Ukraine’s Euromaidan: E-Book

• Herausgeber: ibidem
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 512

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015

Beschreibung

The papers presented in this volume analyze the civil uprising known as Euromaidan that began in central Kyiv in late November 2013, when the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych opted not to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union, and continued over the following months. The topics include the motivations and expectations of protesters, organized crime, nationalism, gender issues, mass media, the Russian language, and the impact of Euromaidan on Ukrainian politics as well as on the EU, Russia, and Belarus. The goal of the book is less to offer a definitive account than one that represents a variety of aspects of a mass movement that captivated world attention and led to the downfall of the Yanukovych presidency. The authors comprise well known and younger scholars who work on contemporary Ukraine and its neighbors.

Leseprobe

ibidem Press, Stuttgart

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Maidans Past and Present: Comparing the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan

Introduction—Déjà Vu: a Ukrainian Revolution

Outline

Methodology and Data

Contributing to the Literature on Ukrainian Activism and Protest

What was the Euromaidan?

More Similar than Different, or Visa-Versa: the Euromaidan and Orange Revolution Compared

Size, Spatiality[23] and Geographic Diffusion of Protest Events

When? And How Long?

In the Cities

In the Country

How Many?

Actors Involved in Euromaidan Mobilization Processes

Activists and SMOs

Foreign Actors

Political-Economic Elite

"Ordinary" Citizens: the Median Protester

An Expanding Protestorate?

Protest Claims Then and Now: Foreign Policy, Civic and Ethno-linguistic Claims

Expansion of Protest Tactics: the Rise of Violence

The Rise of the Right and the Divisive Nature of the Protests

New Technologies, Social Media and Samo-orhanizatsya [Self-organization]

Conclusions—Directions for Further Study

Vigilantes, Organized Crime, and Russian and Eurasian Nationalisms: The Case of Ukraine

Vigilante Skinhead Sportsmen

Donetsk and the Crimea: Crime, Politics, and Business

Mass Media Framing, Representations, and Impact on Public Opinion

Introduction

The Media Landscape

Mainstream Media Reporting, Silencing, Framing

Russian and International Media Framing

Journalists Targeted

Impact on Public Opinion

Conclusion

A Ukrainian Thesaurus in Russian

EuroRevolution: A Historian's Street-Side Observations

Gender and Nationalism on the Maidan

Helping Make the Revolution, or Making the Revolution?

Silent and Silenced

Sisters in Arms

Maidan as a State of Mind

Beyond the Square: The Real and Symbolic Landscapes of the Euromaidan

Why Euromaidan? Historical Continuity, Aura, and Religion

From Euromaidan-Square to a Euromaidan-State-of-Mind

Outside Kyiv: Euromaidan and Taras Shevchenko

Conclusion and Discussion

"Voices of Resistance and Hope": On the Motivations and Expectations of Euromaidaners

"People who have got things to lose"[3]: A Socio-Demographic Sketch of the Maidan

"This blood, blood on the cobblestones—I'll never forget it…."[14] On the Motives of Joining the Civil Unrest

"I wish they all would resign, then we will come to Khreshchatyk [Street], wearing summer dresses, to plant flowers and paint benches...."[23]—On Changing Expectations and Hopes

Conclusions

Digital Civil Society: Euromaidan, the Ukrainian Diaspora, and Social Media

Voices of Ukraine: A Translations Blog

Behind the Scenes

Global Reach

Personal Focus

The Diaspora

DigitalMaidan: Twitter Activists

The Storm

Trending and Response

Twitter Populace

Beyond Euromaidan

Razom, Inc.: From Facebook Group to Transnational Organization

Rapid Expansion

Razom Initiatives

InfoCenter

Event Department

Legal Aid Group

Investigation Groups

Professionals' Forum

Outcomes and Impact

Conclusion

Canada's Response to Euromaidan

Belarus and Euromaidan: Lukashenka's Response

Introduction

The Initial Response

Response of the Belarusian Opposition

Opinion Polls

Ukraine and the Popularity of Lukashenka

Federalism and NATO

Lukashenka's Attitude to Yanukovych and Turchynov

Economic Issues

Russian Military Bases in Belarus

Responses to Events in Crimea and Odesa

Euromaidan and the Independence of Belarus

Conclusion

Understanding the Euromaidan:The View from the Kremlin

Introduction

Russian Interests

Russian Reaction to the Euromaidan

Conclusion

Contributors

Acknowledgements

The editors owe a great debt to the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, which helped to sponsor the project and providedcriticalfunding. For most of the period under study, it was also the home of the Stasiuk blog site"Current Politics in Ukraine,"which provided regular analyses of the situation during Euromaidan and subsequently, with CIUS funding. CIUS held a number of seminars and conferences on events in Ukraine in 2013–14, organized chiefly by Bohdan Harasymiw, head of the Centre for Regional and Political Studies. We owe a great debt to CIUS director Volodymyr Kravchenko for his enthusiasm and support for this project, which continued, one should add, after David Marples formally left CIUS at the end of August 2014.

Much of the editorial work undertaken by Dr. Marples took place while he was a Visiting Scholar with the Slavic and Eurasian Research Center (SRC) at the University of Hokkaido, Sapporo, Japan, during the summer of 2014. That work was facilitated and enhanced by the members of SRC, and in particular its director Osamu Ieda. Aya Fujiwara, one of the contributors to this book, presented a version of her paperatSRC in August 2014.We are also grateful toMarta Dyczok for providing photographs and toThe King's Review, an online magazine publishing academic journalism based in King's College, University of Cambridge, for permitting us to republish a new version of Tanya Zaharchenko's paper.We would like to thank Sofia Dyak, for alerting us to the work of Natalia Otrischenko and Anna Chebotariova of the Lviv Center for Urban History in East-Central Europe, who agreed to contribute to this volume.

Lastly, we are grateful toibidem-Verlag for their patience and helpfulness at various stages, especially to Valerie Lange, Florian Boelter,and Chris Schoen. Having a cooperative publisher is a tremendous asset for any project and this one has been exemplary.

David R. Marples

Frederick V. Mills

Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

January 2015

Introduction

David R. Marples

From November 2013 to the end of February 2014, protesters gathered on Kyiv's central square, in a series of demonstrations known as the Euromaidan. These protests involved several distinct stages, culminating in what some analysts have called a national revolution that removed the government and presidency of Viktor Yanukovych. As a historian who has followed Ukraine since Soviet times, I recall in particular two earlier civic protests of importance. The first was the occupation of the Maidan by Kyiv's university students in 1990, demanding the resignation of then Prime Minister VitaliiMasol. Though widely condemned by Communist officials, it ended with the removal of the unpopular figure. The second was known as the Orange Revolution, and arose as a protest against the doctored results of the 2004 presidential election. Ironically, this event served to prevent the same Yanukovych from winning the presidency. He did, however return as Prime Minister under the Yushchenko presidency, and then won the 2010 elections, narrowly defeating Yulia Tymoshenko.

In late November 2013, Yanukovych had signaled his willingness to commit Ukraine to signing an Association Agreement with the European Union at the EU summit in Vilnius, an event that represented the culmination of an agreement made in 2012, and the high point to date of the Eastern Partnership initiative of 2008.[1]The Europeans had demanded in return that he release Tymoshenko from captivity (she had served 2.5 years of a 7-year jail sentence for signing an agreement with Russia on energy prices in 2009, when she was Prime Minister), and start constitutional and legal reforms. After a visit to Moscow, where he spoke with President Vladimir Putin, Yanukovych made the decision to postpone the signing of the agreement and seek better terms. It seemed once again that Ukraine would remain within the Russian orbit, and would most likely commit itself to future membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, which was to come into force on January 1, 2015, and currently involves Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, with Armenia a likely additional member.

On November 24, protesters came to the streets, motivated by anger at the change of direction. They were mainly youth, alerted by social networks and text messages. What occurred was essentially a civil protest on the future of Ukraine and it took the authorities completely by surprise. Though the daily numbers would dwindle, every weekend saw masses come out on the streets. At its peak, the numbers were so vast that it was impossible to count them. In several cities of Ukraine, especially in the western regions, the events in Kyiv were replicated. On the whole, the authorities reacted cautiously, deploying theBerkutriot police but without any serious confrontations. But on the night of November 30 and the morning of December 1, the order was given for theBerkutto clear the square by force. TheBerkutdescended on the Maidan, clubbing and beating demonstrators.

The protests were re-energized by this clumsy and thoughtless assault. The numbers rose sharply again. On December 16, Putin offered Ukraine $15 billion in loans and reduced gas prices to offset Ukraine's financial crisis, sparked by the near depletion of its hard currency reserves.[2]More than anything the offer seemed to emphasize that without Russia, Ukraine could not survive. Moreover, the sum was far more than the EU or the IMF was prepared to consider. In truth it was probably more than Russia could afford. The situation was exacerbated further by the quasi-legal rushing through parliament of draconian laws—the so-called"anti-protest laws"on January 16.[3]Their goal appeared to be to curb freedom of speech and assembly, the outlawing of NGOs and the establishment of a dictatorship under Yanukovych. The laws were the brainchild of two deputies from the Party of Regions, Vadym Kolesnychenko and Volodymyr Oliinyk. Though repealed only twelve days later, these laws heralded the culmination of the Euromaidan protests.

The protests were now less about the EU and more about the future of Ukraine. More attention was paid to the innate and grotesque corruption of the ruling regime, of the prevalence of oligarchs who had enriched themselves at the expense of the state, and the lack of legal reforms. These protests had two immediate results. One was the agreement of Yanukovych to sacrifice his Prime Minister, NikolayAzarov (who promptly fled to Vienna on an Austrian passport) and try to make a compromise with opposition leaders by bringing them into the ruling administration.[4]

On January 25, the Prime Minister's position was offered to Arsenii Yatsenyuk, the former Economy and Foreign Minister of Ukraine and leader of theBatkivshchyna[Fatherland] Party following the incarceration of Tymoshenko. That of Deputy Prime Minister for"humanitarian questions"was offered to Vitalii Klychko (Vitaly Klitschko), the former world champion boxer and leader of the partyUDAR[the Fist], which ran third in the 2012 parliamentary elections. Both refused to take up these posts, possibly because they could detect the growing weakness of the government, but more likely because to have done so would have cost them influence on the square. Moreover, Yatsenyuk was insistent that the new government should be formed through the parliament rather than the presidency.[5]

In reality, these leaders, and to some extent thethird opposition leader Oleh Tyahnybok ofSvoboda, had never led the protests. Rather they reacted to the moves on the Maidan. As the situation polarized, both sides changed character and personnel. On the government side, gangs of thugs were bussed into Kyiv from other cities, principally Kharkiv and Donetsk, simply to cause mayhem.Batkivshchynaformed its ownself-defensegroup. The average protester—if one can deduce such a thing—was no longer the 20-something student, but more hardened 30 and 40-year olds, not only ready for a fight but unprepared to compromise. Many were from western Ukraine. In their local regions, the government of Yanukovych no longer existed. Elsewhere the government deployed gangs to carry out drastic actions. They set fire to cars, beat up protesters, kidnapped people, and targeted prominent journalists.

On the opposition side, several local militias formed, based partly on rightist groups likePravyi Sektor(hereafter Right Sector). The latter initially comprised soccer fan"ultras,"mainly Russophones who were nonetheless fanatical nationalists. Though relatively small in numbers, Right Sector's members were prominent in a number of radical actions, commencing with an attack on Ministry of Internal Affairs (MV