Alexander II E-Book

Richard D. Oram

• Herausgeber: Birlinn
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 688

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2012

Beschreibung

By equal measure state-builder and political unifier and ruthless opportunist and bloody-handed aggressor, Alexander II has been praised or vilified by past historians but has rarely been viewed in the round. This book explores the king's successes and failures, offering a fresh assessment of his contribution to the making of Scotland as a nation. It lifts the focus from an introspective national history to look at the man and his kingdom in wider British and European history, examining his international relationships and offering the first detailed analysis of the efforts to work out a lasting diplomatic solution to Anglo-Scottish conflict over his inherited claims to the northern counties of England. More than just a political narrative, the book also seeks to illuminate aspects of the king's character and his relationships with those around him, especially his mother, his first wife Joan Plantagenet, and the great magnates, clerics and officials who served in his household and administration. The book illustrates the processes by which the mosaic of petty principalities and rival power-bases that covered the map of late 12th-century Scotland had become by the mid-13th century a unified state, hybrid in culture(s) and multilingual but acknowledging a common identity as Scots.

Leseprobe

ALEXANDER II, KING OF SCOTS

This eBook edition published in 2013 by Birlinn Limited West Newington House Newington Road Edinburgh EH9 1QSwww.birlinn.co.uk

Copyright © Richard Oram 2012

First published in 2012 by John Donald, an imprint of Birlinn Ltd

The moral right of Richard Oram to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form without the express written permission of the publisher.

ISBN: 978-1-904607-92-2 eBook ISBN: 978-1-907909-05-4

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Contents

List of Plates

Acknowledgements and Dedication

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

1 The Shadow of the Past: Alexander’s Heritage

2 The Fox-Cub and the Old Lion

3 Finding a Just Peace

4 Master in His Own House, 1215–1235

5 The Best of Friends and Neighbours?

6 Alexander Triumphant

7 The Church, the King and the King’s Faith

8 Intellectual and Material Culture in Alexander II’s Scotland

Conclusion

Bibliography

Index

Plates

1 Norham Castle, Northumberland: scene of William the Lion’s stormy meeting with King John.

2 Arbroath Abbey, Angus: Alexander’s first formal act as king was to join the cortege carrying his father’s body from the bridgend at Perth to its burial-place in William’s unfinished abbey at Arbroath.

3 Forfar Castle, Angus: the nineteenth-century tower marks the site of the royal castle where Alexander held his first Christmas court in 1214.

4 Brougham Castle, Cumbria: the donjon of Robert de Vieuxpont’s castle which held out against Scottish attack in the war of 1215–17.

5 Barnard Castle, Co Durham: Alexander failed to take the castle during his race south to join the Dauphin Louis at Dover.

6 York Minster, York: scene of Alexander’s marriage to Joan, sister of Henry III of England.

7 Tarbert Castle, Argyll and Bute: the grass-grown ruins of the castle built by Alexander to dominate Kintyre and the adjacent islands.

8 Fotheringhay Castle, Northamptonshire: only earthworks survive of the key castle of the earldom of Huntingdon, which Alexander sought to control during the minority of his cousin, Earl John.

9 Council Buildings, Forfar, Angus: the market cross where the last member of the MacWilliam family was brutally slain in 1231 stood in the street in front of the later burgh-council meeting-place.

10 Rothesay Castle, Argyll and Bute: stormed by the Norwegians in 1230 during their intervention in the civil war in the kingdom of the Isles.

11 Tomb of Alan of Galloway, Dundrennan Abbey, Dumfries and Galloway: the broken effigy in the north transept is identified traditionally as that of the last and greatest of Galloway’s native rulers.

12 Urquhart Castle, Highland: the highest point of the castle at centre right is the remains of the shell-keep built by Alan Durward, to whom Alexander had granted this highly-strategic lordship which controlled the Great Glen.

13 Coucy-le-Chateau en Affrique, France: the outer curtain of the great castle of Queen Marie’s family in north-eastern France.

14 Sound of Kerrera, Argyll and Bute: looking south across Oban Bay from Dunollie towards the island where Alexander died.

15 Melrose Abbey, Scottish Borders: the abbey church looking east from the fragments of the twelfth-century west front, the only surviving portion of the church that Alexander knew, towards the site of his tomb in the choir.

16 Balmerino Abbey, Fife: the fragmentary remains of the Cistercian abbey founded by Queen Ermengarde and the location of her tomb.

17 Pluscarden Priory, Moray: the restored crossing and choir of the church of the Valliscaulian monastery founded by Alexander II at the end of his long struggle with the MacWilliams.

18 Elgin Cathedral, Moray: the western towers and south transept of the new cathedral church commenced by Bishop Andrew de Moravia.

19 Dunblane Cathedral, Central: the tower of the cathedral inherited by Bishop Clement in 1233 and the nave of the new church which he commenced.

20 Glasgow Cathedral, Glasgow: interior of the choir of Bishop William de Bondington’s cathedral.

Acknowledgements and Dedication

I owe a huge debt of gratitude to many friends and colleagues who have endured my waxing lyrical about many of the finer points of Alexander II’s reign over the last two years as this work has finally come together. Particular thanks are owed to Alasdair Ross, whose research on Moray has transformed thinking about the relationship of this region with the crown and with Alexander’s MacWilliam rivals, and Michael Penman, whose work on Alexander’s personal faith made me rethink many of my preconceptions on the king’s relationship with the Church across his reign. My greatest thanks, however, are to my friend and colleague Richard Fawcett, whose encyclopaedic knowledge of Scottish medieval architecture and abundant generosity with his time, and with whom close research collaborations on Scottish medieval parish churches, the abbeys of Melrose and Dryburgh, and most recently Elgin Cathedral, have hugely enriched my understanding of the cultural achievements of Alexander’s day. Thanks are also very much due to Hugh Andrew for his patience in waiting for this text whilst I worked on an overdue commitment to another publisher, to Mairi Sutherland who has helped to steer the book to its final stages, and to all the other staff at Birlinn/John Donald whose patience I have tested thoroughly over the years.

To my son, Alasdair, who thankfully is neither named after Alexander II nor shares his more unpleasant characteristics, this book is dedicated to you.

Richard Oram, Stirling, 2012

Abbreviations

ALC

Annals of Loch Cé, http://www.ucc.ie/celt/online/T1000010A

Anderson (ed.), Early Sources

Anderson, A O (ed.), Early Sources of Scottish History, AD500–1286, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1922)

Anderson (ed.), Scottish Annals

Anderson, A O (ed.), Scottish Annals from English Chroniclers, AD500–1286 (London, 1908)

Annales Monastici

Annales Monastici, ed. H R Luard, 5 volumes (London, 1864–9)

APS

The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, ed. T Thomson and C Innes (Edinburgh, 1814–75)

Arbroath Liber

Liber Sancte Thome de Aberbrothoc, 2 vols (1848–56)

AU

Annals of Ulster, http://www.ucc.ie/celt/online/T100001A

Balmerino Liber

Liber Sancte Marie de Balmorinach (Abbotsford, 1844)

Benedict of Peterborough

Benedict of Peterborough, Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, ed. W Stubbs, 2 vols (London, 1867)

Bower, Scotichronicon

Bower, W, Scotichronicon, ed. D E R Watt and others, 9 vols (Aberdeen, 1987–98)

Cal. Pat. Rolls

Calendar of the Patent Rolls of Henry III, 1216–25 (London, 1901); 1225–32 (London, 1903); and 1232–47 (London, 1906).

Cambuskenneth Register

Registrum Monasterii Sancte Marie de Cambuskenneth (Grampian Club, 1872)

CDI

Calendar of Documents Relating to Ireland, ed. H S Sweetman (London, 1875)

CDS

Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, ed. J Bain, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1881)

Chron. Fordun

John of Fordun’s Chronicle of the Scottish Nation, ed. W F Skene (Edinburgh, 1872)

Chron. Lanercost

Chronicon de Lanercost (Maitland Club, 1839)

Chron. Man.

Chronica Regum Manniae et Insularum. The Chronicle of Man and the Isles. A Facsimile of the Manuscript Codex Julius A. VIII in the British Museum (Douglas, 1944)

Chron. Melrose

Chronicle of Melrose (facsimile edition), eds A O Anderson and others (London, 1936)

Chron. Pluscarden

Liber Pluscardenis, ed. F J Skene (Edinburgh, 1877–80)

Chron. Wyntoun

The Original Chronicle of Andrew of Wyntoun (Scottish Text Society, 1903–14)

Close Rolls Henry III

Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, 14 vols (London, 1902–38)

CPL

Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers Relating to Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters, ed. W H Bliss and others (London, 1893–present)

Dunfermline Register

Registrum de Dunfermelyn (Bannatyne Club, 1842)

Durham Liber Vitae

Liber Vitae Ecclesiae Dunelmensis, ed. J Stevenson (Surtees Society, 1841)

Foedera

Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et Cuiuscunque Generis Acta Publica, ed. T Rymer (Records Commission edition, 1816–69)

Glasgow Register

Registrum Episcopatus Glasguensis (Bannatyne and Maitland Clubs, 1843)

Henry III Letters

Royal and Other Historical Letters Illustrative of the Reign of Henry III, ed. W W Shirley, 2 vols (London, 1862–6)

Histoire des Ducs de Normandie

Histoire des Ducs de Normandie et des Rois d’Angleterre, ed. F Michel (Paris, 1840)

Holyrood Liber

Liber Cartarum Sancte Crucis (Bannatyne Club, 1840)

Kelso Liber

Liber Sancte Marie de Calchou (Bannatyne Club, 1846)

Letters of Guala

Letters and Charters of Cardinal Guala Bicchieri, Papal Legate in England 1216–1218, ed. N Vincent, Canterbury and York Society series, 83 (Woodridge, 1996) (1996)

Macphail, Pluscardyn

Macphail, S R, History of the Religious House of Pluscardyn (Edinburgh, 1881)

Matthew Paris, Chron. Majora

Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, ed. H R Luard, 7 vols (London, 1872–84)

Matthew Paris, Historia Anglorum

Matthew Paris, Historia Anglorum, ed F Madden, 3 vols (London, 1866–9)

Melrose Liber

Liber Sancte Marie de Melrose (Bannatyne Club, 1837)

Moray Register

Registrum Episcopatus Moraviensis (Bannatyne Club, 1847)

Newbattle Register

Registrum Sancte Marie de Neubotle (Bannatyne Club, 1849)

Paisley Register

Registrum Monasterii de Passelet (Maitland Club, 1832)

Raine, North Durham

Raine, J, The History and Antiquities of North Durham (London, 1852).

Register of Walter Grey

Register of Walter Grey, Lord Archbishop of York, ed. J Raine (Surtees Society, 1870)

RLP

Rotuli Litterarum Patentiumin Turri Londiniensi Asservati, ed. T Duffus Hardy (London, 1835)

RMS

Registrum Magni Sigilli Regum Scotorum, ed. J M Thomson and others (Edinburgh, 1882–1914)

Robertson, Concilia

Concilia Scotiae: Ecclesiae Scoticanae Statuta tam Provinvialia quam Synodalia quae Supersunt, 1225–1559: Statuta Ecclesiae Scoticana, ed. J Robertson, 2 vols (Bannatyne Club, 1866)

Roger of Howden, Chronica

Chronica Roger de Hovedon, ed. W Stubbs, 4 vols (London, 1868–71)

Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum

Rogeri de Wendover, Liber qui dicitur Flores Historiarum ab anno Domini MCLIV annoque Henrici Anglorum regis secundi primo, ed. H G Hewlett, 3 vols (London, 1886–9)

RRS, vol. 2

Regesta Regum Scottorum, vol. 2: The Acts of William I, ed. G W S Barrow (Edinburgh, 1971)

RRS, vol. 5

Regesta Regum Scottorum, vol. 5, The Acts of Robert I, ed. A A M Duncan (Edinburgh, 1988)

RRS, vol. 6

Regesta Regum Scotorum, vol. 6, The Acts of David II, ed. B Webster (Edinburgh, 1976)

Scone Liber

Liber Ecclesie de Scon (Bannatyne Club, 1843)

Theiner (ed.), Vetera Monumenta

Theiner, A (ed.), Vetera Monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum Historiam Illustrantia (Rome, 1864)

Walter of Coventry, Memoriale

Memoriale Fratris Walteri de Coventreia, ed. W Stubbs, 2 vols (London, 1872–3)

Introduction

‘A great prince and very greedy of this world’s honour’1

Bracketed by the long and well-documented reign of his father William the Lion and by the supposed ‘Golden Age’ of the reign of his son Alexander III, the thirty-five years of King Alexander II’s rule have remained one of the least well studied yet most substantial reigns of an adult ruler in medieval Scotland. Widely recognised as a period of decisive change in the nation’s history, during which a new self-confidence in the nature and identity of Scottish kingship became apparent and relationships with external powers were redefined, the reign nevertheless remained curiously neglected in both medieval narrative sources and modern general histories of Scotland down to the later twentieth century. Why that should be is largely attributable to the broad characteristics assigned to the rule of his predecessor and successor in most of the contemporary or near-contemporary sources which have come down to us; Alexander’s personality and achievements did not fit the needs of later writers who were seeking to construct a particular kind of narrative and to formulate a particular ideal of Scottish kingship. As Norman Reid has expressed it:

On either side of Alexander, William’s reign is noteworthy because of the contrast within it of disaster (1174) and success (1189). Alexander III is the archetypical good king, leading his people to peace and stability. Alexander II is left nondescript between them, fitting neither purpose.2

Since Alexander II’s reign was not perceived to have witnessed the dramatic reversals and recoveries of fortune of his father’s, nor experienced the climax of Scottish territorial expansion and benefited from the ‘peace dividend’ as did his son’s, it was dismissed in a series of generalisations epitomised by the bland eulogies assigned to the records of his death in medieval chronicles.

For later generations of writers seeking to construct a kingdom-making narrative or to provide exemplars of ‘good kings’ for the instruction of later rulers, the records of Alexander’s achievements seemed to offer little that was useful to their purpose. This view was perhaps most jarringly expressed by Patrick Tytler in the opening sentence of the preface to his monumental nine-volume History of Scotland, which he began to publish in 1828. ‘I have commenced the History of Scotland at the accession of Alexander the Third,’ he announced, ‘because it is at this period that our national annals become particularly interesting to the general reader.’3 In effect, he was dismissing not just Alexander II but all of his predecessors, including that greatest of Scottish state-builders, David I, to construct a narrative of Scottish identity-making that was grounded in the supposedly formative experiences of the kingdom complete and at peace in the reign of Alexander III and then reshaped through the traumas of the Wars of Independence; Alexander II had, it seemed nothing to offer in that tale. It was to remain thus in most subsequent Scottish histories, with the reign of Alexander II at best treated as part of a thirteenth-century continuum of the two Alexanders.4 Only in the first decade of the twentieth century did Alexander II finally begin to gain separate treatment as a subject worthy of individual study.

Until 2005, the most scholarly examination of the king and his reign was a single chapter in Professor Archie Duncan’s magisterial 1975 publication Scotland: The Making of the Kingdom.5 This remains the best summary of the key events and developments of the reign, for it threw into sharp highlight the significance of Alexander II as a key figure in our national history; but its detail has been expanded and refined by a generation of new research which has transformed our understanding of the reign and the development of the kingdom in the first half of the thirteenth century. The most important single contribution to this new view of Alexander II’s reign as pivotal in national development is constituted by the essays gathered in the 2005 volume The Reign of Alexander II, 1214–49.6 Conceived of as an exploration of a series of broad themes and key relationships, ranging from the Anglo-Scottish war of 1215–17 through to the developments in all areas of law during the reign, it consciously moved from a focus on the king to the social, political, economic and cultural evolution of his kingdom. One of the most important dimensions of these essays was the stress that they threw onto the relationships between Alexander’s kingdom, the wider British Isles and north-western Europe. Rather than being an introspective backwater, Scotland and its ruler were revealed as outward-looking participants in the great thirteenth-century flourishing of European society, culture and trade.

The Reign of Alexander II, 1214–49 redressed many injustices in the manner in which Alexander and his reign were treated in traditional historiography. It did not, however, provide an opportunity to develop an extended reappraisal of his achievements as king in the domestic political and international diplomatic fields. This present study was conceived to address those issues. It is very much a political study and history of Alexander’s life and reign, but with two short additional chapters that explore the king’s relationship with the church and his senior clergy, and the intellectual and architectural achievements of his reign. Wider and far more detailed studies of the development of government and administration in the first half of the thirteenth century will be imminent additions to our understanding of Alexander’s reign when volume 3 of Regesta Regum Scottorum is completed; the king’s relationship with his nobles and officials has therefore not been treated in depth. For the same reason, the institutional evolution of royal government and administration is not addressed in this present study.

ONE

The Shadow of the Past: Alexander’s Heritage

In late August 1186, William, king of Scots, was forty-three years old and had been Scotland’s ruler for twenty-one years. Since the age of fourteen he had been driven by one burning ambition: he longed to regain what he believed passionately should have been his by inherited right. On the death in 1152 of his father, Earl Henry, only child of King David I, William had been vested with the earldom of Northumberland and lordship of Carlisle, which his grandfather had prised from English control during the long years of civil war that had riven the southern kingdom after 1135. In 1157, however, the new English king, David I’s great-nephew the Angevin Henry II, having ended the civil conflict and imposed firm government over his domain which stretched from the border with Scotland to the Pyrenees, required William’s elder brother King Malcolm IV to restore to English rule the land which formed William’s inheritance. Bitterly aggrieved at the meagre compensation for his disinheritance that he had received, William hungered for his lost earldom and almost constantly agitated for its restoration. His ambition had not diminished after 1165, when he succeeded his childless elder brother as king of Scots; indeed it became a central theme in his dealings with King Henry. Theirs had been a stormy relationship from before the start of William’s reign, Henry understanding well the obsession that drove his cousin, but it had taken on a wholly different complexion following William’s disastrous intervention in the rebellion of 1173–4 led against Henry by his eldest son Henry, the Young King. Promised the restoration of Northumberland and Cumberland by the Young King, William had thrown in his lot with the rebels, only to experience defeat and captivity at the hands of Henry II’s loyal northern English lords. Since then, William had been subject to the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Falaise by which he had secured his personal freedom from Henry’s prison in Normandy; the cost, however, had been recognition of Henry’s superior lordship over both him personally and over the whole of his kingdom. Regardless of the curbs on his independence as king that the treaty imposed, William still cherished hopes that some day he would secure the elusive prize.

Considering this obsession with his inheritance, however, there was an odd contradiction in William’s personal life. In contrast to the chaste reputation of his dead elder brother Malcolm, William had evidently been something of a hell-raiser in his youth and was the father of several acknowledged bastard children – daughters and sons – but he was still unmarried and had as his only legitimate heir his younger brother, Earl David of Huntingdon.7 For all his efforts to regain his patrimony, William had as yet failed to produce the legitimate son to whom he would pass the inheritance he had striven for so long to secure. Now, in the late summer of 1186, all that was to change, and he journeyed south from Carlisle in the company of his overlord for marriage to the bride whom Henry had chosen for him.

Two years earlier, Henry had exercised his rights as superior lord to arrange the marriage of his vassal, William.8 A high-status bride would have done much to restore the badly dented prestige of the Scottish king, sending out a signal that he was a man with powerful connections to be courted, not ignored; and, perhaps, she would bring with her a dowry that might resolve the impasse in the question of Northumberland and Cumberland. William certainly aimed high, requesting the hand of Henry’s eldest granddaughter, Matilda of Saxony, a bride who would not only have strengthened the already close kinship of the Scottish and English royal houses but would also have given the Scottish king important political connections throughout northern Europe. Henry, however, had no intention of yielding any such prospects to William, but nor could he risk entirely alienating him by an outright refusal. Instead he used Matilda and William’s unquestioned consanguinity as a reason to defer a decision until the pope’s permission for a marriage within the prohibited degrees had been secured. Had Henry wished the marriage to proceed, it is likely that he would have petitioned harder and appealed when the request was rejected; his unquestioning acceptance of the decision sent a clear signal to William.9

The issue of William’s marriage receded until the spring of 1186, when Henry needed to be sure of William’s subservience as he struggled to settle a political crisis which had erupted in Galloway.10 William, Henry knew, favoured the rival to his own preferred candidate for succession to the lordship there, but he was not prepared to accept any outcome that might weaken his influence in this highly strategic region. Accordingly, in May 1186 he summoned William and Earl David to Oxford, ostensibly to discuss his cousin’s marriage, and detained him at court on the pretext of awaiting the arrival of his prospective bride, while the Scottish lords were ordered to force Roland son of Uhtred, William’s candidate in Galloway, to come to terms. Keeping William and David with him, Henry travelled to Carlisle in July to impose personally a settlement of the Galloway question, then in late August headed south, still accompanied by his cousins.11 Finally, on 5 September in the chapel at Henry’s manor at Woodstock in Oxfordshire, William received his bride.12

Given William’s earlier ambition to secure a wife from within the close family of Henry II, we can perhaps assume that he was disappointed with the choice that Henry had made for him. Ermengarde, the daughter of Richard, vicomte of Beaumont-sur-Sarthe, was not as has sometimes been suggested entirely without social significance, being a distant cousin of the English king by virtue of her descent from Constance, one of Henry I’s many illegitimate children,13 but she lacked any more direct connection with royal blood such as Matilda of Saxony had possessed. Nevertheless, her father’s albeit remote kinship with Henry was intended to strengthen the bonds between the two families, and her own wider Beaumont kin, although not of the highest noble rank, possessed estates in England, Normandy and Anjou and were politically very well connected amongst the nobility of England and northern France. Henry made every effort to make the marriage more palatable to William, paying for the wedding ceremony over which the archbishop of Canterbury, attended by three other bishops, presided, and for the four days of sumptuous festivities that followed. Ermengarde’s dowry, too, although not the rich prize of Northumberland and Cumberland which William had hoped would have come with the hand of Matilda, was also a signal of Henry’s favour towards him; Edinburgh Castle, surrendered to Henry under the terms of the Falaise agreement and occupied since then by an English garrison, was restored to William on condition that it should be held by his wife in dower.14 It was a gesture by Henry which cost him little but which encouraged William to maintain his submissiveness. Acceptance of Henry’s rights as superior lord had brought its first tangible results; what more might flow from continued loyalty? Now, William had hopes of a legitimate son and heir to whom both the kingdom of the Scots and a restored patrimony in northern England might descend.

Through the first nine years of his marriage, William’s hopes remained largely unrealised. Ermengarde had become pregnant, but the child was a daughter – named Margaret after the royal saint from whom she and her father were descended – rather than the hoped-for son. A second pregnancy resulted in 1196 in a second daughter, Isabella, a bitter disappointment for the ageing king. There had, however, been some substantial advances, most notably the regaining of his kingdom’s full independence from English overlordship. Henry II’s son, Richard I, having little interest in maintaining his father’s policy towards Scotland and eager to raise funds to pay for his planned crusade, had in December 1189 agreed the so-called Quitclaim of Canterbury, which cancelled the Treaty of Falaise in return for payment of 10,000 merks of silver.15 Over the northern counties of England, however, there was no movement, but William was undeterred by this lack of success. During Richard’s absence on crusade and subsequent long imprisonment in Austria, William strove to rebuild connections with leading families within his lost patrimony: families whose support might help win him back his inheritance. In 1191, he arranged the marriage of his illegitimate daughter Isabella to Robert de Ros, lord of Wark-on-Tweed, and in 1193 a second illegitimate daughter, Margaret, was married to Eustace de Vescy, lord of Alnwick.16 Despite his undiminished desire to regain Northumberland and Cumberland, however, William was nevertheless not prepared to gamble on supporting the English Prince John’s attempted usurpation of the absent Richard’s throne; a similar act in 1174 had cost him his freedom and compromised his kingship. Instead, he reckoned that a grateful Richard might be more amenable to discussions over the northern counties, and he sought to further ingratiate himself with the English king through a personal contribution of 2,000 merks towards his ransom.17 Richard was indeed grateful, but he was still not prepared to yield what William wanted and delayed making any judgement of the Scottish king’s renewed claims. Well understanding Richard’s hunger for money but in an equally clear sign of his own desperation, William met him at Winchester and offered 15,000 merks – half as much again as he had paid to secure the freedom of his kingship from Richard’s superior lordship – for a grant to him of the earldom of Northumberland. Richard was tempted but in the end offered William only the earldom’s lands without its strategic castles, an offer wholly unacceptable to the Scottish king. ‘Grieving and downcast’, according to the well-informed English royal clerk Roger of Howden, William returned to his kingdom.18

In June 1195 William fell grievously ill at the royal manor at Clackmannan and, it is reported, was so sure he was dying that he made preparations for the succession. For the previous thirty years, it had been assumed that the kingship would pass to his nearest legitimate male relative, his younger brother Earl David. Now, however, fearing that the inheritance which had eluded him for so long would pass forever from his lineage through default of a direct male heir, William dreamed up a radical alternative. In place of David, he proposed that Margaret, at this point his only legitimate child, should marry King Richard’s nephew, Otto, the younger son of Henry the Lion, deposed duke of Saxony, and that the throne would pass to them on his death. William, however, had not consulted his nobles before presenting his proposal to Richard. Led by Patrick, earl of Dunbar, they reacted furiously to the scheme. It was, they declared, utterly uncustomary and without precedent in Scotland for the succession to the throne to pass to a woman, and still more unacceptable given that there was already a recognised male heir in the person of the king’s brother, who also had a son.19 A full-blown political crisis between William and his nobles was only averted by the king’s recovery to full health, but even then he continued to explore the potential in the idea of a match between Margaret and Otto. Before the end of the year a new settlement was being negotiated which appeared to bring Northumberland and Cumberland at last within William’s grasp; he would give Lothian to Otto and Margaret on their betrothal, with Richard holding the land and its castles in trust for the young couple until their marriage, while Richard likewise would give them Northumberland and Cumberland, with William holding the land and its castles. A deal seemed finally to be in prospect, but early in 1196 William withdrew his offer; the Scottish nobles remained implacably opposed to such an arrangement and, perhaps more importantly in the king’s reckoning, Queen Ermengarde was again pregnant and William, ‘hoping that the Lord would give him a son’, would not risk any compromising of the inheritance of a direct male heir.20 Although Ermengarde was delivered of Isabella, a second daughter, and not the son whom her husband so desired, the possibility of a negotiated settlement of William’s claims to the northern English counties had gone and the scheme was never again revived.21

No record survives of how Earl David viewed his proposed disinheritance by his brother. There is certainly no record or suggestion of animosity between them; in 1196 David displayed his continuing loyalty to his elder brother by bringing his military following to accompany William on a campaign into the far north of Scotland.22 It is probable that the open hostility to William’s schemes and outspoken support for David’s status as heir-presumptive which the Scottish political community had displayed convinced him that there was no serious risk of losing his position. Indeed, his participation in the Caithness campaigns of 1196–7 might be read as a clear reminder of that status to William, and as a reassurance to the Scottish nobles who had supported his rights despite his increasingly rare presence in Scotland. Since the late 1180s David had pursued a career as an English nobleman and perhaps had begun to see the future for his line as lying chiefly within the southern kingdom, where his most important properties were; his support for his brother in 1196–7 might have been intended to show where he believed his true future lay. It is likely too, however, that David’s intimate knowledge of the personalities of both William and Richard led him to believe that the elaborate schemes for an alternative succession had little prospect of lasting success. When David returned to England at the end of the successful expedition into Caithness, he was perhaps confident that his eventual succession to the Scottish throne was secure.

Any such confidence lasted little more than a year, for by early 1198 it was clear that the queen was once more with child. In August, Ermengarde and her husband were at Haddington in East Lothian, probably awaiting her confinement in the royal manor there, which possibly had been assigned to her as part of her marriage portion; it had been one of the dower lands formerly held by William’s mother, Countess Ada. There on St Bartholomew’s Day (24 August) she was delivered of a son, who was soon afterwards baptised by Jocelin, bishop of Glasgow, with the name Alexander.23 Last held within the royal house by William’s great-uncle, King Alexander I, it is unknown why that name was chosen in preference to any of those borne within the child’s direct male ancestry, or even that of his mother. According to one of the thirteenth-century chronicles incorporated into the fourteenth-century work attributed to John of Fordun, the birth and baptism were the cause of joy for many throughout Scotland, and continued to be celebrated for the hope which they brought for many years afterwards.24 There were men, however, who did not share in the celebrations, Earl David perhaps included in their number; for the birth of the king’s son placed another potential obstacle in the path to the throne which they believed was rightfully theirs.

To modern eyes, Alexander’s eventual succession to his father might seem natural, conventional and uncontroversial. In early thirteenth-century Scotland, however, inheritance by male primogeniture – succession by the first-born son – a tradition which had been introduced to the kingdom in the cultural baggage of the English and continental colonists who had begun to settle there in the 1100s, was not the universally established practice. It was, in truth, only a combination of individual ruthlessness and personal genetic accident which from the late eleventh century had kept the royal succession in Scotland within the lineage descended from King Malcolm III, but even that descent had been no straightforward father-to-son progression. Malcolm’s own designated heir had not been Duncan, his elder son of his first marriage, but Edward, the eldest son of his second wife, St Margaret. When the king and his heir-designate were killed in 1093, the leading men of the kingdom turned against Malcolm’s innovative plan to pass the throne directly to his son, reverting instead to the established Gaelic practice of succession by the eldest suitable male from within the wider royal kindred; his actual successor was his younger brother, King Donald III Bán.

In 1094 Malcolm’s eldest son, Duncan, overthrew his uncle with English aid and ruled briefly as King Duncan II, but was killed within the year by Donald’s supporters. Although Duncan had an infant son, William, the expediency of having an adult capable of leading the family against Donald saw the headship of Malcolm III’s lineage pass to the next acceptable male, Edgar. On the unmarried Edgar’s death in 1107, the throne passed to his next surviving brother, Alexander I, but his marriage proved childless and, although he had fathered one illegitimate son, Malcolm, the succession fell to his youngest remaining brother, David I. For the first decade of his reign, David faced serious challenges to his position as king from two quarters, both of which enjoyed strong support for their candidacy for the kingship. The more serious challenge was from the Moray-based descendents of Lulach, the stepson of King Macbeth, but the longer-lasting threat was from his elder brother’s bastard, Malcolm. The latter enjoyed widespread support amongst the Gaelic political leadership of the kingdom and, although he was captured in 1134 and spent the rest of his life in captivity, his sons and descendents continued to present serious challenges to David and his grandsons into the 1150s.

For many men, particularly within the Gaelic heartland of Scotland, the bastard Malcolm and his line had been more acceptable as kings than David and his foreign ways. There was also a third potential challenger in the person of Duncan II’s son William, who was already a mature adult at the time of David’s succession in 1124. His claim was strongest if primogeniture were applied – his father had been the oldest of all of Malcolm III’s children – but it appears that he may have been won over by recognition of his status as David’s heir-presumptive, at least until the king’s own son, Henry, reached adulthood. Despite Henry’s death in 1152, David’s mastery of his kingdom was sufficiently strong for him to present his twelve-year-old eldest grandson, Malcolm, as his heir, passing over William’s children. Again, however, men hostile to David’s lineage both within and outwith Scotland, saw in the existence of the male descendents of this senior line of the royal kindred – known to history as the MacWilliams – serious contenders for the throne. From at least 1181 and perhaps as early as 1165,25 they had mounted a series of bids for the kingship, which as recently as 1187 had forced William to lead major military expeditions into the north of his kingdom. Despite the defeat and death of the head of the MacWilliam kin, Donald, at the hands of the king’s men in 1187, William knew that his rival’s sons were still at large and probably gathering fresh support for a renewed challenge for the throne. It was into the midst of such turbulent uncertainty that Alexander was born.

William may have intended that his son should succeed him right from the moment he received news of his birth. However, the recent strong support from amongst his nobles for the rights of Earl David had shown how conservative many remained in respect of inheritance practice. In an age of high infant mortality, moreover, it would have been dangerous to risk creating a possible political crisis on the basis of one child’s fragile life. His own views, however, were made clear within a year of Alexander’s birth when, in April 1199, a succession crisis erupted within the Angevin domain; on his death-bed, Richard I had designated his youngest surviving brother, John, as his heir, disinheriting his nephew Arthur of Brittany, the son of their dead middle brother Geoffrey.26Although William’s stance in the political turmoil and warfare that followed was essentially opportunistic – he saw in the disputed succession a realistic chance of regaining his long-desired patrimony – there are also glimpses of awareness of how important this dispute was in the growing legal debates surrounding the question of royal inheritance. William was torn between his obsessive ambition to recover Northumberland and Cumberland, and the need to support inheritance by primogeniture over collateral designation. In the end, he failed to achieve either goal.

In May 1199 William sent envoys south to England, where support for John was strong, to request restoration of the northern counties. In return, William would recognise John’s right to the kingship and swear fealty to him.27 Successful delaying tactics by John and his supporters prevented the formal presentation of William’s claim until after John’s coronation on 27 May, a fait accompli which significantly weakened the impact of the Scottish king’s threat to transfer his support to Arthur.28 John now called on the Scottish king to perform homage to him for his English lands, but William prevaricated and repeated the terms on which he would come to John. William, spurred on promises of French military backing for Arthur, and perhaps also a proposal that the infant Alexander could be betrothed to the French king’s daughter, strengthened his demands, but John remained unmoved.29 He now resorted to bluster, threatening to invade should John not do justice by him, but when John simply put his border castles in a state of defensive readiness and displayed his confidence in his northern nobles by leaving them and crossing to Normandy, William’s resolve faltered and then failed when Arthur made peace with John.30 Although Howden tells us that William’s decision not to invade England was the result of a vision he had received at the tomb of his saintly ancestress, Margaret, at Dunfermline,31 it is more likely that the evaporation of any possibility of aid from France and fear of a repetition of the disaster of 1174 panicked him. That previous invasion had ground to a halt before those same English castles and had ended in defeat, captivity and the long humiliation of the Falaise treaty. That was hardly the legacy which he wished to pass to his son.

Despite the collapse of his position, William resisted making any formal submission to John for over a year. Finally, a delegation led by Earl David came north with letters of safe-conduct for William and a summons for him to attend John at Lincoln to perform homage;32 the man who was probably still William’s presumed heir had clearly aligned himself with John. The reasons for David’s opposition to his brother’s stance are unknown, but it must be recognised that he was in a tremendously vulnerable position. In 1174, he had been stripped of the earldom of Huntingdon by Henry II and had spent the next decade based chiefly on the lands in Scotland that William had given him by way of compensation.33 David’s reinstatement as earl had come only after William’s steady display of loyalty and subservience to Henry, and the position David had subsequently built for himself in England was founded equally on loyalty and service, first to Henry and then to Richard I. His marriage in 1190 to Matilda, sister of Ranulf de Blundeville, earl of Chester, was a clear statement of his high favour with Richard, in whose hands the gift of her marriage lay, and he was to repay Richard with unswerving loyalty.34 He had opposed John’s attempted usurpation of the throne in 1193–4 and received further rewards for that loyalty; to turn against Richard’s designated successor in 1199 would have been to risk all that he had gained. There was, moreover, the question of the Scottish succession, in which David’s status closely resembled that of John, with Alexander as Arthur of Brittany. If primogeniture was to triumph over designation in respect of the English succession, what hope was there for David’s position as heir-presumptive in Scotland? David’s status and that of his heirs in future – either as kings of Scots or as English earls – depended on the maintenance of peaceful relations between the kingdoms. William had jeopardised all of that.

Accompanied by his leading counsellors and lords, William travelled to Lincoln and, outside the city on 21 November 1200, performed homage to John. Reminding John that he had promised to do justice to his claims once he had given his submission, William made a formal request for restoration of the northern English counties as ‘his right and heritage’, but the subsequent discussions were fruitless.35 Further negotiations in early 1201 brought no resolution, John being more concerned with growing threats to his hold over his continental domain than with reaching a settlement with William, and judgement in the issue was deferred until September. When that deadline passed without any action by John, it was clear to William that the English king had no interest in reaching a settlement. Fast approaching his sixtieth year, William might finally have despaired of ever personally regaining the lands which he believed were his birthright, but now he was prepared to pass on his claim to the next generation by securing recognition of Alexander’s hereditary rights as his legitimate son from the Scottish political community. On 12 October 1201 at Musselburgh, a great assembly of the nobles and prelates of the kingdom swore fealty to the three-year-old Alexander as William’s heir.36 This time, if there was any support voiced for Earl David’s thirty-five year status as heir-presumptive, no surviving account records it.

Within weeks of the Musselburgh assembly, news reached Scotland of renewed war between John and the French king, who formally stripped him of his continental lands and titles and granted them to Arthur of Brittany. Any brief hope of a revival of earlier schemes to offer Arthur his support in return for a cession of the northern English counties, however, was quickly dashed by reports of Arthur’s capture by John. Ugly rumours followed of a drunken John murdering his nephew and disposing of his body – rumours which grew in strength as John failed to display his prisoner in public or even demonstrate that he was alive through the reports of credible witnesses.37 It has been argued convincingly that the whispers surrounding Arthur’s fate played on William’s fears for the safety of his own young son, and perhaps drove a wedge between William and his younger brother; after all, if John had disposed of his elder brother’s son to secure the throne for himself, might Earl David – John’s close ally – not be encouraged to emulate him?38 Such fears for the life of his son and for the security of Alexander’s future succession were to mould William’s policies and actions for the remainder of his life.

For the next four years, William’s relationship with both his brother and King John remained in suspension whilst John battled in France to preserve the integrity of his continental domain. After the fall of Normandy to King Philip II of France in 1204, John had been based mainly in England whilst he attempted to gather his strength to launch a bid to regain his ancestral lands. Conscious of the many grievances that William had against him and mindful of previous Franco-Scottish dealings, John needed to be sure that William would not exploit his vulnerability during this critical time by advancing his claim to the northern counties once again. It was perhaps with this need in mind to keep William distracted that John sent Earl David to Scotland in 1205. There, possibly in a ceremony at Musselburgh, he at last gave homage to his seven-year-old nephew, signalling his formal recognition of Alexander’s position as William’s heir.39 This submission may have helped to keep relations between William and John amicable through the summer of 1205 as the two kings began diplomatic discussions over the future status of the lands of the kings of Scots in England, possibly including a suggestion from William that the northern counties be restored but granted to Alexander. The negotiations, however, may have been linked more directly to David’s homage and implicit acceptance of his relegation in the royal succession. Before the end of the year, William had received a safe-conduct from John for him to travel to York in February 1206 to conclude the negotiations, its terms accepting William’s requirement that Earl David would be sent to Scotland and remain there for the duration of William’s time in England.40 This stipulation may be evidence for William’s lingering distrust of his brother, but probably more particularly of John, and seems to mark a growing paranoia on William’s part over the security of the still under-age Alexander’s succession. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that either he or his son were in any real danger of abduction or death, as John needed to keep Scotland neutral or supportive whilst he led his planned expedition to Poitou. The last thing the beleaguered English king wanted was any threat of war on his northern frontier.

From 1206 the relationship between William and John held secure, and there were even fresh and potentially productive discussions between the two men at Newcastle over the question of the northern counties, but all of this collapsed spectacularly in spring 1209.41 Two main reasons have been offered for this sudden deterioration of affairs. The most common is that William had reacted adversely to the bishop of Durham’s construction of a castle at Tweedmouth on the English side of the river opposite the main Scottish trading port at Berwick. Supposedly angered and alarmed by the threat that he felt it posed, he ordered his men to attack and destroy the unfinished building.42 A second suggestion is that John had become aware that William was negotiating for the marriage of one of his daughters to a foreign power. Later sources suggest that this was Count Renaud of Boulogne (who was actually favourably inclined to John at that date but, unfortunately for these later rumour-mongers, already married) or, more likely, a member of the French royal family.43 Despite the prominence given to it in medieval records and modern discussions, the Tweedmouth incident seems a minor issue, given the gravity of the diplomatic crisis which erupted. There is, however, greater evidence that William was involved in negotiations that might have been seen as threatening to John’s position; John had heard rumours that William and King Philip of France were discussing the marriage of William’s daughter. Philip was already involved in a major scandal with the pope for bigamy, so it is unlikely that he even considered the possibility of taking the young Scottish princess as a bride; but his younger son, also named Philip, may have been considered.44 This younger Philip was later to be vested with the county of Boulogne by his father following Count Renaud’s fall from favour, hence the later tradition of the possible betrothal of a count of Boulogne to Margaret. The suggestion of a French match had reached John between the end of the Newcastle meeting – when William had fallen ill and returned to Scotland at John’s urging, where he held a council at Stirling to discuss the proposals which John had tabled – and the arrival at John’s court of a Scottish delegation headed by William Malveisin, bishop of St Andrews. In place of the friendliness with which William had been received at Newcastle, Malveisin was confronted with unconcealed hostility and sent scurrying back to Scotland with threats of an English invasion ringing in his ears.45

William’s response suggests that he had indeed been involved in foreign negotiations, but these had resulted in no agreement; he had been found out but had failed to settle any alliance to lend him security against John’s retribution, which was sure to follow. He fully expected an invasion of his kingdom, and therefore ordered the Scottish host to assemble and for his border castles to be readied to withstand siege, but he also sent a new delegation south to treat with John. At the same time, English emissaries had come north to set out John’s demands directly before William: Alexander was to be surrendered to John as a hostage and, as in the aftermath of 1174, key royal castles were to be placed in John’s hands. William was so alarmed by those terms that he at once dismissed his gathering army – a gesture surely intended to reassure John of his good faith – and sent a second delegation hurrying south to plead for peace before the first had returned from the English court.46 Soon after its departure the first mission reported back with news that the English king was advancing towards Scotland with his army, forcing William to issue a fresh military summons. With his kingdom made vulnerable by his indecisiveness, William had no real alternative but to treat for peace. In late July 1209 the negotiations which had begun at Newcastle in the early months of the year were resumed between the kings in the bishop of Durham’s castle at Norham. At Newcastle, John had been prepared to make concessions to keep the peace with William; at Norham it was very clear that the English king was in a position to dictate almost whatever terms he wished, and a treaty had been confirmed and implemented by the middle of August.

In accordance with the Anglo-Scottish treaty agreed at York in 1237, all copies of the 1209 treaty were surrendered to the Scots for destruction. Consequently, no full and contemporary text of the Norham agreement survives, but its general tenor can be reconstructed from chronicle accounts of the negotiations.47 The settlement, described by the English chronicler Roger of Wendover as a ‘treaty of friendship’,48 was in reality a reimposition of the superior lordship over Scotland exercised by Henry II and Richard I under the terms of the Treaty of Falaise. William had secured peace, but at the cost of a cash payment of between 9,000 and 15,000 merks (the figure varies between chronicle accounts), and the handing over to John of the princesses Margaret and Isabella, as well as hostages drawn from the leading noble families of Scotland.49 In an indication that John was convinced of William’s use of his daughters as bargaining chips in his foreign diplomacy, John obtained from him what had been probably the main objective behind his aggression: the concession that John could arrange their marriages, a blow somewhat sweetened by the proposal that Margaret would marry John’s infant son Henry and that Isabella would be found a suitable – but unspecified – English nobleman as a husband. Such was the importance of this arrangement that John required and had obtained the handing over of the girls to his representatives at Carlisle by 16 August.50 There were some concessions to the Scots: Scottish merchants were confirmed in the right to trade freely in England, a clause perhaps intended to make it easier for William to persuade his wealthier subjects to contribute towards the cash payment which he had promised John; and the arrangements for how kings of Scots were to be conducted and maintained during their visits to the English court were also confirmed. It is likely that the question of the Scottish king’s English lands was also dealt with in the treaty, probably activating the agreement that had been negotiated back in 1205 but left unimplemented on account of William’s insistence on including the northern counties in its terms.51 In 1205, William had perhaps proposed that John should grant Northumberland and Cumberland to Alexander as a means of resolving the long-running dispute; in 1209 all suggestion of such a solution had been dropped from the treaty. Instead, its terms dealt only with the lands which William still held in England. He was to surrender these to John, who in turn would regrant them to Alexander, to be held by him as heir of Scotland, and so to be held by future heirs and not the reigning Scottish king. For his part, Alexander and his heirs would perform homage and fealty to English kings specifically for those lands.52 Again, such was the importance of the personal lordship which this arrangement gave John over the Scottish heir that Alexander performed his homage to the English king at Alnwick before John and his army withdrew southwards in mid-August.53 It can be assumed that John was well satisfied with all that he gained at Norham: an end to prospective foreign alliances secured by the marriages of William’s daughters; physical possession of those daughters and the right to arrange their marriages; the personal homage of William’s male heir; hostages from amongst the children of William’s chief nobles; and a substantial tribute in silver to fill his depleted coffers and fund his efforts to regain his ancestral domain in France.

Following Norham, John’s domination of the whole of the British Isles was approaching its zenith. Such was William’s desire to ingratiate himself with John that when in 1210 the disgraced Hugh de Lacy, earl of Ulster, and members of the de Briouze family who were fleeing from the English king landed in Scotland, most of the refugees were detained and then surrendered to John.54 There could be no clearer demonstration of the effectiveness of John’s mastery over the aged William. It is perhaps no coincidence that it was at this juncture that the next generation of the Scottish king’s MacWilliam rivals mounted their bid to unseat him, capitalising on the blow to William’s prestige and personal authority that the capitulation at Norham had caused. In 1211 Godred, son of Donald MacWilliam, backed by a force of Scottish and Irish warriors, raised a rebellion in Ross that quickly attracted widespread support through the northern part of the kingdom.55 Such was the seriousness of the situation that William was forced to take the field in person, leading the second of two expeditions sent north to quell the insurrection, and ordering the construction of two new castles to control the routes into Ross across the Beauly and Cromarty firths.56 Although Godred’s army had been defeated before the end of 1211, he eluded capture, and it was perhaps William’s anxiety over the political consequences of a protracted conflict that in 1212 drove him to turn to John for aid. English assistance, however, came at a price.

On 2 February 1212 William, accompanied by Queen Ermengarde, met John at Durham. With the queen acting as a mediator, new terms were settled between the two kings that went much further than what had been agreed at Norham. Although some doubt has been cast on the authenticity of the surviving English exchequer copy of the agreement, which dates from sometime in the 1230s and may have been drafted in connection with Anglo-Scottish treaty negotiations in 1236–7, the Durham deal has usually been seen in terms of a further humiliation for the Scots and often been presented as a key component in the bitter resentment of John which Alexander was to display once he had succeeded to the throne.57 At face value there is much to justify that view, for not only had William granted John the right to arrange his daughters’ marriages and given him custody of Alexander’s sisters, but now he also gave him the right to arrange the thirteen-year-old Alexander’s own marriage within six years. In effect, John was now in a position to shape the dynastic future of the entire Scottish royal family. But there were other elements to the Durham settlement which indicate that it was not an entirely one-sided agreement, and that John was also seeking reassurances and more personal benefits to safeguard the future of his own kingship. Both men agreed to lend whatever support was necessary to maintain the other in his ‘just quarrels’, a clause certainly designed to provide William with English aid to suppress the MacWilliam-led insurrection in northern Scotland, but also framed by John with a backwards glance at the mounting political tension in England. John was, too, faced with a need to secure Scottish support in the various conflicts which were disturbing the western and northern limits of his own kingdom in Ireland. That Alan, lord of Galloway, distant cousin of John, William’s hereditary constable and son-in-law of Earl David, was the sole Scottish oath-taker to uphold the treaty suggests that he may have had a significant influence in framing its terms.58 Master of a large fleet of galleys and with ambitions to extend his power across the Irish Sea into Ulster and north into the Hebrides, Alan was no mere tool in the power-play between William and John, but was perhaps to direct to his own advantage Scottish policy in the Atlantic west for the best part of the next two decades. The clause, however, went further than simple military assistance in ‘quarrels’, making both men promise that the survivor would do everything in his power to ensure the succession of the other’s son in his kingdom.59 William now had John’s personal guarantee that it would be Alexander and no other who would, if necessary, receive English support to secure the throne after him, a condition perhaps directed as much against Earl David as against what William seemed to have regarded as a very real possibility of MacWilliam success. But, again, it was not only William who had sought such security, for John, mindful of how he had gained the crown of England and, perhaps, of the royal blood spilled to secure that prize, was as fearful for the safety of his young son Henry as William had been for Alexander. With the treaty settled, the focus of William’s energies returned to the conflict with his dynastic rivals.

It was perhaps William’s intention that his son would gain his first personal experience of command in warfare in this campaign, but he had first to receive his knighthood. Alexander had probably travelled south with John after his formal giving of homage and fealty at Alnwick, for on 4 March he was knighted by the king during festivities held at the guesthouse of the great London priory of St Brides, Clerkenwell.60 The boy Alexander, described in one English chronicle as but ‘small of stature, yet dignified and of amiable appearance’, had gone through his first rite of passage, leaving behind his childhood and entering the adult male chivalric elite.61 He may have returned north with the contingent of John’s Brabantine mercenaries which the English king sent to honour his promise to give real aid to William in his just quarrels, but there is no surviving contemporary evidence that Alexander led them into the Highlands in pursuit of Godred MacWilliam. The ‘certain English noble’ whom John placed in command of the mercenaries might have been Saher de Quincy, earl of Winchester, who was also an important tenant-in-chief of the Scottish king.62 According to the fifteenth-century account of Walter Bower, based on now lost thirteenth-century sources, Godred’s support had been dwindling since his defeat by William’s army in 1211, and early in 1212 he was betrayed to the king’s men by some of his own followers, carried south to Kincardine Castle in the Mearns where Alexander was based, and swiftly executed there.63 The death of the MacWilliam claimant, however, did not end the threat from that lineage and, as events at the outset of Alexander’s reign were to demonstrate, there was still a reservoir of support for the family in the northern parts of the kingdom.