Action, Freedom and Responsibility E-Book

Subasini Barik

• Herausgeber: D.K. Printworld
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 298

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022

Beschreibung

This book, a work on human doing, analyses and applies three central aspects of human life – Action, Freedom and Responsibility – in the wide spectrum of the Philosophy of Mind. Reflections on these issues and their interconnections have a significant effect on the Philosophy of Value and application of ethical theories in practical life. This book even reconstructs the conceptual connection between action and freedom, on the one hand, and that between freedom and responsibility, on the other.
It also puts the concepts of freedom and determinism to critical test and reinterprets them from different angles and perspectives. The conventional doctrine of karma, based on the teachings of the BhagavadgÁtÀ, is relieved from its usual deterministic presentation and a logically reasonable explanation is offered.
Human actions and human agency are central concepts in the philosophy of mind and action. Free will and responsibility constitute the bedrock of the moral life of the human agents and the book pinpoints that freedom is meant to undertake the goal-oriented actions. It is, therefore, focused on the enquiry into the various aspects of philosophy of mind, as well as the philosophy of value.

Leseprobe

Action, Freedom and Responsibility

Action, Freedom and Responsibility

A Conceptual Study

Subasini Barik

Foreword by

P.K. Mohapatra

Cataloging in Publication Data — DK

[Courtesy: D.K. Agencies (P) Ltd. <[email protected]>]

Barik, Subasini, 1963- author.

Action, freedom and responsibility : a conceptual study /

Subasini Barik ; foreword by P.K. Mohapatra.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 9788124610640

. Act (Philosophy) 2. Free will and determinism.

. Responsibility. I. Title.

LCC B105.A35B37 2021 | DDC 128.4 23

ISBN: 978-81-246-1064-0 (Hardbound)

ISBN: 978-81-246-1112-8 (E-Book)

© Author

First published in India in 2021

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The publication of this book has been financially supported by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi. The responsibilities for the facts stated or the opinions expressed is entirely of the author(s)/editor(s) and not of the ICPR.

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Dedicated to

All Students and Teachers

of Philosophy

Auṁ

नहिकश्चित्क्षणमपिजातुतिष्ठत्यकर्मकृत्।

कार्यतेह्यवश: कर्मसर्व: प्रकृतिजैर्गुणै: ।।

– Bhagavadgītā 3.5

There is no one who can remain without action even for a moment. Indeed, all beings are compelled to act by their qualities born of material nature (the three guṇas).

तस्मादसक्त: सततंकार्यंकर्मसमाचर ।

असक्तोह्याचरन्कर्मपरमाप्नोतिपूरुष: ।।

– Bhagavadgītā 3.19

Therefore, giving up attachment, perform actions as a matter of duty, for by working without being attached to the fruits, one attains the Supreme.

Foreword

Action, freedom and responsibility form three crucial concepts in philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. If we do everything freely — that is, if we do X when we could have done otherwise — then we are responsible for what we do. This also forms the supposed foundational maxim of the Indian doctrine of karma — as you sow, so shall you reap. There is no escape from undergoing the consequences of one’s actions, and this virtually points at fatalism or determinism — a queer paradox, freedom of the will leading to outright determinism! In the present book the author Dr Subasini Barik comes to grips with this problem by analysing and even reconstructing the conceptual connection between action and freedom on the one hand and that between freedom and responsibility on the other. Along with this she also puts the concepts of freedom and determinism to critical test and reinterpretation, where necessary. Actions, which inevitably are backed by conscious intention of the agent, are clearly distinct from events that are passive occurrences in nature. The agent being endowed with the essential features of value sensitivity and self-transcendence, the moral aspect of the universe cannot be denied, if action explanation is backed by the conscious intentions of the free agent. In contrast, the theory of determinism has the inevitable feature of denying this. Barik steers clear between these extremes by reinterpreting the concepts of freedom as applied to human actions and pleads for a sort of compatibilism. Actions are not to be considered in abstraction, she argues. Depending on the nature of freedom exercised in particular actions, the nature of responsibility and desert are to be explained. For although actions are done intentionally and in that sense freely, such intentional doings are often interfered with by several antecedent factors, such as external and/or internal constraints. These constraints, however, do not impedeour moral judgements on actions. For example, a child brought up with meticulous care and even indoctrination for being good and doing things good, more often than not, would still be praised for doing something good and commendable. Determinism and freedom are thus compatible and action explanations are to be done accordingly. Abstraction and absolutism are philosopher’s myth and cannot help explaining human actions and their accountability with reasonable logical fervour.

The relation between action and freedom and also between freedom and responsibility is not of strict logical necessity, though this is a close conceptually necessary relation. Interestingly, with this sort of argumentation the author of this book seeks to review the law of karma — and that is one special feature of her analytic skill, I am happy to note. As you sow so you reap is true not only of our past actions over which we have no control, it is true also of our present actions, which are reasonably under our control. The operation of the karma doctrine is thus not only retrospective but also is significantly prospective. Accordingly, not only our present karmas but pace the injunction of theGītā, their intended consequences also should be within our control. The absolutist-deterministic reading of the karma doctrine, thus, loses force. The agent’s power of evaluation and pursuit of desire is therefore not something fixed and predictable but is open to alternatives chosen under specific situations. Fatalism or determinism is thus denied its full share in explaining actions, and freedom is salvaged in due proportion.To be sure we deserve the fruits of our actions; but from this near triviality it does not follow that we experience all that we deserve, nor that we deserve all that we experience or undergo.Karma alone is powerless in explaining desert in retributive morality. It is an admitted fact in Indian tradition that apart from adr̥ṣṭa (invisible)the role of self-effort (puruṣakāra)is fairly important in reaping the consequences of action. Yājñavalkya says that with subsequent good work and virtuous conduct some bad effects of one’s prārabdha can be effaced and his sañcita karmas can be stopped from fructifying. The law book of Baudhāyana also has injunctions to this effect. The freedom to regulate one’s saṁskāras in particular and to perform actions in general constitutes a very important aspect of the karma doctrine. Destiny is fairly modifiable; by his present efforts and virtuous actions man can help it or hinder it. Karma, therefore, is not inviolable and karmaphala is avoidable. In this spirit of analysis and reconstructive endeavour, the author has sought to relieve the doctrine of karma from its usual deterministic presentation and present a logically reasonable explanation.

The book deserves to be read and its arguments utilized for effective understanding of some of our very important concepts and conceptions occupying prominent positions in both Western and Indian philosophical corpus.

Prafulla K. Mohapatra

Bhubaneswar

14 May 2020

Preface

“An unexamined life is not worth living”, observes Socrates. “You must be the change you want to see in the world”, preaches Mahatma Gandhi. “Arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached”, advocates Swami Vivekananda. Reflection of these immortal statements of the great personalities leaves remarkable impact on my journey of life. All of them assure and ensure self-motivated and an introspective human intervention.

Every human act involves intention. Hence, the act of publishing a research work as it is after a long gap is equally intentional and self-motivating. If any research on human doing inflicts some impact on the researcher’s mind, the exercise becomes rewarding. The deliberated conceptual analysis once practised in everyday life with strong motivation reaffirms one’s conviction about the effectiveness of the work.

This book is a culmination of the analysis and application of three central aspects of human life: “Action”, “Freedom” and “Responsibility”. Being an ardent self-conscious and self-evaluative person, these concepts dragged me to the whirlpool of life that started questioning me every time before undertaking any task, simple or complex. The sense of responsibility always pushed me to a point where I could never think of anything other than offering the best in all endeavours of my life. The difficult experiences in application as well as the critical implication of these concepts in real life prompted me to put this work in print. The readers/further researchers are the real examiners of this work.

At the outset I am indebted to the various sources of materials (books/ journals /articles) indicated in the Bibliography and their authors, the great philosophers who have influenced me mostly to formulate my arguments for this study.

I take this opportunity to express my deep sense of gratitude and indebtedness to Professor Prafulla Kumar Mohapatra, my teacher, philosopher and guide for always being a constant source of inspiration with all kind of illuminating insights and critical observations all through my academic journey that helped me to accomplish this work. He has been very kind in providing a Foreword for this book.

I wish to place on record my special thanks to Prof. Roma Chakraborty, University of Calcutta, Professor Vibha Chaturvedi, University of Delhi (DU) and Professor Ramesh Pradhan, University of Hyderabad for their valuable comments and critical remarks on my work.

I am highly obliged to the Chairman, Indian Council of Philosophical Research and his team for offering me the publication grant, which encouraged me to publish this long-pending work.

A heartfelt gratitude to late Prof. G.K. Das, former Director South Campus, DU and former VC, Utkal University and my father late Shri Mayadhar Barik, who were my primary sources of inspiration and whose blessings really worked as the inner spirit behind this work. They would have been the happiest ones to see this work in print.

I am also grateful to my teachers/mentors Professor Aditya Mohanty Professor S.K. Mohanty, Professor Ashok Vohra and late Professor Tandra Patnaik who have always been a source of inspiration in all my academic pursuits.

I shall remain ever indebted to my friend Mr Ashwini Shankar for his contribution and support at the real time of need and Dr Sushim Dubey for his encouragement and keen interest in bringing out this book, without which this piece would have been a distant reality.

My special thanks are due to our principal Dr Rajiv Aggarwal and all colleagues at Deshbandhu College who provided me a very congenial environment and supported in many different ways to complete this work. Thanks are also due to my friends Dr Roshni Rajmohan and Dr Namita Gandhi for their genuine support and cooperation as and when required during this long journey.

My family deserves my personal gratitude. The work would not have been possible without the unconditional moral support extended by the entire family. I am indebted for ever to my “Maa” late Smt. Satyabhama Barik, whom I owe my existence and who made me the person I am today. Baby, my sister, despite her ill health, provided all kind of support as and when necessary and Tutu, my nephew always stood by me during every crucial time. It is also my responsibility to acknowledge the contribution of all my sisters Pankajini and Sarojini, and brothers, Gagan, Nagen and Prasanna for their each atomic and significant contribution since my formation age till today to accomplish this work with all dignity. Each member of the extended family deserves special thanks for their love, affection and support offered to me every time in many explained and unexplained ways.

I am thankful to Mr Susheel K. Mittal of D.K. Printworld and his editors for being very supportive to bring out this work with utmost care and attention.

I shall deem my labour amply rewarded if this work on human doing serves the needs of the scholars/readers and makes some impact on them.

Subasini Barik

Opinions

The book reveals how an intentional action, performed by a reflective self-evaluator, can come within the purview of moral actions. Addressing the doctrine of karma, with its conventional platitude, “as you sow, so you reap”, the author goes a step further to show how this principle can be reinterpreted and freed of its usual deterministic reading. Dr Barik firmly defends the central role of an agent who can choose her course of action and, thereby, can always create her world of moral values/desirability. — Prof. Roma Chakraborty

University of Calcutta, Kolkata

It’s a book on human actions and human agency which are central concepts in philosophy of mind and action. Free will and responsibility constitute the bedrock of the moral life of the human agents and freedom is the freedom for undertaking the goal-oriented actions. With such solid logical connections, Dr Barik exhaustively analyses these concepts and holds a compatibilist position on the nature of freedom vis-à-vis the world. This book, I am sure, will be a valuable addition to the growing literature on human actions, agency and freedom in moral philosophy and the allied field of human action.

— Prof. R.C. Pradhan

University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad

The book explores analytically the interrelationships among the concepts of action, freedom and responsibility. The author emphasizes that an agent’s reflective self-evaluation of own actions, rooted in her value perceptions, leads to second-order desires. These pave the way for  self-improvement and moral progress of the agent. The book would be of interest to both scholars and general readers because of its focus on important ethical concepts. — Prof. Vibha Chaturvedi

University of Delhi, Delhi

Contents

Foreword - P.K. Mohapatra

Preface

Opinions

Introduction

1. Nature and Concept of Action

Introduction

Action and Event

Action and Non-action

Refraining: An Act of Omission

Action as an Object of Moral Judgement

The Means–End Controversy

Free Will

2. Agency

Introduction

Formal Analysis

Natural Agency

Unnatural Agency (Agency in a secondary sense)

Supernatural Agency

Substantial Analysis

Features of Personhood

Reasons and Actions

Significance of Intention

The Doer, Deed and the done

Action and Free will

3. Action and Free Will

Introduction

A Systematic Account of Personal Agency

Ascription of Responsibility

Determinism

Libertarianism

The Argument from Deliberation

The Argument from Agent Causation

The Argument from Moral Responsibility

Compatibilism

A Critique of Determinism and Libertarianism

4. Action, Freedom and Responsibility

Introduction

Agency and Desire

The First-Order Desire and First-Order Action

Second-Order Desires or the Level of

Reflective Self-Evaluation

Motivational System and Evaluation System

5. Summary and Conclusion

Bibliography

Index

Introduction

From time immemorial, there is a great deal of debate and discussion about man, his genesis, nature and destiny. Yet, we have not converged on any common line of arguments or facts of delineation. We do, however, enter into a discourse about the thoughts and actions, undergoingsand responsibilities, as well as, the constraints and freedom of human domain in relation to the overall progress of the society. It is this quest for knowledge that encouraged me to undertake the present study on Action, FreedomandResponsibility in a meaningful philosophical perspective. The study seeks to analyse the three concepts of “action”, “freedom” and “responsibility” in the broad area of Philosophy of Mind. Reflections on these issues and their interconnections also have significant effect on the Philosophy of Value and application of ethical theories in practical life. Significantly, the philosophy of mind helps in analysing the concepts thoroughly and tries to establish a clear picture of each concept and their interconnection. The present book attempts to have a clear understanding of each concept and examine their correlation. The ethical theories, however, provide the distinctive features of man vis-à-vis the members of the other species through the application of normative standards and value paradigms. Hence, this work centres around an enquiry into these aspects of philosophy of mind, as well as the philosophy of value, where man is inevitably placed.

The first chapter concentrates on a comprehensive understanding of the concept of action as it is used in common usage, as well as in philosophical analysis. It is pointed out, as a generally agreed fact, that there is not much of a clear-cut barrier between the common usage and philosophical use of such concepts; in most cases philosophical use of the term is either roughly in keeping with the common usage, or is a modification thereof. At any rate, philosophical use is hardly in conflict with the common usage. Action is an intentional and a purposive doing of a rational agent. The distinction between event and action, action and non-action or refraining, etc. will be some important highlights of this chapter. Actions and events may look similar as processes of change, but the presence of human factor makes action purely personal and intentional, which is entirely different from the events. Thus, the philosophical use of action is confined to human doings only. The causal factor determining the performances of actions are not strictly mechanical, but guided by several subjective factors like intention, purpose and goal. Because of this, it has been shown that action-causation is typically different from event-causation. Because of the involvement of the rational subject, it is pointed out that actions often become unpredictable, for notwithstanding the agent’s power of freedom, he may choose not to act in accordance with what he wills. On this line, distinction has also been drawn between actions and non-actions. Attention is also drawn to the purely mental acts, which may not involve any manifested physical change in the agent. Prominent among such mental actions are what we call refraining, which may easily be confused with non-action, but which nevertheless is a kind of action after all. The cases of forebearance, voluntary stillness, abstention or chosen non-intervention are all cases of refraining. This chapter also discusses actions as objects of moral judgements. This is where the interconnection of action and freedom explains that the agent is essentially endowed with freedom of will. His intention behind the performance of action is normally backed by his free choice. The agent, therefore, is normally held morally responsible for his actions. The agent desires an end towards which he freely adopts a means and hence becomes accountable for whatever consequence follow from his action.

The second chapter is focused on the central character of the action analysis, i.e. “agency”. It is the agent, who initiates the action process for a certain purpose. Hence, without focusing on the agent, any discussion concerning action is either inadequate or futile. To have a clear understanding of the concept, the chapter demonstrates both, a formal as well as a substantial, analysis of agency. To this purpose, agency in general is classified into three parts, i.e. natural, unnatural and supernatural. Ultimately, it is argued that the natural–personal agents are considered to be the agents in the present context instead of all unnatural, supernatural and other natural agents like impersonal and non-personal agents. A formal as well as a substantial analysis of the concept of “agency” is put forth to support this view. A moral personal agent requires the essential qualities of self-transcendence and value-sensitivity along with all other necessary attributes like rationality, self-consciousness and communicability. This chapter will include a discussion on the essential features of personhood and primarily the subjective features of a person that led him to be known as an agent. Though, there are other animals, even plants, who have some specific qualities such as “natural instinct”, “wants” and “purposiveness” like that of the persons, it is argued here that animals and plants shall not be considered as agents, because the qualities they own are not sufficient for being an agent. Rather, it is the “intention” and “act of will” within the person, which identify him as an agent and which is lacking in all other creatures. The intention specifies the purpose behind the action. Hence, these internal features of the person provide the reason, as well as the justification, for that action. From this point of view, reasons for actions are different from the causes of the action. Reasons provide the internal features of an agent as the necessary condition for the occurrences of any action, which never go beyond the agent, and so, are not coming under the causal theory. It is pertinent to note that “intention” is the focal point of discussion here. With an intention the agent starts the action process and it is the “intention of the agent” only which fixes responsibility for the action, because responsibility will be ascribed to a person if and only if he does something intentionally and freely. Both intention and free will along with the physical behaviour constitute the means of the action, which justifies the end.

The third chapter entitled “Action and Free Will” starts with the discussion on a systematic account of personal agency with a view to have a clear picture of these crucial concepts and their interrelations. Paradigmatically, agents are identical with persons. This view is established by examining the mental features of an agent as well as of a person. An attempt is made here to combine the two unique features of self-reflection as well as self-evaluation, so that there evolves a reflective self-evaluator, who can control and direct his own actions for a higher objective, i.e. for a morally desirable and perfect world. Hence, responsibility is ascribed to him as he has freely opted for this path. At this point of discussion, it is also pointed out that every event has a cause, or everything is predetermined, is a widely accepted idea. But if it is accepted as such, then the role of an agent as a reflective self-evaluator will be subject to scrutiny. This chapter, thus, brings into focus the role of freedom in action-explanation in a way that has important bearings on the conventional discussions of freedom and determinism. Though the theory of determinism explains the predictability of events by denying the intervention of any rational conscious agent, thus leaving no scope for free will, it is argued that actions are different from events and have their origination in a conscious agent in contrast to any passive determining factor. The moral aspect of the universe can never be denied as we generally acknowledge our conscious effort in choosing good from bad, right from wrong, virtuous from vicious, etc. while performing an action. Simultaneously also, libertarianism tries to show the predominance of free will in place of determinism. At this point, it is argued clearly that neither are we totally in favour of determinism, where there is no scope for free choice, nor are we totally in favour of libertarianism, if it totally eliminates factors leading to, or responsible for, the performance of actions, which may therefore be described as random and capricious actions. That is, though actions are performed intentionally, and in that sense freely, such intentional doings may be quite often the results of several antecedental factors as discussed under internal and external constraints. Thus, there is a positive scope for compatibilism, which combines and reconciles determinism, as well as free will. It is practicable to make room for free will, as it certainly is, within the realm of action-explanations. It has also been explained that as a conscious agent, the person can and does exercise his free will in deciding a course of action and making any decision by utilizing his inner capacities like desire, intention, hopes and convictions.

In the fourth chapter an attempt is made to have a focused discussion of the three crucial concepts — “Action”, “Freedom” and “Responsibility” — and for a critical examination of their relationship. It is an established fact that action presupposes agency and the agent is held responsible for his freely willed actions. In this chapter, we consider the necessary connection between action and agent on the one hand and freedom and responsibility on the other. To this purpose an attempt has been made to provide a clear understanding of the action process and the actual role of freedom and responsibility in it. Considered in abstraction, free action implies responsibility, while determinism rules it out; while the former is open to moral evaluation, the latter, i.e. a determined action, leaves no scope for moral evaluation. But, in keeping with the actual usage and factual considerations, the chapter defends a theory of compatibilism, which provides a constructive analysis in between the two extreme views and also does justice to both. A further focus of the chapter is an analysis of the concepts of agency and desire. It is rather commonplace that desires and intentions are necessary antecedent features of human action, and freedom of will inevitably involves desires and intentions. However, the needs and wants, that non-human beings and things are said to have, cannot be termed as desire in the strict sense of the term. Because, normally, desires are associated with intention and connected with freedom of will, and in this sense they are primarily human-person specific. This chapter argues that neither is this a universal feature with all animals nor can it be a distinctive feature of the said higher animals. What distinguishes human persons from these higher animals is what we call the second-order desires or the higher-order intuitions. In respect of the latter, human agents are held responsible for their actions, which are not or cannot be true of even the so-called higher animals. Human beings are moral agents, who are praised or rewarded for good moral conducts and blamed or punished for moral failings. Human agents are considered as the primary owners of desires, needs and wants.

By way of conclusion, a compatibilistic position concerning human action and its relation to free will and responsibility is defended. It is shown that because these concepts are not necessarily connected and also because the human agent is a reflective self-evaluator with the power of exercising desires, depending on situations, that the scope of freedom in action, plays a central role in action-explanation. Actions and their consequences, thus, are not to be considered in abstraction, but in terms of the role of the agent whose power of evaluation and pursuit of desires is not something fixed and predictable, but is open to alternatives chosen in an appropriate manner under specific situations.

1

Nature and Concept of Action

Introduction

In any philosophical discussion concerning human being, the concept of action plays a crucially important role. It is by performing action that people can affect the world they live in and, thus, in some measure, control their environment too. It ensures a necessary connection between the worldly phenomena and the human activities, as human beings occupy a pivotal position in the phenomenal world. If we analyse the entire cosmic process, we find that one has nothing to do with the natural phenomena, which constitute a major part of life. Other than these natural phenomena, there are things which are mostly connected with the doings and undoings of human beings and which can also be measured and controlled by them. Among them the “doings” of human beings are named as “actions”. The very existence of human being is marked by actions along with all other happenings.

karmaṇy akarma yaḥ paśyed akarmaṇi ca karma yaḥ ।

sa buddhimān manuṣyeṣu sa yuktaḥ kr̥tsna-karma-kr̥t ।।

— BhagavadgītāIV.18

Act one must. Inaction or non-action is neither possible nor desirable. Our very existence, i.e. the practical exigencies, demands that we must act. If someone prefers not to do anything at all and abstains from necessary and obligatory actions, it would be deemed as a “bad action” rather than “non-action”.

— Mishra 1992: 9

As per the etymological meaning, the term “action” has its origin from the verb root “to act”. The words like “act”, “action” and “activity”have similar usage in the English literature. Among them the term “action” has manifold usages. In the analysis of the concept of action the use of those terms seems to be necessary. They are often used in philosophy, especially in ethics and jurisprudence. An action is called an act only when it can be described in a proposition with a personal subject. In that sense, every act — whether voluntary or involuntary — is an action but not every action is an act. Though the terms like “acts” and “actions” are not used in ordinary discourse, still there are some specific usages of such terms. The actions, which have a personal subject, come under the category of acts. But others, which do not have any personal subject, are not acts. In this sense, it is obvious that the term action is used in certain general cases, such as:

i. the bodily movements like action of heart, action of liver, etc.,

ii. the chemical processes or reactions like action of sulphuric acid or H2SO4,

iii. the physical or natural processes like action of cyclone, action of flood, action of sea rocks, and

iv. the mechanical processes like action of an atom bomb, action of a cylinder in an engine, etc.

None of these cases is a substitute for the case “act” which has a personal subject, in the philosophical use of the particular term “action”. Though this term is used in some of the above-mentioned general cases of movement of inanimate things, machineries, etc. or, in case of natural happenings, those implications of the term are arbitrarily vague.

Action is used to point a contrast between a state of quiescence and a state of movement, i.e. between action and inaction; activity and inactivity. However, the philosophical analysis concerning the concept of action must not be confused with the other important studies of language like philology, lexicography and grammar, which are primarily interested in empirical investigation. The job of a philosopher is to show the way out of bewilderment concerning a particular concept. Hence, he tries to find out the possible answers for certain important queries like

“What do we exactly mean by the concept of action?”,

“What is its nature and significance?”, and

“What are the distinctive features of the action?”.

In other words, philosophers are concerned with the meaning and the analysis of the concept. Ordinarily, by action we mean “what is done”. “To act” is to consciously effect a change in the external world or to influence the course of nature. But how do we define it? Does the term “action” refer to each and every doing of living beings? It invites a detailed discussion of the concept.

Action may broadly be classified into “mental action” as well as “physical action”. “Mental action” includes all types of mental processes like “forebearance”, “voluntary stillness”, “chosen non-intervention” of human beings; as we know human beings are endowed with the faculty of mind. The description “physical action” may apply to all types of movements and behaviours of all higher and lower animals as well as all the actions and reactions of the physical world like the natural events and disasters.

In philosophical enquiry, the question of action arises in connection with our ordinary dealings with impersonal things as well as with persons.

“I raised my hand” and “my hand is raised”

These are two different statements. In both the cases the physical movement of my hand (limb) is involved. The former case shows “I” (the person concerned or the doer) moved “my hand” knowingly and also states “my awareness” about the fact. The latter case may provide different possibilities regarding the incident/fact.

“My hand can be raised” at several occasions. It can be raised:

i. by somebody else other than me, or

ii. as a result of a reflex action, like if suddenly I face the possibility of some dangerous insects very close to my head, and to get rid of them I spontaneously raise my hand towards them, or

iii. as per Newton’s law “every action has an equal and opposite reaction”, or

iv. any kind of spontaneous bodily behaviour like sudden muscle contraction at any upper part of the body, as a result of which someone’s hand might go up.

This movement of a person entirely depends on the bodily mechanism, and so is beyond anybody’s control. Human effort has no contribution here at all. It seems that the human body plays an important role in the performance of human action. When we talk of action, a general question comes to mind — “what is an action?” Is it “raising my hand?”, where the physical movement includes a mental factor of the agent? Or exclusively “the physical movement”? Or, the total series of action?

Arthur Danto and many other thinkers have introduced the concept of “basic action” to close the gap between the mental factor of the human person as an agent and the physical movement. They tried to assimilate the agential power as well as his bodily movements, which are the prime requirements for the performance of an action.

For example, “the Pope blessed the child by raising his hand”.

In this case, this is a deliberate doing of an agent “the Pope”, and the act of blessing is performed by “raising his hand”. Thus, “Blessing” is an action the agent performed “by raising his hand”.

“I lightened the room by switching on the tubelight.”

Here “I”, the agent, performed an action “lightening the room” by “switching on the tubelight” for which “I pressed my finger in a typical manner on the switch”. In both the above-mentioned cases, the agent performs an action, i.e. “blessing the child” or “lightening the room” by doing something different, i.e. “by raising his hand” and by “a typical finger movement” respectively, without which in former case, the agent could not have played the role of a blesser, and in the latter case one would not have managed to lighten the room. Such physical movements or gestures on the part of an agent are the prime requirements for the performance of the actions. According to Danto, “these are actions which we do directly but not by doing something else” (1973: 28). Such basic actions may be considered to be the building blocks of action proper.

Action and Event

The notion of “an act” is related to the notion of “an event”, as a change in the world. What is the nature of this relationship? “To act is to effect a change in the external world.” Some believe that it is open for observation as a process of change. But it would not always be a right description. “Act” does not always bring a change in the world, though a few may quite appropriately be described as the bringing about or effecting (at will) a change. In this sense “to act” is to interfere with the course of nature. The term “action” is used in many cases, viz. action of rain, reflex action, habitual action, performance of an act, etc. As the concept of action is centrally related to human doings, the other uses of the term like action of rain, action of the atom bomb on Japan, etc. are the non-standard uses of the term. Strictly speaking, these natural/unnatural happenings of the world like action of rain are events. there is an intuitive distinction between the two different categories.

An event is a transition from one state-of-affairs to another, or from a state to a process, or from a process to a state or it may also be stated as a transformation of processes. It is something that occurs or happens to be, irrespective of any human intervention. Though action and event sometimes seem to have similar characteristics, they are different in the described way:

An act is contrasted with and distinguished from an event. An action is something that is done, while an event is something that is not done but can be said to have happened. Both acts and events are changes in the world of existence. In principle both are open to observation as a process of change.

— Macmurray 1938: 78

Hence, it can be admitted that actions and events differ in respect of differing modes of occurrence. While events are paradigmatically opposite occurrences that are causal consequences of some preceding events, actions are occurrences, which are owed to agents, conceived as unified centres of consciousness, endowed with cognitive, affective and volitional characteristics:

Event Z is caused by Y, which is caused by X, which is caused by W, which is caused by V, which is caused by ... . Like this the event W may result in X, which again yields in Y, which may further yield in Z, etc.

Such causal link in case of an event may end in infinity. Events admit of causal descriptions and explanations in such a way that if two events X and Y