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W. H. Mallock

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In "Aristocracy & Evolution," W. H. Mallock engages with the intricate relationship between social hierarchy and evolutionary theory, infusing his discourse with both philosophical rigor and literary finesse. Written during the late Victorian period, the book challenges prevailing democratic ideals by advocating the merits of aristocratic governance, positing that intellectual and moral superiority among the ruling class can fundamentally shape societal evolution. Mallock'Äôs prose is rich with allegorical nuances, deftly interweaving philosophical reflections with socio-political critique, inviting readers to reconsider the implications of evolutionary theory within the context of social structures. W. H. Mallock, an English writer and a keen thinker of the Victorian era, was profoundly influenced by the debates surrounding Darwinian evolution and its socio-political ramifications. His diverse background'Äîa combination of literature, philosophy, and economics'Äîprovided him the tools to dissect contemporary issues through a lens that was both critical and imaginative. Mallock's perspectives often stemmed from his concern over the erosion of traditional societal roles and the challenges posed by rising populism, making his arguments resonate with the complexities of his time. Readers who appreciate a thought-provoking exploration of social theories framed within a literary context will find "Aristocracy & Evolution" an essential addition to their library. With its bold assertions and intellectually stimulating narrative, this work challenges conventional wisdom and invites careful reflection on the intersection of evolution, governance, and the future of society.

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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2019

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W. H. Mallock

Aristocracy & Evolution

A Study of the Rights, the Origin, and the Social Functions of the Wealthier Classes
Published by Good Press, 2019
EAN 4057664589132

Table of Contents

PREFACE
BOOK I
CHAPTER I THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR IN MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY
CHAPTER II THE ATTEMPT TO MERGE THE GREAT MAN IN THE AGGREGATE
CHAPTER III GREAT MEN, AS THE TRUE CAUSE OF PROGRESS
CHAPTER IV THE GREAT MAN AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE PHYSIOLOGICALLY FITTEST SURVIVOR
BOOK II
CHAPTER I THE NATURE AND DEGREES OF THE SUPERIORITIES OF GREAT MEN
CHAPTER II PROGRESS THE RESULT OF A STRUGGLE NOT FOR SURVIVAL, BUT FOR DOMINATION
CHAPTER III THE MEANS BY WHICH THE GREAT MAN APPLIES HIS GREATNESS TO WEALTH-PRODUCTION
CHAPTER IV THE MEANS BY WHICH THE GREAT MAN ACQUIRES POWER IN POLITICS
BOOK III
CHAPTER I HOW TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN THE PARTS CONTRIBUTED TO A JOINT PRODUCT BY THE FEW AND BY THE MANY.
CHAPTER II THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF PURELY DEMOCRATIC ACTION, OR THE ACTION OF AVERAGE MEN IN CO-OPERATION.
CHAPTER III THE QUALITIES OF THE ORDINARY, AS OPPOSED TO THE GREAT, MAN
BOOK IV
CHAPTER I THE DEPENDENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL ACTION ON THE ATTAINABILITY OF EXCEPTIONAL REWARD, OR THE NECESSARY CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE MOTIVES TO ACTION AND ITS RESULTS.
CHAPTER II THE MOTIVES OF THE EXCEPTIONAL WEALTH-PRODUCER
CHAPTER III EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
CHAPTER IV INEQUALITY, HAPPINESS, AND PROGRESS

PREFACE

Table of Contents

The word aristocracy as used in the title of this volume has no exclusive, and indeed no special reference to a class distinguished by hereditary political privileges, by titles, or by heraldic pedigree. It here means the exceptionally gifted and efficient minority, no matter what the position in which its members may have been born, or what the sphere of social progress in which their exceptional efficiency shows itself. I have chosen the word aristocracy in preference to the word oligarchy because it means not only the rule of the few, but of the best or the most efficient of the few.

Of the various questions involved in the general argument of the work, many would, if they were to be examined exhaustively, demand entire treatises to themselves rather than chapters. This is specially true of such questions as the nature of men’s congenital inequalities, the effects of different classes of motive in producing different classes of action, and the effects of equal education on unequal talents and temperaments. But the practical bearings of an argument are more readily grasped when its various parts are set forth with comparative brevity, than they are when the attention claimed for each is minute enough to do it justice as a separate subject of inquiry; and it has appeared to me that in the present condition of opinion, prevalent social fallacies may be more easily combated by putting the case against them in a form which will render it intelligible to everybody, and by leaving many points to be elaborated, if necessary, elsewhere.

I may also add that the conclusions here arrived at, with whatever completeness they might have been explained, elaborated, and defended, would not, in my opinion, do more than partially answer the questions to which they refer. This volume aims only at establishing what are the social rights and social functions, in progressive communities, of the few. The entire question of their duties and proper liabilities, whether imposed on them by themselves or by the State, has been left untouched. This side of the question I hope to deal with hereafter. It is enough to observe here that it is impossible to define the duties of the few, of the rich, of the powerful, of the highly gifted, and to secure that these duties shall be performed by them, unless we first understand the extent of the functions which they inevitably perform, and admit frankly the indefeasible character of their rights.

BOOK III CHAPTER IHOWTO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN THEPARTSCONTRIBUTED TO AJOINTPRODUCTBY THEFEWAND BY THEMANYMill declares that when two agencies are essential to producing an effect, their respective contributions to it cannot be discriminated • 197Mill argues thus with special reference to land and labour; • 198but he overlooks what in actual life is the main feature of the case • 198The labour remaining the same, the product varies with the quality of the land • 198The extra product resulting from labour on superior land is due to land, not labour • 199This is easily proved by a number of analogous illustrations • 199Mill errs by ignoring the changing character of the effect • 201The case of labour directed by different great men is the same as the case of labour applied to different qualities of land. The great men produce the increment • 202Labour, however, must be held to produce that minimum necessary to support the labourer, • 203both in agriculture • 203and in all kinds of production • 204The great man produces the increment that would not be produced if his influence ceased • 204Labour, it is true, is essential to the production of the increment also; • 205but we cannot draw any conclusions from the hypothesis of labour ceasing; • 205for the labourer would have to labour whether the great men were there or no • 206The cessation of the great man’s influence is a practical alternative; the cessation of labour is not, • 206as we see by frequent examples • 206Thus the great man, in the most practical sense, produces what labour would not produce in his absence • 208An analysis of practical reasoning as to causes generally will show us the truth of this • 208For practical purposes the cause of an effect is that cause only which may or may not be present; • 209as we see when men discuss the cause of a fire, • 210or of the accuracy of a chronometer, • 210or the causes of danger to a man hanging on to a rope • 211But there is another means of discriminating between the products of exceptional men and ordinary men • 212This is by an analysis of the faculties necessary to produce the product • 213Are these faculties possessed by all, or by a few only? • 213CHAPTER IITHENATUREANDSCOPEOF PURELYDEMOCRATICACTION,ORTHEACTIONOFAVERAGEMENINCO-OPERATIONCarlyle was wrong in his claim for the great man because he failed to note that his powers were conditioned by the capacities of the ordinary men influenced by him • 215The socialists are wrong because, seeing that the many do something, they argue that they do everything • 215What the many do is limited. We must see precisely what the limits are • 216If a Russian conspirator employs a hundred workmen to dig what they think is a cellar, but is a mine for blowing up the Czar, • 216the conspirator contributes the entire criminal character of the enterprise • 217When a choir sings Handel’s music, Handel contributes the specific character of the sounds sung by them • 217Let us turn to the facts of progress, • 217and begin with economic progress and progress in knowledge • 218In the case of economic progress we must apply the method of inquiring what is produced by labour with and without the assistance of the great man • 218To the question of progress in knowledge we must apply the method of inquiring what faculties are involved in it • 219These are faculties entirely confined to the few • 219And now let us turn to political government • 220What can the faculties of average men do when left to themselves? • 220They can accomplish only the simplest actions, • 220and formulate only the simplest demands • 221The moment matters become at all complex the faculties of the exceptional man are required • 221Now in any civilised country few governmental measures are really simple • 222Exceptional men must simplify them for the many • 222Thus the voice of the many, in all complex cases, echoes the voice of the few • 223This, however, is not the end of the matter; • 224for the details of governmental measures are not the whole of government • 224The true power of democracy is to be seen in religious and family life • 224Though the influence of the great man in religion is enormous, • 225yet religions have only grown and endured because they touch the heart of the average man • 225Christianity exemplifies this fact, • 225and especially Catholicism • 226The doctrines formulated by the aristocracy of Popes and Councils originated among the mass of common believers • 227Theologians and councils merely reasoned on the materials thus given them • 228Catholicism shows the great part played by the many so clearly, because the part played by the few is defined by it so sharply • 228Catholicism, however, is only alluded to here because it illustrates the essential nature of truly democratic action • 229Thus enlightened by it, let us turn back to family life • 230Catholicism shows that democracy is a natural coincidence of conclusions • 231The home life of a nation depends on the same coincidence, or on spontaneously similar propensities • 231This truly democratic coincidence forces all governments to accommodate themselves to it • 233The same democratic power determines the structure of our houses, • 233and the furniture and other commodities in them, • 234and indeed all economic products • 234For though in the process of production the many are dependent on the few, • 235(a fact which the powers of trade unionism do but make more apparent) • 235yet it is the wants and tastes of the many which determine what shall be produced • 238and though great men elicit these wants by first supplying them, • 239the wants themselves must be latent in the nature of the many, and when once aroused are essentially democratic phenomena • 239Thus though economic supply is aristocratic, economic demand is purely democratic • 240The most gifted brewer cannot make the public drink beer they do not like • 241Now in politics also there is a similar demand and supply; • 242but the truly democratic demand in politics is not for laws • 242The demand for laws is not the counterpart of a demand for commodities, for commodities are demanded for their own sake, laws for the sake of their results • 243The demand for laws is like a demand that commodities shall be made by some special kind of machinery • 243No one makes this latter demand. Economic demand is single; political demand is double • 244Political democracy is vulgarly identified with the demand not for social goods, but for machinery • 244But in so far as democracy is a demand not for goods but for machinery, it is not purely democratic • 245The demands of the many are manipulated by the few • 245Why, then, is democracy especially associated with the demand in which its power is least? • 246Because it is the only sphere of activity in which the many can interfere with the machinery of supply at all; • 246and they can interfere with it here because the effects of political government on life are less close and important than the effects of business management on business; • 247and in any case the apparent power of the many is even here controlled by the few • 247The power of the many is a power to determine the quality of civilisation and progress, not to produce them • 248CHAPTER IIITHEQUALITIESOF THEORDINARYAS OPPOSED TO THEGREATMANIt will be objected that the conclusions reached in the last chapter derogate from the dignity of the average man • 250But they do not really do so; • 251for since the great man, as here technically defined, is the man who influences others so as to promote progress, • 251the ordinary man, as opposed to him, need not be stupid • 252He is merely the man whose talents do not increase the efficiency of other men • 252Poets, in this technical sense, are ordinary men • 252So are the most skilful manual workers, • 253for very great manual skill does not promote progress or influence others, • 254unless it can be metamorphosed into the shape of orders given to others • 256Again, brilliance or charm in private life does not promote progress • 256Therefore ordinary men, who do not promote progress, are not asserted to be lacking in high qualities • 257Indeed, what is really interesting in human nature is the typical part of it, not the exceptional, • 258as we may see by referring to art and poetry • 258Average opinion also on social matters is for each class the wise opinion; • 259and the average faculties shared by all are in one sense the test of truth • 259Therefore in denying to the average man the powers that promote progress • 260we are not degrading the average man. We are merely asserting that these powers form but a small part of life • 260Socialists can object to this conclusion only because it establishes the claim of exceptional men to exceptional wealth • 262They cannot have any theoretical objections to it, for they are beginning to recognise the importance of the exceptional man themselves, • 263and only obscure the fact for purposes of popular agitation • 264So far, however, as the reasoning of this book has gone already, no claim has been made for the great man to which socialists need object; • 264for we have assumed that he keeps none of the exceptional wealth he makes, for himself, • 265but that he works exactly on the terms the socialists would dictate to him • 266It now remains to consider whether he would really do so • 266BOOK IV CHAPTER ITHEDEPENDENCEOFEXCEPTIONALACTIONON THEATTAINABILITYOFEXCEPTIONALREWARD,OR THENECESSARYCORRESPONDENCEBETWEEN THEMOTIVESTOACTIONAND ITSRESULTS.Great men differ from ordinary men in degree only, not in kind, • 271and the use of exceptional powers is conditioned like the use of ordinary powers • 272Now let us take the most universal powers possessed by man, viz. those used in acquiring the simplest food • 272Man’s powers in agriculture would be latent unless man wanted food and the earth’s surface were cultivable • 272Thus the exercise of the simplest faculties depends on the want of some certain object, and the possibility of attaining it • 273If this is true of the commonest faculties which aim at supplying necessaries, much more is it true of rare faculties which aim at producing superfluities • 273Society, then, if great men are to work in it, must be so constituted as to make the reward they desire possible • 274In so doing society makes a contract with its great men; • 274and this is a contract which is being constantly revised • 275The great men themselves are the ultimate fixers of their own price • 276Here is the final proof that living great men, not past conditions, are the causes practically involved in progress • 276Thus living great men are masters of the situation • 277because no one can tell that they have exceptional powers till they choose to show them • 277They cannot, therefore, be coerced from without, like ordinary workers • 278They must be induced to work by a reward • 278which they themselves feel to be sufficient • 279Hence the great man’s character and requirements impress themselves on the structure of society • 279This is what socialists constantly forget • 280and they propose to equalise matters by not offering great men any exceptional reward • 281They forget to ask whether, under these circumstances, great men would exercise or reveal their exceptional powers at all • 281Exceptional rewards are essential to exceptional action • 282We must inquire what the required exceptional rewards are • 283CHAPTER IITHEMOTIVESOF THEEXCEPTIONALWEALTH-PRODUCERSocialists, though often forgetting the necessity of exceptional motives, often remember it, • 284and endeavour to show that socialistic society would have sufficient rewards to offer to its great men, • 284such as the pleasure of doing good, of excelling, and of receiving honour • 285The fundamental question is, will such rewards as these stimulate great men to wealth-production? • 285Is the enjoyment of exceptional wealth superfluous as a motive to producing it? • 286If it is so, it is for the socialists to prove that it is so; • 286for they themselves admit that it has not been so in the past, and is not actually so now • 287Are there any signs, then, that the desire for exceptional wealth is beginning to lose its power? • 288We shall find that the socialists themselves maintain just the contrary; • 288for they appeal to the desire of each producer to possess all he produces as the most universal and permanent desire in man; • 289and never questioned this so long as they believed that the sole producer was the labourer • 289They questioned the doctrine only when they came to see that the great man is a producer also; and they confine their questioning to his case • 290But if the labourer desires to possess what he produces, much more will the great man do so; • 290for even if he gives away what he produces, he desires to possess it first • 291There is no sign, therefore, that the desire for exceptional wealth is losing force as a motive • 292Are, then, other desires acquiring new force as motives to wealth-production? • 292Are the joys of excelling, of benefiting others, or of being honoured by others, doing so? • 293The desire of these joys is a motive to certain kinds of exceptional conduct • 293It is a motive to benevolent action and religious work; • 293But neither of these is the same thing as wealth-production • 294It is a motive to artistic production, certainly, • 294and also to scientific discovery; • 295and works of art are wealth, and scientific discovery is the basis of industrial progress; • 296but great art forms but a small part of wealth, • 296and artistic effort other than the highest is motived by the desire of pecuniary reward, • 297whilst scientific discoveries, though made generally from the desire for truth, are applied to wealth-production because the men who apply them desire wealth • 297What, however, of the fact that the desire for honour makes the soldier work harder than any labourer? • 298Why, the socialists ask, should not the same desire make the great wealth-producer work? • 299Mr. Frederic Harrison has urged a similar argument • 299The answer to this is that the work of the soldier is exceptional; • 300and we cannot argue from it to the work of ordinary life • 301The fighting instinct is inherent in the dominant races, • 302in a way in which the industrial instinct is not • 303And even in war those who make the prolonged intellectual efforts required, ask for themselves other rewards besides honour • 303Still more will the great wealth-producers do so • 304There is therefore nothing to show that these other motives will supersede the desire of wealth • 304What they really do, and what socialists fail to see, is to mix with the desire for wealth, and add to its efficiency • 304As the desire of wealth has mixed with other desires in men like Bacon, Rubens, etc. • 305For in saying that the desire of wealth is essential as a motive to wealth-production we do not mean the desire of wealth for its own sake, • 305or for the sake of physical gratification • 306This forms a small part of its desirability • 306It is desired mainly as a means to power, and to those very pleasures which socialists offer instead of it • 307The great wealth-producers, susceptible to the motives on which socialists dwell, will desire exceptional wealth all the more because of them • 308It is argued, however, by semi-socialists that the actual producer may be allowed the income he produces, but that this must end with his life, and not be passed on to his family as interest on bequeathed capital • 309It is claimed that this arrangement would coincide with abstract justice, • 310for it is argued that all wealth which is not worked for must be stolen • 310This is utterly untrue, as the case of flocks and herds shows us; • 311but the chief producer of wealth that is not worked for is capital, which is past productive ability stored up and externalised • 311The dart of a savage hunter, • 312the manure heap or cart horse of a peasant, • 312are forms of capital which actually produce, and the product belongs to those who own them • 313The same is the case with such capital as engines and manufacturing plant • 313These implements are like a race of iron negroes, and are producers as truly as live negroes would be • 314Indirectly, wage capital is also a producer in the same way • 314And indeed, till they saw that this argument could be turned against themselves, it was strongly urged by the socialists • 315Practically, however, the justification of income from capital • 316rests on the fact that the power of capital to yield income is what mainly makes men anxious to produce it; • 316since if income-yielding capital could not be acquired and amassed, wealthy men could make no provision for their families, • 317nor could wealth give pleasure to those who might at any moment be beggars • 318Moreover, if incomes were not heritable, wealth would produce none of those social results, such as continuous culture, etc., which make it valuable • 319The wealth that ceased with the men that actually made it would produce a society of beasts • 319Wealth is desirable because it is the physical basis of an enlarged life; • 320and there must thus be continuity in the possession of wealth • 320Hence the great wealth-producer demands the possession not only of what he produces directly, but of what he produces indirectly through his past products • 321The majority not only may, but do, acquire a share of the increment produced by the great man; • 322but whatever this share may be, it can never be such as to make social conditions equal • 322CHAPTER IIIEQUALITYOFEDUCATIONALOPPORTUNITYThe wealthy class, owing to inheritance, is always much more numerous than the great men actually engaged at any given time in production • 324But though inheritance gives a certain permanence to the wealthy class, the families belonging to it are constantly, if slowly, changing, • 325and new men are constantly forcing their way into it • 326Indeed the wealth of the country depends on the men potentially great as producers actualising their talents and producing the wealth that raises them • 326It is therefore obvious that the wealth will increase in proportion as these potentially great men have the opportunity of actualising their productive powers • 327It is impossible, however, to make opportunities absolutely equal • 328The question is how near we can approach to equality • 328In a country where these opportunities have been made artificially unequal there will be room for a great deal of equalisation • 329But removing artificial impediments is only a negative kind of equalisation • 329It is probable, however, that for the development of genius of the highest order this is all that is needful, • 330and will secure the development of all the genius of the highest kind that exists • 331But genius of a lesser kind, which would else be lost, may, no doubt, be elicited by positive educational help from the State; • 332though the amount of such genius is overestimated by reformers, because they confuse talents rare in themselves with accomplishments that are only rare accidentally • 332The latter can be increased indefinitely, the former not • 333For real productive genius there is always room, • 333but the economic utility of mere accomplishments is limited by the conditions of production at the time • 333Thus to produce more possible clerks than are wanted merely lowers the wages of those employed, without increasing the utility of those who are not employed • 334Still, within limits, educational help from the State does much to increase the supply of exceptional, though not great, talent • 335But the main difficulty involved in the equalising of educational opportunity is not the production of good results, but the avoidance of bad • 335The bad results are the stimulating of discontent, not in average men, but in men who are really exceptional • 336but those exceptional gifts are ill-balanced or have some flaw in them • 337For if education sets free and stimulates sound intellectual powers • 337it will similarly stimulate intellects that are not sound, • 338or wills, with no intellect to match, and will generate a desire for wealth in men who are not capable of creating it, • 338and thus will merely produce needless misery and mischief • 339Education, again, stimulates faculties that can really produce exceptional results, but not results that are complete • 339The progressive struggle requires that the intellects of some should be stimulated, whose efforts fail • 340But those failures that promote progress are failures that partially succeed • 340But there are abortive talents which produce failures that have no relation to success. Those talents are purely mischievous; • 341for example, the failure of the would-be artist, • 341or that of the man who popularises wrong medical treatment • 342But the commonest example of this kind of man is the socialistic agitator, • 342who demands the redistribution of wealth, whilst absolutely powerless to produce it, • 343and who consequently invents false theories about its production, which do nothing but demoralise those who are duped by them • 343(though even these theories can be discussed with profit under certain circumstances) • 344Men like these embody the two chief dangers of the equalisation of educational opportunity, • 345namely, the rousing in the average man wants he cannot satisfy, and the stimulating of talents that are constitutionally imperfect • 345The latter of these dangers is the source of the former • 346It cannot be completely avoided, but the present theories of education tend to heighten, not to minimise it • 346The current theory that all talents should be developed is false, • 347so is the theory that all tastes should be cultivated in all alike. The education proper for the rich is not a type but an exception • 347These false theories rest on the false belief that equal education could ever produce equal social conditions • 348The majority of each class will remain in the class in which they were born • 348Only the efficiently exceptional can rise out of their own class, • 348and it is the ambition of the efficiently exceptional only that it is really desirable to stimulate • 349The average man should be taught to aim at embellishing his position, not at escaping from it • 349CHAPTER IVINEQUALITY,HAPPINESS,ANDPROGRESSThe radical politician will object to the foregoing conclusions in terms with which we are familiar • 351The radical theorist will put the same objections more logically. If the desire of exceptional wealth is really the strongest motive, he will say that it follows that most men, since they cannot all be exceptionally rich, must always remain miserable • 352Now the first answer to this is that the fact that all men will never be equally wealthy does not prevent the conditions of all men from improving absolutely • 353Another answer is that if inequality in the possession of the most coveted prizes of life implies misery amongst the majority, this evil would be intensified rather than mitigated by socialists, who would substitute unequal honour for unequal wealth • 354The final answer is that the unequal distribution of wealth has no natural tendency to cause unhappiness; • 357for men’s desires vary. There is equality of desire for the necessaries of life only; for this desire rests on men’s physical natures, which are similar; • 357but the desire for superfluities depends on their mental powers, which vary • 358The special appeal of luxury is mainly to the mind and the imagination—• 358the luxury, for instance, of a large house, • 359or sleeping accommodation in a train • 359Consequently the desire for luxury and wealth, like the pleasure they give, depends on peculiar mental powers or peculiar mental states • 360Amongst most men the desire for wealth is naturally a speculative desire only • 361It implies no pain caused by the want of wealth • 361The desire ceases to be speculative and becomes a practical craving only when the imagination is exceptionally strong, and a strong belief is present that the attainment of wealth is possible • 362The desire for wealth, in fact, is in proportion to each man’s belief that by him personally it is attainable • 364This belief is naturally confined to men with exceptional imaginations and exceptional productive powers • 365It only becomes general by the popularising of false theories which represent wealth as attainable by all, without exceptional talent or exceptional exertion • 366It is roused, for instance, in a man who suddenly is told that he has a legal right to an estate which previously he never thought of coveting • 366The socialistic teaching of to-day creates a spurious desire for wealth by its doctrines of impossible rights to it • 367The practical craving for wealth is naturally confined to those who have some talent for creating it, and the pain caused by its absence is naturally confined to such men • 368The socialistic theories merely cause a barren and artificial discontent, • 368which interferes with that harmonious progress on which the welfare of the many depends • 369These theories make enemies of classes who would otherwise be allies, and the cause of true social reform suffers incalculable injury • 370The object of the present work is to show the fallacy of the theoretic basis of existing socialistic discontent and socialistic aspirations; • 371and to show that the many are not a self-existent power, • 372but depend for all the powers they possess on the co-operation of the few, • 373whose rights are as sacred, and whose power is as great, as their own • 375The recognition of the fact that the relations and positions of classes can never be fundamentally altered • 376(especially when we consider the facts of history to which Karl Marx drew attention) • 376shows us not only how chimerical are the hopes of the socialists, but what solid grounds there are for the hopes of more rational reformers • 378

BOOK I

Table of Contents

CHAPTER I THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR IN MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY

Table of Contents

The interest with which the world in general, throughout the middle portion of this century, has watched the progress of the various positive sciences, would, when we consider how abstruse these sciences are, seem strange and almost inexplicable if it were not for one fact. This fact is the close and obvious bearing which the conclusions of the sciences in question have on traditional Christianity, and, indeed, on any belief in immortality and the divine government of the world. The popular interest in science remains still unabated, but the most careless observer can hardly fail to perceive that the grounds of it are, to a certain extent, very rapidly changing. They are ceasing to be primarily religious, and are becoming primarily social. The theories and discoveries of the savant which are examined with the greatest eagerness are no longer those which affect our {4} prospects of a life in heaven, but those which deal with the possibility of improving our social conditions on earth, and which appeal to us through our sympathies, not with belief or doubt, but with the principles which are broadly contrasted under the names of conservative and revolutionary.

Such being the case, it is hardly necessary to observe that science itself has been undergoing a change likewise. The character of the change, however, requires to be briefly specified. From the time when geologists first startled the orthodox by demonstrating that the universe was more than six thousand years old, and that something more than a week had been occupied in the process of its construction, to the time, comparatively recent, during which the genius of Darwin and others was forcing on the world entirely new ideas with regard to the parentage, and presumably the nature of man, there was a certain limit—a certain scientific frontier—at which positive science practically stopped short. Having sedulously examined the materials and structure of the universe, until on the one hand it reached atoms and molecules, it examined, on the other, the first emergence of organic life, and traced its developments till they culminated in the articulate-speaking human being. It brought us, in fact, to man on the threshold of his subsequent history; and there, till very recently, positive science left him. But now there are signs all round us of a new intellectual movement, analogous to that which accompanied the rise of Darwinism, {5} and science once again is endeavouring to enlarge its borders. Having offered us an explanation of the origin of the animal man, it proposes to deal with the existing conditions of society very much as it dealt with the structure of the human body, to exhibit them as the necessary result of certain far-reaching laws and causes, and to deduce our civilisation of to-day from the condition of the primitive savage by the same methods and by the aid of the same theories as those which it employed in deducing the primitive savage from the brutes, and the brutes in their turn from primitive germ or protoplasm. In other words, the great triumph of science during what we may call its physical period has been the establishment of that theory of development which is commonly spoken of as Evolution, and the application of this to the problems of physics and biology. The object of science in entering on what we may call its social period is the application of this same theory to the problems of civilisation and society.

It is true that, if we use the word science in a certain sense, the attempt to treat social problems scientifically is not in itself new. Political economy, to say nothing of utilitarian ethics, is a social science, or it is nothing; and political economy had already made considerable advances when modern physical science had hardly found its footing. But before long physical science passed it, with a step that was not only more rapid, but also immeasurably firmer, and was presently giving such an example of what {6} accurate science is, that it was thought doubtful whether political economy could be called a science at all. The doubt thus raised cannot be said to have justified itself. In spite of all the attacks that have been made against the earlier economists, their principal doctrines survive to the present day, as being, so far as they go, genuine scientific truths. But whenever the thinker, who has been educated in the school of modern physical science, betakes himself now to the study of society and human action, and begins to apply to these the developed theory of evolution, though he does not reject the doctrines of the earlier economists, he sees them in a new light, by which their significance is profoundly changed. The earlier economists took society as they found it, and they reasoned as though what was true of the economic life around them must be absolutely and universally true of economic life always. Here is the point as to which the thinker of to-day differs from them. He does not dispute the truth of the deductions drawn by them with regard to society as it existed during their own epoch; but, educated by the methods and discoveries of the physical and biological evolutionist, he perceives that society itself is in process of constant change, that many economic doctrines which have been true during the present century had little application to society during the Middle Ages, and that centuries hence they may perhaps have even less. Thus, though he does not repudiate or disregard the economic science of the past, he {7} merges it in a science the scope of which is far wider and deeper. This is a science which primarily sets itself to explain, not how a given set of social conditions affects those who live among them, but how social conditions at one epoch are different from those of another, how each set of conditions is the resultant of those preceding it, and how, since the society of the present differs from that of the past, the society of the future is likely to differ from that of the present.

What political economy has thus lost in precision it has gained in general interest. So long as it merely analysed processes of production and distribution which it was assumed would always continue without substantial modification, political economy was mainly a science for specialists, and was little calculated to arouse any keen interest in the public. But now that it has been merged in that general science of evolution, which offers to an unquiet age what seems a scientific licence to regard as practically producible some indeterminate transformation in these processes, political economy has come to occupy a new position. Instead of being ignored or ridiculed by the more ardent school of reformers, and even neglected by conservatives as a not very powerful auxiliary, it has now been brought down into the dust of the general struggle, and is invoked by one side as the prophetess of new possibilities, and by the other as an exorcist of mischievous and mad illusions. And what is true in this respect with regard to political economy is {8} also true with regard to evolutionary social science as a whole. Social science as a whole, just like this special branch of it, is being brought into vital contact with the lives and hopes of man, and is exciting a popular interest strictly analogous to that which had been excited by physical and biological science previously.

It is doing this in two ways, which, though closely connected, are distinct. In the first place, it is directing our attention to the human race as a whole, and is showing us how society and the individual have developed in an orderly manner, growing upwards from the lowest and the most miserable beginnings to the heights of civilisation, intellectual, moral, and material, and how they contain in themselves the potency of yet further development. It thus offers to the mind a vast variety of suggestion with regard to the significance of man’s presence upon the earth, and is held by many to be supplying us with the materials of a religion calculated to replace that which physical science has discredited. The second way in which it excites popular interest is the way which has been just illustrated by a reference to political economy. For besides offering to our philosophic and religious faculties the vision of man’s corporate movement from a condition of helpless bestiality towards some “far-off divine event,” which glitters on us in the remote future, social science is suggesting to us changes which are of a very much nearer kind, and which appeal not to our speculative desire to discover some {9} meaning in the universe, but to the personal interest which we each of us take in our own welfare—such, for instance, as a general redistribution of wealth, the abolition or complete reorganisation of private property, the emancipation of labour, and the realisation of social equality.

This distinction between the speculative and practical aspects of social science has a special importance, which will be explained and insisted on presently. But it is here mentioned only to show the reader how strong a combination of motives is impelling the present generation—the conservative classes and the revolutionary classes equally—to transfer to social science the interest once felt in physical; and how strong is the stimulus thus applied to sociologists to emulate the diligence and success of the physicists and biologists, their predecessors. Nor have diligence, enthusiasm, or scientific genius been wanting to them. As has already been observed, they have transformed social science altogether by applying to it the doctrines of evolution which physical science taught them, and have thus organically affiliated the former study to the latter. This is in itself a triumph worthy of the enterprise that has achieved it. But they have done far more than borrow from physics this mere general theory. They have established between physical phenomena and social an enormous number of analogies, so close that the one set assists in the interpretation of the other. They have borrowed from the physicists a number of their subsidiary theories, their methods of grouping facts, and, above {10} all, their methods of studying them. In a word, they are endeavouring to follow the masters of physical science along the precise path which has led the latter to such solid and such definite results.

We have now, however, to record a singular and disappointing truth. Though men of science have, in the manner just described, been engaged for years in the field of sociological study; though the way was prepared for them by men like Comte, Mill, and Buckle; though amongst them have been men like Mr. Spencer, with capacities of the highest order, and though certain results have been reached of the kind desired, complaints are heard from thinkers of all shades of opinion that these results are singularly unsatisfactory and inconclusive when compared with the efforts that have been made in reaching them, and still more when compared with the results of corresponding efforts in the sphere of physics.

No one complains more loudly of this comparative failure than some of the most distinguished students of social science themselves. Professor Marshall, for instance, who has done more than any other English author to breathe into technical economics the spirit of evolutionary science, admits that Comte, who laid the foundation of sociology, and Mr. Spencer, who has invested it with a definitely scientific character, have brought to the study of “man’s actions in society unsurpassed knowledge and great genius, and have made epochs in thought by their broad surveys and suggestive hints”; but neither of them, he proceeds to say, has succeeded {11} in doing more than this. Mr. Kidd, again, whose work on Social Evolution, if not valuable for the conclusions he himself desires to substantiate, is curiously significant as an example of contemporary sociological reasoning, repeats Professor Marshall’s complaint, and gives yet more definite point to it. Having observed that “despite the great advance which science has made in almost every other direction, there is, it must be confessed, no science of human society, properly so called,” he justifies this observation by insisting on what is an undoubted fact, that “so little practical light has even Mr. Herbert Spencer succeeded in throwing on the nature of the social problems of our time, that his investigations and conclusions are, according as they are dealt with by one side or the other, held to lead up to the opinions of the two diametrically opposite camps of individualists and collectivists, into which society is rapidly becoming organised.”

Now what is the reason of this? Here is the question that confronts us. That the methods adopted by the scientist in the domain of physics are applicable to social phenomena, just as they are to physical, has been not only established in a broad and general way, but demonstrated by a mass of minute and elaborately co-ordinated facts. Why, then, when we find them in the sphere of physics solving one problem after another with a truly surprising accuracy, do they yield us such vague and often contradictory results when we apply them to the solution of the practical problems of society? {12}

Those who complain so justly of the failure of social science and who yet show themselves altogether at a loss to account for it, might have seen their way to answering this question had they concentrated their attention on a point that was just now alluded to. It was just now observed that the problems which social science aims at answering, and is popularly expected to answer, are of two distinct kinds—the philosophic or religious, and the practical; the former being concerned with the destinies of humanity as a whole, with movements extending over enormous periods of time, and with the remote past and future far more than with the present; the other being concerned exclusively with the present or the near future, and with changes that will affect either ourselves or our own children.

Now it will be found that social science, whilst busying itself with both these sets of problems, has met with the failures which are alleged against it, only in dealing with the latter, and that, so far as regards the former, it has successfully reached conclusions comparable in precision and solidity to those of the physicists and biologists whose methods it has so conscientiously followed. Professor Marshall’s own treatise on The Principles of Economics, and that of Mr. Kidd on Social Evolution likewise, abound in admissions that this statement of the case is correct. Professor Marshall’s account of the rise and fall of civilisation as caused by climate, by geographical position, and the influence of one race and one civilisation on another—an account of which he {13} places in the very forefront of his elaborate work—is professedly merely a summary of conclusions already arrived at; and the manner in which he states these conclusions is itself evidence that sociologists, when dealing with certain classes of social phenomena, have given us something more than “surveys” and “suggestive hints.” Social science, in fact, cannot be properly called a failure except when it ceases to deal with the larger phenomena of society, which show themselves only in the long course of ages, and descending to the problems of a particular age and civilisation, endeavours to deduce, from the general principles it has established, propositions minute enough to be applicable to our immediate conduct and expectations. As practical inquirers, therefore, the real question before us is not why social science has failed, where physical science has succeeded, but why social science has succeeded like physical science in one direction, and, unlike physical science, failed so signally in another. If we concentrate our attention on the subject in this way, and thus realise with precision the nature of the failure we desire to explain, we shall find that the explanation of it is not only far simpler than might have been supposed, but also that the remedy for it is far more obvious and more easy.

It has been said that sociology has succeeded in dealing with those social phenomena which extend themselves through vast periods of time, and has failed in dealing with those whose interest and {14} existence is limited to lives of a few particular generations. Now between these two sets of phenomena, as thus far described, the most obvious difference is, no doubt, the difference in their magnitude. This difference, however, is altogether accidental, and does nothing to explain those curiously contrasted results which the study of one set and the other has yielded to the modern sociologist. The difference, which will explain these, is of quite another kind, and may briefly be stated thus. The larger social phenomena—those which interest the speculative philosopher, and with which sociology has dealt successfully, are phenomena of social aggregates, or masses of men regarded as single bodies; the smaller phenomena—those which interest the practical man, and with which sociology has dealt unsuccessfully—are essentially the phenomena not of social aggregates, but of various parts of aggregates.

Let us illustrate the matter provisionally by two rudimentary examples. As an example of the larger phenomena let us take the advance of man from the age of stone to the ages of bronze and iron. Of the smaller, we may take the phenomena referred to by Mr. Kidd—namely, the appearance in the modern world of the socialist or collectivist party, and the antagonism between it and the party of private property and individualism. Now the first of these two sets of phenomena—the use by men of stone implements, and the subsequent use of metal implements—consist of phenomena which, so far as the {15} sociologist is concerned, are manifested successively by humanity, or some portion of humanity, as a whole. They are not referred to individuals or small classes. No question is asked as to what particular savage may rightly claim priority in the invention of metal implements, or whether flint or bronze were the subjects of any prehistoric monopoly. Those races amongst which the use of the metals became general are regarded as a single body, which had made this advance collectively. They are, indeed, as we shall again have occasion to observe, habitually described under the common name of Man. But let us turn to such phenomena as the antagonism between individualists and collectivists, and the case is wholly different. It is true that here also, as in the case we have just been considering, our attention is called to a portion of the human race, namely, the Western or progressive nations, which we may, for certain purposes, regard as a single aggregate; but it is fixed, not on the phenomena which this aggregate exhibits as a whole, but on those exhibited by unlike and conflicting parts of it—the part which sympathises with individualists on the one hand, and the part which sympathises with collectivists on the other.

Thus the subject-matter of sociology, regarded as a speculative science, consists of those points in which the members of any given social aggregate resemble one another. The subject-matter of sociology, regarded as a practical science, consists of those points in which the members, or {16} certain groups of members, of any given social aggregate differ from one another. And here we come to the reason why sociology, as a practical science, has failed. It has failed because hitherto it has not realised this distinction, and has persisted in applying to the phenomena, involved in practical social problems, the same terminology, the same methods of observation and reasoning, which it has applied to the phenomena involved in speculative social problems. By so doing, though it has dissipated many popular errors, it has, in the most singular manner, given a new vitality to others. It has indeed supplied a pseudo-scientific sanction to the most abject fallacies that have vitiated the political philosophy of this century; and it has thus been instrumental in keeping alive and encouraging the most grotesquely impossible hopes as to what may be accomplished by legislation, and the most grotesquely false views as to the sources of social and political power. To expose these fallacies, and the defective reasoning on which they rest, is the object of the present volume.

The nature of that peculiarity in the procedure of modern sociology which has just been described, and to which all its errors are due, forms a very curious study, and it will be essential to exhibit it with the utmost plainness possible. In the following chapter, therefore, the reader shall be presented with examples of it.

CHAPTER II THE ATTEMPT TO MERGE THE GREAT MAN IN THE AGGREGATE

Table of Contents

Let us take any book we please, by any modern writer, who is attempting to deal with any social subject scientifically, and whenever he is calling attention to the great intellectual triumphs which have caused the progress of civilisation, or to any developments of human nature which have marked it, we shall find that these triumphs or developments are always attributed indiscriminately to the largest mass of people with whom they have any connection—sometimes to “the nation,” sometimes to “the age,” sometimes to “the race,” and more frequently still to “man.”

Reference has been made already to Mr. Kidd’s work on Social Evolution, which, on its publication, attained an extraordinary popularity, and which, whatever its value otherwise, is interesting as a type of contemporary sociological reasoning. It is peculiarly interesting as illustrating the point which we are now discussing. Most of Mr. Kidd’s reasoning, especially in the crucial parts of it, is not {18} only conducted, but is actually represented by a terminology which refers everything to “the race,” “the age,” or “man.” And it would be hard to find better examples in the works of any other writer of the condition of thought underlying the use of these phrases, and of the extraordinary consequences to which it leads.

Three examples will be enough. The two first shall be from two other writers, whom Mr. Kidd quotes with admiration; the third shall be from himself. We will begin with the following passage, taken from a contemporary economist, which Mr. Kidd singles out for emphatic approval as “a very effective statement” of one of the truths of social science.

“Man,” so the passage runs, “is the only animal whose wants can never be satisfied. The wants of every other living thing are uniform and fixed. The ox of to-day aspires no more than did the ox when man first yoked him. … But not so with man [himself]. No sooner are his animal wants satisfied, than new wants arise. … [He] has but set his feet on the first step of an infinite progression. … It is not merely his hunger, but taste, that seeks gratification in food. … Lucullus will sup with Lucullus; twelve boars roast on spits that Antony’s mouthful of meat may be done to a turn; every kingdom is ransacked to add to Cleopatra’s charms; and marble colonnades, and hanging gardens, and pyramids that rival the hills, arise.”