A Companion to the Falklands War E-Book

Gregory Fremont-Barnes

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 619

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017

Beschreibung

The Falklands War is a story of occupation, fierce air battles, heavy naval losses and bitter encounters between ground forces amidst an inhospitable terrain and unforgiving climate. With complex political machinations and nationalist sentiment at the centre of the conflict, even today the sovereignty of the islands is hotly contested in political circles. For the first time, renowned military historian Gregory Fremont-Barnes has compiled a definitive A–Z guide to the British involvement in the Falklands conflict, including personalities, weapons, battles, ships, places, and much more. This accessible yet comprehensive companion to the Falklands War will be a welcome addition to any enthusiast's shelves.

Leseprobe

Cover illustration: 45 Commando Royal Marines marches towards Port Stanley, 14 June 1982. Corporal Peter Robinson carries the Union Flag on his radio aerial. (© Crown copyright. IWM (FKD 2028))

First published in 2017

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CONTENTS

Foreword

Preface

Introduction: A Synopsis of Operation Corporate, April–June 1982

Chronology of Events

Maps

A–Z Entries

Appendix A

Further Reading

Appendix B

List of Ships and Submarines in Theatre

Appendix C

Air Order of Battle

Appendix D

Numerical Summary: British Aircraft Deployed to the South Atlantic and Ascension Island, 2 April to 14 June

Appendix E

British Aircraft Losses, 2 April to 14 June

Appendix F

Chronology of British Aircraft Losses

Appendix G

Ground Forces Order of Battle

FOREWORD

Gregory Fremont-Barnes’ latest work is a tour de force. He has brought his considerable skill and knowledge as a military and naval historian, a senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and battlefield guide to writing A Companion to the Falklands War. The weaving together of fact and narrative is masterly and the end result is a book that will be an invaluable reference and research tool for writers and scholars. But it is also an accessible guide for members of the public seeking answers to questions they may have about the Falklands War of 1982. Readers will find every ship and unit that participated on the British side in the Falklands War listed in this book with relevant technical detail as well as an account of the actions in which that ship or unit participated.

With the exception of the British landings in Madagascar in 1942, the Falklands War involved an amphibious operation carried out at greater distance from home base to intermediate base to objective than any other amphibious enterprise in history, including the Pacific campaigns of the Second World War. A Ministry of Defence Study in 1981 had concluded that retaking the Falklands, in the event of their seizure by Argentina, was impossible; mainly, although not exclusively, because of the distances involved. So not only was the Task Force invited to carry out ‘mission impossible’, but also, in the opinion of some in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), ‘mission undesireable’ since it ran counter to the aspirations of elements within the FCO who hoped to hand over the Falkland Islands to Argentina regardless of the desire of the Islanders to remain British. While these views within the FCO did not impinge on the conduct of the campaign, geography is immutable, and distance was to present a massive challenge, especially logistically, hence due regard being accorded in this book to merchant Ships Taken Up From Trade, or STUFT for short.

Anyone contemplating just the array and variety of ships in particular listed in this Companion might question whether such an operation would be possible today; just one fact: twenty-three British frigates and destroyers took part in the Falklands War. This was less than half the total number of such vessels in the Royal Navy at that time. Now the frigates and destroyers in the navy total a mere nineteen. As well as providing food for thought, Gregory Fremont-Barnes’ book fills a gap that has existed for thirty-five years in the profusion of works on the Falklands War. He is to be congratulated.

Major General Julian Thompson CB OBE RM

CO 3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands War

January 2017

PREFACE

With no single volume reference work on the Falklands War hitherto existing, a gap worthy of filling presented itself, with this humble offering seeking to fulfil the needs of those who desire a single accessible book to guide them in their understanding of this short but fascinating conflict.

Owing to limitations of space, this work confines itself to the British aspects of the campaign, and within that context it focuses on military and naval affairs rather than matters political and diplomatic. While additional space self-evidently provides the opportunity for the inclusion of more detail, every work must retain manageable limits; thus, where readers require further information, they should find the lengthy ‘Further Reading’ section more than ample.

Many books on the Falklands suffer from discrepancies in timings, either owing to the perpetuation of errors committed in one work and unfortunately repeated in another, or through neglect by the author to identify the classification of time employed by the author, i.e. Falkland Islands local time, British Summer Time, or Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time or GMT) – the last employed by UK Headquarters at Northwood to ensure clarity and uniformity for individuals, troops, ships, aircraft and the like both in and out of theatre. In April to June 1982, Zulu Time, identified by the suffix ‘Z’, was one hour ahead of British Summer Time and four hours ahead of the Falklands, where during the campaign dawn occurred at about 1030Z (i.e. 0630 hrs local) and dusk at about 2015.

Where the text appears in bold, this indicates an available cross-reference to which readers may refer for additional information.

In most instances distances are indicated in feet, yards and miles, as consistent with Imperial measurements used in the UK.

In light of the particular interest shown by readers in the events at Goose Green, considerable space has been devoted to this subject, although this is not to imply that this action necessarily carried greater importance than those ground engagements that followed.

Only ships present in the theatre of operations before 14 June 1982 receive coverage here; this therefore excludes treatment of the handful of vessels (e.g. HMS Ledbury, MV Laertes, MV G A Walker and RMS St Helena) that arrived at Ascension or the Total Exclusion Zone after that date and therefore – notwithstanding their important post-war service – did not serve during the actual period of hostilities.

For reasons of space, separate entries on the commanding officers of Army battalions and Royal Marines Commandos are not included, nor for ships’ captains.

Any errors contained herein remain my own, but are subject to correction in later editions. Readers are therefore encouraged to advise the author where these may arise, as accuracy must stand paramount in any reference work.

Finally, I wish to express very special thanks to Major General Julian Thompson CB OBE RM for kindly offering suggestions for changes, helpfully identifying various errors requiring correction, and for preparing so fulsome a foreword.

Gregory Fremont-Barnes, DPhil FRHistSoc Department of War Studies, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst January 2017

INTRODUCTION

A Synopsis of Operation Corporate, April–June 1982

When Argentine forces descended on the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, Britain faced a daunting challenge: repossessing a territory geographically extremely remote from the United Kingdom at a time when most of her resources were not immediately deployable owing first to the country’s NATO commitment to the defence of Western Europe and the North Atlantic, and second to its ongoing struggle against the nationalist insurgency in Northern Ireland. Margaret Thatcher’s government laboured under the further disadvantage that the Argentine invasion caught it completely by surprise and lacking any contingency plan for repossessing the islands, which lay 8,000 miles away in the South Atlantic. Nor could the armed forces call upon any recent operational experience, for one had to look back to the failed Suez Crisis of 1956 for the most recent example of a major expeditionary operation launched from British shores. In the event, the forces assembled to liberate the Falklands represented the UK’s largest military and naval endeavour since the Second World War.

This response the Argentines certainly did not anticipate, and indeed confidently launched their invasion on the basis of various signals from London of waning interest in the South Atlantic – above all, in light of the withdrawal of the Royal Navy’s last patrol vessel, HMS Endurance – and on the mistaken assumption that Britain would not resort to force once occupation became a fait accompli. Britain had moreover yet to carry out its extensive, planned defence cuts stipulated by the Nott Review of the previous year. Yet if Britain found herself caught unprepared, poor planning characterised the Argentine position from the very start, for by invading in early April the Argentines inadvertently furnished their opponents with a very narrow – yet in the event a sufficiently large – window of opportunity in which to retake the islands before the Southern Hemisphere winter reached its height. Such miscalculations – above all the failure of Argentina’s military junta accurately to gauge Thatcher’s, not to mention the British public’s, exasperation and resolve – obliged Buenos Aires to mount a poorly devised defence of a bleak and inhospitable possession 400 miles east of its southern coast, leaving many of its best troops behind to protect its long border with Chile, with whom, like Britain, Argentina also maintained a long-running territorial dispute.

The speed with which Britain launched the first elements of the Task Force mark out its efforts at mounting an expeditionary operation on this scale as both remarkable and impressive, particularly in light of the absence of any plans for operations in such a remote part of the globe. In very short order the Royal Navy deployed two aircraft carriers, Hermes and Invincible, which sailed from Portsmouth on 5 April, only three days after the Argentine landings, while further departures swiftly followed with the requisitioned P&O liner Canberra conveying 40 and 42 Commando Royal Marines and 3 Para, accounting for much of 3 Commando Brigade. By the middle of April many of the warships and supply vessels of the Task Force had reached Ascension Island, 4,000 miles to the south – although still only halfway to the Falklands. Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island would prove itself an absolutely essential element in the success of the campaign, providing a secure base of operations that would assist decisively in maintaining an exceptionally long logistics and command chain.

In fact, while the logistics chain remained vulnerable yet intact throughout the war, its command counterpart proved one of the weaker elements of the operation as a whole, for the campaign involved no overall theatre commander in situ. Owing to the essential maritime nature of the operation, the Royal Navy took precedence, with the Task Force Commander drawn from that arm in the person of the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, based at Northwood, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse RN, who reported to Admiral Sir Terence Lewin RN, Chief of the Defence Staff. Beneath them served the land forces commander, Major General Jeremy Moore, plus several operational commanders, including Rear Admiral ‘Sandy’ Woodward RN, who commanded the Carrier Battle Group; Commodore Michael Clapp RN, who commanded the Amphibious Task Group plus escorts; and Brigadier Julian Thompson RM, commanding the Landing Task Group, which consisted principally of 3 Commando Brigade, the first of the two major ground formations dispatched to the South Atlantic.

British strategists well understood that success in so distant an area of operations hinged upon an efficiently managed logistics chain. Indeed, nothing less than a gargantuan effort undertaken by the Royal Navy, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the Royal Air Force could transport troops and supplies such a prodigious distance, thus sustaining the fighting capabilities of British forces so remote from home shores. To facilitate supply, large numbers of C-130 Hercules, VC10s, strategic freighters and Boeing 707s would be required to convey tens of thousands of tons of freight and thousands of personnel, supported by heavy-lift helicopters to cross-deck supplies and move troops once in theatre. At sea, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and dozens of Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) transported vital supplies of oil and vast amounts of other supplies in cargo vessels, while the Ministry of Defence requisitioned many other types of vessels, including the previously mentioned Canberra, the North Sea ferry Norland, which transported the whole of 2 Para, and the luxury liner Queen Elizabeth 2, which carried most of 5 Infantry Brigade.

This array of vessels, numbering more than eighty, supported the largest force of warships deployed by Britain on active operations since 1945, including two aircraft carriers (carrying between them twenty Sea Harriers), eight destroyers, fifteen frigates and three nuclear submarines. The critical importance of this naval force – not least its logistic element – cannot be overstated. The Argentines need only have disrupted it by sinking a few key vessels – either high-profile warships such as a carrier or a heavily laden troopship, or several cargo vessels holding essential equipment such as helicopters, spare parts for aircraft, or oil – to put the entire operation in jeopardy. Even without doing so, if the Argentines could simply maintain a lengthy occupation of the capital, Port Stanley, deteriorating weather conditions would bring their opponents’ logistic system to a halt and oblige the Task Force to withdraw at least as far as Ascension – thus rendering the renewal of operations after winter a very remote possibility. For with the initiative lost and the mood of public opinion almost certainly dampened by the failure of British forces to achieve a quick, decisive victory at minimal cost in lives, there could remain no appetite for renewed hostilities by the time the skies finally cleared and the seas calmed. In short, an expeditionary operation conducted at such great distance from home waters faced the very pressing constraint of time, for with winter approaching, operations intended to secure repossession of the Falklands could not extend much beyond mid-June before snow, high winds, poor visibility and heavy seas rendered impossible operational sorties conducted by fighter aircraft as well as heli-borne resupply and troop transport.

The objective of the Task Force was to establish an air and sea blockade of the islands in order to prepare the way for an amphibious landing, first by 3 Commando Brigade and later by 5 Infantry Brigade, with the expedition’s ultimate goal the capture of Port Stanley, the site of the majority of the islands’ 1,800 inhabitants and the location of the principal airfield and port. The Argentines garrisoned the islands with 13,000 troops, artillery and anti-aircraft guns, against which Britain could deploy 8,000 ground troops plus supporting naval and air elements. Yet if the British could not match the Argentines numerically, they benefited enormously from the fact that the airstrips on the Falklands were not substantial enough to enable the Argentines to employ their best aircraft, thus obliging them to launch their Skyhawks, Super Etendards, Mirages and Daggers from bases on the South American mainland about 400 miles west of Stanley. This marked the practical limit of their range, which left pilots only a few minutes of flight time over the Falklands – a serious disadvantage for aircraft such as the Skyhawk and Dagger, which closely matched the capabilities of the British Harrier. In addition to fighters, the Argentines operated a number of Pucara ground attack aircraft that could operate throughout the islands, supplemented by helicopters that, like their opponents, they possessed in insufficient numbers.

From the British point of view, recapturing the islands would require a strategy based on stages: first, imposing a sea blockade around the Falklands and retaking South Georgia (which lies 800 miles to the south-east) to make use of it as a secure base and transit area; second, establishing air and naval supremacy around the Falklands; and finally, defeating the Argentine garrison on the Falklands and reoccupying the islands. Strategists intensively studied the characteristics of the islands to determine the best site for a landing, a task made considerably easier by the expert, first-hand knowledge of the coastline provided by Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour RM, who had sailed around and mapped the islands’ periphery a few years earlier. Although the Falklands cover about 4,600 square miles, once the landings occurred ground forces would focus their attention on the Argentines in and around Stanley, at the eastern end of East Falkland.

British strategists appreciated that they could largely ignore West Falkland, for although the Argentines deployed about 1,700 men on that island, the garrison there possessed no amphibious capability to facilitate a crossing of Falkland Sound, the narrow body of water that separated it from its far more strategically important counterpart to the east. Moreover, no jet aircraft could operate from this very sparsely inhabited area owing to the absence of a suitable airfield and ground facilities. In short, Argentine forces on West Falkland stood isolated and static, unable to affect operations to the east. On East Falkland, conversely, about 1,000 Argentines occupied the twin settlements of Darwin and Goose Green, towards the western end of the island, while the bulk of their remaining forces garrisoned in Stanley and the mountains immediately west of the town. There infantry and marines had established prepared positions among the rocky crags of Mount Harriet, Two Sisters, Mount Tumbledown, Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge, the last of these less than 2 miles from the capital and the final point of the Argentine defensive ring. The island boasted very few roads, a few isolated settlements involved in sheep-farming, and large stretches of open, wind-swept, treeless, water-logged ground made all the more difficult to traverse by the ubiquitous presence of substantial tufts of grass known as ‘babies’ heads’ – the bane of the soldiers’ knees and ankles.

The first phase of operations took place in late April when a small force of Royal Marines landed on South Georgia and forced the surrender of the token Argentine garrison there. Shortly thereafter, in order to tighten the ring around the Falklands themselves, the British government declared a Total Exclusion Zone of 200 nautical miles around the islands, a course intended to alert the Argentine navy that all vessels operating within this area now stood subject to attack – though it should be stressed that Britain retained its right to attack vessels operating outside these designated limits.

The first strike against the Argentines on the Falklands themselves came on 1 May when an RAF Vulcan bomber, flown in history’s longest sortie (from Britain to Ascension and thence to East Falkland – all made possible by regular in-flight refuelling), targeted Stanley airfield with 1,000lb bombs. Due to incorrect mapping, however, the Vulcan inflicted relatively little damage. Further attacks by carrier-borne aircraft caused more substantial harm, particularly on Argentine aircraft both at Stanley and at Goose Green. The following day, the Task Force struck a mortal blow on the naval front when the nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror sank the cruiser General Belgrano, taking 368 lives, and constituting a loss of sufficient magnitude to persuade the Argentines to recall their entire fleet, including their single aircraft carrier, to home waters. Yet if their naval assets were no longer to play a role in the conflict, this certainly did not apply to the impressive air power the Argentines could bring to bear from the mainland. Three days after the sinking of the Belgrano, an Exocet missile fired from a Super Etendard launched from Tierra del Fuego struck HMS Sheffield, setting the ship ablaze, killing more than a dozen, injuring twice as many more, and leaving the stricken vessel a useless hulk.

Nevertheless, the Argentines failed to achieve air supremacy over the islands, as a consequence of which amphibious commanders adhered to their schedule for landings on 21 May in San Carlos Water, an inlet on the west coast of East Falkland. Chosen from among many potential landing sites, the beaches there proved suitable for landing craft, the surrounding hills offered good cover from air attack and the narrow passages provided a sheltered anchorage for supply vessels. The Argentines maintained only a small observing force in the area that Special Forces could easily drive off. The only disadvantage lay in its distance from Stanley: almost 60 miles of entirely exposed, boggy ground over which helicopters could theoretically convey large amounts of supplies and equipment and a substantial body of troops – but only if three conditions were satisfied. First, a successful offensive required the availability of sufficient numbers of helicopters and fuel; second, the inability of the Argentines to mount an effective counter-attack against San Carlos or any main forward supply base that the British might establish closer to Stanley; and third, the availability of sufficient air assets to keep the Argentines’ Pucaras or jet aircraft at bay while helicopters flew the many dozens of sorties required to convey ground forces and artillery forward – not to mention keeping them supplied with rations, water and ammunition thereafter.

The landings proceeded unopposed in the early hours of 21 May, but even as the Marines and Paras established a firm presence on the ground, over the course of the next four days a series of determined air attacks struck British warships in Falkland Sound, now dubbed ‘Bomb Alley’. More than ten warships fell victim to Argentine bombs and Exocets, including the frigate Ardent and the destroyer Coventry, which sank, and the frigate Antelope, which blew up. Fortunately for the British, many Argentine bombs failed to explode and ten Argentine aircraft were shot down, mostly by Sea Harriers. Although the Argentines had inflicted serious damage on their opponents’ shipping, they failed to concentrate on the Task Force’s most vulnerable elements: the supply ships, the heavy loss of which, as noted earlier, might have put paid to the entire British effort in a matter of days. Indeed, one loss struck the Task Force particularly hard: that of the container ship Atlantic Conveyor, the destruction of which during an Exocet attack on 25 May denied the British forces ten helicopters and vital supplies, thus posing a very serious blow to the Task Force in terms of its ability to move and resupply its ground forces. Still, just enough helicopters remained at the disposal of Brigadier Thompson to enable him to formulate plans for conveying a portion of his troops eastwards; the remaining Marines and Paras he ordered to ‘yomp’ and ‘tab’, respectively.

At the same time, on 28 May, 2 Para attacked the Argentine garrison at Darwin and Goose Green where the battalion, despite lacking proper fire support, overran a composite force enjoying a clear numerical superiority and a trench-lined front stretching across a narrow, easily defensible isthmus. The British captured the entire garrison – more than 1,000 troops – for a loss of eighteen dead, including the CO, and several dozen wounded. Meanwhile, as 40 Commando remained behind to protect the supply base and medical facility at San Carlos, helicopters conveyed 42 Commando to a forward position at Mount Kent, 10 miles east of Stanley, while 3 Para and 45 Commando proceeded on foot bearing kit in excess of 100lb – a remarkable feat that only troops enjoying the highest degree of fitness and endurance could possibly hope to achieve.

A few days later, on 2 June, 5 Infantry Brigade landed at San Carlos, now making the entire ground force available to Major General Jeremy Moore, on whom devolved command of all ground forces, enabling Brigadier Thompson to resume his normal role as commander of 3 Commando Brigade. All now seemed to bode well for the British; but if poor intelligence and an inability to fly reliably in darkness denied the Argentines the opportunity to slow the British advance, on 8 June they offered a graphic reminder that the skies did not go uncontested everywhere. Over Fitzroy, bombs dropped by Skyhawks struck the landing ship Sir Galahad, carrying Welsh Guardsmen awaiting orders to disembark, killing almost fifty and injuring or burning twice as many.

If the sinking of Sir Galahad (Sir Tristram had also been struck, but less severely) put the Welsh Guards out of action, Moore nevertheless enjoyed a commanding position: 3 Commando now stood poised within 10 miles of Stanley at the outer ring of Argentine defences, with elements from 5 Infantry Brigade, including the Scots Guards and a battalion of Gurkhas deployed to play an equal part in the assaults that now followed in short order. They consisted of a series of well-conducted, comprehensively successful night attacks executed on 11–12 June against Mount Harriet, Two Sisters and Mount Longdon conducted by 42 Commando, 45 Commando and 3 Para, respectively, and, on the following evening, against Wireless Ridge and Mount Tumbledown, led by 2 Para and the Scots Guards, respectively. In each case the survivors fled east into Stanley where, on the morning of 14 June, the Argentine commander, General Mario Menéndez, surrendered all his forces on the Falklands. The entire ground phase of the campaign thus concluded after a mere three weeks – 21 May to 14 June – a remarkable achievement considering the fact that not only did the Argentines enjoy a clear numerical superiority over the British, but possessed ample time with which to prepare their defences and establish stockpiles of supplies during the nearly seven-week period between their own invasion of 2 April and the British landings on 21 May.

Total British losses in the conflict amounted to 253 military personnel and civilians serving in all capacities with the Task Force, three civilians in Stanley and 777 wounded across all services. The Task Force lost four warships and a landing craft, one fleet auxiliary vessel and one merchantman. Helicopter losses amounted to twenty-three from the Royal Navy, seven from the RAF, three from the Royal Marines and one from the Army. Argentine fatalities amounted to about 750, plus 1,100 personnel wounded or ill. The entire garrison of approximately 13,000 men fell into British hands, plus numerous armoured vehicles, aircraft and artillery, rendering this one of the most successful expeditionary operations in British military history.

In analysing the factors behind British success, several stand out particularly prominently: the assembly of the Task Force with extraordinary rapidity, including the acquisition and fitting out of requisitioned vessels to supplement the existing resources of the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary within days of the Argentine invasion; the formulation of a clearly laid-out and effective strategy for retaking the islands; the dispatch of naval and air assets – all trained and equipped to a high standard – in sufficient numbers to drive off the Argentine navy as well as to confine air attacks to an acceptable, albeit expensive, level; the deployment of first-rate ground forces boasting superb levels of fitness, training, motivation and junior officer and NCO leadership; the skilful use of Special Forces (both SAS and SBS) for reconnaissance and raiding; and the acquisition, via diplomatic channels, of clandestine, non-operational American logistic support in the form of vast quantities of aviation fuel based at Ascension Island, as well as critical satellite intelligence.

No proper explanation of British victory must rest alone on the successes attributed to the Task Force and to strategists in Northwood and Whitehall. Rather, a balanced approach must consider some of the principal errors committed by the Argentines. Among many of their shortcomings, they failed to concentrate their air attacks against the British logistic chain – a far more important element of the Task Force in terms of maintaining the operational longevity of ground forces than high-profile naval assets; they neglected to concentrate their efforts against the two opposing aircraft carriers, the loss of either of which might alone have caused a setback of sufficient magnitude as to jeopardise the entire British effort; they made the short-sighted and fatal decision to deploy to the Falklands and South Georgia predominantly inexperienced recruits as opposed to marginally better-prepared reservists or, above all, marines and Special Forces, both composed of full-time professional personnel; and they failed to recognise that light armour could operate across most of the islands despite the boggy nature of the ground, giving them an incalculable advantage over the British, who brought only small numbers of such vehicles. Additionally, although they were incapable – quite understandably – of protecting the entire coastline of East Falkland in anticipation of the British landing, they failed once it materialised to mount a counter-attack against the beachhead at San Carlos, thus enabling 3 Commando Brigade to advance simultaneously south against Goose Green and east towards enemy defences immediately west of Stanley; they maintained an inflexible, static defence throughout the campaign, thus abandoning the initiative to the British from the moment they effected their landing on 21 May; they operated an appallingly poor logistic system within Stanley, such that while the garrison there received adequate provisions and rest, their comrades only a few miles away in the mountains suffered from food shortages owing to faulty administration, pilfering by their own commissariat, and an almost total absence of supply vehicles capable of negotiating trackless ground; they failed to hold out in the defence of Stanley even after the collapse of their defensive ring just west of the town, neglecting the supreme advantage still remaining to them: deteriorating weather conditions, for with the steady decline in visibility and temperature no British forces – whether on land, at sea and in the air – could sustain themselves, much less fight, for long after mid-June.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Friday, 19 March

Scrap metal workers arrive at the derelict whaling station at Leith on South Georgia and raise the flag of Argentina.

Sunday, 21 March

Endurance, at Stanley, sails for South Georgia with two helicopters and a Royal Marines detachment.

Monday, 22 March

The Bahia Buen Suceso leaves Leith harbour; forty-eight scrap metal workers remain behind.

Wednesday, 24 March

Royal Marines detachment from Endurance lands to monitor Argentine activity at Leith.

Thursday, 25 March

Argentine marines land at Leith from Bahia Paraíso.

Monday, 29 March

Replacement for Naval Party 8901 arrives in Stanley.

Wednesday, 31 March

Royal Marines detachment disembarks from Endurance at Grytviken, South Georgia.

Thursday, 1 April

Naval Party 8901 for the 1981–82 deployment passed operational command to the new Royal Marines detachment; both take up defensive positions in and around Stanley; submarine Splendid leaves from Faslane; orders given for the SBS to mobilise.

Friday, 2 April

Argentine invasion of the Falklands begins; after brief resistance Governor Rex Hunt surrenders; the UN condemns the act with Resolution 502; Task Force begins to assemble.

Saturday, 3 April

Royal Marines at Grytviken, outnumbered and outgunned, surrender; NP 8901 is flown to Montevideo for repatriation.

Sunday, 4 April

Brigadier Thompson briefs his commanding officers at Plymouth; submarine Conqueror leaves Faslane.

Monday, 5 April

Task Force sails from Portsmouth with HQ 3 Commando Brigade and elements of 40 and 42 Commando; Naval Party 8901 arrives back in the UK.

Tuesday, 6 April

Naval Party 1222, intended for the island’s defence, arrives at Ascension.

Thursday, 8 April

Broadsword and Yarmouth depart from Gibraltar.

Friday, 9 April

Canberra departs from Portsmouth carrying 3 Para and most of 40 and 42 Commando.

Saturday, 10 April

Antrim Group arrives at Ascension.

Sunday, 11 April

Antrim Group sails for South Georgia from Ascension with M Company 42 Commando aboard.

Monday, 12 April

UK imposes 200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falklands.

Wednesday, 14 April

Brilliant Group leaves Ascension; Rear Admiral Woodward departs from Ascension aboard Glamorgan, with Alacrity, Broadsword and Yarmouth.

Friday, 16 April

Task Force sails from Ascension; Hermes arrives at Ascension; Invincible leaves Ascension; Woodward discusses campaign strategy with Commodore Clapp and Thompson aboard Fearless.

Saturday, 17 April

Admiral Fieldhouse, C-in-C Fleet and Major General Moore, Land Forces Commander, fly to Ascension to meet Woodward, Thompson and Clapp aboard Hermes.

Sunday, 18 April

Carrier Battle Group leaves Ascension: Hermes, Invincible, Glamorgan, Broadsword, Yarmouth, Alacrity and RFA Olmeda and Resource.

Tuesday, 20 April

Canberra and Elk arrive at Ascension; Royal Marines captured at South Georgia arrive in the UK.

Wednesday, 21 April

SBS and SAS teams inserted by helicopter on to South Georgia.

Thursday, 22 April

SAS team rescued from Fortuna Glacier; two Wessex helicopters crash.

Friday, 23 April

M Company 42 Commando lands on South Georgia.

Sunday, 25 April

Intrepid, Atlantic Conveyor, and Europic Ferry depart from the UK; Carrier Battle Group joins with Sheffield Group.

Monday, 26 April

Argentine forces on South Georgia surrender.

Tuesday, 27 April

Cabinet in London gives approval for Operation Sutton; Norland and Sir Bedivere depart from the UK.

Wednesday, 28 April

UK declares 200-mile Total Exclusion Zone, now including aircraft and ships of all nations; hospital ship Uganda arrives at Ascension.

Thursday, 29 April

Uganda departs from Ascension.

Friday, 30 April

UK begins enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone; main Task Group arrives in TEZ.

Saturday, 1 May

Vulcan bomber attacks Stanley airport; Sea Harriers also conduct attacks; naval bombardments commence of the same area; SAS and SBS patrols inserted on East and West Falklands; UK government requisitions RMS Queen Elizabeth 2.

Sunday, 2 May

Conqueror sinks the cruiser General Belgrano.

Tuesday, 4 May

Black Buck 2 raid against Stanley airport; Sheffield struck by Exocet missile; Sea Harrier shot down over Goose Green.

Wednesday, 5 May

Eight RAF Harriers arrive at Ascension.

Thursday, 6 May

Argonaut Group leaves Ascension; 2 Para arrives at Ascension.

Friday, 7 May

Norland arrives at Ascension; most of Amphibious Task Group departs.

Saturday, 8 May

First of refuelled air drops flown to the Task Force.

Monday, 10 May

Sheffield, heavily damaged six days previously, sinks while under tow; Bristol Group leaves UK; Nimrods begin work in support of the Task Force.

Wednesday, 12 May

Queen Elizabeth 2 departs from Southampton with most of 5 Infantry Brigade aboard; Glasgow damaged by Argentine aircraft; Cardiff leaves Gibraltar; 3 Commando Brigade HQ issues Operational Order for the landings in San Carlos Water.

Friday, 14–Saturday 15 May

SAS raid against airstrip at Pebble Island.

Wednesday, 19 May

Cabinet gives approval for amphibious landings; Sea King carrying SAS crashes into the sea during cross-decking.

Thursday, 20 May

Sea King lands in Chile; crew turn themselves in to authorities and are repatriated.

Friday, 21 May

3 Commando Brigade executes landings in San Carlos Water; Ardent sunk.

Saturday, 22 May

3 Commando Brigade all ashore; Brigade Maintenance Area established at Ajax Bay.

Sunday, 23 May

Antelope sunk.

Monday, 24 May

Sir Galahad, Sir Lancelot and Sir Tristram are bombed in San Carlos Water, but the bombs fail to explode in all cases.

Tuesday, 25 May

Coventry and Atlantic Conveyor hit by Exocet missiles, the former sinking.

Wednesday, 26 May

2 Para leaves Sussex Mountain for advance on Goose Green.

Thursday, 27 May

3 Para and 45 Commando tab and yomp, respectively, from San Carlos Water; SAS patrol flies to Mount Kent; Queen Elizabeth 2, Canberra and Norland rendezvous at South Georgia; 5 Infantry Brigade begins cross-decking on to troopships.

Friday, 28 May

2 Para engages Argentine defenders at Darwin and Goose Green.

Saturday, 29 May

Major Keeble accepts Argentine surrender of 1,100 troops at Goose Green; Atlantic Conveyor sinks under tow.

Sunday, 30 May

Major General Moore arrives off the Falklands.

Monday, 31 May

42 Commando move by air to Mount Kent; Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre defeat Argentine troops at Top Malo House; 3 Para arrives at Douglas settlement; 45 Commando arrives at Teal Inlet settlement; Black Buck 5 raid strikes radar position in Stanley.

Tuesday, 1 June

5 Infantry Brigade begin disembarking in San Carlos Water; 3 Commando Brigade forward base established at Teal Inlet in preparation for major engagements; 3 Para and 42 and 45 Commando begin patrolling areas in vicinity of planned objectives.

Wednesday, 2 June

2 Para fly to Bluff Cove.

Thursday, 3 June

Black Buck 6 raid conducted against runway at Stanley.

Saturday, 5 June

Scots Guards embark in Sir Tristram for Bluff Cove.

Sunday, 6 June

Welsh Guards embark in Fearless for Fitzroy but the ship is ordered not to sail; Scots Guards land at Bluff Cove; 5 Infantry Brigade establishes forward base there.

Tuesday, 8 June

Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram hit by bombs in Port Pleasant; LCU Foxtrot Four sunk by Argentine aircraft in Choiseul Sound; Plymouth damaged by unexploded bomb; Moore explains plans for offensive against Stanley.

Friday, 11 June

Major assaults on the outer ring of Argentine defences around Stanley: 42 Commando at Mount Harriet, 3 Para at Mount Longdon, and 45 Commando at Two Sisters.

Saturday, 12 June

By sunrise all attacks have succeeded; Glamorgan struck by land-based Exocet missile; Black Buck 7 raid conducted against radar installation at Stanley.

Sunday, 13 June

2 Para attack Wireless Ridge; Scots Guards attack Mount Longdon; Gurkhas occupy Mount William.

Monday, 14 June

By early morning all assaults successful; Argentine forces surrender.

A

Active, HMS

Of the fifteen frigates in the South Atlantic, Active numbered among seven of the Type 21 Amazon class, the others being Alacrity, Ambuscade, Antelope, Ardent, Arrow, and Avenger. She departed Devonport on 10 May and arrived in Falklands waters on 25 May. Three days later, she left San Carlos Water and sailed to the Tug, Repair and Logistic Area (TRALA) for repairs, setting off back for San Carlos Water on the 30th. On 3 June, Active issued fire against Fitzroy settlement. Active was originally meant to support the attack on Stanley that Admiral Woodward expected to take place on the night of 5–6 June, but when Major General Moore postponed the attack to the 9th, Woodward recalled Active and Arrow from this mission. In the event, she did not come into action until the night of the 13th when, together with Avenger, she fired eight star shell and 220 high-explosive rounds against Argentine defenders on Mount Tumbledown in support of the Scots Guards attack. She arrived back in Devonport on 3 August.

Aden 30mm Cannon

Aden 30mm cannon were deployed aboard Sea Harrier FRS1s and Harrier GR3s and used in both air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. Although not as deadly in the Falklands as the Sidewinder missile, this heavy-calibre weapon accounted for a number of kills, destroying four helicopters on the ground and downing one Pucara, a Hercules already disabled by a Sidewinder, and two A-4 Skyhawks.

Aircraft Carriers

As a result of continuous reductions in the budget of the Royal Navy since the end of the Second World War, only three aircraft carriers remained in service in 1982, two of which were deployed to the South Atlantic. The carriers had fixed-wing aircraft, of course, but there were no further plans to build more vessels for this purpose and long-range air cover for the fleet and responsibility for air strikes against enemy vessels would become the responsibility of the Royal Air Force. Increasingly, the Navy required deployment of anti-submarine helicopters, resulting in acquisition of the through deck carrier for vertical and/or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft, particularly the Sea Harrier, which could perform several important roles: provide local air defence for the fleet, strike surface vessels in the area, and operate in a ground-attack role in support of operations on land in tandem with, or independently of, RAF assets.

Hermes and Invincible played a vital – indeed, indispensable – role in the campaign, for without them the Task Force could neither defend itself with its integral aircraft, nor provide the necessary strike capability in support of ground forces or provide platforms for essential logistics. Helicopters aboard the two carriers provided continual anti-submarine patrols and the Sea Harriers played an important role in diminishing the effectiveness of Argentine air attacks, particularly those over San Carlos Water. In short, without these two carriers Britain would simply have been incapable of deploying forces to the South Atlantic.

As defence of the aircraft carriers stood supremely important, after the loss of Sheffield on 4 May, Admiral Woodward shifted them – and obviously the rest of the Carrier Battle Group at the same time – well to the east of the Falklands to offer them greater protection from air attack, though this of course impinged upon the range of the Sea Harriers as a result.

Ajax Bay

When the decision was reached to land 3 Commando Brigade in San Carlos Water, Ajax Bay was chosen as one of the three sites. In the event, on 21 May, 45 Commando landed there on Red Beach, together with Brigade HQ. Ajax Bay also served as the site of the Brigade Maintenance Area (BMA) – a massive stores dump situated around the derelict refrigeration plant, which held the principal land-based medical services in the form of the Land Forces Main Dressing Station under Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly. This medical facility came under air attack by two Skyhawks on 27 May, the Argentines apparently as yet unaware that this was a field hospital, although because of its proximity to the BMA Brigadier Thompson chose not to identify it with a red cross.

Two bombs penetrated the roof of the field hospital, lodging themselves but failing to explode. An RAF bomb disposal expert found them too difficult to diffuse, but considered them not to have armed, as a consequence of which they remained in place throughout the war. The raid on the 27th cost the lives of eight British personnel and twenty-six were wounded, with damage to the stores dump and the loss of some ammunition due to fire. Sea King HC4s ferried the casualties to the hospital ship Uganda for treatment.

The field hospital experienced a surge in cases on 8–9 June when helicopters continually ferried in casualties after the attacks on the Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad in Port Pleasant. Once stabilised, the patients were flown out to the Uganda.

Alacrity, HMS

Of the fifteen frigates in the South Atlantic, Alacrity numbered among seven of the Type 21 variety, the others being Active, Ambuscade, Antelope, Ardent, Arrow, and Avenger.

Departing from Devonport on 5 April, Alacrity arrived at Ascension on the 16th and in the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) on the 30th. On 1 May, while positioned off Cape Pembroke with Glamorgan and Arrow and firing briefly on Stanley airfield, Alacrity was attacked by a Dagger A that her radar failed to detect. The aircraft dropped two 500lb parachute-retarded bombs but failed to hit its target, though Alacrity, which managed to loose off a few rounds of ineffective 20mm cannon fire in response, nevertheless received minor damage below the waterline due to the explosion of bombs in the vicinity.

On 8 May, Alacrity fired approximately ninety shells at an Argentine position on Stanley Common, partly as a diversion to allow Yarmouth to proceed to the position of the burned out Sheffield in order to tow her away for possible salvaging.

On the night of 10–11 May, Alacrity proceeded along the coasts of both main islands before sailing up through the Sound between them, marking this as the first instance during the war when a British vessel made this journey. She discovered no mines and enjoyed a certain degree of protection from air attack, owing to poor weather grounding Argentine aircraft. On the night of the 11th, while sailing near Swan Island, Alacrity encountered an Argentine navy transport ship, the 2,684-ton Isla de los Estados, which Alacrity hit with several 4.5in shells, detonating her target’s cargo of aviation fuel and ammunition and killing twenty out of the twenty-two-man crew.

As part of the Carrier Battle Group north of Stanley, Alacrity was not directly involved in the landings in San Carlos Water on 21 May. When Atlantic Conveyor was hit by an Exocet missile on 25 May, Alacrity helped to rescue survivors of that disaster. On the night of 27–28 May, in company with Glamorgan and Avenger, Alacrity took part in a heavy shore bombardment of Argentine positions around Stanley, the three vessels unleashing 250 rounds. She left the TEZ on 2 June for Ascension to undergo repairs to her main engine and did not return to South Atlantic waters, instead proceeding back to Devonport, arriving on 24 June.

Alvega, MV

One of the large number of Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT), Alvega was a motor tanker chartered from Silver Line on 1 May and departed Portsmouth four days later for Ascension, where she served as a base storage tanker for fleet refuelling both there and off the Falklands. She did not arrive back in Rosyth until 21 March 1984.

Ambulance Vessels

Three survey vessels served in this capacity: Hecla, Herald and Hydra.

Ambuscade, HMS

Of the fifteen frigates in the South Atlantic, Ambuscade numbered among seven of the Type 21 (Amazon class), the others being Active, Alacrity, Antelope, Ardent, Arrow and Avenger.

She departed Gibraltar on 3 May and arrived at Ascension eight days later. Entering the Total Exclusion Zone on 22 May, on the afternoon of the 25th Ambuscade was with the Carrier Battle Group about 60 miles north-east of Stanley when two Super Etendards fired their Exocet missiles, the intended targets probably being the aircraft carriersHermes and Invincible. Ambuscade fired chaff rockets as a decoy, which may have successfully diverted the Exocets, but at least one of them reacquired a target in the form of Atlantic Conveyor. Ambuscade, together with Yarmouth, supported 2 Para’s attack on Wireless Ridge on 13–14 June. She arrived back at Devonport on 24 July.

Amphibious Assault Ships

Also known as Landing Platform (Docks) or LPDs, the only two possessed by the Royal Navy, Fearless and Intrepid, served on Operation Corporate, together playing a vital role in the conflict. With a displacement of more than 12,000 tons and a speed of 21 knots, both could operate landing craft, helicopters and function as command ships. An amphibious assault ship carried a crew of 480, including its complement of ninety Royal Marines, with accommodation for 700 embarked troops. To launch its landing craft or LCUs, an LPD flooded its docking area at the stern, a process known as ‘docking down’, allowing in 3,000 tons of ballast, after which the troops could embark directly from their mess decks into the four craft, which then sailed out of the stern. She also carried four LCVPs slung from davits on the upper deck. The landing craft themselves belonged to a Royal Marines Assault Squadron consisting of approximately eighty Royal Marines and Royal Navy personnel, including an Amphibious Beach Unit. LPDs carried sophisticated Command and Control communications facilities.

Facilities for aircraft included a flight deck from which two Wessex helicopters could operate at any one time, with space for more parked rotary wing aircraft if required. Sea Harriers could also operate from LPDs if circumstances demanded. For close range air defence, LPDs carried four Seacat systems and two 40mm Bofors.

Amphibious Task Group

Commanded by Commodore Michael Clapp RN, who held the post of Commander Amphibious Warfare at Plymouth, this force was responsible for planning the amphibious landing, directing inshore operations and supporting ground operations in pursuit of Argentine defeat. Fearless served as HQ ship of the Amphibious Task Group. While the Commander Amphibious Task Group neither controlled operations on shore nor laid down the design for battle for the landing force, he did make the ultimate decision in respect of whether or not a landing should proceed on the basis that he furnished the transport for the landing force, and other assets such as ship-to-shore movement craft and helicopters, naval gunfire support, and control of fixed-wing support.

For Operation Sutton, the amphibious landings executed on 21 May in San Carlos Water (officially designated the Amphibious Operating Area or AOA), the Amphibious Task Group and its escorts consisted of the destroyer Antrim, the frigatesArdent, Argonaut, Brilliant, Broadsword, Plymouth and Yarmouth, the amphibious assault shipsFearless and Intrepid, seven Royal Fleet Auxiliaries and three Ships Taken Up From Trade. The total number of helicopters aboard these vessels amounted to one Wessex, five Lynx HAS2s, two Wasp HAS1s, twelve Sea King HC4s, four Sea King HAS5s, nine Gazelle AH1s, and nine Scout AH1s.

Anco Charger, MV

A motor tanker forming part of the large number of Ships Taken Up From Trade for the campaign, Anco Charger was chartered from Panocean on 18 April for refuelling duties and departed from Fawley on 24 April with a Naval Party supplied by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, reaching Ascension on 5 May. At the end of the fighting she served off the Falklands from 27 June and arrived at Portsmouth on 16 August.

Andromeda, HMS

One of fifteen frigates deployed to the South Atlantic, but the only one of the ageing Batch 3 (Broadbeam) Leander class. She departed Devonport on 10 May, reached Ascension eight days later and arrived in theatre with other ships of the Bristol Group on the 25th, spending the majority of her time as ‘goalkeeper’(or anti-aircraft ‘screen’) for the aircraft carriers in tandem with Brilliant and Broadsword. She did not reach Devonport until 10 September.

Antelope, HMS

Of the fifteen frigates deployed to the South Atlantic, Antelope numbered among seven Type 21s (Amazon class), the others being Active, Alacrity, Ambuscade, Ardent, Arrow and Avenger.

Departing from Devonport on 5 April, she reached Ascension on the 21st. Having only just arrived in the Total Exclusion Zone the day before, Antelope came under attack at 1650Z on 23 May, when four A-4B Skyhawks encountered her close to Fanning Head in San Carlos Water. One of the aircraft dropped its 1,000lb bomb on the starboard side of the ship’s stern, but it failed to explode. Two of the aircraft left the area, one damaged by a surface-to-air missile, while the remaining two continued their attack, hitting Antelope again with another 1,000lb bomb, which also failed to explode but inflicted serious damage on the port side of the vessel below the bridge. Her mainmast was also damaged by a low-flying Skyhawk. One sailor was killed in the attack.

HMS Antelope in her death throes, 24 May. (AirSeaLand Photos)

Antelope proceeded to Ajax Bay, where an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team tried to defuse the two bombs; one exploded, instantly killing Staff Sergeant James Prescott of the Royal Engineers and severely injuring Warrant Officer John Phillips. After the explosion the crew of 175 evacuated the ship without injury, transferring to other vessels nearby as fires quickly consumed the ship. These continued through the night until a second explosion, almost certainly the other bomb, broke the frigate’s back at about 1100Z on the 24th.

Anti-Ship Missiles

The Royal Navy employed three types of anti-ship missiles on Operation Corporate: the AS.12, the MM.38 Exocet and the Sea Skua.

Antrim, HMS

One of two County class guided missile destroyers on Operation Corporate, the other being Glamorgan. In late March she was engaged in Exercise Springtrain off Gibraltar as flagship to Admiral Woodward, together with four other destroyers. After cross-decking stores and transferring personnel and aircraft in Gibraltar, Antrim formed part of the initial Task Force. During the voyage south she was, however, detached for service on Operation Paraquet, the recapture of South Georgia, off which she arrived on 21 April. In providing naval gunfire support to the ground forces there, she and Plymouth played a decisive part in persuading the Argentine garrison to surrender without resistance.

Antrim arrived off the Falklands on 20 May and the following morning, at approximately 0200Z, she entered Falkland Sound from the north to insert an Special Boat Squadron (SBS) team to monitor Argentine positions on Fanning Head. She then assumed a post, together with Argonaut and Broadsword, at the mouth of San Carlos Water for the remainder of the day to provide an air defence screen to protect the amphibious ships unloading troops and supplies further south. At 0452Z she opened fire with her 4.5in gun, shelling Argentine positions on Fanning Head ahead of the SBS assault.

At 1325Z, while still off Fanning Head, Antrim was surprised by two Dagger As and hit by several rounds of cannon fire, but the aircrafts’ bombs missed their target. Shortly thereafter, a second group of Daggers appeared, one striking Antrim with a 1,000lb bomb, which bounced off the flight deck, smashed through various compartments including the magazine containing Seaslug surface-to-air missiles, before finally settling in one of the vessel’s heads. Miraculously, the bomb failed to detonate an armed missile that it passed close to and did not itself explode. Minor fires were extinguished, but some damage was caused by bomb splinters to one of the ship’s helicopters. A bomb disposal team defused the device later that day. Owing to damage sustained by her Seacat system, Antrim joined the Carrier Battle Group to the east of the Falklands, where she performed escort duties in the replenishment area for the remainder of the conflict. Antrim’s service in the war ended with her arrival in Plymouth on 17 July.

Antrim Group

Those vessels constituting the first flotilla to leave on operations in the South Atlantic. They headed from Exercise Springtrain for Ascension on 2 April, the day of the invasion of the Falklands, led by Rear Admiral Woodward in his flagship, the County class destroyer Antrim, her sister ship Glamorgan, Type 42 destroyersCoventry, Glasgow and Sheffield, the frigatesArrow, Brilliant and Plymouth, and the RFA fleet tankers Appleleaf and Tidespring. They arrived at Ascension on 10 April.

Appleleaf, RFA

One of five Leaf class support tankers chartered to the Ministry of Defence, together with Pearleaf, Plumleaf, Bayleaf and Brambleleaf. Appleleaf departed Exercise Springtrain on 2 April and served as a refuelling ship in the South Atlantic for ships transiting to and from the Falklands. She did not take part in the amphibious landings in San Carlos Water on 21 May and arrived back at Rosyth 9 August.

Ardent, HMS

Of the fifteen frigates in the South Atlantic, Ardent numbered among seven of the Type 21 Amazon class, the others being Active, Alacrity, Ambuscade, Antelope, Arrow, and Avenger. Ardent departed from Devonport on 19 April and arrived at Ascension ten days later.

At midnight (Zulu) on 19–20 May she entered Falkland Sound from the north as the lead vessel of the Amphibious Task Group approaching San Carlos Water for the initial amphibious landings, then carried on to Grantham Sound, part of Falkland Sound, 12.5 miles from Goose Green, to support an Special Air Service (SAS) diversionary attack on Goose Green and Darwin timed to coincide with the landings.

Accordingly, at around 1130Z on D-Day, 21 May, she bombarded the grass airstrip there with 4.5in shells, hoping to hit the handful of Pucaras there, though these all withdrew to Stanley in the course of the day.

The Type 21 HMS Ardent, which sank on the evening of 22 May, after being struck by multiple bombs the previous evening. (AirSeaLand Photos)

At 1555Z a 1,000lb bomb dropped by a Skyhawk narrowly missed the frigate, inflicting no damage apart from bending the ship’s radar antenna 30 degrees out of alignment. Later, three Dagger As appeared over Grantham Sound and at 1744Z attacked Ardent, which not only could not rotate its 4.5in gun to fire at aircraft approaching from behind but was unable to engage its Seacat system owing to a malfunction of its missile control, leaving the ship’s defence to its Oerlikon 20mm guns and light machine guns. One 1,000lb bomb struck the sea, bounced and penetrated the ship’s hull without exploding. A second bomb, however, landed on the hangar deck and detonated, killing or injuring several members of the crew, destroying the ship’s hangar and Seacat launcher, rendering the ship’s gun inoperable by severing power cables and causing several fires. A third Dagger missed Ardent with its bomb, but the ship was already in serious distress and slowly proceeded to the protection offered by friendly vessels at the mouth of San Carlos Water.

While proceeding northwards off North West Island at 1806Z, two A-4Q Skyhawks attacked Ardent from her rear quarter, both aircraft dropping their respective loads of four 500lb Snakeye bombs, an uncertain number of which struck her stern, adding to her already stricken state and setting new fires. A third Skyhawk also released its bombs, but apparently missed.

Having been struck by nine bombs, two of which failed to explode, bereft of her steering, her lower decks flooding, causing the ship to list, Commander West ordered the crew to abandon her, whereupon the survivors transferred to Yarmouth and then to Canberra, while helicopters flew her wounded directly to the latter vessel. She had lost twenty-two killed and more than thirty wounded. Yarmouth towed the frigate but on the evening of the 22nd Ardent exploded and sank off North West Island.

Commander:

Commander A.W.J. West

Builders: