After the Caliphate E-Book

Colin P Clarke

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 351

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2019

Beschreibung

In 2014, the declaration of the Islamic State caliphate was hailed as a major victory by the global jihadist movement. But it was short-lived. Three years on, the caliphate was destroyed, leaving its surviving fighters - many of whom were foreign recruits - to retreat and scatter across the globe. So what happens now? Is this the beginning of the end of IS? Or can it adapt and regroup after the physical fall of the caliphate? In this timely analysis, terrorism expert Colin P. Clarke takes stock of IS - its roots, its evolution, and its monumental setbacks - to assess the road ahead. The caliphate, he argues, was an anomaly. The future of the global jihadist movement will look very much like its past - with peripatetic and divided groups of militants dispersing to new battlefields, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, where they will join existing civil wars, establish safe havens and sanctuaries, and seek ways of conducting spectacular attacks in the West that inspire new followers. In this fragmented and atomized form, Clarke cautions, IS could become even more dangerous and challenging for counterterrorism forces, as its splinter groups threaten renewed and heightened violence across the globe.

Leseprobe

CONTENTS

Cover

Acknowledgments

Foreword by Ali H. Soufan

Introduction

Notes

1 The Long Road to the Caliphate

Evolution over Time

Ideological Underpinnings

Goals and Objectives

Strategic Decision-making

Organizational Structure

Campaigns and Operations

Franchise Groups and Affiliates

Notes

2 The Inner Workings of the Islamic State

Operational Capabilities

Organizational Capabilities

Notes

3 The Coming Terrorist Diaspora

IS Affiliates Abroad

Other Locations

Notes

4 From “Remain and Expand” to Survive and Persist

Preparation

Adaptation

Opportunism

Strategy

Tactics

Ongoing Debates in Jihadi Ideology

The IS–Al-Qaeda Dispute

The Future Is the Past

What Happens Next?

Notes

5 After the Caliphate: Preventing the Islamic State’s Return

Dealing with Returnees

Endgame for IS or New Beginnings?

Notes

Index

End User License Agreement

Tables

Chapter 3

Table 3.1

Analysis of IS affiliates

Guide

Cover

Table of Contents

Begin Reading

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Dedication

For my girls, Fiona and Maya

After the Caliphate

The Islamic State and the Future of the Terrorist Diaspora

Colin P. Clarke

polity

Copyright © Colin P. Clarke 2019

The right of Colin P. Clarke to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2019 by Polity Press

Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press101 Station LandingSuite 300Medford, MA 02155, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-3389-3

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataNames: Clarke, Colin P., author.Title: After the Caliphate : the Islamic State & the future of the terrorist diaspora / Colin P. Clarke.Description: Medford, MA : Polity Press, [2019] | Includes bibliographical references and index.Identifiers: LCCN 2018044631 (print) | LCCN 2018046064 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509533893 (Epub) | ISBN 9781509533879 (hardback) | ISBN 9781509533886 (pbk.)Subjects: LCSH: IS (Organization) | Terrorism--Religious aspects--Islam. | Terrorism--Prevention.Classification: LCC HV6433.I722 (ebook) | LCC HV6433.I722 C624 2019 (print) | DDC 363.325--dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018044631

The publisher has used its best endeavors to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.

Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to many people for contributing to this study and for their enduring support, without which this effort would not have been possible. I owe so much to the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA), especially to Phil Williams, who is both a mentor and a friend. At the RAND Corporation, I would like to thank my friends and colleagues Chad Serena, Christopher Paul, Patrick Johnston, Brian Michael Jenkins, Seth Jones, Andy Liepman, and Howard Shatz, among others, for intellectually stimulating conversations over the years. Also, special thanks are due to Valerie Nelson, who helped me with the dozens of op-eds that originally motivated me to write this book. Her help, but more importantly her sense of humor and wit, were indispensable to me while I was writing. At Carnegie Mellon University, I thank Kiron Skinner and my wonderful colleagues, as well as my students, with whom I’ve spent countless hours speaking about the subjects covered in this book.

At Polity, I would like to offer the sincerest thanks to Louise Knight, Nekane Tanaka Galdos, and their team. Polity was such a well-organized group and Louise’s sense of humor helped push me through. Her patience, encouragement, and kindness brightened many of my days.

I would like to acknowledge the many named and unnamed scholars and practitioners who took time away from their busy schedules to avail me of their expertise and knowledge in this area, whether in interviews or in conversations about this subject which helped shape my thinking, including Graeme Wood, Daniel Byman, John Horgan, Bruce Hoffman, J. M. Berger, Haroro Ingram, Aaron Zelin, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Michael Kenney, Martha Crenshaw, Elisabeth Kendall, Fred Wehrey, Mia Bloom, Derek Henry Flood, Zack Gold, Zachary Abuza, Jason Warner, Craig Whiteside, Amir Jadoon, Hassan Hassan, Amar Amarasingam, Charlie Winter, Rukmini Callimachi, Brian Fishman, Assaf Moghadam, Tom Joscelyn, Robin Simcox, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, Louis Klareves, Jean-Marc Oppenheim, Mary Beth Altier, and Sam Mullins.

I am so thankful to Ali Soufan and my colleagues at The Soufan Center in New York City. I read about Ali and his heroism when I was a graduate student and have always admired him, even before I knew him. Especially given the topic discussed in this book, which can be dark at times, I think this world needs more heroes, and Ali is one of mine. Moreover, sometimes people you idolize from afar let you down once you meet them in person, but not Ali. For all of his success, he’s an even better person, so it’s surreal that I now have the opportunity to work alongside him.

Many thanks to Alastair Reed, Renske van der Veer, Bart Schuurman, Christophe Paulussen, Jos Kosters, and my colleagues at The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT); Michael Noonan and my colleagues at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia; and Seamus Hughes and his team at the Program on Extremism at George Washington University.

Most importantly, I would like to thank my family and friends, who mean everything to me. I’ve been blessed to have a tight-knit group of friends and we’ve done an admirable job of keeping in touch over the many years. It’s amazing to watch how our lives have changed as we each raise families of our own. None of this would be possible without my parents, Phil and Maureen, who instilled in me the value of hard work, not by spelling it out explicitly, but by quietly setting the example. I love you guys. Thanks go to my brother Ryan and my sister Katie, who are my siblings but, more importantly, my friends. Lastly, I would like to thank my wife Colleen, an amazing partner and mother and the rock of our family. Her smile alone is enough to get me through my toughest days. Without her help, this book would certainly not have been possible.

Any and all mistakes contained here within are the sole responsibility of the author.

Foreword

Ali H. Soufan

Almost 18 years ago, the United States was attacked by al-Qaeda, a Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization of around 400 members, based primarily in Afghanistan and led by Osama bin Laden. The United States responded swiftly, and, along with its allies and partners, defeated that version of al-Qaeda. Today, however, a new jihadist threat has emerged around the world. It consists of many different organizations that have successfully embedded themselves in local conflicts, making them incredibly difficult to target.

In After the Caliphate, terrorism scholar Colin P. Clarke traces the evolution of the global jihadist movement from its earliest days all the way up to and through the collapse of the caliphate. In my career as an FBI Special Agent, I experienced firsthand the depth of commitment of some of al-Qaeda’s most committed ideologues. Clarke’s book goes a long way toward capturing the essence of what made al-Qaeda, and then the Islamic State (IS), so unique – an unwavering commitment to reinstating the rule of the caliphate through any means necessary. Over time, the leadership of the global jihadist movement has changed hands, from Osama bin Laden to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. What will the future of the movement look like? Will Hamza bin Laden, Osama’s son, re-emerge to lead al-Qaeda in its next chapter as the group seeks to reclaim the leadership of aspiring jihadists from Europe to the Middle East and beyond? Or will the movement splinter and fracture, leading to a decentralized and dispersed cluster of groups and lone actors tenuously linked by ideology and common cause?

During his bloody reign, the Jordanian al-Zarqawi planted the seeds for the rise of IS, exporting his draconian vision throughout the broader region. Other jihadist ideologues, including Abu Musab al-Suri, contributed significantly to the call to establish a caliphate, something al-Qaeda was never able to achieve but that IS ultimately did. Bloodshed plays into the jihadis’ overall game-plan, which has always been about exploiting chaos and weaponizing sectarianism. There is a common factor linking the franchise groups and affiliates of both IS and al-Qaeda. That factor is the narrative of bin Ladenism. We must dedicate ourselves to destroying that narrative and only when we do so will we finally defeat them. But the threat is far from static and has in fact mutated from an organization that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001 into what it is today – a dystopian ideology. Bullets don’t kill narratives, messages, thoughts, or beliefs. What we need is a new strategy that moves away from the myopic obsession with tactical gains and ad-hoc counterterrorism responses. Indeed, it is the legacy of our tactic-driven response to 9/11 that has facilitated the growth of bin Ladenism far beyond what Osama bin Laden could have ever imagined.

The United States in particular, and the West in general, have failed to adequately understand the worldview and belief system underpinning the global jihadist movement. In the words of Olivier Roy, a world-renowned scholar of Islam, the threat posed by IS is not about the radicalization of Islam, but, rather, about the Islamization of radicalism. Groups like al-Qaeda and IS have successfully mobilized the grievances of Muslims, especially young Muslim men, who are seeking to take control of their own destinies to provide meaning to what they see as an otherwise meaningless existence, characterized by mediocrity, isolation, tedium, and a perception of discrimination and an overall lack of opportunities to succeed in mainstream society. The global jihadist movement has filled this void by propagating a narrative that highlights the action, excitement, and camaraderie of joining the caliphate. IS excelled at tailoring its messages to myriad demographics and lowering the barriers to entry for those not well steeped in Islamic theology, culture, or practice.

Following the events of the Arab Spring, bin Laden ordered al-Qaeda to begin focusing more on issues directly related to the grassroots and local levels. The Iraq war was a primary motivation for many jihadists nearly a decade prior, when the US invasion of Iraq helped breathe new life into the ideology and narrative espoused by al-Qaeda. But the Arab Spring refocused the movement, or at least al-Qaeda, on rebuilding its network and planting the seed for future generations. Bruce Hoffman has called this deliberate strategy “quietly and patiently rebuilding.” The global jihadist movement endures by taking advantage of chaos in failed states and ungoverned territories. At a more granular level, al-Qaeda has used the past few years to refocus its effort, allowing IS to suffer the brunt of the West’s counterterrorism efforts while its members ingratiate themselves in parochial conflicts in Yemen, Mali, and the Philippines.

What primarily brings together jihadists in the contemporary era is no longer the shared experience of training camps, although that is one factor, but rather something far more tangible – a commitment to the jihadist narrative and the ideas and beliefs that drive the recruitment of new members and the regeneration of this global network of terrorists. If we ever hope to bring an end to the so-called Global War on Terror, it is essential to find political solutions to the conflicts in weak states where jihadist groups seek refuge and safe haven. Only by diminishing the environment that fuels radicalism and terrorism can the international community begin to make sustainable and lasting progress. This means looking beyond purely military solutions and working to ensure that those regions most beset by bin Ladenism have a vested interest in working together toward an improved future.

The cancer of bin Ladenism has metastasized across the Middle East and North Africa and beyond. The split between IS and al-Qaeda was part ideological, but also a difference between and among personalities. IS has changed from a terrorist group to a proto-state and is now reverting back to a clandestine guerrilla organization focused on subversion and the selective application of violence. Now that the caliphate has been crushed, Clarke’s book is critical in helping us understand what might happen next. From the deserts of North Africa to the jungles of Southeast Asia, After the Caliphate is a groundbreaking work of scholarship that fills a critical void in the contemporary literature on terrorism studies and should prove a useful guide to scholars and practitioners alike.

Introduction

“Soon after buying her, the fighter brought the teenage girl a round box containing four strips of pills, one of them colored red.”1 This is a line from a story by Rukmini Callimachi of The New York Times from March 12, 2016. Re-read that line again, and let it sink in. The sentence describes a jihadist terrorist from the Islamic State (IS) who purchased a teenage girl, from the Yazidi religious minority in Iraq, at the equivalent of a slave auction and was forcing her to consume birth-control pills to ensure that, no matter how many times he savagely raped her, his captive would not become pregnant. This situation played itself out throughout parts of territory in Iraq and Syria under the control of IS, which declared itself a caliphate and set out to build what terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw calls a “counter-state” using any and all means necessary, including rape, murder, and torture.2

The brutality was not merely limited to sexual slavery. There were also beheadings and crucifixions. Some IS captives were burned alive, while others were locked in a cage and submerged in water until they drowned. Many of these actions were recorded and posted online by the group itself, to promote a level of anomic violence that would come to shape and in many ways define its brand. Just a few years ago, horrified onlookers must have wondered how we arrived at a place where a terrorist organization could conquer and control territory, systematically eliminate its rivals, and intimidate the international community from action to halt this blatant display of barbarism.

By mid-2018, the physical caliphate had all but been destroyed, its fighters killed, captured, and chased from their erstwhile strongholds in Raqqa and Mosul. But, as Graeme Wood points out, the caliphate was more than just a territory or a proto-state – it was, and indeed still is, “a phenomenon in both physical and mental space.”3 IS as an idea, as an ideology, and as a worldview is far from over. The group will eventually seek to relocate to another country and establish new franchise and affiliate groups. The purpose of this book is to analyze what happens next with the Islamic State and to determine whether or not, and to what extent, it will manage to adapt and regroup after the physical fall of the caliphate. What form will its relationship with al-Qaeda take? How might its tactics and strategy change in the future? This book will attempt to answer these questions and more, while taking stock of IS – its roots, its evolution, and its monumental setbacks – to provide some insights into what the road ahead could look like.

In many respects, the establishment of the caliphate was an anomaly. Historically, the global jihadist movement has been largely decentralized, consistently inconsistent in its ability to marshal the resources and groundswell of support necessary to achieve anything close to what IS did when it established the caliphate with a headquarters in Raqqa. From bin Laden to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the global jihadist movement has had its share of charismatic personalities. But for the past four decades, it rarely constituted anything close to a monolithic movement operating with a common purpose and core agenda.

The future of the movement is therefore likely to resemble its past – with peripatetic and divided groups of militants dispersing to new battlefields, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, where they will join existing civil wars, establish safe havens and sanctuaries, and seek ways of conducting spectacular attacks in the West that inspire new followers and motivate existing supporters. In this fragmented and atomized form, IS could become even more dangerous and challenging for counterterrorism forces, as its splinter groups threaten renewed and heightened violence throughout the globe. Even if foreign fighters return home in much smaller numbers than initially expected, the next five-year period could very well be characterized by a spike in attacks.

At its peak from 2014 to 2016, the caliphate briefly represented the apex of the global jihadist movement – the closest thing it has ever had to a lasting presence. But with the caliphate in ruins, it will revert to decentralized and dispersed clusters of groups and lone individuals or self-starter groups, tenuously linked by ideology and common cause, although, as history has shown, over time parochial interests tend to trump the movement’s globally focused veneer.4 In order to understand how we got to where we are today and what lies ahead, it is critical to look back to the roots of IS – both how and what it learned from its predecessors, and how it differs from other milieus within the global jihadist universe.

The opening chapter takes us from the beginnings of the global Salafi-jihadist movement following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and traces its evolution through the next three decades, leading up to the events of September 11, 2001. Initially dubbed the “Arab Afghans,” fighters from the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere flocked to Afghanistan to help repel the Soviet Red Army following Moscow’s hasty invasion. These militants moved on following the Afghan conflict to form the core of al-Qaeda, growing the organization in Sudan before branching out to fight in places like Somalia, Bosnia, Algeria, and Chechnya during the 1990s. Differences over objectives and ideology led to numerous splits within the movement, as fighters dispersed from al-Qaeda to join existing militant groups throughout the globe, although due to the trappings of globalization, many were able to remain linked to the core organization from perches in Southeast Asia, Europe, and elsewhere.

After the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and an unrelenting drone campaign, al-Qaeda scattered and established franchise operations in Yemen (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP), North Africa (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM), and Iraq (al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI), while also maintaining ties with groups in parts of Africa (al-Shabaab) and Asia (Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemmah Islamiyah). Core al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan was largely decimated, but several of the franchise groups flourished during this period, including AQAP and AQI, the latter of which was led by the spiritual godfather of IS, the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Over time, AQI would morph into the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in the mid-2000s, a name which the group would keep until early 2013 when it changed officially to IS, following its falling-out with al-Qaeda. The detailed history of the movement described in this first chapter is critical because one potential future alternative in the post-caliphate environment is a return to the franchising model that al-Qaeda pioneered following the onslaught against its core organization based in South Asia.

The book then moves to explore the genesis of the Islamic State and the structural factors and variables that contributed to its rise, including rampant sectarianism in Iraq and the political vacuum caused by the Syrian civil war. A close look at IS infrastructure, decision-making apparatus, and its approach to building the caliphate shows how each informed the group’s approach to conquering new territory and implementing the pillars of a sovereign state, while also developing a unique ability to recruit foreign fighters. This analysis is accompanied by a strategic snapshot of IS’s ideology, its long-term objectives, and a discussion of the group’s capacity to plan and conduct attacks (operational capabilities) and to maintain itself as a cohesive entity (organizational capabilities). In particular, it is these organizational capabilities which will play a substantial role in determining the future of the organization, helping it transition smoothly from a territorially based insurgent organization to an underground, clandestine terrorist group. Its network-like qualities, affiliate franchise groups, and social media expertise contribute to its protean structure and ability to survive.

The Islamic State is a pioneering terrorist group in several ways, from its ability to raise and spend money to its multi-tiered approach to conducting terrorist attacks (inspired vs. directed). IS’s use of social media and encryption to direct terrorist attacks overseas sets it apart from any terrorist groups of the past. As evidenced by the Paris November 2015 attacks and the Brussels March 2016 attacks, at its peak, IS sustained the ability to strike into the heart of Europe. The second chapter examines various aspects of the group’s financing and its tactics, including how IS operates on the battlefield, from vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) to ambushes and hit-and-run attacks. This extends to IS’s exhortation for its followers to conduct attacks in the West, including a synopsis of so-called vehicular terrorism, a tactic pioneered by IS that has emerged as a new trend in terrorism directed against the West.

Chapter 3 offers a rigorous evaluation of the Islamic State’s future, based – in part – on the current trends we are witnessing. This includes a deeper discussion of the so-called free-agent jihadists or roving militants who will seek to travel to active conflict zones to link up with existing terrorist and insurgent groups, acting as a force multiplier. For most of its surviving fighters, the war is not over – many of these militants will almost certainly move on to new battlefields to continue waging jihad. As New Yorker columnist and Middle East expert Robin Wright recently commented, “hundreds of jihadis are believed to be searching for new battlefields or refuge in Muslim countries.”5 The mobilization of jihadists in Iraq and Syria dwarfs similar phenomena that helped define civil wars and insurgencies in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Algeria, and Chechnya. This is an especially ominous observation since the foreign fighter networks formed during those conflicts went on to form the core of al-Qaeda.

Wherever IS fighters fleeing Iraq and Syria congregate next, it will most probably be in a weak state plagued by persistent civil conflict, sectarian tensions, and an inability of the government to maintain a monopoly on the use of force within its borders. There are several potential candidates for the next IS headquarters, including North Africa (Libya, the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt), Central Asia (Afghanistan, the Caucasus), Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Indonesia), or destinations within the Middle East, possibly including Yemen. What these destinations have in common are weak security services, existing or recent sectarian conflict, and a population considered fertile for and receptive to the Islamic State’s propaganda. Moreover, recent IS propaganda has demonstrated an interest in expanding beyond already-existing affiliates, to include insinuating its fighters and garnering new recruits in countries like Myanmar, India, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The penultimate chapter focuses on “core IS” in Iraq and Syria and how it will seek to transition from an insurgent organization to a terrorist group. Three years after IS captured major cities and towns throughout Iraq and Syria, the anti-IS coalition has made significant progress in countering the group and retaking territory. Nevertheless, predictions of the group’s ultimate demise are premature. Rather than an end to the group, what we are witnessing is more accurately a transition from an insurgent organization with a fixed headquarters to a clandestine terrorist network dispersed throughout the region and globe. The differences matter, as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are two completely different strategies. Insurgent organizations hold and seize territory, can exercise sovereignty over a population, operate in the open as armed units, and can engage in mass mobilization, while terrorists conduct attacks with members operating in small cells – they rarely hold territory, and if they do it tends to be for a short period of time. At the time of this writing, IS leadership is more fractured, flimsy, and sporadic than at any point to date, but its intelligence service, the Emni, remains intact and is working to exploit missteps by the Islamic State’s adversaries, including the Kurds, the Assad regime, and the Iraqi government, especially to the extent that these actors reinforce already-existing sectarian issues in the region.

One major inflection point is IS’s ongoing competition with al-Qaeda and whether this will result in IS seeking rapprochement with the latter group or, on the contrary, intensifying its current rivalry as a way to differentiate itself and “outbid” its erstwhile collaborator. IS and al-Qaeda are competing for influence throughout the globe: in Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Mali, Sinai, South and Southeast Asia, Syria/Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus, and Africa. As IS fighters disperse following the collapse of the caliphate, some have speculated that these fighters will reinforce existing wilayats, or provinces, but the collapse could have a deleterious effect upon the IS brand and thus lead to an ascendant al-Qaeda in places we might expect to see IS reinforced. Current and aspiring jihadists may view the al-Qaeda–IS relationship and competition through a zero-sum lens; the two groups “play off each other’s successes and failures.”6 In some theatres, the two groups may engage in a process of outbidding, ramping up violence in the near term to prove dedication and capability. The question of “preference divergence,” wherein franchises face the dilemma of investing in local interests versus diverting resources toward global objectives, now seems more relevant than at any previous point in the conflict.

What is being done to counter IS and its returnees, including the hardcore fighters and mercenaries who will remain in the region, is the focus of the final chapter. This includes finances, logistics, and support for existing militant structures throughout the region and beyond. What are the policy implications of dealing with returning foreign fighters? What can and should states do to help deal with this immense challenge? Finally, how will the counterterrorism strategy pursued by the West affect the various trajectories of the splintered IS elements?

Answering these and other questions, this chapter engages with the myriad public policy issues concomitant with returnees and the decision of how best to reintegrate these people into society, or whether to deal with them in a more punitive manner. Entire families that at one time willingly departed Europe to join the Islamic State are now trickling back home, posing significant challenges to European authorities. Not all returnees should be viewed the same, as some will be willing to reintegrate, others will be reluctant to, and still others may be incapable of doing so, traumatized by the horrors of what they witnessed (and in some cases participated in) during the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

While causing a terrorist organization to break apart might seem like a positive outcome – indeed, this is one of the primary objectives of most counterterrorism campaigns – it often causes the emergence of new, and in some cases more violent, splinter organizations (indeed, we could already be witnessing this in parts of the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt). Dismantling and destroying IS and similar organizations are worthy strategic goals, but policymakers must also be prepared to limit the effectiveness of splinter groups as they emerge in the aftermath of a successful campaign against the parent group. The coalition fighting IS must continue to pursue a multipronged strategy. On the one hand, splinter cells must be aggressively targeted through capture-and-kill operations to prevent further metastasizing. On the other, this approach cannot be pursued in isolation; rather, it must be coupled with efforts to promote good governance and reduce corruption in fragile states while building the partner capacity of security forces in the most affected countries.

Countering IS has become a global priority. Yet there still exists nothing close to an international consensus on what must be done to prevent a future mobilization of jihadists motivated by a desire to establish a caliphate by any and all means necessary, with death and destruction paramount to this quest. The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS consisted of five specific lines of effort, including: providing military support to partners fighting IS; impeding the worldwide flow of foreign fighters; stopping the financing and funding of its organization; addressing humanitarian crises in the region; and exposing the true and odious nature of this barbaric group determined to enslave its enemies and conquer its neighbors. The international community has vowed “never again,” but can it keep that pledge? What makes this time different? This book offers some possible responses to the threat posed by a resurgent, post-caliphate IS. But first, let’s go back to the beginning – to 1979 – and the events that triggered the modern era of the global jihadist movement and everything it epitomizes.

Notes

1.

Rukmini Callimachi, “To Maintain Supply of Sex Slaves, ISIS Pushes Birth Control,”

New York Times

, March 12, 2016.

2.

Email exchange with Martha Crenshaw, June 2018.

3.

Email exchange with journalist and author of

The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with The Islamic State

, Graeme Wood, June 2018.

4.

Although most analysis focuses on the macro-, or group level, it is important not to discard the micro-level view of focusing on lone actors. For more, see Boaz Ganor, Bruce Hoffman, Marlene Mazel, and Matthew Levitt, “Lone Wolf: Passing Fad or Terror Threat of the Future?” in Matthew Levitt, ed.,

Neither Remaining Nor Expanding: The Decline of the Islamic State,

Counterterrorism Lectures 2016–2017 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018), pp. 69–73.

5.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/isis-jihadis-have-returned-home-by-the-thousands

.

6.

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf

, p. 7.

1The Long Road to the Caliphate

Osama bin Laden was killed on May 2, 2011, following a United States Special Operations Forces raid on his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. His death marked a major turning point in the US-led Global War on Terror, closing a chapter that had begun nearly a decade earlier on September 11, 2001. But the significance of bin Laden to the global jihadist movement goes back much further, and can be traced back to Afghanistan in late 1979, following the Soviet invasion of that country and the subsequent defense of the territory by Afghans and foreign fighters from throughout the Islamic world.1 The earliest known attempt to organize foreign fighters, many of them from Arab countries, was through the establishment of al-Qaeda,2 or “the Base,” at a meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1988. Al-Qaeda itself was the outgrowth of an organization called Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), established by a Palestinian named Abdullah Azzam.

The organization’s early efforts focused on recruiting Arab fighters to join the resistance in Afghanistan, where the so-called mujahedin, or holy warriors, were fighting to expel Soviet troops from the country.3 At this point in al-Qaeda’s nascent history, the goal of establishing a caliphate was more of an abstraction than anything. The immediate necessity was merely embryonic survival. Early members of MAK, which was initially founded in 1984, included Azzam, bin Laden, and the Algerian Abdullah Anas. In the mid-1980s, bin Laden met and joined forces with Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of core al-Qaeda. Zawahiri eventually merged key members of his group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), with al-Qaeda, once it emerged as its own entity in the late 1980s, at which point MAK had become more focused on humanitarian efforts rather than actual fighting.4

Al-Qaeda has continued to evolve over the years. Now entering its third decade, al-Qaeda is many things – terrorist organization, global jihadist network, brand and franchise group for Salafi-jihadists throughout the world. But beyond al-Qaeda, the global jihadist movement is a collection of groups and personalities – it is far from the unitary actor so often portrayed in the media. This trope actually plays into the hands of the jihadists, distorting the magnitude of the threat and making the movement seem omnipotent, when in reality it suffers from many of the same shortcomings, vulnerabilities, principal–agent and collective action challenges as other transnational non-state actors. The establishment of the caliphate has been a unifying, if not quixotic, rallying point for jihadists. But it’s been more of a battle cry, or an ideal, than an actual realization. That is, until IS was able to establish one that spanned the deserts of Syria and major cities in Iraq.

To many, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda represented the threat posed by jihadists to the West. But as witnessed by the emergence of the IS, the threat is, and in fact always has been, much broader than al-Qaeda. So while the killing of bin Laden was both a symbolic and tactical achievement against al-Qaeda and its allies, from a strategic standpoint, the battle continues. Even in the immediate aftermath of bin Laden’s death, few serious commentators believed that his demise in any way signaled the end of the global jihadist movement. Accordingly, remarking on the event, reputed terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins soberly noted, “the death of bin Laden does not end al-Qaeda’s global terrorist campaign.”5 Nor did it foreshadow an end to the global jihadist movement that al-Qaeda helped to spawn.

Al-Qaeda has always been a central node – indeed, the central node – in the constellation of jihadist entities throughout the globe. But the movement is much bigger than one man, more complex than one organization. This book takes as its starting point the global jihadist movement as it coalesced during the Soviet–Afghan War, and the 1980s as its logical beginning. The movement as a whole remains the unit of analysis throughout this research. To even begin to understand what the global jihadist movement is, there are several critical questions this chapter will seek to answer:

What are the origins of the global jihadist movement and how has it evolved over time?

What is the ideology underpinning and motivating this movement?

What are the goals and objectives of the movement?

What strategy is the movement pursuing to achieve its goals?

How is the movement structured to execute this strategy?

Evolution over Time

“The global jihadist movement” is a rather broad term encompassing groups, organizations, and individuals, as well as hinting at a specific worldview motivated by the ideology of Salafi-jihad, which advocates a raised awareness among Muslims to reclaim their faith and use violence, when necessary, to restore Islam to its proper status as a beacon of religious, political, military, economic, and cultural guidance.6 There is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes the global jihadist movement or how to measure its evolution over time, which provides scholars with a real challenge in terms of analysis.

This all leads to the difficulty of attempting to study the movement as a singular and consistent unit of analysis. Even al-Qaeda, certainly a more discrete entity, poses “a common analytic problem” in terms of “defining just what the group is.”7 It is part of the reason why, even years after the 9/11 attacks, prominent terrorism scholars still openly posited the question, “what is the current Al Qaeda? An organization? A movement? An ideology?”8 To ascertain a more fundamental understanding of al-Qaeda and the global jihadist movement it helped create, it might make sense to start with the death of its leader, an event that left millions worldwide hopeful that the scourge of Salafijihadist terrorism would die along with the man who was, for more than a decade, the world’s most sought-after man.

Al-Qaeda, perhaps correctly, is frequently analyzed as the nucleus of the global jihadist movement, conceptualized as four distinct – though not mutually exclusive – dimensions: al-Qaeda Central; al-Qaeda Affiliates and Associates; al-Qaeda Locals; and the al-Qaeda Network. Al-Qaeda Central is essentially the core of the original al-Qaeda and is comprised of the group’s initial leadership, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, and is based in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda Affiliates and Associates are made up of “formally established” terrorist groups that have worked closely with al-Qaeda over the years, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Jemmah Islamiyah in Indonesia. Al-Qaeda Locals are “amorphous groups of Al Qaeda adherents” with “a previous connection of some kind” to al-Qaeda, no matter how tenuous. Finally, the al-Qaeda Network consists of homegrown Islamic radicals scattered throughout the globe with no connection whatsoever with al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group, but who are prepared to conduct an attack in solidarity with the ideology of Salafi-jihad.9

Daniel Byman’s analysis largely overlaps with Hoffman’s, but instead collapses the second and third categories together, which he labels as “formal Al Qaeda affiliates or other groups that have varied relationships with the core but cooperate at least to some extent.”10 But the most satisfying analysis of the global jihadist movement is by Seth Jones, who also largely agrees with both Hoffman and Byman, but who more clearly draws a distinction between “affiliated Al Qaeda groups” and “other Salafi-jihadist groups.” The former are groups that became formal branches of al-Qaeda by having their emirs swear bay’at – loyalty – to core al-Qaeda’s leaders, which is then either officially accepted or rejected.11 At one time, al-Qaeda affiliates included al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in Syria. More recent developments regarding the latter two groups will be discussed in more detail in forthcoming chapters. Groups that are more appropriately labeled as “other Salafijihadist groups” include Ansar al-Sharia Libya, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and Imarat Kavkaz in the Caucasus.12 Byman refers to similar groups, namely those that might receive training from a franchise group, as Ansar Dine in Mali did from AQIM, as “affiliates, once-removed,” something akin to a jihadi distant cousin.13

Ideological Underpinnings

It would be wholly inaccurate to attempt to portray a monolithic ideology shared by the global jihadist movement. But, writ large, the ideology of Salafi-jihadism is the overarching banner under which most of the world’s violent Sunni jihadists unite. This ideology is a specific strand of militant Sunni Islamism and can be defined as groups that stress the need to return to the “pure” Islam practiced by the Salaf, or pious ancestors, and those believing that violent jihad is a personal religious duty.14 Many trace the origins of this line of thought back to Ibn Taymiyyah, an Islamic philosopher who advocated and participated in jihad against the Crusaders and the Mongols in the late thirteenth century.15 Still others list the most prominent influences for modern-day jihadists as the Muslim Brotherhood, or Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist whose views had a tremendous impact upon leading al-Qaeda ideologues, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, who credited Qutb with being “the spark that ignited the Islamic revolution against the enemies of Islam at home and abroad.”16

But Azzam found the Brothers’ worldview to be slightly parochial and instead agitated for a different ideology, one based on a “territorial view of Islam” focused on the necessity of driving infidels from Muslim lands.17 In 1984, Azzam authored a fatwa titled In Defence of Muslim Lands, which provided the ideological underpinnings of modern-day jihad, laying out the justifications for and the differences between offensive and defensive jihad.18