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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Foundations of the Philosophy of the Arts
- Sprache: Englisch
Now available in a fully revised and updated second edition, this accessible and insightful introduction outlines the central theories and ongoing debates in the philosophy of art.
- Covers a wide range of topics, including the definition and interpretation of art, the connections between artistic and ethical judgment, and the expression and elicitation of emotions through art
- Includes discussion of prehistoric, non-Western, and popular mass arts, extending the philosophical conversation beyond the realm of Fine Art
- Details concrete applications of complex theoretical concepts
- Poses thought-provoking questions and offers fully updated annotated reading lists at the end of each chapter to encourage and enable further research
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Seitenzahl: 531
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title Page
List of Figures
Preface
Why Study the Philosophy of Art?
Applications and Questions
References and Readings
Acknowledgments
1 Evolution and Culture
1 A Biological Basis for Art
2 The Cultural Invention of Art
3 The Big and the Small Picture
4 “It all depends what you mean by the word ‘art’”
Questions
Readings
2 Defining Art
1 Necessary Conditions and Sufficient Conditions
2 Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism
3 Arguments against Art’s Definition
4 If Not an Essence, What Unifies the Concept of Art?
5 Some Definitions of Art
6 Definitions and Non-Western Art
7 Taking Stock
Questions
Readings
3 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art
1 Aesthetic and Artistic Properties
2 The Aesthetic Attitude and Art for Art’s Sake
3 Aesthetic Theory Criticized
4 Artworks that Pose a Challenge to Aesthetic Theory
5 Art’s Contextually Relative Properties
6 Art for Art’s Sake, Again
Questions
Readings
4 Varieties of Art
1 Artworks as Public Items
2 Are Artworks Created or Discovered?
3 Are all Artworks Potentially Multiple?
4 Multiply Instanced Artworks
5 New Works Based on Old Ones
6 The Ontological Variety of Works of Art
7 Is the Identity of an Artwork Fixed or Evolving?
Questions
Readings
5 Interpretation
1 When Is Interpretation Necessary?
2 What Is Interpreted?
3 Actual Intentionalism
4 Hypothetical Intentionalism
5 Value Maximization
6 Uses for Interpretation
7 Theory-Driven Interpretations
8 Does Interpretation Change the Work’s Meaning?
9 What is Interpretation’s Primary Purpose?
Questions
Readings
6 Expression and Emotional Responses
1 The Nature of Emotions
2 Identifying Others’ Emotions
3 Identifying the Emotions in Art
4 The Expression of Emotion in Music and Abstract Art
5 The Emotional Response of the Audience to the Work of Art
Questions
Readings
7 Pictorial Representation and the Visual Arts
1 The Experience of Representation
2 Representation and Resemblance
3 Representation: Culture and Biology, Again
4 Art versus Non-Art: A Matter of Style
5 Representation in Photographs and Paintings
6 Photographic Representation
7 Photography as an Art
8 Moving Images
Questions
Readings
8 The Value of Art
1 Evaluation and Functionality
2 Rules, Universality, and Objectivity in Artistic Evaluation
3 The Purpose and Form of Artistic Evaluation
4 What Is Rewarding about the Experience of Art?
5 Messages through Art
6 The Relation between Artistic and Moral Values
7 Should a Work’s Immorality Undermine its Claims to Artistic Merit?
8 Morality in Documentaries and Fictions
Questions
Readings
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Illustrations
Chapter 02
Figure 2.1 Marcel Duchamp,
Fountain
, 1917/1964, glazed ceramic with black paint; 38.1 cm × 48.9 cm × 62.55 cm.
Figure 2.2 Andy Warhol,
Brillo Box
, 1964, synthetic polymer and silkscreen on wood, 17" × 17" × 14".
Chapter 03
Figure 3.1 I Made Berata, Balinese picture,
c
. 1990.
Figure 3.2 Pieter Brueghel,
Landscape with the Fall of Icarus
,
c
. 1555, oil on canvas.
Figure 3.3 Caravaggio,
Deposition
, 1602–4, oil on canvas.
Chapter 06
Figure 6.1 È
la vita
, designed by Bijan of Florence.
Chapter 07
Figure 7.1 Two-Js face.
Figure 7.2 Piet Mondrian.
Broadway Boogie Woogie
, 1942−43, oil on canvas, 50" × 50" (127 cm × 127 cm).
Figure 7.3 Vincent Van Gogh,
The Night Café in Arles
, 1888.
Figure 7.4 The Müller–Lyer Illusion.
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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Foundations of the Philosophy of the Arts
Series Editor: Philip Alperson, Temple University
The Foundations of the Philosophy of the Arts series is designed to provide a comprehensive but flexible series of concise texts addressing both fundamental general questions about art as well as questions about the several arts (literature, film, music, painting, etc.) and the various kinds and dimensions of artistic practice.
A consistent approach across the series provides a crisp, contemporary introduction to the main topics in each area of the arts, written in a clear and accessible style that provides a responsible, comprehensive, and informative account of the relevant issues, reflecting classic and recent work in the field. Books in the series are written by a truly distinguished roster of philosophers with international renown.
The Philosophy of Art
Stephen Davies
The Philosophy of Motion Pictures
Noël Carroll
The Philosophy of Literature
Peter Lamarque
Philosophy of the Performing Arts
David Davies
The Philosophy of Art, Second Edition
Stephen Davies
The Philosophy of Art
Second Edition
Stephen Davies
This second edition first published 2016© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Edition history: Blackwell Publishing Ltd (1e, 2006)
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Davies, Stephen, 1950– author. The philosophy of art/Stephen Davies. – 2nd edition. pages cm – (Foundations of the philosophy of the arts ; 5) Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-119-09165-3 (pbk.)1. Art–Philosophy. 2. Aesthetics. I. Title. II. Series: Foundations of the philosophy of the arts. N66.D32 2015 701–dc23
2015026537
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Cover image: Close-up of iguana eye © Hans Strand/Getty
List of Figures
All figures except 7.1 and 7.4 appear in the color plate section between pages 118 and 119
Figure 2.1
Marcel Duchamp,
Fountain
, 1917/1964.
Figure 2.2
Andy Warhol,
Brillo Box
, 1964.
Figure 3.1
I Made Berata, Balinese picture,
c
. 1990.
Figure 3.2
Pieter Brueghel,
Landscape with the Fall of Icarus
,
c
. 1555.
Figure 3.3
Caravaggio,
Deposition
, 1602–4.
Figure 6.1
È
la vita
, designed by Bijan of Florence.
Figure 7.1
Two-Js face.
Figure 7.2
Piet Mondrian,
Broadway Boogie Woogie
, 1942–43.
Figure 7.3
Vincent Van Gogh,
The Night Café in Arles
, 1888.
Figure 7.4
The Müller–Lyer Illusion.
Preface
Why Study the Philosophy of Art?
It is widely thought that the arts provide social and personal goods of the highest value. One measure of a society’s maturity, sensitivity, and sophistication is the quality of its greatest artists and, more generally, the extent to which its government and public support the arts. Meanwhile, a person who has no interest in any of the arts can be thought to be not fully rounded. On all but the most elitist construal of what art is, almost everyone draws on one or other form of art in ways that are significant to their sense of themselves and their perspective on others. Participation in and exposure to the arts contribute to the individual’s psychological, emotional, and moral development, along with their well-being.
Yet such claims about art’s importance can seem puzzling. The production and consumption of art does not directly enhance our survival. Indeed, much art stands conspicuously apart from ordinary, practical concerns. It lacks the immediate, functional value of science and technology. Besides, art usually offers its rewards more to the person who engages with it on its own terms for the sake of appreciating its individuality than to the person who treats it merely as a means to pre-specified, extrinsic goals.
And even if art is a source of knowledge and experience, it often provides such an indirect and complicated route to these that we should wonder what they have to do with its importance. Though we might accept that art contributes valuably to human self-realization and fulfillment, the kind of nourishment it supplies and how it delivers this are not immediately obvious.
These are not the only respects in which art is perplexing. It comes in a bewildering variety of kinds. Individual works often are interpreted in different, even conflicting, ways. Some art is difficult to comprehend and can be provocative or just plain weird. People differ in their tastes and judgments.
Despite all this, we expect a degree of uniformity and objectivity in aesthetic assessments. People are much more bothered if others fault their artistic preferences and evaluations than they would be if it were their liking for blue M&Ms, say, that is challenged. This suggests that, despite their wide-ranging diversity, aesthetic preferences are not expected always to be idiosyncratically personal.
The study of philosophy also is valuable. It refines important skills and techniques. For example, students learn how to analyze and evaluate arguments critically, fairly, and constructively. Also, they are trained to express their understandings of complex or abstract ideas in terms that are clear and precise.
The philosophy of art provides, as well as these general benefits, specific ones that come from addressing the puzzles mentioned above. We can enrich our insight into our practices and ourselves by reflecting on what appears odd or intriguing about them and by attempting to explain art’s significance to our lives. After all, the production and appreciation of art is among the most distinctive of the traits that make us uniquely human.
In thinking about art, here are some of the questions a philosopher might raise: When and why did art originate? What theories best illuminate why people make and consume art? What kinds of things are art and what makes them art? What is the purpose of interpreting art and what constraints, if any, govern its interpretation? What kinds of content and meaning do artworks possess? How do they express emotions? How does art represent what lies beyond its boundaries? Are artworks valuable because they convey insight about the world that can’t be easily obtained in other ways, or does their value lie in their separation from the demands of ordinary life? Is there a connection between aesthetic and moral value?
These and other questions will be considered in the following chapters.
Applications and Questions
The chapters of this book fall into two parts. The first, covered in chapters 1– 4, is largely theoretical. To bring things back to earth, we will close each of these chapters by discussing concrete applications of ideas they contain. The second part, chapters 5–8, deals with more practical (though still general) topics. The issue of how these arguments are to be applied arises inevitably in conjunction with their exposition, so we will consider relevant examples and treatments within the body of the chapter. All chapters close with questions intended to provoke consideration of how the ideas that are outlined might be extended or developed.
As well as presenting relevant theories, we will often consider possible vulnerabilities in the arguments for the positions discussed. But the criticisms are usually merely sketched. They stand in need of further development, along with considerations of the replies that might block them.
References and Readings
I avoid burdening the main text with citations of previously published material, which otherwise might overwhelm it. Some general references are invaluable and cover all the topics discussed in this book, and much else besides. Also, the material they contain is often more digestible than that found in scholarly journals and monographs. They should be the first resource consulted by any student. To avoid repetition, I list them now.
Aesthetics: Critical Concepts in Philosophy
, ed. J. O. Young, 4 vols. (London: Routledge, 2005).
Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition
, ed. P. Lamarque and S. H. Olsen (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics
, ed. P. Kivy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
A Companion to Aesthetics
, ed. S. Davies, K. M. Higgins, R. Hopkins, R. Stecker and D. Cooper (2nd edn., Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art
, ed. M. Kiernan (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).
Oxford Encyclopedia of Aesthetics
, ed. M. Kelly, 6 vols. (2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics
, ed. J. Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Routledge Companion to Aesthetics
, ed. B. Gaut and D. McIver Lopes (3rd edn., London: Routledge, 2013).
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta at http://plato.stanford.edu/
An annotated selection of readings is appended to each chapter. Note that most of the works indicated are not intended by their authors for introductory students. Students who wish to follow up particular issues at a philosophically sophisticated and detailed level should consult these references.
Among the journals devoted specifically to aesthetics and the philosophy of art are British Journal of Aesthetics, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Journal of Aesthetic Education, and Philosophy and Literature. In the readings at the end of each chapter these will be abbreviate as BJA, JAAC, JAE, and PL.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful for the feedback I have received from students who have studied the philosophy of art with me, and for the comments of Philip Alperson, the series editor, John Brown, John Dilworth, Jonathan Farrell, Ted Gracyk, Jonathan McKeown-Green, Justine Kingsbury, Stephanie Ross, and Dabney Townsend. Jeff Dean and Danielle Descoteaux, of Blackwell Publishing and John Wiley & Sons, my project manager, Janet Moth, and anonymous reviewers provided invaluable advice, assistance, and criticism.
1Evolution and Culture
One way of working our way into the kinds of questions that are central in the philosophy of art – What is art? What is the significance of art? How is art to be understood? – is by asking about art’s origins. In this chapter, we will explore the contrasts between two divergent stories, one biological and the other cultural, about art’s foundations.
According to the first, the activities involved in making and appreciating art are products of human evolution. As such, they are universal and old. The second view sees art as the product of a particular time and culture, that of eighteenth-century Europe. It maintains that the concept familiar to us today first emerged then and there. In terms of this account, the appearance of art was comparatively recent and initially localized.
1 A Biological Basis for Art
Here is a story that might be told about the biological basis of art’s creation and appreciation by an evolutionary theorist:
Art is universal. All over the world, mothers sing and hum their babies to sleep. Storytelling, rhyming, and dramatized enactments are present in all cultures. The same is true of music and dance, as well as of depictions of people and animals, along with designs and patterns, which are drawn in pigment or charcoal, molded from clay, and carved or whittled from wood, bone, or stone. Humans everywhere decorate and beautify their environments, possessions, and bodies.
Art also is ancient in its origins. European cave paintings date back more than 35,000 years. Others in Sumatra are of similar antiquity and some rock paintings of the Australian aborigines are at least 20,000 years old. Carvings and molded figurines appeared some 35,000 years ago, and from 20,000 years ago artifacts were regularly decorated with patterns and motifs. While much art is perishable or non-material, its former existence can be deduced from traces that survive. For example, musical instruments made from bones date to at least 35,000 years ago.
As well, art is a source of pleasure and value. Even if artworks serve practical functions, such as appeasing the gods in ritual ceremonies, their production, use, and contemplation usually provide enjoyment to those involved. Though the pleasure art engenders can come as a momentary thrill or chill, much art is a source of abiding satisfaction and deep fulfillment. It warms and adds meaning to our lives.
Indeed, we often regard it as helping to define our very identities: a man might be the kind of person who has a passion for rhythm and blues and who despises country and western; a woman might regard Sylvia Plath’s poetry as central to her existence, so that she could become indifferent to it only if she underwent some dramatic change in personality or circumstances.
These three features – universality, historical age, and intrinsic pleasure or value – are indicative of the biological adaptiveness of the behaviors with which they are associated. In other words, these characteristics are symptomatic of underlying genetic dispositions passed from generation to generation because they enhance the reproductive success of the people who have them. The behaviors in question are universal because they reflect a genetic inheritance that is common to humankind. They are old in that traces of art-like behaviors go back 70,000 or more years. And they are a source of pleasure (like food, sex, and healthy exercise) in order to motivate people to pursue them and thereby to pass on their genes to future generations who will be successful breeders in their turn.
It’s plausible, then, that the impulse to make and consume art is a product of biological evolution. It is important to be clear about what this means. The thought isn’t that there is some single gene for art, or that art production and appreciation are inflexible and reflexive. The genetic bases of the production of art are undoubtedly complicated. They require the realization of complex systems and circumstances, both personal and social, for their activation. The behaviors to which they give rise are plastic, being subject to learning, influence, development, refinement, and the like. There can be no denying that art includes a huge, conventionalized, socio-historical component.
The idea, then, isn’t that the making and consumption of art can be analyzed reductively as mechanical reactions blindly programmed by our genetic inheritance. Rather, it is that they stem from and are channeled by biologically rooted inclinations that are then actively and intelligently taken up in ways depending on each person’s individual, cultural, and historical environment. In other words, artists, performers, and their audiences all draw on biological agendas and energies, but how these are then expressed depends mainly on their cultural setting. The view with which this one is to be contrasted maintains that the behaviors associated with art are purely cultural and entirely conventional.
The evolutionary biologist faces a choice between two positions about the relation between human biological endowments and art. The first maintains that the making and consumption of art are directly adaptive; that is, they contribute to reproductive success (or, at least, did so in the past). According to the second, these propensities were not directly targeted by evolution, but they are a happy and inevitable byproduct of other behaviors that were.
A common version of the first approach notes that reproductive success depends on our attracting mates, which we do by advertising our fitness as a potential partner and parent. One way of doing this is by demonstrating that we have the particular skills and talents that will be involved. Alternatively, we might display in a general way that we have intelligence, originality, creativity, flexibility, and virtuosity in thought and action. And we can dramatize and emphasize our fitness by showing that we can afford the luxury of “wasting” our talents on activities that have no survival value.
Art-making and artistic performance, which so often require extraordinary skill and dedication in their conception, planning, and execution, while not being directed to survival in an obvious way, are among the ultimate tools for sexual advertisement and seduction. In this view, art behaviors, like the peacock’s tail, have evolved through the process of sexual selection.
A different account takes a broader and perhaps more plausible view of art’s evolutionary significance. Art plays a crucial role in intensifying and enriching our lives in general, both as individuals and communities. It brings us together as producers or performers and consumers or audiences and thereby engenders cooperation, mutuality, and a shared identity. When coupled with other socially important events, such as rituals and ceremonies, it heightens their already special powers. As such, it plays a vital role in transmitting and affirming the community’s knowledge, lore, history, and values.
It enhances the reproductive success of the members of communities not by making sex more likely, but instead by contributing vitally to the creation of an environment in which individuals and their children can flourish. It generates mutual support and respect, a shared sense of belonging and caring, stability, self-confirmation, a feeling of control of or accommodation with nature, and so on.
It could be objected that the first of these accounts seems to undervalue the far-reaching significance of art within human affairs, and that the second does not distinguish a role specific to art as such. Meanwhile, both may make the tie between art and reproductive success closer than is believable.
If such criticisms prove strong, evolutionary theorists could fall back to the more modest alternative, according to which art is an indirect but important spin-off from other behaviors for which there has been evolutionary selection. It isn’t difficult to imagine what these behaviors are. Curiosity, adaptability, intelligence, the ability to plan and reason, imagination, improvisatory facility, and patience are all characteristics that promote the survival of people and their heirs. And what is likely to pay off is that these capacities are general and rewarding for their own sakes, not tied in their application only to addressing a limited set of short-term problems.
But once such a being has evolved and finds itself with some spare time, it continues to employ its talents. It can busy itself with inventing new weapons or a more effective mousetrap, but it’s as likely to make up stories, paint evocative pictures of the animals it hunts, decorate its hair with pretty flowers, test what interesting sounds it can make by blowing into a pipe, and so on.
No less important to it will be emotions and their expression, the communication of thoughts, and the development of manipulative and other technical skills. These, too, can find expression in the production of art; for example, in musical invocations by instruments of the tones of the human voice, in the versification of utterance along with the use of metaphor, assonance, irony, and the like, and in developing pictorial and other forms of representation.
2 The Cultural Invention of Art
Here is a second story about art’s origins, as it might be told by a cultural historian.
We think of the arts as a loose but natural collection – literature, drama, painting, poetry, sculpture, music, dance – unified by the fact that their products are to be contemplated for their own sake. As such, the arts are to be contrasted with the crafts, such as saddle-making, boat-building, and plumbing. The crafts are directed at the useful functions that their products can serve. By contrast, works of art are not mere means to ends but are ends in themselves. Their value lies within them, not in benefits and applications that come with their effects.
Other distinctions between the artist and the crafts-person indicate differences in their respective activities and products The crafts-person isn’t expected to be original and he is good at his job to the extent that he can successfully follow the relevant rules, models, or recipes. A work of craft is good if it matches the appropriate template and performs its desired function. By contrast, the artist must be creative and original. Good art can’t be produced by slavish rule-following and imitation. In fact, artists are often rebellious or eccentric in their personalities and their methods of production. Great artists are geniuses whose works transcend the rules and conventions of their time.
Meanwhile, the best art is often unique in its value and, in any case, all art is to be judged and appreciated only for the experience its features produce in a suitably placed observer. This spectator must distance herself from “interested” concerns – that is, from practical uses the artwork could be given, either for her personally or more generally – in order to make herself available to the appropriate experience. That experience involves the pleasurable contemplation of the work’s beauty and its other aesthetic attributes, which are considered only for the sake of their contribution to its overall aesthetic effect.
If our conception of art is the one just described, then art is a product of a specific culture and history, not of biology. This conception is local and comparatively recent, not universal and old. It emerged in Europe over the Enlightenment and the modern age – that is, from the mid-eighteenth century to the early twentieth – under the influence of specific socio-economic conditions that did not obtain elsewhere or in earlier times.
Historians of ideas dispute when particular elements of this way of thinking emerged. They also argue about whether nineteenth- and early twentieth-century developments in aesthetic theorizing misrepresent the views that first appeared in the eighteenth century. These scholarly debates will not detain us here. Despite significant differences between the view’s variants, and despite the long period over which it emerged, by the early twentieth century the doctrines associated with this conception of art had become dominant in Anglo-American philosophy of art.
The story continues:
Because art can be such only when made and appreciated as falling under the concept that identifies it, it follows that non-Western cultures do not have art in our sense, and that art as we now understand the notion was not produced in the West prior to, say, the early eighteenth century. Pieces from outside the ambit of recent Western cultures can become art through appropriation to the Western artworld, which is the constellation of traditions, practices, institutions, roles, and theories relevant to making and appreciating the repository of accepted artworks. And to the extent that Western culture has become thoroughly globalized, people from other societies can make art now. But those who have never shared the modern-age Western concept have not been creators of art, though they may have had their own, similar practices.
(As a concession to her opponent, our story-teller might allow that biologically based urges and interests would tend to encourage the flowering of some correlate to the Western notion of art in other, sufficiently stable, cultures.)
In ancient times, the various art forms were not recognized as comprising a unified group. Music, for example, was classed with mathematics and astronomy, while poetry was grouped with grammar and rhetoric. The first to link the art forms together explicitly and to separate them from other disciplines and activities were the authors of encyclopedias and books in the 1740s and 1750s. Also, when the term art (ars in Latin, techne in Greek) was used in earlier times, this was in order to distinguish works of art from works of nature. In other words, all humanly made things were works of art.
The term gained its current usage, in which it marks a special subset of humanly created items and opposes these to the products of human crafts, only in the late Enlightenment and modern age. As this implies, artists were not previously differentiated from crafts-persons, which was appropriate in earlier times given that almost everyone then worked by copying or borrowing, that individuality was not expected or highly valued, and that many members of a workshop might cooperate on the production of any given work. The job of an artist was that of a servant, usually either of the church or court. He – most were men – was often directed in what to do and when to do it. J.S. Bach, for example, was a church composer who had to produce new music on a weekly basis. Between 1704 and 1744 he composed 300 church cantatas, only one of which was published in his lifetime. Similarly, Domenico Scarlatti wrote more than 600 harpsichord sonatas for Maria Barbara, who became the Queen of Spain. Only 30 were published during his lifetime. Such composers had to produce a constant supply of music to fill the needs of the church, state, or court.
Though the individuality and skill of supreme creators like Shakespeare, Michelangelo, or Dante was acknowledged in earlier times, it was not until the nineteenth century in Europe that large numbers of artists established their independence. With this came the cult of authorship, signed as opposed to anonymous works, emphasis on originality, and the idea that the artist is inspired and creative in ways that mere crafts-persons are not.
Changes in the social status of artists of the time were a consequence of far wider alterations within society. There was a gradual swing of economic power toward the emerging merchant middle class. As a group, they had the wealth to patronize the arts and the desire to confirm themselves as equal in discernment to serious and refined members of the upper classes. This new market for art made it possible for an exceptional few “freelance” artists to survive precariously at the close of the eighteenth century.
This shift of art from the private to the public sphere coincided with the arrival of institutions and practices that are now considered fundamental to the artworld. The late eighteenth century saw the appearance of public concert halls (along with the introduction of subscriptions for series of performances of new works), the art gallery and public exhibitions, the art academy and salon, art criticism and reviews, art history and biography, art theory, and a transfer of copyright for literary works from publishers to authors. In previously established theaters and opera houses, rearrangement of the seating and lighting focused the audience’s attention on the stage, not on the rest of the audience.
Meanwhile, philosophers of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, including giants such as Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer, set down the foundational principles of the new science of aesthetics. They argued that art is concerned with the beautiful and the sublime, these being the cardinal aesthetic properties. (Later philosophers list a greater variety of properties – balance, harshness, serenity, power, elegance, clumsiness, and so on – but these can be regarded as instances of beauty and sublimity or of their opposites.)
Beauty is a source of immediate delight, as when we find a rose attractive. An example of the sublime is the vastness of the night sky, with its countless number of stars. The experience of the sublime includes negative feelings of awe and insignificance in the face of nature’s indifference, power, and magnitude, but it has a positive aspect also, to the extent that we become aware of ourselves as capable of grasping and comprehending such matters.
Where the beauty of a thing isn’t judged in terms of its kind or function, but instead, in terms of its formal and perceptible properties as given directly to the senses, that judgment concerns what Kant calls free beauty. Some later philosophers offer such judgments as their primary examples of the truly aesthetic reaction. A concern with something’s kind, function, or practical usefulness can interfere with a proper aesthetic response, it was thought, because this approach selectively structures what is perceived in the object, rather than allowing the object’s features to announce their own significance, as it were.
To explain why not everyone who is prepared to encounter a thing’s aesthetic properties can recognize them, even when their ordinary perceptual faculties are in order, eighteenth-century theorists posited the existence of a special faculty of aesthetic perception, that of taste. Only those with taste can truly experience an item’s aesthetic properties and arrive at an objective judgment of their worth.
It was suggested that aesthetic experience of an item’s formal beauty or sublimity is often not expressible in language. And aesthetic experience isn’t solely perceptual. It’s infused by a cognitive but non-conceptual process described by Kant as involving the free play of the imagination and the understanding.
It was not part of the agenda of these philosophers to disenfranchise art made prior to the eighteenth century or in sophisticated non-Western cultures. Indeed, they took their paradigms of art from ancient Greece and Rome, from the works of Homer and Sophocles. For example, the nineteenth-century German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel argued that Western art had been in decline from the early Christian era. Others made reference to art from Egypt, India, and China. Schopenhauer, for instance, discussed Islamic and Indian art.
Nevertheless, the story, according to which art is an invention of eighteenth-century, Western culture, proposes that the conception of art that these philosophers were the first to articulate and analyze does not pre-date the eighteenth century. Their theories captured and described this new concept, even if they went on, anachronistically and inappropriately, to apply it more widely.
In summary, the second tale argues that the modern concept of the arts – which is our current concept and the one we are trying to analyze – crystallized out of the changing ideas and practices of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. People who do not distinguish art from craft do not share the same concept and do not make art in terms of that concept. The concept was not possessed prior to the eighteenth century, nor was it possessed outside the West before the globalization of Western culture. So, art isn’t ancient and universal. It’s a comparatively recent and originally localized socio-philosophical creation.
3 The Big and the Small Picture
The previous presentations were referred to as stories and were not attributed to particular authors. This is because each is a simplified composite assembled from a family of related positions. Individual theorists sometimes develop distinctive variants and often disagree with others who fall roughly in the same camp, as well as with those who do not share their basic premises. (See the readings section at this chapter’s close for more information about who holds what view.) A more careful and sophisticated analysis would explore the detail of these differences.
Notice also that the stories have been presented uncritically. If they were to be cross-examined, we might raise issues such as the following: Can we reliably infer the biological origins and significance of complex cultural practices from their modern manifestations, as the biological theory seems to suppose? Or, can people make and appreciate art only if they possess and self-consciously apply the relevant concepts, terms, and theories, as is perhaps implied by the view that art is a recent cultural invention? Meanwhile, the plausibility of each of the competing strands within the broader theories should also be tested.
Instead of taking those directions, we will consider the apparent tension between the two theories and the attitude appropriate to that.
Both the biological and cultural views tap into important assumptions underlying our intuitive understanding of art. We’re inclined to think art is grounded in and reflects our common humanity. The evolutionary story starts from there and proposes that there is a biological underpinning to the art-related interests and predilections we share. We also tend to think that art’s local expressions are largely shaped by historical and social contingencies. The view that art is a cultural invention begins there and argues that art-related behaviors are not constrained by biology or evolution (except insofar as these fix our basic structure and physiology).
There is a genuine opposition between the positions. The one concludes that the making and appreciation of art has a universal, biological basis, even if these behaviors are directed and refined by the local cultural setting. The other, by contrast, describes the same practices as purely cultural in a way that escapes or transcends the influence of biology. Yet there is the prospect of reconciling them, since the widely held intuitions from which each begins are not strictly opposed.
There are two frequent responses to conflicts such as this.
The first proposes that the truth lies somewhere in the middle and that we should reconcile the two views by seeking their common ground. That isn’t an easy option in this case, as it might be if the difference were one about the extent to which nature and nurture each contributes to how we behave in society. The disagreement in this case isn’t about the relative strengths of these two inputs, but about whether our biology constrains or directs the nature of art at all once it has shaped our most basic physical and mental endowments. Moreover, there is no obvious middle ground between the proposal that art is very old and universal and the counterclaim that art is recent and local in its origins.
The second way of responding to such disputes is by suggesting the disagreement between the positions is more apparent than real. This would be the case, for example, if it turned out that they are not talking about the same thing. In what follows we will consider arguments against this option.
4 “It all depends what you mean by the word ‘art’”
As was just observed, it might be thought that it is easy to resolve the appearance of conflict between the claim that there is a biological basis to art and the alternative that treats art as a cultural invention by noting that proponents of the two stories obviously do not mean the same by the term “art.” Since they are not discussing the same thing, differences in what they say do not indicate a disagreement.
If various people say of a mole that it’s a burrowing mammal of the family Talpidae, a spy who remains dormant for a time before becoming active, a concentration of melanin on the skin, a pier or breakwater, and a unit of chemistry, they do not disagree because each is referring to a different meaning of the English word “mole.” And if one person says a mole has dark velvety fur and another apparently denies this, saying that a mole is typically constructed of stone, wood, metal, or concrete, their disagreement is more apparent than real, because they have different meanings of the word “mole” in mind. According to this view, something similar is true of art when one theorist says it’s universal and ancient and the other appears to deny this.
This seemingly simple solution needs to be carefully considered, however. It can’t amount to the claim that each theorist can give the term any meaning she chooses. Both aim to provide a true tale about what “art” refers to in its ordinary, common use, so their accounts must be answerable to the term’s ordinary meaning or meanings. The proposed solution could work only if the English word “art” has various publicly accepted but different meanings, including ones assumed by the two stories.
So far so good, but the proposed solution requires more: there must be no basis for regarding the one meaning as more conceptually foundational than, and thereby as covering and explaining, the other. Because, even if it were true that the word art has both meanings, the competing theorists might disagree about which is more conceptually central. In fact, this seems to be what is happening. So, the task of reconciling their theories may not be simple after all.
Here is a more sophisticated approach allowing that the two theorists differ in what they mean by “art” but acknowledging that a disagreement of substance remains. The person who argues that art is universal because it reflects behaviors and tastes conditioned in part by our biological inheritance might see the disagreement in these terms:
The term art can be applied in a restricted way to Western “high” art, as it was developed in Enlightenment Europe and later. Equally, it can be applied in a restricted way to the aesthetically pleasing ritual artifacts of small-scale, pre-industrial societies, or to ancient Greek tragedies, and so on. But these specific, narrow applications of the term identify species falling under the umbrella of a single genus. Other species within this genus include folk, popular, domestic, and religious art. These differ while falling under the same genus, just as domestic cats differ from tigers though both share membership in the genus Felix. The theory describing art’s biological basis aims to characterize the evolutionary forces shaping the behaviors that produced the genus, not the local concerns that led to its differentiation into species. It therefore can claim conceptual priority because it provides the most general and overarching account if our concern is to understand what art – all art, in its various species – is.
The person who argues that art is comparatively recent and local, being restricted to post-seventeenth-century Europe (until Western culture went on to colonize and overcome all others), conceives of the conflict differently:
The term art or its equivalent has a history of use dating back millennia in which it identified anything that was made by humans, as opposed to works of God or nature. Gradually, it came to acquire a more specific application in Europe, in which it refers to works of art as opposed to works of craft. There is a historical thread between these different uses – the later one arose over time from the former. No conceptual or meaning tie was preserved, however. In its post-seventeenth-century use, the term took on meanings and associations quite distinct from its earlier ones. (Compare it with a word like “plumber,” which has a modern meaning historically continuous but otherwise quite distinct from its ancient one, in which it designated someone who worked in the metal lead.)
Because the task at hand is to analyze our current idea of art, which cut its ties with past meanings when it was forged in the philosophical and social upheavals of the Enlightenment, the concept that must take priority is the comparatively recent, Western one, since that has superseded all others and there is no broader category under which art can be subsumed.
Our two imaginary theorists do mean different things when they talk about art, but that does not mean their disagreement is empty or merely “semantic.” Each can acknowledge the meaning emphasized by the other, but they differ about which of these is central to the analysis.
Can their dispute be settled without begging the question in favor of one side or the other? We would prejudge the question, for instance, if we simply assumed that there is non-Western, pre-Enlightenment art in the relevantly current sense of that term, or if we assumed that Leonardo could not have produced art just because he probably did not distinguish his painting from the practical products of crafts-persons as sharply as we do. I am not sure that I know the answer to this question, though I feel that art is old and universal in ways that suggest no single culture or period can claim exclusive ownership of the concept.
What will become clear in following chapters is that how we approach many of the puzzles that arise when we think about art’s nature and its place in human affairs is likely be affected by whether we lean to the view that assigns a biological role for human nature in art or, instead, to the idea that art as we understand it is purely and arbitrarily cultural. That means also that we may be able to look back with new insight on this opening puzzle after we consider these further issues, taking them on their own terms.
Applications and Connections – the Museum, Tourist Art, Popular Art, and Ancient Art
As promised in the Preface, the first four chapters close with sections in which we briefly review some concrete applications of ideas presented earlier in each chapter. Here, we will apply the debate about the origin and function of art first to consideration of the status of the art museum. We will then go on to think about cultural tourism, the art-like practices of non-Western cultures, and prehistoric cave art.
One perspective regards the art museum negatively. It maintains that, when art is separated from the context of its creation and from its role in the life of the community, it is bled of its relevance and power. The job of art is to intensify and add significance to people’s lives through its immediate involvement in things that affect them directly, such as religion and rites, courtship and domestic life, work, and entertainment.
When altarpieces are ripped from churches and displayed together in a museum, or when J.S. Bach’s cantatas are performed apart from the eighteenth-century Lutheran church services to which they were integral, they can no longer engage with the daily existence of the community. To fill that void, something else, usually of lesser quality, replaces it. To display art in a warehouse, where it is pinned and labeled, is to kill it, to alienate it from the setting in which it matters to ordinary folk, thereby impoverishing their lives.
A different point of view is more positive. Art museums provide, as other settings do not, for the undisturbed contemplation of art, which is how it should be approached. Contextualizing artworks by presenting them together and ordering them by artist, period, and style is the way to optimize their appreciation. (By contrast, sitting through long sermons and Bible readings in order to hear Bach’s music would be a boring distraction, and the gloomy interiors of churches offer conditions for viewing carvings and paintings that are far from ideal.)
Besides, Western high art over the past several hundred years was created for contemplation under the special conditions art museums and concert halls make available. The museum and concert hall are its natural home.
The argument continues: rather than removing art from the wider community, art museums and concert venues are publicly accessible institutions integrated into and catering for the societies in which they are housed. They bring art to people who otherwise might lack the opportunity to see and hear it. (Previously, much art was the preserve of private wealth and not for public display.)
In addition, museums play important curatorial, preservative, scholarly, and restorative functions. They guard and treasure art that otherwise would have been lost as the social contexts in which it was produced were overtaken by the advancing tide of modern life.
The first, negative view of the museum, with its emphasis on the functional role of art within the community, echoes many of the sentiments associated above with the evolutionary theory of art.
Ellen Dissanayake advocates some such position. She is an American who studies human behavior cross-culturally and who regards the making and consumption of art as an evolved behavior, with the function of creating a community within which individuals can flourish. She argues that humankind isn’t adapted to the alienating conditions of modern, industrialized, urban life, and that Western high art has lost its way over the past century, becoming increasingly esoteric, unrewarding, and irrelevant. Her paradigms for healthy, artful societies are small-scale, pre-industrial, non-Western ones.
Meanwhile, the second account, which stresses the thought that art should be contemplated in a manner that extracts it from its social backdrop and which regards institutions like the art museum as admirably suited to serving this purpose, harmonizes with aspects of the art-as-cultural-invention position.
In fact, though, the links just proposed as holding between the two pairs of opposed positions are extremely weak. Whether a person adopts the biological or the cultural account of art need not determine whether she goes along with the positive or negative account of the museum. Explaining why this is the case can help us understand more about the two debates: art as nature versus art as culture, and museum-based art versus community-based art.
Not all advocates of the idea that art belongs in and serves the community and not all critics of the museum take their stances because they believe that art is an evolved behavior. For example, the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey was not committed to an evolutionary account of art’s origins or universality. Nevertheless, he wrote early in the twentieth century that art should be organically integrated with life’s more everyday aspects, and he criticized the estrangement of art from the community when it is housed in museums.
Also, even theorists who are prepared to affirm the special value of Western high art can be disparaging of some of the museum’s activities and policies. For example, some reject the acquisitive imperialism that has seen the global harvest of statues and other pieces from cultures across the world.
To mention a notorious case, ancient marble statues were removed from the Parthenon in Athens in the early eighteenth century by the seventh Earl of Elgin. Despite repeated requests from the Greek government, the statues have not yet been returned from the British Museum. These critics of the museum desire the repatriation of works such as the “Elgin marbles,” so that other societies can reclaim and more effectively preserve the integrity of their cultural heritage.
Similarly, advocates for the museum do not always suppose that art is a recent invention of Western culture, which is why museums usually include statues from Greek and Roman antiquity, medieval religious carvings and paintings, and so on. Nor do they necessarily reject the idea of non-Western and domestic art. In recent decades, materials originating in other cultures have been transferred from natural history to art museums, along with displays of the products of domestic skills such as weaving, quilting, and sewing. The spirit of this trend, seemingly, is one of belated recognition and acknowledgment.
As well, the practices of the museum are more embracing and community-directed than formerly. For example, there is a move to new styles of display, including theme rooms that bring together paintings, sculptures, rugs, screens, furniture, and the rest, as they might have coexisted outside the museum. These show how art is or was integrated with its social context.
Turning now to evolutionary accounts, it is clear that their proponents need not be automatically committed to denigrating the museum and praising community-based art practices. Not all such theorists regard art’s evolutionary function as shoring up and affirming the community’s beliefs, or value the celebration of cultural difference. Those who hold that art should have a universal appeal that transcends local, cultural differences could welcome the way in which museums insulate artworks from the particular social environments in which they happen to be created.
A yet more interesting observation draws attention to the fact that not all advocates of the theory of art as a cultural invention take a positive attitude to what was allegedly created. Some see the European creation of art as motivated by unacknowledged desires to insidiously promote elitist ideologies, often with patriarchal overtones. Accordingly, they condemn the art museum as an institutional embodiment of reactionary forces for cultural suppression. When the art museum takes in folk and non-Western artifacts, this is decried as appropriation and cultural colonization. And when it updates its styles of display, the new forms are challenged for being no less artificial and contrived than were the earlier fashions in presentation that are replaced.
Theorists of this persuasion argue that, if art can be invented, it can also be reinvented or replaced, and this is what is needed. They decry the art museum for serving as a tool of an artworld regime that should be overhauled or overthrown.
Ideologies of elitism are not the only dogmas to be wary of, though. Those who despise them sometimes seem guilty of their own distortions when it comes to the discussion of community-based art, especially that of small-scale, pre-industrial societies. It’s widely assumed by Westerners that “primitive” cultures have art traditions that are old, simple, and stable. Because they have these features, it is reasoned, these traditions tap deep into the spiritual ethos and fundamental values of their home societies and of humanity more widely.
Cultural tourists seek out such communities, expecting to find special nourishment through contact with what are identified by the tourists as these cultures’ arts. In doing so, they apply standards for authenticity they would never dream of imposing on Western art. No one would criticize an American composer for having been influenced by the music of foreign (European or Asian) cultures, or for challenging the conventions used by her predecessors. Neither would they condemn the performer for playing an instrument that was manufactured in Japan, or the performance because it’s staged for a fee-paying audience many of whom are tourists. Yet performances of non-Western music in indigenous contexts are liable to be dismissed as inauthentic if there is any taint of Western influence or commercialism about what is done.
This double standard perhaps indicates that a Romantic ideology is responsible for shaping an inappropriate image in Western thought of what art is and how it functions within small-scale communities.
As Larry Shiner, a contemporary American philosopher, has objected, there is no basis for supposing that the so-called art of small-scale, pre-industrial societies is less eclectic, innovative, fusion-oriented, or financially motivated than our own varieties. (The evidence usually suggests that it is and always was like this.) In that case, there is also no ground for believing that community-based art is more real, rich, or “authentic” than the sophisticated, complex, recent, quickly evolving art movements of modern, industrial Western societies. Shiner takes this line not in order to validate Western high art but for the sake of debunking the mythologies Westerners weave around the products of other cultures, which he thinks are best not regarded as art.
Let’s turn now to another strand in the debate between advocates of the biological account of art’s basis and the art-as-cultural-invention theory. This subplot concerns the products of popular culture. Defenders of the view that art is old and universal are inclined to be inclusive, regarding modern, popular entertainments as art, if not always of the best kind. Some of those who claim that art is an invention of eighteenth-century Europe are more conservative. They put art on a higher pedestal than ordinary occupations and functional artifacts.
But as before, there isn’t a neat match between these various stances. The evolutionary theorist can be conservative and elitist about what is to count as art, especially if she thinks that only a few people at any given time are able to derive selective advantage from their skills in making or appreciating art. Meanwhile, those who argue that art practices are arbitrarily cultural as a step to advocating the reform or rejection of those practices often include on the agenda a more liberal, democratic franchise for the “art” of the future. They would have us reinvent art to make it more encompassing and broad-based, less ideologically driven and politically slanted, and so on.
Modern-day cultural theorists tend to be critics of the art establishment and its practices, as was indicated above. Nevertheless, there is a long history of conservatism that equates art with the highest achievements of Western civilization and distinguishes art from works of popular entertainment, which are despised along with the crafts. A common charge holds that entertainments, because they aim to be accessible, inevitably target the lowest common level of taste by relying on stereotypes and formulas that inhibit the audience’s imaginative and critical engagement with the ideas and values they promote.
The truth of these various allegations should be questioned, of course. When tested against actual examples, they often appear to be false, as the contemporary American philosopher Noël Carroll has shown. For example, much popular fiction is replete with distinctive characters, while genres like the thriller demand from their audience imaginative engagement and critical analysis.
Not all critics of the products of popular culture embrace the position that art belongs exclusively to post-Enlightenment Western culture, though. Some oppose, not folk or popular art as such, but what might be called “mass” art, which is the product of technologies of mass dissemination. Handcrafted works and others bearing the mark of individuality and authorship might be accepted as art, even if they come from outside the European high art tradition of recent centuries.
