Sexual Offending E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 357

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017

Beschreibung

Sexual Offending presents the latest theory and research relating to the social cognition, emotion, and motivational goals of individuals who have committed sexual offences.

• Explores how individuals who have committed sexual offences perceive the world and themselves, and how understanding this can inform their rehabilitation
• Provides a broad-based view of cognition, and explores the complex relationship between cognition, emotion and associated constructs such as motivational goals
• Integrates recent work on female sexual offenders alongside the literature on their male counterparts, providing researchers and practitioners with a single resource
• A valuable handbook for researchers, practitioners and students concerned with understanding and rehabilitating individuals who have committed sexual offences

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

Title Page

Notes on Editors

Notes on Contributors

Preface

Acknowledgments

1 Emotion, Cognition and Motivation

The Concepts of Emotion, Cognition and Motivation

Conceptual Issues

An Enactive Approach

Correctional Therapeutic Implications

Conclusions

References

2 The Role of Cognition, Emotion and Motivational Goals in Sexual Offending

Finkelhor’s Precondition Model

Hall and Hirschman’s Quadripartite Model

Marshall and Barbaree’s Integrated Theory

Ward and Siegert’s Pathways Model

Ward and Beech’s Integrated Theory of Sexual Offending (ITSO)

Conclusion

References

3 Cognitive Explanations of Sexual Offending

Single Factor Explanations of Cognition in Sexual Offending

Overlapping Constructs within Sexual Offending Cognition

Implications for Treatment

Conclusions

References

4 Bridging the Cognitive–Emotion Divide

What is Empathy?

Theories of Empathy

Empirical Evidence

Assessments

Practical Implications

Conclusion

References

5 Emotions and Sexual Offending

The Role of Affect in Sexual Offending

Linking Affect and Key Correlates

Females who Have Sexually Offended and Affect

Treatment

Conclusions

References

6 Motivators, Self‐Regulation and Sexual Offending

Relapse Prevention

Self‐Regulation Model

Multi‐Modal Self‐Regulation Theory

Unique Populations and Self‐Regulation Models

Conclusions

References

7 Cognition, Emotion and Motivation

Part 1: Attitudes and Cognitions, Coping and Emotion Management, Motivation

Part 2: Intervention

A Comprehensive Approach to Treatment

Summary

References

8 Cognition, Emotion and Motivation

Key Developments in Theoretical and Research‐Based Understanding of CEM

Cognition

Emotion/Affect

Motivation

Concluding Comments: The Whole Picture of CEM

References

Index

End User License Agreement

Guide

Cover

Table of Contents

Begin Reading

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Sexual Offending

Cognition, Emotion and Motivation

Edited byTheresa A. Gannon and Tony Ward

This edition first published 2017© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data

Names: Gannon, Theresa A., editor. | Ward, Tony, 1954 March 17– editor.Title: Sexual offending : cognition, emotion and motivation / edited by Theresa A. Gannon and Tony Ward.Description: Chichester, West Sussex, UK : John Wiley & Sons, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index.Identifiers: LCCN 2016038232| ISBN 9780470683521 (cloth) | ISBN 9780470683514 (pbk.)Subjects: LCSH: Sex offenders–Psychology. | Sex offenders–Rehabilitation. | Sex crimes–Psychological aspects.Classification: LCC RC560.S47 .S485 2017 | DDC 616.85/8306–dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016038232

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Cover image: Grandfailure/Gettyimages

Theresa A. Gannon:For Amy Haskew (1990–2016): A Talented Student.

Tony Ward:To Bill Marshall, friend, mentor, brilliant researcher, and mostof all, a great bloke.

Notes on Editors

Theresa A. Gannon, DPhil, CPsychol (Forensic) is Professor of Forensic Psychology and Director of the Centre for Research and Education in Forensic Psychology (CORE‐FP) at the University of Kent, UK. Theresa also works as a Practitioner Consultant Forensic Psychologist specializing in sexual offending and firesetting for the Forensic and Specialist Service Line, Kent and Medway Partnership Trust.

Theresa has published over 100 chapters, articles, books and other scholarly works in the areas of male and female‐perpetrated sexual offending. She is particularly interested in research relating to both the treatment needs and overall supervision of individuals who have sexually offended. This includes offence‐related cognition and emotion, rehabilitation models (i.e., the Good Lives Model), offence‐process models of offending behaviour, polygraph‐assisted supervision and truth facilitation, and attitudes towards individuals who have offended. Theresa is lead editor of several books including Aggressive Offenders’ Cognition: Theory, Research, and Treatment (John Wiley) along with Tony Ward, Anthony Beech and Dawn Fisher, and Female Sexual Offenders: Theory, Assessment, and Treatment (Wiley‐Blackwell) along with Franca Cortoni. Theresa is also co‐editor of several books that discuss or integrate sexual offending with other forensic topics and psychological factors including Public Opinion and Criminal Justice (Willan) along with Jane Wood, Crime and Crime Reduction: The Importance of Group Processes (Routledge) along with Wood, and What Works in Offender Rehabilitation: An Evidence‐Based Approach to Assessment and Treatment (Wiley‐Blackwell) along with Leam Craig and Louise Dixon.

Theresa serves on the editorial boards of several journals including Aggression and Violent Behavior, British Journal of Forensic Practice, International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, and Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment. She is also Editor of Psychology Crime and Law.

Tony Ward, PhD, DipClinPsych received his Ph.D. and trained as a Clinical Psychologist at Canterbury University, Christchurch, New Zealand. Tony was the former Director of the Kia Marama Sexual Offenders’ Unit at Rolleston Prison in New Zealand and has taught clinical and forensic psychology at Victoria, Deakin, Canterbury and Melbourne Universities. He is currently the Director of Clinical Training at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.

Tony has published over 400 chapters, articles, books and other scholarly works in the areas of male sexual offending and general rehabilitation and practice. He is particularly interested in the critique and generation of theory within forensic psychology as well as the examination of ethical constructs in psychological practice. Tony has made a number of key theoretical contributions to the area of sexual offending and offending behaviour more generally, which include: the Self‐Regulation Model of Sexual Offending (Ward & Hudson, 2000), the adaptation of the concept of Implicit Theories to sexual offending (Ward & Keenan, 1999), the Good Lives Model of Rehabilitation (Ward & Stewart, 2003) and the Integrated Theory of Sexual Offending (Ward & Beech, 2006). Tony is also lead editor of several books including Theories of Sex Offending (Wiley‐Blackwell) along with Tony Beech, Sexual Deviance: Issues and Controversies (Sage) along with Richard Laws and Stephen Hudson, and was author of Rehabilitation: Beyond the Risk Paradigm (Routledge) along with Shadd Maruna.

Tony serves on the editorial boards of several journals including Aggression and Violent Behavior, Legal and Criminological Psychology, and Psychology Crime and Law. Tony has served as Associate Editor for Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment and Legal and Criminological Psychology.

Notes on Contributors

Ross M. Bartels, PhD, gained his MSc in Forensic Psychology in 2008 from the University of Kent, and was awarded his PhD in 2014 from the University of Birmingham. Ross is currently a Psychology Lecturer and member of the Forensic and Clinical Research Group at the University of Lincoln (UK). He is also an associate editor of ‘nextgenforensic’; an online blog for the ‘next generation’ working in the field of sexual offending research and treatment. Ross’s primary research interests focus on adapting indirect measures and socio‐cognitive paradigms to gain new insights into the processes underlying (and associated with) sexual thoughts and fantasies, offence‐supportive cognition, and attitudes towards people who have sexually offended.

Nicholas Blagden is a Senior Lecturer in Forensic Psychology and the Course Leader for the MSc Forensic Psychology at Nottingham Trent University (NTU). He is a Chartered Psychologist and has worked and researched within the criminal justice system and HM Prison Service for many years. He has taught undergraduate and postgraduate courses in psychology, forensic psychology and criminology. He has also trained police officers. His work has been funded by the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) and he is currently engaged in numerous collaborative forensic projects with NTU and NOMS. Current projects include understanding paedophilic deviant sexual interest, rehabilitative prison climates, religiosity, and denial in relation to sexual offending. He is a trustee of the Safer Living Foundation, a charity that takes a multi‐agency approach to reducing sexual (re)offending through rehabilitative initiatives.

Sarah J. Brown is Professor of Forensic Psychology, registered Forensic Psychologist, Chartered Psychologist and Associate Fellow of the British Psychological Society. She is the Deputy Executive Director of the Centre for Research in Psychology, Behaviour and Achievement at Coventry University, Vice Chair of the National Organization for the Treatment of Abusers (NOTA) and a member of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ATSA). She has been conducting research in relation to sexual violence since 1994 and was the Editor of the Journal of Sexual Aggression (JSA) from 2008 until 2014. She is currently an Associate Editor of Child Abuse and Neglect and Editorial Board member of JSA and Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment. Brown has published on various topics including sexual aggression, intimate partner violence, engaging individuals who have offended, empathy, risk assessment, evaluation and forensic testing.

Rebecca Lievesley is a Lecturer in Forensic Psychology and part of the Sexual Offences, Crime and Misconduct Research Unit at Nottingham Trent University. She has worked with individuals who have offended since 2008 and is currently engaged in various research projects including an investigation of reoffending and desistance for individuals on short sentences, evaluation of anti‐libidinal medication for individuals who have sexually offended, the role of religion in sexual offending and help seeking prior to committing a sexual offence. She is also a trustee and co‐founder of the Safer Living Foundation, a charity established to promote sexual offence rehabilitation and the prevention of further victims of sexual crime.

Caoilte Ó Ciardha obtained his PhD from Trinity College Dublin in 2010 for research examining social cognition and the assessment of sexual offending. Since 2011 he has worked at the Centre of Research and Education in Forensic Psychology, part of the School of Psychology at the University of Kent, first as a postdoctoral Research Associate and later as a lecturer. His publications have included both theoretical and empirical research relating to the assessment and treatment of individuals who have committed sexual or firesetting offences. He also conducts research on social cognitive factors in individuals who may be at higher risk of those behaviours but who have not offended.

Geris A. Serran, C. Psych. graduated with a doctoral degree in clinical psychology from the University of Ottawa in 2003. A registered psychologist, Dr Serran is currently employed by Correctional Service Canada providing intervention to men who have offended. Prior to that, she worked with Rockwood Psychological Services, providing intervention to clients who committed sexual offences. Her research interests include therapeutic processes, coping strategies and effective intervention with men who have sexually offended. She has authored several book chapters and journal articles, co‐edited and co‐authored books, and presented at international conferences.

Jill D. Stinson received a dual doctorate in Clinical Psychology and Psychology, Policy, and Law from the University of Arizona in 2006. She is currently an Assistant Professor and Director of Clinical Training with the Department of Psychology at East Tennessee State University. She has co‐authored two books on the aetiology and treatment of problematic sexual behaviour, a third book on motivational interviewing with individuals who have offended, and numerous chapters and articles describing sexual offending in relation to mental illness, self‐regulatory problems, and histories of childhood trauma and maltreatment.  She is also an Associate Editor for Sexual Abuse:  A Journal of Research and Treatment.

Jayson Ware graduated with a MA (psychology) in 1997 and then completed a postgraduate diploma in Clinical Psychology in 2000. He is currently the Director of Offender Services & Programs, Corrective Services, New South Wales, Australia. He has worked with individuals who have sexually offended for the past twenty years and has authored over thirty journal articles or book chapters primarily relating to sexual offence treatment. He is currently working toward a doctorate in Psychology at the University of New South Wales, Australia.

Preface

Our initial idea for this book stemmed from a conversation that we had many years ago about the lack of integrative resources available on the topic of sexual offence related cognition, emotion, and motivation (CEM). What became clear to us, as we reflected, was that although the sexual offence field had developed immensely in relation to CEM over the past three decades, more momentum was needed. From this realization, we began to approach a range of internationally esteemed professionals about whether they would be interested in writing a chapter for a book devoted to sexual offence CEM. The response that we received was extremely reassuring; and as editors we feel fortunate to edit a text of special interest to us, with a renowned group of experts. We sincerely hope that this book will promote momentum for theorists, researchers and treatment providers who are working with CEM applied to sexual offending. If readers take only one message from this book we hope it will be that future work on sexual offence related CEM must be expert, integrated and holistic.

Theresa A. Gannon and Tony WardMay 2016

Acknowledgments

We would like to acknowledge all of the individuals who have made this collection of chapters possible. First of all, thank you to all of the authors who put so much time and effort into writing their chapters. We would also like to thank all those at Wiley‐Blackwell who gave expert advice and support on this book. In particular, thank you Clive Hollin for dealing positively with the initial enquiry about this book and for directions about possible avenues for publication. Also, a big thank you to everyone at Wiley‐Blackwell for being so patient with us! In particular, thanks must go to Karen Shield for her utter professionalism, Roshna Mohan for her quality checking, and Amy Minshull and Victoria Halliday for dealing with contractual issues. Finally, we would like to thank Jaimee Mallion for helping us with the proofreading of this book and also Alec McAulay for dealing with the copyediting associated with this book.

1Emotion, Cognition and Motivation: An Enactive Perspective

Tony Ward

A striking feature about emotions in correctional psychology is that they are primarily viewed as problems to be managed. Difficulties with emotional regulation have been identified as a dynamic risk factor in the sexual offending domain, and as a consequence of this are considered to be a critical treatment target (Hanson & Harris, 2000; Thornton, 2013). In the general offending area, impulsive behaviour leading to crime is frequently linked to emotional dyscontrol (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). Theories of sexual offending typically include aetiological pathways or causes that are characterized by emotional instability. For example, in Hall and Hirschman’s (1992) Quadripartite Model of child molestation (see Bartels, Chapter 2 in this volume), one group of individuals is defined by their susceptibility to negative affective states and tendency to behave in an impulsive and unplanned manner. Treatment for this group centres on learning how to control and regulate negative emotions. Similarly, according to Ward and Hudson’s (1998) self‐regulation model, negative emotional states such as anger or anxiety may function as disinhibitors and precipitate reoffending. Finally, a core component of Ross and Fabiano’s (1985) influential cognitive skills treatment programme is devoted to preventing emotional arousal from impairing functioning and leading to further offending. One of the core assumptions of cognitive skills programmes is that there are causal relationships between cognition, emotion and motivation. The picture of emotion emerging from these models and theories is a negative one: emotions overwhelm individuals and if unchecked result in antisocial and destructive behaviour. They are problematic, destructive and need to be controlled.

The conceptualization of emotions within correctional psychology as behavioural disrupters, contrasts starkly with the richer and more nuanced characterization evident in contemporary psychological and philosophical theorizing and research (Colombetti, 2009, 2014; Lewis, Haviland‐Jones & Barrett, 2008; Solomon, 2007). In this latter body of work, emotions are described as biologically adaptive, essential for sound decision‐making, critical elements of interpersonal relationships and conduits to a meaningful engagement with life (Christensen, 2012; Helm, 2002; Maiese, 2011; Sterelny, 2012; Thompson, 2007). Furthermore, a number of emotional phenomena have been identified; ranging from specific emotional states to more enduring moods or personality‐based dispositions. Emotions can enhance personal functioning, may be positive or negatively valenced, motivate individuals to pursue goals and function as interpersonal and intrapersonal signals of progress to goal achievement. The distinction between emotion and cognition has been effectively collapsed, and they are no longer considered to be polar opposites (Colombetti, 2014; Pessoa, 2013). Therapy has reflected this renewed interest in emotions as facilitators of behavioural change and specific emotion focused interventions are now routinely part of the repertoire of contemporary clinical practitioners (Greenberg, 2002; Leahy, 2015). For example, learning to focus on the somatic aspects of emotion in order to activate its phenomenological and behavioural components (Greenberg, 2002).

This change in understanding of emotional phenomena and its subsequent enriched role in therapeutic practice has not occurred in correctional psychology. Rather, a more limited understanding of emotions, motivation and cognition and their function in the process of behavioural change is typically the case. Why is this so? I think there are three major reasons for this neglect of emotional theorizing and research by correctional practitioners. First, a preoccupation with risk prediction and management in forensic and correctional practice has resulted in a neglect of desistance processes and emphasis on agency. What I mean by this is that attention to individuals’ personal goals and aspirations for living fulfilling and better lives has not occurred (Ward & Maruna, 2007). The process of constructing intervention plans that reflect what is meaningful to individuals necessarily involves consideration of positively valenced emotions – and more generally – well‐being related concerns. Second, the fragmentation of treatment programmes into discrete modules, such as emotional regulation, interpersonal functioning, cognitive restructuring and so on, has meant that it is tempting to focus on problem areas rather than processes for facilitating meaningful change. Engaging individuals fully in treatment requires attention to broader values and goals, and a coherent, positive plan for living rather than a disconnected strategy of tackling specific risk factors, or problems. Third, because correctional practice has been driven by pragmatic concerns, there has been a focus only on treatment theories and techniques that have been tested in risk–need–responsivity type studies (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Marshall, Marshall, Serran & Fernandez, 2006). This is a severe limitation. The desire to effect change in certain problem areas has concentrated efforts on developing specific treatment approaches and, as a result, there has been a lack of awareness of current affective science and its implications for therapy.

In correctional psychology, an artificial distinction between emotion and cognition has been uncritically accepted, and cognition has been favoured as the primary causal process. As we will see later, this has been undermined by theory and research in affective science. In this chapter, I present a view of the interrelationship between cognition, emotion and motivation which challenges the current theoretical status quo in sexual offence treatment and has serious implications for how therapists view and treat the components of emotion, cognition, and motivation. First, I will consider definitional and conceptual issues that are currently under the spotlight of affective science. I will then spend the rest of the chapter detailing the enactive approach to human functioning in general, and emotions, in particular. The enactive view of the mind is that it emerges from the biological process of autopoiesis, or rather, the dynamic processes by which dynamic systems protect, repair and organize their components and actively control their relationship to the environment (Hutto & Myin, 2013; Stewart, Gapenne, & Di Paolo, 2010; Thompson, 2007). It is a relational, dynamic conceptualization of organisms in which affective structures and processes play a significant role in framing salient features of the environment that represent potential benefits or possible threats. In this theory, emotions are at the centre of adaptive functioning and actively support cognition and behaviour. Following a description of enactivisim and its general assumptions, I will discuss its implications for correctional practice. My review of these implications will be brief as my major aim is to present a way of thinking about emotional phenomena that is supported by current research and theory, and that is capable of guiding future practice.

The Concepts of Emotion, Cognition and Motivation

Emotions are complex phenomena involving multiple systems that are loosely associated (Mennin & Farach, 2007) and involve physiological responses (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure), behavioural responses (e.g., facial displays and motor actions such as avoidance or escape) and subjective responses (e.g., feelings, verbally mediated thought). They involve relatively automatic appraisals of internal and external stimuli such as thoughts, interpersonal rejection or physical threats, and ready the organism to respond appropriately. Emotions are organism‐wide phenomena and are typically experienced as occurring without volition. There are a range of emotional phenomena that vary in terms of their discreteness, persistence and duration. Specific emotions such as anger, joy and fear emerge readily in response to internal or external cues and serve to alert organisms to sources of threat or well‐being. They usually last for a few minutes at most and are intentional in the sense they are directed to specific objects or cues. On the other hand, moods are longer lasting and may be present continually for several days, even weeks. Personality based dispositions are present more or less permanently and causally generate moods. Furthermore, emotions are motivating and direct the person to engage in goal directed actions of a particular kind. The type of goals and related actions reflect the theme or meaning of the affective state. In addition, the meaning of an emotional situation is partly a function of individuals’ beliefs and attitudes. For example, fear will generate escape or avoidance goals (based on a threat appraisal) while anger causes retaliatory of self‐protective ones (based on a perception of imminent, unjustified harm). Thompson (2007) captures the multi‐faceted nature of emotion nicely in the following quote:

Emotion involves the entire neuroaxis of brain stem, limbic areas, and superior cortex, as well as visceral and motor processes of the body. It encompasses psychosomatic networks of molecular communication among the nervous system, immune system, and endocrine system. On a psychological level, emotion involves attention and evaluation or appraisal, as well as affective feeling. Emotion manifests behaviorally in distinct facial expressions and action tendencies. (p. 363)

Thus, emotions are organism‐wide responses, are initiated without intent, involve evaluations, are motivating (i.e., ready the organism for action), are generally adaptive and have meaning; they are in effect, ‘sense‐making’ (Maiese, 2011). While there is disagreement concerning a number of their features, such as the degree to which specific emotions are discrete, there is consensus on these features (Frijda, 2008).

Conceptual Issues

There are a number of conceptual issues relating to emotions that are currently the focus of research interest in affective science and which will help to elucidate cognition and motivation. These are: (a) the appropriate level of explanation of emotions; (b) the role of emotions in decision‐making and rationality; (c) the relationship between cognition and emotion; (d) values and emotion; (e) conceptualization and emotional experience; and (f) emotion, cognition, and motivation.

Level of Explanation

Although affective science researchers agree that emotions are associated with a range of biological, psychological and social/cultural elements, theories vary according to which factors are considered primary (Damasio, 1994; Frijda, 2008; Pessoa, 2013). For some theorists, somatic features such as heart rate, muscle tension or level of respiration are the core emotional phenomena and constrain subsequent evaluation and behavioural responses (Cannon, 1914). While, by way of contrast, cognitive theorists (e.g., Lazarus, 1991) argue that primary appraisal of the personal significance of certain events or stimuli sets the affective tone and, via a causal cascade, activates the other response systems. As I will discuss later, the cognitive model – which has been adopted in correctional psychology – fails to appreciate emotion as an organism‐wide, multi‐systemic phenomenon characterized by re‐entrant and interacting causal processes. There is no such thing as the cause or one system that is primary.

Emotions and Decision‐Making

Research on the role of emotion in decision‐making and judgement contexts suggests that it can have both positive and disruptive effects (Damasio, 1994; Thiele, 2006). Positive effects are arguably due to the way emotions frame salient aspects of a problem task and help to focus attention and subsequent problem‐solving efforts on these features. With respect to its disruptive effects, some individuals lack specific emotional competencies, such as emotional awareness or the capacity to manage aversive emotions adaptively, making it harder for them to make good decisions in certain contexts. These problems could be due to the presence of distorted desires (e.g., seeking to dominate others) resulting from impoverished learning histories and opportunities. A study by Damasio and his colleagues provides a good description of the adaptive role of emotions in judgement tasks (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1997). In this study participants with bilateral damage of the ventromedial sector of the prefrontal cortex failed to demonstrate galvanic skin responses when engaged in a gambling task. The result was that their judgement was especially poor and they exhibited high levels of inappropriate risk‐taking. Somatic markers such as a galvanic skin response (GSR) in normal participants appeared to function as a non‐conscious cue that a particular card choice was ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and facilitated sound judgement. In other words, emotions can help people to make better judgements in some situations. The diversity of emotions and their association with multiple organism systems mean that they can enhance or obstruct decision‐making depending on: (a) type of emotion, their strength, and the specific context in which they occur; (b) where in the decision‐making process they exert an influence; and (c) the resources of the person concerned.

Cognition and Emotion

Cognition is an umbrella concept that refers to a range of capacities and processes including attention, decision‐making, perception, attention, evaluation, thinking, memory and problem‐solving (Maiese, 2011). The relationship between emotion and the different types of cognitive functions is hypothesized to vary from mediation (where emotional processes and cognition are both causally involved in producing an effect) to moderation (where emotion affects the strength of the relationship between cognition and action). In many instances it is not possible to distinguish between the cognitive and emotional components of a psychological process. In fact, neuroscience research has demonstrated that emotion and cognition utilize many of the same neural circuits and, biologically speaking, are closely allied, even fused, processes (Pessoa, 2013). Furthermore, in a recent review of the relationship between cognition and emotion, Pessoa (2013) stated, ‘the architectural features of the brain provide massive opportunity of cognitive–emotional interactions encompassing all brain territories’ (p. 257) and ‘when we consider the available neuroscientific data, attempts to characterize regions as either “emotional” or “cognitive” quickly break down’ (p. 258). For example, in Richard Lazarus’s appraisal theory of emotion, (cognitive) appraisal is at the centre of an emotional response, either primarily causing it or, at the very least, is an important associated factor (Lazarus, 1991). Johnson (2007) describes the role of appraisal process in the following quote:

every emotional response is part of a process in which there is some appraisal of how a given emotionally competent stimulus stands in relation to the potential well‐being of the organism. Our emotional responses are based on both our nonconscious and conscious assessments of the possible harm, nurturance, or enhancement that a given situation may bring to our lives. (p. 60).

Thus affective phenomena such as moods, discrete emotion and affective dispositions contain cognitive elements as part of their nature. In addition, with respect to cognitive processes like attention and problem‐solving capacities, theorists such as Colombetti (2014), Thompson (2007) and Maiese (2011) have plausibly argued that affective phenomena are essential for their normal functioning. In the case of attention, emotional framing directs attention resources to salient aspects of the internal or external environment for further processing. While, effective problem solving is crucially reliant on affective framing and filtering to help weight options and to arrive at a balanced solution.

Values and Emotion

To grasp the relationship between emotions and values, the pervasiveness of normativity must be examined. Values refer to those aspects of the world that confer benefits to organisms (i.e., help it to survive, flourish, etc.). The influence of values is evident in norms that govern the functioning of different action sequences, such as predator behaviour, workings of biological systems, the application of human moral systems and social relationships. In speaking of the essential roles of norms in biological and social systems, Christensen (2012, p. 104) views normativity as being ‘inherent in the organization or form of living systems, specifically in the form that generates their unity and hence explains their existence’. Normative principles are natural since they specify the functional parameters of biological systems and social practices and develop agency in organisms of all types. Norms are reflected in action goals and the strategies selected to further these goals are evaluated against these norms, typically in a fluid, dynamic and immediate manner, in ‘real time’. In complex animals such as humans the capacity to flexibly adjust goal‐directed strategies and plans in response to changing environmental contingencies is, in part, due to cognitive capacity and to the availability of social and cultural resources (Sterelny, 2012).

Emotions may be viewed as motivational states which function as signals that the organism needs to deal with relevant challenges, whether they are threats, reward opportunities, or physical needs. As I will discuss in the section on enactivism, persons, like all living organisms, are autonomous adaptive systems in which core affective processes direct internal and behavioural processes to protect, repair and advance survival; and in the case of human beings, to achieve greater levels of well‐being.

Conceptualization and Emotional Experience

There is current research interest in the neuroevolutionary origin of emotions and their role in animal and human functioning. Panksepp and Biven (2012) argue that empirical evidence supports the existence of seven emotional systems that have evolved in mammals: fear, seeking (desire), rage, lust, care, grief, play and self (feelings related to subjectivity). Each emotional system is thought to have powerful effects on organisms’ abilities to respond to their environments and to engage in life‐sustaining, enhancing and harm‐avoiding behaviours. An important implication of this research is that emotional experience is comparable across mammals, although in human culture it shapes the nature of this experience, and its expression, considerably. The similarity of emotional experience entails that it is non‐conceptual, or at the very least, is not necessarily language dependent. This follows from the fact that although animals appear to experience emotions, they do not have language or a conceptual life in the same way that humans do. The possibility of experiencing emotions in the absence of language also applies to babies and young infants given that they also do not appear to possess language or categories. However, it is widely accepted that babies and young infants do have an affective life and are capable of emotionally responding to situations in comparable ways to older children and adults (Colombetti, 2014). In clinical domains, the difficulty that individuals who have offended hold in identifying, managing, or expressing emotions may also indicate problems describing psychological phenomena linguistically (Greenberg, 2002).

Subjective experience constitutes the meaning of the emotional episode for a person (e.g., threat, love, anger or pleasure). It is, therefore, mistaken to assume that because emotions can be expressed in language, a lack of linguistic description implies an absence of the relevant emotional experience. It also suggests that for some individuals therapeutic interventions might need to be relatively non‐linguistic, even non‐conceptual, and involve purely physical or action based techniques (see below).

Emotion, Cognition and Motivation

As is evident from the above review, emotions motivate organisms to act in ways that promote their goals within certain environments; they are action tendencies evoked automatically by internal and/or external cues. A difficulty with cognitive theories of emotions is that they struggle to account for the immediacy of the call to action. This is because the action, experiential and somatic aspects of emotion are hypothesized to follow an initial appraisal process. It is thought that the meaning of a situation is evaluated in terms of its theme and implications for the welfare of the organism. However, this is doubtful for three major reasons. First, there does not appear to be a delay between an appraisal phase and the other emotional components (Colombetti, 2014). Second, the neuroscientific evidence suggests that emotional and cognitive processes emerge in a coherent way together and, in addition, overlap (Pessoa, 2013). Third, identifying emotionally salient features would be cognitively overwhelming unless there had been some kind of initial affective framing (see below). In other words, without some kind of prior affective and somatic responses, the organism would struggle to evaluate events as well‐being related. There would be too many possible ways of interpreting situations. Therefore, cognition must be guided by, or linked to, the other facets of emotion right from the start.

Thus, contemporary theory and research points to a close relationship between emotions, cognition, and motivation. In fact, all three are components or the functional consequences of the experience of emotion. For example, the emotion of anger incorporates a cognitive element (e.g., ‘I am under threat’), affective tone element (e.g., ‘This feels bad’) and a motivational element (e.g., ‘I need to remove the threat’). The puzzle is to explain how these components are causally linked. I argue below that the enactive theoretical perspective can answer this question.

An Enactive Approach

The Enactive Mind

In his seminal book, Mind in Life, Evan Thompson (2007), building on his earlier work, developed an enactive, phenomenological view of the mind that sought to integrate philosophy, biology, psychology and cognitive neuroscience. In this book he stated that, ‘Enaction means the action of enacting a law, but also connotes the performance or carrying out of an action more generally’ (p. 13). While Thompson briefly considered the nature of emotion from an enactive perspective, in recent years theorists such as Colombetti (2014) and Maiese (2011) have developed this strand of enactivism in much greater detail. In this chapter I draw heavily on all three theorists. First I will describe the major theoretical assumptions underpinning the general enactive view of the mind that is consistent with contemporary neuroscience, philosophical and psychological research and at odds with current cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) correctional practice.

From the viewpoint of enactivism, organisms are dynamic, adaptive systems that are self‐organizing and inherently purposeful. Natural norms direct the actions of dynamic systems to sustain, repair and protect themselves from internal and external threats. The individual components of systems are organized in concert with each other and in response to environmental perturbations and challenges.

The causal relationships within each dynamic system are bidirectional and complex. The overall form and functional integrity of the system is created by the individual parts and their interrelationships, but, in turn, the whole exerts a causal influence on each part and recruits the resources within it, and from the environment, to ensure it is able to function adequately. Any damage is repaired and the physical resources needed to ensure its survival are either created within the organism or extracted from the environment and converted into resources (e.g., energy). Thus, dynamic adaptive systems such as animals are self‐sustaining and regulatory.

The above properties give organisms a subjective perspective and create a (proto) self in that all its actions and processes reflect a unique temporal, spatial and functional perspective. It has a point of view because its aim is to sustain and protect itself from external threats. The environment is monitored and evaluated with respect to its needs and interest and in this sense everything it does reflects its singular viewpoint. Consciousness and self‐awareness enable organisms to direct attention more effectively to potential benefits and potential harms and to construct longer‐term plans for adaptive action. The goal‐directed nature of complex systems and the ability to flexibly control one’s own activities and actions, causally generates the capacity for agency and a self‐conception or sense of identity.

According to enactivism, the mind and its various psychological properties emerge from lower‐level biological processes. The development of a mind gives the organism more degrees of freedom with respect to self‐regulation and management of needs and core interests. An organism’s goal‐directed activities can be seen as sense‐making, and as a form of cognition. Information about the internal state of the organism and its relationship to the environment is relayed to its internal components and an appropriate response selected. Thus, the mind is not a thing but rather an interrelated set of psychological capacities and powers that are essentially dispositions to act in accordance with an organism’s needs, interests and respective goals. Mental processes are completely and necessarily embodied in the brain, nervous system and all biological systems. The embodiment conception of human functioning is based on a relatively simple idea: human psychological functioning and sense of meaning is shaped in fundamental ways by bodily experience. Additionally, every bodily system (i.e., sensory, motor, nervous, immune, endocrine, etc.) is either constitutive of, or is causally implicated, in psychological functioning and subjective experience (Gibbs, 2006; Johnson, 2007). The mind and body are interrelated sets of processes. For example, physical gestures have been shown by researchers to provide a non‐verbal means of addressing problems of various kinds (e.g., mathematical problems). The research evidence suggests that gestures can foreshadow solutions before a person has consciously solved a problem, and, what is more, such a role is not simply one of emphasis or salience (McNeill, 2005).

Dynamic adaptive systems such as humans always exist in relation to specific environments or contexts, to which they respond and which they shape in ways that increase their chances of survival and enhancement. Cultural resources (e.g., language, norms, institutions, practices, etc.) are simply the contextual aspects of humans’ relationship to their social environment. Enactivism proposes that to understand dynamic systems you need to grasp that they always exist with respect to a specific environment, or what has been termed the world around (‘Umwelt’).

The scientific implications of an enactive conception of human functioning are considerable. First, the complexity of multi‐faceted human autonomous systems means that explanation needs to be multi‐level, dynamic and holistic rather than reductionist. Second, the basic role of sense‐making in life and mind means that for humans it is imperative to include subjective experience when seeking to explain social phenomena such as crime. Third, the relational nature of humans as adaptive autonomous systems entails that explanations should take the external environment into account alongside individuals’ relevant mental states and biological functioning. Relatedly, explanations should be dynamic and look to identify the causal processes that interact in the production of behaviour. The explanatory picture may change over time, and across contexts, and the relative balance of individual versus environmental explanation will vary accordingly.

An enactive Model of Emotion, Emotion and Motivation

The enactive model follows conceptually from the general enactive perspective sketched out above. In essence, it accepts a view of human beings as adaptive autonomous systems who are neurobiologically embodied. A variation on the general model is that provided by theorists such as Maiese (2011) and Colombetti (2014), who believe emotion is fundamental to the sense‐making nature of autonomous systems and operates in tandem with cognition; they are both instances of the sense‐making actions of organisms. In this vein, Colombetti (2014) states: