Update Liberalism E-Book

• Herausgeber: transcript Verlag
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: X-Texte zu Kultur und Gesellschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 244

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023

Beschreibung

Liberal democracy is under pressure worldwide. It is challenged by anti-liberal movements and parties as well as by authoritarian regimes. Liberalism as a cross-party movement and a broad way of thinking has fallen into the defensive and is often associated with market radicalism, social coldness, and ecological ignorance. The contributors show that liberalism as a school of thought is not dead. In their essays, they present ideas and approaches for new liberal concepts to cope with the great challenges of our time: from climate change, globalization, and the digital revolution to transnational migration and the increasing systemic competition between democracies and authoritarian regimes.

Leseprobe

Editorial

The supposed “end of history” long ago revealed itself to be much more an end to certainties. More than ever, we are not only faced with the question of “Generation X”. Beyond this kind of popular figures, academia is also challenged to make a contribution to a sophisticated analysis of the time. The series X-TEXTS takes on this task, and provides a forum for thinking with and against time. The essays gathered together here decipher our present moment, resisting simplifying formulas and oracles. They combine sensitive observations with incisive analysis, presenting both in a conveniently, readable form.

Ralf Fücks, Rainald Manthe (eds.)

Update Liberalism

Liberal Answers to the Challenges of Our Time

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

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© 2023 transcript Verlag, Bielefeld

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https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839469958

Print-ISBN: 978-3-8376-6995-4

PDF-ISBN: 978-3-8394-6995-8

EPUB-ISBN: 978-3-7328-6995-4

ISSN of series: 2364-6616

eISSN of series: 2747-3775

Contents

Update Liberalism. An Introduction

Ralf Fücks & Rainald Manthe

I Contemporary Liberalism of the 21st Century

Democracy without Freedom

Rainer Hank

Globalisation and Democratic Regression

Michael Zürn

The Revenge of Emotions

Karolina Wigura

Poison Cupboard or Treasure Chest? Why each Generation Needs its own Neoliberalism

Stefan Kolev

Do We Need a New Liberalism of Fear?

Amichai Magen

“Move Forward to the Back”: The Illiberal Turn in East-Central Europe

Jacques Rupnik

Liberalism beyond Individualism and Capitalism

Christoph Möllers

Freedom and Justice in a Double Pack: A Short Journey through the Liberal Intellectual History of Justice

Karen Horn

Ecology and Freedom

Ralf Fücks

II Liberal Answers to the Challenges of our Time

On the Critical Infrastructure of Liberal Democracy

Jan-Werner Müller

Freedom in Times of the Pandemic

Sabine A. Döring

Liberalism versus Right-Wing Populism

Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger

Ownership for All! From Class Society to Property Society

Ralf Fücks

Liberal Democracies versus Totalitarian Autocracies: European Responses to the Systemic Conflict

Daniela Schwarzer

Global Migration and Cohesion of Diverse Societies

Cornelia Schu

Smart Market Design for Sustainable Infrastructures

Achim Wambach

The Future of Free Trade

Gabriel Felbermayr

I Tweet, therefore I am? For a New Ethics of Digitalisation

Alexandra Borchardt

Liberty Politics as Democracy Politics

Christopher Gohl

A Civil Right to Further Education

Ralf Fücks and Rainald Manthe

Authors

Update Liberalism. An Introduction

Ralf Fücks & Rainald Manthe

Democracy exists in fact only as liberal democracy. The chimera of “illiberal democracy” is only camouflage on the path to authoritarianism. In the history of ideas, liberalism as a broad political-philosophical stream of thought laid the foundations of modern democracy. It has promoted the separation of powers and the rule of law, the steady expansion of political participation and an active civil society. At its centre is the postulate of equal freedom for all and the normative idea of human rights. Both are subversive postulates vis-à-vis relationships in which they are not fulfilled. Even the concept of an international order governed by law is also based on liberal thinking. Liberalism has penetrated so deeply that we now use the terms “liberal democracy” and “democracy” almost interchangeably.

Liberal democracy is under threat

However, the success story of liberalism is not a guarantee for the future. Currently, liberal democracy is being heavily contested. Domestically, it is being threatened by populist parties and movements that attack it as a deformation of the “real” will of the people.

The populist challenge is far from over. Several populist candidates in neighbouring France competed for the highest office in the 2022 presidential elections. In the USA, too, the populist threat has not been averted. There, political and cultural polarisation has reached a level that hardly makes a return to democratic commonalities possible. In some eastern central European countries, parties are in power that undermine the rule of law, the independence of the media and the space for civil society organisations. In Germany, the right-wing AfD is gaining support in opinion polls and successfully competing for office on the local level. In parts of Eastern Germany, the AfD has managed to become the strongest political force.

Externally, liberal democracy is being challenged by increasingly assertive authoritarian powers, notably China and Russia. We are in the midst of a new ideological competition with authoritarian states. A new type of high-tech authoritarianism has emerged in China, combining totalitarian methods of rule with economic dynamism, technical innovation and digital surveillance.

As we write these lines, Russia is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine, the like of which Europe has not seen since World War II. Putin’s campaign against an independent, democratic and European Ukraine is, at the same time, an attack on liberal democracy. The Kremlin fears nothing more than the spirit of freedom jumping over the border into Russia.

The flagrant breach of international law and the unbridled policy of violence of a permanent member of the UN Security Council mark a deep turning point. Putin’s war has awakened liberal democracies. Germany is ramping up its defence spending and pulled out of its long-standing energy partnership with Russia. The European Community is moving closer together and the transatlantic alliance is being revived.

How can we strengthen democratic resilience, how can and should liberal democracies defend themselves against domestic and external enemies? This almost forgotten question can no longer be brushed aside. Freedom does not exist without a cost; it must be won and defended again and again. Ukraine is currently paying the highest price – partly because the West hesitated too long to oppose Putin’s revanchism.

Challenges of the 2020s

But that’s not all. The 2020s are becoming a decade of upheaval and transformation. Along with the new ideological conflict between democracy and authoritarianism, there are further fundamental challenges.

The greatest is probably climate change. It remains to be seen whether the destabilisation of the Earth’s climate will lead to a kind of ecological emergency regime or whether a global effort will succeed in halting climate change through a new wave of green investment and innovations. A policy based primarily on restrictions and frugality will, at best, delay climate change, but threaten democracy.

The digital revolution affects all aspects of our lives. It is dramatically changing the world of work, such as public communications and the way in which policies are made. In the final analysis, AI and the progressive automation of complex activities lead us to question the dominance of humans over the machine world. Digital technologies have a great potential for freedom, but they can also turn into the opposite, as demonstrated by Chinese high-tech authoritarianism.

Western societies are becoming more and more heterogeneous,socially as well as culturally. This process is growing once again as a result of global migration. How can social cohesion and republican common ground be established in such diverse societies? How can we ensure equal rights and opportunities for all and avoid society disintegrating into identitarian, self-referential groups?

The Covid-19 pandemic was the precursor of a new type of global infectious diseases. It hit the world unprepared. In many countries, not just China with its zero-Covid strategy, drastic measures were taken in order to contain the pandemic. Individual freedoms were restricted in the interests of all. What can be done if the appeal for individual responsibility and solidarity is not enough? To what extent is the restriction of fundamental rights legitimate or even advisable in order to protect the lives and health of us all? Other dangers – such as growing resistance to antibiotics and associated new pandemics – are already knocking on the door.

Thus, the role of the state is changing. When things are falling apart, the state is called upon. It is taking centre stage again as a collective authority of emergency response. But therein lurks the danger of overestimation and overspending. Democratic resilience requires more than a state capable of action. It needs functioning markets and a committed civil society. This is becoming evident again in the great willingness to help with the accommodation of Ukrainian refugees. Market, state and civil society must work together to make liberal democracy fit for the future.

Liberalism under attack

It seems as if contemporary liberalism has little to say about these key challenges. That is another reason why it has often been on the defensive. It is often associated with market radicalism, egoism, social indifference and ecological ignorance by its opponents. Some critics accuse it of overstretching the claim to validity of liberal principles. Others suspect that liberalism has lost its emancipatory potential and has atrophied into the mere defence of privileges of the privileged. The insistence on individual freedom, the liberal independence from the state and the scepticism towards community utopias are now considered to be outdated.

We are convinced that liberalism as a mindset is not dead, but it needs a profound rejuvenation. This self-critical rejuvenation must agree upon the current conditions of freedom, and it must provide liberal answers to the challenges of our time.

What is the aim of this book?

Liberalism is a diverse and constantly changing school of thought. It extends far beyond the parties which include “liberal” or “freedom” in their name. There are free-thinking protagonists in all democratic parties and almost all social milieus. However, the conditions of freedom in the 21st century are different from in the early days of liberalism and different yet again from its heyday in 1989/90, the years of the end of the Cold War and the so-called “end of history”. Liberalism must not leave the search for identity and common ground to the political right, social justice to the left and ecology to the Greens alone. It must find its own liberal answers to the great challenges of our time. The first part of our volume is all about this self-critical rejuvenation of liberalism.

The second part discusses liberal responses to the major problems of the 2020s: climate change, globalisation, the digital revolution, transnational migration. Which infrastructures do democracies need? How should liberals respond to the growing need for security and stability in a rapidly changing world? How must the relationship between state, market and individual civic responsibility be redefined?

After the positive echo on the German version, which was published in summer 2022, we decided to translate “Update Liberalism” into English to foster the international debate on liberal rejuvenation and liberal answers to the challenges of our time. We hope that the English edition will contribute to this overdue debate.

The texts

Our volume brings together authors from academia, politics, the media and civil society who see themselves as liberal in different ways. The fact that liberalism refers to different perspectives on the realisation of freedom also becomes clear from their contributions.

I Contemporary liberalism of the 21st century

Rainer Hankopposes a pure defence of democracy. Liberalism and democracy, he says, are not always the same thing. It is important to defend liberalism and thus liberal democracy. Now we have to fight for liberal tolerance and deal with opponents in a defensive way.

Michael Zürnexamines the tension between globalisation and liberal democracy. The expectation that economic globalisation would promote the triumph of democracy has turned out to be an illusion. Instead, it has led to growing conflicts in the Western democracies and at the same time promoted the global rise of authoritarian populism.

Karolina Wigurapleads for giving more space to a “politics of feelings” again. While populist movements and parties mainly capitalise on the feeling of fear, liberals fail to make progressive politics with feelings.

“Neoliberalism” is an ambiguous term. It is often used as a reason for all evil against liberal thinking and politics. In his contribution, Stefan Kolevtraces the history and meaning of this term and argues that liberalism must constantly renew itself, i.e. that new neoliberalisms are constantly needed.

A life of fear makes one unfree. Following Judith Shklar, Amichai Magenargues for a “liberalism of fear” that prevents fear from becoming the dominant mood.

Jacques Rupnik’stext explores why a fertile ground for illiberal, authoritarian parties has developed in some countries of East-Central Europe. Demographic panic, weak liberal traditions, social discrepancies as well as a cultural definition of national identity form a specific mixture that favours national populist parties.

Christoph Möllersshows that individuality can only be understood as a social achievement. Freedom is linked to social conditions that have to be learned and preserved. This requires collective action as a medium of freedom. Modern liberalism must prove itself above all in situations where people are denied the freedom to shape their lives independently.

Freedom and justice are often traded as competing fundamental values in the public debate. In contrast, Karen Hornshows in her journey through the history of ideas that justice is a central concept for liberal thinkers.

Ecology and freedom also often appear as opposites. Especially now that climate change requires a drastic reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, calls for restrictions on freedom are growing louder. Ralf Fücks, on the other hand, argues for the innovative capacity of liberal democracy and market economy and outlines the potentials of an ecological modernity.

II Liberal answers to the challenges of our time

Democracy is built on its own infrastructures: parliaments, parties and independent, professional media. Jan-Werner Müllerargues that the digital infrastructures of democracy – especially social media and software – should also be democratised more strongly so that they support the active participation of many.

The Covid pandemic was a test for liberalism. Sabine Döringconsiders a general obligation to vaccinate to discuss how freedom and the common good can be linked. In doing so, she ties in with Christoph Möllers: freedom only ever takes place in the context of a community.

Democracy must be defensible. Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenbergerexplains why liberalism must resolutely oppose right-wing populism. Liberals must find a way between radical individualism and false unanimity that denies social lines of conflict.

In another contribution, Ralf Fücksargues for “property for all” as the basis of a liberal civil society: home ownership and broad social participation in companies expand degrees of freedom and enable more economic co-determination.

Daniela Schwarzeranalyses the new systemic competition between liberal democracies and authoritarian powers, above all China and Russia. She shows that democracies must be able to act both internally and externally and outlines possible responses at the EU level so that liberal democracies can hold their own.

Social approval of migration and integration is growing. How can we shape successful integration politically and strengthen social cohesion? Cornelia Schugives five answers.

Achim Wambachshows that there are solutions beyond state ownership to organise important public infrastructures. With “smart market design”, mobile phone or energy markets can be regulated in the interest of the common good.

Gabriel Felbermayrargues for more rather than less free trade. He also sees the dampeners caused by the Covid pandemic as only temporary. States should once again focus more on free trade within the framework of agreed rules of the game instead of erecting trade barriers that reduce prosperity and hamper innovation.

Alexandra Borchardtargues that digitalisation needs a renewed ethic. We must, she appeals, shape the digital world instead of letting it shape us. This is becoming a fundamental question of democracy.

Christopher Gohladvocates anew politics of democracy. For liberal democracy to remain adaptive and alive, democracy policy must find ways between technocratic elite rule and anti-institutional populism.

In the concluding article, Ralf Fücks and Rainald Mantheargue that people need a basic level of security in times of rapid change. Using the example of a basic education income that financially and institutionally secures a citizen’s right to further education, we show how expanded individual degrees of freedom and coping with structural change can go together.

Acknowledgements

This volume would not have been possible without the support of many people and institutions. The first mention goes to the Friede Springer Foundation and the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius, which supported the German edition financially and have encouraged us to see that a rejuvenated liberalism is needed in order to continue to develop our democracy. We would like to sincerely thank Ute Schweitzer and Anna Hofmann, who have assisted the project with great appreciation and flexibility.

We also owe a great debt of thanks to our authors. They have responded to suggestions and have not complained about tight deadlines. Their ideas and texts sustain the book and enrich the debate. To contribute to the debate on a rejuvenated liberalism together with them is an honour and a pleasure for us.

At transcript Publishers, Linda Dümpelmann and Jakob Horstmann have consistently supported us, solved even difficult questions and contributed significantly to the fact that this volume could be published quickly. Last but not least, we would like to thank Nila Sarabi, Lara Schauland and Marius Drozdzewski, who have assisted the project at the Centre for Liberal Modernity and contributed to its success.

I Contemporary Liberalism of the 21st Century

Democracy without Freedom

Rainer Hank

Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine is often said to be an attack on the West. Therefore, “Western values” must now be defended, with the help of economic sanctions and, if necessary, with weapons.1

What are Western values? “Democracy”, many say. But democracy has many varieties, and not all of them suit us. It is no more than a procedure for the legitimisation of a government by the people. The people can also elect scoundrels. That’s not good, but it’s still democracy. Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian head of government, is proud of his “illiberal democracy“. Liberalism he hates, democracy he likes: the votes of the electorate stabilise his power. By democratic means and an electoral law that favours him, Orbán has transformed himself into an autocrat. His Fidesz party has once again won an absolute majority in the Hungarian parliament in 2022.

Liberalism and democracy are often used synonymously. This is wrong. When it comes to defending Western values, it should be about liberal values. They are the legacy of the (Western) European Enlightenment. I would defend liberalism tooth and nail. Whether I would always defend democracy depends. China and North Korea both have autocratic regimes called “people’s” republics. When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi installs Hindu nationalism in his country, he has not betrayed democracy, but he has betrayed liberalism. When Poland’s government replaces disagreeing judges and mutes the non-governmental press, it is not a violation of democracy, but a serious blow to the rule of law.

Are totalitarian systems doomed to fail?

One can go even further: liberalism keeps democratic governments in check against their susceptibility to be seduced by populism and nationalism. The separation of powers relativises the power of the executive and protects minorities against democratic majorities. For the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, “classical liberalism” is an instrument “to manage tolerance peacefully in pluralistic societies”. The central ideas are freedom, tolerance and respect for personal autonomy. These values must be guaranteed by a government that is in turn disciplined by and respects the law. The rule of law safeguards private property, freedom of contract and free markets: none of these may be thrown overboard by a democratically elected government. Liberalism without a market economy is not possible. Democracy without liberalism is possible. Whether liberalism works without democracy is debatable.

The fact that liberalism is in retreat everywhere cannot be overlooked. The American think-tank Freedom House subsumes only 20.3 per cent of the world’s governments under “free” for the year 2020, such as Germany, France, the United States and South Africa. Some 41.3 per cent are “not free”, including Russia, China and Venezuela. The remaining 38.4 per cent are “partly free”, for example Ukraine, Hungary, Singapore and India.2 Compared to 2005, the changes towards illiberalism are dramatic: at that time, 46 per cent of states counted as “free” and 31.1 per cent as “partly free”.3

For Francis Fukuyama, these facts must be a deep grievance. In the summer of 1989, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, he became world famous with a single magazine article entitled “The End of History?”4 Three years later it became a book; the title remained, only the question mark had disappeared. That was a bit premature, as we know today. Fukuyama’s thesis at the time was that communism and fascism were no longer political alternatives, that the way was clear for liberal democracy, an earthly paradise of freedom. Totalitarian systems were doomed to failure because they contradicted the basic liberal idea. That was a bit naïve even then, according to the motto good will prevail in the end.

Dispute for liberal tolerance

What is cheap, however, is the gloating that has poured down on Fukuyama since then. Nothing is more productive than an error of format. Fukuyama is still working on his misjudgement today. His latest book has just been published and is entitled Liberalism and Its Discontents.5 It was completed before the outbreak of the Ukraine war, but has become even more explosive. The thesis, in brief, is that liberalism is not what it used to be either. Fukuyama expresses the suspicion that liberalism is partly to blame for the dwindling support for the values of freedom and the triumph of populists and autocrats.

How so? On the one hand, “dogmatic neoliberals” (economists such as Gary Becker or Milton Friedman) had turned the idea of free markets into a kind of absolute religion. They had not prevented crises of capitalism and had allowed the inequality of income and wealth to become indecent and unbearable in many countries. At the same time, the idea of tolerance and free speech had been ideologically deconstructed by the “left liberals” as a privilege to maintain the power of white men. The liberal mandate to endure ambiguity became a dogmatic identity politics, a distinction between friend and foe. In short, if liberalism itself no longer sets a good example, one need not be surprised that those in power everywhere turn away from it.

Fukuyama’s theses are debatable. That makes them valuable. They also recognisably serve to legitimise the fact that world history has not listened to Fukuyama’s thesis. I doubt that Putin, Orbán and Erdogan would embrace flawless liberalism if wealth inequality in America were lower and the LGBTQ movement less vocal. Despite its moral, philosophical and economic superiority, liberalism has always been decadent to its opponents; capitalism has always been denigrated by them as plutocratic.

For those who feel committed to the values of the Enlightenment, the only thing left to do is to fight even more resolutely for liberal tolerance in the future – and to endure the aporia that there must be no tolerance towards those who base their politics on intolerance, war and destruction.

1This article first appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung on April 3, 2022. © All rights reserved. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH, Frankfurt. Provided by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Archiv.

2Cf. Freedom House: “New Report: The global decline in democracy has accelerated”, press release, March 3, 2022. https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated

3See Freedom House: “Freedom in the World 2005. The annual survey of political rights & civil liberties”, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc 2005.

4Fukuyama, Francis: “The End of History?”, in: The National Interest No. 16 (1989), pp. 3-18.

5Fukuyama, Francis: Liberalism and Its Discontents, London: Profile Books 2022.

Globalisation and Democratic Regression

Michael Zürn

Globalisation has led to the temporary triumph of democracy. It foiled the socialist world’s strategy of isolation from the dynamics of capitalist and democratic societies. It increased the pressure for renewal in these societies and ultimately brought them crashing. Without globalisation there would have been no 1989.1

At the same time, globalisation has brought forth and strengthened the new opponents of liberal democracy. On the one hand, through the export of capital and knowledge, it has introduced economic dynamism to regions that for a long time failed in the face of the challenges of catch-up development. East Asia in particular has benefited from globalisation and found its own path to prosperous modernity. Initially, this process could be observed in societies that also democratised in the course of their economic dynamism. After 1989, on the other hand, China in particular proved that there need not be a close connection between successful capitalist development and democracy. Globalisation thus also enabled the success story of an autocratic political system like China. Since the financial crisis at the latest, liberal democracy of Western provenance has been facing regulatory competition that, in contrast to real existing socialism, is both different and successful. 

Globalisation has also brought forth the new opponents of liberal democracy 

It is different because it explicitly does not link the flourishing of economic market dynamics to the institutions of liberal democracy and thus questions the seemingly inseparable connection between market and democracy. It is successful because the authoritarian ruling elites in countries like China and Singapore cannot be easily dismissed as selfish despots. Their policies have a recognisable common good component and can point to a track record of considerable progress, especially in the fight against poverty. They have also proven to be more successful in fighting the pandemic than Western European and North American countries. These states show that social progress is possible ─ and this without the democratic control of those in power and the guarantee of individual rights, combined with far-reaching surveillance and reward systems. This undermines the notion advocated, especially after 1989, that liberal democracy has no alternatives. If China is seen as a regulatory alternative in parts of the Global South today, then the question of the right political order is back on the global agenda.

Rapid change has strengthened the opponents of liberal democracy 

Globalisation has also strengthened the internal enemies of liberal democracy. Within the Western world, it has led to a dramatic increase in cultural diversity, to growing economic inequality and to the alienation of parts of the population from a political class perceived as aloof. These are the developments that have made the rise of populists possible. This refers to the parties and political movements that claim to give the ordinary people a voice again in the name of democracy, but at the same time represent a fundamental danger to liberal democracy. Indeed, contemporary populism is primarily an authoritarian populism. It is a political ideology that builds on a de-proceduralised form of majority representation and turns nationalistically against “liberal cosmopolitan elites”. The topos “our nation first” expresses this nationalism. De-proceduralisation refers to the rejection of democratic argument about what is right. There is no need to negotiate what is right. It is set. “He knows what we want” was to be found on an election poster of the Austrian Freedom Party referring to H.C. Strache. 

Authoritarian populist parties have a potential of about 20 percent of the vote in almost all liberal democracies in Western Europe. More importantly, a significant proportion of the world’s population is governed by authoritarian populists. The best-known names are Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Lech Kaczyński, Nicolás Maduro, Narendra Modi, Viktor Orbán, Vladimir Putin and, until recently, Jair Bolsonaro and Donald J. Trump. These are almost all large countries, which is what makes authoritarian populism so powerful for the international order. Authoritarian populism has spread globally in a relatively short period of time. 

Authoritarian populism is widespread globally 

Wherever authoritarian populists have come to power, we are experiencing a democratic backsliding. In all eight countries mentioned (Brazil, Turkey, Poland, Venezuela, India, Hungary, Russia and the USA), the Gothenburg Democracy Barometer VDem shows a clear deterioration in the quality of democracy. At the same time, the quality of democratic governance has worsened even in supposedly consolidated democracies. If the decline of democracy was for a long time regarded as something that only took place in distant countries, from the perspective of Western Europeans, the strikes are now getting closer. Not only in Venezuela or Brazil, but also in the USA and Poland, democracy has deteriorated significantly over the past decade. In some of these countries, there is hope that a change of government will reverse the trend; but where liberal democracy has already been replaced by an electoral autocracy, voting out the government is also becoming increasingly less likely. 

Changes in the functioning of democracy are crucial for the widespread alienation from democracy. The discussion so far has focused strongly on the economic and cultural causes of authoritarian populism. While growing inequality in rich countries certainly plays a role and a cultural backlash may be observed to some extent, the political question is the actual key. Economic and also cultural explanations assume that people are dissatisfied with specific policies and therefore turn to authoritarian populist parties. Surveys show, however, that the dissatisfaction is mostly based on a systemic criticism of the political class and the established mainstream parties. Economic satisfaction, on the other hand, is relatively high and gender equality policies enjoy broad support.

People no longer feel noticed in a democracy