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- Herausgeber: Ithaca Press
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
The first decade of the new millennium witnessed wide-ranging transformations in the six countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council. They entered unchartered waters by experimenting politically and socially, expanding economically and asserting their influence internationally. These attempts stemmed not only from the realization that such a shift is inevitable, but also from their newfound confidence that a blend of tradition and modernity can indeed survive alongside and complement each other. "Boom Amid Gloom" is an empirical study of seven themes that help test the pulse of these countries and indicate where they are headed during the course of the next few decades. Some of these game-changers are central to understanding how the 2003-2008 oil boom ushered in and nurtured an unparalleled sense of hope in the region, even as the global economic slowdown thereafter spread gloom in many parts of the world. The book analyzes how the region stands on the threshold of evolving from merely being oil-rich and rapidly modernizing to achieving a more balanced and sustainable model of overall development in future.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011
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Boom amid Gloom
The Spirit of Possibility in the 21st Century Gulf
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1 Political Reforms: Thinking Out of the Box
Notes
2 New Media: Catalyst for Liberalized Political Culture
Notes
3 New Growth: Economic Diversification and Knowledge Economy
Notes
4 Labour Reforms: Redefining the Rules of Engagement
Notes
5 Diplomatic Overdrive: The Making of Mediators
Notes
6 Gulf–Asia Ties: Emerging Contours of a New Security Architecture
Notes
7 Climate of Concern: Land of Black Gold Turns Green
Notes
Conclusion
References
Acknowledgements
Reaching the summit of this mountain of work that shaped up to become my first book has not just been my effort. I am merely a part of it.A number of people and institutions have played significant roles in fulfilling this dream project. My sincere gratitude to them and many others who have, knowingly or unknowingly, made important contributions.
My Gulf journey would have been a non-starter but for the timely suggestion of Prof. A.K. Pasha of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The flight to the region was initiated by two very dear friends – James and Regi.The Gulf Today, Sharjah, gave character to my formative thoughts and published them, along with the Inter Press Service. Much of the research and content development materialized due to stimulating interactions with Prof. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla of the UAE University and my return to academics at the Gulf Research Center (GRC), Dubai. A chance meeting with Dr James Onley, University of Exeter, gave me a foothold in the world of Gulf scholars. More importantly, this helped me get acquainted with Prof. Tim Niblock, who magnanimously allowed me to borrow the ‘Spirit of Possibility’ phrase that he coined and graciously accepted my request to do the introduction.
Prof. Mary Ann Tetreault of Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, Gulf 2000, Ithaca Press, the Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs, UAE, and the Web have also been crucial facilitators in translating my ideas into final print.
My family – Anna and Amma, Meena and Avikshith – and a quiver full of friends have always been a great source of strength and encouragement and have made me what I am.
I remain indebted to all of you.Introduction
Much has been written about the Gulf in recent years. Any new work on the region needs to be distinctive, not just conveying updated information but conveying perceptions and lines of analysis which enable the reader to see the region in a different way and gain a more far-reaching understanding of its dynamics.
This book is distinctive. One aspect of this stems from the writer’s background. Most of the literature which is available on the Gulf – or at least those elements that find their way into the Western public arena – are either by Western scholars or by scholars from the region. This book gives a South-South perspective: an Indian researcher who has spent years working in and researching on the Gulf reflecting on the problems facing the region and the patterns of political, social and economic development which are evident. The approach to the region is different, with a greater tendency to set the Gulf ’s development within the context of South and East Asian developments. Whereas Western literature tends to discuss the rising strength of the South and East Asian economies, and the problems and dilemmas facing the Gulf states, as separate phenomena, here they are treated as integral parts of a changing global balance. What marks the contemporary world system, then, is the growing importance of Asia in its entirety.
A further aspect of distinctiveness arises from the timing of the book. It is a product of the second major oil boom. Most of the other literature surveying and analysing the development of the Arab states of the Gulf dates from an earlier period, before the post-2003 sharp rise in oil prices had transformed the economic, social and political landscape. The significance of this is worth stressing, in historical perspective. The first major oil boom occurred between 1973 and 1982. There was, at that time, a strong spirit of optimism in the Arab states of the Gulf. Development plans that envisaged massive economic and social change were introduced. The region appeared set for a major transformation in all aspects of social and economic provision, leading relatively quickly to the emergence of modern developed states. This was followed by a prolonged period of crisis: the price of oil fell and then fluctuated in a manner that removed the basis for stable development planning. The complexity of some of the social and economic problems thrown up by development also became apparent. The region, furthermore, was riven by the three major wars that shook the international system between 1980 and 2003: the Iran-Iraq war, the first Gulf War, and the second Gulf War. Most of the existing literature on the Arab states of the Gulf is set within this context of boom followed by crisis, regional tension, uncertainty and developmental weakness.
It has only been after 2003, and especially after 2005, that the Gulf has begun to emerge from a necessary obsession with crisis and the need to avoid immediate disaster. The early stages of the oil price rise could initially be seen as one more fluctuation, easily reversed. After 2005, however, it became increasingly clear that this was no short-term fluctuation: it stemmed from a long-term change in the balance between the supply and demand for oil, much of the latter stemming from the rapid pace of industrialization in Asia. Ambitious new development plans were developed. The framework within which development was now envisaged was substantially different from the earlier period. The states of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) had all, by the end of 2005, acceded to the World Trade Organization. Private investment was to play a prominent role in the new developmental explosion. The GCC states could now seek to position themselves at the heart of the global economy, emerging as leading industrial powers through the competitive advantage which they possessed in the field of petrochemicals, and as leading financial powers through the massive resources accruing to their Sovereign Wealth Funds. Hence the ‘spirit of possibility’ which figures in the sub-title to this book.
The global financial crisis since 2008 has not changed this optimistic scenario, despite the attention that Dubai’s shaky finances has attracted. On the contrary, the financial crisis has, overall, reinforced the GCC states’ relative strength in the global economy. Although oil prices fell at the beginning of the financial crisis, reflecting an expectation that demand would fall, they had by the end of 2009 rebounded. At the time of writing, they remain well short of the levels of early 2008, but are nonetheless some three times higher than they were in 2002. There is a widespread expectation that the upward trend will resume in the near future. The GCC states, in fact, constitute a part of a wider picture: the contrast between Asian success and Western weakness, reflected in economic performance during the financial crisis.
Many, and indeed most, of the concerns that Janardhan covers, then, are new ones – or at least they possess a different gloss or different dynamics than before. This is reflected in each of the seven major themes he pursues in the book. First, he looks at the prospects for political reform. The topic itself, of course, figures in most books about the GCC. Janardhan’s emphasis is very much on understanding why externally promoted solutions encounter resistance – sometimes at a popular as well as governmental level. He contends that the counterpoint of reform and conservatism within the GCC states is more subtle and nuanced than is often acknowledged, and that discourses on reform are integral to all the societies of the region. There is a basis on which institutional participation can be developed and democratization constructed, but external pressures sometimes weaken the domestic dynamics that could carry these processes forward. Economic and political reform may work in contrary directions to each other, but can in particular circumstances be mutually supportive. The character of the regional environment is also important: a regional environment marked by conflict and division will not foster the values of compromise, debate and negotiation which encourage a democratically inclined domestic political discourse.
Second, Janardhan focuses on the role of the new media and its relevance for the creation of a liberalized political culture. The debate on this has a different balance from what would have been appropriate a decade ago. In the 1990s, the overwhelming view was that, in the perspective of creating a more liberal and open public space, the Arab media were part of the problem. They had no capacity to engineer or encourage change, but rather constituted instruments of control. Even outside of their countries, governments were acquiring ownership of, or influence over, television channels and newspapers so as to project their own views and prevent or disable criticism. This dimension of the media remains in being. The limitations are, indeed, reinforced by the increasing involvement of the private sector in the media. Arab private investors have widened the range of content broadcast on satellite television, but have not widened domestic political discourse in the countries that host their businesses. Yet, another reality is now present: the populations of the Gulf, as with people elsewhere, are no longer dependent on sources of information that their governments can control. Local populations are gaining access to information through channels that their own governments are powerless to influence. Governmental attempts to direct and channel popular moods and attitudes have become a complex matter.
Janardhan shows how the spread of internet use and of mobile texting has created a new public space for discourse. The forms of media involved here, moreover, are unbounded by national borders. Ideas, views and information move between Arabs in all the countries of the Arab world, Arabs in the outside diaspora, and the international arena more generally. The blogosphere, in particular, has created virtual communities where information is exchanged and views developed – a public space of the kind characteristic of open societies. Satellite television has also played an important role here. Even though each satellite station may be unwilling to criticize the domestic political structures of its home state, the stations are not necessarily so coy about criticizing the policies and institutions of neighbouring states. The Al Jazeera channel provides the best example of this practice, retaining support in its home state of Qatar through its silence on domestic Qatari concerns, while engendering considerable resentment (and sometimes outrage) in governmental circles elsewhere in the Arab world – and often in the West also. The overall outcome of satellite multiplicity has been to broaden the arena for public debate.
Third, Janardhan highlights new areas of economic growth and development. The focus here is on economic diversification and the knowledge economy, linking this in with the capacity of the educational systems of the region to produce graduates of the level and quality needed in the contemporary globalized economy. While the programmes of educational reform are carefully documented in this book, as also are the huge sums that governments are now devoting to the education sector, the overall picture that emerges is not optimistic. Creating new universities and colleges, whether locally instituted (such as the King Abdullah University for Sciences and Technology in Saudi Arabia) or implanted from outside (such as the campuses established by US universities in Qatar), may give the appearance of international educational competitiveness, but the majority of local students continue to be educated in universities which are less well funded, more narrow in their curricula, and more restricted in their activities.
In the light of the information presented, it seems unlikely that the GCC states will be able to rely on a broadly based and internationally competitive native workforce. One aspect of this, which Janardhan does not address, is that a new type of division is emerging in Gulf societies. Accession to the WTO, which all the GCC states have now completed, works to the advantage of industries that are internationally competitive, due to their resource base and their energy requirements. Petrochemicals and hydrocarbons are examples of such industries. They have the resource and incentive to employ graduates of elite universities and colleges, locally and internationally. Personnel in these industries will, and to some extent already do, constitute an internationally aware and internationally competitive elite whose salaries will reflect their scarcity value and their critical roles in their industries’ global expansion. These industries will be able to satisfy government-imposed regulations on labour localization, because they have the resources to attract such local expertise as is internationally competitive. Accession, however, creates new problems for industries that do not share the same competitive advantage. Faced with demands that they localize a percentage of their workforce, they can only attract the less able graduates. The prospects for the survival of such industries are not bright. To some extent this is part of a wider global trend, but its impact is likely to be particularly acute in the Gulf due to the growing discrepancies in attainment and skill levels of those emerging from higher education, and the requirements for locals to be employed at salary-levels that do not reflect international competitiveness.
Fourth, the labour market. Concern over the size of the expatriate labour workforce has, of course, been strong over a prolonged period. Most of the Gulf states’ development plans over the past 30 years in the Gulf have envisaged the localization of employment and the reduction in numbers of foreign labour. In practice, the opposite has happened, at least with regard to the latter. Locals have generally increased their participation in the labour force, but expatriate numbers have increased yet more. Few of the measures which have been introduced to limit or reduce foreign labour affected the overall figures, although some measures have reduced foreign labour in specific sectors. The new element which has come into this dynamic in recent years stems from the accession of the GCC states to the WTO. The opening up of markets to the global economy has, as indicated earlier, intensified the need for business to recruit the most competitively priced and efficient labour. Foreign labour, acquired on the international market, satisfies this requirement more easily than local labour. One solution would be to strengthen the whole range of welfare state provisions for GCC nationals, making it possible for the latter to accept lower salaries. Janardhan’s view, however, is that GCC states would do better to rid themselves of ‘defensive demographic strategies’, see the demographic variables as factors that can enhance the region’s coherent development, and accept the rational consequences of the integration of the GCC economies into the global economy.
Janardhan turns, fifth, to foreign policy. His emphasis here is on the new diplomatic roles the GCC states are now playing. He sees this as evidence of growing self-confidence. The governments are no longer willing to be identified internationally as oil-rich but politically weak, marginal not only to major global issues but even to conflicts within their own region. Buttressed by the increased economic power they now possess, Janardhan contends, the GCC are ‘reinventing themselves as more significant players in the regional and international arena’.
There is certainly considerable evidence to support these contentions. Qatar, in particular, has been active in mediating between Lebanese political groups so as resolve that country’s ongoing conflicts, hosting talks between the Sudanese government and the Darfuri insurgent movements, negotiating for aid and assistance to reach Gaza, maintaining effective channels of communication with Iran etc. The UAE and its component emirates have encouraged global bodies of various kinds to base themselves in the country. Saudi Arabia has taken a lead in forging new relationships in Asia.
Janardhan rightly points to the importance of the expanded resource base in underpinning and prompting these new initiatives and directions. They must also, however, be viewed within a wider geopolitical context. The credibility of the established external power-brokers, the major Western powers, has been in decline since 2001. The causes of the declining credibility have been various. GCC governments reacted badly to US reactions to 9/11: the attribution of blame to GCC governments (Saudi Arabia’s in particular) for ‘creating the conditions which made 9/11 possible’. The pressures exerted after that for political and educational reform were resented as infringements to sovereignty, despite a recognition that reform was needed. In their initiation of the 2003 war, the United States and Britain were seen by many Gulf elites as displaying a cavalier attitude to international law. The conduct and outcome of the war seemed to demonstrate further failings: an inability to foresee the likely consequences of military action, and a lack of capability to control the course of events. Western policies had substantially increased the reach of Iranian power in the region. The Palestine issue also loomed large in the catalogue of grievances. Having failed to respond effectively to the Arab peace plan (crafted in its original form by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 2002), the United States and its allies were seen as pursuing a peace process (the Quartet’s Road Map for Peace) which was increasingly illusory. It was not backed by the pressure needed to halt Israeli settlement-building, let alone to initiate a process geared to the dismantlement of settlements. Nor did the European Union appear as a viable alternative to the United States: it was complicit in the failure of the peace process, and had failed to act effectively in negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with the GCC. The year 2009 marked the 20th anniversary of the first EU–GCC announcement of a shared intention to conclude an FTA. The desire and ability of GCC states to pursue diplomatic initiatives of their own must be set against this backdrop.
Whether the diplomatic initiatives undertaken by GCC states actually increase the collective diplomatic strength of the GCC states, however, is questionable. Many of the initiatives reflect the rivalries between Gulf states rather than a shared determination to project themselves effectively on the international stage. Key elements in Qatar’s distinctive foreign policy, for example, are the maintenance of collaborative relations with Iran, support for Hizbollah in Lebanon, the conclusion of a Free Trade Area agreement with the United States (apparently inconsistent with Qatar’s obligations under the GCC common market), and permission for Israel to open a trade office in Doha (an agreement which was subsequently frozen, in protest against Israel’s assault on Gaza in early 2009). The one element that all of these policies have in common is their dissonance with the international positions espoused by Saudi Arabia. Given that Saudi Arabia is the only one of the GCC states with sufficient international weight to play a role on the global stage, it could be argued that the Qatari initiatives are diminishing rather than enhancing the role of GCC states in global affairs.
It is also worth recalling that the Arab states of the Gulf have, at times in the past, played significant roles in regional and global politics. In the late 1960s and the 1970s, Saudi Arabia helped to shape the parameters within which the Palestine issue was handled. This occurred through direct pressure on the Western world (in particular through the oil boycott imposed in 1973–4), and by means of worldwide diplomatic initiatives. Such initiatives led, for example, to the majority of African countries severing their ties with Israel in the mid-1970s. Close coordination between the Arab states of the Gulf and other Arab states underpinned these initiatives. An active diplomacy is, therefore, not new to GCC states. It is the extent of the intra-regional mediatory activity which is new.
Sixth, Janardhan explores the development of Gulf–Asia ties, and the possibility of fundamental changes to the security architecture of the Gulf region. The importance of the Gulf–Asia relationship has come into sharp focus since 2003. The realization has spread that the substantial and steady rise in oil prices is not the result of random fluctuations in the oil market. Rather, it reflects a long-term change in the balance in the supply and demand for oil, much of which stems from the rapid industrialization of Asia. Asia, then, has created the dynamic for the steady growth in revenues reaching the Gulf states, and its own further development is dependent on increasing imports of Gulf oil. The quantities of oil needed are such that supplies from elsewhere could never be sufficient. The interweaving of common and shared interests is enhanced further by trade and investment in the petrochemicals sector. As Janardhan suggests, mutual economic dependence is bound to raise issues of strategic cooperation. The strengthening of Gulf–Asia mutual dependence, moreover, is happening at a critical time. As has been contended earlier, the Western powers no longer appear as credible as they once did, in terms of providing critical and uncomplicated strategic support. The possibility of a major shift in the dynamics of the Gulf ’s security architecture arises.
Much of the informed discussion of the Gulf–Asia relationship in recent years has focused on the growing symbiosis between the Gulf states and China. Janardhan recognizes the importance of this, but also stresses the significance of India’s broad and multi-faceted relationship with the GCC states. The range of the mutualities that connect India with the Gulf is wide: prolonged and intimate historical contact; a record of trading with each that goes back centuries; population movements both at the elite and labouring levels; some shared cultural traits; and complementary economic needs, especially in the trading of oil and petrochemicals. Indian companies have emerged as major contractors in the Gulf. To all this is now added a strategic dimension: a rapidly developing Indian naval capability in the Indian Ocean. Nor is it only a question of China and India. Many other newly industrializing Asian countries are developing a strong presence in the Gulf, complementing the GCC states’ longer-established links with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.
Janardhan is surely right in seeing these relationships as of key importance for the future. Some possible limitations to the development of these relationships, however, should also be noted. Sharp divisions remain among the countries of the Gulf, especially between the three major players: Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. For as long as such tensions exist, Gulf states will be tempted to seek external support. In the short- and medium-terms the United States has the greatest capability to provide the weaponry and military backup that a state perceiving itself to be vulnerable might require. The United States, moreover, controls many of the key sea lanes on which both oil producers and oil consumers depend. The Asian governments themselves are conscious of their own dependence in this regard, and have shown themselves reluctant to take actions perceived as threatening to the US presence in the Gulf. This dynamic would only change if there is a fundamental shift in the character of intra-Gulf relations – creating a regional security architecture where the Gulf states can resolve differences locally. The confidence built up by such a shift would make an external strategic presence unnecessary. The ability of Asian countries to strengthen their political presence in the GCC states, then, is partially dependent on the creation of more stable, peaceful and conciliatory relationships among the latter. It is in their interest to promote such relationships, and some of them are in aposition to do so. China, for example, is the only great power that enjoys good relations with all of the three major Gulf states. It may in the future find opportunities to use these good relations to foster negotiated agreements on potentially conflictual issues.
Seventh, environmental concerns. This is a field where the GCC states are usually portrayed negatively. Their economies produce much of the oil and gas whose use provides the catalyst for climate change. As Janardhan points out, the Gulf states are responsible for some 30 per cent of the world’s oil output, and control some 40 per cent of the world’s proven gas reserves. The blame for climate change clearly lies primarily with consumers rather than producers, but the association remains in the minds of some observers. At times, Gulf governments have borne some responsibility for this association, given that some have cast doubt on the causes and reality of global warming. That, however, is no longer a significant issue today. A further factor behind the negative image is the high per capita carbon imprint in the GCC countries – one of the highest in the world. More broadly in the environmental field, many of the developments along the Gulf coast have been undertaken with limited knowledge or concern as to how they will affect the wider marine and desert environments.
Yet, there is also a strong trend in the GCC states (some more than others) to develop environmentally friendly projects. These include Masdar City in the UAE, which aims to be the first city in the world with zero carbon emissions. There are also investments taking place in solar energy. In the latter, the GCC states have a strong basis on which to build: guaranteed sunshine for large parts of the year, plenty of open space not currently in economic or housing use, and ample financial resources to support the costly initial stages of solar energy projects.
Janardhan’s book, therefore, breaks important new ground. It raises issues that are important to address, whether or not one agrees with its specific contentions. The book should initiate and shape debate, and this is what is needed at the moment. Debate and discussion is vital both among the local populations themselves, whose future is directly at stake, and among those external to the region. All must recognize how the GCC states will impinge on, and help to fashion, the new global order that is emerging.
1 Political Reforms: Thinking Out of the Box
This changing perception was most prominently articulated by General Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, UAE vicepresident, and prime minister and Ruler of Dubai:
If you do not change, you will be changed … If you do not initiate radical changes, responsibly discharge your duties and uphold the principles of truth, justice and responsibility, your people will resent you. More than this, the verdict of history on you will be severe.1
While there is acknowledgement in all quarters of the need to undertake reforms, the differences, as ever, are related to the nature and extent of these reforms, as well as the role of external forces as an agent for change. Opinions converge, however, in intellectuals and common people alike emphasizing the need for a culture- and region-specific model for democratic reform in the region, while strongly rejecting the imposition of Western diktats.
When Washington announced its first plans after the events of 9/11 in 2001 to push for democratization in the Arab world, the regimes and people reacted with anger and scepticism at one level, while becoming cautiously optimistic on another. Perhaps the greatest cause for initial scepticism was that the George W. Bush administration announced its intention to create the Greater Middle East Initiative – with democratization as its core objective – without first consulting the countries at the receiving end. This meant that even those who thought the US idea was good and could help in the region’s overall development, questioned how one country could push for democracy when Arabs themselves were not part of the consultation process.
The reaction to the US-led invasion of Iraq, and the inability of the United States to make headway in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli violence, were two other reasons for the scepticism regarding the American policy. In particular, having watched the chaos and anarchy that followed the invasion of Iraq – an invasion premised partly on democracy promotion – many in the region associated the American policy with catastrophe.
Two prominent reactions emerged from the Gulf region. First, the official stance, endorsed by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, that reforms have to come from within rather than be imposed from outside. In contrast, Qatar’s position was that rejecting the US idea without considering what is on offer is unwise.
Both views have their own merits and demerits, which leads to the equation ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’. If the region undertook extensive reforms, it would be seen as succumbing to outside pressure; if it did not, it would be interpreted as meaning that reforms are not on their agenda. In reality, neither is true.
It is often questioned why the US should insist on ‘compliance’ from the regional governments in the name of ‘solidarity’, because solidarity does not hinge on agreeing to all the views tabled by Washington. A common refrain is: ‘What may be good for the United States may not necessarily be healthy for the region.’
This is where the problem lies. There appears to be either ignorance or apathy on the part of the West when it comes to understanding that there is no ‘one-size fits all’ policy for the region. In a region that attaches the highest degree of importance to religion, Western reform models cannot supplant traditional systems. Development and change in the region must be a mixed bag of tradition and modernity, one that is compatible with local identity and specificities. Reforms must accommodate the agendas of the conservatives and reformists in an amicable fashion.
Reform debate There are three divergent opinions prevalent in the region over the role of foreign pressure in the reform process: (1) rejecting external intervention altogether; (2) considering foreign pressure crucial because non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are weak; and (3) being open to dialogue with others.
Those arguing that foreign pressure will never bring change suggest that democracy and ideas of good governance can never be enforced. Instead, they favour domestic proponents persuading regimes that democracy and the rule of law will yield tangible benefits for them.
The second school of thought believes that both state and non-state factors are crucial in change and that governments must be influenced from inside and outside for effective reforms. At the same time, they suggest that the state is absolutely necessary and NGOs cannot serve as a substitute.
The third group believes that external pressure is crucial because civil society organizations are weak. However, they believe that the post-9/11 pressure for reforms from the West has been unsuccessful because it was played out in an environment of mutual suspicion, which made the masses construe the proposals as unrealistic, unpopular and tainted. Instead, they feel pressure should be exerted on the regimes from international organizations. They encourage democratization by creating a forum for multilateral dialogue, which can create an atmosphere of mutual trust, and then start demanding transparency in all governmental spheres.2
Still others urge that reforms should target the social sector first in order to build the right platform for political changes. Paramount on this list is education, which could also serve as an economic tool in generating employment and shaping overall development. Internally, they prescribe a modernization policy to combat social problems such as poverty and illiteracy, while activating the role of civic society organizations and embarking on a path towards democratization. This group believes that reform of ‘high’ politics, including elections, is not what the region needs at this stage. Instead, they emphasize ‘soft’ reforms. They feel that initiating domestic reform and ensuring equitable distribution of economic benefits would enhance the legitimacy of the regimes even more. But the fact is that democracy is not a priority in the Gulf region because most people are not exposed to severe economic problems.
Among the external factors that are usually cited as obstructing reforms are lack of a solution to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, instability in Iraq, threat perception from Iran, and terrorism. More importantly, while many feel that 9/11 was a factor in bringing the issue of political reforms to the fore, they also argue that it is not the only catalyst for change. In fact, Washington’s ambiguous policies and its credibility gap have proved to be more of a stumbling block. As a result, it is argued that reforms will ultimately take place in the region despite, and not because of, the United States.
Like the rest of the Arab world, the Gulf region had also linked democratic and economic growth to the resolution of the Palestinian– Israeli conflict. While the call for a comprehensive, permanent and lasting peace endures, increasing emphasis on economic growth and the emergence of more recent crises – Iraq and the Iranian nuclear row – have led to looking beyond this link.
In another development, after ringing in elections in many countries in the Arab world, the Kifaya– Arabic for enough – mantra resounded in the Gulf region too. The media continues to feature bold articles that express ‘the ambition of every citizen to have a say in the working of government, either as an elected official or as a voter’. And leading academics argue that when millions of Arabs in Palestine and Iraq exercised their right to vote, why should the whole region hesitate to tread a similar course.3
Moderating influence One of the positives emerging out of the 9/11 events was the opening up of the peoples’ mindset in the region on religious issues. A limited, yet new, process of introspection into extremism and a willingness to accommodate moderate views emerged. Nevertheless, if absolutely free elections were to be held in the region today, there is little doubt that Islamists would gain the most votes, as seen in Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.
In the absence of legal political organizations, mosques continue to serve as the rallying point for political developments. Islamists have used post-9/11 US-led efforts to counter terror in the region to their advantage. Aiding in the process are incidents associated with Guantanamo Bay and US policies in Iraq, especially the prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib, among others.
Notwithstanding these factors, in the long run, Islamists cannot be checked so long as the correlation between the state and religion persists. The problem, however, is that it is hard to conceive the idea of their separation in Islam. The political gains by Islamists indicate their organizational capability and popularity. In a society dominated by religion, undermining their rise to power or not giving them due recognition would be construed as perpetration of ‘established’ animosity towards Islam in general rather than to a faction within it.
The best way out, perhaps, is to engage the Islamists. Attempts to moderate them may have better prospects when they are in power than when they are in opposition. It is likely that, once they are in power, international attention and the burden of ‘delivering’ rather than pursuing ‘rhetoric’ would force the Islamists to gradually moderate themselves.4
The region has insisted that it has certain religious and social particularities that should not be risked by secularism or Western-style democracy. The challenge is to devise a mechanism to convey that secularism is flexible and that the region can embrace it in its political, economic and educational systems without endangering the social and religious fabric of society.
Economic over political reform Due to unprecedented economic growth – primarily due to high oil prices and economic diversification – political modernization efforts have been measured. It is increasingly being argued that expanding political participation, not democracy, is a better option for a society that is an extended part of a region wracked by chaos.
At this crossroad, the region is treading a path that runs contrary to the established norm of political reform being a precondition for any meaningful economic development. Amid continued regional instability, economic development has coincided with leadership change in all of the GCC countries, except Oman, since 1995. The political transition has been well cushioned by economic openness and the resultant growth, which has led the respective governments to prioritize economic over political reform. Thus, the Gulf countries have seriously challenged the conclusions of the 2004Arab Human Development Report, which argued that ‘the quest for bread before freedom has practically meant that most Arabs have risked losing out on both’.
While analysing the Gulf trend, it could be argued that economic reform is intended as a calculated way of deferring political reform. By giving people a sense of a better life and giving them a stake in the economic pie, it is assumed that they may not be as eager to demand radical political change. This also meets the expectations of those who believe in ‘soft’ over ‘hard’ reforms, because economic reform and ensuring equitable distribution of benefits would foster the legitimacy of the regimes and help cement political and social stability.
The emphasis on economic reform could also be rationalized from the point of view of rapid population growth in the region. Absorbing the political consequences of such a population expansion is difficult without the benefits of economic reforms trickling down to the grassroots level. The key problems afflicting the societies in the region are: first, a deficit of social freedom; second, lack of opportunities for women; and third, a knowledge gap with the rest of the world. The understanding, therefore, is that democracy can wait, as it did in a few countries in Asia like Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, some of which are vibrant democracies now; Gulf cities like Dubai may not have been able to achieve economic progress in a politically reformed milieu.
It is also noteworthy that, unlike in the past, economic and political reforms are finding favour even during periods of high oil prices. While it could be argued at one level that economic progress might be an impediment to political development, it could also be argued that democracy requires certain conditions, such as a market economy, and economic development could help create a new middle class in the region, which could become the vanguard of future political development.
However, the success of GCC countries pursuing an ‘economic reforms first’ approach over political modernization will be sustainable in the long term only if the reform process acquires a more comprehensive flavour to include social and political changes as well. Development, therefore, should be seen as an accumulative and complementary process, involving economic and political liberalization, but with one taking precedence over the other in the long run, depending on the need of the hour.
True to this approach, there is now a realization that a politically unreformed system, having set the pace for economic change, would find it difficult to sustain rapid transformation in the long term.
Ground realities Amid all these debates and perceptions, there is enough evidence on the ground to suggest that the region has begun to tread the path of economic and political modernization, arising out of domestic compulsions. For the West to tamper with this course and pace would amount to ‘Westernization’ and ‘interference’, which would derail a process that has not been easy to initiate or win acceptance in these traditional societies.5
Although political parties are unlikely to make their entry in the Gulf region, Bahrain and Kuwait now conduct parliamentary elections that have qualitatively, quantitatively and gradually expanded the participation of both the political actors and electorate. In the midst of a national debate, Saudi Arabia witnessed the first municipal elections in 2005. Oman allowed all citizens above the age of 21 years to vote in the consultative council elections in October 2003, and though Qatar is yet to hold elections that were first hinted at in 2003, even tentatively scheduled for 2007, it has reiterated that two-thirds of its parliament members will be elected when polls are eventually held. Finally, the limited and indirect experimental election of half the members of the Federal National Council in the UAE in December 2006 completed recent attempts at restricted, but progressive, political developments in the region.
Bahrain – small country, big reforms In Bahrain, the announcement of political reforms that had been in the making for decades was not just an attempt to modernize itself but also a chance to heal sectarian rifts that had nearly spelt its doom. Setting the stage for political reforms, the State of Bahrain became a kingdom in 2002 after a proclamation by King Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa, hitherto emir of the Gulf island state. The decree provided for the restoration of the parliament and the transformation of the country into a constitutional monarchy, with municipal elections and legislative elections to be held the same year.
Bahrain’s first elected parliament was dissolved in 1975, leading to civil unrest. It was replaced with aShuraCouncil appointed by the emir, which advises him on the affairs of the country. The new announcements represented a significant step forward for political and economic reform, including plans for achieving broader political participation and women’s rights. Such was the optimism that the promised reforms would materialize sooner or later that Bahrainis began to express their aspirations by giving fashionable names to babies; for example, Mithaq, meaning ‘charter’.
In 2001, Bahrain’s National Charter restored the 1973 Constitution, which was suspended in 1975, promised wide-ranging reforms, including an independent judiciary and women’s access to representative democracy. The political reform announcement was timed to coincide with the first anniversary of the endorsement by popular referendum of the charter, which secured a 98 per cent mandate.6
The October 2002 elections, the first in 27 years, served as a safety valve for Bahrain’s internal conflict – an olive branch offered to the Shiite Muslims, whose frustration boiled over into riots, bombings and arson attacks in the mid-1990s, and hundreds of activists were suppressed and jailed. After taking over from his father in 1999, Sheikh Hamad released many political prisoners and abolished emergency laws in 2001 as a goodwill gesture, thereby setting the tone for reforms and rapprochement. The reinstatement of the parliament was a key demand of the Shiites. And it was hoped that, in future, sectarian problems could be resolved through democratic channels.7
However, the polls were boycotted by four Shiite political associations – including the Islamic National Wefaq Society and the National Democratic Action Society – to protest against granting the ‘appointed’ Consultative Council equal powers with the ‘elected’ House of Deputies. This provision, they claimed, made elected representatives powerless. The boycott naturally affected the voter turnout. Only 53.2 per cent of the 243,500 eligible voters cast their ballot. And, like in the municipal elections, which witnessed a 51 per cent turnout, candidates backed by Islamist groups performed impressively in the parliamentary elections.
While the newfound political freedom contributed to acrimonious – and often unproductive – parliamentary sessions, it gave all Bahrainis – including the opposition groups – good exposure to representative politics and did not deter the government from conducting the kingdom’s second parliamentary elections in 2006. In particular, the participation of Shiite opposition societies in these polls was a sign of maturing democracy.
In a highly sect-sensitive assembly, the Al Wefaq National Islamic Society – leader of four opposition societies – won 17 of the 40 seats and the support of a Shiite independent. The Sunni bloc, made up of Al Menbar – the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood – won seven seats, and the Salafi Al Asala Society captured five. The conservative Sunni coalition supported the ten winning Sunni independents in a bid to counter Al Wefaq, thus depriving the party of a simple majority in parliament.8And the good showing by independents meant that the leftist National Democratic Action Society (Waad) remained unrepresented despite the presence of some high-profile candidates.
Two hundred and seventeen candidates contested the elections, which recorded a 73 per cent turnout during the first round – an 18 per cent jump in turnout compared to the 2002 elections – and 69 per cent in the second. Polling for 11 seats of the Chamber of Deputies and 16 Municipal Council seats was conducted during the second round. The voter turnout in this second round was also 26 per cent higher than the 2002 polls, an indication of increased Shiite participation in both rounds enthused by Al Wefaq’s involvement. The high turnout was also evidence of the group’s organizational skills, religious orientation and its appeal among the masses, as well as of deepening sectarian feelings not only in the kingdom, but in the region too.9
For its part, the government recognized the new reality of the democratic exercise and named a Shiite as one of the three deputy prime ministers for the first time in the history of the kingdom. The fact that Al Wefaq garnered 17 seats was testimony to the fairness of the democratic process, especially after the opposition had accused the government of plotting to rig the vote. The Shiite group also won 18 of the 40 municipal seats, polls for which were held simultaneously.10
Following the ‘grilling’, Sheikh Nasser said: United States. In a televised address, Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani said: Envisaging a greater role for the FNC, President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan said: But the historic election had its share of critics too. It was described as a ‘setback’ because: Lamenting on the state of women’s rights, Saudi activist Fatin Bundagji said: In this context the following factors are worth considering:
