Belonging E-Book

Montserrat Guibernau

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 398

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

It is commonly assumed that we live in an age of unbridled individualism, but in this important new book Montserrat Guibernau argues that the need to belong to a group or community - from peer groups and local communities to ethnic groups and nations - is a pervasive and enduring feature of modern social life.

The power of belonging stems from the potential to generate an emotional attachment capable of fostering a shared identity, loyalty and solidarity among members of a given community. It is this strong emotional dimension that enables belonging to act as a trigger for political mobilization and, in extreme cases, to underpin collective violence.

Among the topics examined in this book are identity as a political instrument; emotions and political mobilization; the return of authoritarianism and the rise of the new radical right; symbols and the rituals of belonging; loyalty, the nation and nationalism. It includes case studies from Britain, Spain, Catalonia, Germany, the Middle East and the United States.

This wide-ranging and cutting-edge book will be of great interest to students and scholars in politics, sociology and the social sciences generally.

Leseprobe

Belonging

Belonging

Solidarity and Division in Modern Societies

Montserrat Guibernau

polity

Copyright © Montserrat Guibernau 2013

The right of Montserrat Guibernau to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2013 by Polity Press

Polity Press 65Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press350 Main StreetMalden, MA 02148, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

ISBN: 978-0-7456-7168-0

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

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Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Outline of the book

1  Identity as a Political Instrument

Conflicting identities

The role of boundaries

Traditional versus modern societies

The construction and meaning of identity

The consequences of globalization

Summary

2  Belonging by Choice

Belonging and emotion

The conditions of belonging

Collective identity and the power of symbols

Belonging to the nation

Collective identity and political mobilization

Summary

3  Freedom and Constraint

Immanuel Kant

Michel Foucault

Erich Fromm

The freedom to belong

Alienation, fear of irrelevance and group membership

Escaping into new dependencies: addiction

Summary

4  The New Radical Right and the Resurgence of Authoritarian Politics

The rise of authoritarianism

The new radical right versus traditional fascism

Who votes for the new radical right?

‘White resistance’ as a transnational movement

The rise of ethno-politics

On racism

The nation: conflicting views

From biological to cultural exclusion

Summary

5  The Rituals of Belonging

The power of symbols

The meaning of symbols

Ritual and power

Ritual and emotions

Rituals of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’

Rites of belonging in modern society

Rites of passage

‘Exclusive’ and ‘inclusive’ groups and associations

Summary

6  Loyalty, Citizenship and the Nation

On loyalty

Three types of loyalty

Loyalty, the nation and nationalism

National loyalty in peacetime and wartime

Loyalty programmes in the USA

Scapegoating and dissent

Freedom versus conformity

‘Authoritarian’ versus ‘democratic’ loyalty

The great challenge: turning immigrants into Americans

Summary

7  Emotion and Political Mobilization

Emotion and social action

Emotion and the rational imperatives of market capitalism

‘Taming’ emotion and the construction of ‘healing spaces’

Emotion and political mobilization

Summary

Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank those who have supported me while I have been writing and thinking about this book: Christopher Dandeker, Alain Gagnon, Zig Layton-Henry, François Rocher, Grahame Thompson and Nick Swimm.

As a member of the editorial board of the journal Nations and Nationalism, I have greatly appreciated and benefited from debates and conversations with Anthony D. Smith and the other members/friends of the editorial team.

I have also thoroughly enjoyed seminars and debates held at the Cañada Blanch Centre of the European Institute at the London School of Economics. I am especially indebted to Paul Preston for his constant support and advice.

I started this book while being a visiting scholar at the Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge. In particular, I owe a great debt to John B. Thompson for his encouragement and assistance. I am also grateful to Patrick Baert, Christel Lane, David Lehmann and Jackie Scott. My gratitude goes to the College Council at St John’s for kindly inviting me to the Fellow’s Table at Cambridge, thus providing an opportunity to exchange views and meet fellow-scholars in various disciplines.

At Queen Mary, University of London, I would like to thank my colleagues at the School of Politics and International Relations, in particular Jeremy Jennings, Adam Fagan and Monika Nangia.

I have written this book while holding a Leverhulme Trust Research Fellowship granting me research leave, and I am enormously grateful to the Trust for creating this unique opportunity.

Among those who have contributed to the preparation of this book, I wish to thank Gill Motley, Justin Dyer and Clare Ansell.

This book could not have been written without the constant support of my husband and my parents.

Cambridge, March 2013

Introduction

This book argues that the strength and popularity of belonging seriously undermine arguments pointing to the predominance of individualism as the key feature of modern societies. At present, the tension between solidarity and division reflects the complexities of belonging at a time when social, cultural and ethnic diversity feature prominently.

Identification with a group1 or community tends to play a major role in the construction of individual identity built by way of inclusion and exclusion and by constant re-negotiation, modification and transformation of shifting boundaries, which, at times, become fuzzy. Individual identities are not clear-cut; rather they are subject to transformations emerging from their intrinsic dynamic nature. Various identities tend to coexist at a time, and their relevance moves and switches according to individual needs, external demands and expectations.

When joining a community, such as the nation or a church, individuals are expected to conform and follow its rules, to be loyal to its principles and aims, and to accept its dogmas and hierarchy so that a sentiment of solidarity can emerge among them. Throughout this process, self-identification with the community’s values and objectives becomes paramount.

This book shows that through the process of identification with the group or community, from peer groups and local communities to ethnic groups and nations, the individual’s self-identity is gradually replaced by the ‘overriding identity’ of the collective, which now becomes the key source of the individual’s new self-identity. As a result, the individual melts into the group, adopts its values and principles and follows its dictates. The transformation of self-identity under the influence of the newly acquired collective identity encourages the individual to give up a substantial degree of personal freedom in exchange for the security and warmth associated with group membership. In this context the sharing of a collective identity holds a potent emotional content that often becomes instrumental in turning a group into a political actor – endowed with varying degrees of power – able to challenge, oppose, transform or endorse the status quo.

Identity is constructed both through belonging and through exclusion – as a choice or as imposed by others – and, in both cases, it involves various degrees of emotional attachment to a range of communities and groups. The innovative character of my argument is that through the process of choosing, belonging is turned into a consequence of free will, which implies a degree of personal commitment absent from assigned forms of membership where individuals are ‘expected to’ conform to a series of norms, habits and behaviours in the name of tradition.

Here I maintain that membership of a group or community – for example, the nation or a faith – has the ability to offer a vantage point from which human beings are able to transcend their limited existence by sharing some common interests, objectives and characteristic with fellow-members. Belonging by choice entails identification with the group, and this automatically enhances its qualities in the individual’s own eyes.

Outline of the book

The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 focuses upon the construction of identity and its use as a political instrument. It establishes a sharp contrast between traditional and modern societies with reference to the differing degrees of freedom of choice enjoyed by individuals while they are engaged in the construction of their own lives: for instance, the concept of self-identity, as such, was not relevant in traditional societies.

It begins with a theoretical discussion of identity illustrated by the multiple and sometimes contradictory meanings attributed to wearing a burqa or a niqab in the West. In doing so, it highlights processes of reinvention of tradition effected by a radical transformation in the meaning of certain practices, including adherence to a particular dress code. This brings to the fore a detailed analysis of some of the main complexities and contradictions involved in the construction of self-identity which includes the various ways in which conflicting identities both coexist and clash with each other. The chapter analyses the role as well as the fuzzy and fluid nature of boundaries in the construction of identity and it also emphasizes the potential use of identity as a political instrument. It then moves on to discuss the impact of globalization as a transformative force by examining economic insecurity and uncertainty, cultural anxiety and political alienation as the main traits defining individuals in Western liberal democracies.

Chapter 2 appraises the meaning and consequences of belonging by choice as a distinctive feature of modern society. In so doing, it assesses the consequences of belonging and brings to the fore the sentiments of doubt and ambivalence concerning the price to be paid in exchange for being accepted as a member of a particular group or community. Here I analyse the conditions and attributes of belonging and study the processes leading to the construction of collective forms of identity. In particular, I consider the role of symbols in the construction of collective identities. Belonging to the nation entails consciousness of forming a community, sharing a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory, and having the will to decide upon its political future. The emotional attachment associated with the idea of belonging by choice becomes instrumental in processes of collective identity formation, as well as in processes of political mobilization.

Chapter 3 explores the dual nature of belonging as both enabling and constraining men and women living in modern societies who, up to a point, enjoy freedom of choice. As such, it analyses the meaning of freedom in the work of Immanuel Kant, Erich Fromm, and Michel Foucault. The chapter then focuses on what I define as the ‘fiction of original thought’: that is, the belief that our ideas and views are unique and original while, in truth, we are just reproducing the views that have been instilled in us by public opinion and the media. This emphasizes that belonging depends upon the willingness to conform to values, norms, dress codes and other conditions imposed by the group that people wish to join. Yet while freedom has enabled the independence and rationality of individuals, it has often left at least some of them with feelings of isolation associated with a sense of anxiety and powerlessness. It is my argument that belonging by choice acts as an antidote to alienation and loneliness. Even so, to escape freedom, people pursue different strategies, ranging from conformity to obedience to a superior power, ideology, faith or community, which, in all cases seems to entail a certain degree of dependence.

Chapter 4 maintains that in modern societies not everybody is entitled to freedom of choice and not everyone is prepared to use his or her freedom. Here I examine the rise of authoritarian politics exemplified by the proliferation and strengthening of new radical right populist parties across Europe and beyond. This trend is also illustrated by the reappearance of various forms of fundamentalism encompassing the market, politics and the resurgence of religious fundamentalism as a force with political aims. The rise of the new radical right, by excluding those considered ‘too different’, leaves out an important number of people – mainly some immigrants and Muslims. By denying them the right to belong, they are being condemned to the status of ‘permanent outsiders’. The ascent of the new radical right raises important issues about tolerance and rights within multicultural liberal democracies. Crucially, it prompts the debate about ‘who is’ and ‘who is not’ entitled to belong – a question that has serious economic, political and social consequences associated with it. The chapter offers a fresh analysis of the ideology and political discourse of the new radical right. It also investigates its ‘anti-immigrant’ position as well as its transnational nature and ‘white nativist’ programme.

Chapter 5 concentrates on what I refer to as ‘the rituals of belonging’. It examines the ability of symbols to embody entities – such as the nation – by endowing them with distinct attributes destined to make them unique. In so doing, symbols bring to the fore their own power as pillars of individual as well as collective forms of identity. Symbols help individuals to make sense of their own lives and they also contribute to define the characteristics, structure and hierarchy of the communities they belong to. To do so efficiently, symbols must retain some ambiguity allowing for a variety of meanings. In turn, ritual communicates authority and hierarchy and, in order to reinforce a sentiment of belonging, it also emphasizes the dependence of the group. The role of ritual in legitimizing political power is illustrated by reference to two examples: the search for new symbols to prompt and consolidate political change brought about by the Arab Spring; and the role of symbolism and ritual aiming to legitimize the dictatorship imposed by General Franco after the Spanish Civil War.

Chapter 6 begins with a question: does loyalty involve a free choice, or is it the outcome of being under pressure? Here I establish a distinction between ‘authoritarian’ and ‘democratic’ loyalty. The concept of ‘authoritarian loyalty’ refers to loyalty as conformity and, as such, it absolves the individual from personal responsibility for actions performed in the service of political superiors. In contrast, ‘democratic loyalty’ points to a dynamic principle defined by a free devotion to the best interests of the object of loyal attachment. Still a further concept is introduced here, namely ‘instrumental loyalty’, referring to those cases in which the individual’s loyalty is conditional upon whether expected rewards are obtained. This chapter examines the meaning of loyalty as an attitude grounded upon a distinctive emotional commitment and identification. It points out that a shared sentiment of belonging to the nation acts as a potent trigger of loyalty often channelled through nationalism. A certain degree of loyalty is expected from those who belong, but in modern multinational societies we are faced with a paradox: while some individuals who are loyal to the nation are not permitted to belong, others who belong despise their nation and place their loyalty elsewhere.

The discussion of national loyalty in peacetime and wartime leads to the study of opposing reactions prompted by the introduction of loyalty programmes in the USA in the wake of the persecution and conviction of communist sympathizers during the Cold War period. In considering the tensions between freedom and conformity within Western liberal democracies, I raise some fundamental issues brought about by the growing diversity of political and religious ideas, differing definitions of democracy as well as the coexistence of contradictory loyalties within secular multicultural societies.

Chapter 7 studies the – often neglected – role of emotions in selected processes of political mobilization related to nations, nationalism and national identity. It claims that emotions are intrinsic to social and political attachments and focuses upon the emotional appeal of belonging to the nation as one of the most powerful agents of political mobilization. The main argument advanced here is that emotions act as a trigger for political mobilization. This assertion brings to the fore the strong emotional dimension of belonging which involves commitment and identification with the group. It examines the contrast between emotion and the rational imperatives of market capitalism within the framework defined by the tensions and contradictions created by globalization. It also underlines the ambivalent nature of modern political mobilization by introducing a distinction between what I refer to as ‘liberating’ and ‘regressive’ social movements. It concludes by identifying some of the emotions that become instrumental in the crystallization of political mobilization and draws attention to the construction of what I call ‘healing spaces’: that is, public spaces within which certain emotions can be displayed and dealt with within a given community.

To begin with, the book explores the contrasting relevance of identity in modern as opposed to traditional societies. It considers the challenges and contradictions faced by processes of identity construction within the novel context defined by the consequences of globalization, which include economic insecurity and uncertainty, cultural anxiety and political alienation.

1

Identity as a Political Instrument

Conflicting identities

The burqa is a full-body covering leaving just a mesh screen to see through. It is worn by Muslim women over their clothing in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier province and tribal areas; women remove the garment only when they are at home. While the burqa covers the entire face and body, the niqab or face veil covers the virtual totality of the face and hair down to the shoulders, with the slitted exclusion of the eyes, although it may be worn with a separate eye veil. In turn, the hijab refers to a veil covering everything except the hands and the face.1

The burqa is one of many variations of the full-body covering. In Iran, a similar full-body covering is known as the chador. In North Africa, women wear a djellaba or an abaya with a niqab. The result is the same: the full body is cloaked, but the clothing is distinct in each case. While some Muslim women wear them by choice and invoke religious principles and tradition, others use them as a means of protest. However, many women in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan are compelled to wear the garment following traditional norms or Taliban edicts. The Taliban is a Sunni Muslim2 movement dominated by people of Pashtun ethnic identity, which controlled Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001.

I am using the following example not in any sense to make a moral judgement but as a tool to examine the intersection of tradition and modernity illustrated by the different meanings attributed to wearing a particular dress in a Western context.

The scene unfolded in Trignac, near Nantes, in the French western Loire-Atlantique region when a woman lawyer took offence at the attire of a fellow-shopper, resulting in an argument during which the pair came to blows before both being arrested. A 26-year-old Muslim convert was walking through the store in Trignac when she overheard the woman lawyer making ‘snide remarks about her black burqa’. A police officer close to the case is quoted noting: ‘The lawyer said she was not happy seeing a fellow shopper wearing a veil and wanted the ban introduced as soon as possible.’3

This incident illustrates the clash of identities and beliefs coexisting within a single society; alternatively it may be viewed as a sign of intolerance and division between different communities. It may be also interpreted as a display of open hostility against Islam, a religion that has already become an integral part of Europe and entered the public sphere, posing some novel questions regarding how to deal with religion in secular multicultural societies.

Above all, this incident points to two main issues: first, the strong emotional component of belonging; and, second, the urge experienced by some people to make a statement about their religious beliefs, or the lack of them, as a fundamental part of their identity. We could even go further and question whether this incident partly reflects the difficulties of the modern nation-state to define and maintain a distinct national identity in the light of rising ethnic and religious diversity within its borders.

Was the woman wearing a burqa considered a ‘stranger’? Was she being targeted because, according to this piece of news, she was a ‘converted’ Muslim – implying that she was probably a French citizen who had decided to abandon the secular nature of French national identity? For this reason, was she regarded as a ‘bad or non-loyal French woman’? To what extent does the strong religious statement associated with wearing a burqa question the principles and values of secular France or any other secular society? Is it compatible to be French and Muslim?

Undoubtedly, some French people see the burqa as posing a fundamental challenge to the secular character of the French République and as a reminder of the perils of allowing religion to become a powerful force within the nation. France was devastated by the violence of the Wars of Religion (1562–98) fought between French Catholics and Protestants (Huguenots).4 Religious conflict continued well into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and took a dramatic turn during the French Revolution when the so-called De-Christianization of France5 was effected, paving the way for the less radical Laïcité movement. The concept of laïcité is based upon respect for freedom of thought and freedom of religion and defends a separation between state and church. In France, laïcité involves the rejection of any kind of official recognition of a religion by the state. During the twentieth century this concept evolved to signify equal treatment for all religions. In contrast, secularism refers to the right of people to be free from religious rule and teaching. It also includes the right to freedom from any kind of governmental imposition of religion.6 As such, secularism has been long associated with modernity, and, most recently, the realization that Islam has entered the public sphere has stirred a fresh debate regarding the public role of religion.

Tensions and concerns associated with the wearing of the niqab in public places have resulted in it being banned in Italy (2010), Belgium (2010), the city of Barcelona (2010), and, most recently, France (October 2011), where special penalties are enforced (one year in prison or €15,000) for anyone who tries to force the burqa upon an unwilling woman or a minor and a fine and/or the obligation to attend a citizenship course. In 2009, Nicolas Sarkozy – then president of France – lent his support to a proposal to ban the wearing of the burqa and the niqab in France.

It is still early to assess the impact and consequences of such measures, however; as shown above, the first example of ‘burqa rage’ was recorded in France (May 2010) while the process towards the banning of a face-covering veil was being discussed.

In 1802 Thomas Jefferson defended the idea that government is not to interfere with religion. He wrote: ‘I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between Church & State”.’7

Belonging to church and nation is not always compatible. There are times when the individual is forced to choose, and, for some, the return of religion to the political arena is perceived as a threat to the secular model solidly grounded in the Enlightenment and developed in most modern societies. The tension between church and nation reflects the struggle between two powerful institutions willing to acquire and maintain people’s loyalty and define people’s identity – in particular, their collective identity; a quality that automatically endows them with political relevance and power.

The role of boundaries

The Taliban regime, which came into power in Afghanistan in 1996, imposed the use of the sky-blue burqa; however, not all Muslim countries follow a similar policy. Saudi Muslim women are required to wear the niqab by law in cities such as Mecca, Medina and Taif, whereas in other cities it remains de facto obligatory. In contrast, the niqab is outlawed in Tunisia and the habit of wearing it in Turkey has been losing ground in recent years, at least in cities. As Ernest Gellner points out:

Contrary to what outsiders generally suppose, the typical Muslim woman in a Muslim city doesn’t wear the veil because her grandmother did so, but because her grandmother did not: her grandmother in her village was far too busy in the fields, and she frequented the shrine without a veil, and left the veil to her betters. The granddaughter is celebrating the fact that she has joined her grandmother’s betters, rather than her loyalty to her grandmother.8

Some Muslim women in Western countries wear the niqab or the burqa as an expression of modesty – a key virtue in Muslim teaching – which is closely related to a sense of belonging to the Muslim community and tied up with patriarchal norms and traditions. However, wearing the niqab or the burqa in this context seems to be less a case of obeying prescribed dress code practices than it is a response to a process of reinvention of tradition related to the willingness to make a statement about cultural, religious and political difference within modern democracies.

In the eyes of a Westerner, finding some common features between busy Mile End Road in the East End of London and elegant Elizabeth Street in Chelsea may be quite striking. In both cases it has become usual to see a woman wearing a niqab or even a burqa – though in Chelsea she may sport designer-label bag and shoes – busy pushing a pram while at the same time holding a child’s hand. She always walks a couple of steps behind her husband, who, like their small children, is dressed in Western clothes. This seems to indicate that tradition – if tradition were to justify the wearing of a burqa or niqab – applies primarily to women, since only a small minority of Muslim men in the West appear to adopt traditional clothing themselves.

Regarded from the outside, this distinction highlights what can be interpreted as a very different approach to tradition depending on whether it concerns men’s or women’s clothing. Such a striking difference is often cited to feed suspicion about gender inequality within Muslim communities. Clothing is important because living and working or studying in a modern city like London, Berlin or Oslo requires a certain degree of mobility – walking, taking the tube, the bus – and certain types of clothing limit movement. Moreover, and crucially, the niqab and burqa act as a physical barrier to the mere identification of the other.

It is unclear whether the obligation of wearing a niqab is to be founded in the Qur’an since different interpretations of its verses result in different practices. Lack of agreement among Qur’an scholars seems to predominate on this matter. For example, some contemporary scholars agree with the practice of wearing the niqab in Muslim countries, but consider that wearing it in the West is harmful and should be avoided. Shaykh Darsh, a prominent UK scholar, provides the following argument:

•  Some people believe that niqab is recommended (sunnah).

•  Everybody believes that inviting people to Islam (da’wah) is obligatory (fardh).

•  The niqab is often a very significant barrier to da’wah in the West where the concept of face covering has never been known.

•  If a recommended act is a barrier to an obligatory act, one must not sacrifice the fardh for the sunnah.9

When confronted with a woman wearing the niqab or the burqa, many Westerners may react by wondering whether that woman covers her face and body as a personal expression of faith, as a feminist statement or as a sign of oppression. The response to this question is complex and contains important nuances depending on the ways in which women define their identity and their sense of belonging to the Muslim community.

From a Western perspective, often the niqab and the burqa are perceived as a tool of domination employed by husbands and male relatives to control and oppress women. To counter this argument, some Muslim women make a case that it is not them but Western women who are being ‘oppressed’ by a society that expects them to be ‘sexy’ all the time no matter what their age or shape. These Muslim women contend that wearing the burqa or the niqab is a liberating experience which sets them free from the continuous gaze of males primarily interested in their bodies.

The various meanings associated with the wearing of the burqa or the niqab exemplify the ways in which modern societies are able to reinterpret an old tradition. Whereas, originally, wearing the burqa or the niqab was associated with religious observance of a Muslim precept, today, in an altogether radical shift, they become tools for political activism when women wear them as a symbol of liberation and protest. For instance, in recent years many Palestinian women, mostly students, have worn white niqabs adorned with green banners with Arabic messages against Israel’s actions. Covering one of these demonstrations in 2006, the reporter of the Boston Globe wrote: ‘With her textured handbag, heavy mascara, and a veil revealing only her eyes, Alaa Awdeh sounds like the ultimate feminist. Women, she believes, should have equal rights in Palestinian society, especially the right to die in the armed struggle against Israel.’10

The use of the niqab as a tool to voice political protest stands as a novel reinterpretation of tradition insofar as it goes well beyond expressing a sentiment of modesty, piety or liberation from the gaze of men. Instead of complying with the religious meaning of the niqab within Islam, these Palestinian women are turning it into an instrument to demand political change.

In her most recent work, Nira Yuval-Davis studies alternative contemporary political projects on belonging constructed around the notions of religion, cosmopolitanism and what she defines as ‘the feminist ethics of care’, employing an analytical intersectional perspective to deconstruct ‘simplistic notions of national and ethnic collectivities and their boundaries’.11 In turn, Judith Squires assesses to what extent the pursuit of gender equality through the use of quotas, policy agencies and gender mainstreaming has contributed to the assimilation of women in male-defined structures. She also considers the future agendas facing gender equality and argues that such initiatives should be framed by appealing to notions of democratic justice.12

Of course, it should be noted that wearing the niqab or the burqa in a Muslim country where most women, and in some cases all women, wear it by enforcement, habit or as a sign of status does not carry the same connotations as wearing them in a Western country where its use clearly sets people apart by emphasizing their distinct identity.

The burqa and the niqab produce anonymity for their users, but also generate some uncertainty, uneasiness and even fear among people who cannot identify fellow-citizens. Facial language, including gestures and a range of emotional expressions, disappears and communication is reduced to words with no additional interaction except, in some cases, contact through a specific gaze or voice.

In the West, the controversy over the wearing of the niqab and the burqa combines, on the one hand, concerns about the degree of freedom enjoyed by Muslim women and, on the other, uneasiness about whether their right to wear, in public, a garment covering the full body and making their faces unrecognizable should be acceptable.

The niqab and the burqa set up a barrier between the person wearing it and others by erecting a physical and a symbolic boundary and make a strong statement connecting that particular individual to a section of the Muslim community she belongs to. Furthermore, wearing the niqab or the burqa in a Western society breaks the socially constructed idea of conformity with some patterns which have become ‘normal’ – commonplace – within that society and which attempt to render interaction predictable. Breaking conformity implies the emergence of a degree of uncertainty regarding expectations.13

Wearing the niqab or the burqa prompts an external categorization by others, which generally consists of naming (labelling and often employing stereotypes which do not have to be necessarily detrimental or negative) and generating certain presuppositions concerning religious beliefs, views and behaviour. In the West, it defines its carrier as ‘different’, critical of mainstream values and ways of life, and willing to emphasize this alienation and dissimilarity.

Expectations can only be tested against interaction, although, prior to that taking place, individuals already adopt specific attitudes based on categorization. This involves making a set of assumptions about a person’s views and behaviour according to his or her belonging to a specific group. It also assumes a degree of similarity among group members and presumes that the traits of group membership are, to a significant extent, defining individual identity.

For example, by knowing that X is a Catholic, people may assume that he/she stands against divorce and the use of contraceptives. However, when meeting individual Christians, in some cases this assumption will be confirmed while in others it will prove largely wrong. This raises some questions about the degree of internal diversity and deviance that groups are prepared to tolerate insofar as these are not perceived as threatening to their own ethos, a theme that we will explore later on when discussing freedom and loyalty.

It is only through interaction that the features included in categorization may be challenged, transformed or reinforced. Interaction is the most effective test of ideas and attitudes and it is crucial in the construction of boundaries because it compels individuals to express the values and viewpoints guiding their actions and prompting specific responses from others.

Wearing the niqab is probably not a sine qua non attribute for those who wish to belong to more traditional sections of the Muslim community, since its usage varies according to time and place. And as I have already mentioned, wearing the niqab may have multiple meanings for different women. This further illustrates the fluid and permeable nature of boundaries and highlights a certain degree of ambiguity and anomaly, which, according to Richard Jenkins, accounts for the need to map out boundaries and borders with imaginary precision or to dramatize them ritually.14 It is precisely this ambiguity and anomaly which allows us to understand Thomas Barth’s definition of boundaries as ‘fluid and permeable’ but also as situationally contingent and as a perpetual object of negotiation. As Barth argues, it is the ‘ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses’.15

Traditional versus modern societies

Medieval society conceived the social order as a natural order. The individual was not free; however, he or she was not isolated and experienced feelings of security and belonging within an environment dominated by the family, the church, the absolutist state and nature.

Medieval societies lacked the modern emphasis on individuality and they operated on the basis of lineage, gender, social status and other attributes, all of which were fixed by birth. Roy Baumeister argues that ‘only with the emergence of modern societies, and in particular, with the differentiation of the division of labour, did the separate individual become a focus of attention’.16 Baumeister’s analysis recalls that of Durkheim: ‘[T]he “individual”, in a certain sense, did not exist in traditional cultures, and individuality was not prized.’17

Thus, while the eighteenth century’s rejection of the Christian models of human potentiality and fulfilment led the Romantics into a passionate search for new, secular substitutes, the rejection of the legitimacy of the traditional, stable political and social order led to a troubled recognition of the pervasive conflict between the individual and society.

In the nineteenth century, the prestige of the individual self reached an all-time high that declined in the early twentieth century when ‘new social arrangements and events dramatized the relative powerlessness of the individual leading to a devaluation of the self’.18 However, a process giving special significance to the ‘uniqueness’ of each individual led to a particular concern about identity, reflecting the individual and collective (group) desire to be ‘different’.

The modern individual emerged within the new society created by the advent of capitalism as a mode of production that fundamentally transformed the social, political, economic and psychological spheres. For instance, the concept of ‘time’ acquired an unprecedented importance; it became relevant, valuable and not to be wasted. In turn, work attained a distinct character; efficiency and productivity were praised. A sense of duty was instilled in individuals, whose own conscience constantly reminded them of their responsibility. Erich Fromm argues that a sense of duty present in religious and secular rationalizations which emerged in the period of the Reformation continues to apply today. In his view, this sense of duty is defined by its hostility towards the self. He refers to ‘conscience’ as ‘a slave driver, put into man by himself’, with the aim of tricking him into accepting that the wishes ‘he believes to be his own … are actually internalizations of external social demands’.19

The rise of capitalism eventually involved a transformation of habits, attitudes and values that radically altered society and social relations. The individual was now free from the bonds typical of pre-individualist society – nature, church and the absolutist state – and could enjoy the advantages of independence and rationality. However, while it is true that traditional bonds limited the individual, it is also true that they provided a sense of security, including a sense of belonging to a particular community.

The construction and meaning of identity

The key questions with regard to identity are ‘Who am I?’ and ‘Who are we?’ Identity is a definition, an interpretation of the self that establishes what and where the person is in both social and psychological terms. All identities emerge within a system of social relations and representations. As Alberto Melucci observes, all identities require the reciprocal recognition of others: they involve permanence and unity of a subject or of an object through time.20

Melucci connects identity with action. In his view, actors must have a perception of belonging, a sense of temporal continuity and a capacity for self-reflection informing a process of constant reaffirmation of one’s self-identity and differentiation from others. He argues: ‘[W]e might define identity as the reflexive capacity for producing consciousness of action (that is, a symbolic representation of it) beyond any specific contents.’21

Identities are not fixed, immutable or primordial; rather they have a socio-cultural origin and are subject to transformations prompted by interaction.22 Similarity and difference are the dynamic principles of identification. Paul Jones and Michał Krzyźanowski point out that ‘the tendency to conceive of the complex processes associated with identity formation in a uni-linear way, with identities either “created” or “discovered”, overlooks the important question of exactly how identities are constructed frequently through contradictory, dialectical processes’.23 Identity is never unilateral and depends on the relevance of what Erving Goffman has defined as ‘the presentation of the self’.24 In his view, it is impossible either to ensure its ‘correct’ reception or interpretation, or to know with certainty how others are to receive or interpret it. There is an internal–external dialectic between self-image and public image: we construct our own self-identify and, at the same time, others construct their image of us according to their own view, to the point that it becomes unavoidable for an individual not to be influenced by his or her own public image as constructed by others.

Individuals lack control concerning the ways in which others are to interpret the public image that they are projecting through their dress code and manners. In spite of that, their own self-identity will be affected by the interpretation of ‘others’ because one of the components of selfhood includes the way in which others regard ourselves, how they treat us, as well as their expectations. All of this involves a reflexivity whereby individuals react to and become influenced by others’ view of themselves. This is a process endowed with the ability to impact upon our thoughts, our self-image and our actions since, ultimately, a sense of self is constructed through interaction; in particular, selfhood is socially constructed by those defined by Harry Stack Sullivan and George Herbert Mead as ‘significant others’: that is, by those who ‘matter’.25 Mead was a pioneer in acknowledging the significance of ‘important others’ in the development and maintenance of identity.

Although identity is expected to remain constant throughout the life of a person, this does not mean that it is to remain unchanged. A certain degree of flexibility and transformation remains the norm since identity is constructed via a process of constant self-actualization which requires reacting to life challenges, integrating the outcomes of personal choices, negotiating the content of personal roles and responding to others’ expectations. Constructing an identity entails a process of constant self-definition and actualization.

In my view, the defining criteria of identity are continuity over time and differentiation from others. Individuals perceive continuity through a set of experiences that spread out across time and are united by a common meaning. A personal narrative connects all these experiences and presents them as a ‘life story’; quite often, individuals introduce some variations when narrating their ‘life story’ to themselves and when presenting it to others with the aim of enhancing or highlighting coincidence or opposition to the other.

By narrating their life story, individuals seek to project a certain self-image that is bound to be subject to some degree of variation depending upon the individual’s aims and the audience being targeted. Telling our ‘life story’ involves consciously emphasizing certain aspects and events while neglecting, reinterpreting or even deleting others in an attempt to launch a specific self-image. Narrating our life story demands a certain degree of opening up to the other by disclosing some traits, experiences or views considered intimate, and it may even assume sharing some secrets. It also provides the individual with a unique opportunity of redefining and reinterpreting his or her own life and therefore transforming his or her own self-image. Nevertheless, as previously argued, it is impossible to predict the various ways in which the personal ‘image’ that we are aiming to present will be received, interpreted and defined by others.

Identity refers to the set of attributes that make each person unique, and these attributes are, in turn, the outcome of a complex mesh of exchanges and relationships involving a range of people, situations, values, ideologies and objectives. Individual identity is constructed through interaction and a reflexive interpretation of others’ views, attitudes, expectations and demands towards ourselves; however, as indicated earlier, it is only ‘significant others’ who matter.

Identity is the outcome of a combination of assigned roles and a series of choices, which entails a certain degree of risk resulting from insufficient information about their possible consequences, limited resources to manage their outcomes and the need to choose among a limited range of possibilities. Anthony Giddens writes: ‘Modernity confronts the individual with a complex diversity of choices and, because it is non-foundational, at the same time offers little help as to which options should be selected.’26 It is important to contemplate these choices against a backdrop of constraints limiting the range of ‘viable or real’ choices available to individuals. Liah Greenfeld encapsulates this point when she writes that ‘the advantages of modernity come with a heavy price-tag. The greater is the choice one is given in forming one’s destiny, the heavier is the burden of responsibility for making the right choice.… Life has never been so exciting and so frustrating: we have never been so empowered and so helpless.’27

The lack of clear prescriptions on what to choose and how to act, unless a person obeys the principles of a specific doctrine or ideology, adds greater difficulty. Although modern society values freedom and agency as key elements in the active and constant construction and reconstruction of self-identity, not all individuals are prepared to or interested to engage in a dynamic critical and constant process of self-construction. For some, freedom becomes a burden and the possibility of deciding to conform to mainstream patterns offers a source of relief that frees them from the constant pondering and evaluating of the various available options. Identity provides a sense of purpose and meaning in life, it increases self-esteem, it defines who we are as well as how and why we are to behave in normatively specified ways, and, according to Peggy Thoits, it also reduces depression and anxiety.28

The consequences of globalization

Economic insecurity and uncertainty in everyday life

The pace of socio-economic change is being accelerated by globalization, and this is making a major impact upon the lives of individuals. Consumption, production, leisure, media, education, travel and politics are all affected by increasing interdependence and speed in communications. But not all individuals have access to the means of globalization: that is, the sophisticated technological tools that have made it possible. In a similar manner, not all are equally affected by its consequences; social class and education tend to fuel a growing divide between those competent to move around and benefit from living in the global age and those on the margins.

The transition from industrial to post-industrial society requires fast-adapting individuals capable of surviving within a dislocated society where moral norms, values, ideologies, traditions and knowledge are constantly challenged and revised. In this context, only a few achieve an elite position while a substantial under-class, having few chances of escaping its situation, grows at the bottom. Inequality is rampant not only between different areas of the world but also within particular societies, and this generates resentment and fragmentation.

While a successful elite benefits from operating in this global flexible market, a growing number of low- and medium-skilled workers are filling the ranks of the unemployed. Among them there is an escalating sense of vulnerability and defeat, often accompanied by an increasing lack of self-esteem. In addition, the perception that immigrants come to their countries to ‘steal’ their jobs as well as the view, substantiated or not, that asylum seekers and refugees receive greater social benefits than nationals is contributing to a process of increasing resentment towards the state and towards society as a whole. These marginalized workers’ own personal insecurity leads them to disregard the generally precarious conditions in which immigrants tend to find themselves and the frequent unwillingness of nationals to take up so-called ‘immigrant jobs’. Instead, as will be discussed below, the visibility of certain minorities associated with ‘alien’ cultures, traditions and ways of life often fosters fear, a lack of trust and open hostility, and, in some cases, it results in xenophobia and racism against those regarded as different.

The rise of the new radical right partly reflects the insecurity and instability brought about by the end of a bipolar division of the world led by the USA and the former USSR; substantial changes concerning the restructuring of the world economy; and a technological revolution which has far-reaching social, cultural and political consequences.

The collapse of communism has irremediably weakened socialism and trade unions together with the traditional values underpinning them. Solidarity and equality have been replaced by competition, individualism and the survival of the fittest. Among the main factors that have created a climate favouring the emergence of the new radical right are: public political distrust of and resentment towards politicians and the political system alike;29 the proliferation of all sorts of international and transnational institutions, corporations and associations, prompting the transformation of the nation-state’s traditional role; and, in Europe, the weakening of the nation-state or, at least, the substantial transformation of its sovereignty associated with European integration – a process that is also contributing to foster anxiety among some citizens ill prepared to take advantage of the opening up of European frontiers and markets. These people feel threatened by prospects of labour mobility and cultural diversity because, in their view, such changes alter their own expectations and restrict their possibilities, creating an environment where they do not feel secure. Fierce competition for jobs, the restructuring of welfare systems and cultural anxiety break the ‘imagined’ homogeneity, solidarity and sense of community associated with the nation. In addition, the pervasive threat of terrorism since 9/11 is also associated with ‘outsiders’, people who do not ‘belong’, even if they are citizens.

The impact of globalization is not restricted to culture and values; it also affects the economic and the political spheres. World trade and the labour market are currently being guided by capitalist principles, resulting, among other things, in the displacement of the manufacturing industry away from traditional industrialized Western societies, where production is more expensive, to Eastern Europe and developing countries, where labour regulations are less strict, wages lower and worker’s rights weaker and sometimes non-existent.

Cultural anxiety