its religious roots, the rulings of Islamic law (shari’ah), and the outline of Islamic legal experts (fatwas). The history of Islamic terrorism involved various tactics, while terrorists choose the course of action very carefully. Agonizingly somehow, the 9/11 terror attacks seem to indicate the end of the of aircraft hijackings, most probably due to the rigorous and robust changes in security practices at airports.
The maritime terrorism threat, although low in volume, is a worrisome contingency due to its vast and largely global, unregulated, and opaque nature (Szylionwicz and Zamparini 2013). Between the years 1967 and 2007, only 0.9% of terrorist attacks in the United States involved maritime transport (Nowacki 2014) and in the past 15 years only 2% of all terrorist attacks around the world (Roell 2009). These attacks target both passenger vessels and containerized shipping (RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents 2014) or “choke points” and mega harbors (Roell 2009). Several initiatives and regulations have been developed in the United States post-9/11 including “Automated Targeting System” (ATM), “Container Security Initiative” (CSI), and “Security and Accountability for Every Port Act” (SAFE) as described in Chapter 12 of this book by Price and Hashemi. Many initiatives have been adopted worldwide, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (launched by the United States in 2003), a global effort to stop the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction that was endorsed by over 100 nations (Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation 2014).
The suicide attacks targeting surface transportation, mainly trains, subways, and train stations, seem to be an increasing tactic in the post-9/11 era. The improved explosive devices used by terrorists lead to greater lethality (MIPT 2007; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents 2014). Shmuel Bar concludes in his chapter in this book that to combat the radical trend in Islam what may be necessary is a “Kulturkampf” of the orthodoxy against the radicals, but in the short run, the Western political and legal arsenal needs to adapt itself to the existence of a religious war.
Transportation, and especially surface transportation, need to be highly accessible and will remain a soft target for terrorists. These systems may face various additional threats, namely, biological, chemical, nuclear (dirty bombs), and cyber.
The main challenge is therefore to evaluate and develop a long-term strategy to cope with potential, rather than current, threats. In this regard, special consideration should be given to the threat of cyber.
1.2.2 Cyberterrorism
Cybersecurity, a concept that was first used by computer scientists in the early 1990s to underline a series of insecurities related to networked computers, has moved beyond to threats arising from digital technologies, innovations, and changing geopolitical conditions (Nissenbaum 2005 ; Nissenbaum and Hansen 2009).
Although terrorists still employ the traditional tactics, they may target information technology and networking by creating damages to their applications and respective infrastructures (Janczewski and Colarik 2008). Cyberterrorism can be defined as the intentional use of computer, networks, and the Internet to cause destruction and harm (Matusitz 2005). Terrorists can convey encrypted messages, recruit supporters, acquire targets, gather intelligence, camouflage activity, etc., with only limited risk to the attacker. This limited risk is a function of difficulties in distinguishing between a simple malfunction and an attack, in connecting an event with a result, in tracking the source of the attack, and in identifying the attacker; the widespread use of inexpensive, off-the-shelf technologies; and the vulnerability of computer systems (Tabansky 2011).
Information and communication technologies (ICT) are rapidly penetrating all modes of transportation. Cyberterrorism is a tool of destruction that may lead to various devastating effects on the transportation system. Cyberattacks can cause serious damage to a critical infrastructure, which may result in significant casualties. For example, an act of sabotage caused financial and other damages when 800,000 l of untreated sewage were released into waterways in Maroochy Shire, Australia (Abrams and Weiss 2000).
Thus far, no incidents of cyberterrorism in the transportation system have been successful. However, in Haifa, the third largest metropolitan area in Israel, the Carmel Tunnels, a major road tunnel within the city, didn’t function for several hours one day in September 2013. The common hypothesis is that the cause was a cyberattack that led to malfunctioning of the communication and control of the tunnel. In Chapter 15, Talarico et al. report that beginning in 2005 the number of documented cyberattacks against the computer-controlled pipeline systems has notably increased (a series of attacks in 2013 that targeted a gas compressor station, which is a key component in moving gas through pipeline networks in the United States). In Chapter 9, Plant and Young illustrate this threat to railroads. Commuter lines and regional railroads have computer-based signaling and communications systems, which are necessary for their operation and therefore are vulnerable to cyberattack. Moreover, as discussed by Pandolfi in Chapter 10, a sophisticated cyberattack against the computer platforms that operate the railroads is becoming more likely.
Zoli and Steinberg discuss in Chapter 4 emergent challenges for the transportation sector through adoptive notion of resilience as they apply to critical infrastructure security, including cyber control systems that are vulnerable to attacks and accidents. As mentioned by Wachs et al. in Chapter 8, the subject matter of transit security is inherently dynamic, responding to the changing nature of threats and taking advantage of the availability of new technology. Cybersecurity, which was not a significant element of transit system operations just a decade ago, is widely viewed in 2015 as an important vulnerability that requires new forms of training as well as investments in new software and technology. As Zoli and Steinberg indicate, the 2013 US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget of $60 billion includes a 74% increase in cyber expenditures, while the overall department funding has remained the same as in earlier years.
The cyber threat is asymmetric; no great investment is required to perpetrate cyberattacks. In contrast, defense against cyber threats must encompass all channels of attack and keep up to date with new developments. Cyberattacks are often a sophisticated combination of sabotage, espionage, and subversion (Rid 2012). Defense from cyberattack requires more resources and is becoming more difficult to control (Tabansky 2011).
1.3 THE ROLE OF TRANSPORTATION IN EVACUATION
Transportation systems are essential for evacuation when a terrorist attack, a natural disaster, or a man-made failure occurs. The bushfires in Victoria, Australia (2009); the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan (2011); the floods in the United Kingdom (2014); and the Hurricanes Katrina (2005), Rita (2005), Gustav (2008), Irene (2011), and Sandy (2012) in the United States showed the need for efficient large-scale evacuation methods. All types of emergency response depend on the availability of functional roads and transportation assets (Edwards and Goodrich 2014 ). There is no doubt that well-functioning, robust, and flexible managed transportation systems can significantly contribute to mitigate catastrophe consequences.
Large-scale evacuation utilizes existing transportation infrastructure, which requires early and continuous planning and training. In this regard, multimodal transportation networks for emergency evacuation scenarios are also in the forefront. For example, road tunnel evacuations have been studied through different evacuation models (Ronchi et al. 2012). Effective traffic management is also essential for efficient evacuation, for example, converting some roads to one way in the direction of evacuation.
Regardless of the cause or the type of disaster, various factors shape the procedure of evacuation. Among the most important are jurisdiction features (e.g., geographical area, population size, and density) and characteristics of the transportation systems (e.g., state of infrastructure, alternative modes of transport, and transport control). In evacuation, whether mandatory or voluntary, citizens with privately owned vehicles may evacuate in a timely manner, while public transportation-dependent residents remain behind. This is not always the case as when there is insufficient fuel supply in existing gas stations. In the case of public transit users, school bus systems, especially in rural areas, are ideal mode to evacuate people without a car. As Chaudhari et al. discuss in Chapter 18, school buses should be incorporated into a local emergency management plan. Hess and Farrell in Chapter 16 suggest that oversight of emergency planning by national and state governments is justified; however, local officials are usually best positioned to manage disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. Our proposal for improving disaster policy questions such belief.
Heller in Chapter 17 discusses lessons learned in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Irene, and Sandy. Effective emergency planning and response requires extensive interagency coordination and collaboration, involving a multitude of professional talents. While advances in technology and social media have provided emergency managers powerful tools to enhance emergency preparedness and response, it will take a continued collaborative effort between government, the private sector, and the public to ensure a truly resilient evacuation management system.
Furthermore, evacuation procedure will benefit from innovations in communication network, social media, and joint operation centers. As stated by Daniel Hess and Christina Farrell in Chapter 16, an effective emergency response system must have resilient methods of communication and consistent messaging, as communication is often the first system to fail in the chaos of an extreme event. Hess and Farrell emphasize the importance of clear messages and redundancy in communication systems, as disasters often cause accidental technological breakdowns due to infrastructure damage or intentional shutdowns as public security measures. To address these challenges, a disaster communication plan should possess multiple channels, including websites, social media, television, radio and print, and in the recent years, especially smartphones and emergency specialized apps.
1.4 MARKET FAILURE LEADING TO A NEW MODEL OF PPP
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita showed how government at the federal, state, and local levels failed to provide adequate services to the impacted areas (US Senate 2006 : Executive Summary). Mobile telecommunications trailers and the staff to operate them were offered by a private company within few hours from the start of the flood. Buses were needed to evacuate people from the disaster neighborhoods, while available school buses were unused and left on flooded parking areas to be later disabled by the flood. The State of Louisiana requested desperately needed forklifts from out of state even though they were available from local businesses. Home Depot, Walmart, and other retailers had supplies necessary to protect residents and businesses from the flood delivered from other locations (Boaz 2005). The supplies were ready for sale at the impacted areas well before the hurricane arrived. Evacuees at the gathering places lacked adequate food and essential supplies, while truckloads of major suppliers were stopped along the way. Indeed, delivery was suspended or delayed by local law enforcement officers even for trucks just outside the stadium (Business Executives for National Security (BENS) 2006; Lieberman 2005; Theroux 2005). Some “learning by doing” was evident in the response and recovery efforts to Hurricane Sandy in October 2012. However, it is likely that businesses in a competitive environment are more adaptive to such occurrences than is monopolistic government.
Another problem in responding to disasters emanates from what is termed “peak time demand” for local police, fire, and ambulance services. Specifically, greater staffing is needed during disasters than in normal “nonpeak” periods. Moreover, a severe shortage in first responders to Katrina resulted, since some workers chose to help their families and did not report for their duties (US Senate 2006: 12).
The outcry that followed Hurricanes Katrina and Rita prompted federal, state, and local governments to improve delivery of response services. The accumulated “learning by doing” and diffusion of information made governments improve first response services to Hurricane Sandy in October 2012. However, we did not experience any structural changes that assure “built-in” incentives for improved services when disaster occurs. Five major reasons prevent socially optimal allocation of resources for homeland security services.
First, government’s monopolistic position in the delivery of emergency services impedes efficient homeland security services. Government often produces a given level of services at higher cost than could be produced under more competitive conditions. This phenomenon is not peculiar to government. Monopoly or noncompetition even in the private sector often leads to costs being higher than they should be or what economists call x-inefficiency (Shepherd and Shepherd 2004). Prior to their becoming more competitive, the automobile and airline industries had such a problem. Government often allocates resources to various services arbitrarily, which does not necessarily address societal preferences (Homeland Security News Wire 2011).
Second, existence of “peak time demand” for emergency personnel and equipment that is significantly greater than what government possesses for regular activities suggests that supply should closely follow the demand trends. Energy consumption is high in Northeast America during the winter peak of January–February and again in the height of the summer in July–August. These peak time demands are generally consistent over the years, and therefore electric companies can accommodate them by increasing capacity to satisfy peak time demand, by purchasing electricity from electric companies in other regions or by differentiated cost-based prices to avoid expensive investment in power plants. A similar problem exists for homeland security. However, unlike the electric power case, both the probability of occurrence and the costs of homeland security are uncertain.
A third factor that prevents a “built-in” improvement in government provision of emergency services is the rigid territorial boundaries of localities and states that dictate the availability of personnel and equipment. When a disaster occurs, local first responders are the first to respond. The state government later provides additional support with the National Guard and necessary supplies. When the president declares an area has suffered a disaster, FEMA then provides major assistance. It is important to note that all federal resources are channeled through the state and are not provided directly to the affected community. In most disasters, the local mayor is in charge of response and recovery activities. However, most events and their required response and recovery services are not confined to the legal boundaries of a locality, but become instead a regional disaster with similar necessary response and recovery efforts. Mayors and their subordinates usually have the experience and the knowledge for providing regular services and are less knowledgeable in dealing with emergency events. The National Weather Service predicted that a major storm would batter New Orleans on Friday, 3 days before it did, and will topple the levees in New Orleans. The mayor did not order a mandatory evacuation until the following Sunday, a day before the storm hit the city (Moynihan 2009).
The rigidity of government boundaries and bureaucratic structure that may accommodate “peace time” events is likely not to suit emergency conditions. A homeland security occurrence may cross counties and state boundaries, requiring coordinated and even unified response and recovery efforts, which would probably be more efficient and achieve better results.
A fourth reason why households, businesses, and government devote too few resources to homeland security is its perceived low probability of occurrence and high cost. Households and businesses are ready to spend more on high probability of occurrence events with lower costs than on a homeland security event where the expected costs are the same. Households purchase homeowners insurance, compensating mostly when a burglary occurs—an event that has a high probability of occurrence but low costs. At the same time, households are reluctant to purchase flood insurance with low probability but higher costs even though the expected costs are probably higher for floods. Indeed, even with federally subsidized flood insurance premiums, 50% drop their coverage after 3–4 years (Michael-Kayan and Kunreuther 2012). Moreover, homeowners are typically unwilling to spend mitigation measures to reduce damages from flood or other disasters. For example, in earthquake prone areas of California a 1989 survey reported that only 5–9% of respondents adopted any damage mitigation measures (Kunreuther et al. 2013).
Businesses behavior is similar, since its executives are judged by the immediate annual or even quarterly profits; a natural or man-made disaster is likely to be faced by the future managers of the firm. Corporate managers thus have been criticized for being obsessively concerned with the short-run instead of long-run interest of the firm (Blodget 2012). They arguably reduce capital investment and other long-run projects.
