Battle Story: Goose Green 1982 E-Book

Gregory Fremont-Barnes

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

The Battle of Goose Green was the first and longest land conflict of the Falklands War, which was fought between British and Argentine forces in 1982. The British forces, attacking over featureless, wind-swept and boggy ground, were heavily outnumbered and lacked fire support, but brilliantly defeated the Argentine garrison in a fourteen-hour struggle. If you want to understand what happened and why – read Battle Story. Detailed profiles examine the personalities of the British and Argentine commanders, including that of Victoria Cross winner Lt Col 'H' Jones. First-hand accounts offer an insight into this remarkable fourteen-hour struggle against the odds. Detailed maps explore the area of Darwin Hill and Goose Green, and the advance of the British forces. Photographs place you at the centre of this pivotal battle. Orders of battle show the composition of the opposing forces' armies. Packed with fact boxes, this short introduction is the perfect way to explore this crucial battle.

Leseprobe

CONTENTS

Title

Introduction

Timeline

Historical Background: What were they Fighting for?

The Armies

Argentine Forces

British Forces

The Days Before Battle: Opposing Plans and Dispositions

The Argentine Plan of Defence

British Plans and Landings

Preparations for Battle

The Battlefield: What Actually Happened?

The Assault Begins

The Advance on Boca House and Darwin Ridge

B Company’s Attack on Boca House

Final Objectives: Goose Green Airfield and School

The Last Act

After the Battle: Strategic Postscript

Preparations for the Advance on Stanley

Operations on 11–12 June: Mount Harriet, Mount Longdon and Two Sisters

Operations on 12–13 June: Mount Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge

The Legacy: Lessons Learned from Goose Green

Professionalism and Esprit de corps

Misallocation of Time

Argentine Inertia and Failure to Counter-attack

Inadequate Co-ordination of Fire Support and Absence of an All-arms Approach

Inadequate Transport and Resupply

Faulty Command Style

Inadequate Numbers, Composition and Disposition of Defenders

A Final Word

Orders of Battle

Argentine forces

British Forces

Bibliography and Further Reading

Author and Publisher’s Note

Copyright

INTRODUCTION

Goose Green was the first and the longest battle of the Falklands War. It represented a fourteen-hour struggle with The Second Battalion the Parachute Regiment (2 Para) pitted against various sub-units of the Argentine army and air force over nearly featureless, wind-swept and boggy ground, most of it in clear daylight and against entrenched defenders. 2 Para were heavily outnumbered and lacked proper fire support; by all calculations they should have lost. In the event, they not only succeeded, but captured or killed the entire Argentine garrison – a force more than twice their size – and so set the tone for the engagements that were to follow in the drive against Stanley, the capital of the Falklands.

The battle is notable for a number of features. It was fought within just a week of the British landings at San Carlos Water – at the western end of East Falkland, the larger of the two main islands – as a consequence of the political priorities set by the British government to seize the initiative and maintain the momentum of the attack from the outset of the campaign. In doing so, ministers overrode the judgement of the land forces commander, Brigadier (Brig.) Julian Thompson, who believed an attack south was unnecessary and a diversion to the main thrust of his offensive against Stanley, clear on the other side of the island. A victory at Darwin and Goose Green, the government and its strategists at Northwood and the Ministry of Defence in London concluded, would form a prelude to further attacks in the drive on the capital. In so doing, it would preserve the high degree of public support enjoyed at home and set a precedent for other successes on the battlefield to come.

Marines from 42 Commando disarm Argentine prisoners at Stanley, 14 June. (Ted Nevill)

Thus, Goose Green stands as an example of how political intervention can and does – for good or ill – interfere with military priorities set by commanders in the field. Thompson was quite right: the Argentines at Goose Green did not pose a threat to the beachhead established by the amphibious landings, and London made little attempt to establish this as a rationale for 2 Para’s attack. So long as Thompson could prosecute his advance across the northern route to Stanley – an operation feasible by foot and by helicopter – the garrison at Goose Green could be pinned in place, exerting very little influence on events beyond the narrow isthmus upon which the tiny settlements of Darwin and Goose Green sit. Nor did the Argentines expect such an attack, which accounts for the peculiar composition of the forces deployed there.

The Battle of Goose Green may, nevertheless, be seen as a pivotal event in the Falklands War. By boosting the morale of British forces and, conversely, fatally damaging that of the Argentines, its result had a profound effect on both sides for the remainder of this brief, yet decisive, campaign. Victory at Goose Green established British forces’ moral superiority over the defenders, a position which maintained the momentum of the ground offensive until the point of Argentine surrender on the Falklands as a whole, little more than two weeks later.

The battle is also noteworthy for the degree to which the attackers operated outside an all-arms context. When 2 Para struck on 28 May 1982, it did so largely unassisted, with the odds heavily against it. The battalion faced twice its numbers; the defenders occupied entrenched positions overlooking gently undulating, open ground, which they could sweep with rifle, machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire. The quality of 2 Para’s highly trained, highly motivated personnel bore no resemblance to their opponents, but in light of 2 Para’s almost complete lack of support from other arms, it found itself largely dependent on its own resources to cope against poor odds. This was exacerbated by the lack of air support until the close of the battle; only the briefest naval support; the absence of most of the battalion’s heavy weapons until very late in the day; the absence of armoured support; and grossly inadequate artillery support. The battalion was left to fight its way through enemy defences with rifle, grenade, machine-gun, light anti-tank rockets and just two mortars. It took fourteen hours of close-quarter fighting to move 6km (3.7 miles), some of it in darkness. This, by any standard, stands as a remarkable achievement.

The fact that Goose Green need never have been fought in order for British forces to attain their objective – defeating the main concentration of Argentine forces in and around Stanley – must not detract from the battle’s significance. Having made the decision to engage the Argentine garrison there, a great deal hinged on the outcome of the engagement – particularly if Britain had lost. The British were off to an auspicious start a week before Goose Green, when 3 Commando Brigade, of which 2 Para constituted but one of five battalions, had effected a successful lodgement and secured a bridgehead against possible counter-attack. But victory was by no means inevitable, for at the same time Royal Navy ships just offshore found themselves under intense air attack and suffered accordingly high losses: four ships destroyed and five seriously damaged in the week of the landings. If to these losses were added a defeat inflicted against 2 Para, it is difficult to underestimate the negative repercussions that would have occurred back in Britain, both in Whitehall and amongst the public at large.

Quite apart from the serious impact on the morale of the armed forces in theatre, a repulse of 2 Para would result in a delayed offensive against Stanley, and time was in woefully short supply. Even if the simultaneous movement east of ground forces proceeded as planned (and there would have been a real prospect that, in the wake of a defeat at Goose Green, this offensive would be cancelled altogether with forces digging in around Ajax Bay in a defensive posture) it was more than likely that the Argentines, elated by success at Goose Green, would launch a counter-thrust against the meagre British forces, 3 Para and 45 Commando Royal Marines, already en route to Mount Kent on foot. True, reinforcements were on their way to the Falklands in the form of 5 Infantry Brigade, but the delay forced upon Thompson would have derailed his timetable – a timetable utterly dependent upon taking Stanley before the full weight of winter brought a swift halt to any British offensive. Ships could not operate in the rough seas of the South Atlantic winter; aircraft could not fly combat sorties, or helicopters ferry troops and supplies or evacuate the wounded; logistics would break down; and the troops, exposed to snow and freezing winds, would find themselves huddled in a ring around San Carlos and unable to move or, worse still, obliged to disembark. This, in turn, would have forced the Task Force to Ascension Island 6,500km away or, more probably, home to lick its wounds and reflect on its failure to liberate the Falklands.

Argentine prisoners. In all, 13,000 fell into British hands during the course of the war.

2 Para’s flag flying over Goose Green after the settlement’s liberation on 29 May. (Dr Stephen Hughes)

In the event, the Argentines surrendered on 14 June – with no time to spare for the Task Force. In this respect, the outcome of the fighting at Goose Green may rightly be seen to assume a position of vital importance to the war itself.

TIMELINE

1982

19 March

Argentine scrap metal merchants land at disused whaling station at Leith on South Georgia, a dependency of the Falklands lying 1,300km to the south-east, and raise the Argentine flag

21 March

HMS Endurance embarks with a Royal Marines (RM) detachment and sails for South Georgia

24 March

Endurance lands RM contingent to monitor Argentine activities at Leith

25 March

An Argentine naval vessel lands Argentine marines at Leith

29 March

The junta, or Argentine military government under General Galtieri, approves its final plan for the invasion of the Falklands

31 March

Endurance disembarks her RM detachment at Grytviken, South Georgia

2 April

Argentine troops invade the Falklands. Governor Hunt orders the garrison of 72 Royal Marines to surrender after it offers spirited resistance. In Britain, Margaret Thatcher’s government prepares a task force for deployment to the South Atlantic, with 3 Commando Brigade under Brigadier Julian Thompson rapidly concentrated for imminent departure from Portsmouth

3 April

Argentines defeat small contingent of Royal Marines at Grytviken, South Georgia

5 April

First elements of the Task Force sail from Portsmouth, including 3 Para aboard the requisitioned P&O liner Canberra

11–16 April

Reacting to the dispatch of the Task Force from the UK, Argentines reinforce the islands by air with 9 Brigade under Brigadier General Oscar Jofre, Land Forces Commander, himself under Brigadier General Mario Menendez, Commander-in-Chief and governor of Las Malvinas

12 April

Britain declares a 200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) around the Falkland Islands

16 April

Task force proceeds south from Ascension Island, approximately 6,500km from the Falklands

22 April

Senior Argentine commanders meet to devise defensive strategy to prevent Task Force re-establishing British control over the Falklands

25 April

Brigadier General Omar Parada, Commander of 3 Brigade (West Falkland and the western half of East Falkland), posts 12th Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Italo Piaggi to Goose Green, reinforcing the small garrison already there

26 April

Argentine commander on South Georgia surrenders to a company of Royal Marines landed to retake the island. Second Battalion the Parachute Regiment sails from Hull aboard the North Sea passenger ferry Norland

28 April

Britain announces Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) around the Falklands to include aircraft and ships of all nations

30 April

Main Task Force reaches TEZ

May

Piaggi lays mines at various points on the Darwin-Goose Green isthmus, particularly near the beaches

1 May

Royal Air Force (RAF) Vulcan bomber strikes Stanley airfield, but with limited results

2 May

Nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror sinks the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano

4 May

Argentine Exocet missile, fired from an aircraft, strikes HMS Sheffield, causing her to sink six days later

6 May

2 Para arrives at Ascension Island

7 May

Main body of amphibious task group leaves Ascension Island

12 May

The requisitioned luxury liner Queen Elizabeth II sails from Southampton with 5 Infantry Brigade

14–15 May

A squadron of the Special Air Service (SAS) raids Pebble Island, destroying eleven Argentine aircraft on the ground

As a precaution in the event of attack, Piaggi concentrates all 114 residents of Darwin and Goose Green in the latter settlement’s community hall

21 May

Amphibious landings made at 0430 hrs by 3 Commando Brigade, consisting of 2 and 3 Para, and 40, 42 and 45 Commando RM, in San Carlos Water. HMS Ardent sunk by aircraft, signifying the beginning of six days of regular air attacks on British vessels in Falkland Sound

2 Para leaves the beachhead and advances south to Sussex Mountain, establishing itself on the summit around 0630 hrs; SAS launch diversionary raid against Argentine position near Darwin

22 May

3 Commando Brigade established ashore at Ajax Bay, with Rapier anti-aircraft batteries in place and a defensive perimeter around the beachhead. Thompson meets with Lieutenant Colonel ‘H’ Jones, Commanding Officer of 2 Para, and orders him to conduct a raid against Goose Green

23 May

HMS Antelope sunk

23–24 May

Jones draws up plan for raid against Darwin-Goose Green

25 May

HMS Coventry sunk. More critically, when the transport vessel Atlantic Conveyor is mortally damaged by an Exocet on the same day, the Task Force loses all ten helicopters on board, causing a transport and logistics crisis for Thompson. At nightfall, 2 Para begins its march to Camilla Creek House, designated as the start line for the raid, but Thompson cancels the operation and troops return to Sussex Mountain

26 May

Northwood resurrects plan for raid against Goose Green. Jones is elated

27 May

In the early hours, 2 Para leaves Sussex Mountain for the second time and advances to Camilla Creek House. At 1000 hrs, BBC World Service announces presence of a parachute unit poised to attack Goose Green; at 1500 hrs Jones assembles ‘O’ group and issues company orders consisting of a six-phase, silent/noisy, night/day battalion attack

45 Commando and 3 Para commence ‘yomp’ and ‘tab’, respectively, from San Carlos to Mount Kent as preparation for assaults on ring of Argentine defences west of Stanley

28 May

Battle of Goose Green

29 May

Argentines surrender at Goose Green; over 1,200 prisoners taken

30 May

Major General Jeremy Moore arrives in the Falklands and replaces Thompson as land forces commander; Thompson resumes command over 3 Commando Brigade

31 May

42 Commando RM transported by air from San Carlos to Mount Kent, while 45 Commando reaches Teal Inlet on foot. 3 Para, also on foot, reaches Douglas Settlement

1 June

5 Brigade begins disembarking at San Carlos. 3 Commando Brigade forward HQ established at Teal Inlet

2 June

Helicopters ferry 2 Para to Bluff Cove in the south of the island

5 June

Scots Guards embark for Fitzroy aboard SirTristram

6 June

Welsh Guards embark for Fitzroy in HMS Fearless but ship withheld. Scots Guards land at Fitzroy, where 5 Brigade establishes forward base

8 June

Argentine aircraft bomb Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram at Fitzroy, killing dozens of Welsh Guardsmen and sailors. Moore finalises plans for final offensive against defenders dug in west of Stanley

11–12 June

Thompson launches three simultaneous battalion-sized attacks against Mount Longdon, Mount Harriet and Two Sisters

12–13 June

Two further simultaneous attacks, against Mount Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge

14 June

Argentine forces in the Falklands surrender to General Moore, bringing a close to the fighting as weather conditions continue to worsen and British supplies near exhaustion

20 June

In the final operation of the war, part of M Company, 42 Commando, Royal Marines accepts the surrender of Argentine garrison on the remote island of South Thule, South Sandwich Islands, 2,000km (1,240 miles) south-east of the Falklands

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:WHAT WERE THEY FIGHTING FOR?

The Falkland Islands are situated deep in the South Atlantic, 13,000km from Britain and approximately 650km from Argentina. In 1982 the islands were – and continue to be – the subject of a territorial dispute between the two countries. The dispute formally dates from 1833, but rests on a complex chain of events which preceded that year. In 1540, the islands appear to have formed a refuge for several months for the crew of a Spanish ship that survived a violent gale in the Straits of Magellan. The crew made no claim on behalf of Spain and did not leave a settlement behind. Half a century later, in 1592, the islands may have been sighted by the British vessel Desire, but there is no solid evidence of the authenticity of this claim and no landing appears to have been made at the time. A Dutch ship is confirmed to have sighted outlying islands of the Falklands two years later, but again, no settlers remained behind to establish a claim. The first confirmed British connection took place in 1690, when Captain (Capt.) John Strong, sailing the Welfare out of Plymouth, sighted land and sailed along the passage between the two main islands, naming this body of water Falkland Sound, in honour of Viscount Falkland, the First Lord of the Admiralty. Yet again, no one remained behind, leaving the place for the use of French seal-hunters, who from 1698 regularly landed there and named the islands Les Iles Malouines in honour of St Malo, their home port in Brittany. The Spanish subsequently altered the name to Las Malvinas, the title since adopted by the Argentines.

Actual settlement of the islands dates from 1764, when the French established a presence on Port Louis, East Falkland in an effort to colonise the islands as a whole. The following year Capt. John Byron, on behalf of the British government, landed on West Falkland at a place he dubbed Port Egmont, 130km (80 miles) from the French settlement, proclaiming both islands and the many hundreds of smaller ones around them on behalf of his sovereign – although he left behind no one to furnish substance to his claim. In 1766, another British captain landed a hundred settlers at Port Egmont, almost certainly unaware of the existence of the French settlement at Port Louis, although a short time later a British ship encountered the post and informed the inhabitants of their rival claim. Events became more complex the following year when, upon becoming aware of the existence of Port Louis, the Spanish disputed the French right to occupy what Madrid regarded as its territory. They did so on the grounds that the islands formed an offshore dependency of its mainland colony, the Royalty of La Plata, which included all of modern-day Argentina and considerably more territory besides. The French agreed to evacuate the islands in return for financial compensation, so enabling the Spanish to replace the garrison with one of their own, together with a governor at Puerto Soledad, their new name for Port Louis.