Subprime Cities E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Studies in Urban and Social Change
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 682

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2012

Beschreibung

Subprime Cities: The Political Economy of Mortgage Markets presents a collection of works from social scientists that offer insights into mortgage markets and the causes, effects, and aftermath of the recent 'subprime' mortgage crisis. * Provides an even-handed and detailed analysis of mortgage markets and the recent housing crisis * Features contributions from various social scientists with expertise in critical social theories who have assembled and analyzed detailed empirical information * Offers a unique and powerful rebuttal to many of the misleading popular explanations of the crisis and its aftermath * Reveals how racial minorities and the neighbourhoods inhabited by them are more likely to be targeted by subprime and predatory lenders

Leseprobe

Contents

Figures

Tables

Notes on Contributors

Foreword The Urban Roots of the Financial Crisis

Series Editors’ Preface

Acknowledgments

Part I Introduction

Subprime Cities and the Twin Crises

Introduction: Urban Political Economy

The Centrality of Cities in the Crisis

Deregulation and Re-Regulation

Globalization and Financialization

Bubbles and Credit Ratings

Post-Subprime Cities?

Overview

Part II The Political Economy of the Mortgage Market

1 Creating Liquidity Out of Spatial Fixity

Introduction

Real Estate, Housing, and the Secondary Circuit of Capital

The New Deal Housing Finance System and Rise of the Savings and Loan Industry

Economic Crisis and the Decline of the Savings and Loan Industry

Securitization as Crisis Management Strategy

The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Role of the US Federal Government

Discussion

Conclusions

2 Finance and the State in the Housing Bubble

Introduction

Relative Growth and Global Power

Deregulation and Securitization

US Leverage in Global Markets: A House of Cards or Playing the Housing Card?

The Intersection of the Micro-Politics of Race with the Macro-Economics of Housing

Conclusions

3 Expanding the Terrain for Global Capital

Situating the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in a Larger Landscape

Expanding the Operational Space of Advanced Capitalism

The Selectivity of Subprime Mortgage Lending

Subprime Mortgages: A New Global Frontier for Finance

Conclusion

4 Building New Markets

Introduction

Securitization: Opening the Black Box

Capital Switching or Capital Switchers? Producing Urban Space

A Historical Geography of Securitization

Migrating Metrics and the Arrival of US Bond-Rating Agencies in the UK

Building a Crisis: The “Credit Crunch” of 2007–?

Conclusion

5 European Mortgage Markets Before and After the Financial Crisis

Introduction

Differences and Similarities in European Mortgage Markets

Europeanization and Globalization of Mortgage Markets

Why Has Deterritorialization Been So Slow?

The Future of European Mortgage Markets

6 The Reinvention of Banking and the Subprime Crisis

Introduction

Banking Risks and the Transformation of US Banking and Mortgage Markets

From Financial Exclusion to Predatory Lending

From the Margins of the City to the Core of Global Finance

How Subprime Lending Became “Rational”

Why Economists Missed the Crisis

Conclusion

Part III Cities, Race, and the Subprime Crisis

7 Redlining Revisited

Introduction

Analytical Lens

Method and Data

Redlining Phase I: Racializing Housing Credit (1930–50)

Redlining Phase II: Redevelopment and Relocation (1950–80)

Redlining Phase III: Deregulation and the Subprime Mortgage Market (1980–2004)

Spatial Comparisons

Conclusion

8 The New Economy and the City

The American Dream

Mortgages, the New Economy, and the City

Subprime Lending

Measuring Foreclosure

Foreclosures in Essex County

The View from Vailsburg

Conclusion

9 Race, Class, and Rent in America’s Subprime Cities

Introduction

Rethinking “How the World Works”

Credit Rationing, Risk, and Race

Renting Capital

Metropolitan Market Penetration and Racial–Geographic Segmentation

Data

Results

Conclusions

Part IV Conclusion

10 Subprime Crisis and Urban Problematic

Introduction

Why the US Mortgage Market Generated the Subprime Crisis: A View from the Chapters

Economic Approaches to the Subprime Crisis

Globalization and New Rifts in Social Science Inquiry

The Urban Problematic in the Neoliberal Transition

Bringing the Urban Problematic and Heterodox Political Economy Together

The Widgets of the Post-Industrial World?

Conclusion

Glossary

Index

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Aalbers, Manuel.Subprime cities : the political economy of mortgage markets / Manuel B. Aalbers. – 1st ed.p. cm.Includes index.

ISBN 978-1-4443-3776-1 (hardback) – ISBN 978-1-4443-3777-8 (paper)1. Subprime mortgage loans. 2. Mortgage loans. 3. Global Financial Crisis, 2008–2009.I. Title.HG2040.15.A33 2012332.7′2–dc23

2011036441

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Figures

3.1

Comparison of financial crises

3.2

Ratio of residential mortgage debt to GDP: Emerging Asia, 2007

6.1

US mortgage debt by holder, 1968–2007

6.2

Annual percentage growth in US real GDP and outstanding mortgage debt, 1968–2007

6.3

Annual percentage change in US mortgage debt outstanding for selected holders, 1979–2009

6.4

Subprime lenders and structured investment vehicles

6.5

Redlining and subprime outcomes in a credit market

6.6

Demand and supply shifts in the mortgage market during the 2000s due to housing/securitization boom

7.1

1938 Sacramento residential security map

7.2

1949 redevelopment survey area map of Sacramento

7.3

Preliminary map of areas with racially restrictive covenants and mortgage deficient areas in Sacramento County

7.4

Percentage of prime loan denials by census tract for Sacramento County in 2004

7.5

Percentage of subprime loans by census tract for Sacramento County in 2004

8.1

Percentage of loans originated 2000–03 in foreclosure in 2004, Essex County, New Jersey

9.1

Denial rate for conventional mortgage applications, vs. rate-spread share of conventional loan originations, by metropolitan area, 2006

9.2

Metropolitan coefficients of racial segmentation, non-Hispanic African American borrowers, 2006

9.3

Metropolitan coefficients of racial segmentation, Latino/Latina borrowers, 2006

9.4

Metropolitan coefficients of income segmentation and SPV sales conduits, 2006

9.5

Racialized circuits of capital and extent of state legal protections from predatory lending, 2006

Tables

2.1

Population adjusted rates of growth, 1991–2005 or 2006

2.2

Stock of international investment positions, 2007

3.1

New York City, rate of subprime lending by borough, 2002–06

3.2

Ten New York City community districts with the highest rates of subprime lending, 2006

3.3

Rate of conventional subprime lending by race in New York City, 2002–06

3.4

Ratio of residential real estate loans to total loans, developed markets (December 31, 2005)

3.5

Ratio of residential real estate loans to total loans, emerging markets (December 31, 2005)

3.6

Ratio of household credit to personal disposable income, 2000–05

5.1

LTV-ratio, average loan term, and default rate in eight EU countries, ordered by LTV-ratio, respectively 2001 and 2003

5.2

LTI-ratio and mortgage debt in nine European countries, ordered by LTI-ratio, 2003

5.3

Mortgage debt in the European Union and in the US, ordered by homeownership rate, 2004

5.4

Securitization issuance in Europe, 1996–2005

5.5

Securitization in Europe per country, total issuance 2000–05

5.6

Mortgage value chain and prospects for globalization

9.1

Action taken on loan applications, 2004–06

9.2

Race/ethnicity and subprime lending, 2004–06

9.3

Model fit diagnostics for credit history instrument

9.4

Subprime segmentation models

9.5

Segmentation and state regulatory space, 2004–06

Notes on Contributors

Manuel B. Aalbers – a human geographer, sociologist, and urban planner – is Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies at the University of Amsterdam. Manuel has been a guest researcher at Columbia University (New York), New York University, City University of New York, the University of Milan-Bicocca, and the University of Urbino (Italy). He is the author of Place, Exclusion, and Mortgage Markets (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) and two Dutch books; the associate editor of the Encyclopedia of Urban Studies (Sage, 2010) and the journal TESG; and book review editor of Dutch urban planning journal Rooilijn. His main research interest lies in the intersection of housing and finance. Manuel has published extensively on redlining, social exclusion, financialization, gentrification, safety and security, and the Anglophone hegemony in academic writing. His website is http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/m.b.aalbers/.Gary Dymski is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Riverside. He received his B.A. in Urban Studies from the University of Pennsylvania in 1975, and an MPA from Syracuse University in 1977. Gary received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in 1987. From 2003 to 2009, Gary was the founding Executive Director of the University of California Center, Sacramento. Gary has been a visiting scholar in universities and research centers in Brazil, Bangladesh, Japan, Korea, Great Britain, Greece, and India. His most recent books are Capture and Exclude: Developing Nations and the Poor in Global Finance (Tulika Books, New Delhi, 2007), co-edited with Amiya Bagchi, and Reimagining Growth: Toward a Renewal of the Idea of Development, co-edited with Silvana DePaula (Zed, London, 2005).Kevin Fox Gotham is a Professor of Sociology and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs in the School of Liberal Arts (SLA) at Tulane University. He has research interests in real estate and housing markets, urban redevelopment policy, gentrification, race and ethnicity, and the political economy of tourism. He is currently writing a book with Miriam Greenberg (University of California-Santa Cruz) on the federal response to the 9/11 and the Hurricane Katrina disasters (under contract with Oxford University Press). He is author of Race, Real Estate and Uneven Development (SUNY Press, 2002), Authentic New Orleans (NYU Press, 2007), Critical Perspectives on Urban Redevelopment (Elsevier Press, 2001), and dozens of peer-reviewed articles and book chapters on housing policy, racial segregation, urban redevelopment, and tourism.Dan Hammel is Associate Professor and Director of the M.A. Program in the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Toledo. His work focuses on structural and policy changes in the American city, particularly the operation of the housing market in driving nearly four decades of gentrification and other polarizing dimensions of neighborhood change. His research has been published in Urban Studies, Urban Geography, Housing Policy Debate, Geografiska Annaler B, the Journal of Urban Affairs, and Environment and Planning A.David Harvey is a Distinguished Professor at the City University of New York (CUNY), Director of the Center for Place, Culture and Politics. He is the author of numerous books, most recently The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis of Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2010), A Companion to Marx’s Capital (Verso, 2010), and Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (Columbia University Press, 2009). He has been teaching Karl Marx’s Capital for nearly 40 years. His research interests include: geography and social theory; geographical knowledges; urban political economy and urbanization in the advanced capitalist countries; architecture and urban planning; Marxism and social theory; cultural geography and cultural change; environmental philosophies; environment and social change; ecological movements; social justice; geographies of difference; utopianism.Jesus Hernandez is currently completing his Ph.D. in Sociology at the University of California at Davis. His research focuses on how institutional structures and market interventions articulate the nexus between race and economy. For this volume, his work connects the current subprime loan crisis to historical processes of mortgage redlining and residential segregation, and demonstrates how racialized lending practices reproduce long-standing spatial and social patterns of inequality.Markus Moos is Assistant Professor in the School of Planning at the University of Waterloo. His research and teaching focus on urban housing markets, commuting, labor market restructuring, and the relations between sustainability planning and social justice in cities. His publications have appeared in the Journal of Urban Affairs, the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Urban Studies, Environment and Planning A, and Urban Geography. He is a Co-Investigator on an international, major collaborative research initiative led by Roger Keil, focusing on global suburban dynamics of governance, land, and infrastructure.Kathe Newman is Associate Professor in the Urban Planning and Policy Development Program at the Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy and Director of the Ralph W. Voorhees Center for Civic Engagement. Dr. Newman holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Graduate School and University Center at the City University of New York. Her research explores urban change, what it is, why it happens, and what it means. Her research has explored gentrification, foreclosure, urban redevelopment, and community participation. Dr. Newman has published articles in Urban Studies, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Urban Affairs Review, Shelterforce, Progress in Human Geography, Housing Studies, GeoJournal, and Environment and Planning A.Saskia Sassen is the Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology and Co-Chair Committee on Global Thought at Columbia University. She is also a Centennial Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics. Her research and writing focuses on globalization (including social, economic and political dimensions), immigration, global cities (including cities and terrorism), the new networked technologies, and changes within the liberal state that result from current transnational conditions. In her research she has focused on the unexpected and the counterintuitive as a way to cut through established “truths.” She’s the author of many books, including The Mobility of Labor and Capital (Cambridge University Press, 1988), The Global City (Princeton University Press, 1991; 2nd edition, 2002), and Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton University Press, 2006).Herman Schwartz is Professor in the Politics Department at the University of Virginia, USA. His research focuses on economic development, change in the welfare state, and global capital flows. Before coming to the University of Virginia he taught on the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research. He has also been a Fulbright scholar at Aarhus University (Denmark) and the University of Calgary (Canada). Dr. Schwartz’s publications include Subprime Nation: American Power, Global Capital Flows and the Housing Bubble (Cornell), States versus Markets (Palgrave), and In the Dominions of Debt (Cornell), three edited volumes, The Politics of Housing Booms and Busts (Palgrave) with Leonard Seabrooke, Crisis, Miracles and Beyond (Aarhus) with Erik Albæk, Leslie Eliason and Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard, and Employment Miracles (Amsterdam) with Uwe Becker, and over 40 articles and chapters. His website is http://www.people.virginia.edu/∼hms2f.Thomas Wainwright is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Small Business Research Centre (SBRC) at Kingston University. He completed his first degree at the University of Leicester, and holds an MSc from the University of Nottingham. Tom completed his ESRC funded PhD in 2009 (University of Nottingham) where he investigated the UK mortgage market, wholesale banking, asset management and the unfolding of the credit crunch within the financial services sector. Tom then worked at the University of Nottingham as a Research Assistant on projects that examined wholesale-retail bank linkages and wealth management. His current research examines the effects of the credit crunch on small businesses and how individuals are becoming “olderpreneurs” to support themselves during retirement.Elvin Wyly is Associate Professor of Geography and Chair of the Urban Studies Program at the University of British Columbia. He studies the interaction of market processes and public policy in the production of social and spatial inequalities in North American cities. With Patricia A. McCoy, he guest edited a special issue of Housing Policy Debate (2004), “Market Failures and Predatory Lending.” He has also published in City & Community, City, the Journal of Urban Affairs, Urban Studies, Environment and Planning A, the Review of Black Political Economy, and the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.

Foreword

The Urban Roots of the Financial Crisis

David Harvey

Shortly after arriving in Baltimore in 1969, I became involved in a study of inner city housing provision that focused mainly on the role of different actors – landlords, tenants and homeowners, the brokers and lenders, the FHA, the city authorities (Housing Code Enforcement in particular) – in the production of the terrifying rat-infested living conditions in the areas wracked by riots in the wake of the assassination of Martin Luther King the year before. The vestiges of redlining of areas of low income African American population were clearly visible but now justified as a legitimate response to high credit risk (a view that the financial institutions and the FHA clearly articulated). In several areas of the city, active blockbusting practices were to be found. And there was a considerable scandal and court suit over a practice called the “Land Installment Contract” that purportedly was designed to give African American populations access to the American dream of home ownership. Some takers made it (usually in neighborhoods that were declining in value) but in unscrupulous hands (and there were many) this turned out to be a particularly predatory form of accumulation by dispossession on the backs of African Americans that were otherwise excluded from mortgage finance. In the midst of this there were still desultory attempts at urban renewal and neighborhood upgrading, funded with a good deal of help from the Federal Government that accepted that it had a distinctively “urban crisis” on its hands and had multiple programs on tap for urban up-grading. It was only in his State of the Union address of 1973 that President Nixon declared the urban crisis was over. I looked around the city and it then seemed no different to me. What he meant, of course, was that he was cutting the money because he needed it to close out the Vietnam War and keep US imperial power intact.

When I go back to Baltimore now I find it looks even worse than I remember, in part because the inequalities that are always written into any urban landscape are now so much grosser and so much more blatant and callous – as if nobody cared to try and conceal them anymore. Certainly it looks that way in The Wire too.

I had not read Marx or Engels when I arrived in Baltimore, but when I did I was struck by how useful it all was. Speaking to landlords about the distinction between use value and exchange value made a lot of sense to them (they were grateful that I was not an economist they said because I talked sense). The formulation that policies are least successful where they are most needed and most successful where they are least needed sounded exact to many housing inspectors. The bureaucrats and financiers found Engels’ formulation in The Housing Question (1872) – that the bourgeoisie has no solution to the housing question, it only moves the problem around – devastatingly accurate. I did not say it exactly that way of course, and when I did confess to one New York banker, who found the formulation particularly appropriate, that I got it from Engels he surmised that Engels must be working at the Brookings Institution.

I mention all this for two reasons. Firstly, the impression probably emerges from my writings (now described by Dymski as canonical) that I applied Marx and Engels to the urban situation when the reality was that I actually learned what Marx and Engels meant and gained confidence in their formulations from the urban experience to which I was exposed during those years. I was and continue to be just a geographer trying to make sense of the world and change it. The second thing I had to learn was that the long history of racial discrimination could not be avoided as foundational. On the surface, this did not fit too easily with the emphasis on class relations in Marx and Engels. I had to learn to see the way, as Manning Marable (1983) puts it, that race becomes the prism through which issues of class are both experienced and seen in the United States, given the long history of white supremacy and racism. It is not only a question of race, of course. Gender issues are equally paramount and in many instances, particularly in US cities, ethnic identifications (as in East Baltimore) are crucial. However, it is very important to look through the prism, but in doing so to keep the class content very much in view.

I have not followed developments in the housing situation in Baltimore very closely since the late 1970s. But I do know that the land-installment contract scandal that drew a civil rights suit against certain landlords and financiers is now echoed by a civil rights suit against Wells Fargo on the grounds of predatory lending practices that particularly targeted African Americans and in many instances single-headed households, usually women. In between there are multiple scandals over “flipping” in the early 1990s. But at its foundation, and here I may sound dogmatic, we are dealing with a class relation in which those with money add to their pile by effectively robbing those with slender resources or who can easily be victimized. In this instance class, race, and gender overlap and intertwine. I cannot show exactly the connections, but when the Wall Street bonuses add up to roughly the amount that the African American population lost through predatory lending practices, then we have to rotate the prism and take another look: and there it is, just as Marx and Engels said, increasing concentration of wealth at one pole and increasing accumulation of misery, toil, and degradation at the other pole.

The crisis in subprime lending that triggered the financial crisis of 2008–2010 was widespread across the United States but particularly deeply rooted in the housing markets of California, Nevada, Arizona, and Florida. Overinvestment and speculative activity in the housing and property markets in Spain, Ireland, Britain, and elsewhere, complemented the bursting of the US housing bubble to engulf the world in first a financial and then a generalized crisis in the functioning of global capitalism. The crisis quickly spread to export producers who suddenly found themselves with drastic fall-offs in consumer demand that prompted lay-offs. But it has now gone on to trigger a fiscal crisis in state expenditures (everywhere from California to Greece) to deal with unemployment and to bail out the banks. The remedy for state fiscal shortfalls, in many parts of the advanced capitalist world, is draconian austerity with particularly dire consequences for the most vulnerable classes and for public sector unions (as dramatically witnessed in Wisconsin). The fact that much of the problem derived from financial shenanigans, and that the banks live in a world where their moral hazard is covered while everyone else pays up, is now cheerfully forgotten in a welter of complaints that it is the greedy public sector unions who are at the root of the fiscal crisis of the state. Prop up and give succor to the banks and sock it to the people has been the neoliberal tactic all along (it was done to New York City in 1975, then Mexico in 1982, and on and on).

Read backwards this says: current fiscal difficulties of the states (and proposed austerities) were derived from a global crisis of capitalism that arose out of the near collapse of a financial system that was caught in a tangled web of property market speculation that reflected malfunctioning processes of urbanization driven by the need to find outlets for overaccumulating capital. There has, prior to the publication of Subprime Cities, been very little concern for examining and interpreting this sequence of events and explaining the role of urbanization and financialization (along with rent-seeking) in this whole dynamic. What this book does is to begin the complex task of exploring and explaining the urban roots of crisis formation in general and of the dynamics of the most recent crisis in particular.

That capitalism exhibits a general tendency towards periodic crises of overaccumulation is indisputable. The stock market crash of 2001–2002, associated with the bursting of the “dot-com” speculative bubble (that saw major corporations like Enron and WorldCom bite the dust), left the world with a mass of surplus liquidity, of money capital desperately searching for some profitable place to go. That the surplus liquidity might flood into real estate, with potentially disastrous consequences, though not predetermined, was always on the cards. After all, it had done so many times before. Recent studies have revealed, for example, how real estate investments, both housing and commercial property, boomed speculatively during the 1920s in the United States before crashing just before the general stock market debacle of 1929. The dark economic days of the 1970s were ushered in by a collapse of property markets particularly in the United States and Britain in early 1973 (a full six months before the oil embargo put added pressure on Western economies). The effect was not only to bankrupt real estate investment trusts and other property investment vehicles, but also to stress out municipal finances (such that New York City, with one of the biggest public budgets in the world, went virtually bankrupt in 1975 in much the same way that Californian finances are close to total collapse now) and to put several banks worldwide on the brink of if not actually in failure. The turbulent years of neoliberalism since the late 1970s have witnessed multiple financial crises associated with property markets and urban development. The end of the Japanese boom of the 1980s was marked by a collapse of land prices, which is still ongoing. The Swedish banking system had to be nationalized in 1992 because of excesses in property markets. One of the triggers for the collapse in East and Southeast Asia in 1997–8 was excessive urban development in Thailand and Indonesia. The commercial property-led Savings and Loan Crisis of 1984–90 in the United States saw several hundred financial institutions go belly-up at the cost of some $200 billion to the US taxpayers (much of which was, however, eventually recouped as the 1990s boom set in).

This turbulent history runs totally counter to Robert Shiller’s (the expert economist on housing) recent assertion in the New York Times (2011) that housing market crises are relatively rare and we really have nothing much to fear for the future (even as the housing market, like Japanese land prices, keeps on its downward spiral throughout much of the US). Several people saw the dangers early on. I certainly did. In The New Imperialism (2003a: 113) I wrote

the most important prop to the US and British economies after the onset of general recession in all other sectors from mid 2001 onwards was the continued speculative vigor in the property and housing markets and construction … What happens if and when this property bubble bursts is a matter for serious concern.

It should be clear from this that the connectivity existing between urban processes and property development and macro-economic disruptions and shifts is deep and enduring. In the most recent case, what is termed the subprime foreclosure crisis was rooted in urban processes. Subprime lending, some of it highly predatory, was going on in many cities from the mid-1990s onwards. In some instances it could be clothed in benevolence towards the underprivileged and all those hitherto excluded from access to the American Dream. That it was really about accumulation by dispossession (although a lucky few made money in this situation) could all too easily be disguised. But it only led to financial collapse when it spread into more affluent places.

Urbanization has, however, just as often proven to be a solution to crises as it has been the locus of their unfolding. I have often cited the case of Second Empire Paris (e.g., Harvey 2003b), where a profound crisis of overaccumulation in 1848, in which surplus capital and surplus labor lay side by side with seemingly no way to put either back to profitable work, resulted in fierce revolutionary movements. In this case, Louis Bonaparte, wearing the mantle of his uncle, seized the moment, and took arbitrary powers in a coup d’état before declaring himself Emperor. But he knew all too well that he would not stay in power unless he put all that surplus capital and excess labor back to work. Part of the answer lay in the redesign and rebuilding of Paris, a process expertly managed by Haussmann with results that have lasted until today. Similarly, the state promoted and subsidized suburbanization wave that engulfed the United States after 1945 was a crucial element in ensuring that the United States (and the rest of the capitalist world which at that time depended upon the US as the locomotive of capital accumulation) did not fall back into the recession conditions that had bedeviled the 1930s. The construction industry had frozen up almost completely in the 1930s with very high rates of unemployment attached. It was precisely to counter that, that the mortgage finance reform was enacted in 1934, but it really did not gain traction until after 1945.

And in so far as there has been any exit from the crisis this time, it is notable that the housing and property boom in China along with a huge wave of debt-financed infrastructural investments there have taken a leading role not only in stimulating their internal market (and mopping up unemployment in the export industries) but also in stimulating the economies that are tightly integrated into the China trade, such as Australia with its raw materials and Germany with its high speed rail exports. In the United States, on the other hand, construction has been slow to revive with the unemployment rate in that industry more than twice that of the national average.

The virtue of housing and property markets from the standpoint of capital is that they have the capacity to absorb the vast amounts of surplus capital and surplus labor that capital perpetually produces. While investments in the land cannot move, property titles to them certainly can (as Marx noted when looking at the booms and busts in railroad investment in the nineteenth century). Surpluses of money capital in one place can easily be absorbed, therefore, by the building of a new geographical landscape for production, consumption, and daily life elsewhere. This does require, of course, adequate techniques of mediation in financial markets and the advent of securitization and various other financial instruments after 1980 or so certainly created new speculative possibilities (all of this being meticulously laid out in some of the chapters that follow). The big problem, however, is ascertaining when overinvestment is nigh. Urban investments typically take a long time to produce and an even longer time to mature so as to offer a return on capital. It is always difficult to determine, therefore, when an overaccumulation of capital has been or is about to be transformed into an overaccumulation of investments and asset values in the built environment. The likelihood of overshooting, as regularly happened with the railways in the nineteenth century and as the long history of building cycles and crashes shows, is very high. There is evidence mounting that China’s investment spree in creating the built environment is getting closer and closer to a state of overaccumulation. The problem is that it is hard to see and control until it is too late. Asset markets invariably have a Ponzi character: one person invests in property and prices go up so another invests and so on. If and when overinvestment is either feared or becomes apparent then the whole thing crashes. It is now difficult to see where all the surplus liquidity can go and where it will find a profitable outlet for investment. In the United States (as opposed to China), banks and businesses are stashing it away as cash reserves.

But what to do about all this? We can, of course, turn it all into a series of policy questions and seek a programmatic solution to the malfunctioning, the inequalities, the discriminations, and the like. I am a bit too old in the tooth, or maybe cynical, to go for that any more. All that will happen is that the problem will be moved around while those that have will learn to benefit at the expense of those that do not. I have lived through so many generations of anti-poverty initiatives (locally and globally) to realize that you cannot deal with the question of poverty without confronting the accumulation of wealth. If everyone drawn to an anti-poverty initiative converted to an anti-wealth campaign, an anti-capitalist politics, then we might get somewhere. But the city is a terrain where anti-capitalist struggle can flourish. The history of such struggles, from the Paris Commune through the Seattle General Strike to the movements of 1968 (and now we see them in Cairo) is stunning but also troubled. The “right to the city” may be an empty signifier but that does not mean it is irrelevant. It all depends who gets to fill it with meaning and then, as Marx puts it, between equal rights force decides.

An anti-capitalist struggle is about the abolition of the class relation between capital and labor and even when that struggle has to be seen through the kaleidoscopic prism of race, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender it still has to reach into the very guts of what a capitalist system is about and wrench out the cancerous tumor of class relations. This is, I recognize, another kind of project to that which is undertaken here in this volume. The diagnoses here are fine. We have here an astonishing and revelatory understanding of the urban roots of the fiscal crisis. But we need either another volume on what might be done in response or a set of evolving practices that change our urban world in radical anti-capitalist ways.

References

Engels, F. (1872) The Housing Question. Leipzig: Volksstaat.

Harvey, D. (2003a) The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harvey, D. (2003b) Paris, Capital of Modernity. New York: Routledge.

Marable, M. (1983) How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America. Boston: South End Press.

Shiller, R.J. (2011) Housing Bubbles Are Few and Far Between. New York Times February 5: BU5, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/business/06view.html (last accessed: February 23, 2011).

Series Editors’ Preface

The Wiley-Blackwell Studies in Urban and Social Change series is published in association with the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. It aims to advance theoretical debates and empirical analyses stimulated by changes in the fortunes of cities and regions across the world. Among topics taken up in past volumes and welcomed for future submissions are:

Connections between economic restructuring and urban changeUrban divisions, difference, and diversityConvergence and divergence among regions of east and west, north, and southUrban and environmental movementsInternational migration and capital flowsTrends in urban political economyPatterns of urban-based consumption

The series is explicitly interdisciplinary; the editors judge books by their contribution to intellectual solutions rather than according to disciplinary origin. Proposals may be submitted to members of the series’ Editorial Committee, and further information about the series can be found at www.suscbookseries.com.

Jenny RobinsonNeil BrennerMatthew GandyPatrick Le GalèsChris PickvanceAnanya Roy

Acknowledgments

Early in 2007 I sent around a call for papers for a conference session on “The Sociology and Geography of Mortgage Markets.” At the end of that summer, very early drafts of some of the chapters of this book were presented at the annual RC21 conference that took place in Vancouver, Canada. In the months in between, the US mortgage market, and in particular the subprime market, had been falling apart, exactly what some of the authors of this book had suggested previously. Elvin Wyly, one of the contributing authors, was one of the local organizers of the conference. I would like to thank him and the other organizers for allowing us a forum to discuss the issues of this book, including but not limited to: subprime lending, the mortgage market crisis, securitization, and urban political economy. Subsequently, I organized a special issue for the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (issue 33.2, June 2009) on “The Sociology and Geography of Mortgage Markets: Reflections on the Financial Crisis.” I would like to thank the journal’s editors, Roger Keil, Jeremy Seekings, and Terry McBride, not only for supporting the special issue but also for allowing us to include updated and expanded versions of the IJURR papers in this book. After the special issue was accepted, the idea of a book quickly came about. On the one hand, we were eager to update our papers and increase the dialogue between the different contributions. On the other hand, we were frustrated with most of the books that were being published on the financial crisis, as many of them still ignore or misrepresent what had been, and to some extent still is, taking place in the mortgage market. Along with the media, many of those books continued to spread subprime myths that we wanted to address. Personally, I was also eager to include more authors in this book than we had been able to include in the special issue. This allowed us to shift the focus to include more political economy perspectives, as represented by the chapters by Herman Schwartz and Gary Dymski. The idea of this book was fully supported by two fantastic book series editors, Jennifer Robinson and Neil Brenner, as well as by the people at Wiley-Blackwell, including Jacqueline Scott. Philip Ashton and Chris Pickvance assessed the draft manuscript and proposed a number of changes – most of which were excellent suggestions and have clearly improved the quality of the book and the connections between the different chapters. Finally, I would like to thank all the contributing authors, and in particular Gary Dymski who wrote the concluding chapter, for their work. Every time I asked them to adapt, expand, shorten, or update their chapters, they did. It was a pleasure to work with you, you have been great supporters of continuing this project, and I truly believe that thanks to all your work, the sum of the chapters of this book is greater than its parts.

Manuel B. AalbersBrooklyn, December 2010

Part I

Introduction

Subprime Cities and the Twin Crises

Manuel B. Aalbers

Introduction: Urban Political Economy

From the early 1970s to the late 1980s debates on homeownership and mortgage markets were at the center of urban sociology and human geography. Although the interest in mortgage markets in social science has waned since, the importance of mortgage markets to cities and societies has not. To the contrary: homeownership rates have steadily increased in most countries and mortgage markets have grown dramatically and now represent almost €12/$16 trillion worldwide. This expansion has happened at a time when most social scientists, including those in urban studies, have paid little attention to mortgage markets and have left the analysis to economists. The rise of subprime lending and securitization has resulted in a new interest among social scientists in mortgage markets; and this interest has only increased since the mortgage market crisis, and indeed the global financial crisis, of 2007–09. The authors represented in this book all started working on mortgage markets before the recent crisis, but their work, in many different ways, helps us to understand the origins and scope of this crisis.

Traditionally, the mortgage market has been the domain of economists. Other social scientists, most notably geographers, sociologists, and political scientists, have studied the mortgage market, but generally they were considered to work outside the mainstream and their work has largely been ignored by economists. There have been times when geographers and sociologists have contributed greatly to the understanding of mortgage markets. Usually this was at times of turmoil and change as well as when exclusion in mortgage markets was an important issue. One explanation for this may be that mainstream economics, with its obsession with equilibrium, has trouble understanding change. As the political economist Thorstein Veblen already observed 75 years ago, “The question is not how things stabilize themselves in a ‘static state’, but how they endlessly grow and change” (Veblen 1934: 8). It is here that some forms of heterodox economics (including some forms of political economy) shake hands with sociology and geography. It is, to some degree, also the difference between “clean models” and “dirty hands” (Hirsh et al. 1987): while mainstream economics prefers “clean, abstract, and parsimonious modeling,” sociology and geography

produce empirically rich accounts of concrete and socially situated economic processes; they each emphasize the essential diversity of economic phenomena, favoring context-rich explanations in which history is taken seriously; they each attach greater significance to plausibility and explanatory power than to elegance and predictive power; and they each strive to explain, and often improve, the characteristically messy economic worlds that they encounter. (Peck 2005: 132)

This is not, as some have interpreted it, a clash between quantitative and qualitative methods. Although clean models are generally very quantitative (and often have to do more with mathematics than with statistics), not all quantitative work fits the idea of clean models. Indeed, many sociologists and geographers have been getting their hands dirty by presenting both quantitative and qualitative research on issues like redlining and predatory lending (see Glossary). Many of them, in particular in the US, also got involved with local communities and the wider, national community reinvestment movement (e.g., Squires 1992).

Among the various non-economists who have worked on mortgage markets, the work of David Harvey from the late 1970s and early 1980s is probably most well known (e.g., Harvey 1977; 1985). It is part of a broader interest of mostly Northern American sociologists, geographers, political scientists, urban planners, and political economists in redlining and related forms of discrimination in mortgage markets from the 1970s onwards (e.g., Bradford and Rubinowitz 1975; Marcuse 1979; Shlay 1989; Dymski and Veitch 1996; Wyly and Holloway 1999; Gotham 2002; Stuart 2003; Aalbers 2007; 2011). Here, the discipline of political economy should not be taken too narrow. There are many schools of thought that call themselves political economy. Political economy is sometimes referred to as a specific group of heterodox economists, but also as a group of political scientists interested in the economy, often in what is called “international political economy” or “comparative political economy.” In addition, there is also political economy within sociology and geography, which in its origins is heavily influenced by Marxist thinking as we can clearly see in the work of David Harvey. It is also related to the so-called “new urban sociology,” which seeks to situate urban sociology

within an equally emergent political economy, which requires urban sociology to be a more interdisciplinary enterprise (with economics and, to some degree, political science) than it has been. … By tying together urbanization, the quest for profit and domination, and the state’s attempts to moderate domestic conflict between social classes, the new urban sociology achieves a coherence the field had lacked since Weber typified “the city.” (Zukin 1980: 579)

What these different political economy traditions have in common is that they analyze “the economy within its social and political context rather than seeing it as a separate entity driven by its own set of rules based on individual self-interest” (Mackinnon and Cumbers 2007: 14). Therefore, political economists may come from different disciplinary backgrounds and they may be in dialogue with their “disciplinary home” more than with other political economy traditions, but each of these traditions is, almost by definition, interdisciplinary. This book includes a lot of work by academics who would often by referred to as urban sociologists and urban geographers, but they are all, to some degree, influenced by the political economic currents in their respective disciplines. In addition to these “urban political economists” this book also includes work by comparative political economist Herman Schwartz who has recently been seeking to establish a dialogue between comparative political economy and housing studies (Schwartz 2009; Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009) and by (political) economist Gary Dymski, who has been trying to build a relationship between economics and geography for a long time (e.g., Dymski 1996; 2009).

Presently we are living through another episode of turmoil and change in mortgage markets, and again the work of political economists of different traditions sheds new light on what is actually happening in the mortgage market. This book will not so much focus on how this crisis has spread to other sectors of the economy, but will look at the mortgage market and how problems have spread throughout mortgage markets. In all chapters, changes in the mortgage market have a central place. Some chapters present evidence of the changes that have resulted in what is often called the subprime mortgage crisis; others are more focused on some of the structural changes in the mortgage market than on the crisis itself.

The term “subprime mortgage crisis” is misleading, not only because the problem has spread throughout and beyond the mortgage market, but also because the problems did not start with subprime mortgages. Subprime loans (see Glossary) have been one important ingredient in the recent crisis, but other ingredients go beyond subprime lending. What the mortgage boom, at least in the US, has created, however, are “subprime cities:” cities modeled by the flow of capital in and out of neighborhoods. This dynamic of making profits on the production, and indeed reproduction (or revitalization, or gentrification), of the built environment has resulted in suboptimal or subprime cities. In the next section I will elaborate on the idea of the twin crises (subprime and financial) as an inherently urban crisis. In the later sections of this chapter I will look at the twin crises as a combination of a number of interrelated causes, including: (1) deregulation and re-regulation, (2) financialization and globalization, and (3) bubbles and poor credit ratings. Different media and most economists have focused mostly on the latter, but one cannot explain what went wrong without attention to the first two as they, together, explain in which context bubbles could develop. I do not present a full theory of the twin crises here, but I do present a framework in which the authors of this book move and in which we have to look not only for the causes of the crisis, but also for the solutions.

The Centrality of Cities in the Crisis

In a publication released in early 2008, Gregory Squires asks the question “Do subprime loans create subprime cities?” His answer is yes, in the US, they do. Unequal access to conventional financial services is linked to rising inequality of income and wealth, and intensified segregation by class and race. The resulting uneven development is not just costly to disadvantaged areas, but “to all parts of many metropolitan areas and to the U.S. economy as a whole” because it undermines “the political stability, social development, and economic growth of the entire region” (Squires 2008: 2–3). Indeed, cities, and in particular US cities, are central to this crisis for at least four reasons.

First, the urban is the site of racial and ethnic inequalities in housing that can be exploited by brokers and other local actors who have knowledge of these geographies of inequality. Decades of financial deregulation have not resulted in wider access to mainstream financial services, but in a two-tier banking system with mainstream finance in most places next to a landscape of financial exclusion and predatory lending where banking services and the number of bank accounts have declined while fringe banking (pawn shops, payday lenders, etc.) and predatory lending flourish (Caskey 1994; Dymski 1999; Immergluck 2009; Leyshon and Thrift 1997; Squires 2004). Both quantitative and qualitative research show that “subprime loans are making credit available in communities where credit likely historically has not been – and likely still is not – as readily available” (Goldstein 2004: 40). The old geography of place-based financial exclusion (redlining) has not disappeared, but has been replaced – and to a large extent reproduced – by a new geography of predatory lending and overinclusion (see the chapters by Wyly et al., Newman, and Hernandez). Moreover, subprime lenders exploit uneven development that resulted from these earlier rounds of urban exclusion.

Second, cities take a special place in the subprime and foreclosure crisis because this crisis is not merely a financial crisis but also an urbanization crisis: at the root of this crisis is the real estate/financial complex (akin to the military/industrial complex) that fuelled both (sub-) urbanization and financialization. As David Harvey has argued, capital surplus has been absorbed into urbanization. Urban restructuring, expansion, and speculation are all ways to deal with this surplus. Indeed, cities have become huge building sites for capitalist surplus absorption – not only in the US but also elsewhere. In line with Harvey (1985), we can see how, through subprime lending, the urban has become the place of capital extraction (Wyly et al. 2006; Newman Chapter 8, this volume). Capital switching from the primary (production) to the secondary (built environment) circuit of capital may, at first sight, seem to benefit people who want to buy a house, but since it has resulted in dramatic increases in house prices, homeownership has simultaneously become more accessible and more expensive. The expansion of the mortgage market has not so much facilitated homeownership as it has facilitated capital switching to the secondary circuit of capital. By simultaneously expanding the mortgage market, by means of granting bigger loans, and by giving access to more households (so-called “underserved populations”), the growth machine (Logan and Molotch 1987) kept on working smoothly for a while. Yet, every growth machine or accumulation regime needs to keep on growing to function smoothly and it seems that the recent crisis has announced the beginning of the end of ever expanding mortgage markets (Aalbers 2008).

Third, the urban is the scale that matters for people who make decisions about housing and borrowing, and these decisions result in vast differences in mortgage supply. For example, in American Rustbelt cities subprime lending expanded first and foremost in neighborhoods of color; by contrast, the fastest-growing American Sunbelt cities became targets for the “exotic” loans targeted to middle-income and speculative house-flippers (see Glossary) as home prices crested. House prices can go down because of a structurally faltering economy, like in the Rustbelt, but also because they have been going up extremely fast, like in many cities in the Sunbelt. House prices in the Sunbelt were simply more inflated than elsewhere in the US: the housing bubble was bigger and more likely to bust. In addition, some local and regional economies in the Sunbelt also show signs of a declining economy, perhaps not structurally, as in the Rustbelt, but conjuncturally. Finally, high economic growth also meant a lot of new construction and more homeowners who had recently bought a house, thereby increasing the pool of possible victims of falling housing prices (Aalbers 2009).

Fourth, the securitization of mortgage loans (see below and Glossary) increasingly takes place in global cities: highly concentrated command points that function as a global marketplace for finance (Sassen 2001; see also Langley 2006; Pryke and Lee 1995), such as New York and London. It is here that securities, bonds, and swaps are designed and sent into the world. At the height of the crisis – fall 2008 – publications such as the New York Times and New York Magazine had headlines like “Wall Street, R.I.P.” (Creswell and White 2008) and, with a reference to the novelist Tom Wolfe, “Good-bye, Masters of the Universe” (Cramer 2008). In a city where 20 percent of personal income tax and 45 percent of business income tax come from Wall Street, and many others are dependent on Wall Street employees’ spending, the crisis has its own geographies. About a quarter of the 188,000 Wall Street jobs are said to be lost and, since every Wall Street job supports two others in the city, the loss of jobs turns out to be quite dramatic. Not only are the financial services sector and the housing market impacted by the crisis, the services industry – from luxury retailers to restaurants, and from nannies to hotels – is also highly impacted: one high-end massage therapist, for example, lost 50 percent of her Wall Street clientele (Dominus 2008). Cornell medical College received $250 million from Citigroup in 2007 and the New York Public Library $100 million from private equity group Blackstone – both gifts were cancelled in 2008 (Gapper 2008). These are just a few of many, many examples.

Deregulation and Re-Regulation

Land underlies all real estate.1 Historically, the use of land, the desire to acquire it, and the need to regulate its transfer were among the fundamental reasons for the development of states. But land is also at the base of both power and wealth. Because land transaction administration and land surveys established the security and value of land, land not only became a secure investment, but it also became possible to borrow money based on the value of one’s land. This is the basis for the formation of a mortgage market. A mortgage is “a conveyance of an interest in real property given as security for the payment of a debt” (Dennis and Pinkowish 2004: 386); it “gives a lender contingent property rights over an asset of the debtor, and in the event of default the lender may activate those rights” (Carruthers 2005: 365). Although the mortgage system has changed tremendously throughout the centuries, and continues to change, the idea of the mortgage loan is still the same as it was thousands of years ago: the state secures property rights, including land ownership and homeownership, and owners can get relatively cheap loans (i.e., low interest rates) because in case of default the lender can take possession of the property. To cut a long story short: no state regulation, no property rights, no mortgage market. In other words, regulation is a necessary component of (semi-)capitalist societies (Polanyi 1944).

The mortgage market is the outcome of an institutionalization process and a large part of this process is finding ways to stabilize and routinize competition, which is an inherently political process (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Polanyi 1992; Fligstein 2001). Thus, mortgage markets are not only shaped and reshaped by mortgage lenders, but also by state institutions. Immergluck (2004) aptly speaks of “the visible hand of government” as many of the mortgage market institutions of today were designed by government and its institutions. Mortgage loan securitization, to which I will turn shortly, is essentially an invention designed by government and government-created institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The chapters by Gotham and, to a lesser extent, those by Schwartz, Dymski, Wyly et al., and Newman show how the US mortgage market is politically constructed and reconstructed. They show how the state has been instrumental in designing and successfully implementing secondary mortgage markets and the use of securitization, but also how they have enabled the development of subprime and predatory lending. As the chapters by Wainwright and Aalbers show, American conceptions of risk and securitization not only needed to be adapted to fit European markets, but European mortgage markets also needed to be re-regulated – and not just deregulated – to enable securitization (see also Aalbers et al. 2011).

In the US, the banking crisis of the late 1980s was a decisive moment that opened up the mortgage market to widespread securitization, due to the new regulatory framework laid out by state institutions; for example, in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 that indirectly forced many lenders to convert from portfolio lending to off-balance lending. Deregulation also removed the walls between the different rooms of finance, thereby enabling existing financial firms to become active in more types of financial markets and providing opportunities for new mortgage lenders. Many of these new “non-bank lenders” had different regulators from traditional lenders and were also part of other, that is weaker, regulatory frameworks. In addition, it is not always clear which regulator watches what, and even when this is clear, this is no guarantee that regulators actually exercise their regulatory powers as they may be plagued by a lack of interest or a lack of manpower. Some similar re-regulation took place in the UK, as described by Hamnett (1994) and Wainwright (Chapter 4, this volume). In addition, global regulation by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in the so-called Basel Accord I (1988) established capital requirements for banks that encouraged them to place mortgages off-balance sheet, thereby stimulating securitization. The Basel Accord II (initially published in 2004 and to be fully implemented by 2015) has repaired this flaw, but with its Anglo-American bias it now stimulates risk management techniques, which could lead to an increasing use of credit scoring and risk-based pricing; methods that may promote safety, but can also be problematic in nature (see Aalbers 2011: chapter 3).

Globalization and Financialization

Globalization and financialization are not the same thing, but are often co-dependent: financialization needs globalization, and globalization, in turn, in part takes place through financialization. Financialization is a pattern of accumulation in which profit-making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production (Arrighi 1994; Krippner 2005). In a finance-led regime of accumulation (Boyer 2000) risks that were once limited to a specific actor in the production–consumption chain become risks for all of the actors involved in that industry. In such a regime, the rules and logics of Wall Street are increasingly becoming the rules and logics outside Wall Street: on Main Street and anywhere else. It also involves the increasing integration and simultaneous expansion of different financial sub-markets; for example, the mortgage market and the securitization market. The financialization of mortgage markets demands that not just homes but also homeowners become viewed as financially exploitable. It is exemplified by the securitization of mortgage loans, but also by the use of credit scoring and risk-based pricing (Aalbers 2008).

The standardized mortgage loan was introduced in the US by two private, yet government-created and “government-sponsored,” institutions and one public institution: the Federal National Mortgage Association, known as Fannie Mae; the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, known as Freddie Mac; and, the Government National Mortgage Association, known as Ginnie Mae (see Glossary). These organizations played a pivotal role in integrating mortgage markets throughout the US into one mortgage market, and were instrumental in implementing and institutionalizing three other important changes in mortgage markets: secondary mortgage markets, credit scoring, and risk-based pricing (see Glossary). In a primary mortgage market mortgages are closed between the borrower and the lender; in a secondary mortgage market investors can buy mortgage portfolios from lenders. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae were created to buy or guarantee such mortgage portfolios. Mortgage portfolios sold in the secondary mortgage market are usually classified (and subsequently rated) by risk profiles, because risk determines their price. Therefore, mortgage lenders classify loan applicants according to the risks that they pose to both lenders and investors. The calculation of housing costs and other financial obligations in proportion to income determines the likelihood that an applicant will be able to pay a mortgage, but moneylenders also attempt to assess whether they are willing to pay it back (Stuart 2003; Aalbers 2011). Credit scoring uses available information to make predictions about future payment behavior; it is a form of customer profiling (Leyshon and Thrift 1999; Thomas 2000).