Battle of the Bulge 1944-45 - Andrew Rawson - E-Book

Battle of the Bulge 1944-45 E-Book

Andrew Rawson

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Beschreibung

In December 1944 the German military made its final attempt to end the Second World War by throwing in all its reserves in a desperate attempt to shatter the Allied lines. After breaking through the American-held sector in the Ardennes, two Panzer armies headed for the bridges over the River Meuse. However, a combination of poor planning, bad weather, tortuous terrain and, above all, the determined defence of keys towns and villages delayed the advance. The Allies were able to hold the northern and southern shoulders of the attack, hemming the Germans in. The Bulge had been created, and as the fortunes of battle were reversed, the Allies struck back. In Battle of the Bulge 1944–45, historian Andrew Rawson gives a clear, concise account of those dramatic days at the end of 1944, supported by a timeline of events and orders of battle. If you want to understand what happened and why – read on.

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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

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A dark sense of humour prevailed during the siege of Bastogne. (NARA 111-SC-226804)

Cover illustrations. Front: Men of the 2nd Division hug the sides of a shallow ditch as German shells rain down on their positions on Elsenborn Ridge (NARA 111-SC-197304). Back: GIs of the 26th Division during the attack on Wiltz (NARA 111-SC-199092).

First published 2011 as Battle Story: Battle of the Bulge 1944–45

This edition first published 2022

The History Press

97 St George’s Place, Cheltenham,

Gloucestershire, GL50 3QB

www.thehistorypress.co.uk

© The History Press, 2011, 2022

The right of Andrew Rawson to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Andrew Rawson has asserted his moral right to be identified as the Author of this Work.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without the permission in writing from the Publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978 0 75246 846 4

Typesetting and origination by The History Press

Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ Books Limited, Padstow, Cornwall.

eBook converted by Geethik Technologies

CONTENTS

Introduction

Timelines

Historical Background

Conceiving the Plan

Reinforcing the Wehrmacht

Jodl Draws up Hitler’s Ideas

The Generals’ Reaction

The Armies

The Ardennes Battlefield

The German Commanders

The Allied Commanders

The US Army Commanders

Army Group B’s Final Planning

Operation Wacht am Rhein: Army Group B Order of Battle and Objectives

The Allied Situation

The Soldiers

The Kit

The Tactics

The Days Before Battle

Deceiving the Allies

Assembling for Battle

The German Offensive

16–17 December Operation Wacht am Rhein Begins

18–19 December Army Group B’s Breakthrough Begins

20–21 December The Battles for St Vith and Bastogne

The Allied Counteroffensive

Protecting the Meuse Bridges

22–23 December Army Group B’s High Water Mark

24–25 December The Counteroffensive Intensifies

26 December Onwards Driving Army Group B Back

Operation Nordwind

The Legacy

Eliminating the Bulge

The Cost

Analysing the Ardennes Battle

The Place of the Ardennes Offensive in the Second World War

Orders of Battle

Visiting the Battlefield

Further Reading

The bullet-scarred sign went back to Fort Campbell. (NARA 111-SC-200445)

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of 6 June 1944 Allied troops made airborne and seaborne landings on the coast of Normandy and by nightfall they had established a slender beachhead. The long awaited battle for the Second Front had started and over the next six weeks the British and Commonwealth soldiers serving under Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and the American soldiers under General Omar Bradley fought to expand their foothold in Nazi-occupied Europe.

While the British drew in German reserves around the town of Caen, the Americans fought inch by inch through the Normandy bocage as reinforcements poured into the beachhead. Finally, the breakthrough came on 25 July when First US Army launched Operation Cobra. As Montgomery’s 21st Army Group advanced south from Caen, Bradley’s 12th Army Group pushed south to Avranches before turning east in a huge arc to try and encircle Army Group B. General Eisenhower’s plan nearly worked and large numbers of Field Marshal Walter Model’s men were trapped in what became known as the battle for the Falaise Pocket.

The Allied Armies advanced quickly across France while the remnants of OB West fell back in disorder towards Germany and the safety of the West Wall (also known as the Siegfried Line), a long line of fortifications along the border, the Allied Armies followed as fast as they could. While Montgomery’s 21st Army Group entered Belgium and entered Brussels on the north flank, Bradley advanced east, liberating Paris before heading towards the German border. Following a second successful Allied landing in southern France General Jacob Devers’ 6th Army Group pushed quickly up the Rhône Valley and linked up with Bradley’s advance. However, while progress was exceeding all expectations the advance started to falter by mid September because of mounting difficulties in keeping the front line troops supplied. The Germans either held onto ports or destroyed them, leaving the Allies reliant on bringing supplies over the beaches. The destruction of the French rail network meant that everything had to be moved by lorry. With summer turning to autumn, Eisenhower was concerned that his Armies would find themselves stranded in front of the Siegfried Line at the end of a tenuous supply line.

An attempt to outflank the fortified line by pushing through Holland was suggested by Montgomery and approved; on 17 September Operation Market Garden was launched. The plan was to cross the Maas, Waal, and Rhine rivers in southern Holland using British and American airborne troops to pave the way for the ground troops but after a fleeting glimpse of success, German reserves moved in to stop 21st Army Group just short of its final objective. The failure to cross the Rhine left Eisenhower needing to reconsider his options.

An attempt on Hitler’s life in the Wolf’s Lair on 20 July 1944 and the subsequent purge of the Armed Forces High Command, in which many senior officers were executed, had made the Führer paranoid. The purge had gone right to the top and Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge committed suicide when implicated in the plot.

With the Soviet Armies winning the battle for the Eastern front, Hitler wanted to focus on defeating the Allies in the West and on 31 July the Führer made the declaration that the war had to be won in the West and that the Allied armies had to be stopped from breaking out of Normandy. The Wehrmacht could not halt them and over the next six weeks they advanced across France and Belgium. As the Allied advance ground to a halt on Germany’s border, Hitler conceived the offensive in the Ardennes; a counterattack designed to win the war.

The day before Operation Market Garden was launched, OKW’s staff were holding a briefing at Hitler’s headquarters in East Prussia, a place known as the Wolf’s Lair. General Alfred Jodl, OKW’s Chief of Operations Staff, was explaining the situation on the Western Front and it was looking bad for Wehrmacht. Allied divisions outnumbered the Germans by two to one and the Americans had just crossed the German border at Aachen. As he went on to describe how most divisions were short of manpower, armour, heavy weapons and ammunition, Hitler interrupted and announced; ‘I have just made a momentous decision. I shall go over to the counterattack, here, out of the Ardennes, with the objective – Antwerp.’

Hitler also had a new Commander in Chief, West, to plan the offensive following Kluge’s suicide. On 1 September Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt took command having been sacked two months earlier for urging Hitler to make peace following the D-Day landings on the Normandy coast. He was ordered to stall the Allied advance across France and Belgium to give time for the West Wall to be strengthened. Meanwhile, secret planning to gather enough men, armour, artillery and ammunition to smash through the Allied line began immediately. It was going to take a tremendous effort to prepare for the offensive but the stakes were high; the survival of the Nazi regime depended on the Wehrmacht’s success.

Jodl, Hitler and Rundstedt; while Hitler conceived OperationWacht am Rhein, Jodl and Rundstedt argued over the pros and cons of the Big Solution and the Small Solution.

TIMELINES

European Campaign: 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945

1944

6 June

Operation Overlord: D-Day, Allied airborne and seaborne landings on the north coast of France begins. The bloody battle through the Normandy bocage follows.

25 July

Operation Cobra: The Allies breakout into open country begins.

12–21 August

The battle of the Falaise Pocket results in the destruction of a large part of Army Group B; the race across France begins.

15 August

Operation Dragoon: The Allies land on the south coast of France and move quickly north up the Rhône valley.

Early September

21st Army Group advances quickly across north France and into Belgium while 12th Army Group advances to the German border; Allied advance halted by a stretched line of communications while Germans seek safety behind the West Wall.

12 September

Third and Seventh Armies link up at Chantillon-sur-Seine.

14 September

The start of the bloody five-month-long battle for the Hürtgen Forest.

17–25 September

Operation Market Garden: 21st Army Group uses airborne and ground troops to advance through southern Holland. Although Montgomery’s troops cross the Rivers Maas and Waal, they fail to secure a bridgehead across Rhine River at Arnhem.

2–21 October

The fierce battle for Aachen, the first German city to be captured

16 December

Operation Wacht am Rhein: The start of the Battle of the Bulge in the Ardennes.

1945

27 January

Official end of the Battle of the Bulge.

8 February–5 March

The battle of the Reichswald and the advance to the Rhine, including Operation Veritable and Operation Grenade.

7 March

First Crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen.

Late March

Multiple crossings of the Rhine in Third and Seventh Army areas. 21st Army Group launches Operation Varsity crossing the river around Wesel; Operation Plunder, advancing north of the Ruhr.

April

Rapid advances deep into the heart of Germany, as OB West’s resistance collapses.

25 April

US and Soviet troops meet at Torgau on the River Elbe, cutting Germany in two.

30 April

Adolf Hitler commits suicide in the Führer Bunker in Berlin.

8 May

Surrender of all remaining German armed forces.

Battle of the Bulge:16 December 1944 to 16 January 1945

16–17 December

Operation Wacht am Rhein Begins

Sixth Panzer Army

LXVII Corps stopped around Krinkelt and Rocherath while I SS Panzer Corps break through into the Amblève valley.

Fifth Panzer Army

LXVI Corps surrounds 106th Division on the Schnee Eifel while LVIII Panzer and XLVII Panzer Corps struggle to cross the River Our.

Seventh Army

LXXXV Corps keeps pace with Fifth Panzer Army but LXXX Corps struggles to cross the River Sauer.

18–19 December

Army Group B’s Breakthrough Begins

Sixth Panzer Army

LXVII Corps unable to break V Corps around Elsenborn while I SS Panzer Corps is stopped in the Amblève valley.

Fifth Panzer Army

LXVI Corps runs into 7th Armored Division at St Vith while LVIII Panzer Corps breaks through 28th Division and advances past Houffalize; XLVII Panzer Corps battles with rearguards covering Bastogne.

Seventh Army

North flank of LXXXV Corps advances to Wiltz but the right flank stalls at Diekirch. LXXX Corps struggles to make progress on the west bank of Sauer.

20 December

SHAEF splits command of the Ardennes battlefield into two with 21st Army Group taking command of First Army in the north and 12th Army Group taking command of Third Army in the south.

20–21 December

The Battles for St Vith and Bastogne

Sixth Panzer Army

Attacks against Malmédy fail while Kampfgruppe Peiper is surrounded in the Amblève valley

Fifth Panzer Army

LXVI Corps fails to capture St Vith and while LVIII Panzer Corps advances west of Houffalize, 101st Airborne Division reaches Bastogne before XLVII Panzer Corps does.

Seventh Army

III Corps prepare to counterattack Fifth Panzer Army’s southern flank while XII Corps prepares to strike at Seventh Army.

22–23 December

Army Group B’s High Water Mark

Sixth Panzer Army

The St Vith salient is evacuated and Sixth Panzer Army attacks XVIII Airborne Corps between Vielsalm and Manhay.

Fifth Panzer Army

LVIII Panzer Corps fails to breakthrough around Hotton so it transfers west of the River Ourthe to face VII Corps positions around Marche. Part of XLVII Panzer Corps reaches Rochefort while the rest attacks Bastogne.

Third US Army

The counterattack starts and while III Corps advances towards Bastogne and the River Sure, XII Corps starts pushing Seventh Army back to the River Sauer.

22–23 December

The Counteroffensive Intensifies

Sixth Panzer Army

Unable to break through XVIII Corps lines between Trois Ponts and Hotton.

Fifth Panzer Army

LVIII Panzer Corps is stopped in front of Marche while part of XLVII Panzer Corps is stopped close to Dinant and the Meuse. The rest of XLVII Panzer Corps is still engaged at Bastogne.

Third US Army

III Corps closes in on Bastogne and Wiltz while XII Corps moves closer to the River Sauer.

26 December

Army Group B’s advance is over. Sixth Panzer Army calls off attacks while the tip of Fifth Panzer Army’s is blunted by Allied counterattacks. III Corps reaches Bastogne and Army Group Lüttwitz prepares to counterattack. XII Corps forces Seventh Army back across the River Sauer.

27–29 December

III Corps wins the battle for the Bastogne corridor while Third Army prepares to increase the width of its counterattack.

30 December

Third Army begins its counterattack west of Bastogne.

2 January

Third Army begins its counterattack from Bastogne.

3 January

First Army begins its counterattack against the north side of the salient.

16 January

First and Third Armies meet in Houffalize.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Conceiving the Plan

Why was the Ardennes area so important to Hitler’s plans? The Eastern Front was too extensive and the Soviet armies were too large for Germany to force an endgame in the east. While the Wehrmacht could afford to give up territory in the East, Hitler knew he would never be able to negotiate with Stalin. The Western Front was small enough for decisive action and Germany could not afford to lose the Ruhr, its industrial heartland, and the Allied armies were getting closer. The West Wall, a line of fortifications along its western border, was also an ideal position to hold with a thin crust of troops, allowing reserves to concentrate for the counteroffensive.

Hitler wanted to break through and then turn north, driving a wedge between the British and American armies. The advance would isolate British 21st Army Group in Holland from 12th US Army Group in Belgium, removing the threat to the Ruhr. The final objective was the port of Antwerp, which would be the Allies’ main point of entry for supplies in Europe once the River Scheldt was opened to shipping. Its seizure would severely weaken SHAEF’s situation on the Western Front and then negotiations with the Allies could begin. At least that was Hitler’s plan.

By the middle of September it was an overstretched supply line rather than Rundstedt’s capabilities or the tenacity of the German soldier which brought the Allied advance to a halt in front of the West Wall. While SS panzer divisions could be withdrawn immediately from the line, OKW West estimated that it would take until the end of October to withdraw the rest of the troops from the line. On hearing the news, Hitler set the target date for the attack as 1 November and he made it clear to Rundstedt that no ground must be given up in the meantime. It was a tall order for the new Commander in Chief.

Reinforcing the Wehrmacht

By September 1944 Germany had suffered over three million military casualties and untold millions of civilian casualties. The Third Reich’s cities and industries were under constant air attack but Reich Minister Albert Speer was working on expanding the economy. The people carried on working in spite of the devastation but while new factories sprung up in the countryside it was becoming increasingly difficult to meet the Armed Forces’ needs. It seemed that only Hitler was optimistic about the Third Reich’s capabilities to launch an offensive in the West.

Rundstedt must have wondered where the troops would come from to launch such an ambitious attack but plans were already underway to find them. On 19 August Hitler instructed Walter Buhle, OKW’s Army Chief of Staff, and Speer to organise enough men and materiel for the November offensive. Heinrich Himmler was also appointed head of a new ‘Replacement Army’ and he assembled eighteen new divisions and ten panzer brigades by taking men from the military staff and the security services. Although only two of the divisions were sent to the Western Front most of the new tanks, assault guns and artillery manufactured in the summer were sent west.

Hitler had to adjust the timing of the attack until late November to allow the recruitment of another 25 new divisions for an ‘operational reserve’. OKW assembled many by recalling units from the Balkans and Finland to the Western Front. Joseph Goebbels also instigated a ‘comb-out program’, expanding the conscription age limits while lowering medical standards for men recovering from battle injuries.

The Navy and Air Force were also combed for able-bodied men and even the Nazi Party faithful who had so far avoided military service were called up. Employment exemptions were rechecked, new non-essential jobs were announced and many industries and agriculture were investigated with a view to replacing workers with concentration camp inmates.

Hundreds of thousands of new conscripts were found and then formed into new Volks Grenadier Divisions rather than strengthening existing formations on Hitler’s insistence. The expanding Wehrmacht was looking impressive on paper but many divisions were below strength or short of tanks, transport, artillery and all kinds of equipment. The problem was that Hitler believed they were all at full strength and anyone who disagreed was accused of defeatism or treason.

By the time Hitler made his announcement on 16 September, his paranoia had led him to be involved in every major military decision, even getting involved in detailed planning. However, the role of the Wehrmacht’s Chief of the Operations Staff must not be underestimated. Jodl turned the Führer’s ideas into military plans and then made sure they happened. He also represented the Wehrmacht commanders, presenting their suggestions and objections to Hitler.

Although the German generals dare not speak out against Hitler, in private they were scathing of his plans for the Ardennes Offensive. Rundstedt later admitted that ‘all, absolutely all, conditions for the possible success of such an offensive were lacking.’ Field Marshal Model’s reaction was blunter; ‘This plan hasn't got a damned leg to stand on.’

Jodl Draws up Hitler’s Ideas

Around 25 September Jodl was ordered to turn Hitler’s idea for a counteroffensive into an operational plan. The plan had to fulfil eight objectives:

1 The attack would be launched by Field Marshal Walter Model’s Army Group B

2 The attack would be made in the Ardennes in late November

3 Success depended on secret planning, tactical surprise and a speedy advance

4 The initial objective was to cross the Meuse River between Liège and Namur

5 The final objective was to capture Antwerp, cutting the Allied line in two

6 Two panzer armies would spearhead the attack with an infantry army on each flank

7 The attack would be supported by the Luftwaffe and many artillery and rocket units

8 The plan was to destroy the British and Canadians north of the line Antwerp – Liège

The Chief of the OKW, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, was hardly involved in the planning while Rundstedt was kept in the dark. Jodl did all of the work and came up with five alternatives:

1 Operation Holland: single-thrust from Venlo towards Antwerp

2 Operation Liège-Aachen: a double northwest thrust from northern Luxembourg and Aachen

3 Operation Luxembourg: a double attack from central Luxembourg and Metz towards Longwy

4 Operation Lorraine: a double attack from Metz and Baccarat towards Nancy

5 Operation Alsace: a double attack from Epinal and Montbeliard towards Vesoul

Operation Liège-Aachen was chosen and the main drive would be made through the Ardennes and Eifel areas. This double-pronged attack became known as the Big Solution. Jodl presented the outline plan on 19 October and three days later representatives from Rundstedt’s and Model’s forces were briefed about the operation at the Wolf’s Lair.

Jodl’s plan had Fifth Panzer and Sixth Panzer Armies leading Army Group B’s attack while Seventh Army advanced in echelon on the south flank. Hitler promised eighteen infantry and twelve armoured (or mechanized) divisions and Hermann Göring promised maximum support from the Luftwaffe. Preparations had to be complete by 20 November ready to attack five days later. The timing was based on the high possibility of ten days of bad weather, in the hope it would cancel out Allied air supremacy.

Army Group B’s commander, Field Marshal Walter Model. It could be argued that Hitler could have transferred troops from the Eastern Front or shortened the Western Front to release men; he refused to do either. He was adamant that Antwerp was the goal and it had to be taken with his initial estimate of around thirty divisions.

The winter of 1944–45 was one of the coldest in living memory and American, British and German troops suffered in the terrible conditions; civilian refugees did too. Private Thomas O’Brien of the 26th Infantry Division tucks into his C Ration in a snow-covered field. (NARA 111-SC-198483)

The Generals’ Reaction

Hitler had personally selected all Wehrmacht generals following the July Plot, choosing officers who were either subservient or hardened Nazis. None would, or even could, stand up against the Führer and he viewed their proposals and protests with suspicion. He was also involved in decision making at all levels and nothing could be changed without his permission, not even the movement of individual divisions.

While Rundstedt was an old school military general, Army Group B’s commander, Field Marshal Walter Model, was a younger, politically motivated general. Relations between the two were frosty but they dealt with military matters in a workmanlike manner. However, the Führer’s interference often meant that Rundstedt was often treated as a go-between, merely rubberstamping Army Group B’s plans for approval by OKW.