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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Wiley Series in Surface and Interface Science
- Sprache: Englisch
Our democracies repeatedly fail to safeguard the future. From pensions to pandemics, health and social care through to climate, biodiversity and emerging technologies, democracies have been unable to deliver robust policies for the long term. In this book, Graham Smith asks why. Exploring the drivers of short-termism, he considers ways of reshaping legislatures and constitutions and proposes strengthening independent offices whose overarching goals do not change at every election. More radically, Smith argues that forms of participatory and deliberative politics offer the most effective democratic response to the current political myopia, as well as a powerful means of protecting the interests of generations to come.
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Contents
Series title
Title page
Copyright page
Acknowledgements
1 Failing to Deal with the Long Term
The drivers of democratic myopia
Time to ditch democracy?
Conclusion
Notes
2 Reimagining Established Institutions
The legislature
Parliamentary committees
Electoral rules
The constitution
Conclusion
Notes
3 Bringing in an Independent Voice
The Committee for Climate Change
Israel
Hungary
Wales
The promise of OFGs
OFGs and the participation agenda
Conclusion
Notes
4 Deepening Democracy for the Long Term
Designing participation for the long term
The promise of deliberative mini-publics
Critical voices
Pragmatic or radical participatory governance?
Conclusion
Notes
Afterword: Democratic Design for Future Generations
Further Reading
End User License Agreement
Guide
Cover
Contents
1 Failing to Deal with the Long Term
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Series title
Democratic Futures series
Stephen Coleman,
Can the Internet Strengthen Democracy?
Drude Dahlerup,
Has Democracy Failed Women?
Daniel J. Fiorino,
Can Democracy Handle Climate Change?
Donald F. Kettl,
Can Governments Earn Our Trust?
Alasdair Roberts,
Can Government Do Anything Right?
Can Democracy Safeguard the Future?
Graham Smith
polity
Copyright page
Copyright © Graham Smith 2021
The right of Graham Smith to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2021 by Polity Press
Polity Press
65 Bridge Street
Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press
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Suite 300
Medford, MA 02155, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-3924-6
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-3925-3 (pb)
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Typeset in 11 on 15pt Sabon
by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NN
Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon
The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com
Acknowledgements
This book has been a long time coming. Short-term demands have got in the way of its completion. The irony is not lost on me.
The ideas in this book emerged not only from academic conversations, but from political engagement. I am privileged to be the chair of the Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development and have had the pleasure of working with and learning from fellow trustees over a number of years. It does feel as if the policy window is slightly ajar. Whether we are able to force it open is another question. I would like to thank past and present trustees and associates for the inspiring conversations that have helped to develop my ideas. I can also thank future trustees, whoever you are, because the organisation will be necessary in the years to come. Additionally, I have been fortunate enough to work closely with numerous impressive democratic practitioners and activists who, through their actions, have shaped my thinking about the potential for participation and deliberation. I am humbled also by fellow rebels in Extinction Rebellion, who inspire me with their courage and creativity in the face of the climate emergency.
I have presented ideas in this book at numerous academic conferences and workshops. Thanks to everyone who has offered critical reflections. I would like to single out Michael Mackenzie for particular appreciation. Some years back, I had the good fortune to be a visiting scholar at the Ash Center at Harvard University at the same time as Michael. He had recently finished his PhD on future publics – a much revised version of which is soon to be published. Our long and inspiring conversations made me realise that I might have something to say on this topic.
Finally, the greatest source of encouragement has been my family. Susan pushed me to work on the manuscript when other short-term commitments seemed more pressing. She is inspirational and my most supportive and loving critic. I dedicate this book to three wonderful representatives of the world to come: my niece Marianna and my nephews Alex and Matthew. It is their future and the future of those who follow them that is my most significant motivation.
1Failing to Deal with the Long Term
Democracies have a blind spot when it comes to the long term. From issues such as pensions, health and social care, and infrastructure through to climate change, biodiversity, pandemics, and emerging technologies, we find repeated failures to develop robust policies that safeguard the interests of future generations.
Climate change has become the paradigmatic case of short-termism. Over decades, democratic governments have been warned about the long-term impact of climate change and the need to reduce drastically emissions of greenhouse gases and to invest in adaptation. Their response has been painfully slow. In the 2015 Paris Agreement, the world’s governments committed to reducing warming to 2 degrees centigrade above preindustrial levels, with the aim of achieving only 1.5 degrees of warming. The more radical 1.5 degrees ceiling requires net zero emissions across all nations by 2050. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), realising this ambitious goal will entail ‘rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings) and industrial systems’.1 The UK government has led the world in legislating for the net zero target. Yet the Committee on Climate Change, empowered to report regularly on the government’s progress, has questioned its commitment and its capacity to achieve this goal.2 No democratic government has seriously embraced the necessary long-term structural change that achieving net zero requires.
While 1.5 degrees warming will significantly reduce the likelihood of catastrophic impacts of climate change, extreme weather incidents such as flooding and heatwaves, species extinctions and sea-level rise will still increase, threatening livelihoods over decades, particularly for the poor and most vulnerable. The record of democratic governments on capital investments in implementing infrastructure and natural disaster defences is poor, which suggests that the building blocks for more concerted climate adaptation are not in place. Many democracies are plagued by utility distribution systems and transport networks that are near breaking point. Capital spending too often papers over the cracks. The pressure on governments to respond to more frequent natural disasters is rising, whether these be the impact of drought and bush fires on communities in Australia, hurricanes in the United States, more regular and intense flooding in the United Kingdom, or heatwaves in unprepared cities around the world. Democratic governments can often put in place impressive disaster response operations, but the planning and investment that would protect vulnerable communities from the social and economic miseries that natural disasters bring in their wake is too often lacking.
Short-termism is also generating major social policy dilemmas. The ageing populations of our democracies place particular strain on health and pension services designed for previous eras. A focus on acute hospital-based treatment means that preventative services are often underfunded. Children’s services that ameliorate problems early, public health strategies that promote healthy living, and social care services that enable long-term conditions to be managed in communities are starved of money. In the United Kingdom, governments have continually avoided dealing with the social care crisis. Official report after official report has been published, but politicians are unwilling to act. At the same time, political parties compete over how much they will invest in the health service – never enough to keep up with the increasing demand caused by the lack of preventative action in other policy domains. Austerity cuts reinforce these false economies, placing further strain on acute care in hospitals. As the Health Foundation argues, ‘[a] failure to take a long-term view of the value of investments that promote and maintain people’s health means that recent trends in government spending are storing up problems for the future’.3
The recent COVID-19 epidemic is a final example that highlights how a lack of long-term thinking can have negative systemic impact. The failure of many democracies to plan effectively for pandemics increased the death toll and put health and social care services under intense stress. Democracies have been forewarned. Building on previous intelligence assessments, the US Director of National Intelligence stated a year before the outbreak that ‘the United States and the world will remain vulnerable to the next flu pandemic or large-scale outbreak of a contagious disease that could lead to massive rates of death and disability, severely affect the world economy, strain international resources, and increase calls on the United States for support’.4 Similarly, the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board – an independent monitoring and advisory body convened by the World Bank Group and the World Health Organization – warned in 2019 that trends such as global air travel and climate change significantly increase the risk of a pandemic. The report lays out plainly the imperative to build strong, coordinated, and well-financed response systems.5
A clear theme emerges. Inadequate policy responses to climate change, infrastructure, health, and pandemics are just four examples of ‘democratic myopia’ – the tendency towards short-term thinking in democratic decision-making. We could reflect equally on the failure to consider burdens placed on the future in areas of policy as disparate as pensions, housing, education, and nuclear waste and in emerging technologies such as nanotechnology and artificial intelligence.6
These various policy challenges share similar characteristics: they entail immediate costs designed to ensure long-term gains. In more traditional areas such as health and pensions, some gains will be felt immediately by those directly affected by the policy change. Other areas, such as education and infrastructure, can take more time to realise benefits. The temporal characteristics of climate change are particularly challenging. Any effective response requires that extensive costs be borne by current generations, so that generations yet unborn may benefit. The time lag between action and its consequences means that current generations will not witness the fruit of their endeavours.
In all policy areas, not acting stores up problems for the long term. From a purely economic perspective, it is generally more efficient to act now than in the future. The Bank of England has estimated that between $4 and $20 trillion assets could be wiped out if the climate emergency is not tackled.7 The much lauded Stern review The Economics of Climate Change, commissioned by the UK government in 2006, provides clear and unambiguous evidence that the benefits of strong, early mitigation considerably outweigh the costs of not acting.8 The review estimates that unabated climate change will cost 5 per cent of global GDP each year (more dramatic predictions run as high as 20 per cent). In comparison, the cost of reducing emissions would account for only 1 per cent of global GDP. A similar story can be told for natural disasters. Estimates from the United States suggest that every $1 spent on preparedness is equivalent to about $15 of the future damage it mitigates.9
Long-term challenges are not simply technical problems to be solved by experts. They generate significant ethical conundrums. Political decisions need to be made about who gains and who loses. Policy options have differential effects within and across generations. A common tendency is to view future generations and their interests in aggregate. For example, different policy responses to the climate emergency will place varying burdens on current, near future, and far future generations. This assumes that different generations have their own collective interests. Such an assumption is deeply problematic. As Simon Caney argues, it ‘tolerates outcomes in which some lead appalling lives’.10 It fails to recognise that, within future generations (just as in our own), significant imbalances of power will exist, with different vulnerabilities to policy impacts across social groups. National income statistics such as GDP aggregate costs and benefits, hiding significant differences in well-being within and across the current generations. The economic pie may get bigger, but the slice available to the poorest may be getting smaller. Increases in GDP can mask accelerating inequalities. The same will be true for future generations, if we consider them in aggregate. Policy choices have distributional effects, creating and reinforcing differentials in social and economic power and vulnerabilities within and between future generations. The IPCC provides clear evidence that current decisions on the mitigation of greenhouse gases will affect the number and location of people vulnerable to sea-level rise, heatwaves, and food shortages. Our decisions about adaptation strategies entail political choices about what social groups in what locations and in what generations to favour. Technical expertise takes us only so far. Political judgements have to be made about the relative weight that should be given to the interests of different social groups across space and time.
The drivers of democratic myopia
Contemporary democracies are not fit to make political judgements that deal fairly and effectively with the long term. Why does democratic governance seem unable to deliver consistently over time? What is it about democratic institutions that drives myopic, short-term policymaking? Why are the long-term challenges in the ‘too difficult’ box?
The explanation is multifaceted. At least four characteristics of democratic systems engender democratic myopia: the absence of future generations; the electoral cycle; entrenched interests; and the broader capitalist system.11 I will consider the effect of each of these characteristics in turn. While my focus here is primarily on the nation state, these drivers affect decision-making at higher and lower levels of governance.
