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- Herausgeber: Booksell-Verlag
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
The Complete Historical Works of Xenophon offers an unparalleled insight into the socio-political milieu of ancient Greece through the lens of one of its most astute observers. Comprised of works such as 'Anabasis,' which chronicles his journey alongside the Ten Thousand, and 'Hellenica,' a continuation of Thucydides' history focusing on the Peloponnesian War, this compilation showcases Xenophon's distinctive narrative style that blends vivid storytelling with philosophical reflection. His prose, marked by clarity and precision, situates it within the broader context of classical literature, emphasizing the interplay between military leadership and ethical governance. Xenophon, a contemporary of Socrates and a soldier turned historian, was deeply influenced by the tumultuous events of his time, including the chaos of the Peloponnesian War and the decline of Athenian power. His scholarly pursuits were not merely academic; they stemmed from practical experiences and encounters with notable figures, including Socrates himself. This dual perspective as both participant and chronicler infuses his works with a unique authenticity, offering readers an intimate glimpse into the challenges of leadership and virtue. This comprehensive edition is indispensable for those seeking to understand the complex legacy of ancient Greece. It illuminates the fabric of a society undergoing profound transformation, making it a vital resource for scholars, students, and enthusiasts of classical literature and history. In this enriched edition, we have carefully created added value for your reading experience: - A comprehensive Introduction outlines these selected works' unifying features, themes, or stylistic evolutions. - The Author Biography highlights personal milestones and literary influences that shape the entire body of writing. - A Historical Context section situates the works in their broader era—social currents, cultural trends, and key events that underpin their creation. - A concise Synopsis (Selection) offers an accessible overview of the included texts, helping readers navigate plotlines and main ideas without revealing critical twists. - A unified Analysis examines recurring motifs and stylistic hallmarks across the collection, tying the stories together while spotlighting the different work's strengths. - Reflection questions inspire deeper contemplation of the author's overarching message, inviting readers to draw connections among different texts and relate them to modern contexts. - Lastly, our hand‐picked Memorable Quotes distill pivotal lines and turning points, serving as touchstones for the collection's central themes.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023
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The Complete Historical Works of Xenophon
Table of Contents
Introduction
This collection presents the Complete Historical Works of Xenophon, assembling six texts that together define his contribution to Greek historiography and political reflection: Anabasis, Cyropaedia, Hellenica, Agesilaus, the Polity of the Lacedaemonians, and the Polity of the Athenians (transmitted among his writings). The purpose is to read these works as an integrated body, where narrative, analysis, and exempla illuminate one another. Gathered in a single volume, they allow the reader to follow Xenophon from the march of mercenaries through Asia to the institutions and leaders that shaped Greek public life, revealing a consistent concern with action, character, and civic order.
Although unified by a historical and political focus, these texts span multiple classical prose forms. Anabasis offers a first-hand campaign narrative. Hellenica provides a multi-book history of Greek affairs after the Peloponnesian War. Cyropaedia is a didactic prose narrative about the education and rule of Cyrus the Great. Agesilaus is an encomium, a formal praise of a Spartan king. The Polity of the Lacedaemonians is a constitutional exposition of Sparta's institutions. The Polity of the Athenians, preserved with Xenophon's works, presents an analytical sketch of Athenian democracy. Together they represent history, memoir, political theory, biography, and institutional analysis.
Xenophon, an Athenian soldier and writer active in the late fifth and fourth centuries BCE, writes with the authority of experience and the discipline of a practical moralist. He took part in the expedition described in Anabasis, and he observed Greek interstate politics that Hellenica narrates. His prose is noted for clarity, concision, and an unadorned Attic style. Read as a set, these works trace a deliberate pedagogy: they move from the pressures of command in the field, to the conduct of leaders, to the laws and customs that sustain or undermine a polis. The collection foregrounds action informed by reflection.
Anabasis recounts the march of Greek mercenaries who, having joined a Persian dynastic campaign, must fight their way home across unfamiliar terrain. The narrative is composed with an eyewitness's precision: routes, councils, supply, and morale receive as much attention as battles. Xenophon presents deliberation and discipline as the decisive instruments of survival. The work's third-person self-reference underscores its didactic purpose, inviting readers to weigh choices rather than celebrate a protagonist. As the opening arc of this collection, Anabasis introduces recurring concerns—leadership under stress, cooperative decision-making, and the practical virtues required when institutions are distant and necessity is near.
Hellenica resumes Greek history roughly where Thucydides' account ends, covering events from 411 to 362 BCE. Across shifting coalitions, sieges, and diplomatic conferences, Xenophon studies the character of command and the consequences of policy. The narrative complements his more focused works by showing how habits that sustain a company in the field also govern city-states and alliances. While attentive to chronology and fact, Xenophon selects episodes for the lessons they offer about prudence, ambition, and the fragility of hegemony. In this collection, Hellenica provides the wide canvas against which the other texts' portraits are set.
Cyropaedia presents the education and kingship of Cyrus the Great as a sustained inquiry into how authority is acquired, exercised, and preserved. More didactic than documentary, it uses an idealized narrative to explore training, persuasion, reward, and discipline. The work is neither a mere chronicle nor a simple fiction; it is a practical study in forming leaders and organizing communities. Read alongside Anabasis and Hellenica, it shows Xenophon turning from eyewitness reporting to model-building, distilling principles from experience. The emphasis on education, habit, and institutions reveals a central thread of the collection: character and law mutually shape durable power.
Agesilaus is an encomium of Agesilaus II, king of Sparta, composed to honor a leader Xenophon admired. The work assembles deeds and traits to display a standard of civic and military excellence: self-control, fairness, courage, and service to the common good. Its selective focus is programmatic, not exhaustive, complementing the broader record in Hellenica. Taken together, these texts illuminate how Xenophon evaluates a statesman's conduct in war and peace. By placing a praised life beside institutional analyses and narratives of conflict, the collection invites readers to consider the measure of leadership across settings—camp, council, and city.
The Polity of the Lacedaemonians describes the institutions attributed to Sparta's lawgiver, commonly identified as Lycurgus, and their effects on civic discipline, education, and military readiness. Xenophon highlights practices that cultivate unity and restraint, situating them within a coherent system of laws and customs. The treatise complements Agesilaus by abstracting from an individual life to the framework that forms such lives. It also balances Anabasis by showing how sustained order can minimize the emergencies that make improvisation necessary. Together, these works present institutional design not as a theory detached from practice, but as a habit-binding architecture for action.
The Polity of the Athenians, preserved among Xenophon's works, offers a concise analysis of Athenian democracy from a critical, oligarchic perspective. Its authorship is disputed in modern scholarship, and ancient readers also reported doubts; it is often labeled pseudo-Xenophon. Regardless of attribution, it belongs here for the contrast it provides: a city organized on principles different from Sparta's, with strengths and trade-offs plainly marked. Read with the Lacedaemonian counterpart, it sharpens Xenophon's broader inquiry into how laws channel behavior, how incentives align with civic aims, and how different constitutions seek to balance freedom, equality, and competence.
Across these works, Xenophon prefers lucid narration, restrained judgment, and concrete example. He often stages deliberations, allowing competing proposals to be weighed before action, and he marks the role of chance without surrendering to it. Speeches are brief and functional. Technical matters—marching order, supply, training, procedure—receive careful attention because they reveal character and policy in operation. In Anabasis, he even refers to himself in the third person, underscoring the priority of the case at hand over the author. Facts are selected for instruction: episodes are chosen less for spectacle than for what they teach about prudence, courage, and foresight.
Seen together, these texts explore how leaders and communities confront necessity, manage advantage, and preserve dignity. Central themes recur: education as the formation of habits, law as the codification of common purpose, character as the hinge between plan and outcome. Xenophon attends to incentives, rewards, and the distribution of honor, linking private virtue to public order. He treats piety and custom as sources of cohesion, without neglecting calculation. War appears not only as conflict but as a school for judgment. The collection therefore reads as a continuous inquiry into practical reason—how people choose, deliberate, obey, and command.
These works remain significant because they combine vivid reportage with sustained reflection on institutions and leadership. They informed ancient and later discussions of generalship, statesmanship, and constitutional design, and they still serve as case studies in decision-making under constraint. Read as a whole, the collection offers a comprehensive view of action in context: from the march to the council chamber; from the model ruler to the functioning constitution. By placing narrative beside analysis, it equips readers to compare ideals with practice. The result is not a single doctrine but a durable habit of inquiry into how communities endure.
Author Biography
Xenophon was an Athenian soldier, historian, and prose stylist who lived from the late fifth to the mid-fourth century BCE. A student of Socrates and a participant in the turbulent politics and warfare of his age, he produced works that bridge philosophy, history, and practical instruction. His narratives and treatises, written in clear Attic Greek, were widely read in antiquity and long afterward. Best known for the Anabasis, an eyewitness account of a mercenary army’s homeward march through hostile territory, he also continued the historical record of Greece in the Hellenica and explored leadership and ethics in works ranging from the Cyropaedia to the Memorabilia. Across genres, he favored concrete examples and accessible language over abstract speculation, a style that secured him lasting appeal.
Raised in Athens during the Peloponnesian War, Xenophon came of age amid civic strain and intellectual ferment. He associated closely with Socrates, and his recollections of conversations in the Memorabilia, Symposium, and Oeconomicus attest to sustained engagement with Socratic ethics. His training reflected the elite Athenian emphasis on horsemanship, hunting, and rhetoric, interests later formalized in technical treatises. As a historian, he wrote in the wake of Herodotus and Thucydides, adapting their narrative aims to his own experience as a soldier. Spartan institutions and discipline left a marked impression on him, shaping his preference for practical instruction and examples drawn from leadership.
Xenophon’s public life turned decisively when he joined the expedition of Greek mercenaries supporting Cyrus the Younger’s bid for the Persian throne. After the campaign collapsed and senior commanders were killed, he emerged as one of the leaders guiding the “Ten Thousand” on a difficult retreat from the heart of the Persian Empire to the Black Sea. The Anabasis recounts this journey with attention to logistics, morale, negotiation, and terrain, interweaving speeches with vivid scenes. It offers a rare, sustained view of Persian lands by a Greek eyewitness and became a foundational text for later readers of Greek prose and military narrative.
In the Hellenica, Xenophon continued the historical account where Thucydides’ work breaks off, tracing Greek affairs from the late stages of the Peloponnesian War into the shifting alliances and hegemonies of the early fourth century BCE. His coverage of Spartan ascendancy, Theban challenge, and interstate diplomacy is concise and often partisan, a feature noted by ancient and modern critics. Still, the work remains a crucial source for the period. His shorter Agesilaus presents an encomiastic portrait of the Spartan king with whom he campaigned, highlighting military skill and civic virtue. Together these texts reveal his historiographical aims: instructive narrative anchored in lived experience.
Xenophon’s Socratic writings present a different register. The Memorabilia defends Socrates’ way of life by assembling conversations on piety, self-control, friendship, and civic responsibility. The Apology offers a brief account of Socrates’ stance at his trial, distinct in tone from Plato’s version. The Symposium portrays convivial dialogue among acquaintances, while the Oeconomicus treats household management and the formation of capable, moderate character. In these works Xenophon privileges the useful and the practicable, emphasizing Socrates as a moral guide rather than a metaphysician. Their plain style and concrete examples contributed to their longstanding role as introductions to ethics and everyday reasoning.
Beyond history and Socratica, Xenophon wrote influential political and technical treatises. The Cyropaedia (Education of Cyrus) blends narrative and analysis to explore how a capable leader organizes armies, allies, and institutions. Hiero examines tyranny and the conditions of happiness and rule. The Constitution of the Lacedaemonians describes Spartan practices, reflecting his interest in discipline and law. Ways and Means (Poroi) proposes measures to strengthen Athenian finances. His On Horsemanship and The Cavalry Commander systematize equestrian training and command, while the Hunting with Dogs (Cynegeticus) celebrates fieldcraft. Many of these works were composed during years he spent on an estate near Olympia under Spartan patronage.
After prolonged residence in the Peloponnese, Xenophon relocated following shifts in Spartan power in the early fourth century BCE, spending time in cities such as Corinth. He lived into the mid-fourth century, continuing to write and revise. His prose circulated widely in antiquity; the Anabasis served generations as a primer in Greek, and his treatises furnished models of concise instruction. Renaissance and early modern readers returned to the Cyropaedia and Hellenica for reflections on leadership and statecraft, while modern scholars debate his biases and methods. Today he is read as a soldier-writer and Socratic author whose clear style conveys durable lessons in character and command.
Historical Context
Xenophon of Athens (born c. 430 BCE, died c. 354 BCE) wrote across the convulsive transition from the Peloponnesian War to the fracturing equilibrium of fourth‑century Greece. His historical corpus spans the collapse of the Athenian empire (404), the brief Spartan hegemony, the King’s Peace (387/386), and Theban ascendancy ending at Mantinea (362). Educated in the Socratic circle, he combined personal experience, especially in Asia Minor, with reflective analysis of leadership, law, and military practice. The works associated with his name collectively observe how Greeks negotiated power among poleis, how Persia intervened decisively, and how the habits of discipline, piety, and prudence shaped public life.
The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) set the frame for many of Xenophon’s concerns: imperial extraction, naval finance, factional struggle, and wartime law. Athens’ maritime empire, funded by tribute from the Delian League, drew Persian money and Greek resentment into a long conflict with Sparta and its allies. Athenian mobilization—rower pay, jury stipends, and assembly politics—created social dynamics that continued to reverberate after defeat. The geography of conflict, from the Hellespont to Sicily and the Aegean islands, formed a theater that later histories would inherit. The strains of prolonged war fostered oligarchic experiments, democratic restorations, and a permanent debate about civic competence and virtue.
Athens’ surrender in 404 brought a Spartan‑backed oligarchy, the Thirty, and a violent purge of citizens before the democratic restoration in 403. These upheavals supplied an enduring context for discussions of constitutions, civic rights, and the risks of faction. Socrates’ execution in 399, shortly after the crisis, marked a turning point for many of his associates, Xenophon among them. The city’s trauma intensified questions central to the corpus: by what norms should leaders act, how can law restrain passion, and what institutions sustain freedom under stress? The memory of stasis and reconciliation colored later accounts of strategy, statesmanship, and political character.
Relations with the Achaemenid Empire are a unifying thread across the corpus. Under Darius II and Artaxerxes II, Persian satraps in western Anatolia—especially Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus—played Greek rivals against one another with subsidies and threats. Greek mercenary service in Asia became a major economic and military fact, drawing thousands of hoplites and peltasts to campaigns that mingled imperial politics with personal advancement. From Sardis and Ephesus on the coast to the inland routes of Lydia and Phrygia, the Persian administrative and logistical system overshadowed Greek plans. Imperial wealth, cavalry strength, and diplomacy repeatedly redirected Greek affairs, culminating in peace settlements brokered from Susa.
In 401 BCE Cyrus the Younger raised a largely Greek army to challenge his brother Artaxerxes II, leading to the battle at Cunaxa near Babylon. The subsequent march north by the Greek survivors—through Mesopotamia, across the Tigris, over the passes of Armenia to Trapezus on the Black Sea—highlighted the resilience and vulnerability of soldiers operating beyond the polis. The route from Colchis to Sinope and along the Propontis revealed the economic gravity of Black Sea grain and the value of Greek colonies as logistical anchors. The episode underscored recurring themes: leadership under duress, ritual sanction in decision making, and the perils of improvisational strategy.
Sparta’s postwar hegemony, personified by Lysander and later Agesilaus II (reigned 398–360), reshaped Greek politics. Spartan garrisons and harmosts dotted cities once loyal to Athens, while allies chafed under Laconian discipline. The Corinthian War (395–387) pitted Sparta against a coalition of Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, financed in part by Persian gold. Naval power returned to prominence: Spartan setbacks at Cnidus (394) contrasted with earlier successes. Campaigns in Asia by a Spartan king signaled revived Greek ambitions across the Aegean, even as domestic strains—helot manpower, aristocratic ethos, and rigid institutions—tested Sparta’s capacity to project lasting leadership in a changing military environment.
The King’s Peace (Peace of Antalcidas), promulgated in 387/386 BCE, declared the autonomy of Greek cities while recognizing Persian control over the Ionian littoral. This treaty institutionalized Persian arbitration as the arbiter of Greek interstate relations and enshrined “autonomy” as a diplomatic weapon against federal leagues. The settlement recast the strategic map: Sparta acted as guarantor on land, while Persian interests stabilized the coast. The peace’s vocabulary and enforcement mechanisms shaped subsequent conflicts, from border disputes in Asia Minor to alignments in central Greece. It exemplified how law, proclaimed at the highest level, could both secure and subvert civic freedom.
Theban leaders Pelopidas and Epaminondas overturned Spartan land supremacy at Leuctra (371 BCE) and pressed deep into Laconia, liberating Messenia and fracturing Spartan manpower. The period through Mantinea (362) displayed new federative experiments: the Boeotian League’s councils and the strategic use of standing infantry elites, such as the Sacred Band. Tactical innovation—oblique order, concentrated weight on a refused right—altered the terms of hoplite battle. This Theban ascendancy, although brief, exposed fault lines in Greek interstate norms and highlighted how leadership, training, and coalition management could eclipse traditional prestige. It also closed the narrative arc that began with Sparta’s post‑Athenian dominance.
Fourth‑century warfare witnessed diversification in arms and methods. Light infantry (peltasts) and missile troops gained prominence, as in Iphicrates’ destruction of Spartan hoplites near Lechaeum (c. 390). Cavalry, long a tactical auxiliary in Greece, assumed greater roles in reconnaissance, pursuit, and shock when terrain allowed. Naval warfare remained decisive for finance and grain supply, with trireme fleets contesting the Hellespont and Aegean sea lanes. Siegecraft improved, encouraging prolonged operations against fortified poleis. These developments demanded flexible leaders who mastered logistics, morale, and combined arms. Observers drew lessons that linked battlefield conduct to civic order: disciplined soldiers mirrored disciplined citizens.
Spartan and Athenian institutions offered contrasting models of civic organization that animated Greek debate. Sparta’s dual kingship, gerousia, ephors, and agoge forged an elite of endurance and obedience sustained by helot labor and allied support from perioikoi communities. Athens, with assembly, council of Five Hundred, popular courts, and pay for civic service, mobilized poorer citizens as rowers and jurors while nurturing rhetoric and litigation. Both systems produced durable strengths—Spartan military cohesion, Athenian naval capacity—and endemic vulnerabilities: social rigidity and fear of revolt in Sparta, volatility and demagoguery in Athens. These contrasts informed wider reflections on law, equality, and leadership.
Economic realities undergirded politics and war. Tribute from Aegean poleis, customs revenues at Piraeus, and emergency taxes (eisphorai) funded fleets and mercenaries. Estates and pastoral lands supplied hoplite kits and cavalry mounts, while sanctuaries—Delphi, Olympia, and local cult sites—served as repositories of wealth and instruments of soft power through dedications. After exile from Athens, Xenophon received an estate at Scillus near Olympia from Spartan patrons, underscoring how land grants and religious benefactions intertwined. Hunting, horse breeding, and rural management linked elite identity to military readiness. Coinage flows from Persia to Greek cities fueled wars, alliances, and sudden reversals of fortune.
Geography conditioned possibility. Control of the Hellespont and Bosporus guaranteed access to Black Sea grain from places like Byzantium, Sinope, and the rich chora around the Pontus. The coastal satrapies of Ionia and Aeolis—Sardis, Ephesus, and the harbors of Caria—were gateways for Persian armies and Greek fleets alike. Inland routes through Phrygia and Lydia required negotiation with local dynasts and knowledge of rivers such as the Maeander and Hermus. Mountain passes in Armenia and the snows of the upper Tigris presented different challenges from the plains near Babylon. Strategic writing in this era constantly measured distance, provisioning, and seasonal constraints.
The intellectual climate of late fifth‑ and fourth‑century Athens fostered cross‑pollination between philosophy, rhetoric, and historiography. Herodotus’ ethnographic curiosity and Thucydides’ analytical rigor provided models for inquiry; Isocrates’ political pedagogy promoted panhellenism; and Socrates’ relentless questioning shaped ethical scrutiny of action. Historical narrative became a vehicle for teaching leadership and civic prudence. Persian subjects and archaic exempla held up foreign and ancestral mirrors to Greek practice. Biographical praise and critique operated not merely as ornament but as instruction. Within this milieu, history served both to record events and to propose standards—of deliberation, piety, and self‑command—by which statesmen might be judged.
Xenophon’s historical writings range across genres: campaign narrative, constitutional inquiry, encomiastic biography, and didactic fiction. His stylistic clarity—simple Attic diction, preference for concrete scenes, and moralized characterization—made complex politics legible. He sometimes narrated his own role in the third person and was later associated with a putative alternative attribution for one work, reflecting ancient debates about authorship and anonymity. Across the corpus, parallels with Thucydides are explicit in period coverage, yet the tone is more pragmatic and pedagogical. The works aim less to exhaust causes than to evaluate conduct, narrating how law, ritual, and leadership interact amid contingency.
Personal fortune and patronage shaped perspective. Xenophon’s service with Spartans, friendship with King Agesilaus II, and residence at Scillus under Laconian protection aligned him with Peloponnesian interests even as he remained Athenian by birth and culture. His sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, reportedly fought on the Athenian side at Mantinea (362), where Gryllus fell, a poignant emblem of divided loyalties in a fragmented Greece. After Sparta’s defeat at Leuctra (371) the Eleans expelled him from Scillus, and he relocated—perhaps to Corinth—before an eventual recall to Athenian citizenship. These biographical crossings inform a panhellenic outlook skeptical of narrow civic chauvinism.
Religious practice and divination permeated public action. Greek armies sacrificed before battle, consulted seers, and interpreted omens, while leaders sought to align strategy with the gods’ favor. Dedications at Artemis’ and Apollo’s sanctuaries, vows fulfilled after safe returns, and the presence of priests on campaign marked piety as pragmatic necessity. Spartan kings claimed sacral roles; Athenian festivals structured civic time and expenditure. Dreams, portents, and prophetic utterances are presented as part of rational deliberation rather than its negation. This fusion of calculation and cult framed arguments about legitimate authority, inculcating respect for both law and divine sanction in decision making.
By the later fourth century, the Greek world that these works chronicle seemed poised between stubborn polis autonomy and the lure of larger unities. Diplomacy codified by great‑power edicts, shifting coalitions, and the rise of professional soldiery all eroded older civic certainties. Later readers—from Hellenistic strategists to Roman moralists—found in these narratives models of leadership and cautionary tales about hubris, faction, and dependence on foreign gold. The corpus closes as it began: with Greeks debating how to live free under law while surviving amid empires. Its enduring context is the education of judgment in an age of relentless, inventive change.
Synopsis (Selection)
Anabasis
A firsthand narrative of the 'Ten Thousand' Greek mercenaries who, after Cyrus the Younger's failed bid for the Persian throne, must fight and negotiate their way home from deep inside Persia. It follows the army's leadership crisis, grueling retreat to the Black Sea, and encounters with diverse peoples and terrains.
Cyropaedia
A didactic, partly fictionalized biography of Cyrus the Great that traces his upbringing, campaigns, and statecraft. It presents an idealized model of leadership and imperial organization, examining how discipline, education, and institutions sustain power.
Hellenica
A continuation of Greek history from 411 to 362 BCE, covering the end of the Peloponnesian War, Spartan ascendancy, the Corinthian War, and the rise of Thebes. It focuses on shifting alliances, battles, and political calculations among the Greek city-states.
Agesilaus
A laudatory account of the Spartan king Agesilaus II, highlighting his character, campaigns, and governance. It aims to portray him as a model of Spartan virtue and effective leadership.
Polity of the Lacedaemonians
A descriptive analysis of Sparta's constitution and customs, attributed to Lycurgus, including education, military discipline, and social organization. It explains how these institutions produced Spartan cohesion and notes causes of later decline.
Polity of the Athenians
A brief critique of Athenian democracy that explains how its institutions empower the common people and support a naval empire. The work assesses the system's logic and effectiveness from an oligarchic perspective.
The Complete Historical Works of Xenophon
Anabasis
BOOK I
I
Darius and Parysatis had two sons: the elder was named Artaxerxes, and the younger Cyrus. Now, as Darius lay sick and felt that the end of life drew near, he wished both his sons to be with him. The elder, as it chanced, was already there, but Cyrus he must needs send for from the province over which he had made him satrap, having appointed him general moreover of all the forces that muster in the plain of the Castolus. Thus Cyrus went up, taking with him Tissaphernes as his friend, and accompanied also by a body of Hellenes, three hundred heavy armed men, under the command of Xenias the Parrhasian1.
Now when Darius was dead, and Artaxerxes was established in the kingdom, Tissaphernes brought slanderous accusations against Cyrus before his brother, the king, of harbouring designs against him. And Artaxerxes, listening to the words of Tissaphernes, laid hands upon Cyrus, desiring to put him to death; but his mother made intercession for him, and sent him back again in safety to his province. He then, having so escaped through peril and dishonour, fell to considering, not only how he might avoid ever again being in his brother's power, but how, if possible, he might become king in his stead. Parysatis, his mother, was his first resource; for she had more love for Cyrus than for Artaxerxes upon his throne. Moreover Cyrus's behaviour towards all who came to him from the king's court was such that, when he sent them away again, they were better friends to himself than to the king his brother. Nor did he neglect the barbarians in his own service; but trained them, at once to be capable as warriors and devoted adherents of himself. Lastly, he began collecting his Hellenic armament, but with the utmost secrecy, so that he might take the king as far as might be at unawares.
The manner in which he contrived the levying of the troops was as follows: First, he sent orders to the commandants of garrisons in the cities (so held by him), bidding them to get together as large a body of picked Peloponnesian troops as they severally were able, on the plea that Tissaphernes was plotting against their cities; and truly these cities of Ionia had originally belonged to Tissaphernes, being given to him by the king; but at this time, with the exception of Miletus, they had all revolted to Cyrus. In Miletus, Tissaphernes, having become aware of similar designs, had forestalled the conspirators by putting some to death and banishing the remainder. Cyrus, on his side, welcomed these fugitives, and having collected an army, laid siege to Miletus by sea and land, endeavouring to reinstate the exiles; and this gave him another pretext for collecting an armament. At the same time he sent to the king, and claimed, as being the king's brother, that these cities should be given to himself rather than that Tissaphernes should continue to govern them; and in furtherance of this end, the queen, his mother, co-operated with him, so that the king not only failed to see the design against himself, but concluded that Cyrus was spending his money on armaments in order to make war on Tissaphernes. Nor did it pain him greatly to see the two at war together, and the less so because Cyrus was careful to remit the tribute due to the king from the cities which belonged to Tissaphernes.
A third army was being collected for him in the Chersonese, over against Abydos, the origin of which was as follows: There was a Lacedaemonian exile, named Clearchus, with whom Cyrus had become associated. Cyrus admired the man, and made him a present of ten thousand darics2. Clearchus took the gold, and with the money raised an army, and using the Chersonese as his base of operations, set to work to fight the Thracians north of the Hellespont, in the interests of the Hellenes, and with such happy result that the Hellespontine cities, of their own accord, were eager to contribute funds for the support of his troops. In this way, again, an armament was being secretly maintained for Cyrus.
Then there was the Thessalian Aristippus, Cyrus's friend3, who, under pressure of the rival political party at home, had come to Cyrus and asked him for pay for two thousand mercenaries, to be continued for three months, which would enable him, he said, to gain the upper hand of his antagonists. Cyrus replied by presenting him with six months' pay for four thousand mercenaries—only stipulating that Aristippus should not come to terms with his antagonists without final consultation with himself. In this way he secured to himself the secret maintenance of a fourth armament.
Further, he bade Proxenus, a Boeotian, who was another friend, get together as many men as possible, and join him in an expedition which he meditated against the Pisidians 4, who were causing annoyance to his territory. Similarly two other friends, Sophaenetus the Stymphalian 5, and Socrates the Achaean, had orders to get together as many men as possible and come to him, since he was on the point of opening a campaign, along with Milesian exiles, against Tissaphernes. These orders were duly carried out by the officers in question.
1 Parrhasia, a district and town in the south-west of Arcadia.
3 Lit. "guest-friend." Aristippus was, as we learn from the "Meno" of Plato, a native of Larisa, of the family of the Aleuadae, and a pupil of Gorgias. He was also a lover of Menon, whom he appears to have sent on this expedition instead of himself.
4 Lit. "into the country of the Pisidians."
5 Of Stymphalus in Arcadia.
II
But when the right moment seemed to him to have come, at which he should begin his march into the interior, the pretext which he put forward was his desire to expel the Pisidians utterly out of the country; and he began collecting both his Asiatic and his Hellenic armaments, avowedly against that people. From Sardis in each direction his orders sped: to Clearchus, to join him there with the whole of his army; to Aristippus, to come to terms with those at home, and to despatch to him the troops in his employ; to Xenias the Arcadian, who was acting as general-in-chief of the foreign troops in the cities, to present himself with all the men available, excepting only those who were actually needed to garrison the citadels. He next summoned the troops at present engaged in the siege of Miletus, and called upon the exiles to follow him on his intended expedition, promising them that if he were successful in his object, he would not pause until he had reinstated them in their native city. To this invitation they hearkened gladly; they believed in him; and with their arms they presented themselves at Sardis. So, too, Xenias arrived at Sardis with the contingent from the cities, four thousand hoplites; Proxenus, also, with fifteen hundred hoplites and five hundred light-armed troops; Sophaenetus the Stymphalian, with one thousand hoplites; Socrates the Achaean, with five hundred hoplites; while the Megarion Pasion came with three hundred hoplites and three hundred peltasts 1. This latter officer, as well as Socrates, belonged to the force engaged against Miletus. These all joined him at Sardis.
But Tissaphernes did not fail to note these proceedings. An equipment so large pointed to something more than an invasion of Pisidia: so he argued; and with what speed he might, he set off to the king, attended by about five hundred horse. The king, on his side, had no sooner heard from Tissaphernes of Cyrus's great armament, than he began to make counter-preparations.
Thus Cyrus, with the troops which I have named, set out from Sardis, and marched on and on through Lydia three stages, making two-and-twenty parasangs 2, to the river Maeander. That river is two hundred feet 3 broad, and was spanned by a bridge consisting of seven boats. Crossing it, he marched through Phrygia a single stage, of eight parasangs, to Colossae, an inhabited city 4, prosperous and large. Here he remained seven days, and was joined by Menon the Thessalian, who arrived with one thousand hoplites and five hundred peltasts, Dolopes, Aenianes, and Olynthians. From this place he marched three stages, twenty parasangs in all, to Celaenae, a populous city of Phrygia, large and prosperous. Here Cyrus owned a palace and a large park 5 full of wild beasts, which he used to hunt on horseback, whenever he wished to give himself or his horses exercise. Through the midst of the park flows the river Maeander, the sources of which are within the palace buildings, and it flows through the city of Celaenae. The great king also has a palace in Celaenae, a strong place, on the sources of another river, the Marsyas, at the foot of the acropolis. This river also flows through the city, discharging itself into the Maeander, and is five-and-twenty feet broad. Here is the place where Apollo is said to have flayed Marsyas, when he had conquered him in the contest of skill. He hung up the skin of the conquered man, in the cavern where the spring wells forth, and hence the name of the river, Marsyas. It was on this site that Xerxes, as tradition tells, built this very palace, as well as the citadel of Celaenae itself, on his retreat from Hellas, after he had lost the famous battle. Here Cyrus remained for thirty days, during which Clearchus the Lacedaemonian arrived with one thousand hoplites and eight hundred Thracian peltasts and two hundred Cretan archers. At the same time, also, came Sosis the Syracusian with three thousand hoplites, and Sophaenetus the Arcadian 6 with one thousand hoplites; and here Cyrus held a review, and numbered his Hellenes in the park, and found that they amounted in all to eleven thousand hoplites and about two thousand peltasts.
From this place he continued his march two stages—ten parasangs—to the populous city of Peltae, where he remained three days; while Xenias, the Arcadian, celebrated the Lycaea 7 with sacrifice, and instituted games. The prizes were headbands of gold; and Cyrus himself was a spectator of the contest. From this place the march was continued two stages—twelve parasangs—to Ceramon-agora, a populous city, the last on the confines of Mysia. Thence a march of three stages—thirty parasangs—brought him to Caystru-pedion 8, a populous city. Here Cyrus halted five days; and the soldiers, whose pay was now more than three months in arrear, came several times to the palace gates demanding their dues; while Cyrus put them off with fine words and expectations, but could not conceal his vexation, for it was not his fashion to stint payment, when he had the means. At this point Epyaxa, the wife of Syennesis, the king of the Cilicians, arrived on a visit to Cyrus; and it was said that Cyrus received a large gift of money from the queen. At this date, at any rate, Cyrus gave the army four months' pay. The queen was accompanied by a bodyguard of Cilicians and Aspendians; and, if report speaks truly, Cyrus had intimate relations with the queen.
From this place he marched two stages—ten parasangs—to Thymbrium, a populous city. Here, by the side of the road, is the spring of Midas, the king of Phrygia, as it is called, where Midas, as the story goes, caught the satyr by drugging the spring with wine. From this place he marched two stages—ten parasangs—to Tyriaeum, a populous city. Here he halted three days; and the Cilician queen, according to the popular account, begged Cyrus to exhibit his armament for her amusement. The latter being only too glad to make such an exhibition, held a review of the Hellenes and barbarians in the plain. He ordered the Hellenes to draw up their lines and post themselves in their customary battle order, each general marshalling his own battalion. Accordingly they drew up four-deep. The right was held by Menon and those with him; the left by Clearchus and his men; the centre by the remaining generals with theirs. Cyrus first inspected the barbarians, who marched past in troops of horses and companies of infantry. He then inspected the Hellenes; driving past them in his chariot, with the queen in her carriage. And they all had brass helmets and purple tunics, and greaves, and their shields uncovered 9.
After he had driven past the whole body, he drew up his chariot in front of the centre of the battle-line, and sent his interpreter Pigres to the generals of the Hellenes, with orders to present arms and to advance along the whole line. This order was repeated by the generals to their men; and at the sound of the bugle, with shields forward and spears in rest, they advanced to meet the enemy. The pace quickened, and with a shout the soldiers spontaneously fell into a run, making in the direction of the camp. Great was the panic of the barbarians. The Cilician queen in her carriage turned and fled; the sutlers in the marketing place left their wares and took to their heels; and the Hellenes meanwhile came into camp with a roar of laughter. What astounded the queen was the brilliancy and order of the armament; but Cyrus was pleased to see the terror inspired by the Hellenes in the hearts of the Asiatics.
From this place he marched on three stages—twenty parasangs—to Iconium, the last city of Phrygia, where he remained three days. Thence he marched through Lycaonia five stages—thirty parasangs. This was hostile country, and he gave it over to the Hellenes to pillage. At this point Cyrus sent back the Cilician queen to her own country by the quickest route; and to escort her he sent the soldiers of Menon, and Menon himself. With the rest of the troops he continued his march through Cappadocia four stages—twenty-five parasangs—to Dana, a populous city, large and flourishing. Here they halted three days, within which interval Cyrus put to death, on a charge of conspiracy, a Persian nobleman named Megaphernes, a wearer of the royal purple; and along with him another high dignitary among his subordinate commanders.
From this place they endeavoured to force a passage into Cilicia. Now the entrance was by an exceedingly steep cart-road, impracticable for an army in face of a resisting force; and report said that Syennesis was on the summit of the pass guarding the approach. Accordingly they halted a day in the plain; but next day came a messenger informing them that Syenesis had left the pass; doubtless, after perceiving that Menon's army was already in Cilicia on his own side of the mountains; and he had further been informed that ships of war, belonging to the Lacedaemonians and to Cyrus himself, with Tamos on board as admiral, were sailing round from Ionia to Cilicia. Whatever the reason might be, Cyrus made his way up into the hills without let or hindrance, and came in sight of the tents where the Cilicians were on guard. From that point he descended gradually into a large and beautiful plain country, well watered, and thickly covered with trees of all sorts and vines. This plain produces sesame plentifully, as also panic and millet and barley and wheat; and it is shut in on all sides by a steep and lofty wall of mountains from sea to sea. Descending through this plain country, he advanced four stages—twenty-five parasangs—to Tarsus, a large and prosperous city of Cilicia. Here stood the palace of Syennesis, the king of the country; and through the middle of the city flows a river called the Cydnus, two hundred feet broad. They found that the city had been deserted by its inhabitants, who had betaken themselves, with Syennesis, to a strong place on the hills. All had gone, except the tavern-keepers. The sea-board inhabitants of Soli and Issi also remained. Now Epyaxa, Syennesis's queen, had reached Tarsus five days in advance of Cyrus. During their passage over the mountains into the plain, two companies of Menon's army were lost. Some said they had been cut down by the Cilicians, while engaged on some pillaging affair; another account was that they had been left behind, and being unable to overtake the main body, or discover the route, had gone astray and perished. However it was, they numbered one hundred hoplites; and when the rest arrived, being in a fury at the destruction of their fellow soldiers, they vented their spleen by pillaging the city of Tarsus and the palace to boot. Now when Cyrus had marched into the city, he sent for Syennesis to come to him; but the latter replied that he had never yet put himself into the hands of any one who was his superior, nor was he willing to accede to the proposal of Cyrus now; until, in the end, his wife persuaded him, and he accepted pledges of good faith. After this they met, and Syennesis gave Cyrus large sums in aid of his army; while Cyrus presented him with the customary royal gifts—to wit, a horse with a gold bit, a necklace of gold, a gold bracelet, and a gold scimitar, a Persian dress, and lastly, the exemption of his territory from further pillage, with the privilege of taking back the slaves that had been seized, wherever they might chance to come upon them.
1 "Targeteers" armed with a light shield instead of the larger one of the hoplite, or heavy infantry soldier. Iphicrates made great use of this arm at a later date.
4 Lit. "inhabited," many of the cities of Asia being then as now deserted, but the suggestion is clearly at times "thickly inhabited," "populous."
6 Perhaps this should be Agias the Arcadian, as Mr. Macmichael suggests. Sophaenetus has already been named above.
7 The Lycaea, an Arcadian festival in honour of Zeus Αρχαιος, akin to the Roman Lupercalia, which was originally a shepherd festival, the introduction of which the Romans ascribe to the Arcadian Evander.
8 Lit. "plain of the Cayster," like Ceramon-agora, "the market of the Ceramians" above, the name of a town.
9 I.e. ready for action, c.f. "bayonets fixed".
III
At Tarsus Cyrus and his army halted for twenty days; the soldiers refusing to advance further, since the suspicion ripened in their minds, that the expedition was in reality directed against the king; and as they insisted, they had not engaged their services for that object. Clearchus set the example of trying to force his men to continue their march; but he had no sooner started at the head of his troops than they began to pelt him and his baggage train, and Clearchus had a narrow escape of being stoned to death there and then. Later on, when he perceived that force was useless, he summoned an assembly of his own men; and for a long while he stood and wept, while the men gazed in silent astonishment. At last he spoke as follows: "Fellow soldiers, do not marvel that I am sorely distressed on account of the present troubles. Cyrus has been no ordinary friend to me. When I was in banishment he honoured me in various ways, and made me also a present of ten thousand darics. These I accepted, but not to lay them up for myself for private use; not to squander them in pleasure, but to expend them on yourselves. And, first of all, I went to war with the Thracians, and with you to aid, I wreaked vengeance on them in behalf of Hellas; driving them out of the Chersonese, when they wanted to deprive its Hellenic inhabitants of their lands. But as soon as Cyrus summoned me, I took you with me and set out, so that, if my benefactor had any need of me, I might requite him for the good treatment I myself had received at his hands.... But since you are not minded to continue the march with me, one of two things is left to me to do; either I must renounce you for the sake of my friendship with Cyrus, or I must go with you at the cost of deceiving him. Whether I am about to do right or not, I cannot say, but I choose yourselves; and, whatever betide, I mean to share your fate. Never shall it be said of me by any one that, having led Greek troops against the barbarians 1, I betrayed the Hellenes, and chose the friendship of the barbarian. No! since you do not choose to obey and follow me, I will follow after you. Whatever betide, I will share your fate. I look upon you as my country, my friends, my allies; with you I think I shall be honoured, wherever I be; without you I do not see how I can help a friend or hurt a foe. My decision is taken. Wherever you go, I go also."
Such were his words. But the soldiers, not only his own, but the rest also, when they heard what he said, and how he had scouted the idea of going up to the great king's palace 2, expressed their approval; and more than two thousand men deserted Xenias and Pasion, and took their arms and baggage-train, and came and encamped with Clearchus. But Cyrus, in despair and vexation at this turn of affairs, sent for Clearchus. He refused to come; but, without the knowledge of the soldiers, sent a message to Cyrus, bidding him keep a good heart, for that all would arrange itself in the right way; and bade him keep on sending for him, whilst he himself refused to go. After that he got together his own men, with those who had joined him, and of the rest any who chose to come, and spoke as follows: "Fellow soldiers, it is clear that the relations of Cyrus to us are identical with ours to him. We are no longer his soldiers, since we have ceased to follow him; and he, on his side, is no longer our paymaster. He, however, no doubt considers himself wronged by us; and though he goes on sending for me, I cannot bring myself to go to him: for two reasons, chiefly from a sense of shame, for I am forced to admit to myself that I have altogether deceived him; but partly, too, because I am afraid of his seizing me and inflicting a penalty on the wrongs which he conceives that I have done him. In my opinion, then, this is no time for us to go to sleep and forget all about ourselves, rather it is high time to deliberate on our next move; and as long as we do remain here, we had better bethink us how we are to abide in security; or, if we are resolved to turn our backs at once, what will be the safest means of retreat; and, further, how we are to procure supplies, for without supplies there is no profit whatsoever in the general or the private soldier. The man with whom we have to deal is an excellent friend to his friends, but a very dangerous enemy to his foes. And he is backed by a force of infantry and cavalry and ships such as we all alike very well see and know, since we can hardly be said to have posted ourselves at any great distance from him. If, then, any one has a suggestion to make, now is the time to speak." With these words he ceased.
Then various speakers stood up; some of their own motion to propound their views; others inspired by Clearchus to dilate on the hopeless difficulty of either staying, or going back without the goodwill of Cyrus. One of these, in particular, with a make-believe of anxiety to commence the homeward march without further pause, called upon them instantly to choose other generals, if Clearchus were not himself prepared to lead them back: "Let them at once purchase supplies" (the market being in the heart of the Asiatic camp), "let them pack up their baggage: let them," he added, "go to Cyrus and ask for some ships in order to return by sea: if he refused to give them ships, let them demand of him a guide to lead them back through a friendly district; and if he would not so much as give them a guide, they could but put themselves, without more ado, in marching order, and send on a detachment to occupy the pass—before Cyrus and the Cilicians, whose property," the speaker added, "we have so plentifully pillaged, can anticipate us." Such were the remarks of that speaker; he was followed by Clearchus, who merely said: "As to my acting personally as general at this season, pray do not propose it: I can see numerous obstacles to my doing so. Obedience, in the fullest, I can render to the man of your choice, that is another matter: and you shall see and know that I can play my part, under command, with the best of you."
After Clearchus another spokesman stood up, and proceeded to point out the simplicity of the speaker, who proposed to ask for vessels, just as if Cyrus were minded to renounce the expedition and sail back again. "And let me further point out," he said, "what a simple-minded notion it is to beg a guide of the very man whose designs we are marring. If we can trust any guide whom Cyrus may vouchsafe to us, why not order Cyrus at once to occupy the pass on our behoof? For my part, I should think twice before I set foot on any ships that he might give us, for fear lest he should sink them with his men-of-war; and I should equally hesitate to follow any guide of his: he might lead us into some place out of which we should find it impossible to escape. I should much prefer, if I am to return home against the will of Cyrus at all, to give him the slip, and so begone: which indeed is impossible. But these schemes are simply nonsensical. My proposal is that a deputation of fit persons, with Clearchus, should go to Cyrus: let them go to Cyrus and ask him: what use he proposes to make of us? and if the business is at all similar to that on which he once before employed a body of foreigners—let us by all means follow: let us show that we are the equals of those who accompanied him on his march up formerly. But if the design should turn out to be of larger import than the former one—involving more toil and more danger—we should ask him, either to give us good reasons for following his lead, or else consent to send us away into a friendly country. In this way, whether we follow him, we shall do so as friends, and with heart and soul, or whether we go back, we shall do so in security. The answer to this shall be reported to us here, and when we have heard it, we will advise as to our best course."
This resolution was carried, and they chose and sent a deputation with Clearchus, who put to Cyrus the questions which had been agreed upon by the army. Cyrus replied as follows: That he had received news that Abrocomas, an enemy of his, was posted on the Euphrates, twelve stages off; his object was to march against this aforesaid Abrocomas: and if he were still there, he wished to inflict punishment on him, "or if he be fled" (so the reply concluded), "we will there deliberate on the best course." The deputation received the answer and reported it to the soldiers. The suspicion that he was leading them against the king was not dispelled; but it seemed best to follow him. They only demanded an increase of pay, and Cyrus promised to give them half as much again as they had hitherto received—that is to say, a daric and a half a month to each man, instead of a daric. Was he really leading them to attack the king? Not even at this moment was any one apprised of the fact, at any rate in any open and public manner.
1 Lit. "into the country of the barbarian."
2 Or "how he insisted that he was not going up."
IV
From this point he marched two stages—ten parasangs—to the river Psarus, which is two hundred feet broad, and from the Psarus he marched a single stage—five parasangs—to Issi, the last city in Cilicia. It lies on the seaboard—a prosperous, large and flourishing town. Here they halted three days, and here Cyrus was joined by his fleet. There were thirty-five ships from Peloponnesus, with the Lacedaemonian admiral Pythagoras on board. These had been piloted from Ephesus by Tamos the Egyptian, who himself had another fleet of twenty-five ships belonging to Cyrus. These had formed Tamos's blockading squadron at Miletus, when that city sided with Tissaphernes; he had also used them in other military services rendered to Cyrus in his operations against that satrap. There was a third officer on board the fleet, the Lacedaemonian Cheirisophus, who had been sent for by Cyrus, and had brought with him seven hundred hoplites, over whom he was to act as general in the service of Cyrus. The fleet lay at anchor opposite Cyrus's tent. Here too another reinforcement presented itself. This was a body of four hundred hoplites, Hellenic mercenaries in the service of Abrocomas, who deserted him for Cyrus, and joined in the campaign against the king.
From Issi, he marched a single stage—five parasangs—to the gates of Cilicia and Syria. This was a double fortress: the inner and nearer one, which protects Cilicia, was held by Syennesis and a garrison of Cilicians; the outer and further one, protecting Syria, was reported to be garrisoned by a body of the king's troops. Through the gap between the two fortresses flows a river named the Carsus, which is a hundred feet broad, and the whole space between was scarcely more than six hundred yards. To force a passage here would be impossible, so narrow was the pass itself, with the fortification walls stretching down to the sea, and precipitous rocks above; while both fortresses were furnished with gates. It was the existence of this pass which had induced Cyrus to send for the fleet, so as to enable him to lead a body of hoplites inside and outside the gates; and so to force a passage through the enemy, if he were guarding the Syrian gate, as he fully expected to find Abrocomas doing with a large army. This, however, Abrocomas had not done; but as soon as he learnt that Cyrus was in Cilicia, he had turned round and made his exit from Phoenicia, to join the king with an army amounting, as report said, to three hundred thousand men.
From this point Cyrus pursued his march, through Syria a single stage—five parasangs—to Myriandus, a city inhabited by Phoenicians, on the sea-coast. This was a commercial port, and numerous merchant vessels were riding at anchor in the harbour. Here they halted seven days, and here Xenias the Arcadian general, and Pasion the Megarian got on board a trader, and having stowed away their most valuable effects, set sail for home; most people explained the act as the outcome of a fit of jealousy, because Cyrus had allowed Clearchus to retain their men, who had deserted to him, in hopes of returning to Hellas instead of marching against the king; when the two had so vanished, a rumour spread that Cyrus was after them with some ships of war, and some hoped the cowards might be caught, others pitied them, if that should be their fate.
But Cyrus summoned the generals and addressed them: "Xenias and Pasion," he said, "have taken leave of us; but they need not flatter themselves that in so doing they have stolen into hiding. I know where they are gone; nor will they owe their escape to speed; I have men-of-war to capture their craft, if I like. But heaven help me! if I mean to pursue them: never shall it be said of me, that I turn people to account as long as they stay with me, but as soon as they are minded to be off, I seize and maltreat them, and strip them of their wealth. Not so! let them go with the consciousness that our behaviour to them is better than theirs to us. And yet I have their children and wives safe under lock and key in Tralles; but they shall not be deprived even of these. They shall receive them back in return for their former goodness to me." So he spoke, and the Hellenes, even those who had been out of heart at the thought of marching up the country, when they heard of the nobleness of Cyrus, were happier and more eager to follow him on his path.
After this Cyrus marched onwards four stages—twenty parasangs—to the river Chalus. That river is a hundred feet broad, and is stocked with tame fish which the Syrians regard as gods, and will not suffer to be injured—and so too the pigeons of the place. The villages in which they encamped belonged to Parysatis, as part of her girdle money 1
