The Works of John C. Calhoun Volume 5 E-Book

John C. Calhoun

• Herausgeber: Jazzybee Verlag
• Kategorie: Sachliteratur, Reportagen, Biografien
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 680

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Beschreibung

John C. Calhoun was the seventh Vice President of the United States from 1825 to 1832. He was a strong defendant of slavery and of Southern values versus Northern threats. His beliefs and warnings heavily influenced the South's secession from the Union in 1860–1861. This is volume five out of six of his works, this one containing reports and letters (1811-1846).

Leseprobe

The Works of John C. Calhoun

Volume 5

JOHN C. CALHOUN

The Works of John C. Calhoun 5

Jazzybee Verlag Jürgen Beck

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ISBN: 9783849651831

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CONTENTS:

REPORT On Foreign Relations, submitted to the House of Representatives, Nov. 29th, 1811.1

REPORT On the System of Indian Trade, communicated to the House of Representatives, Dec. 8th, 1818.5

REPORT On the Reduction of the Army, communicated to the House of Representatives, December, 14, 1818.15

REPORT On Roads and Canals, communicated to the House of Representatives, January 14, 1819.24

LETTER In relation to an additional Military Academy, communicated to the House of Representatives, January 29, 1819.32

LETTER In relation to  the Yellow Stone Expedition.37

REPORT On the subject of civilizing the Indians, communicated to the House of Representatives, January 17th, 1820.41

CIRCULAR.43

REPORT On the Military Academy at West Point, communicated to the House of Representatives, February 25th, 1820.44

REPORT On the Reduction of the Army, communicated to the House of Representatives, December 12th, 1820.49

REPORT On the Expenditures for the Indian Department for 1820 and 1821, communicated to the House of Representatives, January 16th, 1822.57

REPORT On the Expenditures for the civilization of the Indians, communicated to the House of Representatives, January 22nd, 1822.60

REPORT On the condition of the several Indian tribes, communicated to the House of Representatives, February 11th, 1822.64

REPORT On the Accounts of the Superintendents of Indian Affairs in Michigan and Missouri, communicated to the House of Representatives, February 11th, 1822.67

LETTER On the Accountability of Agents, communicated to the House of Representatives, February 12th, 1822.70

REPORT on the Expenses of the Army and Military Academy for the years 1818, 19, 20, and '21, and estimates for the year 1822; communicated to the House of Representatives, March 5th, 1822.72

REPORT On the Condition of the Military Establishments and Fortifications, communicated to Congress, by the President, Dec. 3rd., 1822.76

REPORT On the Execution of the Treaty with the Choctaws, of the 18th of October, 1820, communicated to the House of Representatives, February 6th, 1823.78

REPORT On the Condition of the Military Establishment, Fortifications and Returns of the Militia; communicated to Congress by the President, Dec. 2nd, 1823.82

REPORT On the Condition of the Military Establishment and Fortifications, communicated to Congress by the President, Dec. 7th, 1824.84

REPORT On the Extent of Executive Patronage, Feb. 9th, 1835.90

REPORT On that portion of the President's Message which related to the adoption of efficient measures to prevent the circulation of incendiary Abolition Petitions through the Mail, February 4th, 1836.113

REPORT On the Public Lands, submitted to the Senate, May 13th, 1840.123

MR. CALHOUN'S LAND BILL.142

REPORT On the Memphis Memorial, submitted to the Senate, June 26th, 1846.144

MEMORIAL, ETC.170

CORRESPONDENCE In relation  to the Annexation of Texas.180

THE OREGON NEGOTIATION.236

LETTER From the Secretary of State, relative to the alleged errors of the Sixth Census.259

REPORT On Foreign Relations, submitted to the House of Representatives, Nov. 29th, 1811.

The Committee to whom was referred that part of the President's Message, which relates to our Foreign affairs, beg leave to Report in part:— That they have endeavored to give the subject submitted to them, that full and dispassionate consideration which is due to one so intimately connected with the interest, the peace, the safety and honor of their country.

Your committee will not encumber your journals and waste your patience with a detailed history of the various matters growing out of our foreign relations. The cold recital of wrongs, of injuries and aggressions, known and felt by every member of this Union, could have no other effect than to deaden the national sensibility and render the public mind callous to injuries with which it is already too familiar.

Without recurring, then, to the multiplied wrongs of partial or temporary operation, of which we have so just cause of complaint against the two great belligerents, your committee will only call your attention, at this time, to the systematic aggressions of those powers, authorized by their edicts against neutral commerce—a system, which, as regarded its principles, was founded on pretensions that went to the subversion of our national independence; and which, although now abandoned by one power, is, in its broad and destructive operations as still enforced by the others, sapping the foundations of our prosperity.

It is more than five years since England and France, in violation of those principles of justice and public law, held sacred by all civilized nations, commenced this unprecedented system, by seizing the property of the citizens of the United States, peaceably pursuing their lawful commerce on the high seas. To shield themselves from the odium which such outrages must incur, each of the belligerents sought a pretext in .

the conduct of the other—each attempting to justify his system of rapine as a retaliation for similar acts on the part of his enemy. As if the law of nations, founded on the eternal rules of justice, could sanction a principle, which if engrafted in our municipal code could excuse the crime of one robber, upon the sole plea that the unfortunate object of his rapacity, was also a victim to the injustice of another. The fact of priority could be true as to one only of the parties; and whether true or false, could furnish no ground of justification.

The United States, thus unexpectedly and violently assailed by the two greatest powers in Europe, withdrew their citizens and property from the ocean; and cherishing the blessing of peace, although the occasion would fully have justified war, sought redress in an appeal to the justice and magnanimity of the belligerents. When this appeal had failed of the success due to its moderation, other means founded on the same pacific policy, but applying to the interests, instead of the justice of the belligerents, were resorted to.

Such was the character of the non-intercourse and non-importation laws, which invited the return of both powers to their former state of amicable relation, by offering commercial advantages to the one who should first revoke his hostile edicts, and imposing restrictions on the other.

France, at length, availing herself of the proffers made equally to her and her enemy, by the non-importation law of May, 1810, announced the repeal, on the first of the following November, of the decrees of Berlin and Milan. And it affords a subject of sincere congratulation to be informed, through the official organs of the Government, that those decrees are, so far at least as our rights are concerned, really and practically at an end.

It was confidently expected that this act on the part of France would have been immediately followed by a revocation on the part of Great Britain of her orders in council.

If our reliance on her justice had been impaired by the wrongs she had inflicted; yet when she had plighted her faith to the world that the sole motive of her aggression on neutral commerce was to be found in the Berlin and Milan decrees, we looked forward to the extinction of those decrees, as the period when the freedom of the seas would be again restored. In this reasonable expectation we have, however, been disappointed. A year has elapsed since the French decrees were rescinded, and yet Great Britain, instead of retracting pari passu that course of unjustifiable attack on neutral commerce in which she professed to be only the reluctant follower of France, has advanced with bolder and continually increasing strides. To the categorical demands lately made by our Government for the repeal of her orders in council, she has affected to deny the practical extinction of the French decrees, and she has moreover advanced a new and unexpected demand, increasing in hostility the orders themselves.

She has insisted, through her accredited minister at this place, that the repeal of the orders in council must be preceded, not only by the practical abandonment of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, so far as they infringe the neutral rights of the United States; but by the renunciation on the part of France, of the whole of her system of commercial warfare against Great Britain, of which those decrees originally formed a part.

This system is understood to consist in a course of measures adopted by France and the other powers on the continent subject to, or in alliance with her, calculated to prevent the introduction into their territories of the products and manufactures of Great Britain and her colonies, and to annihilate her trade with them. However hostile these regulations may be on the part of France towards Great Britain; or however sensibly the latter may feel their effects, they are, nevertheless to be regarded only as the expedient of one enemy against another, for which the United States, as a neutral power, can, in no respect, be responsible; they are, too, in exact conformity with those which Great Britain has herself adopted and acted upon in time of peace as well as war.

And it is not to be presumed that France would yield to the unauthorized demand of America what she seems to have considered one of the most powerful engines of the present War.

Such are the pretensions upon which Great Britain founds the violation of the maritime rights of the United States—pretensions not theoretical merely, but followed up by a desolating war upon our unprotected commerce. The ships of the United States, laden with the products of our own soil and labor, navigated by our own citizens and peaceably pursuing a lawful trade, are seized on our own coasts, and at the very mouths of our harbors, condemned and confiscated.

Your committee are not, however, of that sect whose worship is at the shrine of a calculating avarice. And while we are laying before you the just complaints of our merchants against the plunder of their ships and cargoes, we cannot refrain from presenting to the justice, and humanity of our country the unhappy case of our impressed seamen. Although the groans of these victims of barbarity for the loss of (what should be dearer to Americans than life) their liberty —although the cries of their wives and children in the privation of protectors and parents, have, of late, been drowned in the louder clamor at the loss of property; yet is the practice of forcing our mariners into the British navy, in violation of the rights of our flag, carried on with unabated rigor and severity. If it be our duty to encourage the fair and legitimate commerce of this country by protecting the property of the merchant, then indeed, by as much as life and liberty are more estimable than ships and goods, so much more impressive is the duty to shield the persons of our seamen, whose hard and honest services are employed, equally with those of the merchants in advancing, under the mantle of its laws, the interests of their country.

To sum up, in a word, the great causes of complaint against Great Britain, your committee need only say—That the United States as a sovereign and independent power, claim the right to use the ocean, which is the common and acknowledged highway of nations, for the purpose of transporting in their own vessels, the products of their own soil and the acquisitions of their own industry, to a market in the port of friendly nations, and to bring home, in return, such articles as their necessities or convenience may require—always regarding the rights of belligerents, as defined by the established laws of nations. Great Britain in defiance of this incontestable right, captures every American vessel bound to, or returning from a port where her commerce is not favored: enslaves our seamen, and in spite of our remonstrances perseveres in these aggressions.

To wrongs so daring in their character, and so disgraceful in their execution, it is impossible that the people of the United States should remain indifferent. We must now tamely and quietly submit, or we must resist by those means which God has placed within our reach.

Your committee will not cast a shade over the American name, by the expression of a doubt which branch of this alternative will be embraced. The occasion is now presented when the national character, misunderstood and traduced for a time by foreign and domestic enemies, should be vindicated.

If we have not rushed to a field of battle like the nations who are led by the mad ambition of a single chief or the avarice of a corrupted court, it has not proceeded from a fear of war, but from our love of justice and humanity. That proud spirit of liberty and independence, which sustained our fathers in the successful assertion of their liberties against foreign aggression, is not yet sunk. The patriotic fire of the revolution still burns in the American breast with a holy and inextinguishable flame, and will conduct this nation to those high destinies, which are not less the reward of dignified moderation, than of exalted valor.

But we have borne with injury until forbearance has ceased to be a virtue. The sovereignty and independence of these States, purchased and sanctified by the blood of our fathers, from whom we received them, not for ourselves only, but as the inheritance of our posterity, are deliberately and systematically violated. And the period has arrived, when, in the opinion of your committee, it is the sacred duty of Congress to call forth the patriotism and resources of the country. By the aid of these, and with the blessing of God, we confidently trust we shall be enabled to procure that redress, which has been sought for by justice, by remonstrance and forbearance, in vain.

Your committee, reserving for a future report those ulterior measures which in their opinion ought to be pursued, would at this time earnestly recommend, in the words of the President, “That the United States be immediately put into an armor and attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations.” And to this end, they beg leave to submit for the adoption of the House, the following resolutions:

1. Resolved, That the military establishment as authorized by the existing laws, ought to be immediately completed by filling up the ranks and prolonging the enlistment of the troops; and that to encourage enlistments, a bounty in lands ought to be given in addition to the pay and bounty already allowed by law.

2. That an additional force of ten thousand regular troops ought to be raised to serve for three years; and that a bounty in lands ought to be given to encourage enlistments.

3. That it is expedient to authorize the President, under proper regulations, to accept the service of any number of volunteers not exceeding fifty thousand: to be organized, trained and held in readiness to act on such service as the exigencies of the Government may require.

4. That the President be authorized to order out from time to time such detachments of militia, as in his opinion the public service may require.

5. That all the vessels not now in service, belonging to the navy and worthy of repairs, be immediately fitted up and put in commission.

6. That it is expedient to permit our merchant vessels owned exclusively by resident citizens, and commanded and navigated solely by citizens, to arm under proper regulations to be prescribed by law, in self-defense, against all unlawful proceedings towards them on the high seas.

REPORT On the System of Indian Trade, communicated to the House of Representatives, Dec. 8th, 1818.

DEPARTMENT of WAR, Dec. 5th, 1818.

SIR,—In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 4th of April, 1818, directing the Secretary of War to prepare and report, at their next session, “a system providing for the abolition of the existing Indian trade establishments of the United States, and providing for the opening of the trade with the Indians to individuals, under suitable regulations,” I have the honor to make the following report:— The nations of Indians who inhabit this portion of our continent, were, on its first discovery, in a state of the most perfect commercial independence. Their knowledge of the useful arts was, indeed, very limited, but it was commensurate with their wants and desires. With their rude implements of husbandry, their hook and bow, in the construction of which they were well instructed, they drew a scanty, but (for them) a sufficient supply from the soil, the water, and the forest. A great change has since taken place, such as appears to be inevitable by a fixed law of nature, in the intercourse between a civilized and savage people. Helplessness has succeeded independence. While their wants have been greatly multiplied and enlarged by their intercourse with their more civilized neighbors, their knowledge even of their former rude arts has been lost, without acquiring those which are necessary in their new condition. The manufacture of the axe and hoe, by which they now clear and cultivate the soil, and the gun and ammunition, by which they take their game, are far above their skill; and, with the exhaustion of their present stock, without a new supply, they would be reduced to extreme want. On trade, then, with those from whom they can draw these and other supplies, they are wholly dependent. We have the exclusive right to trade with those within our limits; and cut off, as the Southern tribes are, by our acquisition in the late war, from intercourse with foreigners on the side of the Gulf of Mexico, we have the means, by a proper extension of our posts on the lakes, the Mississippi, and the Missouri (to effect which, measures have already been taken), to enforce effectually, without much additional expense, this important right.

The period seems, then, to have arrived to give to our control over the Indians, through an exclusive supply of their wants, the greatest efficiency, and to promote their and our interests, by a judicious system of trade fairly and justly directed.

A similar view of this branch of our trade seems to have been taken at an early period by our Government. It directed its attention to this interesting and important subject as early as the year 1773, when a committee was appointed by Congress, to devise a plan for carrying on trade with the Indians. In the next year a very considerable purchase of goods was directed to be made for the Indian trade; and trade with them, except under license and bond, was strictly prohibited. The subject was frequently acted on during the confederation, but no systematic effort was made to regulate it till 1786, when an ordinance was passed, dividing the Indian Department into two districts, and appointing a superintendent with a deputy to each. It was made their duty to execute such regulations as Congress might establish in relation to Indian affairs; to correspond with the Secretary of War, through whom their communications were directed to be made to Congress; to obey the instructions of the War Department; and to grant licenses to trade with Indians.

This ordinance directed that no license should be granted to foreigners, and only to citizens whose good moral character should, be certified by the Governor of a State, under the seal of the State; and that bonds should be given to conform to established regulations. Licenses were granted, to continue in force for one year only, and upon the payment of $50. To trade without a license incurred a penalty of $500, and forfeiture of goods. The superintendents and their deputies were prohibited from engaging in trade.

The change in the form of the Government a few years after the passing of this ordinance, and the debility into which public affairs fell about the termination of the confederation, prevented this judicious system from being carried into effect.

Under the present constitution, the subject of Indian trade attracted the attention of Congress as early as the year 1790. The system of trade by licenses was retained, which were directed to be granted for two years, by persons to be appointed by the President, to applicants of good character, who gave bonds to conform to regulations; and to trade without license was subjected to a forfeiture of merchandise.

The act contains no prohibitions of foreigners, and requires nothing to be paid for the licenses. In the years 1793 and 1796 acts were passed very similar in their provisions to the one just recited; and in the year 1802 an act repealing former acts, and which still continues in force, was passed. It inflicts a fine of $100, and imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, in addition to the forfeiture of goods, for trading without license, and directs licenses to be granted on bond, with sufficient security, to conform to law and regulations, without making a good character or citizenship a requisite.

By an act of 1816 (the last passed on this subject), foreigners are prohibited from trading with the Indians, except permitted by the President, and under such regulations as he should establish. Instructions have been given under this act to prohibit foreigners from passing into the Indian country, except as boatmen, and, under certain conditions, as interpreters.

The system of trade by public factors, now proposed to be abolished, commenced in the year 1796, but without superseding the original mode of carrying on the trade by license. The President was authorized to establish trading houses, and to appoint an agent to each house, to carry on, as the act states, “a liberal trade with the Indians.” The act appropriated $150,000 as the capital of this trade, and the additional sum of $8,000 annually, for the payment of agents and clerks; and directed the trade to be carried on so as not to diminish the capital. It was limited to two years; but was, by a subsequent act, continued in force till 1806. A superintendent of Indians was then appointed, and the capital increased to $260,000, and $13,000 was annually appropriated for the payment of superintendents, agents, and clerks. This act was limited to three years, but afterwards continued in force till 1811. The capital was then increased to $300,000, with an annual appropriation of $19,250 for the payment of superintendent, agent, and clerks. It was limited to three years, but has been extended by a subsequent act to the 1st of March next.

The capital at present is distributed among eight trading houses, or factories, established at the following places: Fort Mitchell; the Chickasaw Bluffs; Fort Confederation, on the Tombigbee; Fort Osage, on the Missouri; Prairie du Chien, on the Mississippi; Sulphur Fork, on the Red River; Green Bay; and Chicago. Such is the rise, progress, and present condition of our Indian trade. It was commenced, and has been continued, from motives both of prudence and humanity; and though it may not have fully realized the expectations of its friends, it has no doubt produced beneficial effects. If wars have not been entirely prevented by it, they probably, without it, would have been more frequent; and if the Indians have made but little advances in civilization, they probably, without it, would have made less. If greater effects have not resulted, it is to be attributed, not to a want of dependence on the part of the Indians on commercial supplies, but to defects in the system itself, or in its administration. Scarcely any attempt has been made till lately to exclude foreigners, and the granting of licenses has not been subject to those' checks which are necessary to give to it the most salutary effects. Should it be thought unadvisable to continue the present trading system by factories, by permitting the act to expire by its limitation on the first of March next, it will then, of course, terminate. In winding up its concerns, two points are to be regarded: to sustain as little loss as possible; and to withdraw from the trade gradually, in order that the capital employed may be supplied from other sources. To effect both of these objects, I would suggest that so much of the act of 1811 as authorizes the appointment of a superintendent and factors be continued in force for one year; and that they be authorized to make sales, as heretofore, of the goods and effects on hand, and those which may be acquired from the Indians.

The superintendent of Indian trade should also be authorized and directed to exhibit at his office, for inspection, an inventory of the stock in trade, with the property attached to the respective factories; and he should be directed to sell the same on the best terms offered, provided the sales can be effected at cost and charges. It would be proper to allow considerable credit, upon approved bonds and security; and the President ought to be empowered to annex, as the condition of the sale, if he should think it advisable, to sell the goods to the Indians at the place at which the factory is established, provided the sales can be effected within the period of one year. The factory at Fort Clarke, being established by a treaty with the Great and Little Osages in the year 1808, must be continued by the Government, or sold out, subject to the condition of being continued so long as the Indians may desire it. It would, perhaps, be advisable to direct a new treaty, rescinding, on suitable compensation, the stipulation referred to. The establishment would, by these means, terminate gradually, without the hazard of any considerable losses. To provide for opening the trade to individuals, under suitable regulations, is a task of much greater difficulty.

The vast extent of the country inhabited by the Indians, and the number and variety of the tribes, render it impossible to apply, with propriety, any one uniform system to the whole.

The various tribes, for the purpose of trade, may, however, be comprehended in two classes: those in our immediate neighborhood, surrounded by our settlements and our military posts, and who, from long intercourse with us, have become partially civilized; and those more remote, who still retain their original character and customs. In the former are comprehended the four Southern tribes: the Osages, and the small tribes immediately west of the Mississippi; those within the limits of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and that part of the Michigan Territory east of Lake Michigan. The latter comprehends all of the tribes without those limits. I propose to consider the system of trade best calculated for each division, beginning with the former.

After giving the subject that full consideration which its importance merits, it appears to me that the provisions of the ordinance of 1786, with a few additions and modifications, particularly in the administrative part, so as to adjust it to our present form of government, are, for this division of our Indian trade, the best that can be devised. The provisions of the acts now in force in relation to licenses are not as well guarded or as efficient as those of the ordinance referred to. The introduction of the factories seems to have relaxed the attention of Government to the system of trade under license. I would then propose to assume the provisions of the ordinance referred to, as the basis of a system to open the trade with the contiguous tribes of Indians to individual enterprise. Instead, however, of appointing two superintendents, I would propose a superintendent of Indian affairs, to be attached to the War Department, with a salary of $3,000 per annum; the superintendent to be under the control of the Secretary of War, and to be charged, subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe, with the correspondence, superintendence, and general management of Indian affairs; and to be authorized, with the approbation of the Secretary of War, to grant licenses to trade with the Indians. Licenses to be granted to citizens of good moral character, and to continue in force till revoked. A sum not less than $100, nor more than $500, to be determined under regulations to be prescribed by the President, to be paid for the privilege of using it at the time of granting the license, and annually during its continuance; and bonds, with sufficient security, to be taken to conform to law and regulations. Licenses to be revoked by the President whenever he may judge proper. To trade without license, to be subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000 and imprisonment not to exceed six months, with a forfeiture of the goods. Licenses to be granted to trade at specified places, to be selected by the applicants, and not to be changed without the consent of the superintendent. All peddling and sales of spirituous liquors to be strictly prohibited. Each trading-house, or establishment, to require a separate license; and books to be kept at the establishment, in which the prices of the goods sold and the articles purchased should be regularly and fairly entered; and to be subject at all times to the inspection of the Indian agent, or such persons as the superintendent may appoint.

The reasons for most of these provisions are so obvious as to require no illustration. They will all be passed over, accordingly, without observation, except the provision which requires the payment of an annual sum for the use of a license, and that which requires the trading establishment to be fixed. The former provision is taken from the ordinance of 1786, which directed licenses to be granted for one year only, and on payment of $50 to the superintendent, for the use of the United States; a sum nearly equal to that now proposed, if the value of money at that time be taken into consideration.

But it will probably be objected that it is our interest, and, as we propose to monopolize their trade, our duty too, to furnish the Indians with goods on as moderate terms as possible; and that the sum to be paid for a license, by acting as a duty on the goods sold under it, will tend to enhance their price. In answer to which it may be justly observed, that it is not a matter of so much importance that they should obtain their supplies for a few cents more or less, as that the trade should, as far as practicable, be put effectually under the control of the Government, in order that they may be protected against the fraud and the violence to which their ignorance and weakness would, without such protection, expose them. It is their very ignorance and weakness which render it necessary for the Government to interfere; and, if such interference is proper at all, it ought to be rendered effectual. Such will be the tendency of this provision. Its first and obvious effects will be to diminish more certainly, and with less injurious effect than any other provision which can be devised, the number of traders, and to increase the amount of capital which each would employ. The profit of a small capital of a few hundred dollars would scarcely pay for the license; while that on a large one would not be much diminished by it. Both of these effects—the diminution of the number of traders, and the increase of the capital—would add greatly to the control of the Government over the trade.

It would be almost impossible to inspect the conduct, and consequently control the actions, of the multitude of traders with small capital, diffused over the Indian country, and settled at remote and obscure places. The greatest vigilance on the part of the superintendent and his agents would be unequal to the task. By diminishing the number, and bringing each more permanently before the view of the Government, a due inspection and superintendence becomes practicable. Again: what control can the Government have over the conduct of a trader, with a capital of a few hundred dollars only? Suppose he should violate the express injunctions of law and regulations; what serious loss would he sustain by revoking his license, or by putting his bond in suit? To him it would be nothing to wind up his business, and give his capital another direction; and as to the bond, in such distant and obscure transactions, he might pretty safely calculate on escaping its penalty. Very different would be the case with the trader of a large capital. To revoke his license would be a serious evil, which must subject him to certain loss; and, should he break the conditions of his bond, he would be much more in danger of feeling its penalty. The control of the Government would not only be greater over such traders, but (what is of equal importance) their influence with the Indians would have a more salutary direction. A war between them and us, would, in all cases, be injurious, and in many cases would be ruinous, to the trader of a large capital; but not so with one of small capital. A single profitable speculation may be of more importance to him than the continuance of his bond. From the effects of war he can as easily escape as from the revocation of his license, or the penalty of his bond. Let the character of the former be what it may, he must, from interest, be the advocate of peace and the influence of his own Government; while the latter, unless influenced by virtuous motives, would feel in either but little interest.

From the nature of the trade, the more it can be concentrated, provided there is reasonable competition, the better it will be for the Indians and ourselves. The very opposite, it is true, would be the fact, if they had the capacity and intelligence to take care of their own interest without our protection; but, situated as they are, indefinite competition would be no less injurious to them than to our citizens; and such appear to be their sentiments. The Chickasaws, in a late treaty, complained of the injury which they had sustained from peddlers and small traders; and they had a stipulation inserted against the granting of any license to trade with their nation, as the only effectual means which suggested itself to prevent it.

The reasons for fixing the trading establishments are no less strong. By rendering them stationary, and compelling the proprietor to keep books, containing regular entries of all their sales and purchases, important checks will be presented to prevent fraud and exorbitant charges. It will also strongly tend to prevent collision between the traders; and, consequently, the creation of parties among the Indians for or against particular traders—a state of things unfriendly to their interest, and dangerous to the peace of the frontier. Besides, the trading establishments being fixed, as they will be, in the most advantageous position, will, in time, become the nucleus of Indian settlements, which, by giving greater density and steadiness to their population, will tend to introduce a division of real property, and thus hasten their ultimate civilization.

Such are the provisions under which the trade with those tribes of Indians in our immediate neighborhood may, with safety and advantage, be opened to individual enterprise.

With a vigilant administration, it will produce results equally salutary to the Indians and ourselves. In fact, the knowledge of the use of money, and the prices of most of the ordinary articles of trade, is so far advanced among them, as to guard them, to a considerable extent, against mere fraud and imposition; and, with the control which the Government may exercise over the trade with them, they would generally receive their supplies on fair and moderate terms.

The system is not less calculated to secure peace. The regular traders, who have paid for the use of their licenses, will be the most active to prevent vexatious peddling and retailing of spirituous liquors, which are the bane of the frontier. They will, besides, become the most active promoters of industry: for the almost total destruction of game has rendered the amount of peltries and furs of little value in the branch of Indian trade; and their capacity of paying for the goods purchased must consequently, in a great measure, depend on the proceeds of the soil. In fact, the neighboring tribes are becoming daily less warlike, and more helpless and dependent on us, through their numerous wants; and they are rendered still more pacific by the fear of forfeiting their land and annuities. They have, in a great measure, ceased to be an object of terror, and have become that of commiseration. The time seems to have arrived when our policy towards them should undergo an important change.

They neither are, in fact, nor ought to be, considered as independent nations. Our views of their interests, and not their own, ought to govern them. By a proper combination of force and persuasion, of punishments and rewards, they ought to be brought within the pales of law and civilization. Left to themselves, they will never reach that desirable condition.

Before the slow operation of reason and experience can convince them of its superior advantage, they must be overwhelmed by the mighty torrents of population. Such small bodies, with savage customs and character, cannot, and ought not to be permitted to exist in an independent condition in the midst of civilized society. Our laws and manners ought to supersede their present savage manners and customs. Beginning with those most advanced in civilization and surrounded by our people, they ought to be made to contract their settlements within reasonable bounds, with a distinct understanding that the United States intend to make no further acquisition of land from them, and that the settlements reserved are intended for their permanent home. The land ought to be divided among families; and the idea of individual property in the soil carefully inculcated. Their annuities would constitute an ample school fund; and education, comprehending as well the common arts of life as reading, writing, and arithmetic, ought not to be left discretionary with the parents.

Those who might not choose to submit, ought to be permitted and aided in forming new settlements at a distance from ours. When sufficiently advanced in civilization, they would be permitted to participate in such civil and political rights as the respective States within whose limits they are situated might safely extend to them. It is only by causing our opinion of their interest to prevail, that they can be civilized and saved from extinction. Under the present policy, they are continually decreasing and degenerating, notwithstanding the Government has, under all of its administrations, been actuated by the most sincere desire to promote their happiness and civilization. The fault has been, not in the want of zeal, but in the mode by which it has been attempted to effect these desirable objects. The Indians are not so situated as to leave it to time and experience to effect their civilization.

By selecting prudently the occasion for the change, by establishing a few essential regulations, and by appointing persons to administer them fairly and honestly, our efforts could scarcely fail of success. Nor ought it to be feared that the power would be abused on our part; for, in addition to the dictates of benevolence, we have a strong interest in their civilization. The enmity even of the frontier settlers towards them, is caused principally by the imperfection of the present system; and under the one which I have suggested, it will greatly, if not entirely, subside. The natural humanity and generosity of the American character, would no longer be weakened by the disorder and savage cruelty to which our frontiers are now exposed. A deep conviction of the importance of the subject, and a strong desire to arrest the current of events, which, if permitted to flow in the present channel, must end in the annihilation of those who were once the population of this prosperous country, must be my apology for this digression.

It remains to consider in what manner our trade can be most successfully prosecuted with the numerous Indian tribes who occupy the vast region extending west to the Pacific Ocean. It is obvious that the system proposed for the partially civilized tribes bordering on our settlements, would prove altogether inadequate to this branch of our Indian trade. It will require a system of far more energy to effect the great objects which ought to be pursued through it.

To establish a decided control over the numerous and savage tribes within these vast limits, and to give to our trade with them its utmost extension, are deemed to be objects of great national importance. It is believed that, within our limits, along the range of the Rocky Mountains, quite to the Mexican frontier, is the best region for fur and peltries on this continent. With proper efforts, the whole of this valuable trade, extending quite across to the great Western ocean, would, in a few years, be exclusively in our possession. To produce these desirable results, foreign adventurers, whose influence must, at all times, be hostile to our interest and dangerous to our peace, must be excluded. With this view, and to protect our own trade, means have been taken to extend our military posts on the Mississippi and Missouri. Whatever character our trade in that quarter may assume, the extension of our posts, as contemplated, will be indispensable to its enlarged and successful prosecution; but it is believed that, with all the advantages which they will afford, unless the trade be properly and efficiently organized, we shall not be able to compete with the British companies on the north, nor to acquire that decided control over the Indians which is indispensable to its complete success.

In order to have just ideas on this subject, it is necessary to take into consideration, not only the vast extent and remoteness of the region over which it is proposed to extend our trade, but the character of the numerous tribes who inhabit it. They are all more or less migratory; in the summer moving towards the north, and in the winter to the south, in pursuit of the buffalo and other game. They are thus, in the summer, brought into the neighborhood of the British establishments to the north of our limits, where, notwithstanding our military posts, and the advantage of our position, much of the trade and influence over these fierce and warlike tribes will center, unless our means of carrying it on should be as well organized and as efficient as theirs. The difficulty, though of an opposite kind, is no less considerable on the southern frontier of this portion of our country. The line between us and the Spanish possessions in Mexico is, in its whole extent, a subject of discussion, and even should it be adjusted, will probably, to a considerable extent, be without natural and visible boundaries. To a trade thus situated, extending over so vast a region, inhabited by numerous tribes not less warlike than savage, with the competition of powerful and long-established companies on one side, and danger of collision on the other, the unorganized efforts of individuals, always with jarring, and frequently with opposing interests, appear to be wholly inadequate to its successful or safe prosecution. The rivalry of trade, which, in well-regulated communities, gives the greatest prosperity to commerce, would in these distant regions, beyond the control of law or superior authority, amongst fierce and ignorant savages, lead to the most fatal consequences. Each trader, or association of traders, would endeavor to monopolize the trade within certain limits, and would exert their cunning and influence to render the savages their partisans, and the enemy of their rivals in trade. Among a people at once so fierce and so easily duped, the result may be readily anticipated. A state of disorder and violence would universally prevail, equally unfortunate to the Indians and ourselves; and which would strongly tend to turn the trade, and with it the influence over the Indians, to the well-organized foreign fur companies near our limits.

If these observations are correct; if the uncombined efforts of individuals are inadequate to a successful competition with the British fur companies; if they will endanger our peace with our southern neighbors, and lead to fierce and dangerous rivalry among themselves; it only remains to consider whether a mode can be devised of carrying on this branch of our Indian trade which will obviate these evils, and accomplish the desirable objects of giving the greatest extension to it, accompanied with the most efficient control over the Indians themselves. The united influence and combined efforts of the fur companies referred to, can be met successfully, it is believed, only by an equal concentration of influence and efforts on our part; the jealous rivalry of independent traders, with its fatal consequences, can be obviated only by removing the diversity of interest by which it would be excited; and the danger of collision on our southern limits, by subjecting the trade completely to the will and control of the Government. The mode, then, which I would propose, would be to vest the trade in a company, with sufficient capital, to be divided into shares of one hundred dollars each, and to be limited to the term of twenty years; to pay an annual tax on its subscribed capital, for the privilege of exclusive trade; and to be subject, in like manner as private traders, to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed. It is thus that most of the evils to be apprehended, by leaving the trade open to the competition of private adventurers, would, it is believed, be avoided. The efforts of the company, undisturbed by rival interests, would be directed to establish its control over the various tribes of Indians, to exclude foreign adventurers, and to give the greatest degree of profit to its trade. The success of such a company, properly conducted, scarcely admits of a doubt. Our position in regard to this trade, the facility which the navigation of our great and numerous rivers in that quarter would afford, and the protection from our military posts, would speedily destroy all foreign competition, and would in a few years push our trade to the Pacific Ocean. The most profitable fur and peltry trade in the world would be ours, accompanied with a decided influence over the numerous and warlike tribes inhabiting those extensive regions. The mere objection, that it would create a monopoly, ought not to outweigh so many advantages. The trade with the Indians has never been opened, without restriction, to our citizens. Licenses from the Government have at all times been required: and the Government has itself, through its factories, to a considerable extent, monopolized the trade; and, by an extension of its capital only, might engross the whole of it. All of these provisions, however necessary in the Indian trade, would be absurd in any other branch of our commerce. Besides, the profit of the trade with the Indians has, at all times, been confined to a few individuals; and it is highly probable that a greater portion of the community would participate in it, by carrying it on in the manner proposed, than in any other mode. In fact, absurd as commercial monopoly would be, where law and authority exist to repress the mischievous effects which might spring from unbounded rivalry, and to give to such rivalry salutary consequences, just in the same degree would it be wise and advantageous to carry on the trade under consideration by an incorporated company. A nation discovers its wisdom no less in departing from general maxims, when it is no longer wise to adhere to them, than in its adherence to them in ordinary circumstances. In fact, it evinces a greater effort of reason. The first advance of a nation is marked by the establishment of maxims, which are deemed universal, but which further experience and reflection teach to be only general, admitting of occasional modifications and exceptions. Should the House, however, not adopt these views, but prefer to open the trade to the enterprise of single individuals, or such associations as might be formed for the purpose, I would suggest the provisions already proposed for the trade with the neighboring tribes of Indians, as the most advisable, with the exception of the provisions which require the trader to be located, and that regular books of sale and purchase should be kept. In lieu of which provisions, I would propose that the goods intended for this branch of Indian trade, and the articles acquired by purchase from the Indians, should be entered under oath (the former with a copy of the invoice, and the latter with a statement of prices), with the Indian agent at Mackinaw, St. Louis, Bellepoint on the Arkansas River, or Natchitoches on Red River, or such other places as the President may designate. The entry can be made without much inconvenience to the trader, as the geography of the country is such as to make it necessary for the trader to pass by one or the other of the points proposed, at each of which there is now an agent. It is believed that these provisions would be as effectual as any that can be devised, short of a company incorporated for the purpose; but it is proper to observe that they are open to the objections which have already been stated. In fact, they equally apply to any system, so long as the trade is exposed to the effects which must flow from the jealous rivalry of independent traders, when law and authority cannot step in to restrain its consequence within proper bounds. The Indians themselves are not the proper judges of their own interests, and, so far from restraining the effects of such rivalry, they would become the instruments of the most cunning and vicious of the traders, to wreak their vengeance on such as might stand in the way of their profits.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

J. C. CALHOUN.

To the Hon. H. CLAY, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

REPORT On the Reduction of the Army, communicated to the House of Representatives, December, 14, 1818.

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives, passed the 17th of April last, directing the Secretary of War “to report, at an early period of the next session of Congress, whether any, and, if any, what reduction may be made in the military peace establishment of the United States with safety to the public service; and whether any, and, if any, what change ought to be made in the ration established by law, and in the mode of issuing the same; and also report a system for the establishment of a Commissariat for the army,” I have the honor to submit the following report:— . In order to form a correct opinion on a subject involving so many particulars as the expense of our military establishment, it will be necessary to consider it under distinct and proper heads. To ascertain, then, “whether any, and, if any, what reductions may be made in the expenses of our military peace establishment,” I propose to consider its number, organization, pay, emoluments, and administration.

To one or the other of these heads all of its expenses may be traced; and if they are greater than they ought to be, we must search for the cause in the improper extent of the establishment, the excessive number of officers in proportion to the men, the extravagance of the pay and emoluments, or the want of proper responsibility and economy in its administration. Pursuing the subject in the order in which it has been stated, the first question which offers itself for consideration is, whether our military establishment can be reduced “with safety to the public service,” or can its expenditures be with propriety reduced, by reducing the army itself. It is obvious that, viewed in the abstract, few questions present so wide a field for observation, or which are so well calculated to produce a great diversity of sentiment, as the one now proposed. Considered as an original question, it would involve in its discussion the political institutions of the country, its geographical position and character, the number and distance of our posts, and our relations with the Indian tribes and the principal European Powers. It is considered, however, that a satisfactory view of it may be taken without discussing topics so extensive and indefinite. The military establishments of 1802 and 1808 have been admitted, almost universally, to be sufficiently small. The latter, it is true, received an enlargement, from the uncertain state of our foreign relations at that time; but the former was established at a period of profound quiet (the commencement of Mr. Jefferson's administration), and was probably reduced, with a view to economy, to the smallest number then supposed to be consistent with the public safety. Assuming these as a standard, and comparing the present establishment (taking into the comparison the increase of the country) with them, a satisfactory opinion may be formed on a subject, which otherwise might admit so great a diversity of opinion.

Our military peace establishment is limited, by the act of 1815, passed at the termination of the late war, at ten thousand men. The corps of engineers and ordnance, by that and a subsequent act, were retained as they then existed; and the President was directed to constitute the establishment of such portions of artillery, infantry, and riflemen, as he might judge proper. The general orders of the 17th of May, 1815, fix the artillery at 200, the light artillery at 660, the infantry 5,440, and the rifle 660 privates and matrosses.

Document A exhibits a statement of the military establishment, including the general staff, as at present organized; and B exhibits a similar view of those of 1802 and 1808; by a reference to which it will appear, that our military establishments at the respective periods, taken in the order of their dates, present an aggregate of 3,323, 9,996, and 12,656.

It is obvious that the establishment of 1808, compared with the then wealth and population of the country, and the number and extent of military posts, is larger in proportion than the present; but the unsettled state of our relations with France and England at that period, renders the comparison not entirely just. Passing, then, that of 1808, let us compare the establishment of 1802 with the present. To form a correct comparison, it will be necessary to compare the capacity and necessities of the country then, with those of the present.

Since that period our population has nearly doubled, and our wealth more than doubled; we have added Louisiana to our possessions, and with it a great extent of frontier, both maritime and inland. With the extension of our frontier, and the increase of our commercial cities, our military posts and fortifications have been greatly multiplied. Document marked C exhibits the number and positions of posts in the year 1802, and document D those of the present time; by a reference to which it will be seen that at the former period we had but twenty-seven posts, the most remote of which were, to the north, at Mackinaw, and to the south, at Fort Stoddert, on Mobile River; but now we have seventy-three, which occupy a line of frontier proportionally extended.

On the lakes, the Mississippi, Missouri, Arkansas, and Red River, our posts are now, or will be shortly, extended, for the protection of our trade and the preservation of the peace of the frontiers, to Green Bay, the mouths of the St. Peter's and the Yellow Stone River, Bellepoint, and Natchitoches. Document marked E exhibits a statement of the extent of the line of our frontier, inland and maritime, with the distance of some of the more remote posts from the seat of Government, drawn up by Major Long, of the topographical engineers, from the most approved maps. If, then, the military establishment of 1802 be assumed to be as small as was then consistent with the safety of the country, our present establishment, when we take into the comparison the prodigious increase of wealth, population, extent of territory, number and distance of military posts, cannot be pronounced extravagant; but, on the contrary, after a fair and full comparison, that of the former period must, in proportion to the necessities and capacity of the country, be admitted to be quite as large as the present; and on the assumption that the establishment of 1802 was as small as the public safety would then admit, a reduction of the expense of our present establishment cannot be made, with safety to the public service, by reducing the army. In coming to this conclusion, I have not overlooked the maxim, that a standing army is dangerous to the liberty of the country, and that our ultimate reliance for defense ought to be on the militia. Its most zealous advocate must, however, acknowledge that a standing army, to a limited extent, is necessary; and no good reason can be assigned why any should exist, but which will equally prove that the present is not too large. To consider the present army as dangerous to our liberty, partakes, it is conceived, more of timidity than wisdom. Not to insist on the character of the officers, who, as a body, are high-minded and honorable men, attached to the principles of freedom by education and reflection, what well-founded apprehension can there be from an establishment distributed on so extended a frontier, with many thousand miles intervening between the extreme points occupied? But the danger, it may be said, is not so much from its numbers, as a spirit hostile to liberty, by which, it is supposed, all regular armies are actuated. This observation is probably true when applied to standing armies collected into large and powerful masses; but, dispersed as ours is over so vast a surface, the danger, I conceive, is of an opposite character—that both officers and soldiers will lose their military habits and feelings, by sliding gradually into those purely civil. I proceed next to consider whether any reduction can be made, with propriety, by changing the organization, or by reducing the number of officers of the line or the staff in proportion to the men. It is obvious that, as the officers are much more expensive, in proportion to their numbers, than the soldiers, the pay of the army, in relation to its aggregate numbers, must be increased or diminished with the increase or diminution of the former. It is impossible to fix any absolute proportion between officers and men which will suit every country and every service; and the organization of different countries, and of different periods in the same country, has accordingly varied considerably. Our present organization, of which document marked A contains an exhibit, is probably as well or better adapted to the nature of our country and service, than any other, as it seems to be the result of experience; for, by a reference to document marked B, it will be seen that it is nearly similar (with the exception of the general staff, in which the present is more extensive) to the organization of the military establishments of 1802 and 1808. It is believed that the proportion of officers of the line to the men, will require no further observations.

The staff, as organized by the act of the last session, combines simplicity with efficiency, and it is considered to be superior to that of the periods to which I have reference.

In estimating the expenses of the army, and particularly that of the staff, the two most expensive branches of it (the engineer and ordnance departments) ought not fairly to be included. Their duties are connected with the permanent preparation and defense of the country, and have so little reference to the existing military establishment, that if the army were reduced to a single regiment, no reduction could safely be made in either of them. To form a correct estimate of the duties of the other branches of the staff, and, consequently, the number of officers required, we must take into consideration not only the number of troops, but, what is equally essential, the number of posts and extent of country which they occupy. Were our military establishment reduced one half, it is obvious that, if the same posts continued to be occupied which now are, the same number of officers in the quartermaster's, commissary’s, paymaster's, medical, and adjutant and inspector general's departments, would be required.

To compare, then, as is sometimes done, our staff with those of European armies assembled in large bodies, is manifestly unfair. The act of the last session, it is believed, has made all the reduction which ought to be attempted. It has rendered the staff efficient, without making it expensive.

Such a staff is not only indispensable to the efficiency of the army, but is also necessary to a proper economy in its disbursements; and should an attempt be made at retrenchment by reducing the present number, it would, in its consequences, probably prove wasteful and extravagant.

In fact, no part of our military organization requires more attention in peace than the general staff. It is in every service invariably the last in attaining perfection; and, if neglected in peace, when there is leisure, it will be impossible, in the midst of the hurry and bustle of war, to bring it to perfection. It is in peace that it should receive a perfect organization, and that the officers should be trained to method and punctuality; so that, at the commencement of war, instead of creating anew, nothing more should be necessary than to give to it the necessary enlargement. In this country particularly, the staff cannot be neglected with impunity.

Difficult as its operations are in actual service everywhere, it has here to encounter great and peculiar impediments, from the extent of the country, the badness, and frequently the want of roads, and the sudden and unexpected calls which are often made on the militia. If it could be shown that the staff, in its present extent, was not necessary in peace, it would, with the view taken, be unwise to lop off any of its branches which would be necessary in actual service. With a defective staff, we must carry on our military operations under great disadvantages, and be exposed, particularly at the commencement of a war, to great losses, embarrassments, and disasters. As intimately connected with this part of the subject, it is proper to observe, that so many and such distant small posts as our service requires, not only add to the expense of the army, by rendering a more numerous staff necessary, but they increase the price of almost every article of supply, and the difficulty of enforcing a proper responsibility and economy. To an army thus situated, the expenses and losses resulting from transportation alone constitute a considerable sum. Under the best management, our army must be more expensive, even were our supplies equally cheap, than European armies collected in large bodies, in the midst of populous and wealthy communities. These observations are not made to justify an improper management, or to divert the attention of the House from so important a subject as the expense of our military establishment. They, in fact, ought to have an opposite effect; for just in the same proportion that it is liable to be expensive, ought the attention and effort of the Government to be roused to confine its expenses within the most moderate limits which may be practicable.

The next question which presents itself for consideration is, can the expenses of our military establishment be reduced, without injury to the public service, by reducing the pay and emoluments of the officers and soldiers? There is no class in the community, whose compensation has advanced less since the termination of the war of the revolution, than that of the officers and soldiers of our army. While money has depreciated more rapidly than at any other period, and the price of all of the necessaries of life has advanced proportionably, their compensation has remained nearly stationary.