166,99 €
System Health Management: with Aerospace Applications provides the first complete reference text for System Health Management (SHM), the set of technologies and processes used to improve system dependability. Edited by a team of engineers and consultants with SHM design, development, and research experience from NASA, industry, and academia, each heading up sections in their own areas of expertise and co-coordinating contributions from leading experts, the book collates together in one text the state-of-the-art in SHM research, technology, and applications. It has been written primarily as a reference text for practitioners, for those in related disciplines, and for graduate students in aerospace or systems engineering.
There are many technologies involved in SHM and no single person can be an expert in all aspects of the discipline.System Health Management: with Aerospace Applications provides an introduction to the major technologies, issues, and references in these disparate but related SHM areas. Since SHM has evolved most rapidly in aerospace, the various applications described in this book are taken primarily from the aerospace industry. However, the theories, techniques, and technologies discussed are applicable to many engineering disciplines and application areas.
Readers will find sections on the basic theories and concepts of SHM, how it is applied in the system life cycle (architecture, design, verification and validation, etc.), the most important methods used (reliability, quality assurance, diagnostics, prognostics, etc.), and how SHM is applied in operations (commercial aircraft, launch operations, logistics, etc.), to subsystems (electrical power, structures, flight controls, etc.) and to system applications (robotic spacecraft, tactical missiles, rotorcraft, etc.).
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 1506
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
About the Editors
List of Contributors
Foreword
Preface
Part One: The Socio-technical Context of System Health Management
Chapter 1: The Theory of System Health Management
Overview
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Functions, Off-Nominal States, and Causation
1.3 Complexity and Knowledge Limitations
1.4 SHM Mitigation Strategies
1.5 Operational Fault Management Functions
1.6 Mechanisms
1.7 Summary of Principles
1.8 SHM Implementation
1.9 Some Implications
1.10 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 2: Multimodal Communication
Overview
2.1 Multimodal Communication in SHM
2.2 Communication Channels
2.3 Learning from Disaster
2.4 Current Communication in the Aerospace Industry
2.5 The Problem of Sense-making in SHM Communication
2.6 The Costs of Faulty Communication
2.7 Implications
2.8 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Chapter 3: Highly Reliable Organizations
Overview
3.1 The Study of HROs and Design for Dependability
3.2 Lessons from the Field: HRO Patterns of Behavior
3.3 Dependable Design, Organizational Behavior, and Connections to the HRO Project
3.4 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 4: Knowledge Management
Overview
4.1 Systems as Embedded Knowledge
4.2 KM and Information Technology
4.3 Reliability and Sustainability of Organizational Systems
4.4 Case Study of Building a Learning Organization: Goddard Space Flight Center
4.5 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 5: The Business Case for SHM
Overview
5.1 Business Case Processes and Tools
5.2 Metrics to Support the Decision Process
5.3 Factors to Consider in Developing an Enterprise Model
5.4 Evaluation of Alternatives
5.5 Modifications in Selected Baseline Model
5.6 Modeling Risk and Uncertainty
5.7 Model Verification and Validation
5.8 Evaluation Results
5.9 Conclusion
Bibliography
Part Two: SHM and the System Lifecycle
Chapter 6: Health Management Systems Engineering and Integration
Overview
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Systems Thinking
6.3 Knowledge Management
6.4 Systems Engineering
6.5 Systems Engineering Lifecycle Stages
6.6 Systems Engineering, Dependability, and Health Management
6.7 SHM Lifecycle Stages
6.8 SHM Analysis Models and Tools
6.9 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Chapter 7: Architecture
Overview
7.1 Introduction
7.2 SHM System Architecture Components
7.3 Examples of Power and Data Considerations
7.4 SHM System Architecture Characteristics
7.5 SHM System Architecture Advanced Concepts
7.6 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 8: System Design and Analysis Methods
Overview
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Lifecycle Considerations
8.3 Design Methods and Practices for Effective SHM
8.4 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Chapter 9: Assessing and Maturing Technology Readiness Levels
Overview
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Motivating Maturity Assessment
9.3 Review of Technology Readiness Levels
9.4 Special Needs of SHM
9.5 Mitigation Approaches
9.6 TRLs for SHM
9.7 A Sample Maturation Effort
9.8 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 10: Verification and Validation
Overview
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Existing Software V&V
10.3 Feasibility and Sufficiency of Existing Software V&V Practices for SHM
10.4 Opportunities for Emerging V&V Techniques Suited to SHM
10.5 V&V Considerations for SHM Sensors and Avionics
10.6 V&V Planning for a Specific SHM Application
10.7 A Systems Engineering Perspective on V&V of SHM
10.8 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Chapter 11: Certifying Vehicle Health Monitoring Systems
Overview
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Durability for VHM Systems
11.3 Mechanical Design for Structural Health Monitoring Systems
11.4 Reliability and Longevity of VHM Systems
11.5 Software and Hardware Certification
11.6 Airworthiness Certification
11.7 Health and Usage Monitoring System Certification Example
11.8 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Part Three: Analytical Methods
Chapter 12: Physics of Failure
Overview
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Physics of Failure of Metals
12.3 Physics of Failure of CMCs
12.4 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 13: Failure Assessment
Overview
13.1 Introduction
13.2 FMEA
13.3 SFMEA
13.4 FTA
13.5 SFTA
13.6 BDSA
13.7 Safety Analysis
13.8 Software Reliability Engineering
13.9 Tools and Automation
13.10 Future Directions
13.11 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Chapter 14: Reliability
Overview
14.1 Time-to-Failure Model Concepts and Two Useful Distributions
14.2 Introduction to System Reliability
14.3 Analysis of Censored Life Data
14.4 Accelerated Life Testing
14.5 Analysis of Degradation Data
14.6 Analysis of Recurrence Data
14.7 Software for Statistical Analysis of Reliability Data
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Chapter 15: Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Overview
15.1 Introduction
15.2 The Space Shuttle PRA
15.3 Assessing Cumulative Risks to Assist Project Risk Management
15.4 Quantification of Software Reliability
15.5 Description of the Techniques Used in the Space Shuttle PRA
15.6 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 16: Diagnosis
Overview
16.1 Introduction
16.2 General Diagnosis Problem
16.3 Failure Effect Propagation and Impact
16.4 Testability Analysis
16.5 Diagnosis Techniques
16.6 Automation Considerations for Diagnostic Systems
16.7 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Chapter 17: Prognostics
Overview
17.1 Background
17.2 Prognostic Algorithm Approaches
17.3 Prognosis RUL Probability Density Function
17.4 Adaptive Prognosis
17.5 Performance Metrics
17.6 Distributed Prognosis System Architecture
17.7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Part Four: Operations
Chapter 18: Quality Assurance
Overview
18.1 NASA QA Policy Requirements
18.2 Quality System Criteria
18.3 Quality Clauses
18.4 Workmanship Standards
18.5 Government Contract Quality Assurance
18.6 Government Mandatory Inspection Points
18.7 Quality System Audit
18.8 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 19: Maintainability: Theory and Practice
Overview
19.1 Definitions of Reliability and Maintainability
19.2 Reliability and Maintainability Engineering
19.3 The Practice of Maintainability
19.4 Improving R&M Measures
19.5 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 20: Human Factors
Overview
20.1 Background
20.2 Fault Management on Next-Generation Spacecraft
20.3 Integrated Fault Management Automation Today
20.4 Human–Automation Teaming for Real-Time FM
20.5 Operations Concepts for Crew–Automation Teaming
20.6 Empirical Testing and Evaluation
20.7 Future Steps
20.8 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 21: Launch Operations
Overview
21.1 Introduction to Launch Site Operations
21.2 Human-Centered Health Management
21.3 SHM
21.4 LS Abort and Emergency Egress
21.5 Future Trends Post Space Shuttle
21.6 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 22: Fault Management Techniques in Human Spaceflight Operations
Overview
22.1 The Flight Operations Team
22.2 System Architecture Implications
22.3 Operations Products, Processes and Techniques
22.4 Lessons Learned from Space Shuttle and ISS Experience
22.5 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 23: Military Logistics
Overview
23.1 Focused Logistics
23.2 USMC AL
23.3 Benefits and Impact of SHM on Military Operations and Logistics
23.4 Demonstrating the Value of SHM in Military Operations and Logistics
23.5 Conclusion
Bibliography
Part Five: Subsystem Health Management
Chapter 24: Aircraft Propulsion Health Management
Overview
24.1 Introduction
24.2 Basic Principles
24.3 Engine-Hosted Health Management
24.4 Operating Conditions
24.5 Computing Host
24.6 Software
24.7 On-Board Models
24.8 Component Life Usage Estimation
24.9 Design of an Engine Health Management System
24.10 Supporting a Layered Approach
24.11 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 25: Intelligent Sensors for Health Management
Overview
25.1 Introduction
25.2 Sensor Technology Approaches
25.3 Sensor System Development
25.4 Supporting Technologies: High-Temperature Applications Example
25.5 Test Instrumentation and Non-destructive Evaluation (NDE)
25.6 Transition of Sensor Systems to Flight
25.7 Supporting a Layered Approach
25.8 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Chapter 26: Structural Health Monitoring
Overview
26.1 Introduction
26.2 Proposed Framework
26.3 Supporting a Layered Approach
26.4 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Chapter 27: Electrical Power Health Management
Overview
27.1 Introduction
27.2 Summary of Major EPS Components and their Failure Modes
27.3 Review of Current Power System HM
27.4 Future Power SHM
27.5 Supporting a Layered Approach
27.6 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 28: Avionics Health Management*
Overview
28.1 Avionics Description
28.2 Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Qualification
28.3 Environments
28.4 Failure Sources
28.5 Current Avionics Health Management Techniques
28.6 Avionics Health Management Requirements
28.7 Supporting a Layered Approach
28.8 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 29: Failure-Tolerant Architectures for Health Management
Overview
29.1 Introduction
29.2 System Failure Response Stages
29.3 System-Level Approaches to Reliability
29.4 Failure-Tolerant Software Architectures for Space Missions
29.5 Failure-Tolerant Software Architectures for Commercial Aviation Systems
29.6 Observations and Trends
29.7 Supporting a Layered Approach
29.8 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Chapter 30: Flight Control Health Management
Overview
30.1 A FC Perspective on System Health Management
30.2 Elements of the FC System
30.3 FC Sensor and Actuator HM
30.4 FC/Flight Dynamics HM
30.5 FC HM Benefits
30.6 Supporting a Layered Approach
30.7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 31: Life Support Health Management
Overview
31.1 Introduction
31.2 Modeling
31.3 System Architecture
31.4 Future NASA Life Support Applications
31.5 Supporting a Layered Approach
31.6 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 32: Software
Overview
32.1 Sampling of Accidents Attributed to Software Failures
32.2 Current Practice
32.3 Challenges
32.4 Supporting a Layered Approach
32.5 Conclusion
Bibliography
Part Six: System Applications
Chapter 33: Launch Vehicle Health Management
Overview
33.1 Introduction
33.2 LVSHM Functionality and Scope
33.3 LV Terminology and Operations
33.4 LV Reliability Lessons Learned
33.5 LV Segment Requirements and Architecture
33.6 LVSHM Analysis and Design
33.7 LV LVSHM System Descriptions
33.8 LVSHM Future System Requirements
33.9 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 34: Robotic Spacecraft Health Management
Overview
34.1 Introduction
34.2 Spacecraft Health and Integrity Concerns for Deep-Space Missions
34.3 Spacecraft SHM Implementation Approaches
34.4 Standard FP Implementation
34.5 Robotic Spacecraft SHM Allocations
34.6 Spacecraft SHM Ground Rules and Requirements
34.7 SFP and SIFP Architectures
34.8 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 35: Tactical Missile Health Management
Overview
35.1 Introduction
35.2 Stockpile Surveillance Findings
35.3 Probabilistic Prognostics Modeling
35.4 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 36: Strategic Missile Health Management
Overview
36.1 Introduction
36.2 Fundamentals of Solid Rocket Motors
36.3 Motor Components
36.4 Challenges for Strategic Rocket Health Management
36.5 State of the Art for Solid Rocket System Health Management (SHM)
36.6 Current Challenges Facing SRM SHM
36.7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 37: Rotorcraft Health Management
Overview
37.1 Introduction
37.2 Rotorcraft System Health Management Standard Practices
37.3 New Practices
37.4 Lessons Learned
37.5 Future Challenges
37.6 Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 38: Commercial Aviation Health Management
Overview
38.1 Commercial Aviation Challenge
38.2 Layered Approach to SHM
38.3 Evolution of Commercial Aviation SHM
38.4 Commercial State of the Art
38.5 The Next Generation: Intelligent Vehicles/Sense and Respond
38.6 Conclusion
Bibliography
Glossary
Acronyms
Index
This edition first published 2011
© 2011, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
Registered office
John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom
For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com.
The rights of the authors to be identified as the authors of this work have been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books.
Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.
Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
System health management: with aerospace applications / edited by Stephen B Johnson … [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-470-74133-7 (hardback)
1. Aeronautics—Systems engineering—Quality control. 2. Astronautics—Systems engineering—Quality control. I. Johnson, Stephen B., 1959-
TL501.S97 2011
629.1–dc22
2011005628
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Print ISBN: 978-0-470-74133-7
ePDF ISBN: 978-1-119-99404-6
Obook ISBN: 978-1-119-99405-3
ePub ISBN: 978-1-119-99873-0
Mobi ISBN: 978-1-119-99874-7
This book is dedicated to Joan Pallix, a pioneer in our field. Joan's ingenuity brought many of us together to develop early demonstrations of system health management technologies for the Space Shuttle Thermal Protection System, and her trailblazing approach provided a key foundation of the System Health Management process that we describe herein. Her dedication, originality, and technical expertise earned the respect of the System Health Management community.
About the Editors
Stephen B. Johnson has been active in the field of system health management since the mid-1980s. His experience includes the development of fault protection algorithms for deep-space probes, research into SHM processes within systems engineering, the development of SHM theory, the psychological, communicative, and social aspects of system failure, and the application of directed graph methods for assessment of testability, failure effect propagation timing, and diagnostic systems. He is the author of The Secret of Apollo: Systems Management in American and European Space Programs (2002) and The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation 1945–1965 (2002), the general editor of Space Exploration and Humanity: A Historical Encyclopedia (2010), and has written many articles on SHM and space history. He has a BA in Physics from Whitman College and PhD in the History of Science and Technology from the University of Minnesota. He currently is an associate research professor at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, and a health management systems engineer at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center.
Thomas J. Gormley has been involved in the aerospace industry for 24 years and brings a systems engineering and implementation perspective to this SHM textbook. He was the Integrated Vehicle Health Management Project leader for Rockwell Space Systems during the early 1990s and was the developer of the Propulsion Checkout and Control System that was successfully demonstrated on the next generation reusable launch system testbed. Mr. Gormley transferred to Lockheed-Martin Telecommunication Systems where he focused his efforts on fault protection systems for commercial telecommunications. In 2000 he formed Gormley & Associates and has been a consultant for NASA on several SHM projects. He is presently supporting NASA's Constellation Program Information Systems Office and is applying his systems engineering and health management expertise to NASA's Space Exploration Program. Mr. Gormley has published several technical papers on SHM and is a member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
Seth S. Kessler is the president and CEO of the Metis Design Corporation, a small consulting firm that has specialized in structural health monitoring technologies for a decade. He has experience from managing more than three-dozen government-funded BAA, SBIR, and STTR contracts. His research interests have included distributed sensor network architectures, analytical modeling of guided waves, diagnostic algorithms for composite materials, and carbon nanotube (CNT) based multifunctional structures. In 1998 he received his SB in aerospace engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) studying the effects of a cryogenic environment on composite materials. In 1999, he received his SM from that same department, creating and experimentally validating a design tool to analyze composite structures subjected to extreme inertial loading. Dr. Kessler completed his PhD from MIT in 2002, researching structural health monitoring piezoelectric-based techniques for damage detection in composite structures. He also was a post-doc in that department, modeling durability effects in composite laminates as part of the DARPA-funded, Boeing-led Accelerated Insertion of Materials Program. Dr. Kessler was a Draper Fellow working on the DARPA seedling WASP Program, and at the Lockheed Martin Skunk Works was an advanced concepts engineer on the X33/VentureStar Program. In 1998, he received the Admiral Luis De Florez Award for Ingenuity and Creativity in Design, in 2001 was awarded the American Society for Composites PhD Research Scholarship, and was awarded Best Paper by ASC in 2002 and the PHM Society in 2009. Dr. Kessler has more than three-dozen technical publications and holds 10 patents in his areas of expertise.
Charles D. Mott brings expertise in the social and economic aspects of large-scale technological projects. He has experience in business process improvement, systems analysis and design, financial system design and implementation, and organizational management. He has worked at Bank One, Patriot Management Corporation, Don Breazeale and Associates, Dow Chemical, and NASA. He has a bachelor's degree in management information systems from Michigan Technological University and a masters in space studies from the University of North Dakota. He is a member of the Prognostics and Health Management Society.
Ann Patterson-Hine, PE, has worked at NASA Ames Research Center since 1988. She is the branch chief for Discovery and Systems Health in the Intelligent Systems Division. She has been the project leader for advanced technology demonstrations under the Next Generation Launch Technology Program and many of the program's predecessors including the Reusable Launch Vehicle and Space Launch Initiative Programs. She participated on the Shuttle Independent Assessment Team and Wire Integrity Pilot Study at Ames. She was Principal Investigator for NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program's Integrated Systems Health Management project. Her research has focused on the use of engineering models for model-based reasoning in advanced monitoring and diagnostic systems. She received a BS degree in mechanical engineering from The University of Alabama and a doctorate in mechanical engineering from The University of Texas at Austin, and is a member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and a senior member of the IEEE.
Karl M. Reichard is the a research associate at the Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory and assistant professor of acoustics. He is the head of the Applied Research Laboratory's Embedded Hardware/Software Systems and Applications Department and teaches and advises graduate students in The Pennsylvania State University Graduate Program in Acoustics and the Department of Electrical Engineering. He has over 25 years of experience in the design and implementation of signal processing, control, and embedded diagnostics/prognostics systems. He has developed unattended remote sensing, active control, and health monitoring systems for land- and sea-based platforms. He earned BS, MS, and PhD degrees in electrical engineering from Virginia Tech.
Philip A. Scandura, Jr. has over 25 years of experience in the system definition and implementation of real-time embedded systems, for use in safety-critical and mission-critical applications. Mr. Scandura joined Honeywell in 1984 where he is currently employed as a staff scientist in its Advanced Technology Organization. During his tenure at Honeywell, he has specified, designed, and tested avionics systems for use in commercial, regional, business, and commuter aircraft, as well as human-rated space vehicles. He served as system architect, contributing to the development of several integrated modular avionics (IMA) and integrated vehicle health management (IVHM) systems, including those used on the Boeing 777 aircraft family. Mr. Scandura served for eight years as a certified FAA Designated Engineering Representative (DER), specializing in the certification of critical systems and equipment for aircraft. He is the author of Chapter 22, “Vehicle Health Management Systems,” in The Avionics Handbook, Second Edition, edited by Cary R. Spitzer (CRC Press, 2006), and has written many papers on vehicle health management concepts. Mr. Scandura holds a BS degree in electrical engineering from the University of Missouri–Rolla and a MBA in technical management from the University of Phoenix.
List of Contributors
Gordon B. Aaseng, NASA Ames Research Center, USA
George Y. Baaklini, NASA Glenn Research Center, USA
Edmund C. Baroth, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, USA
Gary Bird, Microsoft Corporation, USA
Gautam Biswas, Vanderbilt University, USA
David E. Brinza, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, USA
Thomas Brotherton, Brotherton & Associates, USA
Barbara L. Brown, NASA Ames Research Center, USA
Edward N. Brown, The Boeing Company, USA
Robert M. Button, NASA Glenn Research Center, USA
Carl S. Byington, Impact Technologies, USA
Fu-Kuo Chang, Stanford University, USA
Savio Chau, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, USA
Amy Chicatelli, Qinetiq North America at NASA Glenn Research Center, USA
Michael Christensen, Honeywell International, USA
Alan Crocker, NASA Johnson Space Center, USA
Eddie C. Crow, Pennsylvania State University, Applied Research Laboratory, USA
Ryan W. Deal, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center and Miltec, a Ducommen Company, USA
Paula J. Dempsey, NASA Glenn Research Center, USA
Luis A. Escobar, Louisiana State University, USA
Martin S. Feather, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, USA
Robert A. Ferrell, NASA Kennedy Space Center, USA
Kai Goebel, NASA Ames Research Center, USA
Grant A. Gordon, Honeywell International, USA
Thomas J. Gormley, Gormley & Associates, USA
Ron Hodge, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, USA
Todd Hong, NASA Johnson Space Center, USA
Brian K. Hughitt, NASA Headquarters, USA
Gary W. Hunter, NASA Glenn Research Center, USA
Kumar V. Jata, Air Force Research Laboratory, USA
Stephen B. Johnson, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center and University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, USA
Gregory J. Kacprzynski, Impact Technologies, USA
Kirby Keller, Boeing Research & Technology, USA
Anthony R. Kelley, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, USA
Seth S. Kessler, Metis Design Corporation, USA
Yujun Kim, Stanford University, USA
David Kortenkamp, TRACLabs Inc., USA
Abdul J. Kudiya, United States Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center, USA
Daniel Lutz, Honeywell International, USA
Robyn Lutz, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology and Iowa State University, USA
Ryan M. Mackey, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, USA
Eric-Jan Manders, Vanderbilt University, USA
Johannes F.C. Markmiller, McKinsey & Company, Inc., Germany
Lawrence Z. Markosian, Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies at NASA Ames Research Center, USA
Stephen A. Marotta, United States Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center, USA
Robert S. McCann, NASA Ames Research Center, USA
William Q. Meeker, Iowa State University, USA
Paula S. Morgan, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, USA
Charles D. Mott, Complete Data Management, USA
Priya Narasimhan, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Sriram Narashimhan, University of California at NASA Ames Research Center, USA
Patricia E. Nicoli, NASA Kennedy Space Center, USA
Allen Nikora, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, USA
Lawrence G. Oberle, NASA Glenn Research Center, USA
Brian O'Hagan, NASA Johnson Space Center, USA
Gary O'Neill, Georgia Tech Research Institute, USA
Triplicane A. Parthasarathy, UES, Inc., USA
Clint Patrick, US Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense, USA
Ann Patterson-Hine, NASA Ames Research Center, USA
Krishna Pattipati, University of Connecticut, USA
Jose M. Perotti, NASA Kennedy Space Center, USA
James Poblete, Boeing Research & Technology, USA
Karl M. Reichard, Pennsylvania State University, Applied Research Laboratory, USA
Michael J. Roemer, Impact Technologies, USA
Edward W. Rogers, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, USA
Gregory A. Ruderman, Air Force Research Laboratory, Edwards Air Force Base, USA
Beverly A. Sauer, BAS Consultants Inc., and NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, USA
Philip A. Scandura, Jr., Honeywell International, USA
Daniel P. Siewiorek, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Lilly Spirkovska, NASA Ames Research Center, USA
Irem Y. Tumer, School of Mechanical, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Oregon State University, USA
George Vachtsevanos, Impact Technologies, USA
Kosta Varnavas, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, USA
William E. Vesely, NASA Headquarters, USA
Al Volponi, Pratt & Whitney, USA
Robert D. Waterman, NASA Kennedy Space Center, USA
Susan J. Waterman, NASA Kennedy Space Center, USA
Michael D. Watson, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, USA
Andrew Wiedlea, Los Alamos National Laboratory, USA
Timothy J. Wilmering, Boeing Research & Technology, USA
Bruce Wood, Pratt & Whitney, USA
Jinkyu Yang, California Institute of Technology, USA
James J. Zakrajsek, NASA Glenn Research Center, USA
Alan J. Zide, NASA Kennedy Space Center, USA
Douglas J. Zimpfer, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, USA
Foreword
In November of 2005, the editors of this volume and I organized a forum entitled Integrated System Health Engineering and Management (ISHEM) in Napa, California. The purpose of the forum was to recognize the relationship between traditional safety and reliability engineering methods and more recent approaches in detecting, diagnosing, and predicting failures of complex engineered systems. The particular title for the forum was chosen in order to highlight the tight coupling between engineering, operational, and management practices in this emerging field of study. We intended the forum to highlight the state of the art in system health management (SHM) at the time, with the forum papers providing the basis for the first reference textbook for the field. To that end, we invited 40 experts to present their perspectives on the state of the art in their respective fields of study. Five years later, we bring you this volume with expanded and updated versions of the forum papers as this book's chapters, and with additional topics that were not discussed in the original forum. We intend this volume to serve as a comprehensive reference for the state of the art in SHM as of 2010.
The field of SHM is based on some fundamental observations: all electromechanical components wear out as a function of time, use, and environmental conditions, and complex systems contain inherent design flaws that often reveal themselves only in operation. Over time, component aging may result in performance degradation, subsystem faults, or system failures. When designing safety-critical and mission-critical systems, engineers aim to prevent system failures or at least to minimize their impact. These systems have stringent reliability requirements. These reliability requirements are typically met using a combination of reliability engineering and risk management methods:
Fail-safe or fail-operational component/subsystem designs“Designing out” identified failure modesDesign margins (power, propulsion, supplies, etc.)Fault accommodationRedundant components and subsystemsRedundancy management techniques enabling fault tolerance for flight-critical functionsFault detection, isolation and recovery, FDIRFault protection.A key intuition in SHM is that even though failures may not be avoidable, they are frequently predictable given the right instrumentation and appropriate physical models. Over the last few decades, the systems engineering community started investigating the fundamental principles of system failures in an attempt to understand how electromechanical components age and to predict when they might fail. With the emphasis shifting from population statistics (e.g., bathtub curves or Weibull statistics) to remaining useful life of individual components, a new discipline started to emerge. Several terms are used to refer to (variations of) SHM, including integrated systems health management (ISHM), integrated vehicle health management (IVHM), prognostics and health management (PHM), condition-based maintenance (CBM), enterprise health management, and health and usage monitoring systems (HUMS). Despite the recent emphasis on the field of SHM as a new discipline, health management for subsystems such as aircraft engines has been part of the engineering practice for well over 30 years.
As a systems engineering discipline, SHM addresses the design, development, operation, and lifecycle management of components, subsystems, vehicles, and other operational systems with the purpose of maintaining nominal system behavior and function and assuring mission safety and effectiveness under off-nominal conditions. While SHM concepts apply equally well to consumer products such as automobiles or computers, the discipline has its roots in aerospace applications that involve operations in hazardous or extreme environments. Examples include spacecraft operating in unfamiliar environments under extreme temperature variations, aircraft that are subject to frequent pressurization cycles and aerodynamic loads, and rocket motors that are very costly to test under off-nominal conditions.
For space exploration, SHM enables:
Autonomous (and automated) launch abort and crew escape capabilityEfficient testing and checkout of ground and flight systemsMonitoring and data analysis of ground and flight system operationsEnhanced situational awareness and control for ground personnel and crewVehicle autonomy (self-sufficiency) in responding to off-nominal conditions during long-duration and distant space missionsIn-space (autonomous) maintenance and repairEfficient ground processing of reusable systems.For aircraft, SHM enables:
Efficient fault detection, isolation and recoveryPrediction of impending failures or functional degradationIncreased reliability and availability of mission systemsEnhanced vehicle situational awareness for crewsCondition-based and just-in-time maintenance practicesEfficient ground processing and increased asset availability.It is important to note that SHM is not a substitute for traditional safety and reliability engineering methods. In contrast, SHM embraces and expands traditional engineering approaches to safety- and mission-critical systems design. Even though real-time systems monitoring and health management tasks constitute the majority of applications, the scope of SHM is not limited to real-time operations. Instead, SHM spans the entire systems lifecycle from design to verification, and from operations to logistics.
SHM methods have been deployed for flight-critical operations for decades, and there have been remarkable achievements in developing and maturing new SHM technologies over the last 10 years, However, there are relatively few commercial success stories in the deployment of advanced SHM technologies for maintenance and logistics operations. Even the most outstanding SHM technologies have no chance of deployment in a flight mission or aerospace vehicle if they do not address mission or program needs or reduce programmatic or technical risks. Earlier, I commented on the interplay between engineering and management as a core tenet of SHM. Accordingly, a successful SHM technologist needs to understand the relevant figures of merit for the target mission or program and determine what role the SHM technologies play in meeting those metrics. For aerospace systems, lifecycle cost, safety, reliability, and productivity are the most pertinent figures of merit that SHM systems might be able to address.
Lifecycle cost includes system acquisition costs as well as recurring operational costs. It is not uncommon to have service lifetimes of over 30 years for aerospace systems such as commercial or military aircraft or reusable spacecraft such as the Space Shuttle. With such long service lifetimes, maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) costs dominate the total lifecycle cost for these platforms. Modern fighter aircraft are among the worst offenders in terms of service costs, with each flight-hour requiring nearly 30 person-hours of maintenance to inspect, overhaul, or replace mission-critical, life-limited components.
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF, or F-35) Program has taken a revolutionary step to ease the conflict between cost and reliability: the F-35 is a single-engine fighter jet that is allowed to operate on aircraft carriers (the US Navy traditionally prefers multi-engine aircraft as an additional safety margin for flights over long stretches of ocean). Furthermore, the JSF Program has an ambitious goal of eliminating scheduled engine inspections entirely. The key to this bold move is prognostics, or the ability to determine remaining useful life of critical life-limited components in real time. Based on these prognostic technologies, the JSF Program aims to develop a comprehensive autonomic logistics infrastructure that will reduce system lifecycle costs while maintaining reliability margins.
Safety involves the safety of flight crews, passengers, ground support personnel, and the public. For crewed spacecraft and military aircraft, crew escape systems are commonly considered as a final risk mitigation strategy when mission-critical failures occur and there is no redundancy or safety margin available. In most cases, fault protection and accommodation methods serve as primary safety measures. For instance, modern aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35 incorporate failure accommodation methods that allow the aircraft to “limp back to base” following an in-flight failure or battle damage. Failure accommodation is typically achieved through sufficient safety margins and functional redundancy. Another principle is failure recovery, where an aircraft or spacecraft reconfigures its flight controls (autonomously or through crew intervention) in order to mitigate the impact of an in-flight failure and continue the mission. Finally, fault protection can halt system operation (safing) until the problem can be studied and remedied.
Reliability is directly related to maintenance costs and indirectly related to system safety. However, there are instances where safety and reliability are not necessarily related. Examples include nuclear power plants and weapon systems. Such systems are designed with the utmost concern for safety (of operators as well as the public). Reliability, important as it may be, is often a secondary concern decoupled from safety measures. On the other side of the spectrum, reliability is a top priority for robotic spacecraft destined for Solar System exploration while safety may not be a major concern—especially for those spacecraft that do not contain hazardous fuel or materials.
As a figure of merit, productivity includes asset availability (e.g., sortie rates or flights per day) and performance (e.g., ground turnaround time for a space or air vehicle). For science missions, productivity may be measured in terms of science return (e.g., experiments completed or measurement processed) or accomplishment of other mission goals. Asset availability is one of the most important figures of merit used to justify deployment of SHM technologies, since it is directly related to revenue for commercial assets or acquisition costs for military and space assets. Condition-based maintenance practices may help reduce asset downtime by minimizing “surprise” maintenance events, and reduced downtime may allow for smaller fleets to accomplish similar missions, thereby reducing acquisition costs.
Even though there are significant advances in health management technologies in fields such as structural health monitoring, aircraft avionics testing, non-destructive evaluation, prognostics, and physics of failure for mechanical components, deployment of new SHM technologies for aerospace operations remains as challenging now as it was a decade ago. Going forward, one of the most significant obstacles for new SHM technologies will continue to be limited deployment experience. This is especially the case with space systems applications where there is very little operational data from which statistically significant information could be derived. Coupled with the exceptional reliability of space-qualified systems, it is conceivable that the majority of the known failure modes may never be observed in actual space flight. In many cases, high-fidelity hardware-in-the-loop simulations are the only way to replicate certain failure modes and to observe their “signatures” so that effective failure detection and fault isolation techniques may be developed.
Given the advanced state of medicine today, it is difficult to recall that we did not understand the causation of heart disease, various cancers, or even more mundane ailments such as stomach ulcers only a few decades ago. As of 2010, the field of SHM is approximately as advanced as the field of medicine was in the 1970s. Today, we can detect the failure of subsystems with accuracy, but we may or may not be able to identify the root cause. X-ray and ultrasound-based inspection techniques are quite accurate or comprehensive. We return aerospace subsystems to service after intermittent failures that cannot be replicated on the test bench (euphemistically referred to as “no fault found” or “cannot duplicate” events in the aerospace vernacular). Yet, there are strong signs that investments in SHM over the last few decades are making a difference. We now have intriguing clues as to what might be causing intermittent failures of avionics units during flight. In the near future, we will have detailed physics-based models that might prevent us from experiencing catastrophic launch system failures like the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster. Pervasive structural sensing will help alleviate the need to increase safety margins (and weight) for composite aircraft out of fear, resulting in substantial fuel savings. Techniques developed to monitor rotorcraft drivetrains are already being applied to giant wind turbines, helping reduce the lifecycle cost of these investments in renewable energy. Insights into the chemistry and physics of battery aging are paving the way for batteries with better energy density and longer useful life—and thus helping fuel the electric vehicle revolution.
SHM has come a long way over the last couple of decades. This book documents recent significant advances in the basic theory and concepts of SHM, which have significant implications for the cost-effective implementation of SHM in the system lifecycle. I look forward to further maturation of current SHM technologies and the full integration of SHM principles into day-to-day operations of complex aerospace systems.
Serdar Uckun, MD, PhD
President, The Prognostics and Health Management Society, Palo Alto, CA, USA
October 2010
Preface
This book is predicated on the idea that SHM has been evolving into its own discipline over the course of the last 20 years, and has reached “critical mass.” The intent of this book is to provide a basic resource for those who work in, or interact with, one or more aspects of the many facets of SHM. Those experts will be familiar with their own sub-discipline, but not with the specifics of all of the related SHM fields that interact with it. Each chapter, written by an expert in the chapter subject, is intended to provide a basic overview for those with some familiarity with the field, but are not experts beyond one or two of the sub-disciplines. This is the typical situation for almost all “SHM engineers” and also for managers and researchers of SHM-related tasks and technologies. Whether we have hit the mark, the reader can judge for him- or herself.
There are many people I must thank, starting first with the editors and authors of this book. They have been an outstanding and disciplined group, leading to a quality product that was nearly on time. Those who have edited multi-author works realize that this is a minor miracle! Serdar Uckun, Ann Patterson-Hine, and Mike Watson set the stage for this book by supporting the ISHEM Forum that was the direct progenitor of this book.
Over the years, many people have contributed to the ideas of SHM as a discipline, leading to the contents of Chapter 1, which provides the framework for this book. In the 1980s while on the Magellan project, Whittak Huang and Ed Craig at Martin Marietta, and John Slonski and Chris Jones, taught me the basics of fault protection for deep-space missions. This implanted the idea that SHM is ultimately a set of system capabilities, not a technology. My Vehicle Health Management R&D team at Martin in the early 1990s, namely, Don Uhrich, Ron Grisell, Maxine Obleski, Ron Puening, and Glen Campbell, were instrumental in forming the first SHM methodology based on the systems engineering process. George Gilley of The Aerospace Corporation, and the Dependability Working Group, including Walt Heimerdinger and Dan Siewiorek from Carnegie Mellon, introduced me to the ideas of dependability theory. Don Uhrich, along with Larry Cooper from the University of Cincinnati, were instrumental in the development and publication in 1995 of the idea of SHM as a control loop. Mike Watson brought me to NASA in 2005, and provided the institutional base at Marshall Space Flight Center to develop the full-blown theory of SHM. John C. Day of Inspace Systems has been the single most influential person with whom I have worked to develop the mature theory described in this book, and Bob Rasmussen at JPL spurred the idea of SHM preserving functionality and has helped hone the theory. Finally, Mike Santi at MSFC, the Constellation Fault Management Terminology team, and my Functional Fault Analysis team from Ames Research Center (most particularly Eric Barszcz, Peter Robinson, and Jeremy Johnson), and Glenn Research Center (Bill Maul), and Lorraine Fesq's Fault Management Handbook team have all sharpened many of the ideas presented in Chapter 1.
Stephen B. Johnson
November 2010
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
Lesen Sie weiter in der vollständigen Ausgabe!
