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- Herausgeber: Biteback Publishing
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
FOREWORD BY GENERAL SIR MIKE JACKSON After the pain of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is hard to imagine the UK being drawn into another war. Defence chiefs warn that there is a real prospect of future conflict, but they have struggled to persuade most politicians to take them seriously. Our leaders have concluded there are no votes in defence, and have progressively run down the armed forces. Today, the army is at its smallest since the Napoleonic Wars; the RAF is less than half its size twenty five years ago, and the Royal Navy will struggle to muster the ships and weapons required to protect our new aircraft carriers. Is there really a risk of war? Is our military less capable and, if so, what could that mean for our future? White Flag? explains what has happened to our armed forces in recent years and asks whether their decline endangers our safety and prosperity.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018
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CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost we would like to thank the very many members of the armed forces who generously gave their time and consideration to this project.
Our investigation draws from interviews with several hundred military personnel of all ranks. Some of our most valuable sources were serving officers and talked to us on condition of anonymity. They know who they are and how very much their contributions were appreciated. We are particularly grateful to General Sir Mike Jackson GCB CBE DSO DL, former Chief of the General Staff, for his incisive and generous foreword.
As White Flag? is about the state of the armed forces today, we were especially keen to talk to individuals with current or very recent experience of the military. For this reason we did not interview all the very distinguished retired generals, air marshals and admirals whose passionate views on our subject are a matter of public record. This does not mean that their opinions were ignored. On the contrary, they were respectfully studied.
A number of military figures went to particular trouble to support our research. They did this because they care about defence, have concerns about the state of the armed forces, and believed in what we were trying to achieve. They are Lt General Sir David Capewell KCB OBE (former Chief of Operations at Permanent Joint Headquarters); General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE (former Commander Joint Forces Command); and Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, GCB CBE DSO DL (former Chief of the Defence Staff). We are very grateful to them. Lt General Sir Graeme Lamb KBE CMG DSO (former Director of Special Forces); Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DL (former Chief of Defence Staff); General Sir Peter Wall GCB CBE DL (former Chief of the General Staff); Air Marshal Greg Bagwell CB CBE and Lt General Sir Simon Mayall KBE CB were also most supportive.
Rear Admiral Chris Parry CBE is a great communicator about the importance of sea power in the twenty-first century and was incredibly helpful with the naval sections of the book. Thanks are also due to Rear Admiral Roger Lane-Nott CB for his contribution to our section on submariners, and to Admiral Sir George Zambellas GCB DSC ADC DL. We would also like to mention James Glancy CGC, a Royal Marine, and Captain Anton Lin.
We were keen to explore how our armed forces are perceived by our allies and travelled widely for the project, attending defence conferences in Bahrain, Singapore and Germany and interviewing military figures in Brussels and Washington. We also went to Estonia and Lithuania. General David Petraeus AO, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and former Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, was among a number of distinguished Americans who kindly agreed to talk to us and we were very grateful for his time. Particular thanks are due to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, which facilitated our research trip to the Donbas. They offered interviews with serving military personnel at the highest level and arranged our trip to the frontline. Kevin Culwick, director of Lord Ashcroft Polls, arranged surveys in ten countries with characteristic efficiency and flair.
White Flag? is as much about the politics of defence as the military itself and we were extremely grateful to secure interviews with many former Defence Secretaries. The Rt Hon. the Lord Robertson of Port Ellen KT GCMG PC; Rt Hon. the Lord Hutton of Furness PC and the Rt Hon. the Lord Browne of Ladyton PC were all willing to go on record with their experiences and were very generous with time and insights. Several other Defence Secretaries spoke to us on background terms. Liberal Democrats Sir Nicholas Harvey, who was Minister of State for the Armed Forces between 2010 and 2012, a key period for this book; and the Rt Hon. Sir Vince Cable MP, who as Business Secretary during the coalition years was responsible for arms exports, also both kindly agreed to be interviewed. We talked to several former Ministry of Defence special advisers, among whom we would especially like to thank Michael Dugher, who worked for Labour Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon as well as in Downing Street during Gordon Brown’s administration; and Rob Golledge.
Special thanks are due to a number of MPs who know a great deal about the armed forces and work tirelessly to promote the interests of our servicemen and women in the Houses of Parliament. Given the political focus of this book, their perspective was particularly important. Captain Johnny Mercer MP, who has led a determined and selfless campaign to end the pursuit of veterans over historic allegations of abuse, gave valuable advice throughout the project. His own book, WeWere Warriors, about his tours of duty in Afghanistan, was a source of inspiration. The Rt Hon. Ben Wallace MP, James Cleverly MP TD VR, Kwasi Kwarteng MP and the Rt Hon. Tobias Ellwood MP were also very supportive. Lt Col Tom Tugendhat MP VR is an expert on war and the law and his exceptional work in this field was an important source for our chapter on ‘lawfare’.
The Rt Hon. Gavin Williamson CBE MP, Defence Secretary at the time of writing, is keen to make the Ministry of Defence less riskaverse, and led by example by co-operating with this project. He did so unconditionally because he is keen to promote a greater understanding of the importance of defence to the UK and the value of our armed forces. His support for what we are attempting to achieve in this book made a very significant difference to the project and brought our understanding of the politics of defence right up to date.
A number of former Ministry of Defence officials talked to us off-record, and their contributions greatly enhanced our understanding of the inner workings of the department, particularly in relation to the complex procurement process. Though we are critical of some aspects of the department’s record, we are clear that where there are shortcomings, they are generally institutional failures, not failures by individuals.
Defence academics were pivotal to our research. We spent a great deal of time listening to these specialists and attending conferences, lectures and seminars organised by defence and foreign affairs think tanks, especially the Royal United Services Institute. These academics sought nothing in return for assisting us. We would like to thank all of those who gave their time, including Professor Gwythian Prins; Dr Mark Galeotti; Dr Rob Johnson; the naval historian Eric Grove; Dr Patrick Bury; Dr Lee Rotherham; Dr Richard North; and everyone at Veterans for Britain. The ethnographer Dr Mark De Rond was another inspiration. We drew heavily from his powerful account of life and death in a field hospital in Afghanistan for our section on the ethics of modern warfare.
Among other valued contributors to the project were veteran defence correspondent Tim Ripley; Luke Skipper, former Chief of Staff to the Scottish National Party’s Westminster Group; and Major General Mick Laurie CBE. We would also like to thank Peter Oborne.
We have tried extremely hard to avoid inaccuracies, but in a work of this length and detail, on a subject of such complexity, some mistakes are inevitable. Josh Dolder and Tony Diver worked very long hours towards the end of the project assisting with fact checking and referencing. Both were highly professional and committed, and helped us meet our publishing deadline. Any mistakes that have nonetheless slipped through the net are honest ones.
Finally, we are grateful to Angela Entwistle, corporate communications director to Lord Ashcroft, and her wonderful team; and to everybody at Biteback Publishing, for making this project possible.
FOREWORD BY GENERAL SIR MIKE JACKSON GCB CBE DSO DL
The Defence of the Realm does not preoccupy many voters, but nonetheless it affects us all. We are privileged that, unlike many in the world, our collective survival is not an issue that presents itself often in day-to-day life. The task of managing defence is trustingly delegated to those whom we elect to govern. We expect the state to fulfil the most basic function of government: the provision of armed forces trained, equipped and ready to protect us against those who seek to do us harm. The sharp end of this requirement is the provision of military forces with the capacity to close and destroy the Queen’s enemies.
Far away from the bayonets and boot polish, it is ideological disagreements and budgetary constraints that consume the lives of those who work in the upper echelons of Parliament and the Ministry of Defence. Of course, it is right that decisions over how our country is to be defended are taken democratically, with advice from experts and intelligence from government agencies informing those who represent civilians at risk from foreign threats. But there are two grave errors that result from the political wrangling and horse-trading associated with the debate over defence in the UK, and they bear heavily on this country’s safety.
First, the focus on funding the armed forces too often takes place at the beginning of the debate about defence rather than at the end. When Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson was appointed in November 2017, he was immediately asked to make a judgement on what capabilities to cut to ease the financial crisis engulfing the Ministry of Defence. In Whitehall, the priority seems to be improving the appearance of the departmental spending spreadsheet. At Westminster, there was much speculation over whether the new man could wrest more money from the Treasury than his predecessor. It is a metric by which many seem to assess the success of politicians who do his job. As this book is published, in autumn 2018, a major review of UK defence has been delayed indefinitely due to irreconcilable differences over finance.
This current obsession with the defence budget is a mistake. Rather than reflecting what is thought to be affordable, our armed forces should reflect the position we wish our country to hold in the world, and the threats to which we believe they may have to respond. Only then, when we have identified what we expect of our services, can we begin to assess what the necessary capabilities are going to cost. When governments alight on a relatively arbitrary figure (shaped by what is left in the public coffers after more popular causes like health and education have been given their lot) and ask defence chiefs to make the best of it, they are in danger of putting our security at risk.
Second, if we are to create a strategy that addresses threat, not thrift, then we must be realistic about how long it takes to construct a fighting force with the necessary software and hardware. We may look across Eastern Europe and into Asia, where future security challenges may lie, and conclude that nothing bad is going to happen any time soon; and if it does, it will be thousands of miles away. However, the wars of tomorrow will be fought with capability acquired today. What may be true now will not necessarily be true in ten or twenty years’ time. It is impossible to know for sure what potential adversaries may be willing and able to do in the decades ahead. This is difficult for politicians, who instinctively operate on the five-year electoral timescale. They must, where they can, look beyond current challenges to future threat. It is often said that defence capability is an insurance policy against existential danger. The increasingly volatile world in which we find ourselves requires that we do not economise unduly on its protection.
In recent wars, the armed forces have employed superior technology in unfamiliar territory to destroy disparate enemies, some operating covertly. They have also been deployed on humanitarian missions and to combat pirates off the Horn of Africa. These are important and honourable roles that we should maintain the capability to perform. But politicians should not be so quick to dismiss the possibility of states, not terrorists, doing us real harm, especially where they have been blatant about their intentions. Asked what was the worst event of the twentieth century, Russian President Vladimir Putin once replied that it was the fall of the Soviet Union. Neither the Holocaust nor either of the two World Wars, in his mind, match the humiliation of the lowering of the hammer and sickle over Moscow in the early 1990s. That feeling of nostalgia for Russian imperium has powerful consequences for global security in the twenty-first century – as does the Chinese exceptionalism that is already finding expression in the aggressive militarisation of the South China Seas.
As the government considers its next move in terms of its defence strategy for the foreseeable future, Michael Ashcroft and Isabel Oakeshott’s new book White Flag? is both highly topical and extremely relevant. Indeed, rarely could a book of this nature be better timed. White Flag? will be read and enjoyed by politicians and defence experts, but its key strength is that it is a book for everyone who cares about our country’s security and their own family’s safety. This is a salient, even an indispensable, work for the general reader, not just the military geek.
White Flag? takes a balanced, measured and analytical look at the UK’s past, current and future defence capabilities. It is well written and well argued – it does not try to point the finger of blame at individuals or even a single political party for past failings, but it does provide a considered assessment of what the UK needs to do in future if it is to remain a respected and formidable power on the global stage.
White Flag? is thought-provoking and challenging too: when a reader puts this book down for the last time, I feel certain that he or she will be left with real concerns that the UK may not be sufficiently equipped at present to deal with the uncertain dangers that lie ahead.
I commend the two authors for producing a diligently researched, timely and important work that everyone who worries about our future security and safety should find the time to read.
AUTHORS’ ROYALTIES
Lord Ashcroft is donating all authors’ royalties from White Flag? to military charities.
LORD ASHCROFT AND THE ARMED FORCES
Lord Ashcroft has a long-standing interest in defence and supports many charities relating to the armed forces.
Between 2012 and 2018, he was the UK government’s special representative for veterans’ transition. In this capacity, he worked with all departments to ensure military personnel receive the help they need when making the move to civilian life. In May 2011, he was appointed lead adviser to a government review of military bases on Cyprus.
A former treasurer and deputy chairman of the Conservative Party, Lord Ashcroft has written six books on gallantry. He is a trustee of Imperial War Museums, which display his collection of Victoria Crosses (VCs) and George Crosses (GCs) in the Lord Ashcroft Gallery along with other VCs and GCs in the museums’ care. Over the past three decades, he has acquired more than 200 of these awards, the largest collection of such decorations in the world.
LordAshcroft.com | LordAshcroftPolls.com | LordAshcroftMedals.com @LordAshcroft
SAXA VORD
A WARNING
Far away, where seagulls wheel and cry in graphite skies and the wind has been known to reach 197 miles per hour, lies the last outpost of the UK’s air defence system.
The radar station of Saxa Vord clings to a barren hillock on Unst, the remotest tip of the Shetland Isles, battered by salt sea and winters that envelop it in darkness for up to eighteen hours a day. It is further north than St Petersburg.
Once upon a time, this desolate place was on a list of Russian nuclear targets. At the height of the Cold War, 300 military men were based there keeping watch for the Soviets. Sometimes Royal Air Force fighter jets would be scrambled to intercept Russian aircraft and escort them out of UK airspace. The radar system meant the stretch of sea between Greenland, Iceland and the UK known as the GIUK gap was under constant Ministry of Defence surveillance. Whoever controls this passageway controls Russia’s access to the world’s seas.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat to national security dissipated and the radar station was closed. When the last uniformed personnel left in 2005, the Ministry of Defence made a bit of money by selling off part of the site. The old buildings were converted into a hotel and bar for the remaining inhabitants of Unst and for tourists in search of shelter and refreshment after the odyssey from mainland Scotland.
Between 2006 and 2018, there was no routine surveillance of this area. Whether the Kremlin discovered that hundreds of miles of airspace were rendered invisible to the UK’s armed forces after Saxa Vord closed, the Ministry of Defence cannot disclose. Under the Official Secrets Act, Saxa Vord is defined as a ‘prohibited place’: such information is secret. A forbidding sign at the perimeter of the old radar station warns the curious to keep out – or risk arrest.
What is public knowledge is that the Royal Air Force now spends a lot of time and energy launching fighter jets to warn off approaching Russian military aircraft. For the past five years, it has happened approximately once every month.
In February 2018, Saxa Vord was officially re-opened.1
Some £10 million is being invested in new radar detection systems on Unst.
The Ministry of Defence has bestowed Saxa Vord with a motto: Praemoneo de Periculis. It means: ‘I Give Advance Warning of Danger’.
NOTES
1https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/02/05/raf_saxa_vord_radar_station_reopened/
INTRODUCTION
GREAT BRITAIN
Every Monday, British military chiefs file into a room on the fifth floor of the Ministry of Defence to discuss anything going on in the world that might affect the armed forces.
The meeting takes place in the sober surroundings of the Mountbatten Suite, the venue for the most sensitive official briefings in the department. The boardroom is dominated by a long, coffin-shaped table and a large map of the world.
Above the door, a set of digital clocks displays the time in London, Washington, Brussels, Moscow and Bahrain. At the far end of the room, a huge video screen patches in overseas commands, British representatives in NATO and Washington, and even US satellite imagery.
During the first part of the meeting, which is not attended by politicians, civil servants and military attendees like to play a game. After full and frank discussions among themselves about what is really going on, they discuss how little they can get away with telling the Secretary of State and his team.
One afternoon in 2017, after the politicians had settled themselves into the beige, faux-leather seats for the second part of the proceedings, the discussion took an unusual turn. At issue was whether British Commandos might be able to perform a daring operation to seize a port in Yemen, potentially allowing vital food and medical supplies to get through to starving civilians.
Around the table was the Director of Special Forces, heads of the army, navy and RAF, and various senior mandarins. They had been through the usual briefings on the position of Russian submarines in British waters and the latest provocations from President Putin’s bombers over the North Sea. Now they were on to the next item on the agenda: the long-running civil war in Yemen. There were reports that the former president had been murdered by Iranian militias angered by his close relationship with the Saudis. It looked like a humanitarian catastrophe that had already left 7 million civilians starving and 18 million in need of urgent aid was about to get much worse.1 With the United Kingdom heading the UN Security Council group on Yemen, there was an onus on the British government to provide some leadership.
Pivotal to the success of any aid operation was access to the port of Al Hudaydah, a vital aid delivery point on the Red Sea, where the vast majority of Yemen’s food imports arrive. The United Nations had been trying in vain to broker a deal between Iranian-backed Houthi groups controlling the port and the Saudi-led Arab coalition determined to crush them and establish dominance of the country at whatever cost. The challenge was to turn the port over to neutral parties.2
‘How about this for an idea? We send in the Marines,’ suggested junior defence minister Tobias Ellwood.
The exchange that followed between politicians, uniforms and officials in the Ministry of Defence illustrates how attitudes have changed towards Britain’s role on the world stage. Ellwood, a former captain in the Royal Green Jackets who served in Kuwait, set out his vision for a carefully brokered intervention. Having worked on Yemen when he was a minister at the Foreign Office, he felt he understood the complexities.
‘We have got to get everybody back to the negotiating table. There’s a million people in Hudaydah. There’s cholera; hunger; thousands of people are dying; and it’s only going to get worse. The Saudi coalition is getting frustrated. There’s a danger they will just charge in and try to take the port, and that will be a disaster,’ he urged.
He reminded the room of the huge loss of life when the rest of the world turned a blind eye during a battle for the smaller Yemeni port of Mocha.
‘This is much bigger than Mocha. It will be a bloodbath,’ he warned.
Ellwood outlined the diplomatic and practical steps required before the UK could dispatch the Royal Marines. To his mind, the advantages of such an operation were obvious. Most importantly, securing the port could save many lives. Secondly, it would reassert the UK’s status as an active player in international crises, reminding Gulf Nations and others that despite our refusal to enter the civil war in Syria, we are not ready to resign ourselves to the role of bystander in conflicts whose reverberations affect the wider world. Finally, as Treasury and Ministry of Defence budget-cutters question the relevance of amphibious capability in the twenty-first century, it could help secure the future of the Royal Marines.
For a painful ten seconds after Ellwood presented his case, nobody uttered a word. But their expressions said it all: the minister must be off his rocker. It wasn’t just that Britain had no immediate skin in the game and that nobody was asking our armed forces to step forward. It was also the risk to the Marines. If this entirely discretionary rescue mission more than 4,000 miles away went wrong, by the minister’s own reckoning, ten to fifteen British personnel could be killed. To the assembled group, this was unconscionable.
Eventually Ellwood broke the silence.
‘Well, clearly nobody is taking me seriously. Let’s move on to something else,’ he said briskly, and that was the end of that. Perhaps that’s a good thing. Even if the Marines had succeeded in seizing the port, how long could they have held it if things didn’t go to plan?
What if the mission escalated, and more troops were required? What would taxpayers make of yet another disastrous foreign military adventure turning sour?
How different that discussion might have been under Tony Blair, however. When Labour swept to power in 1997, the new Prime Minister was quick to make clear where he saw Britain’s place in the world. A year after taking office, he unveiled a defence review full of language and jargon from what now seems like a bygone age. It was the era of ‘Cool Britannia’, and his government was ready to get stuck into other people’s wars. With the bombast of an administration that had won the election by a landslide, Labour’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998 declared:
The British are, by instinct, an internationalist people. We believe that as well as defending our rights, we should discharge our responsibilities in the world. We do not want to stand idly by and watch humanitarian disasters or the aggression of dictators go unchecked. We want to give a lead, we want to be a force for good.3
This gung-ho Strategic Defence Review received almost universal praise at the time. A UN intervention in Bosnia under the previous government, later passed to NATO, had been popular across the political spectrum in the UK. The failure of major powers and international organisations to intervene to prevent Rwanda’s genocide in 1994 had added to the feeling that Britain, along with other Western powers, had a duty to help bring repressive foreign dictators to book; free the oppressed; and rescue those at risk from natural disasters or humanitarian crises. The road to Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq was set.
Fast-forward twenty years, and we are in a very different place. The experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan have had a profound effect on public appetite for wars of choice.
We could not achieve decisive or lasting victories in either country, and the campaigns came at huge cost. Hundreds of brave men and women who set off to far-flung places on missions to make the world a better place returned from the deserts and mountains in Union Jack-draped coffins. Billions of pounds that could have been spent on hospitals, schools and roads were squandered. To critics of these operations, the sacrifices made without bringing peace and stability (never mind democracy) to those countries discredit the concept of using the British military as a force for good. Meanwhile, the furore over Blair’s infamous ‘Dodgy Dossier’ about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has left many voters deeply mistrustful of the motives of political leaders who choose to send our troops into conflict zones.4
The UK’s ill-fated intervention in Libya in 2011, which rid the country of Muammar Gaddafi but ended up fuelling conflict across the region and strengthening ISIS and al-Qaeda, cemented a widespread view that we are better off keeping out.5
The grim determination among MPs of all political persuasions to avoid repeating such mistakes was exposed in the summer of 2013, when they refused to sanction UK involvement in US-led strikes on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The majority of MPs did not want Britain to get involved, even when a tyrant crossed ‘red lines’ by using chemical weapons against his own people.6 When it happened again in April 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May decided not to risk asking MPs for permission to join US strikes, and wisely so. It is entirely possible that she would have been defeated.7
When they oppose discretionary military action, MPs are largely reflecting the views of their constituents. In polling for this book, just 62 per cent of those questioned in June 2018* said they would support the deployment of UK forces to defend an ally that had been invaded by another country – the mutual defence that underpins the UK’s relationship with other members of NATO. Only half would support ‘pre-emptive action against foreign states believed to pose a threat to the UK’. The prospect of state-on-state warfare does not prey on the public mind.
All this has created the environment in which defence cuts are a political soft touch. Voters may not like reductions to the armed forces, but they do not take to the streets to protest. In so far as they give it any thought, many people imagine that drones and robots will soon be able to do the work of soldiers, sailors and airmen in any case. There is a sense that we can get by without much of an army or navy, because nobody is going to invade the UK, and wars of the future will probably be in cyberspace or outer space. It is widely taken for granted that any future military action will be with allies, who can fill our capability gaps. Preoccupied with getting through the day, successive Prime Ministers and their Chancellors have not lost sleep about cutting defence, reassuring themselves that any backlash will largely be confined to those they dismiss as ‘the usual suspects’: retired generals who suddenly find a voice after leaving office, and old boys harking back to the glory days of the Falklands in letters to the Daily Telegraph.
The downward trend in defence spending in the UK dates back to the so-called peace dividend following the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin Wall was accompanied by a sense of triumphalism in the West and a feeling among intellectuals and policy-makers that the long struggle with the Soviet Union had come to a conclusion. With Communism in retreat, Francis Fukuyama, a young American intellectual, famously wrote that the world might be witnessing ‘not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’.8 His intervention reflected widespread optimism among Western policy-makers that the last redoubts of dictatorship would eventually succumb to the march of capitalism, and state-on-state warfare driven by diverging political ideologies would become a thing of the past.
The new world order had a dramatic impact on the balance between ‘guns and butter’, setting the scene for decades of defence cuts. In 2010, the coalition government went further than any previous administration dared. Declaring there was no ‘conventional military threat’ to the ‘territorial integrity of the United Kingdom’, they proposed such brutal reductions to the armed forces that parts of the service felt they were in danger of going extinct.9
Those who are content with the status quo have a peacetime mentality, shaped by decades of life in a stable, secure, rules-based environment. They see no reason to think any differently. But can policy-makers be so confident that tomorrow will be like yesterday?
In recent months, military leaders, politicians and academics have begun voicing increasing concerns about the nature and scale of new threats and our ability to counter them. As we shall see, in Ukraine, Russia disdains the rules-based international order that acts as a restraining influence on the ambitions of unscrupulous political leaders and has underpinned global security for decades. A resurgent China is busy militarising the South China Seas, aggressively asserting its sovereignty over disputed territory and transforming rocks into military outposts that could be used to disrupt global free trade. Meanwhile, in North Korea, a dictator in a country where most people earn just a few dollars a month and have no access to gas or electricity threatens to hold the world to ransom with a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. All this at a time when ISIS may be weakened but has not yet packed away the black flag, and any oddball or extremist with exceptional computer skills can hack into sensitive IT systems and disrupt or cut off vital services. There is no evidence that any of these dangers are receding.
Against this backdrop, there is deepening disquiet at every level within the armed forces, and within wider defence circles, at what looks like a terrible mismatch between defence resourcing and a growing likelihood that we may soon be at war again. As the defence cliché goes: ‘We may not be interested in the enemy; but they sure as hell are interested in us.’ Moreover, as Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir Nick Carter has warned: ‘The threats we face are not thousands of miles away but now on Britain’s doorstep.’ Carter went on to declare: ‘The time to address those threats is now – we cannot sit back.’
The chorus of distinguished voices highlighting the perils of complacency is becoming difficult to ignore.1011
Our polling suggests that a great majority of people in Britain think the country now faces bigger dangers than it did during the final years of the Cold War. Three quarters of British adults said they thought the overall threat to the UK’s national security is higher today than it was thirty years ago – and more than four in ten thought it much higher. Perhaps surprisingly, those with the longest memories were the most likely to think the peril had increased: among those aged sixty-five or over, 85 per cent thought the current threat was greater, compared to just under two thirds of those aged eighteen to twenty-four.
Under Defence Secretaries Philip Hammond and Sir Michael Fallon, the Ministry of Defence adopted a brilliant catchword as a cover for diminishing strength. Ministers and officials would insist the debate was not about numbers, but capability.
On the face of it, it was a fantastic way to neutralise arguments about vanishing regiments and mothballed ships. The same rhetoric has been used to justify cuts to other public services during the austerity years.
Sometimes it is indeed possible to do more with less. There are compelling examples of super-efficient NHS Trusts treating more patients and police forces catching more criminals despite slimmed-down budgets. More often, having less results in doing less, as doctors and detectives know.
After years of dissembling, government ministers are beginning to admit that defence cuts have gone too far. This is not the fault of any one political party. As we shall see, the state of our armed forces today is the product of multi-billion-pound procurement decisions whose origins stretch back decades. It is a consequence of both Labour and Conservative policies, devised by politicians grappling with limited public funds and no crystal ball. No party occupies the moral high ground.
Politicians aren’t the only ones responsible for confusing voters in this debate. There are many vested interests. Heads of the army, navy and RAF compete for resources, and have to justify their budgets while rivals question their value. The defence industry, which has a turnover of £23 billion and contributes £8.7 billion in Gross Value Added to the UK economy, needs to peddle new kit.12 Some retired air marshals, admirals and generals need to maintain a public profile to keep them in work. This doesn’t make their views any less valid, but they are not necessarily objective.
Think tanks produce brilliant reports about the state of defence, but the sheer volume of jargon, acronyms and assumed knowledge often renders the subject impenetrable to those with no background in defence. The manner in which the issues are discussed and reported elsewhere (typically by specialists for specialists) can be off-putting.
This book does not attempt to compete with the experts, but to complement their work. It is designed for a general audience. It is for people who sense that the UK may not be fully prepared for a conflict we cannot avoid, and would like a better understanding of what’s going on, particularly at the top. It is as much about the politics of defence as the military itself.
In our polling for this book, we presented people with a list of potential hazards and asked them to give each one a score out of 100, according to the danger they thought it currently posed. Top of the list across the board was ‘terror attacks in the UK carried out by terrorist groups’ (p. 393). Detecting and preventing possible extremist threats, mainly from radical Islam but also from cyber terrorism, organised criminals and the far right, is chiefly the job of the UK’s intelligence services, not the armed forces, so will not be given detailed treatment in this book.
We have not attempted to re-write the Chilcot Report on the UK’s role in the Iraq War, or trawl over the mistakes of Afghanistan and the notorious era of ‘bad kit’. We do not start from the premise that efficiency savings are bad per se, or that Britain necessarily needs a huge field army or a certain number of ships and planes.
We have simply asked questions about whether we still need a well-resourced military; what range of capabilities they require; and what shape they’re really in. We have explored whether the armed forces are equipped to deal with the threats we might face later today or tomorrow; the extent to which we can rely on allies to fill gaps in our capabilities; and how well the Ministry of Defence works.
These are huge subjects, and each of the chapters that follows is worth a book in itself. Indeed, hundreds of highly specialised tomes and journals have been written by distinguished individuals about specific strands of the subject. This book tries to bring it all together, to give the lay reader an overview.
There are many good reasons why nobody has attempted anything similar to date, not least that the subject is so vast that covering it in the depth that would satisfy defence experts would take years – and necessitate a work longer than the Bible. By the time it was complete, it would be hopelessly out of date. So we have had to be pragmatic. We acknowledge that the intelligence agencies play a huge role in defence and recognise that soft power and international aid are vital parts of the picture. However, the work of spies, diplomats, charities and NGOs is beyond the scope of this project. Our focus is the British military, as it is today.
We do not intend to paint a picture that is all doom and gloom. The UK still has the sixth largest military budget in the world.13 It is one of only a handful of countries with fully functional expeditionary capabilities that allow us to launch some operations on our own on faraway shores.14
As we shall see, there are certain things our armed forces do that nobody else does better. Our Special Forces, our anti-submarine warfare capabilities and our ability to fight on all terrains in extreme weather are the envy of armed forces across the globe.15 When we started this project, in late 2016, there was less cause for optimism. In political circles, few were talking about the importance of defence. The Ministry of Defence was institutionally secretive and deeply risk-averse.
Two years on, there are signs that political and public opinion is starting to change – and so is the Ministry of Defence. Under an energetic and committed new Secretary of State, Gavin Williamson, the department is cautiously opening up – and defence has shot up the political agenda.
As we prepare to leave the European Union, this country is at a crossroads. We must forge a new identity on the world stage. The shape and size of our armed forces, and our expectations of them, will be pivotal to our new international status. Our hope is that this book contributes to the debate about what happens next.
NOTES
1https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34011187
2https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20161022-yemens-al-hudaydah-a-childs-worst-nightmare/
3http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP98-91/RP98-91.pdf
4http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/british-public-opinion-after-a-decade-of-war-attitudes-to-iraq-and-afghanistan/
5https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/16/libya-gaddafi-arab-spring-civil-war-islamic-state
6https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23892783
7https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/theresa-may-trump-syria-strikes-parliament-vote-britain-russia-chemical-weapons-latest-a8303146.html
8https://www.embl.de/aboutus/science_society/discussion/discussion_2006/ref1-22june06.pdf
9 National Security Strategy 2010, p. 30; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/national-security-strategy
10http://www.dw.com/en/uk-army-chief-nick-carter-calls-for-cash-to-counter-russia-threats/a-42253039
11https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-china-russia/u-s-military-puts-great-power-competition-at-heart-of-strategy-mattis-idUSKBN1F81TR
12https://www.adsgroup.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2017/09/DefenceOutlook2017-WebRes.pdf
13 IISS, Military Balance 2018, pp 502–8
14http://www.janes.com/images/assets/097/71097/Evolving_expeditionary_capabilities.pdf
15 Interviews with US and Allied serving officials
* Note: 2,021 adults were interviewed online between 8 and 11 June 2018. Results were weighted to be representative of all adults in Great Britain. Full results are in the Appendix to this book, with detailed data at LordAshcroftPolls.com.
PART ONE
THE THREAT
‘SI VIS PACEM – PARA BELLUM’ If you want peace, be ready for war
VLAD’S BOYS
A NOTE ON THE SOFT UNDERBELLY OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
One November evening, a stocky businessman from Bristol strolled up to the gates of a London embassy, announced his arrival through the intercom, and slipped into the heavily guarded confines of the building.
What happened next perfectly illustrates the dilemma facing the British armed forces today: do they tool up with conventional military hardware for the mother of all battles with a powerful nation state, or switch their focus to cyber and robotics, quietly accepting subordination to the intelligence services?
It was 16 November 2015, and Arron Banks was on a high. He had recently started bankrolling a Brexit campaign and was putting the finishing touches to plans for the official launch. It would take place later that week in a grand auditorium a few streets from the Palace of Westminster, with a respected American pollster called Gerry Gunster and a representative from the data mining firm Cambridge Analytica lined up to deliver speeches. His new movement was beginning to attract serious political attention.
As he made his way along Kensington Palace Gardens, Banks must have been reflecting on the challenges that lay ahead. His determination to take on the establishment over the relationship between Britain and Brussels was going to thrust him into the media spotlight, a position in which he was not always comfortable. It was also going to require serious capital. Luckily, new business opportunities were always coming his way – which was why he was off to the Russian Embassy again.
Banks was getting to know the place, having already spent some time there. His growing relationship with the Ambassador, Dr Alexander Yakovenko, had begun with a chance encounter on Doncaster racecourse a few weeks earlier. There, he’d bumped into a senior Russian Embassy official, who’d followed up with an invitation to lunch with his boss.
The meal had been a tremendous success. What might have been a rather stiff and formal event turned into a riotous social occasion. Over a marathon six-hour lunch, Banks had briefed the Ambassador about his plans for the referendum, gushing about his friend and hero Nigel Farage. He explained his conviction that the controversial leader of the UK Independence Party should play a key role in the campaign.
The Ambassador was impressed. He was beginning to see just how useful this maverick character could be. As the vodka flowed and tongues loosened, the conversation shifted from politics to money. It was then that the Ambassador dangled a tantalising business opportunity in front of his English guest: a stake in a major consolidation of Russian gold mining companies.
For Banks, such an investment was not unnatural territory. Though he had made his fortune in car insurance, he already had significant interests in precious metals and gemstones in Africa. He kept a close eye on the gold market and believed it was on the rise. When he and the Ambassador finally parted ways, more than a little merry, they exchanged mobile phone numbers, promising to catch up again very soon.
Yakovenko lost no time following up. The following day, 7 November 2015, he texted Banks inviting him for a drink. He wanted to introduce him to an associate who could explain more about the Russian gold opportunity. The date he suggested was 16 November.
‘1800 at my place. He will come to London. Is it good for you?’ he messaged.
‘The 16th will be fine,’ Banks replied eagerly, offering an invitation of his own.
‘I would like to reciprocate your hospitality and invite you and your wife to my home in the countryside. Maybe December?’
The Ambassador accepted ‘with pleasure’.
Over drinks at the Ambassador’s Residence on 16 November, Banks was introduced to a wealthy Russian businessman named Siman Povarenkin. A key player in the potential gold speculation, he too was keen to get Banks involved. After some small talk, he gave an informal presentation on the business proposal they had been discussing. It involved the possible acquisition and amalgamation of six gold mining companies, three of which were listed on the London Stock Exchange. All had something important in common: they depended on loans from Sberbank, a state-owned Russian banking and financial services company headquartered in Moscow.
Banks liked what he heard. Eager to take the project forward, the following day, he messaged Povarenkin suggesting next steps. ‘Very nice to meet yesterday with the Russian Ambassador,’ he wrote, in an email with the subject line ‘Gold Play’. ‘I’m very bullish on gold so keen to have a look.’
It was just the beginning of an extraordinary relationship between the Kremlin’s political and diplomatic emissaries in London and the individual who donated the most money to Brexit. This relationship would involve the discussion of further potentially lucrative business opportunities; intelligence-sharing about the Brexit campaign; and numerous invitations to social and cultural events. During this period, Banks pushed the Kremlin’s point of view in various political debates, including during a diplomatic spat between Russia and the UK government over migration.
In the aftermath of the EU referendum, Banks found himself under mounting public pressure over his Russian links. Quite how he raised several million pounds for his referendum campaign, becoming the single most generous supporter of the cause, was the subject of intense speculation in the UK. He had initially told friends he was ready to put up £250,000. In the end, he spent some twenty times that amount on the campaign, in cash and services in kind. Friends say that had Leave. eu become the official Brexit campaign, he would have recouped some of his outlay, which he had hoped would only have to be loaned. That did not happen. Such was the suspicion surrounding his huge loans and donations that a formal investigation was launched into the source of his funds.
Certainly, the outcome of the referendum suited the Kremlin: disarray in the European Union, hampering its ability to react to Russian aggression, and turmoil in the UK, temporarily weakening its position on the world stage. Much better conditions, in other words, for Putin to pursue his geopolitical aims. And all without a single shot fired!
Banks just laughed it all off, rubbishing the notion that any ‘dark money’ from the Kremlin was involved. ‘The allegations of Brexit being funded by the Russians … are complete bollocks from beginning to end,’ he has said. ‘My sole involvement with “the Russians” was a boozy six-hour lunch with the Ambassador where we drank the place dry (they have some cracking vodka and brandy!) and then wrote the account of the lunch in my book … Hardly top secret stuff!’
It is now clear that this was far from the full story. Almost by accident, the Kremlin had managed to forge a very useful relationship with one of the most powerful players in the Brexit campaign.
Why were they so keen to cultivate this self-styled anti-establishment figure? Perhaps they are incredibly generous and regularly offer relative strangers big business opportunities that require the support of the Russian state. Perhaps it’s because Banks just struck lucky, and the Ambassador was feeling friendless around the time they met.
More likely, however, the astute Russians identified the Bristol-based businessman as an extraordinarily valuable political asset. Not only did he provide an entrée into the Brexit campaign, with its delicious potential to upend the EU; he also offered a direct line to Farage, one of the most influential political figures in the UK.
That Farage had close links to figures close to Donald Trump, who was running for the White House, must have been the icing on the cake. Clausewitz famously described war as the ‘continuation of politics by other means’ – but for the Kremlin in the twenty-first century, politics is the continuation of war by other means.
What has this got to do with the state of the British armed forces?
To some, it is evidence that we are already at war…
BLOSSOM AND BLOOD
A NOTE ON THE HARD EDGE OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
The trenches on the frontline of the war the West forgot are not deep enough for tall men. ‘That is the frontline of Europe right there,’ Ukrainian Colonel Vitali Krasovsky says as he points at the five-foot-high dugout fortified with scraps of timber and a few sandbags.1 These soldiers see themselves as the bulwark against Russian aggression towards the West.
The enemy has yet to pinpoint where the Ukrainian army is positioned outside the abandoned village of Novogorodsky in the Donbas, but the platoon based at the Forward Observation Post know to keep their heads down: snipers are always a threat.
It is not immediately obvious that this is a war zone. There are no bodies lying in the rubble or fighter jets roaring overhead. In the small town a kilometre or so from the frontline, where the former community centre has been turned into an army base, civilian life just about goes on. The roads are lined with pretty apricot and apple trees in blossom. A small child plays in a dilapidated playground; an old woman totters to a faded grocery store; stray dogs skitter in the dust.
But the birdsong is mixed with a more ominous sound: the faint thud of mortar attacks in the distance. The Ukrainian armed forces in this town and at the Observation Post beyond do not spend every day fighting for their lives – but the zip and smack of bullets somewhere not far off is a dark reminder that, in the surrounding area, their comrades are under fire.2
What is happening in this part of the former Soviet Union matters not just to the people of Ukraine but to everyone who would prefer to contain President Putin’s regime. It is a showcase for the fate that can befall places he considers weak. It exposes the vulnerability of parts of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ that have neither the protection of NATO nor the military capability to make short work of Russian aggression. The UK and its allies could shrug and let it go, but that would risk emboldening Putin’s administration, which is why our armed forces are involved.
Putin has already appropriated chunks of Ukraine, creating a series of Russian-controlled enclaves in sovereign territory over which he had no legitimate claim. The number of ethnic Russians in Ukraine who were prepared to tolerate or help the operation made it relatively easy. As the Kremlin continues a low-key campaign to seize more ground, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence is determined to resist.
The soldiers charged with holding the line against Russian-backed separatists bear a grave responsibility. The loss of Crimea after it was illegally annexed by the Russian Federation in 2014 underlines what is at stake.3 At the time, the world stood by, leaving the region to its fate. Now NATO allies have come to recognise the potential price to be paid for turning a blind eye and are helping prop up Ukraine’s armed forces. Some would say that this assistance has come much too late.
The UK has contributed at least £5 million to the effort.4 In an initiative called Operation Orbital, British troops have been training thousands of members of Ukraine’s armed forces in fourteen locations outside the contested Donbas region. More than 1,300 British servicemen and women have been deployed since 2015. Ministers say the UK stands ‘side by side’ with the Ukrainians ‘in the face of Russian belligerence and aggression’.5
Along with a £200 million contribution from America this year,6 the help has been very gratefully received, but it is not enough. Since April 2014, Russian-backed separatists have been in control of Donetsk, the fifth largest city in Ukraine. They show no sign of stopping there. Almost every day, Ukrainian soldiers lose their lives to the fight. To date, over 4,000 have been killed in action; a further 11,000 have been wounded. Morale is holding up, but only just.7
On the frontline, what they really want is drones. The enemy has more than enough, allowing them to scope out Ukrainian positions and launch well-targeted attacks. Ukraine’s determined but overstretched armed forces cannot compete with this very modern capability.
The platoon at the Forward Observation Post spends long days hanging around waiting for sporadic contact with the enemy. In recent weeks they have lost comrades and were shaken when a popular commander lost a leg in a mortar attack on a village a few kilometres away. He keeps in touch with his men, sending video messages of encouragement from hospital.
Until a few years ago, what is now their base was someone’s home: a small house with a nice garden on the outskirts of the village. Apparently, the owner offered it to Ukrainian troops as the local population fled. Now it is somewhere for soldiers to eat, sleep and monitor opposition forces.
Boredom is a problem. On quiet days, the men while away the hours as best they can. In an outdoor area protected by sandbags and other makeshift fortifications, they try to keep fit, keeping an eye out for unmanned aerial vehicles as they exercise. When darkness falls, those who are not keeping watch outside sit around the grubby kitchen chatting about home and family. Their rations are surprisingly tasty. ‘We believe that if you don’t feed your army well, you’ll soon feed someone else’s,’ their commander observes wryly.
Some men get closer to the action. One beady-eyed Special Forces operative has just returned from a sabotage mission behind enemy lines. He has a skull-and-crossbones insignia and his blood type sewn onto the shoulder of his military fatigues.
But for most it is a long, hard grind, and the end is nowhere in sight. In several months, the 26 km section of frontline that is the responsibility of this platoon has only moved a few metres. In some ways it would be less painful for the platoon if there was more drama – they would relish the adrenalin of a fight – but the Kremlin is loath to use its mighty firepower to bring this mission to a swift, bloody end, knowing it would attract too much international attention. Putin plays a long game, and while the evidence that his forces are helping local rebels is incontrovertible, he is careful to keep their efforts below the threshold that would trigger too much outside interest. Both sides expect to be here for years.8
* * *
The gregarious senior Ukrainian general is a bear of a man. He is tall and imposing, with a thatch of white hair and thick glasses. But his voice, after four years of commanding a war with no end in sight, is low and tinged with sorrow. He still can’t believe how quickly the rulesbased international order has broken down.
‘No one could have imagined that in the twenty-first century someone could just grab territory. It was Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. But Putin was sure that no one would stop him!’ he says. The Russian President was half right. Ukraine was advised by Western allies not to fight for Crimea militarily, a decision that some in Ukraine bitterly regret. At least they blocked what they expected to be Russia’s next move. The general looks proud as he declares, ‘We messed up all their plans.’ On a piece of scrap paper, he draws a line cutting Ukraine in half diagonally, from Kharkiv in the north-east to Odessa in the south-west. ‘They wanted all of this to be part of Novorossiya, new Russia! But they didn’t expect us Ukrainians to fight back.’9
Now, the country is on a permanent war footing. The general illustrates this by flicking open his notepad and scribbling a crude map of the country and its neighbours. He draws arrows pointing to Kiev from every direction. He sees threats from Russia and Belarus to the north, annexed Crimea and the Russian Black Sea fleet to the south, Transnistria* to the west and the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions to the east. The Ukrainian government believes that, in total, the Russians have nearly 60,000 soldiers along the borders, and are ready to invade.10 When Russia conducted large-scale military exercises in Belarus in late 2017, Western analysts watched with academic detachment. It was different for the Ukrainians: their eyes were not only on Russian military capability, but what troops left behind. They believe Russia deposited stockpiles of equipment and weapons in strategic positions at the end of the exercise in preparation for a potential future assault.†
The extensive military operation, along with the condemnation of the international community and crippling economic sanctions, has cost Russia dear. But for the Kremlin, it is a small price to pay for what is seen as a step towards restoring Russia’s prestige as a great power. The 1990s were a catastrophe for Russia. Overnight it lost an empire, along with the associated political and economic clout. Living standards fell dramatically. The humiliation was compounded by the Russian army’s shocking military defeat at the hands of a rag-tag band of freedom fighters in Chechnya. Putin came to power in 2000 determined to turn things around.
He started softly. Senior Western officials saw no cause for alarm during his early years in power. (Lord) George Robertson, NATO Secretary General from 1999 to 2004, recalls constructive meetings with the Russian President. He says:
I met Vladimir Putin nine times during my years at NATO. He said in my first meeting with him, ‘I want Russia to be part of Western Europe. That’s what I believe our destiny is.’ For the first time in its history, Russia had a stable Western border. There was the prospect of prosperity and stability, in a way they had never experienced before.11
In his London office, Robertson points to a photo of the two of them sitting down at a table, smiling for the camera and looking cordial. Contrary to the Kremlin’s subsequent claims of ‘NATO encroachment’, Robertson says that ‘at no point did he object to the Baltic States becoming members of NATO.’12
The first sign of how Putin’s geopolitical strategy might play out came with the crushing of the Chechen rebels who were fighting for independence from the Russian Federation. Then, in 2008, Russian troops invaded Georgia in support of a pro-Russian breakaway government in the disputed territory of South Ossetia.13 When pro-European demonstrators toppled the Russian-oriented President Viktor Yanukovych in Kiev, Putin feared both that Ukraine would join NATO and that he would lose control over Russia’s only warm-water naval base in Sevastopol, which was on lease from Ukraine.14 So he moved in.
