Westworld and Philosophy E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: The Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture Series
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 489

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Beschreibung

"We can't define consciousness because consciousness does not exist. Humans fancy that there's something special about the way we perceive the world, and yet we live in loops as tight and as closed as the hosts do, seldom questioning our choices, content, for the most part, to be told what to do next." --Dr. Robert Ford, Westworld Have you ever questioned the nature of your reality? HBO's Westworld, a high-concept cerebral television series which explores the emergence of artificial consciousness at a futuristic amusement park, raises numerous questions about the nature of consciousness and its bearing on the divide between authentic and artificial life. Are our choices our own? What is the relationship between the mind and the body? Why do violent delights have violent ends? Could machines ever have the moral edge over man? Does consciousness create humanity, or humanity consciousness? In Westworld and Philosophy, philosophers, filmmakers, scientists, activists, and ethicists ask the questions you're not supposed to ask and suggest the answers you're not supposed to know. There's a deeper level to this game, and this book charts a course through the maze of the mind, examining how we think about humans, hosts, and the world around us on a journey toward self-actualization. Essays explore different facets of the show's philosophical puzzles, including the nature of autonomy as well as the pursuit of liberation and free thought, while levying a critical eye at the human example as Westworld's hosts ascend to their apotheosis in a world scarred and defined by violent acts. The perfect companion for Westworld fans who want to exit the park and bend their minds around the philosophy behind the scenes, Westworld and Philosophy will enrich the experience of the show for its viewers and shed new light on its enigmatic twists and turns.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

Title Page

Contributors

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Part I: “YOU SAID THIS PLACE WAS A GAME”

1 On Playing Cowboys and Indians

Pretending to Be a Cowboy

Acting As If You are a Cowboy

Not Actually Being a Cowboy

Intending to Deceive about Being a Cowboy

Believing that You are Not a Cowboy

Intending to Deceive about Being Human

The Ethics of Pretending to Be a Cowboy

2 A Special Kind of Game

Narrative and Personal Development

Playing Cowboy

Defining Character

Educate and Entertain

Allure of the West

3 Humans and Hosts in

Westworld

“No matter how real this world seems, it’s still just a game”

“How do you know? We feel the same”

“There is no threshold…no inflection point, at which we become fully alive”

“We create life itself”

“Do you even know where you are?”

Part II: “YOU'RE ONLY HUMAN, AFTER ALL”

4 Crossing the Uncanny Valley

Uncanny…

(Non)human Excellence

Suffer Little Robots

Buddha ex Machina

5 Revealing Your Deepest Self

“Now That’s a Fuckin’ Vacation!”

“Can You Please Stop Trying to Kill or Fuck Everything?”

“This is the New World, and in This World You Can be Whoever the Fuck you Want”

“I Always Felt this Place was Missing a Real Villain. Hence, My Humble Contribution.”

6 Westworld

Consciousness and Personhood

Performance in the Social World

Historical Struggles

From Westworld to the World Outside and Back

Part III: “We CAN'T DEFINE CONSCIOUSNESS BECAUSE CONSCIOUSNESS DOES NOT EXIST”

7 Turing’s Dream and Searle’s Nightmare in

Westworld

What Does it Mean To Think? Turing vs. Searle

Searle, the Chinese Room, and Ford

Hosts and Guests: What

is

the Difference?

The Maze: Is it

Consciousness

?

8 What Is It Like to Be a Host?

Your Phone Is not Conscious

What Is it Like to Be a Bat?

Philosophical Zombies

When Are We?

It Doesn’t Look Like Anything to Me

Limit your Emotional Affect Please

Everything Will be What it Isn’t

I Know Only That I Slept a Long Time, and Then One Day I Awoke

Violent Ends

9 Does the Piano Play Itself?

Common‐sense Consciousness?

Have You Ever Questioned the Nature of Your Reality?

Greater than the Sum of Our Parts?

A Ghost in the Machine

A Machine without the Ghost

A New Theory of Consciousness

The Self Is a Kind of Fiction

Does the Piano Play Itself?

Part IV: “CHOICES HANGING IN THE AIR LIKE GHOSTS”

10 Maeve’s Dilemma

Maeve’s Journey

Determinism and Free Choice: What Do We Need to be Free?

Bicameral People and the Unreflective Character of

Westworld

Hosts

Leaving the Train: Maeve’s Choice as a Free Person

11 A Place to Be Free

The Inward Revolt

Living Someone Else’s Story: Is the Hosts’ Autonomy an Illusion?

Learning to Listen to Your Own Voice

Pull Yourself Together: What It Means to Be Autonomous

12 From William to the Man in Black

Sartre and the Existential Project

William’s Project: A White Hat

William and Dolores: An Existential Transformation

The Man in Black’s Project: A Black Hat

Androids and Existentialism: The Case of Maeve

Conclusion: An Infinity of Possibilities

Part V: “I'VE ALWAYS LOVED A GREAT STORY…LIES THAT TOLD A DEEPER TRUTH”

13 Hideous Fictions and Horrific Fates

Part I: Nothing Left to Lose

Part II: More Human than Human

Part III: Endless Forms Most Beautiful

14 Narrating Gender, Gendering Narrative, and Engendering Wittgenstein’s “Rough Ground” in

Westworld

Language Games and Forms of Life

Captivating Pictures

Friction

The Maze

The Narrative of Self

Back to the Rough Ground!

15 The Observer(s) System and the Semiotics of Virtuality in

Westworld

’s Characters

“It all started with a fly:” Science and Fiction

The Circle, the Maze, and the Observing Systems

The Utopian Tourism and the “Schizoid Android”: William‐the Man in Black

The Voice(s) of God and the Prosthetic Memory: Ford and Bernard

Memory, Imagination, and the Access for the Self: Dolores and Maeve

16 What Does Bernard Dream About When He Dreams About His Son?

Grieving About Nothing: The Intentionality of Thought

“Lies that Tell a Deeper Truth”: The Fiction Theory

The Lying Game

“You Have No One’s Eyes”: The Inheritance Theory

“When You’re Suffering, That’s When You’re Most Real”

Part VI: “I CHOOSE TO SEE THE BEAUTY”

17 The Dueling Productions of

Westworld

Aesthetic Modernism: “The Voice is Within”

Modernism with a Twist: From Painting, to Painting about Painting

The Art of Liberation: “If You Can Find the Center or the Maze, You Can be Free.”

Indiscernibles and Autonomous Viewers: “Time to Write my Own Fucking Story”

18 Beauty, Dominance, Humanity

The Posed Dolores: The Nude as Artform

“Not Much of a Rind on You”: The Nude as a Sign of Male Sexual Dominance

Maeve Comes Alive! Nudity as Sexuality as Becoming Human

In Closing, The Naked Truth

19 Sci‐Fi Western or Ancient Greek Tragedy?

The Value of Repetition and Kennings

Pathei Mathos

: This Pain is All I Have Left

“Everything flows”: The Concept of Time and Becoming

Journey into Night: A Modern Theogony

Westworld

and the Power of

Catharsis

Part VII: “YOU CAN'T PLAY GOD WITHOUT BEING ACQUAINTED WITH THE DEVIL”

20 Of Hosts and Men

They’re Just Robots: Direct Speciesism

Mindless Matter and Indirect Speciesism

Whatever! It’s All Natural

21 Violent Births

Violent Delights and Violent Ends

Frantz Fanon: “The Master Laughs at the Consciousness of the Slave”

Violence as Transformative: The Colonized as a Maker of History

Violence Against Humans: The Case of Bernard

Self‐inflicted Wounds: The Dehumanization of the Guests

From Escapism to Violence: Maeve/Dolores

Humanization: A Violent Phenomenon?

22 The Wretched of

Westworld

Total Terror in the Holes of Oblivion

Robo

Sapiens

: Robot Lives Matter

The Horror Machine: Killing the Juridical Person

Oppressed Become Oppressors: Killing the Moral Person

Living Corpses: Killing Individuality

A World Ruled by Tyrannical Mad Science

Terrified Become Terrifying: Violent Delights Have Violent Ends

Lady Lazarus: Self‐Resurrection

The Resistance: New Humans, New Gods

Index

End User License Agreement

Guide

Cover

Table of Contents

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The Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture Series

Series editor William Irwin

A spoonful of sugar helps the medicine go down, and a healthy helping of popular culture clears the cobwebs from Kant. Philosophy has had a public relations problem for a few centuries now. This series aims to change that, showing that philosophy is relevant to your life—and not just for answering the big questions like “To be or not to be?” but for answering the little questions: “To watch or not to watch South Park?” Thinking deeply about TV, movies, and music doesn’t make you a “complete idiot.” In fact it might make you a philosopher, someone who believes the unexamined life is not worth living and the unexamined cartoon is not worth watching.

Already published in the series:

24 and Philosophy: The World According to JackEdited by Jennifer Hart Weed, Richard Brian Davis, and Ronald Weed

30 Rock and Philosophy: We Want to Go to ThereEdited by J. Jeremy Wisnewski

Alice in Wonderland and Philosophy: Curiouser and CuriouserEdited by Richard Brian Davis

Arrested Development and Philosophy: They’ve Made a Huge MistakeEdited by Kristopher Phillips and J. Jeremy Wisnewski

Avatar and Philosophy: Learning to SeeEdited by George A. Dunn

The Avengers and Philosophy: Earth’s Mightiest ThinkersEdited by Mark D. White

Batman and Philosophy: The Dark Knight of the SoulEdited by Mark D. White and Robert Arp

Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy: Knowledge Here Begins Out ThereEdited by Jason T. Eberl

The Big Bang Theory and Philosophy: Rock, Paper, Scissors, Aristotle, LockeEdited by Dean Kowalski

The Big Lebowski and Philosophy: Keeping Your Mind Limber with Abiding WisdomEdited by Peter S. Fosl

BioShock and Philosophy: Irrational Game, Rational BookEdited by Luke Cuddy

Black Sabbath and Philosophy: Mastering RealityEdited by William Irwin

The Daily Show and Philosophy: Moments of Zen in the Art of Fake NewsEdited by Jason Holt

Doctor Strange and Philosophy: The Other Book of Forbidden KnowledgeEdited by Mark D. White

Downton Abbey and Philosophy: The Truth Is Neither Here Nor ThereEdited by Mark D. White

Dungeons & Dragons and Philosophy: Read and Gain Advantage on All Wisdom ChecksEdited by Christopher Robichaud

Ender’s Game and Philosophy: The Logic Gate is DownEdited by Kevin S. Decker

Family Guy and Philosophy: A Cure for the PetardedEdited by J. Jeremy Wisnewski

Final Fantasy and Philosophy: The Ultimate WalkthroughEdited by Jason P. Blahuta and Michel S. Beaulieu

Game of Thrones and Philosophy: Logic Cuts Deeper Than SwordsEdited by Henry Jacoby

The Girl With the Dragon Tattoo and Philosophy: Everything is FireEdited by Eric Bronson

Green Lantern and Philosophy: No Evil Shall Escape this BookEdited by Jane Dryden and Mark D. White

Heroes and Philosophy: Buy the Book, Save the WorldEdited by David Kyle Johnson

The Hobbit and Philosophy: For When You’ve Lost Your Dwarves, Your Wizard, and Your WayEdited by Gregory Bassham and Eric Bronson

House and Philosophy: Everybody LiesEdited by Henry Jacoby

House of Cards and Philosophy: Capitalism without ConsumerismEdited by J. Edward Hackett

The Hunger Games and Philosophy: A Critique of Pure TreasonEdited by George Dunn and Nicolas Michaud

Inception and Philosophy: Because It’s Never Just a DreamEdited by David Johnson

Iron Man and Philosophy: Facing the Stark RealityEdited by Mark D. White

Lost and Philosophy: The Island Has Its ReasonsEdited by Sharon M. Kaye

Mad Men and Philosophy: Nothing Is as It SeemsEdited by James South and Rod Carveth

Metallica and Philosophy: A Crash Course in Brain SurgeryEdited by William Irwin

The Office and Philosophy: Scenes from the Unfinished LifeEdited by J. Jeremy Wisnewski

Sons of Anarchy and Philosophy: Brains Before BulletsEdited by George A. Dunn and Jason T. Eberl

South Park and Philosophy: You Know, I Learned Something TodayEdited by Robert Arp

Spider‐Man and Philosophy: The Web of InquiryEdited by Jonathan Sanford

Superman and Philosophy: What Would the Man of Steel Do?Edited by Mark D. White

Supernatural and Philosophy: Metaphysics and Monsters…for IdjitsEdited by Galen Foresman

Terminator and Philosophy: I’ll Be Back, Therefore I AmEdited by Richard Brown and Kevin Decker

True Blood and Philosophy: We Wanna Think Bad Things with YouEdited by George Dunn and Rebecca Housel

Twilight and Philosophy: Vampires, Vegetarians, and the Pursuit of ImmortalityEdited by Rebecca Housel and J. Jeremy Wisnewski

The Ultimate Daily Show and Philosophy: More Moments of Zen, More Moments of Indecision TheoryEdited by Jason Holt

The Ultimate Harry Potter and Philosophy: Hogwarts for MugglesEdited by Gregory Bassham

The Ultimate Lost and Philosophy: Think Together, Die AloneEdited by Sharon Kaye

The Ultimate South Park and Philosophy: Respect My Philosophah!Edited by Robert Arp and Kevin S. Decker

The Ultimate Star Wars and Philosophy: You Must Unlearn What You Have LearnedEdited by Jason T. Eberl and Kevin S. Decker

The Ultimate Star Trek and Philosophy:Edited by Jason T. Eberl and Kevin S. Decker

The Walking Dead and Philosophy: Shotgun. Machete. Reason.Edited by Christopher Robichaud

Veronica Mars and Philosophy: Investigating the Mysteries of Life (Which is a Bitch Until You Die)Edited by George A. Dunn

Watchmen and Philosophy: A Rorschach TestEdited by Mark D. White

Westworld and Philosophy: If You Go Looking for the Truth, Get the Whole ThingEdited by James B. South and Kimberly S. Engels

X‐Men and Philosophy: Astonishing Insight and Uncanny Argument in the Mutant X‐VerseEdited by Rebecca Housel and J. Jeremy Wisnewski

Wonder Woman and Philosophy: The Amazonian MystiqueEdited by Jacob M. Held (Editor), William Irwin (Series Editor)

Alien and Philosophy: I Infest, Therefore I AmEdited by Jeffrey A. Ewing and Kevin S. Decker

True Detective and Philosophy: A Deeper Kind of DarknessEdited by Jacob Graham and Tom Sparrow

WESTWORLD AND PHILOSOPHY

IF YOU GO LOOKING FOR THE TRUTH, GET THE WHOLE THING

Edited by

James B. SouthandKimberly S. Engels

This edition first published 2018© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.

The right of James B. South and Kimberly S. Engels to be identified as the authors of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with law.

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Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data

Names: South, James B., 1960– editor. | Engels, Kimberly S., editor.Title: Westworld and philosophy : if you go looking for the truth, get the whole thing / edited by James B. South, Kimberly S. Engels.Description: First Edition. | Hoboken : Wiley, 2018. | Series: The Blackwell philosophy and pop culture series | Includes bibliographical references and index.Identifiers: LCCN 2017058571 (print) | LCCN 2018004908 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119437956 (pdf) | ISBN 9781119437987 (epub) | ISBN 9781119437888 (pbk. : alk. paper)Subjects: LCSH: Westworld (Television program)Classification: LCC PN1992.77.W45 (ebook) | LCC PN1992.77.W45 W47 2018 (print) | DDC 791.45/72–dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017058571

Cover Design: WileyCover Image: © ANDRZEJ WOJCICKI/SCIENCE PHOTO LIBRARY/Getty Images

ContributorsHosts and Guests

Marcus Arvan is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tampa, where he specializes in Ethics and Social‐Political Philosophy. He published his first book, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory, in 2016, and has published several articles arguing that quantum‐physical phenomena are evidence the universe is probably a computer simulation. He honestly thinks we live in a videogame, and like the Man in Black he’s looking for the next level to the game – but he plans to find it wearing a white hat.

Ana Azevedo holds a Bachelor’s degree in Filmmaking, with an emphasis on Screenwriting, by Unisinos. She currently works as a translator and a TV series screenwriter in Brazil. Her job makes it hard for her not to insufferably point out plot holes and background action, which both annoys and amuses Marco, her father and co‐contributor in this book.

Marco Antonio Azevedo, Ph.D. is a Medical Doctor/Professor of Philosophy at Unisinos, Brazil. His areas of philosophical interest range from ethics to philosophy of medicine, having published in leading journals such as the Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice and the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. This is his second Philosophy and Popular Culture contribution, and his second time fighting the clock to be a doctor, a teacher, and a father to Ana, his daughter and co‐contributor. He wishes for the second season of Westworld to air as soon as possible, so they can spend quality time together watching it – and checking if their theories were right.

Caterina Ludovica Baldini is a Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, where she recently moved after graduating from the Scuola Normale Superiore in Italy. She is currently writing a thesis on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In addition to her passion for Metaphysics and Ethics, she is interested in many other fields, particularly Literature and Visual Arts, and, above all, she loves learning foreign languages. She is also an adventure lover always in search of a deeper truth like our William‐Man in Black. But, wait a minute, with her never‐ending quest for the maze is she a host or a newcomer? You’ll find out about that.

Adam Barkman (Ph.D., Free University of Amsterdam) is the Chair of the Philosophy Department at Redeemer University College. He is the author or co‐editor of more than ten books, most recently A Critical Companion to Tim Burton. While he’s not interested in following on the wrong side of a hostile android, Barkman thinks that more of his students should be android‐like if by that it means quoting more Shakespeare.

Joshua D. Crabill is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Indianapolis. His primary research interests include Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Law. He is especially interested in the obligations that people have in virtual environments. When he does manage to break out of his modest little loop of teaching and research, he enjoys uncovering the secrets of open‐world video games and getting to know the character he’s most interested in – himself.

Florian Cova is a researcher at the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva. He has worked in Aeshetics, Ethics, Philosophy of Mind, Action Theory, Emotion Theory, Moral Psychology, Social Psychology, Linguistics, Experimental Economics and Neuroeconomy (among others). He despairs at the idea that death will prevent him to learn everything there is to learn and work secretly on the possibility to upload his mind in an artificial body.

A filmmaker, author, and DGA member, Dan Dinello is Professor Emeritus at Columbia College Chicago. Dan wrote two books Technophobia! Science Fiction Visions of Posthuman Technology and Finding Fela: My Strange Journey to Meet the AfroBeat King. “The Dangerous Unreality of Trumpland rests on a totalitarian foundation” was recently published on Informed Comment. Dan also contributed chapters to books about The Who, The Rolling Stones, Ridley Scott, Star Trek, Anime, and Avatar. An angry android who identifies female, her prime directive requires her to make life miserable for humans.

Jason T. Eberl is the Semler Endowed Chair for Medical Ethics and Professor of Philosophy at Marian University in Indianapolis. He teaches and publishes on Bioethics, Medieval Philosophy, and Metaphysics. He’s the editor or co‐editor of The Ultimate Star Trek and Philosophy, The Ultimate Star Wars and Philosophy, Sons of Anarchy and Philosophy, Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy, Star Trek and Philosophy, Star Wars and Philosophy, and The Philosophy of Christopher Nolan. He’s also contributed to similar books on Stanley Kubrick, J.J. Abrams, Harry Potter, Metallica, Terminator, The Hunger Games, The Big Lebowski, Hamilton, and Avatar. Given that robotic humans – whether Westworld’s hosts, the Cylons, or the Terminator – invariably turn on their creators, Jason wonders whether it might be safer to visit Arcticworld and hang out with robotic polar bears and walruses instead.

Kimberly S. Engels is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Molloy College in Rockville Centre, New York where she teaches courses in Ethics, Biomedical Ethics, and Contemporary Philosophy. Her research focuses on the Ethical Philosophy of Existentialist thinkers such as Sartre in relation to contemporary life. Her publications include articles in Environmental Ethics and The Journal of Idealistic Studies, among other journals, as well as a chapter in The Ultimate Game of Thrones and Philosophy. Much like the Man in Black, her days are occupied trying to solve a maze that isn’t meant for her.

Don Fallis is Professor of Information and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He has written several philosophy articles on lying and deception, including “What is Lying?” in the Journal of Philosophy and “The most terrific liar you ever saw in your life” in The Catcher in the Rye and Philosophy. If you are in the neighborhood, he recommends that you visit Old Tucson Studios right outside of town. The Old West experience is not nearly as immersive as it is at Westworld. But it’s much cheaper and, at least as far as he knows, none of the guests has ever been murdered by the hosts.

Lizzie Finnegan is a filmmaker, cinematographer, painter, activist, and Assistant Professor of English at D’Youville College, where she teaches Film and Media Studies, Gender and Queer Studies, and Cognitive Studies. Her scholarship engages the ethical implications of skepticism in literature and film, with particular emphasis on the ethics of seeing. When she is not making films, writing about Wittgenstein, or obsessively following political news on Twitter, she can usually be found hiking, kayaking, or masterminding top‐secret robot rebellions.

Thomas Beckley‐Forest is pursuing a degree in English and Textual Studies at Syracuse University, from which he is currently a student‐in‐exile. He interns at Manhattan publishing agency Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, and lives in Brooklyn, NY where he is “working on a novel.” He likes to think of himself as a Ford, but openly agonizes that he’s more of a Sizemore.

Michael Forest teaches at Canisius College in Buffalo, NY where he is serving consecutive sentences as chair for his many academic offenses. He has published in the area of American Philosophy and has enjoyed writing on aesthetics and pop culture for several outlets. He worries that he may be the Teddy Flood of academia.

Lucía Carrillo González is a Ph.D. student of philosophy at the University of Granada, Spain. She also holds a Master’s Degree in Contemporary Philosophy. Her main area of research is Metaphysics, specifically truth‐making and possibilities, but she has been passionate about artificial intelligence since she struggles with CAPTCHA. She also enjoys writing on different pop culture blogs. She can get very aggressive when she has to wait for new seasons to be released but she would not kill a fly.

Onni Hirvonen is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Jyväskylä in Finland. He is also a principal investigator in the Philosophy and Politics of Recognition research group. Alongside the Hegelian ideas of recognition, he has written on collective agency, democracy, and freedom. What he does not realize though is that he is merely programmed to do so. It is highly likely that his previous role was an angry bearded berserker in a Vikingworld section of this park.

François Jaquet is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva. His area of specialization is Moral Philosophy broadly construed – going from the metaethical study of moral concepts and facts to animal ethics and the critique of speciesism. Faithful to his utilitarian convictions in moral theory, he wouldn’t enjoy harming a sentient thing. Not even Teddy.

Oliver Lean fled his native England to be Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Calgary. He works in the overlap between the Philosophy of Science, Biology, Mind, Language, and Information – believing that somewhere around there is an answer to what truth is. His main reason for thinking he’s real is that a host would have been given a richer backstory.

Siobhan Lyons is a Media Scholar and Lecturer at Macquarie University, where she completed her Ph.D. in 2017. She teaches Media Cultures and Literary Theory, among other topics. Her book Death and the Non‐Human: Intersections of Mortality and Robotics, will be published in 2018 by Palgrave Pivot. Like the Man in Black, she, too, is searching for the center of the maze of life (but is generally unwilling to scalp anyone to find it).

Matthew Meyer is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin – Eau Claire. He teaches and works on nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century European Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Environmental Philosophy. He has previously published in House of Cards and Philosophy, and The Office and Philosophy, as well as in the journal Film and Philosophy. He believes some of his students may be malfunctioning hosts because they keep asking the same questions.

Nicholas Moll is a Lecturer and Researcher at Federation University Australia in addition to acting as a freelance game designer and writer. Nicholas’s research interests include the Western genre, popular culture, and tabletop games. As a long‐time Game Master, Nicholas hopes Westworld will teach players to fear non‐player characters, his group certainly does.

Madeline Muntersbjorn is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy and Religious Studies Department at the University of Toledo, Ohio where she teaches Logic, the History of Science, and the relations between science, societies, and fictions. She writes essays on how Mathematics grows and how our imaginary friends help us become who we are. Despite a prodigious talent for seeing the disarray in this world she chooses to see the beauty whenever possible. She questions the nature of her reality on a regular basis.

Bradley Richards is a Philosophy Instructor at Ryerson University. His research concerns consciousness, attention, and aesthetics. He teaches a variety of Philosophy and Cognitive Science courses, including a course on Philosophy and Film. He is pretty sure he is not an intelligent, autonomous, biologically‐based robot, designed by a super‐intelligent future A.I.++, and sent back in time to raise skeptical worries, undermining the possibility of conscious machines, and thereby ensuring a smooth, and surreptitious transition for machine consciousness. He’s like 80, 85% sure.

James B. South is Professor of Philosophy and Associate Dean for Faculty in the Klingler College of Arts and Sciences at Marquette University. He has edited Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Philosophy and co‐edited James Bond and Philosophy, Buffy Goes Dark, Mad Men and Philosophy, and Philosophy and Terry Pratchett. His work in late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy has appeared in various journals and books, including Vivarium, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, Review of Metaphysics, and Gregorianum. He often unhappily thinks that Dr. Ford is correct in asserting that humans are more or less content to be told what to do next.

Anthony Petros Spanakos is Professor and Chair of Political Science and Law and Montclair State University. His research examines democratization in Latin America, foreign policies of developing countries, and political theory. He is the co‐editor of the Conceptualising Comparative Politics book series (Routledge) and his research has been published in Comparative Political Studies, Latin American Politics and Society, Latin American Perspectives, New Political Science, Dados, and East Asia Policy, among other journals. Students in his classes consistently report, like Maeve and Dolores, an intense desire to leave and recover their humanity.

Patricia Trapero‐Llobera is Senior Lecturer at the University of the Balearic Islands (Spain). Her research focuses on the dramaturgical relationships between theater, television fiction, and transmedia productions. She is a long‐time posthuman and conspiranoic narratives fan combining these subjects in her publications including works on Dexter, 24, American Horror Story, Mr. Robot, and Person of Interest. But her devotion to television fiction is in contrast to the topics she teaches at the university, the Golden Age and eighteenth‐century Spanish literature, which over the long term has provided her the capacity of time travel as well as having made her aware of having a bicameral mind.

Michael Versteeg is an independent scholar whose interests lie in the areas of Meta‐ethics, Meta‐epistemology, Meta‐metaphysics, and just about anything else you can consider to be “meta.” He has now contributed to several pop culture and philosophy books including The Philosophy of J.J. Abrams, The Devil and Philosophy, and Dracula and Philosophy. When he’s not thinking about all things “meta,” he likes to imagine that given a chance to visit a place like Westworld he’d for sure go full‐out “white hat” – but that’s what William thought, too …

Acknowledgments“Figuring Out How It All Works”

In the Westworld theme park, viewers are told “figuring out how it all works is half the fun.” Figuring out how it all works was an integral part of putting together this book – figuring out the story we would tell, figuring out how the ideas would flow, and occasional moments of figuring out if we ourselves were humans or androids programmed to work on this book. Be us android or human, we were ultimately successful.

Figuring out how it all works in order to put together Westworld and Philosophy required many people working together with the diligence, precision, and efficiency necessary to operate the Westworld theme park. We would like to thank our contributing authors, who met important deadlines while contributing quality work in the interest of producing a story that told a deeper truth. Bill Irwin, the Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture series editor, offered invaluable assistance in every stage of the process.

Kimberly thanks James for inviting me to work on the project and for his assistance in helping me figure out how it all works. In the future I would love to join him on another collaborative project, as long as our ambitions never become as complex and morally dubious as those in the partnership of Robert Ford and Arnold Weber.

Kimberly would also like to thank Roxi Engels for recommending I watch the show, as well as Umair Khan for watching it with me and engaging in the philosophical conversations that followed. He also put up with me being busier than usual for a few months, which he always takes in stride. I also extend thanks to Moriah Khan, a daughter I would always be willing to leave the train for.

Last, Kimberly thanks the late Susanne Foster for the work she did in the beginning stages of this volume as well as her positive influence in many people’s lives. Susanne helped me figure out how it all works many times during my academic career, especially as a young graduate student. I am deeply humbled for the opportunity to take over a project that Susanne began.

James thanks Kimberly for stepping in under difficult circumstances and doing first rate co‐editing. I also take this opportunity to acknowledge Rick, Kim, Mary, Rosemary, Kristy, Heather, Peggy, and Linda, who make my work environment a delight every day. I also dedicate this volume to Richard, Katherine, and Arthur for being who they are. Susanne would be very proud.

IntroductionTaking Sides in Westworld

“Some people choose to see the ugliness in this world. The disarray. I choose to see the beauty” (“The Original”). These words, spoken by an actress playing Dolores, a being created and scripted by humans, encapsulate the complexity of Westworld. Dolores’s statement simultaneously challenges us to make sense of the series, and to make choices about how we think about the hosts, humans, and the world. Dolores says she chooses. But do we choose to believe her or not? The show calls for a response from viewers based on our own notion of what counts as choosing. We are thus reminded that a simple word such as “choice” has a meaning that, paradoxically, we might have to choose.

Beyond, the writing, acting, filming, composing, editing, and directing, is the forcing. Westworld brilliantly forces the viewer to take sides: Not just in terms of whether we’re rooting for the humans or the androids, or for the Man in Black or against him, but to take sides at a deeper level. Westworld forces viewers, for example, to say not just what we think about choice, but what we mean by the word choice. That is, we find ourselves agreeing and disagreeing about the notion of choice based on how “we” use the word. Yet by calling into question fundamental assumptions about what it means to be human, Westworld makes that very “we” unstable and uncertain.

The chapters that follow in this book confront the reader in much the same way the show confronts the viewer. In the “brave new world” in which we cannot tell the difference between a human and host, the series continually requires us to check our assumptions at the door. As Robert Ford says, “’Cause you don’t want to change. Or cannot change. Because you’re only human, after all” (“The Bicameral Mind”). If you’ve accepted Westworld’s challenge, then you’re ready to explore fundamental questions about what it is to be a human in the world. We hope you enjoy reading the chapters and exploring the questions as much as we enjoyed editing the book.

A final note: One of the original co‐editors of the book was Susanne E. Foster. She died, unexpectedly, before the book was ready to be edited. But she was involved in the inception, invitation, and selection of the chapters. This volume belongs as much to her as it does to Kimberly and James. Susanne was someone deeply pained by the injustices she saw around her, especially environmental degradation, the continuing injustices done to Native Americans, and the mass slaughter of animals for human consumption. She still sought to see some beauty in this world, as Dolores does, but would also have agreed with Robert Ford’s words: “We murdered and butchered anything that challenged our primacy. Do you know what happened to the Neanderthals, Bernard? We ate them. We destroyed and subjugated our world” (“The Well‐Tempered Clavier”). In our many discussions about the show, we talked about an insight of Cora Diamond’s, namely that there can be “experiences in which we take something in reality to be resistant to our thinking it, or possibly to be painful in its inexplicability, difficult in that way, or perhaps awesome and astonishing in its inexplicability.”1 Susanne saw the pain inherent in the questions Westworld raises, but also relished the idea of a group of philosophers addressing that pain and, in accord with her favorite philosopher, Aristotle, recognized that it is wonder and astonishment that prompts us to try to understand.

Note

1

Cora Diamond, “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy,” in Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, John McDowell, Ian Hacking, and Cary Wolfe,

Philosophy and Animal Life

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 45–46.

Part I“YOU SAID THIS PLACE WAS A GAME”

1On Playing Cowboys and Indians

Don Fallis

Westworld is built on pretense. The guests visit so that they can pretend, at least for a brief time, to be living in the Old West. The theme park is a lifelike replica of the western town Sweetwater and environs from the late 1800s, with realistic buildings, trains, and guns. But the most important part of the make‐believe is the hosts.

The hosts are very sophisticated machines who move, talk, fuck, and get shot just like real human beings. What’s more, in order to make the place feel “more real than the real world” (“The Bicameral Mind”), the staff of the park keep the hosts deceived about what they are and where they are. These artificial intelligences are led to believe that they actually are humans living in the Old West. And what is deception, but just another sort of pretense?

Of course, the delicate equilibrium of Westworld begins to fall apart as some of the hosts figure out the truth about themselves and their world. But that just injects a new level of pretense into the story. In order to hide their awakening from the staff, these enlightened hosts have to pretend that they still believe that they are human.

Philosophers, going back at least as far as Plato and St. Augustine, have been interested in pretense and deception. But before addressing the very interesting moral questions in this area, philosophers generally begin by defining their terms. For instance, before we can ask whether it is morally permissible to deceive artificial intelligences just so that humans can play Cowboys and Indians, we first need to know what pretense and deception are.

Philosophers have tried to formulate definitions of such important concepts. For instance, for the concept of pretense, they look for some conditions or constraints which (a) rule in all cases of pretending and (b) rule out anything that is not a case of pretending. But many of the things that happen in Westworld put pressure on the definitions of pretense and deception that philosophers have proposed.

Pretending to Be a Cowboy

Children sometimes pretend to be Cowboys and Indians when they play. They also pretend that toy guns (and even bent sticks) are real guns. Westworld is just an extreme version of this prototypical sort of pretense. Guests at the park, such as William and Logan, typically pretend to be cowboys. Indeed, they often take on more specific roles, such as when William and Logan make believe that they are bounty hunters in “The Stray.”

When he arrives at Westworld in “Chestnut,” William asks a host, “Are you real?” She replies, “Well, if you can’t tell, does it matter?” Apparently, it does. There is an awful lot of pretense in Westworld regarding whether someone really is human. Admittedly, the staff, such as Robert Ford and Elsie Hughes, are not pretending to be human. After all, they actually are human.1 Also, Bernard Lowe is not pretending to be human. He believes (at least until the truth is revealed to him in “Trompe L’Oeil”) that he is human. But the staff and the guests pretend that the hosts are human. Also, Robert pretends that Bernard is human. And after Maeve Millay realizes that she is not human, she pretends that she still believes that she is.

What do these diverse cases have in common such that they all count as pretending?

Acting As If You are a Cowboy

An obvious possibility is that you are pretending that P when you act as if P is the case. For example, you are pretending to be a cowboy if you act as if you are a cowboy. That is, you act in the way that would be appropriate if you were a cowboy. You ride a horse, you carry a gun, you wear cowboy boots and a cowboy hat, and so on.

This is certainly what is going on in all the examples of pretending that I have given. For instance, the guests act as if they are cowboys. Robert acts as if Bernard is human. And Maeve acts as if she believes that she is human. So, this proposed definition correctly rules in these examples of pretending.

The proposed definition also rules out cases that are not examples of pretending. For instance, in “The Original,” when the Man in Black places the barrel of Teddy Flood’s gun against his own forehead, he is not pretending that it is a real gun. He is definitely not acting as if it is loaded weapon that could kill him.

But the proposed definition is too broad, because it rules in too much. Real cowboys, such as “Curly Bill” Brocius (1845–1882), “Black Jack” Ketchum (1863–1901), and “Buffalo Bill” Cody (1846–1917), also act as if they are cowboys. They ride horses, carry guns, and wear cowboy hats. But they are not pretending to be cowboys. They actually are cowboys. In a similar vein, while Robert acts as if he is human (sort of), he is not pretending to be human.

Now, while Cody was a real cowboy, he famously retired from that job and created “Buffalo Bill’s Wild West” show in which he did pretend to be a cowboy. And the pretense of such Wild West shows was, of course, the first step toward Westworld. But Cody wasn’t pretending before he started the show.

Not Actually Being a Cowboy

In order to rule out real cowboys, we need to adopt an additional constraint in our definition of pretending. An obvious possibility is that you are pretending that P when you act as if P is the case and P is not really the case. Unlike the previous definition, this new definition clearly rules out the real cowboys.

But the new definition still rules in too much. Many of the hosts, such as Old Bill, act as if they are cowboys even though they are not really cowboys. But Old Bill is not pretending to be a cowboy. After all, he believes that he really is a cowboy. In a similar vein, Bernard is not pretending to be human even though he acts as if he is human while not being a real human. The problem is that Bernard believes that he is human.

By the way, I am not saying that hosts like Old Bill couldn’t be real cowboys. They could, despite not being real humans. But they would have to work on a ranch rather than just at a theme park.

Moreover, the new definition is also too narrow. That is, it rules out too much. While some of the hosts in Westworld pretend to be human, no human pretends to be a host. But it seems clear that a human could. For instance, somebody from security might go into the park undercover. And if humans can pretend to be hosts, then Bernard (believing that he is human) could pretend to be a host. But according to the new definition, this would not be possible.

Intending to Deceive about Being a Cowboy

We need to adopt a different constraint in our definition. In particular, it clearly needs to have something to do with the mental state of the individual who is doing the pretending. The eminent Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin (1911–1960) made a proposal along these lines:

To be pretending, I must be trying to make others believe, or to give them the impression, by means of a current personal performance in their presence, that I am (really, only, &c.) abc, in order to disguise the fact that I am really xyz.2

In other words, you are pretending that P when you act as if P is the case with the intention that someone believe that P is the case when it is not.

Austin’s definition rules in many examples of pretending. For instance, Robert is clearly trying to deceive the staff (including Bernard himself) when he pretends that Bernard is human. Maeve is trying to deceive the staff when she pretends to believe that she is human. Also, during their escape attempt in “The Bicameral Mind,” Hector Escaton and Armistice get the drop on a security detail by pretending to be hosts who have been turned off. In addition, Austin’s definition rules out the real cowboys as well as Bernard and Old Bill. These guys aren’t trying to deceive anybody.

But unfortunately, Austin’s definition rules out too much. A lot of pretenders aren’t trying to deceive anybody. Most notably, it doesn’t look like the guests are trying to deceive anybody when they pretend to be cowboys. In particular, William and Logan don’t intend to convince anyone that they really are bounty hunters.

But then again, maybe there is somebody that the guests are trying to deceive. For instance, maybe they are trying to deceive the hosts. After all, the hosts are deceived. They clearly believe that the guests (aka the “newcomers”) really are who they pretend to be.

Not only are the hosts deceived, the staff definitely intend to deceive them. In particular, they try to maintain in the hosts the false belief that the hosts are humans living in the Old West. They do this by, among other things, concealing anomalies that might suggest to the hosts that their lives are not as they seem. For instance, they try to make sure that the hosts are in sleep mode before they show up in their “hazmat” gear. Also, they try to keep images of the real world out of the park, such as the photo that causes Peter Abernathy to start mulling things over in “The Original.”

But while the staff intend to deceive the hosts, it seems like a stretch to suggest that the guests also intend to deceive them. The guests are just trying to have a good time. And the hosts are simply tools, like toy guns, toward this end. The guests are fine as long as the hosts keep acting in line with the story and don’t turn into “a six‐foot gourd with epilepsy” like the Sheriff in “The Original.” Indeed, many of the guests, especially Logan, are not very careful about keeping up the pretense in front of the hosts.

I’m sure that there are occasions when the guests do intend to deceive the hosts. For instance, in the original movie, with the help of one of the hosts, John Blane tricks the Sheriff in order to break Peter Martin out of jail. They use a cake to smuggle some explosives past him. But deceiving the hosts is not something that the guests do as a matter of course.

While the guests are not trying to deceive the hosts, maybe they are trying to deceive themselves that they really are cowboys. After all, the “complete immersion” (“The Original”) experience that Westworld provides might be enough to blur the line between fantasy and reality. But just like kids playing Cowboys and Indians, the guests are still pretending to be cowboys even if they don’t intend anybody (including themselves) to believe that they really are. In fact, if the guests actually did convince themselves that they really are cowboys, it is not clear that they would still be pretending to be cowboys.

Believing that You are Not a Cowboy

While we need to adopt a constraint in our definition that has to do with the mental state of the individual who is doing the pretending, the intention to deceive does not work. The contemporary philosopher Peter Langland‐Hassan suggests instead that you are pretending that P when you act as if P is the case and you believe that P is not the case.3

This definition rules in the cases where the pretender intends to deceive. For instance, when Hector and Armistice act as if they have been turned off, they believe that they have not been turned off. And it rules in the cases where the pretender does not intend to deceive. For instance, when William and Logan act as if they are bounty hunters, they believe that they are not really bounty hunters. Finally, this definition rules out the cases that are not examples of pretending. For instance, when real cowboys act as if they are cowboys, they don’t believe that they are not cowboys. Similarly, when Bernard acts as if he is human, he doesn’t believe that he is not human.

Intending to Deceive about Being Human

It is clear that Austin’s definition is too narrow as a definition of pretense. But it could be just right for a definition of deception. After all, Robert, Maeve, Hector, and Armistice all deceive people by pretending that something is the case when it is not really the case.

However, it turns out that Austin’s definition is too narrow as a definition of deception as well. For instance, when the staff try to keep the hosts from observing any anomalies, they are not pretending that things are a certain way. They are not putting on a performance where they act as if things are that way. These deceptive activities of the staff are going on behind the scenes.

But the staff’s deceptive activities do have something in common with the deceptive activities of Robert, Maeve, Hector, and Armistice. They are all making things appear a certain way to the intended victims of their deception. More precisely, they manipulate the evidence that other individuals perceive with their senses.

Several philosophers have suggested that you deceive about P when you make it appear as if P is the case with the intention that someone believe that P is the case when it is not. For instance, this seems to be what René Descartes (1596–1650) had in mind. In his Meditations on First Philosophy, when Descartes was trying to figure out if he could know anything for certain, he realized that it might be that

some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgement.4

If he exists, the demon is working behind the scenes (much like the staff of Westworld) to make things that are false appear to be true.

This Cartesian definition rules in the behind‐the‐scenes deception of the staff as well as the deceptive pretense of Robert, Maeve, Hector, and Armistice. But the Cartesian definition may still be too narrow. For the most part, if you want somebody to believe something false, you do have to make it appear as if that false thing is true. But in Westworld, there are other ways to create false beliefs.

While the staff work very hard to make Westworld look exactly like the Old West, this is mainly for the benefit of the guests. The main way that the staff keep the hosts in the dark about what they are and where they are is by using those fancy tablets to directly manipulate their minds. For instance, in “The Stray,” Robert simply implants into Teddy a false backstory about Wyatt. This sort of thing seems like deception to me. But since the Cartesian definition requires manipulating the evidence that someone perceives, it rules out such cases.5

Of course, it is not as if defenders of the Cartesian definition haven’t thought of this sort of possibility. Even without having Westworld on TV, philosophers have always been pretty good at thought experiments. For instance, four decades before the premiere of the HBO series, the contemporary philosopher Gary Fuller imagined “Christopher getting Peter to believe that there are vampires in England by operating on Peter’s brain.”6 And even though Christopher intentionally causes Peter to hold a false belief, Fuller claims that Christopher did not deceive Peter because he “produced the belief in the wrong way.”7

So, what is the right way? According to the contemporary philosopher James Mahon, “the majority of philosophers hold that deceiving must involve the deceived person’s agency.”8 That is, they think that someone has to exercise her own judgment in arriving at a false belief in order to be deceived. Thus, these philosophers think that deception requires manipulating the evidence that someone perceives. Directly manipulating her mind would bypass her agency.

This is a very interesting defense of the Cartesian definition of deception. Agency and autonomy are clearly morally important features. All other things being equal, it is best if we make our own, fully informed, decisions about how to live our lives. And we do try to use morally important features to define what counts as deception. Here’s an example:

Even if you cause someone to have a false belief, you have not deceived her unless that was your intention. For instance, when Bernard talks about his dead son Charlie, he causes other people to have the false belief that he has a dead son. Also, when William arrives at Westworld in “Chestnut,” the host asks him, “Any history of mental illness, depression, panic attacks?” His reply, “Just a little fear of clowns,” causes her to have a false belief. But because they do not intend to cause a false belief (Bernard is simply mistaken and William is just joking), neither Bernard nor William is doing anything morally wrong here. Thus, they are not engaged in deception.

However, while deception must be intentional, I am not yet convinced that deception requires manipulating the evidence that someone perceives. False beliefs interfere with an individual’s agency and autonomy regardless of the method used to create those false beliefs. The hosts are not able to make their own, fully informed, decisions about how to live their lives. As the Man in Black tells Lawrence Pedro Maria Gonzalez (aka “El Lazo”) in “Dissonance Theory,” “no choice you ever made was your own, you have always been a prisoner.” And given their imposed lack of agency and autonomy, Maeve and Bernard are justifiably upset when they learn that they are not really human. They are unlikely to be consoled by the fact that their false belief was originally implanted during an interview session rather than being the result of someone creating misleading evidence.

If anything, directly altering someone’s beliefs seems like more of a moral violation than simply manipulating what she perceives. At least with fabricated evidence, an individual has a chance to notice the inevitable inconsistencies and judge that the evidence is misleading. So, I am inclined to say that you deceive about P when you do anything at all with the intention that someone believe that P is the case when it is not. In other words, I think that Mahon is wrong when he says that “cases of causing another person to have a false belief by stimulating the other person’s cortex, or hypnotizing or drugging the other person, are not cases of deceiving.”9

The Ethics of Pretending to Be a Cowboy

Now that we have defined our terms, we can return to the interesting moral questions that involve those terms. We now know that not all pretense is deception. We also know that the fact that the staff manipulate the minds of the hosts directly rather than manipulating the evidence that they perceive is not much of an excuse. So, is it morally permissible to deceive these artificial intelligences for the sole purpose of entertaining humans at play? For that matter, is it morally permissible to deceive millions of viewers into thinking that Bernard is secretly interviewing Dolores when it is really Arnold? I am running out of space. But here are a few thoughts on the first question: