The Vietnam War Handbook E-Book

Andrew Rawson

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Seitenzahl: 569

Beschreibung

The book covers everything from infantry, artillery, armour, special forces, riverine craft, intelligence, combat support and service units, to weapons and equipment, organisation, command and control, daily life and tours of duty, awards and medals. Films and books, memorials and the legacy of the Vietnam War in the USA and South East Asia are also covered.

Leseprobe

ANDREW RAWSON

THE

VIETNAM WAR

HANDBOOK

US ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM

First published in the United Kingdom in 2008

The History Press

The Mill, Brimscombe Port

Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QG

www.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2016

All rights reserved

Copyright © Andrew Rawson, 2008

The right of Andrew Rawson to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly

EPUB ISBN 978-0-7509-7983-2

eBook converted by Geethik Technologies

All photographs, unless otherwise noted, are from the National Archives and Records Administration Photograph Collection, College Park, Maryland, USA. They are from the US Army Signal Corps, US Marine Corps, US Air Force and US Navy collections. Credits refer to the relevant photograph collection and image number.

CONTENTS

ONE

Background to a Long War

TWO

Command and Control

THREE

Those Who Served

FOUR

Combat Arms

FIVE

Combat Support

SIX

Special Forces

SEVEN

Intelligence

EIGHT

Support Services

NINE

Divisional Organization and Operations

TEN

The Soldier

ELEVEN

Weapons

TWELVE

Equipment

THIRTEEN

Tour of Duty

FOURTEEN

Naval Command in Southeast Asia

FIFTEEN

The Air War

SIXTEEN

Free World Allies

SEVENTEEN

South Vietnam’s Armed Forces

EIGHTEEN

The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army

NINETEEN

The Aftermath

Further Reading

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO A LONG WAR

FRENCH RULE TO COMMUNIST THREAT

The United States’ first contact with Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnam’s future leader, came during the Second World War. Minh’s resistance fighters were engaged with the Japanese forces occupying French Indochina and as part of their struggle they gathered intelligence and rescued downed American pilots. At the cessation of hostilities US Army officers looked on while Ho Chi Minh rejected French rule of Indochina and declared Vietnam’s independence.

America’s support for Vietnam changed course in August 1950 when a small team of personnel arrived in Saigon to set up Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina, ready to distribute military aid delivered to Southeast Asia. Four months later equipment and supplies started to arrive, allowing the Vietnamese Army to expand in its growing fight alongside the French against the Viet Minh, Ho Chi Minh’s Communists.

For the next three years the French engaged Minh’s troops and they struggled to come to terms with a different kind of warfare, guerilla warfare. In November 1953 General Navarre decided to draw them into open battle, deploying a large concentration of troops at Dien Bien Phu near the Laos border. The Viet Minh soldiers took up the challenge, occupying the hills surrounding the French positions, and slowly tightened their stranglehold. Heavy fighting and dwindling supplies took their toll on the French and after six months they were forced to surrender on 7 May 1954. Two months later hostilities came to an end as Vietnam was split into two at the 17th Parallel.

The communists controlled the north while the French handed over the south to a new democratic regime led by President Ngo Dinh Diem. However, the Viet Minh continued the struggle in the south and it soon became clear that the South Vietnamese Armed Forces needed assistance to protect their borders and maintain internal security. The first group of US military advisors reached South Vietnam in March 1955 and eight months later Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, was organized to supervise a range of training programs to help the South Vietnamese.

The United States kept a close eye on developments in Southeast Asia, concerned by the worldwide spread of Communism (America was also extremely sensitive to home-grown Communism at this time) and it believed that if one country fell under its control, the rest of the area would follow; a theory branded the ‘Domino Effect’. Four years passed before events descended into a deepening circle of violence following North Vietnam’s announcement that it was changing its strategy from a political struggle to an armed struggle. President Dwight Eisenhower made the United States’ first public commitment to support South Vietnam’s fight for independence in April 1959 but it had little effect on Ho Chi Minh’s followers and three months later two American servicemen were killed during an attack by Vietnamese Communists (now known as the Viet Cong).

North Vietnam began to step up the pressure in April 1960, in the hope of toppling the South Vietnamese government, and it began sending trained soldiers to the south to organize attacks while military conscription was introduced in the north. At the end of the year it announced that a new organization, the National Liberation Front, had been formed to lead the struggle in the south.

The beginning of 1961 saw John F. Kennedy elected as President of the United States and he continued Eisenhower’s support, pledging further military assistance at the end of the year in response to a call for help from the South Vietnamese president. A new organization, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was formed in February 1962 to control the increase of American advisors and support personnel supervising the build-up of US war material.

The world’s attention was briefly centered on Cuba the following October as America confronted the Soviets over the deployment of missiles close to its shores, a confrontation which ended in a desperate nuclear standoff between Presidents Kennedy and Khrushchev. However, trouble was never far away in South Vietnam and on 1 November 1963 President Diem’s unpopular government was toppled by a military coup; the President was killed by his own soldiers.

Three weeks later, President Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November in Dallas, Texas, leaving Lyndon B. Johnson to take control of the uncertain situation in the United States and the countries it supported. He did not have to wait long before his resolve was tested.

North Vietnam began sending regular troops into South Vietnam in April 1964 to take advantage of the chaos left by the coup. An attack against a US base at Nam Dong on 6 July showed that the Viet Cong was determined to seize control whatever the cost and a month later they made a second hostile move against US military personnel.

US Navy ships had been patrolling off the coast of North Vietnam, monitoring vessel movements and coastal defenses since February 1964 and at the end of July they were given permission to shell targets in the Gulf of Tonkin. On 2 August, North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the destroyer, USS Maddox and while F-8 Crusader fighter planes from USS Ticonderoga sank one of the boats, it marked the first time that North Vietnamese and American servicemen had openly engaged each other (undercover operations involving Special Forces teams had been underway for some time). A second destroyer, USS Turner Joy, joined Maddox later that evening and patrolling resumed but two days later the North Vietnamese allegedly made a second attack (several key witnesses later reported that the second attack never took place).

President Johnson acted immediately on the information available, ordering retalitory airstrikes against North Vietnamese naval bases and a fuel depot. He also presented the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and on 7 August, the United States Congress and Senate passed it, authorizing the President to deploy US Armed Forces to defend the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia.

Johnson was elected President on 3 November, and two months later he was called upon to use his Resolution when the Viet Cong attacked US military installations in Pleiku. US Navy planes based on carriers stationed in the South China Sea responded by attacking targets across North Vietnam. With the threat of attacks against military installations mounting, Johnson increased the stakes, ordering the deployment of ground troops to protect them. 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade landed at Da Nang on 8 March where the bemused Marines were greeted by government officials and cheering civilians carrying garlands of flowers. In May 173rd Airborne Brigade, the first US Army unit to deploy, arrived at Bien Hoa to the north of Saigon. It was the start of an eight year commitment of US ground troops to South Vietnam, one that would cost thousands of lives, force many more to leave their homes and change the lives of everyone who was involved.

A US advisor watches while a Vietnamese officer plans how to cross a river during a river crossing. (111-CC-22791)

The first Marines land on the beach near Da Nang on 8 March 1965. (127-GVC-A183727)

GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER

The terrain and the weather in South Vietnam affected the nature of warfare waged by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army. The United States Armed Forces had prepared for a war against the Soviet Union, across the open plains of northern Europe; in Southeast Asia they encountered every type of terrain ranging from rugged mountains covered by thick jungle to flooded paddy fields and river deltas.

South Vietnam is long and thin with an extensive coastline extending over 900 miles from North Vietnam in the north to Cambodia in the Gulf of Siam to the south. It is only around 100 miles wide for much of its length, narrowing to 40 miles at the Demilitarized Zone, next to the 17th Parallel, the border with North Vietnam.

Temperatures are high all year round throughout most of the country, except in the mountainous region running down the Laotian border. Humidity is always high while monsoons and tropical cyclones alternately sweep the northern and the southern regions. Hue, the ancient capital of the north, is soaked with an average of 116in of rain between November and February while Saigon, South Vietnam’s capital in the south, has an average of 58in of rain between June and September.

South Vietnam’s terrain is varied but the country can be split into three distinct areas.

South Vietnam with both its military and provincial areas outlined.

CENTRAL HIGHLANDS

An inland chain of mountains, ranging from 100 to 200 miles wide, sits astride South Vietnam’s border with Cambodia and Laos. The mountains are covered by tropical forests and while some areas have multi-canopy trees hiding tall elephant grass others are secondary growth areas with a denser coverage of smaller trees and thick undergrowth. Occasional bamboo thickets, rubber plantations and farms are scattered across the area. A large plateau, known as the Central Highlands, has peaks ranging from 600 to 1,600ft to the north of Ban Me Thuot while the mountains to the south rise as high as 3,000ft. Rugged spurs and river valleys jut out to the east, in many places almost to the sea, restricting north and south movement to the coastal plain.

CENTRAL LOWLANDS

A narrow coastal area, rarely more than 40 miles wide, separates the mountains from the sea. The lowlands are heavily populated and the farmers live in small villages and hamlets, tending their crops and paddy fields. Sand dunes line the coast and fishermen earn a living from the shallow coastal waters.

MEKONG DELTA

The area south of Saigon is crisscrossed by a network of rivers, including the Mekong, the Dong Nai, the Saigon, and the Vain Co Dong. Canals were added by the French, creating large expanses of paddy fields and areas of high ground where the villagers live. The northern edge of the delta, an area known as the Plain of Reeds, is a large expanse of mud covered by mangrove patches. The Delta floods during the monsoon season, leaving extensive areas under water. The southern tip of the Mekong Delta is known as the Ca Mau Peninsula.

Terrain varied from mountains covered by thick forests . . . (127-GVC-A372128)

. . . to expanses of marshland and paddy fields cut by canals and streams. (111-CC-40405)

CAMPAIGNS AND PHASES

United States military involvement began with a small number of advisors in March 1962 and over the next seven years the number of troops engaged increased to over half a million. Starting in April 1969, major units were withdrawn as the pacification and Vietnamization programs allowed the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) to take over offensive operations. The thirteen years of US military activity was later divided into the seventeen distinct phases and campaigns:

ADVISORY PHASE: 15 MARCH 1962 TO 7 MARCH 1965

US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, battled to help the South Vietnamese Army improve internal security and national defense with field advisors and Special Forces detachments. Thousands of civilians were gathered into protected strategic hamlets but they proved to be unpopular and provoked unrest for the government as it struggled with political turmoil and corruption.

DEFENSE: 8 MARCH 1965 TO 24 DECEMBER 1965

Following attacks on military installations, US troops were deployed across South Vietnam. While the Marine Corps deployed in the north, the Army took over the Central Highlands, the coast and Saigon, leaving the ARVN operating in the Mekong Delta.

Thousands of civilians had to be relocated from the Viet Cong sanctuaries during the large operations in the early stages of the conflict. (111-CC-33062)

Ground operations were consolidated under US Army Vietnam (USARV) and while engineers began establishing bases and ports, troops kept the Viet Cong at bay. In October a large enemy attack on Plei Me near the Ia Drang Valley marked the start of an advance on Qui Nhon and an attempt to cut the country in two. The recently deployed 1st Cavalry Division retaliated in a month long campaign.

COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE I: 25 DECEMBER 1965 TO 30 JUNE 1966

With troops in position across the country, it was time to expand the search and destroy operations into Viet Cong held areas. United States and Allied troops were deployed as follows:

III Marine Amphibious Force with the South Vietnamese I Corps in the north

I Field Force with the South Vietnamese II Corps in the center

II Field Force with the South Vietnamese III Corps around Saigon

South Vietnamese IV Corps covering the Mekong Delta

Operations improved the security around base camps and across populated areas, protecting the rice harvests and limiting Viet Cong activity.

In February and March 3d Marine Division and 173d Airborne Brigade moved near to the Demilitarized Zone to stop North Vietnamese troops crossing into South Vietnam. B-52s began bombing along the Laos border for the first time in April.

COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE II: 1 JULY 1966 TO 31 MAY 1967

The Joint Chiefs of Staff declared their objectives as ground troops fought a war of attrition in South Vietnam and the Navy and Air Force continued air strikes against the north:

Stop the North Vietnamese control and support of insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos

Assist the South Vietnam in defeating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces

Assist the pacification of South Vietnam so the government could extend control

A shell just misses a transport plane as it comes to a halt on the runway at Khe Sanh base during the long siege at the beginning of 1968. (127-GVC-A190615)

Eighteen large operations, including White Wing/Masher, Hastings, Attleboro and Junction City, were carried out across the country as United States and Allied troops worked together to drive the Viet Cong from their sanctuaries.

COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE III: 1 JUNE 1967 TO 29 JANUARY 1968

By June 1967 US forces had risen to nearly 450,000 personnel and major operations continued as the South Vietnamese Armed Forces started to conduct their own. Vietnamese Special Forces took over a number of Special Forces camps in the Central Highlands but when North Vietnamese attacks began to threaten their existence, sixteen American battalions had to be deployed to restore the situation.

TET COUNTEROFFENSIVE: 30 JANUARY 1968 TO 1 APRIL 1968

Starting on 30 January, over 80,000 North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong units attacked a wide range of targets across the country during the Tet holiday period. They infiltrated or fired on the majority of cities and provincial capitals, attacking the US Embassy and the Presidential Palace in Saigon and both the Vietnamese Joint General Staff’s headquarters and Tan Son Nhut air base on the outskirts; many military installations were also attacked. The US Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh was besieged for over ten weeks while Dak To Special Forces camp in the Central Highlands was repeatedly attacked. US and Allied troops reacted quickly and in many places the fighting was over within days, however, there was extended street fighting in urban areas and it took over a month to clear Hue.

The Tet offensive was a major military defeat for the Communists and the Viet Cong never recovered from the losses it sustained. Most attacks were crushed in the first few hours and anticipated public uprisings did not happen. However, the US public was shocked by the level of violence they saw and many felt betrayed by the generals and politicians who had assured them that the war was being won. As public support for the war diminished in America, thousands of South Vietnamese refugees faced a bleak future.

COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE IV: 2 APRIL 1968 TO 30 JUNE 1968

Battalion-size operations took place between April and June 1968 as US and Allied forces continued their counteroffensive against the scattered remnants of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. In the north, Operation Pegasus relieved Khe Sanh Combat Base while Operation Delaware regained temporary control of the A Shau Valley, forcing the NVA to end attacks across I Corps.

The emphasis then moved to III Corps as the Viet Cong launched a series of attacks against Saigon on 5 May (the attacks were known as Mini-Tet). The attacks were small and after a few isolated battles around the edge of the city, the NVA and the Viet Cong withdrew.

COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE V: 1 JULY 1968 TO 1 NOVEMBER 1968.

The NVA’s final offensive on 17 August was quickly stopped and US troops began concentrating on support for the South Vietnamese government’s pacification programs. US and ARVN troops restored control of populated areas, allowing government units to move in. Regional and Popular Forces started to take over responsibility for security while the police and civil authorities systematically screened the population for Viet Cong sympathizers.

President Johnson announced that the bombing campaign over North Vietnam would end in October while the NLF and South Vietnam were invited to join peace talks in Paris for the first time.

COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE VI: 2 NOVEMBER 1968 TO 22 FEBRUARY 1969

President Richard Nixon was elected in November 1968 and two months later he announced the phased withdrawal of US combat troops, coinciding with the start of peace negotiations in Paris. As soon as the populated areas had been cleared, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign extended operations into the countryside, hunting down the Viet Cong’s leadership as its units scattered. Meanwhile, ground operations to corner large units operating along the border continued.

TET 69 AND COUNTEROFFENSIVE: 23 FEBRUARY 1969 TO 8 JUNE 1969

On 23 February NVA attacks against military installations across I Corps were stopped. American troop strength peaked at 543,400 in April and although there were over seventy ground operations, the NVA and Viet Cong avoided major contacts.

SUMMER AND FALL 1969: 9 JUNE 1969 TO 31 OCTOBER 1969

US troop numbers fell to 505,500 by October as President Nixon announced more withdrawals. The remaining ground troops were engaged in small unit actions, tracking down fragmented Viet Cong units and fending off isolated attacks on fire bases.

The attack on the US Embassy during the Tet Offensive shocked the American people; Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker inspects the damage. (111-CC-46024)

WINTER AND SPRING 1970: 1 NOVEMBER 1969 TO 30 APRIL 1970

As Army and Marine Corps units continued to withdraw, Vietnamization improved the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. US and allied forces concentrated their efforts on the Viet Cong’s base camps and tried to reduce the number of attacks against military installations.

SANCTUARY COUNTEROFFENSIVE: 1 MAY 1970 TO 30 JUNE 1970

The situation was under control in South Vietnam and attentions turned to NVA bases in Cambodia. As the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong advanced on Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s capital, Marshal Lon Nol appealed for help; President Nixon did not hesitate and removed restrictions on crossing the border. US and ARVN troops launched eight separate invasions in May and June, discovering large bases and huge quantities of material.

COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE VII: 1 JULY 1970 TO 30 JUNE 1971

Starting on 30 January, Vietnamese troops advanced from I Corps into Laos aiming to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and attack bases around Techepone. Despite large amounts of US fire and air support, Operation Lam Son 719 failed to achieve its objectives and the ARVN fell back in disarray; it did, however, interrupt the North Vietnamese Army’s plans to attack in March 1971.

CONSOLIDATION I: 1 JULY 1971 TO 30 NOVEMBER 1971

South Vietnam assumed full control of ground operations as the US Armed Forces handed over responsibility for them on 11 July (101st Airborne Division would carry out the final operation, Jefferson Glen, in October). Phase I of Vietnamization came to an end on 11 August when President Nixon announced that the remaining 191,000 US troops were deployed in a defensive role.

When the American forces had withdrawn they thought they were leaving trained and well-equipped Armed Forces: but could they stop the North Vietnamese? (111-CC-81753)

CONSOLIDATION II: 1 DECEMBER 1971 TO 29 MARCH 1972

The final stages of Vietnamization were carried out, leaving around 25,000 US troops behind to protect US military installations. Meanwhile, the air attacks on North Vietnam were stepped up to disrupt anticipated offensives against South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Both sides exchanged peace proposals during the period but little headway was made. President Nixon proposed to withdraw all US and Allied troops within six months of an agreement being made: the Communists wanted all troops removed and US aid to Indochina.

CEASEFIRE: 30 MARCH 1972 TO 28 JANUARY 1973

The NVA launched a conventional offensive on 30 March 1972, capturing large areas. South Vietnamese troops counterattacked, recapturing Quang Tri City in September, while US Army helicopters and planes struck the NVA supply routes.

With time running out, American advisors working with the South Vietnamese Air Force made their final preparations before they withdrew. The final seven battalions protecting US military installations left but many support and service support units remained behind to help the South Vietnamese stopped.

DEPLOYMENT OF COMBAT TROOPS

THE 2½ WARS CONCEPT

President Kennedy’s administration began planning for a new kind of strategy in 1961, expanding the American Armed Forces to face a number of threats around the world. The strategy was known as the 2½ Wars Strategic Concept and by 1965 there were the equivalent of over twenty-five active and reserve divisions ready to deploy either to Europe to face the Soviets or to Asia to face the Chinese. The possibility of a counterinsurgency threat anywhere in the world was counted as half a war.

Initially Vietnam was seen as the half war but the conflict escalated and between March 1965 and April 1968 the Army alone deployed the equivalent of nine divisions and four independent brigades where they are joined by a large number of Allied troops.

By 1967 reinforcements for Europe and the Strategic Reserve had been deployed. Shortages of trained officers and men, the limitations of the twelve-month tour and President Johnson’s refusal to mobilize the Reserves severely stretched the Armed Forces. It left the US troops deployed dangerously thinly across Germany and Korea. Units arrived in the following order:

1965

March 8

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade lands at Da Nang

May

3d Marine Division headquarters arrived at Da Nang to take control of its units

173d Airborne Brigade arrives at Bien Hoa, and is joined by an Australian battalion

July 29

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division deploys

September

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) arrives

Korea’s Capital Division and Marine Brigade arrive

October

1st Infantry Division arrives

1966

February

1st Marine Division headquarters takes command of its units at Chu Lai

March

25th Infantry Division deploys and a second Australian battalion deploys

August

196th Light Infantry Brigade deploys

September

4th Infantry Division arrives

Korea’s 9th Infantry Division deploys

December

9th Infantry Division and 199th Light Infantry Brigade deploy

1967

May

A New Zealand company deploys, and is joined by a second company in December

September

The 23d Americal Division starts to form with 196th Light Infantry Brigade

A regiment from Thailand deploys

October

198th Light Infantry Brigade joins the Americal Division

November

101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) joins its 1st Brigade

December

11th Light Infantry Brigade joins the Americal Division. Australia deploys 3d Battalion Royal Australian Regiment to join the Australian Task Force in III Corps. New Zealand deploys an Infantry Company to III Corps.

1968

February

3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division deploys following the Tet Offensive

April 30

US military personnel in South Vietnam peaks at 543,400

July

Thailand’s commitment increases to a division

US TROOP NUMBERS

From just a few dozen military staff in March 1955, the number of troops serving in South Vietnam grew to 543,400 by the end of April 1969. The election of President Nixon in November 1968 marked the beginning of the end of American involvement in Vietnam. His adminstration imposed Vietnamization on the US Armed Forces, so they could hand over responsibility for the fighting to the South Vietnamese. Units started to withdraw in the summer of 1969 as the Armed Forces began looking at a new strategy, the 1½ Wars Strategic Concept. Over the next three years units left the country and by the end of 1973 only fifty advisors were left. The following table shows the number of troops deployed at the end of each year:

Thousands of troops poured into South Vietnam between 1965 and 1968; many arrived by ship. (111-CC-31462)

INCREASING

NUMBERS

DECREASING

NUMBERS

1959

760

1969

475,200

1960

900

1970

334,600

1961

3,200

1971

156,800

1962

11,300

1972

24,200

1963

16,300

1973

50

1964

23,000

1974

50

1965

184,000

1966

385,300

1967

486,600

1968

536,000

US Marines were the last troops to leave South Vietnam on 30 April 1975 as they helped to evacuate the US Embassy in Saigon during Operation Frequent Wind.

CHAPTER 2

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The number of servicemen and women serving in Vietnam grew from a few dozen advisors to over half a million between 1950 and 1968. Command and control had to reorganize several times to cope with the increase as the United States Armed Forces’ role changed from advising to conducting large multi-battalion operations across the country.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, INDOCHINA (MAAG – INDOCHINA)

A small military assistance advisory group of 128 men arrived in Saigon on 3 August 1950 and by November it had been formed into Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina. On 23 December the United States signed military aid agreements for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; the commitment would cost $2.6 billion over the next fifteen years. The Group distributed and maintained equipment but it had no authority to train their South Vietnamese counterparts.

General Navarre, the French commander, took advantage of the aid to go on the offensive against the Communist Viet Minh, deploying a large force at Dien Bien Phu in November 1953 to precipitate a decisive battle. It was decisive. After a six-month-long siege the garrison surrendered on 8 May 1954, ending French military operations.

On 20 July the Geneva Accords officially ended the fighting in Indochina and although neither the United States nor South Vietnam formally acknowledged them, the United States agreed to adhere to the terms laid down, including the following:

Vietnam would be split at the 17th Parallel

Laos and Cambodia would be granted independence

New troops and equipment could not be moved into Vietnam

Neither North nor South Vietnam could establish new military bases

New types of arms, ammunition and equipment were forbidden, except as replacements

The number of advisors and their staff was fixed at 542 French and 342 Americans

The Geneva Accords left President Eisenhower’s administration in a dilemma. France was looking for direct armed support, but he was unable to act without Congress approval and support from the rest of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the alliance formed to counter the Communist threat. Another way of supporting South Vietnam had to be found.

The losing struggle against the Viet Cong is etched on the face of this South Vietnamese Ranger captain. (111-SC-616827)

General John O’Daniel took over as the commander of MAAG, Indochina, on 12 April 1954 and arranged clearance with the French commander, General Ely, for US advisors to start training the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The agreement was ratified by the President’s special envoy, General J. Lawton Collins, and on 1 February 1955 the new Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) started work. While Army and Air Force advisors helped the South Vietnamese Armed Forces out in the field to defend their country, Naval advisors supervised the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of civilians from the north to the south before the border closed in May 1955. French involvement finally came to an end in August 1955 when their High Commissioner left Saigon.

While Vietnam was dealing with the end of French rule, Cambodia declared itself an independent state on 25 September 1954. The following May it agreed to accept military aid from the United States and Military Assistance Advisory Group, Cambodia, was organized in Phnom Penh to supervise the delivery of military aid.

MAAG, INDOCHINA’S COMMANDERS

Brigadier General Francis G. Brink

October 1950

Major General Thomas J.H. Trapnell

August 1952

Lieutenant General John W. O’Daniel

April 1954

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, VIETNAM (MAAG, VIETNAM)

The departure of the French and the Cambodian situation called for the reorganization of the military assistance in Vietnam and on 1 November 1955 Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina, was renamed Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. TRIM was renamed Combat Arms Training and Organization Division and Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) was established to salvage American material left behind by the French. By May 1960 the number of staff had been raised to 685.

South Vietnam faced turbulent times in the late 1950s. The Army suffered widespread corruption and it was opposed by several religious sects and a criminal group known as the Binh Xuyen. While the Montagnards living in the Central Highlands refused to recognize the government, the influx of over one million Catholic refugees from North Vietnam upset the country’s balance of power.

President Diem’s refusal to hold a referendum in 1956 stopped the Communists seizing power through the ballot box but terrorist activity against the South Vietnamese government intensified. Elections in the fall of 1959 did not stop the unrest (many claimed results were falsified) and President Diem was forced to announce that his country was at war with the Viet Cong as MAAG, Vietnam, began teaching his troops anti-guerrilla tactics.

The new United States President, John F. Kennedy, pledged increased military and economic aid for South Vietnam while a new policy group, known as the Country Team, devised a Counterinsurgency Plan to improve the South Vietnamese Army, train a Civil Guard and a Self Defense Corps while US Special Forces teams trained a new Vietnamese Ranger force.

In October 1961 a team headed by General Maxwell D. Taylor made the following recommendations to improve the situation in South Vietnam:

Expansion of the Vietnamese Armed Forces and the number of US advisors

US combat support, in particular tactical aircraft and helicopters

Support for the strategic hamlet program, moving villagers out of Viet Cong control

The suggestions were approved but as MAAG, Vietnam’s, headquarters mushroomed to 2,394 staff, the existing command structure could not cope. A new type of command structure was needed.

Although US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was established to take over control of military operations on 8 February 1962, MAAG, Vietnam, continued to control the field advisors (3,400 at the beginning of 1963) until it was disbanded on 15 May 1964.

The heat and humidity have taken their toll on this American advisor and he takes a short break while his Vietnamese unit crosses a river. (111-SC-616-825)

General Westmoreland is briefed on the deteriorating situation by two advisors. (111-SC-616823)

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland give statements to the press following attacks on Qui Nhon base in February 1965; the attacks led to retaliatory air attacks on North Vietnam. (111-CC-31914)

MAAG, VIETNAM’S COMMANDERS

Lieutenant General Samuel Williams

November 1955

Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr

September 1960

Major General Charles J. Timmes

July 1962

US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM (MACV)

US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was established as a temporary measure to supervise the counterinsurgency effort against the Viet Cong, allowing MAAG, Vietnam, to continue work on the Military Assistance Program. The commander, General Paul Harkins, was responsible for policy, operations and assistance of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, advising their government on military and security matters. The Command also had an Army commander to control operations (the Naval and Air Force involvement were still only small) while the Navy’s Support Activity provided logistical support from Saigon. The intention was that MACV would be disbanded once order had been restored but as the situation deteriorated, the two headquarters increasingly came into conflict.

In March 1964 General Paul Harkins requested full control over all Army activities to ease the problems and two months later MAAG, Vietnam, was closed down as MACV took over responsibility for the Military Assistance Program. On 20 June 1964, General William C. Westmoreland became commander of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, with responsibility for all military activities in Vietnam. It would eventually have the following subordinate commands:

III Marine Amphibious Force

Ran Marine operations in I Corps

I Field Forces Vietnam

Controlled operations in II Corps Tactical Zone

II Field Forces Vietnam

Ran operations in III Corps and later IV Corps Tactical Zone

XXIV Corps

Controlled Army operations in I Corps after 1968

USARV

Controlled administrative and logistical Army units

5th Special Forces Group

Ran countrywide Special Forces operations from Nha Trang

Field Advisory Element

Ran South Vietnamese Armed Forces advisory activities

CORDS

The Civil Operations and Rural Development Support programs

Naval Forces, Vietnam

Controlled warships off the coast and aircraft carrier wings

Seventh Air Force

Commanded land-based air wings, including those in Thailand

MACV headquarters moved out of Saigon in 1967 as part of operation MOOSE (Move Out Of Saigon Expeditiously), part of General Westmoreland’s plan to reduce the US military presence in Vietnam’s towns and cities. It relocated to Tan Son Nhut, north of the capital, remaining there until it finally closed down on 29 March 1973.

MACV, VIETNAM COMMANDERS

General Paul Harkins

February 1962

General William Westmoreland

June 1964

General Creighton Abrams

July 1968

General Frederick Weyand

June 1972

FIELD ADVISORY ELEMENT, MACV

Advisors provided the link between the American and South Vietnamese military at all levels with the help of interpreters. In many isolated areas they were the first Americans the Vietnamese had encountered and although they initially faced many problems, hard work and initiative overcame them and the majority developed a close bond with their Vietnamese counterparts. Advisors accompanied troops on operations and they were able to call on American artillery, helicopter and air support. Although they did not have the authority to command the Vietnamese troops, advisors often stepped in to help steady a shaken unit.

To begin with field army advisory teams were allocated to each regiment and they gave advice and assistance with training, operational planning, communications, logistics, medical evacuation and intelligence. Advisors also worked with each province, providing help with psychological warfare and civil affairs.

In 1964 teams were allocated to battalions while others joined the districts around Saigon, increasing the number of advisors to over 4,700; eventually each district had an advisory team. Over 350 new teams were created in 1968 to advise Regional and Popular Forces platoons on village defense, bringing the total to over 9,400 advisors. The advisory teams’ role took on a new importance as the American troops handed over to the Vietnamese and prepared to withdraw.

FIELD FORCES

The US Army level of command for controlling divisions and support troops across a large area was the Corps. However, the situation in Vietnam demanded a headquarters capable of controlling the tactical situation while it advised the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. It also had to deal with the supply problems inherent with operating in a hostile country while pacifying the civilian population. General Westmoreland chose the title Field Force to avoid confusion with the South Vietnamese Corps zones and the two were organized in March 1966. I Field Force took control of II Corps while II Field Force covered III and IV Corps (I Corps was under III Marine Amphibious Force control).

American advisors worked closely with the ARVN during the Military Assistance period. (111-CC-27764)

A Field Force Headquarters was far more flexible than the traditional Corps organization and it managed additional units as they moved into and out of the area. The Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion was responsible for heavy artillery support across the Field Force’s area and the two Artillery Groups each had a number of heavy batteries, including self-propelled 175mm guns and 8in howitzers. The batteries had a list of pre-planned missions which could be fired at short notice and they were used to protect military installations (both US and ARVN), lines of communications and population centers; combat units could also request support. A Chemical Detachment Battalion was armed with heavy mortars.

Operational communications were controlled by a Signal Battalion while an Army Security Agency Battalion dealt with confidential wireless and radio traffic. A Military Intelligence Detachment coordinated the interpretation of intelligence material while a Psychological Operations Battalion provided support for units in the field.

The Civil Affairs Company and two Public Information Detachments, one for each Corps, organized civil programs while the Military History Detachment recorded events.

The Transportation Company provided vehicles for the Field Force staff while the Military Police Company covered security issues. An Army Postal Unit dealt with mail, both military and personal.

An advisor discusses the outcome of an armored personnel carrier field exercise with the squadron’s officer. (111-CC-22793)

I FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM (I FFV)

A provisional field force headquarters, titled Task Force ALPHA, was organized at Nha Trang in August 1965 to counter the NVA’s threat to the Central Highlands. It was renamed Field Forces, Vietnam, the following month, with control over all US and Allied forces. It was renamed I Field Force, Vietnam, covering II Corps when II Field Force was organized.

I Field Force took over command of the following combat units when it came into existence: 1st Cavalry Division, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. It also commanded 5th Special Forces Group’s Company B while fixed wing and helicopter support was provided by 17th Aviation Group. The following combat units joined I Field Force later:

4th Infantry Division after July 1966

52d Artillery Group in January 1967 and 41st Artillery Group in May 1967

173d Airborne Brigade after May 1967

Task Force South (Provisional) was formed in July 1968 with 173rd Airborne Brigade and brigades from 4th Division and 101st Airborne Division

The Field Force Headquarters closed in 30 April 1971 but many of the staff went on to serve with Second Regional Assistance Command (SRAC) and US Army Forces, Military Region 2, the two new organizations created to deal with Vietnamization and redeployment.

General Westmoreland congratulates a group of Air Cavalry troopers after Operation Thayer II. (111-CC-78503)

II FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM (II FFV)

II Field Force was organized at Bien Hoa, near Long Binh, to control operations in III Corps. It would later extend its area to cover IV Corps and became the largest combat command in Vietnam, coordinating US, Allied and ARVN operations around Saigon, along the Cambodian border and across the Mekong Delta. Capital Military Assistance Command was organized in June 1968 to secure Saigon and the surrounding provinces.

II Field Force took command of 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade when it formed; it also controlled 5th Special Forces Group’s Company A. 12th Aviation Group provided fixed wing and helicopter support while 23d Artillery Group took control of the artillery; 54th Artillery Group joined in October 1966. The following combat units joined later:

196th Infantry Brigade and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from October 1966

9th Infantry Division and 199th Infantry Brigade after December 1966

3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division after December 1967

1st Cavalry Division and 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division after October 1968

Field Force II headquarters closed in May 1971 but many of the staff went on to serve with Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC).

CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AND MILITARY REGION US ARMY ADVISORS

In June 1966 senior US Army advisors were added to each of the South Vietnamese Corps area. Most were either colonels or brigadier generals but in October 1970 four lieutenant generals took over when the role became the responsibility of the senior general in each Military Region (Military Regions had the same number as the Corps). IV Corps was renamed Delta Military Assistance Command in April 1968 and then Military Region 4 in October 1970.

THE MARINES AND THE ARMY IN I CORPS

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade had been activated after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 as a reaction force to any further attacks on US bases. Following attacks against Da Nang base in February 1965, President Johnson agreed to have two Marine battalions deployed to protect US installations in the northern sector of South Vietnam. 1st Marine Battalion Landing Team landed on 8 March but rather than enemy fire, the Marines were met by dignitaries and schoolgirls carrying garlands of flowers as they waded out of the surf.

US Marines had been deployed first because of their ability to supply themselves from ships and landing craft by Logisitics over the Beach (LOTB) methods. This allowed them to operate without ports and airfields and by the end of the month 5,000 Marines had formed a perimeter around Da Nang base. To begin with they had strict orders not to engage the Viet Cong but as enemy activity increased in the area, the order was reversed and on 22 April the Marines carried out their first helicopter assault landing near Da Nang air base.

III Marine Expeditionary Force was renamed III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) on 7 May and its commander, Major General William R. Collins, was placed in command of all US Marine and Army units in I Corps area.

3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade was landing near Chu Lai (it was briefly renamed 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade) at the same time, extending US activity across I Corps and 3d Marine Division headquarters were ashore by the 30th, the day Major-General Lewis Walt took over as commanding general of III MAF. By 7 June over 16,500 Marines had landed as fighting intensified around Da Nang and Phu Bai.

A series of helicopter and amphibious assaults extended the Marines’ hold on the coast of I Corps over the next nine months and in March 1966 Force Logistic Command had to be activated at Da Nang to supply ongoing operations and prepare for the imminent arrival of the 1st Marine Division in the Chu Lai area at the end of the month.

Although the Marines were able to keep enemy activity under control for the next twelve months, by the spring of 1967 it was clear that Army troops would have to be sent north to reinforce I Corps. Task Force Oregon, a division-sized organization comprising three separate brigades and an assortment of support troops, reached Quang Ngai on 12 April and took over responsibility for the southern part of Quang Tin Province. The move allowed 1st Marine Division to move north to the Demilitarized Zone and permitted 1st Cavalry Division to extend its area of operations along the coast area of Binh Dinh Province, opening Highway 1.

Task Force Oregon was headquartered at Chu Lai and ran operations around Chu Lai and Quang Ngai until 23d Infantry Division (Americal) was formed on 22 September 1967.

NVA activity continued to increase over the winter of 1967/8 and the Tet Offensive in February 1968 meant a further increase in Army units in I Corps as 1st Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division joined the battle for Hue and Quang Tri. MACV set up a Forward Headquarters on 9 February to coordinate Army operations in I Corps; it was renamed Provisional Corps, Vietnam, on 10 March 1968. Even though the NVA and Viet Cong attacks subsided, it was obvious that I Corps needed a permanent Army presence and XXIV Corps was activated at Phu Bai on 15 August 1968 to replace the Provisional Corps. Despite remonstrations from some quarters, the Corps reported to III MAF as it controlled combat operations immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone; III MAF controlled support and civil activities across I Corps as well as combat operations south of XXIV Corps’ area of activity.

27th Marine Regiment was the first to leave Vietnam in September 1968 and 3rd Marine Division followed between July and November 1969. 1st Marine Division started to send units home the following spring and on 14 April 1971 III MAF disbanded as 1st Marine Regiment prepared to be the last combat unit to leave. XXIV Corps had moved to Da Nang in March 1970 but it controlled Army units until June 1972 when its assets joined First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC), the new command overseeing the final handover to the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMANDS

The Tet offensive in February 1968 exposed weaknesses in the Vietnamese defense of Saigon and the lack of coordination between the military and police forces. The situation was rectified by the appointment of a new military governor for the Saigon area and Gia Dinh Province in June 1968 while the Vietnamese Army commander of the Capital Military District acted as his deputy.

General Abrams and Commander Zumwaltz attend the handing over of sixty-four gunboats to the South Vietnamese Navy. (111-CC-58664)

II Field Force had set up a temporary command group called Hurricane Forward in February 1968 and a Task Force was reestablished following a second NVA offensive in May. It was organized as Capital Military Assistance Command the following month.

Delta Military Assistance Command was organized in April 1969 to coordinate activities across the Mekong Delta.

COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

US Military Forces had to cooperate at all levels with their Allies, in particular the South Vietnamese Army. General Westmoreland originally suggested establishing a combined US-ARVN headquarters but the South Vietnamese Army staff objected to the idea and US commanders had to coordinate operations through one of the nine advisory groups out in the field. Representatives on the Vietnamese General Staff dealt with high-level issues. Intelligence collected by American and Vietnamese sources was pooled and assessed at the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam.

While South Korean troops controlled their own operations following the guidelines set down by the Free World Military Assistance Council, Free World Military Forces from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand were under American control.

A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR

In previous wars success and failure could often judged on the amount of territory captured or lost. In Vietnam, statistics became important and new terminology and reports appeared while commanders tried to maintain the pressure on an elusive enemy. Increasing the time combat units spent in the field improved Operational Effectiveness while higher numbers of enemy killed or prisoners taken increased Operational Efficiency. Eventually, divisional staff had to compile eighteen different statistical summaries, so they could be discussed at Weekly Operational Review and Analysis briefings.

OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

Divisions fought a constant struggle to maintain the numbers of men in the field and continual studies were made to improve their organization. The standard organization of seven rifle battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions did not suit the terrain in some areas. Some mechanized battalions had to be dismounted while others were exchanged between divisions, moving to areas where they could be deployed.

The three-rifle company battalions were also reorganized into four-rifle company organization to increase effectiveness and battalions changed over the winter of 1968 and 1969; divisions generally gained 33 per cent in rifle strength. It was also found that four-battalion brigades were very effective but divisions rarely used them because it created an ineffective two-battalion brigade.

As divisions settled into their areas, the number of defensive missions grew as units organized routine patrols, base security and convoy escorts. Units had to be rotated to stop the men becoming complacent and enemy activity had to be monitored so that troops were deployed effectively.

Divisions had to keep a constant watch on the use of their manpower. Rotations, excessive numbers of men deployed on base and administrative duties and long-term minor illnesses severely limited the number of men in the field:

5 per cent

Losses due to rotation and casualties were slow to be replaced

10 per cent

Infantry soldiers diverted from line units to brigade and battalion headquarters

15 per cent

Fire base perimeter security duties and morale boosting facilities

Poor management could reduce a company’s paper strength from 164 down to 120 (known as the Paddy Strength).

Commanders also had to monitor recurrent diseases as malaria, diarrhea and foot diseases could debilitate hundreds of men if preventive programs and sanitary conditions were not controlled.

OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY

Operations in Vietnam were designed to sweep areas (known as search-and-destroy and later clear-and-search operations) and commanders could only rely on the number of Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldiers killed (known as the body count) or captured and the amount of material seized to measure their success. A high body count soon became recognized as an important factor in operations as statistics took on a new importance. Commanders were under constant pressure to return high body counts, but results could be misleading. In many areas the Viet Cong chose to hide while they regrouped and a successful unit which had cleared its area would see its body count fall.

A battalion commander outlines the tactical situation in his operational area to his brigadier during 101st Airborne Division’s Operation Cook.

Brigade commanders were continually looking to reinforce successes and improve on failures as the Viet Cong responded with new tactics. The nature of the war in Vietnam made it difficult to carry out operational studies and it took skill and experience to draw the correct conclusions from them. One of the main indicators used was a comparison between the number of enemy killed compared with their own casualties, often called the Exchange Ratio or, more controversially, the Kill Ratio.

Well-led and motivated units had consistent positive results rather than the occasional big encounter. Poor results could mean either that the unit needed extra training and a change in tactics or the enemy had moved out of its area of operations.

The number of enemy killed following a sighting was known as the Contact Success Ratio. A high number meant that units were using the right tactics while a low number showed that the enemy was consistently evading contact.

CONSTANT PRESSURE CONCEPT

The NVA and the Viet Cong suffered heavy losses during the large US operations in 1967 and many units went into hiding. Although results could be rewarding, it took time to plan a large operation; time which the NVA and the Viet Cong soldiers used to rest while political cadres gathered new recruits. The Constant Pressure Concept was introduced as a solution.

Company and platoon-sized operations could be organized quickly and they were more responsive to intelligence leads. The risk of using smaller units was higher but well thought-out contingency plans made it acceptable even though the operations put extra pressure on junior officers. Constant searches of an area made it impossible for the NVA and Viet Cong to regroup, making units difficult to command and the fragmented groups eventually disintegrated under the pressure.

CHAPTER 3

THOSE WHO SERVED

Over 9 million men and women served in the Armed Services between 1964 and 1973; 2,594,000 of them were posted to Vietnam. More than 1.7 million were drafted during the same period and while four out of five men serving in Vietnam in 1965 were volunteers, by 1970 the number had fallen to 30 per cent. The majority of draftees served in the Army and while around 40,000 served in the Marine Corps, the Navy and Air Force continued only to accept volunteers.

VOLUNTEERS

Some men volunteered at their local Armed Forces Recruiting Stations so they could time their service and plan their education or career around it. They could also choose their Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) providing their Armed Forces Classification Test score was high enough. Men served for three years and they were then in the Standby Reserve for three years. They could be mobilized if there was a war or a national emergency, however, Vietnam was only classified as a conflict and Reservists were never recalled. Men were discharged at the end of their six-year military obligation.

Over one million men volunteered to serve in the National Guard or the Organized Reserves and after six months of training they attended monthly weekend drills, training courses and a two-week summer camp for the next six years. Only a small number of National Guard units were posted to Vietnam but several were deployed to deal with the violent anti-war demonstrations at college campuses across the United States during the latter stages of the conflict.

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

All males had to register at one of the 4,000 draft boards when they reached the age of 18; 17-year-olds could enlist if they had their parents’ permission but they had to wait until they were eligible for service in Vietnam. Draft boards were given a monthly quota and men were eligible to be called until the age of 27. The oldest were drafted at the beginning of the conflict but the situation was reversed in June 1967 so that 18-year-olds were called first, in the belief that it was easier to draft men before they started college, careers or families. The number of men called every year varied considerably and while numbers peaked at over 380,000 in 1966, they had dropped rapidly by 1970. Draftees served for two years followed by four years on the Reserve.

While the Army accepted thousands of of draftees, the Marine Corps was more selective, preferring to accept volunteers; the Air Force and Navy only accepted volunteers.

New recruits receive training with the .30 machine gun during their Advanced Infantry Training. (111-SC-618815)

THE LOTTERY

In 1969 a lottery was introduced to make the selection of draftees impartial and registrants born between 1 January 1944 and 31 December 1950 (men aged 18–26) were included. Capsules containing dates were drawn live on radio and television and paired with a lottery number. Each state and county had to fulfill its draft quota and the numerical sequence determined who would be drafted first. The first draw was held on 1 December 1969 and millions watched as Congressman Alexander Pirnie drew the numbers. The lottery ended in 1973.

CLASSIFICATION

After men had received their Registration Certificate, or Draft Card, they were called for their classification tests where they completed questionnaires and underwent the Armed Forces Physical Examination. The following areas were checked:

P - Physical capacity or stamina

U - Upper extremities

L - Lower extremities

H - Hearing and ears

E - Eyes

S - Psychiatric

Men had to be awarded 1, the top mark, in all six categories to qualify for the combat arms (the artillery accepted 2 for hearing). The combined results determined the man’s classification and it was printed on a results card complete with the following statement:

This is your Notice of Classification, advising you of the determination of your selective service local board that you have been classified in accordance with Selective Service Regulations . . .

Class I-A meant that a man a good chance of being drafted and while the rest of Class I and all of Class II were deferred to a later date, Classes III and IV were classified exempt from military service due to personal, employment or medical reasons. A minority lied about their personal circumstances or tried to fake the result of the physical but the majority accepted the result. The boards were supposed to operate impartially but there were suspicions that different criteria were applied across the country. The following list outlines the main classifications and what they signified:

CLASS I

I-A:

Available for military service and almost certain to be drafted

I-A-O:

Conscientious objector available for non-combat military service

I-C:

Member of the Armed Forces, Environmental Science Services Administration or the Public Health Service

I-D:

Member of the reserves or a student undergoing military training

I-O:

Conscientious objector available for civilian work in hospitals or other service work

I-S:

Student deferral; lasted until graduation from high school, the end of a college or university academic year or their 20th birthday; deferment could be lost if grades dropped

I-W:

Conscientious objector performing civilian health work or other service work

I-Y:

Qualified for military service only in time of war or a national emergency

CLASS II

II-A:

Deferred due to a civilian occupation (engineering, defense work, teaching, police)

II-C:

Deferred due to an agricultural occupation

II-S:

Deferred student on special studies

CLASS III

III-A:

Extreme hardship deferment or the registrant had a dependent child

CLASS IV

IV-A:

Sufficient prior active service or a sole surviving son

IV-B:

Official deferred by law

IV-C:

Alien not currently liable for military service (many were later reclassified and served)

IV-D:

Minister of religion or divinity student

IV-F:

Physically, mentally or morally unfit; some imitated an illness to avoid being drafted

CLASS V

V-A:

Over the age of liability for military service

There have been many discussions about how men from different social and racial backgrounds were allocated to units but statistics indicate that the Armed Forces in Vietnam generally represented the national population in both areas. However, the upper and middle classes were more likely to be exempted or deferred due to their reserved occupations or continuing education while the lower classes were more likely to be classified I-A. While only 40 per cent of college graduates went to Vietnam, around 65 per cent of high-school graduates and dropouts served. The Army often capitalized on a man’s education, assigning him to the appropriate arm or service to develop his skills; it meant that high-school graduates and dropouts were usually assigned to combat units. The racial and social composition of society in America meant that many Blacks and Hispanics fell into this category and consequently suffered higher casualties.

DRAFT DODGERS

Thousands (numbers vary from 50,000 to over 100,000) refused to be caught up in their country’s war for a variety of reasons, including political, personal or religious beliefs, and many did not register with their draft board. Some draft dodgers ignored the registration letter and tried to avoid being arrested while thousands emigrated to Canada to escape the authorities (meanwhile, hundreds of Canadians enlisted in the American Armed Forces). Others openly defied authority and publically burnt their draft cards at one of the many anti-war demonstrations.

SWEARING IN