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The logics and ethics of neoliberal capitalism dominate public discourses and politics in the early twenty-first century. They morally endorse and institutionalize forms of competitive self-interest that jettison social justice values, and are deeply antithetical to love, care and solidarity. But capitalism is neither invincible nor inevitable. While people are self-interested, they are not purely self-interested: they are bound affectively and morally to others, even to unknown others. The cares, loves and solidarity relationships within which people are engaged give them direction and purpose in their daily lives. They constitute cultural residuals of hope that stand ready to move humanity beyond a narrow capitalism-centric set of values. In this instructive and inspiring book, Kathleen Lynch sets out to reclaim the language of love, care and solidarity both intellectually and politically and to place it at the heart of contemporary discourse. Her goal is to help unseat capital at the gravitational centre of meaning-making and value, thereby helping to create logics and ethical priorities for politics that are led by care, love and solidarity.
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Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Neoliberal Capitalism
Creating a Care-Centric Narrative
Building on the Work of Mothers and Others
The Text
Notes
1 Care and Capitalism: Matters of Social Justice and Resistance
Neglect of Affective Relations
Ontological impediments to recognizing affective relations
Affective Equality
Neoliberal Capitalism, Inequality and Care
The anti-care culture of neoliberal politics
Domination and carelessness: pre-capitalist antecedents
Ideological matters
Conclusion: Contradictions, Residuals and Resistances
Affective relations of love, care and solidarity: unincorporated residuals
Notes
Part I Care Matters Inside and Outside Capitalism
2 Care as Abject: Capitalism, Masculinity, Bureaucracy, Class and Race
Patriarchy and Capitalism Interface
Racialized care
Patriarchy: historical considerations
The role of ideas in legitimating subordination
Hegemonic masculinity
Men Leading Capitalism
The material dividend of patriarchy
The gender order of caring in families
Bureaucracy, Hierarchy and the State
Women in Bureaucratic Organizations
Being a Man
Care as Abject
Denigration of care and domestic labour
Abjection and capitalism
Conclusion
Notes
3 Making Love: Love Labour as Distinctive and Non-Commodifiable
Introduction
Love as Other in the Academy
Making Love Commercial
Love in the Context of Care
Love Labouring as Distinctive
The professional love dimension of secondary care relations
Why Love Matters and Is Not Commodifiable
Conclusion
Notes
4 Time to Care
On Time
Hands-On Care as Process and Practice: A View from Primary Care Studies
Care, time and values
The time it takes
Bureaucracy, Time and Care
Capitalism and Time
Capitalism and Speed
Neoliberal Capitalism and Care Time
Speeding Up Care
Technology and Care Time
Assistive Technologies of Care
Mining Care Data for Profit: Affective Computing
Migration and the Geographies of Time for Care
Conclusion
Notes
Part II Challenges
5 Liberalism, Care and Neoliberalism
Methodological Individualism
The Limits of Liberalism Reformism
Groups and Group Identities
Liberalism Accepting Structural Inequalities
Intersectionality of Inequalities: Why They Matter for Care
Processes of acquiring social goods as sites of injustice
The Public, the Private and the Politics of Care
Conclusion
Notes
6 Individualism and Capitalism: From Personalized Salvation to Human Capitals
Individualism in Historical Context
Individualism in Europe
Individualism within the European Christian Tradition
The Individual as Human Capital
Capital’s mobile individual
The Political Imaginary of Homo Economicus in Education
Care-Free and Technologically Assisted
The Independent Citizen
The Care Contradictions of Capitalism
Conclusion
Notes
7 Care-Harming Ideologies of Capitalism: Competition, Measurement and Meritocratic Myths
Ideology
Comparing and Ordering
Competition
Judgement and harm
Competition: the moral and psychic impact
Numbering enabling competition
Metrics Undermining Care, an Immeasurable
Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy
Creating a culture of arrogance and blame
Conclusion
Notes
Part III Violence – the Nemesis of Care
8 The Violation of Non-Human Animals
Violation
The Anthropocentrism of Language
Care of Non-Human Animals and Social Justice
Distributive Justice, Missing Animals
Ethicists, Welfarists and Animal Rights
Moral Indifference to Violence against Non-Human Animals
Guilt
Capitalism and the Abuse of Animals
Conclusion: Learning Not to Care for Non-Human Animals
Notes
9 Violence and Capitalism
Violence, Care and the Separation of Spheres
Forms of Violence
Violating the Impoverished
Capitalism and Violence
The Violence of Allowing People to Die
The State and Violence
Capitalism Building on Other Injustices: Race and Violence
Capitalism and Gender-Based Violence
Sex industry violence
Conclusion
Notes
Part IV Conclusions
10 Resisting Intellectually, Politically, Culturally and Educationally
The Contradictions of Care and Capitalism
Capitalism’s Internal Contradictions
Resisting Capitalism
Affective Relational Resistances and Refusals
Education and Resistance to Capitalism
Notes
Postscript: Care Lessons from the Covid-19 Pandemic
Privileged Ignorance
Touch, Presence and the Limits of Technology
Death in Care Homes: Questions on the Corporatization of Care
The Pandemic: A Care- and Rights-Based Perspective on Justice
Notes
References
Index
End User License Agreement
Chapter 3
Table 1
Affective relations of love, care and solidarity
Chapter 5
Table 2
Forms of in/equality and the intersectionality of affective and other inequaliti...
Chapter 1
Figure 1
Affective relations: love, care and solidarity
Cover
Table of Contents
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Kathleen Lynch
polity
Copyright © Kathleen Lynch 2022
The right of Kathleen Lynch to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2022 by Polity Press
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Care and Capitalism is dedicated to all those who work and struggle to promote a more loving, caring and socially just world, and to the memory of my mother, Molly Neylon-Lynch, who loved and cared for so many throughout her long life of 104 years.
Financial support from the Irish Research Council (IRC) Advanced Research Project Grant (Advanced RPG) (RPG2013-2) to research Equality of Opportunity in Practice: Studies in Working, Learning and Caring provided me with the opportunity to write this book. I am deeply grateful to the IRC for what Bourdieu termed ‘the freedom from necessity to write’.
I also want to express my appreciation to the many universities that invited me to speak on affective equality and social justice in recent years, as these visits both enriched and challenged my thinking: the Autonomous University of Barcelona, City University of New York, Glasgow Caledonian University, the WISE Centre for Economic Justice, the Havens-Wright Center, University of Wisconsin Madison, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Universities of Linköping and Örebro, Sweden, University of Melbourne, University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece, University of Oulu, Finland, University of Oxford, UK, Peking University, Beijing, and University of Siegen, Germany.
The deep concern and frustration that I have seen, felt and documented through research on classed/raced/ableist and other inequalities in education over several decades (in The Hidden Curriculum, 1989, Equality in Education, 1999, and with Anne Lodge in Equality and Power in Schools, 2002), and on the gendering of injustices under neoliberalism (with Bernie Grummell and Dympna Devine in New Managerialism in Education: Commercialization, Carelessness and Gender, 2012), demanded that I write about the injustices and carelessness of neoliberalism in greater depth, and in ways that not only examined its harms but identified ways of challenging them.
The book builds on earlier work with John Baker, Sara Cantillon and Judy Walsh in Equality: From Theory to Action (2004) and particularly in Affective Equality (2009). When Affective Equality: Love, Care and Injustice was published first in English in 2009, it generated an unexpected level of interest. It was translated into Spanish in 2014, and into Korean by Prof. Dr Soon-Won Kang of Hanshin University in 2017. It seemed to speak to people’s need to talk and read about things that mattered to them in their everyday lives, and how institutions and structures often impeded them in their love, care and solidarity work. I wanted to re-engage with the many issues that Affective Equality raised, in terms of understanding inequality and social injustice, and the politics of social change.
The encouragement and support I received from several colleagues in University College Dublin were also very important to me. I would like to thank the staff in the UCD School of Education, and especially Dympna Devine, for their ongoing support. I am really appreciative of the support of recent doctoral colleagues, Luciana Lolich, Majella Mulkeen, Meabh Savage and Dorothy Conaghan, who were pursuing studies in related fields, and of inspiring postdoctoral fellows with whom I worked when writing, John Bissett, Maria Ivancheva, Manolis Kalaitzake and Monica O’Connor. Thank you all for engaging conversations and comments at seminars, and chats over coffee and tea.
Sara Cantillon, Professor of Gender and Economics at the GCU Glasgow School for Business and Society and Director of the Centre for Economic Justice, was one of the first people who encouraged me to write a book on care and capitalism. I am deeply grateful for her support throughout. Mags Crean, UCD postdoctoral scholar, social justice activist, and sociologist in the School of Education, offered ongoing guidance, inspiration and critical feedback while I was writing the book; during the isolation of Covid-19 lockdown her support was invaluable. So indeed was that of other activist-scholars, especially John Bissett, Cathleen O’Neill and Ebun Joseph.
I could not have written the book without the belief and support of John, my beloved; as always, his hands-on love and care, his wit and sense of humour kept me going during hard times. The engagement, kindness and thoughtfulness of our children, Nóra and John, and their partners, Stephen and Rose, were of greater importance than they may have known. I also appreciated the quiet encouragement of my many friends, and of my sisters and brother throughout. I am especially grateful to my sister Ann for the time and attention she gave to proofing the text at the pre-submission stage.
Many thanks too to the staff at Polity Press, and especially to Jonathan Skerrett, Senior Commissioning Editor in Sociology, Health and Social Care, for believing in the concept of the book. His courtesy, encouragement and professionalism throughout were more than I could have hoped for. I also greatly appreciated the time and attention Karina Jákupsdóttir, Assistant Editor, gave to the work during different phases of writing and planning. The copy-editing undertaken by Fiona Sewell was invaluable. I am extremely grateful for her meticulous work, and the amount of time and consideration she devoted to the text.
Although written in my name, this book is owned by the many people who have contributed to it, the scholars from different disciplines from whom I learned so much, the many people who contributed to the empirical research that underpins it, the people whose names I do not know whom I met at so many different public lectures and conferences who challenged and encouraged me, and last but by no means least, the community groups and students, inside and outside the university, from whom I learned so much.
Capitalism is the dominant political-economic system of the twenty-first century (Streeck 2016): profit-oriented companies own and control most of the world’s productive resources and capacities (Block 2018). The human cost of the concentration of wealth among so few is unsustainable (Oxfam 2021),1 something that became even more evident during the Covid-19 pandemic that took hold in 2020.2
Although capitalism has varied in character over time and place, from merchant to industrial to neoliberal, the fundamental principles governing its operation remain constant (Patel and Moore 2018). It institutionalizes and legitimates class-based economic inequalities, frequently in deeply racialized and gendered ways. It builds on and consolidates pre-existing hierarchical, patriarchal and racial divisions of wealth and power, thereby producing and reproducing eliminable forms of human suffering. Capitalism also contributes to a corrosion of democracy and community, the encouragement of environmentally destructive patterns of consumption, and, in a world of nation states, a fuelling of militarism and imperialism (Wright 2010: 37).
As neoliberal capitalism is the dominant form of capitalism in the twenty-first century (Harvey 2005; Streeck 2016), and although it can vary in form between nation states, depending on the politics and institutional structures in place (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2009), its fundamental operational principles and ethics remain the same. This book will focus on its multiple implications for caring.
As with all forms of capitalism, neoliberal capitalism promotes the protection of private property and the privatization of assets. In addition, neoliberalism promotes state endorsement of free market economic systems across national and global settings, and the institutionalization of market-based cultural logics and values throughout public and private organizations. The state is defined as an agent of capital by providing it with legal protections to enforce contracts, protect property rights, and protect markets in times of economic crisis (Friedman 1948; Hayek 1960, 1994). As a corollary to this, neoliberalism prescribes limited investment in public services, based on its ideal of a small, ‘cheap’ state in welfare terms. The primary purpose of education and welfare institutions is seen as conditioning and training individuals to be self-reliant, individually responsible and entrepreneurial. In this self-reliant society, the need for public services will be greatly reduced if not eliminated. To ensure the restructuring of public services, neoliberals advocate for new managerial policies and corporate-style accountability metrics and performance indicators. These are regarded as mechanisms for eliminating wastefulness, monitoring and improving performances, and maximizing ‘customer’ satisfaction (Chubb and Moe 1990; Friedman 2002).
Neoliberalism also builds on the idealization of choice in classical liberalism, prioritizing freedom over equality. In cultural terms, it is assumed that the market can replace the state as the primary producer of cultural logic and cultural value. The citizen mutates from a person with rights vis-à-vis the state to a market actor, a consumer, an economic maximizer, a free chooser. As neoliberal capitalism endorses a form of entrepreneurial individualism that is highly competitive and self-referential (Harvey 2005; Bröckling 2015; Mau 2015), and as it regards these traits as natural and desirable (Friedman 2002), it is antithetical to caring and affective justice in deep and profound ways (Federici 2012; Fraser 2016; Oksala 2016).
To create a new narrative to challenge the ethics of capitalism in its current mutation, it is necessary to move beyond the non-relational, self-referential ontology that underpins neoliberalism’s culture and politics. This means building a care-centric, relational concept of the individual person and of the wider economic, socio-political and legal order (Folbre 1994; Tronto 1993, 2013; Fineman 1995, 2004; Herring 2020).
While it would be foolhardy not to recognize the power of markets and the economy in determining the dynamics of social life, it is equally important not to place ‘capital at the gravitational centre’ of all ‘meaning making’ (Gibson-Graham, Cameron and Healy 2016: 194). A new paradigm is required, one that moves beyond the narrow capitalocentrism3 of current thinking about social change (Gibson-Graham 1996). People have a care consciousness (Crean 2018) that gives purpose and meaning to everyday life. Their relationalities are central to their identities, impacting on their ambitions and priorities (Lynch, Baker and Lyons 2009) in ways that could and should be harnessed intellectually and politically to drive egalitarian and care-led social change (Care Collective 2020).
Because neoliberalism provides not only an analytical but also a normative framework for understanding the world, explaining it and prescribing how it should be, it has an ideological power that is deeply embedded culturally and politically (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). One of the aims of this book is to help create a counter-narrative to neoliberalism, one that does not simply critique its harms but helps challenge capitalocentric modes of thought that have crowded out narratives of care and social justice in thinking about social change.
As the atomistic vision of the self is closely aligned with neoliberal capitalism, one of the first tasks is to put the relational self at the centre of meaning-making, to move beyond the idea of the separated, bounded and self-contained self. The goal is to develop a political and cultural appreciation of how the self is co-created, through struggles and negotiations in relationships, for better or worse, both collectively and individually (Herring 2020).
People are not only economic and political agents, but cultural and relational actors; they are involved in nurturing, loving, hating, fighting, relating and co-creating each other. The selves they become ‘can only exist in definite relationships to other selves’ (Mead 1934: 164).4 Recognizing relationality and interdependency helps reclaim the language and logics of care that make people up in nurturing terms. It helps enhance an appreciation of affective relations in giving meaning and purpose to everyday life, and it enables an appreciation of the interdependencies of humans, not only on each other, but also on non-human animals, other living species and the Earth itself.
The affective care domain of life gives people direction and purpose in their daily lives and is central to how they define themselves. The primary love relations within families/households are what first create people in their humanness. This primary nurturing and co-creating work (what I have called love labour: Lynch 1989a, 2007) is complemented by the secondary caring relations of schools and local communities that are created, in turn, by adults caring for each other as friends, neighbours, colleagues and, ultimately, as strangers at the political level, through showing solidarity for the unknown other (Lynch and Kalaitzake 2018). A society that is not caring cannot create people who are flourishing, as ‘citizens are produced and reproduced through care’ (Tronto 2013: 26), and individuals cannot flourish without love, as it is fundamental to their ‘subjective and objective well-being’ (Gheaus 2017: 743).5 Although the nurturing values that underpin care relations are generally politically domesticated and silenced, naming and claiming them can help reinvigorate resistance to neoliberalism. It can create a new language and a new set of values and priorities for politics.
As became evident during the Covid-19 pandemic, even in a capitalist society people are often moved by motives arising directly from consideration of the claims of others. Because relationality feeds into morality within people, this enables them to identify morally appropriate behaviour in themselves and others that orients and regulates their actions (Vandenberghe 2017: 410). They act from a sense of justice, from concern, friendship, loyalty, compassion, gratitude, generosity, sympathy, family affection and other such relational considerations (Midgley 1991: 5). Though these latter motives are not necessarily dominant at a given time (Sayer 2011: 172), they are living, and there to be named and claimed politically and intellectually.
While humans are replete with contradictions, having the capacity to be altruistic and self-interested, kind and cruel, thoughtful and thoughtless, which dispositions are encouraged, developed and prioritized is contingent not only on their personal circumstances but also on the cultural and political values of their time. As Folbre (1994: 250) observes, ‘altruism does not emanate from our genes or fall from the sky. It is socially and culturally constructed, economically and politically reinforced.’ Research by epidemiologists Wilkinson and Pickett (2009, 2018) has demonstrated the truth of this claim: the more caring societies are in terms of re/distributing wealth more equally, the lower the rate of poverty and violence, the fewer the status distinctions, and the more likely people are to enjoy better physical and mental health. If people are to thrive, they need to thrive not only as individuals, but as members of communities, and as political persons. Because of this we ‘need to pay attention to the conditions that foster people’s capacity to form caring, responsible and intimate relationships with each other – as family members, friends, members of a community, and citizens of a state’(Nedelsky 1993: 355).6
To bring homo curans (‘the caring human’; Tronto 2017) to life politically, however, it must also be brought to life intellectually. This requires extending the narrative about equality and social justice ‘outside the master’s house’ of mainstream thinking about social change, and about politics and sociology, and recognizing the salience of affective justice (Lynch 2014; Lynch, Kalaitzake and Crean 2021).
While economic and political self-interest play a key role in determining people’s political priorities, focusing on these alone fails to do justice to the ties and commitments that bind people to one another relationally. As Mauss (1954 ) observed, the ‘gift economy’ exists and underpins much of social and political life; it contests the logic of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. It incentivizes people to collaborate to help, care for and support each other in a reciprocal manner. But the morality that drives reciprocity extends beyond it as even the gift giver knows that some gifts cannot and will not be reciprocated at the individual level. There are many affiliations, affections and commitments that bind people to one another ‘in defiance of self-interested calculation’ (Nussbaum 1995a: 380). Care, in its multiple manifestations, matters not only for intimate relations but also for community and political relations; it is a public and political matter and a personal one. Resistance to the ethics of carelessness that is endemic in neoliberal capitalism matters because the ‘brutish pursuit of individual ends is harmful to the ends and the peace of all, to the rhythm of their work and joys – and rebounds on the individual himself’ (Mauss 1954: 98).
As I was working as a sociologist in a school of education in the 1980s, my academic interest in relationality is long-standing. It was informed initially by the philosophical work of Noddings (1984) on the cultivation of caring in education, and the ground-breaking psychological research of Carol Gilligan (1982) and that of Howard Gardner (1983). Not only did Gilligan provide a missing feminist perspective on moral development, but her work laid the foundations for a more generalized care-based theory of moral behaviour, thereby paving the way for the recognition of relationality and caring. In a very different context, Gardner’s pioneering work on multiple intelligences, and especially his recognition of personal intelligences (both inter- and intra-personal), helped move mainstream educational thinking outside its Cartesian straitjacket and a narrow cognitive understanding of rationality.7 I saw his work, and that of Gilligan, as having revolutionary potential for a reawakening of educationalists to the importance of relationality in social, political, personal and economic life.
As love was not an accepted concept in sociology, something I learned when publishing on this subject in 1989,8 Eva Kittay’s Love’s Labor (1999) was a reassuring publication. Her critique of Rawls’ theory of justice, and her connection-based concept of equality ‘grounded in our understanding of ourselves as inherently related to others’ (ibid.: 70), resonated not only with empirical research I was undertaking, but also with my personal experience of living with children and young women in residential care, and my personal family-care experience. The capabilities approach of Nussbaum (1995a, 1995b) also informed my thinking, especially Nussbaum’s validation of the rationality of emotions, and her appreciation of the importance of affiliations for human life and well-being.
While Gilligan, Gardner, Nussbaum and Kittay inspired me to pursue my interest in love, care and solidarity, their analysis did not address the impact of wider political and economic structures on the operationalization of care institutions and practices. Their work did not engage with capitalism or neoliberal capitalism in any overt way. Those who did engage, and inspired me to write this book, were care theorists and feminist across different disciplines, who were implicit if not in all cases explicit critics of capitalism (Held 1993, 2006; Nelson 1993, 1997, 2013, 2018; Stanley and Wise 1993; Tronto 1993, 2013; Folbre 1994, 2001, 2020; Sevenhuijsen 1998; Kittay 1999; Fineman 2004; Puig de la Bellacasa 2011, 2017; Mies 2014). I was also encouraged by the work of sociologists, such as Archer (2000) and Sayer (2011), who have demonstrated the importance of meaning-making outside of market relations, and by that of critical political theorists, especially Nancy Fraser (1997, 2008), whose work has explored at length the intersectionality of injustices within capitalism and how gendered and raced care-related social injustices are in practice (Fraser 2016).
Given the depth and range of the work of the ‘founding mothers’9 of care theory and research, it is a challenge to identify what this book can contribute that is new. Working at the interface of political theory, ethics and feminist theory, Tronto (1993) was among the first to develop the political argument for an ethic of care, demonstrating the moral significance of human relationships, dependencies and interdependencies. Along with Gilligan (1982) and educationalists such as Noddings (1984), Tronto’s work (and that of Ruddick 1989, Held 1993 and Kittay 1999) played a major role in challenging traditional care-indifferent approaches to morality; in particular, she challenged the universalistic claims of Neo-Kantian theorists of justice within liberal political theory. I owe a huge debt to all of these scholars but especially to Tronto in terms of normative political theory.
Having spent a few years living in residential care settings, with children and young women who were not only poor but also seriously deprived of care, I always felt there was something missing in conventional Marxism’s analysis of social injustice. As the lyrics of John Denver’s song professed, ‘Hearts starve as well as bodies’; people need bread, but they also need roses. Tronto’s early work (1993) on the ethics of care provided the moral foundation for this argument, highlighting how all people are needy at some time in life. This book hopes to build on her work, and especially on her latest ground-breaking book, Caring Democracy (2013), by illustrating sociological challenges that must be addressed.
Like Tronto, I too want to put care rather than the economy at the centre of political concerns. I see the urgency of replacing the ethics of capitalism with the ethics of care. However, while the purpose of Tronto’s book is to define what ‘caring with’ means within a democracy, Care and Capitalism is focused more directly on how the dynamics of neoliberal capitalism preclude caring, not only institutionally but also ideologically. One of the contributions of the book is its close examination of the complex relationship between liberalism, individualism and neoliberalism at an intellectual and cultural level. It demonstrates how creating a care-centric society requires a radical ideological shift from the deep-rooted individualism of liberal thinking, intellectually, culturally and politically. It also explains why contesting care-harming ideologies of neoliberalism, especially meritocracy, competitiveness and metricization, is vital for creating a cultural shift in political thinking about care.
The book also wants to build on the work of feminist economist Nancy Folbre; my contribution is not as an economist of care, but as a sociologist and scholar who shares Folbre’s deep commitment to equality and social justice. Her ground-breaking analysis of how patriarchal thinking and institutions preclude an economic appreciation of the value of care work (Folbre 1994) was something that encouraged me, as I had seen first-hand the impact of that devaluation on women.10 Not only did Folbre identify the economic value of caring as (mostly) women’s work, she also identified the importance of care as a social good (Folbre 2008), making a strong economic case for paying carers well (Folbre 2006). Her critique (and that of Julie Nelson 1997) of individualistic models of thinking about human preferences in economics, especially in relation to the use of time (Folbre and Bittman 2004), and her related identification of the importance of structures and institutions in determining choices and patterns of injustice, are something that has informed the analysis in this book.
I share Folbre’s recognition of the vital importance of care as a public value. As she rightly observed in The Invisible Heart (2001), women know they can benefit economically by becoming achievers rather than caregivers. But they also know that if all of humanity, and especially women, adopt this strategy, society as a whole will become oriented further towards more and more achievement and less and less care.
While Tronto (2013) has made a compelling case in Caring Democracy for placing care, not economics, at the centre of democratic politics, and Folbre, in The Rise and Decline of Patriarchal Systems (2020), identifies the reasons why care rather than the market should be central to economic thought, this book examines the many challenges that have to be addressed intellectually and culturally in a neoliberal capitalist era to create a more care-centric society and, equally importantly, a more care-centric academy. It examines some of the major changes in cultural and intellectual practice that are required to replace the ethics of capitalism with the ethics of care.
The book underscores the primacy of affective care relations in social life, exploring why equality in the doing and receipt of care is a central matter of equality and social justice. It explains why education, both culturally and more formally, is potentially a powerful site of resistance to neoliberal capitalism, and to the racism, sexism, ableism, speciesism and many other injustices on which capitalism thrives. The book investigates reasons why a capitalist-oriented education is a threat to affective equality and social justice more generally. It claims that creating a socially just and caring global order demands challenging not only the economics and politics of capitalism but also its core affective, cultural and intellectual values.
Care and Capitalism focuses attention on creating an ideological platform for change, by mobilizing new languages and narratives around care, social justice and affective equality in cultural and political discourse, especially by educating people about care and social justice across all levels of society. In Gramsci’s (1971) terms, there is a ‘war of position’ that must be fought at an ideological level. Winning the ideological battle with neoliberalism will not happen by accident. Research and teaching priorities that are driven by academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 2001; O’Hagan, O’Connor, Myers, Baisner, Apostolov et al. 2019), and an educational system that does not educate about love, care and solidarity or social justice, and that undermines respect for care in daily practice under its new managerialist rules of engagement (Lynch 2010; Lynch, Grummell and Devine 2012), cannot enable or resource people to think with care, or to think how to create an egalitarian and caring society. To develop care-centric thinking there is a need to rethink the epistemology underpinning academic scholarship (Medina 2013; Puig de la Bellacasa 2012), because how we come to know impacts on what we know. Creating knowledge is a relational practice (Harding 1991), and how we do it impacts not only on what we come to know, but on the known other. There is a need to move beyond the idea of science and research as a means of controlling nature (and other peoples), to the idea of science as a site of learning through cooperation, not only with other scholars, but with nature and non-human animals with a view to arriving at a mutual understanding, driven by concerns for social, species and environmental justice, and an ethic of care.
To date, care theory and research has focused strongly on human relations, and while this book is within this tradition, it tries to move beyond it by extending the discussion about care to the environment, focusing especially on the care and suffering of non-human animals. If we are to have a rich and inclusive concept of care, then care of the Earth itself and all living species are all part of the relational world that must be considered. The book argues that one cannot fully understand care without exploring its nemesis, violence. Human capacities to show love, care and solidarity are always shadowed by their opposites: the capacities to be care-indifferent, neglectful, abusive, hateful and even violent. Which capacities are called out and lived personally and politically is not accidental; it depends on what values and capacities are nurtured and enabled culturally and economically. While violence is not the preserve of capitalism, it is frequently exacerbated by it, as is evident in sexual violence, the violences of war and trade, the passive violences of letting people die through neglect and indifference, and the many violences humans inflict on non-human animals in the interests of profit and pleasure.
It is a call to action in terms of bringing care talk out into the public spheres of formal and informal education, cultural practices, and community, professional and party politics. As Raymond Williams observed, there are always residual sites of resistance because of the fact ‘that no mode of production, and therefore no dominant society or order of society, and therefore no dominant culture, in reality exhausts human practice, human energy, human intention’ (1973: 12). While recognizing the realpolitik of capitalist economic and political power, Care and Capitalism suggests that there are strong residual values of care in most cultures that could be ignited politically and intellectually, especially given what humanity has learned about the primacy of care during the Covid-19 pandemic. While making political culture care conscious is a major struggle, even within democracies with strong care traditions, we must start building resistance to the hegemony of economic-centrism under capitalism (Gibson-Graham 2006; Engster 2010; Tronto 2013; Alcock 2020; Folbre 2020). The book takes Iris Marion Young’s (1990) critique of liberal political egalitarian thinking seriously, highlighting the primacy of structures, including ideological structures and institutions, that must be contested if there is to be a reframing of contemporary intellectual and political thinking based on social justice.
One of the reasons for writing this book was to draw attention to the importance of relational justice and affective equality (Lynch, Baker and Lyons 2009; Lynch, Ivancheva, O’Flynn, Keating and O’Connor 2020; Lynch, Kalaitzake and Crean 2021). It not only explores why affective equality matters, but, building on the work of Fraser (2008, 2010) and many others, it investigates how relational justice is deeply embedded with re/distributive justice, recognition-led justice and representational justice arising from the intersectionality of group-based identities, and the continuity of structural injustices institutionally through time. My long-standing commitment to teaching and researching about equality and social justice (Lynch 1995, 1999), and my previous theoretical and empirical research with colleagues (Baker, Lynch, Cantillon and Walsh 2004; Lynch, Baker and Lyons 2009; Lynch, Grummell and Devine 2012), inform the analysis throughout.
The book opens in chapter 1 examining ways in which the failure to substantively engage with the politics of affective relations, including the political economy of domestic non-care work in which care relations are embedded in classed and racialized ways (Duffy 2005), has contributed to misrecognition of their pivotal role in generating social injustices in the production of people in their humanness (Federici 2012; Oksala 2016). It explores how focusing on affective (care-related) inequalities would facilitate the politicization of care relations (Tironi and Rodríguez-Giralt 2017) and provide an intellectual frame for challenging the care-indifferent immoralities of capitalism (Müller 2019).
The first part of the book is devoted to examining care matters inside and outside capitalism. Because being vulnerable and needy is defined as a sign of weakness in pre-market (Nussbaum 1995a) as well as market societies (Fraser and Gordon 1997), the work of caring for needy and dependent others is not regarded as citizenship-defining (Sevenhuijsen 1998; Lister 2003). It is lowly work undertaken with lowly people. Chapter 2 explores how women, as society’s default carers (and carers generally), are made abject by association. The devaluation of care, especially hands-on care and the hands-on manual labour that is intrinsic to it, and the devaluation of women are not just inextricably linked; the devaluation of care is a major generative reason why women are disrespected and undervalued within and without capitalism.
As the production and reproduction of social classes require care labour, both the care of people, and of those parts of nature that are available for exploitation and commodity production (Patel and Moore 2018), to get this work completed, capitalism builds on and exacerbates pre-existing gendered care exploitations (Dalla Costa and James 1972; Folbre 1994, 2020; Federici 2012), in classed and racialized ways (Duffy 2005, 2011).
As women are strongly socialized and morally impelled to do hands-on care (Bubeck 1995) in a way that men are not (Hanlon 2012), women live at the point of convergence between care and capital, the point where the conflicts between doing caring and serving capitalist values are felt most acutely, especially if they are poor. Given this structural positioning, carers and those for whom they care go on co-producing each other relationally, often in the face of adversity. They experience the conflicts and contradictions between the instrumental, exploitative, homo economicus logic of capitalism (Brown 2005) and the cooperative, nurturing and non-exploitative values that are intrinsic to caring labour (Tronto 1993; Robinson 2011; Puig de la Bellacasa 2017). They undertake necessary nurturing, relational work, labour that has no assigned market value and a very low voice politically. The ethics and values underpinning their work are not political incidentals, however, but cultural residuals (Williams 1977) that have the potential to be named, claimed and mobilized to confront the hegemonic values of neoliberal capitalism.
Chapter 3 explores the ways in which the making of love, through love labour, is a very particular form of intimate caring work that can be distinguished analytically from other secondary and tertiary forms of care labouring, owing to its inalienability and non-substitutability (Lynch 2007; Cantillon and Lynch 2017). Drawing on empirical research by the author on love and care, this chapter demonstrates how love labour’s non-substitutability, as a social and personal good, means that the logics of love labouring are at variance with market logic, as love is non-commodifiable. It cannot be assigned to others without undermining the premise of mutuality that is at the heart of intimacy (Strazdins and Broom 2004). Given its uniqueness as a form of labouring, love labouring can be claimed as a political and sociological place of resistance. Staying silent about the uniqueness and non-substitutability of love labouring creates a myth that there are market substitutes, thereby allowing the carelessness of capitalism to persist.
Care, love and solidarity work require time and proximity, presence and attentiveness, inside or outside capitalism. Chapter 4 examines the conflicts between the time and space logics of capitalism and those of care, focusing on how a society that prioritizes capitalist values of competitiveness and speeded-up productivity can leave people time poor and spatially distanced from those for whom they care most, often leaving both the carer and those who depend on them under-cared-for. I draw on my own collaborative studies of caring to highlight many of the tensions that arise over time as a resource in a bureaucratized society governed by the ethics of productivity and competition. The limits and possibilities of technologizing care are also examined, showing how the technologizing of care, including the use of affective technologies, is strongly profit-led, and by no means care-enhancing in affective relational terms. Overall, the chapter illustrates how the competitive and appropriative culture of neoliberal capitalism compresses time, making affective relations appear incidental and marginalized, work that is done in leftover time, with leftover energy, after productive (market) work has been completed.
Part II investigates the interfaces between the political values of liberalism, individualism and neoliberalism; it explores how these values have been incorporated and reinvented under neoliberal capitalism in ways that are often contrary to caring and social justice. The goal is to underscore the ideological challenges that neoliberal capitalism poses to care and social justice especially when it is dressed up in the respectable languages of liberalism, individualism, competition, choice and merit.
Chapter 5 examines the methodological individualism that is endemic to liberalism, showing how the lack of a structural and group-related analysis within liberal thinking (Young 1990) leads in turn to a lack of attention to institutionalized, enduring injustices (Tilly 1999), including those in the care field. The chapter examines the rise of self-responsibilization as social reformism in the era of neoliberalism, and how this generates a culture of political carelessness towards the suffering of the unfamiliar public ‘other’. Finally, this chapter investigates how duplicitous thinking within liberalism facilitates capitalism at the psychic level, by celebrating private charity and compassion, while sanctioning policy interventions to address structural injustices that generate a need for charitable giving in the first instance (Muehlebach 2012).
Individualism in its entrepreneurial self-interested manifestations is an integral element of neoliberal capitalism (Mau 2015: 20). Chapter 6 analyses the complex relationship between different conceptions of individualism, how these have evolved over time, and how they interface with the development of neoliberal capitalism and conceptions of care. The chapter shows how religious and secular interpretations of individualism have overlapped through time, moving from individual salvation to self-realization and self responsibilization. The ways in which neoliberal capitalism promotes the concept of the individual entrepreneurial self, the individual as a bundle of human capitals, devoted to the project of developing itself as homo economicus, are also explored. Finally, this chapter investigates how the moral individualism of neoliberalism is care-free and independent, albeit contested by a residual culture of love and care that can challenge it from within.
Chapter 7 analyses the role that competitiveness, metricization and meritocratic evaluation play in generating harms, first by defining many people as failures relative to others, and then by holding them responsible for not competing successfully in competitions they cannot win. The role that metrics play in exacerbating and enabling competitiveness, and in hierarchically ordering people in care-harming ways, is given special attention. The chapter also probes how the immeasurability of care means that it is discounted in the very care-related services where it is the foundational ethic of good practice. The failure to take cognizance of affective relations across multiple settings means that when named and claimed they can become sites of moral generation and resistance to the hegemonic ideals of care as a commodity.
Because it is impossible to pursue affective justice without examining its nemesis, violence, the third part of the book examines the relationship between care, capitalism and violence. As the experience of climate change and the coronavirus crisis demonstrates, life on planet Earth is relational and highly interdependent. Because of this, care is not just an issue for human relations, but concerns relationships with non-human animals and the natural environment. Chapter 8 is devoted to exploring the ways in which the ontological distinction between nature and society in Western intellectual thought has provided a moral justification for the domination, and frequent destruction, of other species, non-human animals and the environment (Patel and Moore 2018). The chapter outlines reasons why social justice theorists should recognize the moral status of non-human animals as sentient beings that can and do experience intense and prolonged suffering at human hands. Chapter 9 opens with a discussion on why debates about violence and care occupy separate academic spaces in sociology, briefly examining the implications of this for understanding the interface between care and violence. While recognizing that war, abuse and violence long preceded capitalism, the chapter explores how agents of neoliberal capitalism and the state are active in the precipitation of violence, both separately and conjointly, especially in institutional contexts. The racialized and gendered character of the violence that underpins profiteering in trafficking, and in both the care and sex industries is explored. The chapter concludes by noting how unregulated profiteering can deprive people of a livelihood, health care, clean water and/or clean air, but is not registered in the calculation of the costs of capitalism. It is regarded as an unaccountable externality rather than a process of violation (Tyner 2016). This chapter tries to draw attention to how an ethic of care could help mitigate violence, not only in the personal relations but in the wider political order (Held 2010), not least because violence, including terrorist violence, is often instigated by those who are experiencing the geopolitical harms of globalized capitalism, directly or indirectly.
Ways in which neoliberal capitalism is imposing an alien market logic on affective relations are re-examined in the conclusions in part IV, and reasons for moving beyond a capitalocentric way of seeing the world are reiterated. As loving, caring and showing solidarity are endemic to being human, capitalist logics cannot be allowed to redefine the meaning and making of humanity itself. The ‘war of position’ (Gramsci 1971) between neoliberal capitalism and the values and practices of love, care and solidarity, and related political, economic and cultural justice, needs to be planned, organized and funded if it is to persist over time. Creating a new narrative will require both formal and cultural education, and ongoing mobilizations across social movements by progressive activists and scholars, and especially by women, carers and those who need care, which is all of humanity at some point in their lives. And it will be important to remember when doing this work that there is no end time in the pursuit of social justice and the creation of a caring world.
The book ends with a short postscript on the care lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic. This postscript examines some of the dangers of ‘privileged’ ignorance (Medina 2013) in defining social justice and care matters that the pandemic exposed, as well as demonstrating how primary care was constrained during the pandemic. The lessons learned from the early deaths and isolation of older people in residential care, and the increased corporatization of care, are also examined, as is how the pandemic demonstrated that both a care/needs-based and a rights-based justice perspective are necessary because one is incomplete without the other (Casalini 2020).
1
Since the early 1980s, the richest 1 per cent have received more than double the income of the bottom half of the global population, while the richest 1 per cent have consumed twice as much carbon as the bottom 50 per cent since the mid-1990s. The growing gap between rich and poor builds on and exacerbates the existing racial and gender inequalities (Oxfam 2021: 3).
2
Worldwide, billionaires’ wealth increased by a staggering US$3.9 trillion between 18 March and 31 December 2020. Their total wealth at the time of writing stands at US$11.95 trillion, which is equivalent to what G20 governments have spent in response to the pandemic. The world’s ten richest billionaires have collectively seen their wealth increase by US$540 billion over this period (Oxfam 2021: 11).
3
Capitalocentrism was defined by Gibson-Graham in 1996. It refers to the way that different ‘economic relations are positioned as either the same as, a complement to, the opposite of, subordinate to, or contained within “capitalism”’ (Gibson-Graham, Cameron and Healy 2016: 193).
4
‘No hard-and-fast line can be drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, since our own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such into our experience also. The individual possesses a self only in relation to the selves of the other members of his social group’ (Mead 1934: 164).
5
This was expressed passionately by one of the mothers in the
Affective Equality
research: ‘It is something that if you didn’t have it to do … I mean it is part of your life. I mean if someone told me in the morning your job is gone, I would go, I will get another job, so be it! But if someone told me in the morning I didn’t have to care for my kids or I didn’t have them or something were to happen to them, I would scream, I would go to pieces, I really would!’ (Clodagh, a mother of three primary-school children, in Lynch, Baker and Lyons 2009: 65–6).
6
Bearing in mind that millions of people are stateless due to war, displacement and enforced migration.
7
His work in the Harvard Zero project was further enhanced by Goleman’s research (1995) on emotional intelligences.
8
I published a paper in
The Sociological Review
(Lynch 1989a) on love labour, the original title of which was ‘Love labour: Its nature and marginalisation’. However, both the editor and reviewers at the time thought that the use of ‘love’ in an academic article was ‘over the top’ (their words), so it was changed to ‘Solidary labour: Its nature and marginalisation’ although it was about love rather than solidarity.
9
It is time to name women as ‘founding mothers’ just as sociology identifies the canon with its ‘founding fathers’, generally Durkheim, Weber and Marx.
10
Reared on a farm in the West of Ireland, I was keenly aware that women had two jobs: unlike men, they worked both ‘inside and outside’, a phrase used regularly by women living and working in farm households. Yet their
inside
work was not named as productive. Not only was women’s care work and domestic labour not recognized in monetary terms, the work they did on the farm was not fully counted for much of the twentieth century. While men were counted in agricultural surveys as
one unit
of labour, women working on farms counted as
a percentage
of men’s labour (equal to that of a young teenage boy). Yet women did equal amounts of farm work and most of the caring and household service work for the family.
As the creation, repair and maintenance of human life cannot be undertaken without care (Tronto 1993), the affective relations that produce (or fail to produce) nurture are structural matters that are central to social justice and politics. This chapter examines ways in which the failure to substantively engage with the intellectual, political and economic significance of affective relations of love, care and solidarity has contributed to their misrecognition as sites of injustice (Folbre 1994; Federici 2012; Oksala 2016).
Affective relations are those nurturing-oriented care relations, and nurturing dimensions of other social and species relations, that humans engage in to co-create, support and enrich each other and the non-human world. There are three sociologically distinguishable contexts in which affective relations operate in the social world: the primary sphere of intimate love relations; the secondary sphere of professional, neighbourly and community care relations; and the tertiary sphere of solidarity-led political relations with largely unknown others (Lynch 2007). Care of other species and the environment is a further site of affective relations, albeit not a social-specific one. While each set of care relations is discrete, they are built on mutual trust. When they are broken or defaulted on, they are potentially harmful and abusive. Like all human relations, affective relations are embedded in relations of power, status and wealth that generate conflicts and contradictions within (Lynch, Baker and Lyons 2009; Care Collective 2020).
The chapter opens with a discussion of how affective relations of love, care and solidarity have been peripheralized across different disciplines in the social sciences. It examines the implications of this neglect for sociological and socio-political understandings of nurturing as a site of praxis and politics. Following this, an analysis of the different dimensions and forms of affective relations is presented, and the reasons why affective inequalities matter for social justice are explored. The third section is devoted to analysing how neoliberal capitalism promotes carelessness and affective injustices by undermining people’s capabilities and resources for nurturing work. Finally, the chapter explores how the unincorporated and previously silenced political character of affective relations makes it a residual space (Williams 1977), a site of resistance for radical political thinking at an ideological level.
The neediness of the human condition leads to interdependencies that generate feelings of belonging, appreciation, intimacy and joy, but also feelings of ambivalence and anxiety, tension and fear. It is only when we acknowledge the challenging reality of our shared dependence, and the irreducible differences between us, that we can fully appreciate what a new politics of care might involve (Care Collective 2020: 21–31).
From Hobbes and Locke to Rousseau and Kant, and up to and including Rawls, Western liberal political theorists upheld a separatist view of the person, largely ignoring the reality of human dependency and interdependency (Nussbaum 1995a). As contractual models of social relations tend to inform dominant moral theories, and as these are built on liberal models of social relations between strangers (Held 2006: 80), the role of moral judgement and concern for others is marginalized in political understandings (Benhabib 1992). The separatist concept of the person and the focus on contractual models of social relations have combined to blind political theorists also to the material significance of care relations as central matters of social justice (Tronto 2013: 7–11).
Within classical economics, the core assumption has been that the prototypical human being is a self-sufficient rational economic man (sic) (Ferber and Nelson 1993; Folbre, 1994, 2001). Within sociology, neither Marxist, structural functionalist nor Weberian social scientists identified any major role for the affective system of social relations independent of the economy, polity or status order. The affective domain was defined almost exclusively in terms of the heterosexual family, as exemplified in the work of Talcott Parsons. Caring was assumed to be ‘natural work’ for women, not an autonomous system of social relations that operated both inside and outside families. In Marxist, and even neo-Marxist feminist, traditions, domestic work and care labours were defined as unproductive, creating use value but not exchange value (Engels 1942; Mitchell 1971).
The indifference to matters of vulnerability and inter/dependency in the human condition led to the framing of social injustices primarily in terms of the coercive political relations of the state and the economic relations of market economies, and thereby in terms of inequalities of income and wealth, status and power. This is exemplified in the three key conditions Nancy Fraser lays down as essential for realizing the social justice principle of participatory parity, namely equality in economic relations, political relations and cultural relations (Fraser 2005). The ways in which affective relations operate as a discrete and relatively autonomous site of social relations that impact on participatory parity is not conceptualized within this framework, as it is not defined as a key site of politics. As the production and reproduction of labour power are integral to the survival of capitalism (Dalla Costa and James 1972; Federici 2012), and as they cannot be completely commodified and ‘brought into the sphere of market transactions’ (Oksala 2016: 299), any theory of justice must take account of how care relations impact on participatory parity in everyday life.
As sociable beings do not exist prior to their relatings (Mead 1934; Haraway 2003: 6), caring and relating share ontological roots (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017: 69). As relatings inevitability create interdependencies (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017: 72), and at times dependencies, care is a necessity, not an optional extra for human survival (Tronto 1993; Collins 2015). Without care, in all its forms, people would not survive, given the high dependency of humans at birth and at times of vulnerability (Kittay 1999; Fineman 2004).1 To develop a sense of affirmation and recognition as an individual person of value and worth, love is also necessary. It is through love that the individual can grow and gain confidence in her/himself as an incarnated individual capable of feeling emotions (Honneth 1995, 2003). While caring, and especially loving, can be individualistic or dyadic in character, caring is not necessarily individualistic. Caring about the needs of unknown others is foundational to public welfare and to the principle of solidarity; it is a moral and benevolent motivation to alleviate or prevent the suffering of others (Rorty 1989; Halldenius 1998; Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2003).
Despite these care realities, there are doxa-like2
