The Democratic Process E-Book

Kurt Theodor Oehler

• Herausgeber: novum publishing
• Kategorie: Gesellschafts- und Liebesromane
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 739

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025

Beschreibung

How can democracy succeed as a form of government? An adult may have developed self-confidence, but they cannot change the world alone. They can only gain power, influence, and assertiveness by joining forces and networking with like-minded people. It is the group and its dynamics that make transformation possible. A democratic consciousness can only emerge when many people who think alike and have a similarly developed consciousness come together in an organized way. Democratic maturity is therefore the decisive criterion for the success of democratic structures. This is a reappraisal of human history in light of current global political issues, examining the group-dynamic development of democracy, its limits, and its drivers.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Preliminary remarks to the second edition

Foreword

Introduction

1 Is there a shift to the right?

2 World events as a group dynamic process

3 Stability of political systems

4 Finality of the group dynamic process

5 The crucial contradiction: autocracy or democracy?

6 Five reasons for the global shift to the right

7 thoughts on the general world situation and specifically on Russia's attack on Ukraine and the ren

8 thoughts on the current world situation

9 Conclusion

List of sources

Catalogue raisonné

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THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Democracy is the crown of a state, and

democratic maturity the decisive criterion of success.

Kurt Theodor Oehler

Preliminary remarks to the second edition

This book is a completely revised and updated edition of the previously out-of-print book entitled “Does Democracy Still Have a Future?”, which was published by a Swiss publisher in 2018, with a view to current events in Europe, especially in Ukraine, Israel, Iran and, most recently, China.

I attach particular importance to explicitly highlighting the great importance of democracy as a form of government and to my thesis that all groups, be they small like study groups, school classes and executive bodies or large like cities or states, automatically and as a matter of natural law strive towards democratic structures in logical steps.

Surprisingly, with few exceptions, hardly anyone believes me. Especially not political scientists. They believe that people are primarily concerned with personal needs, such as their standard of living, specifically food and a roof over their heads. No one seems to believe that the development toward democracy is primarily an extremely complex and existentially important process of changing consciousness.

My most important thesis is therefore that democracy is the crown of all forms of government, and democratic maturity is the decisive criterion for the success of democratic structures.

In this sense, this book is an optimistic one. The democratic form of government and the associated liberal economic activity will ultimately prevail in the long run, despite all obstacles. It is not without reason that the English economic historian Niall Ferguson stated with regard to China:

“I don’t think the Communist Party (of China) will be able to stay in power for more than 20 years.”

A renowned Swiss university professor of democracy studies didn't like my theories. He said the concept of democratic maturity represented an inherent process in a certain direction. He couldn't understand that.

But that's precisely the crucial point. Democracy isn't something that simply exists as an organizational construct and can be imposed on any state without considering the existing psychosocial conditions. Quite the opposite. Democratic maturity is the result of a long and often very painful process of intellectual development.

The democratic form of government can therefore only prevail in states that have achieved genuine democratic capacity in a long, natural development process.

Is there a sustainable democracy without a mature human consciousness? No ! It is not enough to build institutions and organizations. Everything depends – first and foremost – on the maturity of consciousness.

This is clearly evident in the dynamics of small groups. The participants in a study group are not poor or hungry. Quite the opposite. These are people who can certainly afford such an event. On the path to their group's democratic capacity, they are neither concerned with money nor with food. The crucial developmental processes take place on a completely different and usually non-conscious level.

The path to democratic capability can be experienced in a study group in an impressive way and in all phases in a differentiated manner and studied in detail with all specific details.

This also underscores the realization that "change through trade" doesn't really work. While trade does increase contacts and generate an intensive exchange of knowledge and goods, these contacts hardly lead to a change in consciousness. Among other things, there is a lack of determined debate about spiritual values, the will to build something together, and existing social conditions.

Although there are repeated attempts to initiate a discussion of values at international meetings, this is often, and rightly, viewed as inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of another state.

In reality, it's about trust, relationships, the way we cooperate, the building of institutions, and an unbroken sense of self-worth. It's about the determination to build a functioning whole together and the will to grant citizens the maximum of internal and external freedoms.

This has little to do with money or food, but primarily with legal certainty, with a network of institutions, with the will to independence and self-determination and, finally, with freedom of assembly, opinion, thought and speech.

The subject in a monarchy experience and thinks quite differently than the self-confident citizen of a democratic state. For the loyal subject of a monarchy, the monarch represents the archetype of a nurturing mother who can do everything, knows everything, cares for everyone, and satisfies all needs. Psychodynamically speaking, this corresponds to the consciousness of an unborn child.

In contrast, the self-confident citizen of a true democracy fights for entirely different values. People, for example, in Ukraine, are fighting not only for food and a livelihood. They are also not fighting for a roof over their heads. Ukrainians are fighting primarily for their independence from Russia, for their freedom, and for human rights. Ultimately, it is about human dignity and the democratic form of government. This attitude has a completely different quality than that of passively suffering and politically immature subjects.

Between these two attitudes lies a history of intellectual development that can be studied in detail by psychologists and psychohistorians, for example. This is less about the actual historical data and processes. It is not about studying organizational and command structures, but primarily about understanding how historical conditions influence people's thinking and, in particular, human consciousness. The history of human emancipation is therefore not the result of material hardship and wars, but primarily the result of the emancipation of human consciousness.

There is therefore a great difference between a citizen, craftsman, farmer, city dweller, etc. – who obediently and submissively follow the orders of their monarchs, who unquestioningly and uncritically accept the hereditary succession process, and unquestioningly recognize the power of the rulers and their entourage – and a free citizen convinced by Western values – who, intellectually mature, enlightened, and independently, exercises civil liberties. A difference in feelings and thoughts. The latter behave, to use the words of psychohistorians, like adults who have slowly and conflict-riddenly struggled their way from fetal or toddlerhood through rebellious puberty into adulthood.

Before the French Revolution, the citizens were poor, hungry, and suffered from excessive taxation. They saw that the nobility, and especially the royal families, reveled in their privileges, building magnificent castles and lavishing themselves without bounds at the expense of the impoverished population. The citizens realized that these privileges were not divinely ordained and self-evident, but unjust and, even more seriously, man-made, not divine.

This fundamentally changed their consciousness. They demanded justice and no longer fought for food, a roof over their heads, and against excessive taxes, but for far more ambitious goals such as equality, liberty, and fraternity—and ultimately for a republic and democracy.

Such an attitude is no longer compatible with submissive and humble behavior in a mentally backward, unjust, and dictatorial autocracy. A person who has developed a unique and distinctive personality in an independent, liberal, and just society will consciously identify with the values of a free and just democracy and will never again voluntarily submit to monarchical or dictatorial pretensions.

People who, due to their socialization, think predominantly in technical, materialistic, and mechanistic ways are in a "having" mode of thinking. It's about ability and power, about generating influence and relationships, and possibly also about claiming honor and fame. This corresponds to a serious developmental deficit.

In contrast, people who also integrate spiritual values are concerned with the so-called "being mode." This involves values such as being free, independent, responsible, fair, communicative, and adult.

This difference is not self-evident. It is a difference in thinking and consciousness—usually also in the subconscious.

This also includes the fact that a hundred years ago, it wasn't even possible to study psychology. This difference is, one could also call it, an expression of a psychological turning point.

The so-called pre-psychological age can be described, for example, by the following content:

By overemphasizing the physical in health and medicine,

by not recognizing or not wanting to punish social injustice,

by not wanting to see early neglect, child abuse and church abuse,

by allowing early marriage and circumcision of young women,

by trivializing the oppression or rape of women,

by making interpersonal or internal family conflicts taboo,

by repressing or defending against prenatal or early childhood influences and ultimately

through the disregard for psychological-psychoanalytic healing methods.

From this general “head-in-the-sand-age” a psychological age can be distinguished, which was primarily shaped

by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) with his “Interpretation of Dreams” (1899),

by Anna Freud (1875–1982) with her book “The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense” (1984),

by Melanie Klein (1882–1960) with her work “The Soul Life of the Infant”,

by Otto Rank (1884–1939) with his book “The Trauma of Birth” (1924),

by Stanislav Grof (1931) with his presentation of the “Topography of the Unconscious” (1978) and finally

by Bruce W. Tuckman (1938–2016) with his first description of the group dynamic process in “Developmental sequence in small groups” (1965).

The Psychological Age expects people to perceive things more openly, to analyze things more differentiatedly, and ultimately to address and punish social undesirable developments more decisively.

All of the painful experiences listed above generally leave few to no physical symptoms. However, they usually leave behind a devastating psychological trauma, which, while not physical death, can usually result in a lifelong psychological decline or even psychological death—a spiritual death that, due to the lack of physical symptoms, has received little recognition from many doctors and society in general. After this shift in history, psychological symptoms were given far greater importance.

What do these discussions have to do with democracy and group dynamics?

Changes in thinking and consciousness form the basis for all social changes and thus for understanding the essence of the democratic process. It is therefore not a question of creating new institutions and procedures, but of ensuring that these changes are supported by a fundamental shift in consciousness.

This change in consciousness is the result of an automatic and natural mental development process, which is mainly a function of the (large) group dynamic process.

Despite a developed sense of self-confidence, an adult cannot change the world alone. They can only make a difference by joining forces with like-minded people and networking. Then, by working together with others, they gain power, influence, and assertiveness.

Thus, it is the group and its dynamics that make transformation possible. Only when there are many people in an organized form who think alike and have a similarly developed consciousness can a democratic consciousness emerge, and thus democracy succeed as a form of government.

The reader may be surprised that this text frequently cites biblical stories and associations with religious rituals. This is no coincidence. Political or historical events are always linked to religious and developmental psychological factors. The connection between religions and group dynamics is not highlighted here because group dynamics might have much to do with religious feelings, but rather, because religions have a lot to do with group dynamics. This is because the content and rituals of religions always represent a spiritual reflection of the dynamic processes of large groups. This is intended, not least, to emphasize the multidimensionality of human beings.

The change in society and thus in consciousness is the result of a development process that manifests itself on both the sociological and psychological levels.

For these reasons, this book attempts to present the process of small group and large group dynamics in a differentiated manner, connecting it with political, psychological, psychoanalytic, psychohistorical, and ultimately religious aspects. The foreword by former Swiss Federal Councilor and President Dr. h. c. Kaspar Villiger has been included in the new edition in a slightly shortened form with the author's consent.

This foreword, however, refers only to the first few chapters of this text. In view of the current global situation and the relevance of current events, three additional chapters have been added, specifically regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the re-election of US President Donald Trump, and the ongoing Middle East conflict.

This approach will certainly lead interested readers to completely new perspectives and illuminating insights.

Zimmerwald, January 1, 2025

Dr. rer. nat. Kurt Theodor Oehler

Foreword

from

Former Federal Councillor Dr. h. c. Kaspar Villiger

The future of democracy no longer appears as rosy as we all believed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Francis Fukuyama wrote of the end of history, meaning the definitive overcoming of poverty and war through a market economy and democracy. [1] Long-standing democracies are suddenly afflicted by severe political and economic turmoil, while authoritarian governments are celebrating successes. What are the reasons for this, and what does it mean for our future? These are the burning questions that Kurt Theodor Oehler seeks answers to with new and original approaches.

For thousands of years, global economic growth hovered around zero. Conditions we consider catastrophic today—destitution, poverty, disease, violence, and exploitation—were the norm for the overwhelming majority of people. However, about two hundred years ago, a fascinating development took hold in Europe. Freedom of thought and the competition of ideas generated an explosion of knowledge and technological development. A market economy based on competition sparked entrepreneurship and thus growth. Free trade, through the law of comparative cost, allowed more and more countries to share in prosperity. Democracy and the rule of law suddenly enabled millions of people to live in freedom and dignity. Despite repeated bloody conflicts and economic crises, humanity made enormous progress in a historically short period of time.

When we consider the horror stories constantly bombarding our iPhones and iPads, we might be overcome by the fearful suspicion that Murphy's Law is increasingly determining the course of the world. It's no wonder, therefore, that fears about the future plague many people. But sober statistics show that, on average, humanity has never been better off than it is today, despite population explosions, environmental problems, terrorism, and refugee influxes.

The hopeful expectations immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, appear to be unfulfilled. Democracy is in a real crisis. Established democracies are suffering from weak growth, excessive debt, high unemployment, and political instability. The transformation of overthrown authoritarian regimes into functioning democracies has failed almost everywhere. Democracy has lost its role model effect for developing countries. Conversely, authoritarian states that provide favorable conditions for market economies and have discovered free trade are celebrating economic successes.

The question arises as to whether humanity is facing a secular trend reversal and whether the enormous achievements of the last two hundred years are at risk. There are indeed indications of such a pessimistic view. Such questions are difficult to answer clearly in highly complex systems such as global politics and the global economy. Scientists often work with simplified models to understand the driving forces of development. One example is the fictional character of the always rational Homo oeconomicus, which has continued to yield valid insights. But because this simplified view of humanity does not do justice to its true, complex nature, it cannot explain many economic phenomena. Therefore, models must continually be verified or falsified based on measured reality and adapted or rejected accordingly. Kurt Theodor Oehler has made the interesting attempt to apply empirically proven findings on the dynamics of small groups to large and supergroups such as states and groups of states. Through meticulously compiled case studies and a dense web of anecdotal evidence, he has undertaken the ambitious attempt to verify his hypothesis. He has thus succeeded in presenting profound insights into the nature of democracies in a form that is easily understandable even for laypeople. Many of his findings are confirmed by other academic disciplines such as institutional economics and behavioral economics. Whether all the conclusions of his ambitious undertaking are correct remains to be seen, but they are certainly interesting and thought-provoking.

I want to briefly discuss four aspects of Oehler’s hypotheses.

Despite all the problems that democracies have encountered, Oehler is right when he considers democracy by no means obsolete, but rather still the most desirable form of government. In his view, it is the optimal framework for balancing the strongly diverging interests in a developed society. However, he is also aware of the complex prerequisites for the flourishing of a democracy, such as the need for a culture of values shared by the majority, the creation of an appropriate legal framework, the existence of effective institutions, the formation of a sense of homeland, and the presence of a government that is sufficiently democratically controlled and oriented towards the common good. The development economist Paul Collier speaks of a suitable social model that consists of a complex network of institutions, organizations, values, and cultural elements [2]. It is particularly important now, time and again, to emphasize the central importance of democracy as the only form of government that is appropriate to human dignity. Oehler places a clear emphasis on this.

Oehler's central hypothesis is based on the assumption that established empirical findings on the behavior of small groups of people can be transferred to large groups such as states or even world orders. He identifies similar laws which, however, with the increasing complexity of larger groups, have a much longer-term effect, up to periods of decades or even centuries. He distinguishes between an initial phase of uncertainty in which the call for a strong man resounds and the tendency towards dictatorship arises, a middle phase in which, after rebellion against the ruling class, the republic is born, and a mature phase with differentiated political structures and a democratic constitution. In this way, he depicts in a highly simplified way the mechanism of state formation, as described in great detail by Nobel laureate Douglass North with co-authors John Wallis and Barry Weingast [3]. North defines three social orders in human history: first, the hunter-gatherer order (the so-called "natural state," typical of small groups of hunter-gatherer societies); second, the order with restricted access (personal relationships are the basis of social organization; personal relationships between powerful individuals are important, but the individual's ability to form organizations is limited); and third, orders with free access (personal relationships are still important, but in many areas of social behavior, impersonally categorized individuals interact with each other; the possibility of forming an organization that supports society as a whole is open to anyone who meets defined minimum criteria). The transition to an order with free access requires a series of changes in the community, such as greater citizen participation, the safeguarding of impersonal political rights, greater institutional transparency, economic changes, and free access to and competition in many markets. North also identifies a pronounced correlation between political and economic development: there is a close relationship between high incomes and good political institutions. Modern societies that made the transition to freedom of access and thus became more prosperous than any previous society in history were able to significantly reduce periods of negative growth.

Oehler also concludes that the transfer of small group dynamics mechanisms to large groups must be institutionally supported and, so to speak, channeled. He rightly states that appropriate legal, organizational, and material structures must be created. This is entirely consistent with what Daron Acemoglu demonstrated in his groundbreaking work "Why Nations Fail": It is institutions, not ethnicity, climate, or religion, that determine the success of a state [4].

Oehler aptly describes another characteristic of state development: it is always a dynamic process. There is a "back and forth" in the conflict between two forces, as he simplifies and models, the "disease party" and the "health party." Here, too, he agrees with Douglass North, who describes the dynamics of social order as one of change, not of progress. While Oehler believes he recognizes in this dynamic a finality of the group dynamic process, as in a small group—a goal-oriented process, so to speak, from absolutism to democracy—North is more pessimistic. He notes that most societies move back and forth and that there is no teleology. At least he concludes that societies with freedom of access can cope with change much better than natural states.

Democracy, he argues, finds solutions to emerging problems more quickly than autocracies. Of course, this tendency can certainly be interpreted as a long-term driving force for progress. However, the more pessimistic interpretation also has much to offer. Time and again, states that actually possess the structures and know-how for continued successful development collapse.

Oehler rightly devotes considerable space to the question of how states must respond to the constant changes in all influencing factors in order to maintain the stability they have achieved. He correctly postulates that, first, every change in the environment requires an adjustment of institutional structures, and, second, that reforms that are too rapid and too drastic and lack public support could lead to failure just as much as missing necessary reforms.

That may be true in general. Nevertheless, experience shows that rapid and far-reaching reforms, such as those in Turkey a few years ago or in Poland after the fall of communism, may cause more pain, but subsequently generate faster growth and greater prosperity. Conversely, timid and insufficient reforms lead to permanent, chronic suffering and reform fatigue, as was the case in France under Hollande or in Greece. As accurate as Oehler's reflections on the permanent pressure for reform in democracies are, they should probably be supplemented with considerations regarding the principles according to which reforms should be carried out. It may not be surprising that a psychologist and a former finance minister and entrepreneur do not think entirely congruently on these issues. As early as 1896, the great Swedish economist described the goals of politics as follows [5]:

“The ultimate goal is equality before the law, greatest possible freedom, and the economic well-being and peaceful cooperation of all people.”

As banal as this formulation may sound, it is challenging to apply in practical politics. Every political system will eventually lose the support of its people if it does not achieve sufficient and fairly distributed prosperity and if individual freedoms are not adequately guaranteed. Nobel Prize winner Hayek wrote as early as the 1940s that the necessity of a significant reduction in living standards or even a prolonged standstill in economic progress was the only thing that modern democracy would not survive [6]. The palpable disenchantment with politics and the seductive power of populists in economically weak democracies seem to confirm this insight. This has far-reaching consequences for the design of reforms. If, for example, the market economy is strangled by regulations or individual freedom is merely restricted instead of protected, Wicksell's goals can no longer be achieved. Oehler's valuable considerations therefore require further supplementation with criteria that suitable reforms must meet, and which, by their very nature, will always be politically controversial. In a careful analysis, Oehler rightly notes that globalization, on the one hand, significantly accelerates the need for adaptation, but, on the other, creates deep-seated fears and limits the scope for action of individual countries. Both of these factors complicate the political implementation of even suitable reforms, but make them all the more urgent.

Oehler's reflections on world politics are interesting and, at times, utopian. He sees the world currently in its initial phase of group dynamics, which—if one wants to construct an analogy to a small group—seems entirely plausible. Global regulatory power is lacking, international institutions are relatively powerless, international law is violated everywhere without risk of sanctions, and local and regional potentates can indulge their lust for power at the expense of their peoples with relative impunity. Is there really a finality for the better? Oehler postulates a "world government" with appropriate, effective institutions, because only in this way can the planet's growing global problems be solved in the long term, and only in this way can man-made catastrophes of global proportions be prevented. Here, he joins prominent authors such as Otfried Höffe, who recently wrote that the global need for action is pushing for a democratic world legal order [7]. Even if this goal is utopian, it is certainly worth considering. However, there is so much to argue against the feasibility of such a concept that considering realistic alternatives is equally important. Because the demographic and economic weight of states alien to liberal Western and democratic values is constantly growing and will increasingly shape the actions of international organizations, the world is likely to remain in the "initial phase of group dynamics" for a long time to come. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily have to result in a global catastrophe. Even authoritarian rulers can have a long-term interest in stability and prosperity, and the stable state of the Cold War was probably quite convenient for us in the West, but we must not underestimate the risks it entailed. Relatively stable equilibria between important states of varying democratic maturity are certainly conceivable. This, too, must be worked on. But on one point, Oehler deserves unconditional support: democracies must work intensively to overcome their weaknesses, and even if the deceitfulness of the times forces them to cooperate with rather unsavory contemporaries, they must defend their democratic, liberal, and constitutional values tooth and nail. Then perhaps the present setback will be merely a dent in the historical process, and the feasibility of Oehler's visions will gradually become more likely.

Dipl. Ing. ETH, Dr. hc Kaspar Villiger was a member of the Swiss Federal Council from 1989 to 2003, Minister of Defense from 1989 to 1996, Minister of Finance from 1996 to 2002, President of the Swiss Confederation from 1995 and 2002, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of United Banc Suisse (UBS) from 2003 to 2012. He also served on the boards of Nestlé, Swiss Re, and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) until 2002.

Sources for the foreword

[1] Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History and the Last Man,” Penguin Books Ltd., 2012.

[2] Paul Collier, “Exodus”, Siedler Verlag Munich, 2014.

[3] North, Douglass C.; Wallis, John Joseph; Weingast, Barry R., “Violence and Social Orders: A Reinterpretation of Political and Economic History,” Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2011.

[4] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012), “Why Nations Fail,” Crown Business, New York.

[5] In James M. Buchanan Jr. – Prize Lecture, “The Constitution of Economic Policy”, Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 8, 1986.

[6] FA Hayek, “The Road to Serfdom”, Verlag moderne Industrie, 1971.

[7] Otfried Höffe, “Law and Morality: Confucius, the Koran and Justice”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 July 2017.

Introduction

Is democracy at an end? One could almost believe it. In fact, there are many contradictory signs that raise this question anew. In the USA, the elderly Joe Biden has been president since 2020, and Donald Trump, a notorious liar and convicted of multiple crimes against the state, who was always accustomed to ruling in an authoritarian and autarkic manner in his private empire, was re-elected US President on November 5, 2024. Like Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, he seems more concerned with weakening democracy and making it appear "obsolete." In fact, Donald Trump, like his authoritarian counterparts, is hardly a true democrat. He has little regard for democratic rules and would prefer to weaken or even abolish them altogether, like Erdoğan in Turkey or Viktor Orbán in Hungary. He would prefer to run his state like an entrepreneur. According to the Washington Post, he said, with regard to his difficulties in implementing his hasty proposals:

"Look at the rules in the Senate, even the rules in the House. In my opinion, this is a really bad thing for the country. Maybe at some point we need to address these rules."

Trump reacted similarly disrespectfully toward the judiciary and the media. After just two weeks, he questioned the legitimacy of the courts blocking his "travel ban." And he called individual media outlets "enemies of the American people."

Freedom of the press is a thorn in his side. He calls the media's ability to write whatever they want "disgusting" and suggested a "possible withdrawal of special rights for certain broadcasters due to the alleged dissemination of fake news"1into play.”

One might therefore wonder with concern why voters are suddenly electing nationalist, right-wing conservative, megalomaniac, paranoid, or even narcissistic figures to government office. Could this possibly be due to a general shift to the right?

What do the two terms “right” and “left” actually mean?

The origin of the “right-left distinction” is traced back to the seating arrangement in the French National Assembly of 1789, in which the reserved and more pro-monarchy citizens sat on the right side and the revolutionary or republican-minded deputies sat on the left side of the parliament.

Actually, the "right-left" schema actually encompasses a completely different pair of concepts. Monarchists sought to "preserve" the balance of power and the associated privileges rather than make fundamental changes. This standpoint reflects conservative behavior. In contrast, republican-minded representatives sought to change or reform these relationships. The pair of concepts "right-left" is thus viewed in a somewhat more differentiated way, becoming "conservative-progressive " or "preservative-reformist."

What does the term "rightward shift" actually mean? Does it mean that voters are increasingly leaning toward a conservative stance that seeks to solidify existing power structures rather than dismantle them? Indeed, in many states, voters are leaning toward a stance that favors clearer power structures, more direct lines of command, more efficient decision-making, and a vertically organized hierarchy.

This paper is less concerned with the question of whether the shift to the right is caused by various short-term motives, but rather with whether there are still unknown long-term causes behind these factors, deep within the structures of globalization.

To answer this question, we resorted to a factor that – at first glance – seemed somewhat strange: group dynamics.

What does group dynamics have to do with world events? A lot.

The following considerations are based on the hypothesis that both small groups, as they can be experienced and studied in study groups, as well as medium-sized groups such as families, school classes, work teams and parties and even largest social groups such as ethnic groups, language communities or even states are subject to the same group dynamic principles.

These laws are not wild speculation. The course of group dynamics has been documented thousands of times and statistically proven many times. This lends the phenomenon a high degree of credibility. The transfer from small group dynamics to large group dynamics is nevertheless a bold undertaking. The insights drawn from this comparison are more than surprising. They are convincing. Why shouldn't the micro-processes in small groups also be valid as macro-processes in large groups?

Why do monarchies, dictatorships, and democracies actually exist? What significance, from a (large) group dynamic perspective, did the Reformation, the Thirty Years' War, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the two World Wars have?

Why does the development of democratic structures occur automatically?

The answer is:

People are continually becoming more knowledgeable, more educated, more informed, more open, more direct, more capable, more resilient, more trusting, more cooperative, more conscious, more critical, more self-confident, more determined, and above all – more connected. This connectedness culminates in the awareness: We can do it ourselves.

The automatism lies in the change in consciousness initiated by the group dynamic process and the associated, slowly developing, more differentiated power structures. The decisive drivers of these changes are consciousness and the resulting will to change. However, these can only unfold in a community of people.

Crucially, as the network of relationships grows, so does people's consciousness. Encounters with others lead to a constant interpersonal exchange and learning process. Cognitive fields are opened up and knowledge is shared. People learn not only their own beliefs but also the opinions of others. Furthermore, these contacts increasingly lead to a strengthening and stabilization of the emerging network of relationships.

Such a heightened consciousness is no longer compatible with a submissive and humble attitude in a mentally backward, unjust, and dictatorial autocracy. A person who has developed a distinct and distinctive personality in an independent, liberal, and just society will consciously identify more readily with the values of a free and just democracy and will never again submit to monarchical or dictatorial pretensions.

However, the change in consciousness is not accidental. It is the result of a developmental process that extends throughout life and is only possible within the context of being embedded in a group that is also changing and synchronously changing. In fact, the decisive factor in the development toward democracy is not the form of government, but the consciousness of its citizens.

The change in consciousness can be briefly described from before birth to old age as follows:

In the state of prenatal experience, the fetus can experience cosmic consciousness, as has been repeatedly reported in the context of near-death experiences or under the influence of consciousness-expanding substances.

The birth process itself, with its fateful exposure, allows a so-called awareness of fate to grow,

while engaging in human society requires an awareness of risk.

The postnatal development of the ego boundary and the formation of the ego simultaneously include the development of the specific ego consciousness,

and in the defiant phase the child develops the first signs of self-confidence.

In the context of Oedipal family conflicts, the child experiences that there are other people in his or her environment with his or her own needs and different abilities, which, among other things, creates a primary group consciousness and triggers various feelings of rivalry.

During puberty, the adolescent develops and tests an increased sense of autonomy as part of his or her striving for autonomy and his or her own personality consciousness with regard to his or her unique and distinctive personality.

As adults, a sense of responsibility for the family and society as a whole, and a global awareness of the world, eventually develops.

This process of change ultimately leads to personally and politically mature adults who associate indispensable and indispensable demanding expectations with their society.

1 Is there a shift to the right?

1.1 There is indeed a shift to the right

The Western world is deeply unsettled. The German BR Director Ulrich Wilhelm2said in an interview: “Something has slipped.” By this he meant that something important in the world has become unbalanced.

People feel powerless. While democratic governments retreat further and further onto the defensive, non-liberal governments fill the resulting gaps.

In Russia, Vladimir Putin has blocked the beginnings of a democratic state order and largely reversed the democratization process initiated by Yeltsin.

And in Turkey, President Erdoğan has, within the framework of the state of emergency and the new constitution, gagged the press, destroyed the existing separation of powers, and at least circumvented term limits for himself personally.

The situation is no different in the Balkan countries of Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia, which are increasingly sympathetic to autocratic forms of government.

The so-called shift to the right is not just a purely European phenomenon, but a global rebellion against established liberalism. Russia, Turkey, and China in particular are moving into the political vacuum left by the EU and the US.

The shift from a liberal-democratic political system to authoritarian structures is no coincidence. The population appears to increasingly favor a more direct exercise of power. Turkey provides a striking example of this trend:

At Easter 2017, over 51% of the Turkish population voted to abolish the liberal-democratic constitution, granting the president a level of power previously reserved for a sultan. And what did Erdoğan announce on the first day of his greatest triumph? The introduction of the death penalty.

But this will not impress the thieves and murderers so much as it will frighten those who think differently and are politically persecuted.

The shift to the right is clearly confirmed in the graph below (Fig. 1):3

Change in attitude towards authoritarian government structures

The 2014 graph shows that public attitudes have shifted significantly toward authoritarian leadership in several countries (with the exception of the Philippines and Pakistan) over the past twenty years. The largest shifts, in descending order, were identified by this survey in Ukraine, Romania, India, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and Spain.

According to this chart, many people trust authoritarian rulers more than democratically elected governments. The authors of the report from the Security Conference, which met in Munich from February 17 to 19, 2017, cited the following reasons for this change:

Citizens increasingly believe "that openness and global thinking at the political level (...) bring benefits (...)." Many citizens "would trust authoritarian rulers more than democratically elected governments."

The results further show that since the turn of the millennium, the state of democracy has deteriorated significantly in Turkey, Bahrain, Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine, in descending order. The authors therefore speak of a global "dismantling of democracy."

This isn't surprising. Many countries have successful autocratic governments. China, with its rigid leadership, has overcome its previous famines and triggered an astonishing economic boom. On November 8, 2017, the American magazine "Time" wrote, on the occasion of President Trump's state visit to the People's Republic of China, that China had already won the power struggle:

Authoritarian state capitalism has proven its stability. Liberal democracy, on the other hand, must fight for its survival.

This also impressed former American chief strategist Steve Bannon when he said,

that the Chinese have a “brilliant system.”

He “takes off his hat.” 4

And in Turkey, President Erdoğan has triggered a remarkable construction boom. In just a few years, he has built a stable healthcare system, tripled wages, and reached 17th place among industrialized nations through massive construction projects and the attraction of deep-pocketed investors.

As a summary of the considerations so far, a first answer can now be given:

There is actually a shift to the right!

1.2 What reasons might be responsible for the global shift to the right?

Is the shift to the right perhaps inherent in the system or democracy?

Are there possibly factors inherent in the system or democracy that favor the shift to the right?

In a democracy, everything moves very slowly. Compromise is difficult, if not impossible. Decisions have to be pushed through numerous committees. The difficult processes of forming governments in France, Germany, England, Spain, etc., are also not a good reference point for democracy as a form of government.

In contrast, a dictator can act very simply. Everything happens much faster and more directly. He doesn't have to consider friends or enemies. He can impose his will without having to go through a lengthy compromise process.

However, this advantage is offset by a serious shortcoming. Democracy may be lengthy and complicated, but like no other system of government, it provides an optimal framework for considering and balancing the most diverse interests.

Are climate change and the population explosion responsible for the shift to the right?

The Swiss historian and conflict researcher Kurt R. Spillmann believes,5that populism is based on deep insecurity or fear among the population. These fears are the result of "political and social changes of geological depth and intensity." These fears are caused by both the demographic explosion and climate change. Survival in parts of Africa and Bangladesh is becoming increasingly difficult. This is increasing the pressure to migrate worldwide.

Climate change will also exert enormous pressure on migration. However, this pressure can be countered more effectively, for example, through direct economic aid in the affected countries. Furthermore, it is unlikely that hunger alone is driving people to flee; precarious economic or political conditions, a lack of infrastructure, and a lack of educational opportunities are also driving people to flee. Ultimately, emigration is also evident in countries less affected by climate change.

Does the shift to the right only occur in areas where people feel socially marginalized?

Indeed, there are many regions, such as the Midwest or the so-called Rust Belt of the USA, where the shift to the right is extremely pronounced. Similarly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan found his greatest support in the still underdeveloped Anatolia. Moreover, even in Western democracies, many people feel their existence is threatened and financially neglected.

While a father's wages used to be enough to support an entire family, this is hardly possible today. Presumably, poor people in particular long for a strong man who will "finally make a difference."

The global economic crisis of 2008 further damaged the belief in the self-regulating power of the free market economy.

However, it is usually the autocratic rulers who promise voters a lot and deliver little. Moreover, the general shift to the right is not only evident in socially neglected areas.

Is the shift to the right the result of cyclical change?

The fourth factor concerns the assumption that the observable changes are only short-term and subject to cyclical change. This may be particularly true in the United States. A shift to the right is in fact usually followed by a shift to the left—and a shift to the left is, in turn, followed by a shift to the right.

In fact, many economic and biological processes exhibit cyclical patterns. One example is the American presidential elections, which appear to be subject to cyclical change. According to this theory, a Democratic president is always elected, and a Republican president is always elected.

Since the Second World War, the party affiliation of American presidents, with the exception of George H. Bush, has repeatedly changed, for example, in the case of presidents elected by the people:

1945–1953 Harry S. Truman (Democrat)

1953–1961 Dwight D. Eisenhower (Republican)

1961–1963 John F. Kennedy (Democrat)

1969–1974 Richard Nixon (Republican)

1977–1981 Jimmy Carter (Democrat)

1981–1989 Ronald Reagan (Republican)

1989–1993 George H. Bush (Republican)

1993–2001 Bill Clinton (Democrat)

2001–2009 George W. Bush (Republican)

2009–2017 Barack Obama (Democrat)

2017–2020 Donald Trump (Republican)

2020-2024 Joe Biden (Democrat)

2024– Donald Trump (Republican)

The two presidents Lyndon B. Johnson 1963 to 1969 (Democrat) and Gerald Ford 1974 to 1977 (Republican) were not initially directly elected by the people, but gained their presidency as vice presidents after the assassination of John F. Kennedy or after the resignation of Richard Nixon.

It is therefore not surprising that after Joe Biden, a Republican president, Donald Trump, was elected, and that a Democrat would be elected again.

This theory implies that the shift to the right is based solely on a psychological effect and could be found in all countries of the world. However, this is not always the case, as is the case in Austria and Germany, for example.

Does democracy sometimes lead to questionable results?

Democracy as a form of government often leads to surprising or even seemingly "undemocratic" election or voting results. Although women in Switzerland today perform outstandingly well both as parliamentarians and members of government and are an integral part of everyday political life, after several unsuccessful attempts, women's suffrage was only introduced in 1971 through a national referendum with 66% in favor and 34% against. Several times before, democratic means had produced what was described as an "undemocratic" result.

A second "fiasco" occurred in 2012, when Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood ally, was elected president by the Egyptian people in an open and free election. After numerous unrests and uprisings, he was deposed in July 2013 by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in a military coup.

A third, at least questionable, voting result was achieved in Great Britain on June 23, 2016, when 51.89% of Britons surprisingly voted to leave the European Union (Brexit).

The fourth unexpected result was achieved by Donald Trump, who, as a relatively inexperienced and perhaps even unsuitable politician, was elected as the 45th American president. Is it really the case, as critics of the democratic system often claim, that the majority of the electorate is relatively naive and inexperienced and can be seduced into relatively questionable voting behavior by some populists? Or is it perhaps the other way around, that both the British and American electorate sent an important global political message with their votes?

Once again, a presumably open and free election failed to produce the expected outcome, but instead led to more chaos and uncertainty. It may be precisely such events that cause lasting damage to democracy as a form of government and cast doubt on it worldwide.

Is the shift to the right a reaction to the slow “decline of the West”?

According to Oswald Spengler6Every advanced civilization, after a successful period of prosperity, inevitably strives towards its downfall.

It must be noted that the decline of the West has not yet taken place, nor will it actually take place in the foreseeable future, because there no longer exists a distinct West.

Western civilizations are closely intertwined with other cultures. The sociopolitical development of a country can no longer be viewed in isolation. Overarching structures continually inspire individual civilizations to new efforts. Democracy, in particular, provides a direct incentive for constant internal renewal through the recurring changes of government.

Can the shift to the right be attributed to migration?

In addition to the refugees whose lives are under real threat due to the war in many countries and who rightfully seek asylum in other countries, there are millions of economic refugees, especially in Africa and Central America, seeking their fortunes in the highly developed countries of Europe or the USA. They are well connected via cell phones and well informed about entry options. They also see on television the high standard of living, the thriving cities, and the enormous wealth in the highly developed Western countries.

Population growth is particularly gigantic in India and Africa. In the future, it will be not hundreds of thousands, but hundreds of millions of people who want to migrate to the so-called West.

It is primarily the children of more well-off families who emigrate to the North with the savings of their entire family. They usually cross the borders to Europe or America illegally and often go into hiding if their applications are rejected. This poses the risk that they will organize themselves in their host countries and build parallel worlds. In doing so, they avoid integration into existing social structures and threaten the stability of the respective countries.

European countries, the United States, and even Australia are trying to keep these refugee flows away from their borders. They see their own culture at risk. They want to protect it and are trying to regain control over immigration by creating an impermeable external border.

The following factors must be taken into account:

First, it is the migrants themselves who generally benefit from their departure, even if they do not immediately find suitable work in their host countries.

Second, it is the host countries where the upper and middle classes in particular benefit from immigration. In contrast, the lower classes tend to suffer disadvantages because they face competition for jobs, available housing, and financial support.

Third, the fate of the countries of origin must be considered. As a rule, it is the wealthiest, best-educated, and most intelligent people who muster the courage to undertake the perilous journey. These people, if they manage to integrate into Western society, subsequently remit significant sums of money to their home countries, which are taxed there. This, for understandable reasons, does not motivate their governments to take decisive countermeasures.

Fourth, the ongoing exodus is leading to a professional and intellectual hemorrhage of the respective countries of origin.

It is widely believed that without uncontrolled migration and Islamist terrorism there would have been no Brexit in Great Britain and no President Trump in America.

These assumptions are probably all correct. Thilo Sarrazin, among others, wrote that migration is a general "mega-issue." And Viktor Orbán said on March 7, 2017:

“Migration is the Trojan horse of terrorism.”

In fact, the crime rate among young male immigrants is much higher than among young people in their host countries. Former German Interior Minister Gerhart Baum stated on a television program on ZDF,7that “the group of young men represents the most dangerous group in society.”

In his election manifesto, Dutch right-wing populist Geert Wilders called, among other things, for a ban on Islam and the closure of mosques. He called the latter "Nazi temples" and compared the Koran to Hitler's "Mein Kampf."8

The assumption that migration is an important motive for the general shift to the right is further confirmed by the results of a representative survey conducted by the renowned British Institute for International Affairs, Chatham House.

The institute confronted people in ten European countries with the question:

“Should all migration from predominantly Muslim countries be stopped?”

The result was not surprising:

The absolute majority of respondents (55%) supported a migration ban. This means that the public's thinking differs significantly from the policies of many governments.

This gap between thought and feeling is particularly evident in Germany. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel's welcoming culture and the Federal Republic's asylum law are based on a high ethical standard, but politically they are controversial. The loss of the political "center" and the growth of extremist parties can be understood, as will be explained and justified in detail later, as an important (group dynamic) symptom of the loss of social balance.

The attitude of the German government not only attracted more refugees, but also a large number of so-called bogus asylum seekers.

Presumably, it is precisely the migration issue that provides the decisive tailwind for the surprising successes of the Alternative for Germany (AfD).

The population is no longer able to tolerate the lack of separation from immigrants, whether via the Balkan route or the Mediterranean. It creates fear and drives voters into the arms of extremists.

Illegal migration and terrorism are very likely contributing significantly to the general shift to the right.

However, the shift to the right is also evident in countries less affected by migration and terrorism. For these reasons, one must assume that the shift to the right could also be due to other, deeper causes.

Is the shift to the right a sign of a religiously influenced culture war?

David Goodhart's theory is based on the hypothesis that populism and the shift to the right are a sign of a deep social divide and are specifically the result of a religious culture war. Goodhart writes in his book "The Road to Somewhere,"9

That on the one hand, there is a cosmopolitan society that cultivates an extremely mobile, liberal, and loosely rooted lifestyle, while on the other hand, there are people who are more deeply rooted and feel more closely connected to traditions. This theory points to two different lifestyles, possibly due to the different levels of development of their societies.

The last assumption in particular highlights a particular aspect that will play an important role in the course of this paper, namely the (large group dynamic) level of development of a population.

Ultimately, however, the shift to the right is also taking place in regions that are less affected by an internal culture war.

Is it due to the West's unwillingness to defend its values?

Swedish author Malcom Kyeyune writes,10that there is a noticeable reluctance on the part of the West to adequately defend itself. Western policy is characterized by a contradiction. On the one hand, the peaceful times are over, and a protracted war threatens. On the other hand, hardly anyone is interested in it:

According to surveys, the desire to fight for one's country is very low in many parts of the Western world. Young people, in particular, remain completely unmoved. Even in Ukraine, many young men prefer to avoid military service. Instead, they go clubbing. Western armed forces are shrinking because they lack recruits. How did it come to this?

Kyeyune subsequently refers to numerous examples from history, such as the Roman Empire, the French Revolution, and the fall of the Aztecs, and sees the causes of the lack of willingness to defend one's country in the emergence of a small, irresponsible elite and a broad, uninterested population that has turned away from public service.

Fewer and fewer people are showing interest in standing up for the common good. However, the increasing distancing of citizens is an unmistakable sign that a tsunami (which means a catastrophe) is approaching.

1.3 Summary assessment

It is undisputed that the inherent disadvantages of democracy, global climate change, the neglect of certain population groups, the law of cyclical change, uncontrolled migration, terrorism, and religiously motivated culture wars contribute significantly to the global shift to the right. However, all these hypotheses only address part of the underlying causes.

The changes discussed are only partially subject to cyclical progression, because structural change is a long-lasting and complex process. Populism and authoritarian tendencies are therefore only the most obvious symptoms of a deeper global change.

The problem can therefore only be attributed to medical, individual psychological, local, or demographic reasons to a limited extent. It is neither the narcissism of American presidents, the character traits of Erdoğan, Kaczynski, Orban, and Putin, nor the notion that these tendencies are subject to cyclical change that are causing a shift to the right.

There are probably more important reasons for the global shift to the right, which are based on a broader and deeper process.

What could be the reasons for this?

What exactly is going on with the so-called rightward shift? It's primarily people's emotional attitudes and political stances toward the state that are slipping.

But what does the term “state” mean?

According to Georg Jellinek’s “three-element theory” 11, the “state” is a social entity whose constitutive features are a territory surrounded by borders, a group of people residing there as a core population, and a state authority ruling in this territory.

According to this definition, the "state" is, in simple terms, a (large) "group" of people who together constitute a "social entity." However, such a constitution is always an active event that extends over a longer period of time and is usually subject to a dynamic process.

The three characteristics “group,” “dynamics,” and “process” can be summarized under the term “group dynamics” or “group dynamic process.”

For these reasons, the following considerations are based on the hypothesis that both the development and decline of democracies and also the global shift to the right are based on global large-group dynamics, and that there are system-immanent parallels between the small-group dynamics and the processes in large and very large groups.

Under this assumption, the study of group dynamic processes in small groups allows conclusions to be drawn about the laws in large and very large groups such as nations, states and, last but not least, world society as a whole.

To confirm these assumptions, one must first examine the laws of group dynamics in small and large groups. In small groups, the process develops through several phases until it reaches its maturity stage. It can be experienced, studied, and described in detail in all its phases. It can be observed that the group dynamic process obeys natural laws in small, medium, and very large groups. The differences arise only from the length of time available for these developmental processes.

Could these laws also be applied to world events as a whole?

2 Die Zeit, May 22, 2016.

3 Hock, Fabian (2017).

4 Jensen, Lars (2017).

5 The Bund, March 29, 2017.

6 Spengler, Oswald (1918).

7 “Markus Lanz” (2017).

8 Polke-Majewski, Karsten (2017).

9 Goodhart, David (2017).

10 Kyeyune, Malcom (2024).

11 Jellinek, Georg (1900).

2 World events as a group dynamic process

Can world events be understood as a holistic, group-dynamic process? Of course not. The term "world events" encompasses an infinite number of processes at various levels and in numerous dimensions. It is impossible to summarize all world events in a single concept. Nevertheless, this attempt is made to focus on a microprocess that unconsciously underlies many social events and whose overarching significance is often not even recognized.

The unique approach of this essay is that it initially focuses on a micro-process that models the basic pattern for many social events. Based on this micro-process, many backgrounds can be better elucidated, for example, the significance of democratic attitudes and political action, human consciousness, and, last but not least, the unconscious significance of religions and religious narratives. Viewed in this way, events that generally receive little attention and whose impact on social events remains unrecognized suddenly assume paramount importance and thus unexpectedly appear in a different light. Starting with this micro-process, this text will also address overarching global political issues and, ultimately, the so-called ultimate questions.

2.1 Small group dynamics

The group dynamic process as it occurs in small groups will be described in a few sentences below. Reducing the process to three main phases—the initial phase, the middle phase, and the maturity phase—represents a significant simplification. The group dynamic process can also be described in five, eight, or ten phases.12While this simplification makes sense, it allows for a better understanding of the fundamental significance of large group dynamics. However, the ten-phase presentation allows for a more nuanced and understandable description of the entire process. For these reasons, the small and large group dynamics process is presented here in ten individual phases, corresponding to a ten-day retreat.

According to Günter Ammon, the group dynamic process is13determined by natural law. It can be characterized as follows:

It is self-organizing and, under favorable conditions, automatically leads to optimal and differentiated need satisfaction for all participants. The process is self-directed and unconscious, even if it is not theoretically processed or reflected upon.

It is logically organized. The increasing complexity of the network of relationships and the densification of the structures proceed in consistent and comprehensible, logically successive individual steps.

It is success-oriented. It leads to a visible and measurable improvement in human communication and work efficiency.

It is goal-oriented. It increases overall performance by eliminating rivalry and positional struggles. The goal is optimal work capacity and performance.

The process is similar in both small and large groups. Large group dynamics builds on the same microprocesses as small group dynamics.

The group dynamic process is verifiable and repeatable. It can be reproduced at any time and in any place, as soon as a group of people are in the same place at the same time. It always exhibits the same characteristics. It ends either with the process being blocked, with the achievement of the goal, or with the dissolution of the group.

In the following, the group dynamic process is illustrated in a vivid and very differentiated manner using a concrete example of a study group that was held several times a year as a “ten-day group dynamic retreat” under the overall leadership of Günter Ammon in Paestum, southern Italy.

The groups were led by a pair of leaders and met for two-hour group sessions in the morning and afternoon over ten days. During breaks, participants were free to use their time as they wished, while all leaders continuously reflected on the processes of all groups within a supervision group.

In the evenings, in-depth seminars on various topics were held.

The first day

Morning session: Fear of other people

At the beginning of the first meeting, the leaders will explain the group contract. Punctuality is expected. Confidentiality is maintained externally and openness is maintained internally. Furthermore, written minutes of all meetings are required for later theoretical analysis of the process.