Arab Media E-Book

Noha Mellor

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: PGMC - Polity Global Media and Communication series
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 423

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

This book provides a clear and authoritative introduction to the emerging Arab media industries in the context of globalization and its impacts, with a focus on publishing, press, broadcasting, cinema and new media. Through detailed discussions of the regulation and economics of these industries, the authors argue that the political, technological and cultural changes on the global media scene have resulted in the reorganization of the Arab media field. They provide striking examples of this through the particular effects on media policies, media technology and the content and genres developed for the new generation of media consumers.

As part of the book's overview of the contemporary characteristics of Arab media, the authors outline the development of the role of modern Arab media from a tool of mobilizing the public to a tool of commercial and symbolic profit. Overall, the volume illustrates how the Arab region represents a unique case where the commercialization and liberalization of selected media industries has gone hand in hand with continuous state intervention and an increasing self censorship.

Written for students without prior knowledge of the topic, Arab Media will be essential reading for all interested in the contemporary global media industries.

Leseprobe

Arab Media

Arab Media

Globalization and Emerging Media Industries

NOHA MELLOR, MUHAMMAD AYISH,

NABIL DAJANI AND KHALIL RINNAWI

polity

Copyright © Noha Mellor, Khalil Rinnawi, Nabil Dajani, Muhammad I. Ayish 2011

The right of Noha Mellor, Khalil Rinnawi, Nabil Dajani, Muhammad I. Ayish to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2011 by Polity Press

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ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-3736-5

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Contents

Detailed Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Introduction

1.

Arab Media: An Overview of Recent Trends

2.

Arabic Books

3.

Arab Press

4.

Radio Broadcasting in the Arab World

5.

Television Broadcasting in the Arab World: Political Democratization and Cultural Revivalism

6.

Arab Cinema

7.

Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Trilogy

8.

When Global Meets Local

Conclusion

References

Index

Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Introduction

Boundaries of the region

Cultural unifiers

Socioeconomic diversifiers

Arab media in the age of globalization

Structure of the book

1.

Arab Media: An Overview of Recent Trends

The rise of media industries

Expansion of media markets

State control or self-censorship?

Role of media in mobilizing the Arab nation

Media consumers inside the region

Arab media consumers across the globe

New media; new challenge

Conclusion

2.

Arabic Books

Historical background

Printing regulation throughout history

Modern Arabic printing

Challenges facing Arabic printing

Book market

Conclusion

3.

Arab Press

Historical background

Regulation of the Arab press

Arab émigré and transnational press

Changing roles of the Arab press

The print market: online and offline

Conclusion

4.

Radio Broadcasting in the Arab World

Historical overview

The radio landscape

Radio broadcasting regulation

Financing radio broadcasting

Radio audiences

Radio programs

Roles

International radio broadcasting in Arabic

Conclusions

5.

Television Broadcasting in the Arab World: Political Democratization and Cultural Revivalism

Historical developments

Impact on state-run television systems

Contributions to democratization and cultural revivalism

Television and political reforms

Television and culture

Conclusion

6.

Arab Cinema

A historical overview

The cinema as an industry

Regulations of the cinema industry

New markets, new entrants

Documentary films: another story

Role of cinema in the pan-Arab public sphere

Conclusion

7.

Arab Internet: Schizophrenic Trilogy

Internet in the Arab world

Obstacles to internet diffusion in the Arab world

The main players

Internet as a virtual public sphere

Users’ patterns and internet culture

Official approaches to the internet

Conclusion

8.

When Global Meets Local

New global market

Changing media roles

Global media flows

Media effects

The Arab nation-state

The role of Diaspora communities

Conclusion

Conclusion

References

Index

Tables and Figures

Figure 1:

The Arab World

Table 1:

Arab Regions as Former Colonies

Table 2:

GDP and Demographic Indicators

Table 3:

Export Percentage of GDP

Table 4:

Arab Countries’ Import and Export of Cultural Goods

Table 5:

Percentage of Arab Youth of Total Population

Table 6:

Selected Arab Radio Services

Table 7:

Program Categories Aired on Arab Satellite Channels

Table 8:

Cinema Admission and Number of Screens in Selected Arab Countries

Table 9:

Internet Users in the Arab World and in the World

Table 10:

Arab World Internet Usage and Population Statistics

Introduction

Noha Mellor

Boundaries of the region

This book focuses on the media industries in the Arab-speaking countries in the Middle East, the region that is usually referred to as the Arab homeland or the Arab world (Hopkins & Ibrahim, 2003). What are the cultural unifiers and diversifiers among Arab populations across the region?

The Arab region is part of a geopolitical entity called the Middle East, which was a British term created during the Second World War (Smith 1968, 4). The military used this name when referring to Persia and eastern Arabia in particular, while the western part of the Middle East was called the Levant. Thus, the British military at that time “never thought of the Middle East as a single or distinctive region possessing any particular unity, except in so far as it was but a portion of the Muslim world” (Smith 1968, 4). The name was originally used by the Royal Air Force, which amalgamated its Iraq and Cairo units, retaining the name Middle East for the new unit. The term spread after that in other communiqués, and perhaps one reason for its success is its vagueness. As the phrase “Middle East” is only an invented geopolitical label, it “should not lead to assumptions about similarities between these countries” (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1998,180). The Middle East, as a geographical area, was later expanded to include Libya, Sudan, the Maghreb countries, and even Afghanistan. This expansion increased the confusion resulting from mixing “separate and distinct concepts of Arab Asia, the Arab world, the Islamic world, and the Middle East” (Smith 1968, 8).

Arabs are usually defined as those “who speak the Arabic language, identify themselves as ‘Arabs’ and are nationals or residents of member countries of the League of Arab States.” (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003, 1). The word “Arab” does not refer to a particular race, as Arabs are of diverse religions and ethnic origins. Various ethnic groups such as Nubians, Bedouins, Kurds, and Berbers are encompassed by the term, as well as other religious groups including Christians (of various denominations), Muslims (Sunni, Shiite, Bahhai, Druze), and Jews. Several terms denote Arab identity: Arab, Arabic, Arabian. These are used interchangeably.

The Arab region referred to in this book includes the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE, and Yemen. This limitation is in line with other scholars (Amin 2001), and it confines itself to countries where Arabic is the official language. Other countries, such as the Comoros, Mauritania, and Somalia, are also members of the League of Arab States (LAS), and thus are seen – at least officially – as part of the Arab world. The Arabs are not a homogenous group. “Their world, cultural unity, and political division have been evolving throughout history. Even the cultural boundaries, let alone the political borders, have continued to change” (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003, 4). This is seen, for instance, in the joining of Mauritania, Somalia, and Djibouti to the LAS in the 1970s, followed by the Comoros Islands in the 1990s.

These newcomers are not included here because they have unique historical backgrounds that distinguish them from other Arab countries. This is reflected in the several other official languages (particularly French and Somali) that form part of their unique identities. The Comoros, for instance, has three official languages: Comorian, Arabic, and French. The country has been a member of four different organizations, each of which represents a part of the Comoros history and identity: the African Union, La Francophonie, Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Arab League. This reflects the impact of French, Arab, African, and Islamic cultures on the shaping of the Comoros. The Arab cultural influence has been evident since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with the Omani rule of Zanzibar, and several Omani intellectuals spreading their Arabic publications in Zanzibar, such as the Omani newspaper Al Falaq (al-Kindi 2001). The unique relationships the Comoros, Somalia, and Mauritania have with other members of the LAS, and their cultural similarities and differences, have yet to be analyzed.

Language, culture and traditions are among the similarities connecting the Arab countries; they share a history of being subordinated to first Ottoman and then European colonial powers. The Ottoman Empire was challenged by the new colonial powers in Europe who sought “to colonize whatever territories they could reach overseas” and the “intensity of colonial competition over the Arab world was due not only to the quest for markets and raw materials, but also for its many strategic advantages. The Arab homeland is geographically situated at the center of the ‘Old World’ of Asia, Africa and Europe” (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003, 3). The dominance was mainly French or British, as shown in Table 1.

In addition, several other Arab countries were British protectorates, such as Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. Morocco was a French protectorate (Abdelali, 2004). Following their independence, Arab governments established large bureaucracies, which in turn encouraged the population to move to the capitals (Ibrahim 1975). This relates urbanization to modernization, as Lerner described this process in his 1958 study.

Table 1: Arab Regions as Former Colonies

(Source, Abdelali 2004, p. 24)

Since the nineteenth century, the Arab countries have increased their exports, particularly to Europe. This increase encouraged the growth of coastal cities and seaports (Ibrahim 1975). The proportion of Arab city dwellers has grown immensely in the course of the first half of the twentieth century, compared to the Western world, where it took two centuries to achieve a similar growth (Ibrahim 1975). Urbanization was driven by population increases as well as migration from rural areas to cities. During the first half of the twentieth century, Arab states’ urbanization differed widely. Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Iraq were among the most urbanized compared to Yemen, Sudan, or Saudi Arabia (Ibrahim 1975). Saudi Arabia has since undergone a significant urbanization process, with the percentage of its city dwellers jumping from less than 10 percent in 1902 to 84 percent in 1999 (Assad 2007).

Cultural unifiers

The most important cultural unifiers for Arab states are language (Modern Standard Arabic: MSA), religion (Islam remains the dominant religion in the region, with over 90 percent of the population Muslims) and common history (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003, 2). This has prompted several countries to seek a unified Arab identity, particularly following independence. Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic in 1958; it was disbanded in 1961. Arab nationalism was seen as a political reaction to both Turkish nationalism and European colonialism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Haddad 1994, 217). Even in states where Arabic was not the only official language, such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, the decision to enforce Arabization in the post-independence era was a political decision par excellence. It was the political regime that determined the success or failure of the Arabization process (Al-Thawadi 1990). For instance, in Algeria, Arabization was aimed at enforcing a new Arab identity to counteract the French identity enforced during colonization (Al-Th awadi 1990).

Despite the existence of distinct dialects in each Arab state, the spread of one shared written language, or MSA, has contributed to the spread of pan-Arab media and publications. The spread of Islam has resulted in written Arabic’s prevalence across the region. The classical language of the Koran, however, is different from MSA, which has been simplified to suit media and educational purposes. Moreover, Islam’s migration from Arabia to other Arab countries, and the conquest of several of these countries, played a major role in spreading the Arabic language at the expense of indigenous languages such as Coptic, Aramaic, and Greek (Mellor 2005). In fact, early pan-Arab nationalist movements in the nineteenth century were inspired by Muslim modernists, such as those in Syria who “felt that educational reform should be pursued through Arabic, the language of the land of Islam” particularly when faced with Turkification in education (Haddad 1994, 202). Thus, among Syrian Christians, Arabic replaced Greek as the language of the church at the end of the nineteenth century, particularly with the appointment of an Arab patriarch to replace the Greek one (Haddad 1994).

Arab leaders propagate this pan-Arab discourse and indeed, “no Arab regime . . . has dared formally to go against the proclaimed national self-identification” (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003, 4). However, those leaders tend to diffuse Arabism with other discourses that bind Arab populations with non-Arabic speaking Islamic countries as well. Former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952–1970), the father of pan-Arabism, who linked Egyptian identity with “Arabism, Islam and Africa” (Smith 1968, 8). Undoubtedly, the pan-Arab discourse glosses over the ethnic and religious diversity that characterize the Arab populations, and this “diversity . . . reflects the ebb and flow of empires, and the spread of cultures and religions in the past – thus the concentration of Berber-speakers in the Maghreb, the inclusion of Nuer, Dinka, Azande, Fur, and others in Sudan, and the combination of Christians and Druze in Lebanon” (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003, 2).

Some scholars do not see the Arab region as part of one unified Arab society. Tibi, for instance, argues, “With a few exceptions, such as Egypt and Morocco, most of these newly established nation-states lack historical legitimacy and thus are historically questionable . . . the post-colonial Arab states are nominal nation-states” (1997, 23). Thus the Arab states would be seen here as “a regional subsystem.” The defeat following the 1967 war (between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, which ended with Israel seizing the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights) was seen as the first serious blow to Arab unity (Mellor 2007). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came as a second blow (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003), with the future option being “a system of regional cooperation based on the national sovereignty of the participating states” (Tibi 1997, 24). There were indeed attempts among several Arab states to group in separate political and economic unions, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) formed in 1981, comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and UAE. The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) comprising Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Yemen, was formed in 1989 as a response to the GCC. The ACC, however, did not survive the political division following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the tensions between Egypt and Iraq in the wake of the invasion. Another example is the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) founded in 1989 and comprising Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. This alliance aimed to strengthen the economic partnership among its member states. Indeed, scholars tend to divide the Arab world into the Mashreq, Maghreb, and Gulf regions (e.g. Boughanmi 2008; Fargues 2006; Page 2006), and some of the data presented in this chapter will reflect this particular regional division.

Socioeconomic diversifiers

There are also remarkable differences among Arab states in terms of their political, economic, and demographic situations. For instance, while Algeria had an estimated population of 33 million in 2007, Bahrain had less than one million inhabitants. Table 2 shows these economic and demographic differences across the region.

Poverty figures differ from one country to another, so in Egypt the percentage of population under the poverty line was estimated at 20 percent in 2005, compared to 25 percent in Algeria, 7 percent in Libya, 11 percent in Syria, and 45 percent in Yemen in the same year (CIA World Factbook).

Some Arab states depend on industry (UAE, Qatar, and Libya), particularly in the Gulf oil region. The economy in other states, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian territories, depends more on services. In addition, as shown in Table 2, some states struggle with poverty while others (such as the oil-rich Gulf States) are more prosperous. The Gulf States countries enjoy higher literacy rates, more globalised economies, higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and living standards; they have embraced new technologies more quickly than other Arab states. Although the region currently has the largest growth in internet users in the world (Dutta et al. 2007), there are remarkable differences among the Arab states. Some are advanced while other countries still lag far behind. While the UAE has nearly 34 users per 100 inhabitants, Syria has only 4, and while the former has 117 personal computers per 1,000 inhabitants, the latter has only 19 (Dutta et al. 2007).

Table 2: GDP and Demographic Indicators

*figures are estimate for 2005, extracted from CIA World Factbook

** estimate for 2009 by CIA World Factbook

These conditions combine to make the Gulf States suitable candidates to lead the region in the twenty-first century. Some commentators, however, see this role as likely to be modest, mainly because the Gulf States rest on factors that reduce their appeal to the Arab masses, such as dependence on the USA for security and an abundance of resources absent in other countries (Springborg 2008).

Recent economic reforms in several Arab states have increased their exports. Table 3 shows export increase as percentage of GDP in several Arab countries, including the resource-poor countries such as Egypt and Jordan.

Economic and demographic indicators are not the only diversifiers among Arab states. There are also cultural diversifiers that give each Arab state its own distinct national identity: local dialects and religious denominations that exist side-by-side with the unifiers (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003). Some language scholars argue that the differences among dialects can be so great as to be mutually unintelligible, say for Moroccans and Omanis (Mellor 2005). Even in the written variety of Arabic or MSA, there are differences in spelling and usage and adoption, as manifested in the language of Arab newspapers (Abdelali 2004).

Table 3: Export Percentage of GDP

(Source, UNESCO, 2005)

Arab leaders draw on the unifiers and diversifiers according to their political interests, so “times of Arab strength and glory are those in which the ‘unifiers’ are invoked. Periods of weakness or decline are those in which the  “diversifiers” are manipulated by indigenous or external factors to divide the Arabs” (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003, 6). However, diversifiers and unifiers are diffused in times of crisis, such as the civil wars in Lebanon (1975–1985), and Sudan (1956–1973 and 1983–1996). This also includes the recent crisis in Darfur, the turmoil in Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s, and the recent tensions in Iraq (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003). Arabs may feel united and/or divided by crisis.

The political situation has influenced development plans in the region and the intensification, or conversely the downplaying, of Arab nationalist discourse. In one example, the region experienced more than 20 parliamentary elections between 1985 and 1996, or only twice the number of elections that took place over the preceding twenty years, following the independence of Arab states (Sadiki 2000). There were other political crises, particularly the second Gulf war in 1991, the Iraq war in 2003, and the recent turmoil in Lebanon in 2006. These crises have also had an impact on the pattern of media consumption. For instance, during the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006, news circulation (print and broadcasting) increased across the region (Arab Media Outlook 2007). The alternative discourse of pan-Islamism has gained tremendous importance particularly since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978, and “pan-Islamism has emerged as a competing paradigm contending for public space with other paradigms” (Hopkins & Ibrahim 2003, 7).

Arab media in the age of globalization

The main argument of this book is that Arab media has undergone a series of changes over the past two decades as a direct result of the acceleration of the globalization process. Thus, the book acknowledges the interplay between local and global cultures, seeing globalization as a process (Robertson 1992; Waters 2001). Globalization as a phenomenon has been at the centre of several Arab publications and at the centre of debate among Arab scholars over the past decade. Several Arab scholars see in globalization a celebration of capitalistic values and a threat to native cultural identity. To back this argument, such scholars point at the increasing consumerism and imitation of Western lifestyles among Arab youth, thereby focusing on the cultural exchange of the globalization process rather than the economic or political exchanges.

For instance, Abdel Rahman (2002) argues that globalization has resulted in the accentuation of the gap between the North or Developed World and the South or Developing World. In so doing, the South has become more and more dependent on the North, which only uses the South as a market for cultural products. Such views usually accuse the West (particularly the USA) of spreading their cultural values at the expense of indigenous cultural heritage. Increasing consumption of American media products among Arab youth is seen as escapism, rather than as a means of encouraging them to participate in public debates (see e.g. Al Kahtani 2000).

Likewise, Al Yasin (cited in Hindkær 2001, 61) fears that the increasing consumption of Western cultural products may be the most immediate threat to local cultures. Such scholars then equate globalization (at least at the cultural level) with dependency on the West and hegemony of the latter in setting up new values and norms. Such views usually refer to the global statistics on cultural flow, showing, for instance how the Arab states’ import of cultural products (from the USA and UK in particular) exceeds its export. One such state is Egypt: its cultural exports were reduced by one-third from 1994 to 2002, with the rest of Arab countries as major importer of Egyptian cultural exports. Core cultural goods are defined as those including heritage goods, books, newspapers and periodicals, printed matter, recorded media, visual arts, audiovisual media.

On the other hand, the expansion of Arab satellite channels during the past decade has prompted several scholars to claim that this is a sign of the so-called “contra-flow of culture” from the Arab region to the rest of the world. For instance, Wessler & Adolphsen (2008) show that leading Western channels such as the BBC World Service, CNN, and Deutsche Welle relied on Arab satellite channels such as Al Jazeera during the Iraq war 2003, which helped to highlight the “Arab perspective” on the war.

Table 4: Arab Countries’ Import and Export of Cultural Goods, 2009

Moreover, Arab leaders now support international initiatives to spread Arab culture in the world. One such initiative is The Sharjah Prize for Arab Culture, established in 1998 on the initiative of the United Arab Emirates. The prize is given to nationals of Arab states who have contributed, through their artistic or intellectual work, to the diffusion of Arab culture in the world. In addition, Arab states, as we shall see in Chapter One, now compete in profiling their cities as “global” cities, as a result of recent economic reforms in the region.

In the Arab context, globalization can be seen as a positive force in certain aspects, such as economic prosperity and development. At the cultural level, however, there are ambivalent attitudes as to how globalization may prove beneficial for the native culture. For instance, while the Americanization of certain (serious) genres, that is, news and debate programs, has been hailed as a sign of progressive and democratic revolution in the region, the Americanization of the (popular) genres such as music videos and soap operas has been regarded as a regression from the authentic heritage of the region (Mellor 2005, 5). Thus, globalization can be seen as a medium that may threaten the “authentic” culture: traditions and customs. Changes at economic or political levels usually take place voluntarily, going top-down, that is, enforced from the more privileged elites and circulated to laypeople. The cultural changes, on the other hand, are seen as going from the bottom up, that is, the changes are incorporated by ordinary people who, thanks to technical advances, can access global media such as transnational media, Internet, books, and so on. Moreover, the impact of globalization on cultural heritage may indeed vary from one Arab state to another. Suleiman (2003), for instance, argues that the Lebanese people tend to see themselves as a liaison between East and West, while in Saudi Arabia, due to the existence of holy places there, it is tradition and customs that form the national identity. Saudi Arabia, moreover, has long opened the door for economic and technical expertise from the West while attempting to maintain traditional core values (Yamani 2000). Seen against this backdrop, different discourses may prevail in Arabic discussions regarding the impact of globalization. Resistance to this globalization process, however, may arise if it is seen to tarnish the “authentic,” or if the changes are seen to be imposed by – rather than sought or even bought from – the West.

The following chapters will pick up on this theme of globalization and its impact on the development of local as well as pan-Arab media industries. It is the view of the authors that the recent changes in Arab media have been the outcome of this globalization process. Thus, the political, technological, and cultural changes on the global media scene have resulted in the reorganization of the Arab media field in terms of media policies, media technology, and the content and genre developed for the new generation of media consumers.

Structure of the book

We begin with an overview of the modern Arab media landscape and particularly the change in the role of media from a tool for mobilizing the public to a tool of commercial and symbolic profit. The first chapter also reviews some of the pressing changes in the region that have affected the media scene, such as increasing immigration within and outside the region. The subsequent chapters deal with the impact of these changes on a selected media industry.

Chapter 2 deals with the printing and publishing industry. A large part of the chapter reviews the historical evolution of this industry in the region in order to understand the contemporary changes. The main argument is that Arab printing has been subject to immense technological developments that seem to undermine the development of the human component of this industry and instead to center on copying Western technology.

Chapter 3 deals with the press, and it too begins with a historical overview of the development of press in the Arab region. The chapter also discusses the role of the press as a watchdog, and how the press has failed to play that crucial role because of its orientation to the interests of the political and financial elites rather than the general public.

Chapter 4 surveys the Arab radio broadcasting industry, paying particular attention to recent developments since the 1990s. The chapter also sheds light on the role of radio in the age of media convergence and multimedia environments. These changes offer both opportunities and threats to radio broadcasters.

Chapter 5 surveys the television industry, which has been subject to state monopoly since its inception, reviewing recent developments and the launch of privately owned satellite channels. The main argument here is that despite the major cultural transformations in the region over the past two decades, changes were induced by global rather than local developments and hence were not sustainable. They thus had little impact on the television industry and its role in ensuring pluralistic public space.

Chapter 6 focuses on cinema, paying great attention to Egyptian film as the pioneer in the region. The chapter discusses the changing role of the cinema as an industry, becoming part of the progressive image of Arab states, particularly those in the Gulf regions. The chapter reviews current challenges that face the cinema industry, as well as its function as a space to expose and debate social ills. The chapter argues that this role is likely to continue in the future, where joint Arab-European production will be more common.

Chapter 7 surveys internet spread and usage in the Arab region and discusses the role of the internet in the Arab public sphere. Despite state censorship and filtering of internet sites, states still strive to update their telecommunication and internet development as an element in their economic development plans. This reflects governments’ ambivalent attitude toward internet usage, which is increasing rapidly in comparison to other regions, particularly with the this region’s changing demographics.

Chapter 8 sums up the recent trends in the Arab media industries, reflecting, for instance, on the role of the Arab Diaspora as media audiences as well as the role of Arabic-speaking transnational media in enforcing a sense of pan-Arab national identity among Arab audiences inside and outside the Arab world.

We conclude this book with brief remarks on the outlook of Arab media industries (particularly printing, press, radio, TV, cinema, and internet) and their expected role in the twenty-first century.

1

Arab Media: An Overview of Recent Trends

Noha Mellor

Most Arab media industries (particularly print, broadcasting, cinema, and New Media) are controlled by totalitarian governments that exercise great powers over media organizations. This is in sharp contrast to democratic societies, where the media are largely independent and attempts to reflect diverse voices in these societies. Although it is hard to envisage Arab totalitarian societies as a nurturing environment for commercially vibrant media systems, the Arab region represents an unusual case: commercialization and liberalization of selected media industries has gone hand-in-hand with continuous state intervention and an increasing self-censorship.