Central Asia E-Book

A M Vasilev

• Herausgeber: Saqi Books
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 601

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2014

Beschreibung

Based on first-hand research conducted by the Moscow Centre for Civilizational and Regional Studies, this book documents the findings of one of the first authoritative studies on the newly independent states of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgizia and Tadjikistan. Focusing on the unprecedented challenges facing these nascent countries, it examines the political events and socio-economic changes which followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union by analysing the difficulties of state-building and the dramatic social upheavals experienced by these republics. The book also covers the path of economic growth in the 1990s by examining the recession of 1991-1995 and the increasing income disparity between the affluent minority and the impoverished majority. The continuing socio-political and inter-ethnic tensions in the region are also covered in some detail, as is the relationship between the new states and Russia. Attention is further drawn to the causes and outcomes of the civil war in Tadjikistan as well as the growing international competition for access to the natural resources of the Central Asian countries. This work will be of particular use to the student of economics and politics of Central Asia and will also provide great insight to business professionals and other readers interested in the progress of post-Soviet states.

Leseprobe

CENTRAL ASIA

Political and Economic Challengesin the Post-Soviet Era

Edited byAlexei Vassiliev

Saqi Books

Contents

Russia and Central Asia

A.M. Vassiliev

PART ONE: KAZAKHSTAN

The Course Towards Political Stability

N.I. Petrov & M.S. Gafarly

The Economy of Kazakhstan

L.N. Kalinichenko & N.N. Semenova

PART TWO: UZBEKISTAN

Political Stability in the Conditions of the Command-Administrative Regime

N.I. Petrov

The Preservation of The State’s Dominant Positions in the Economy

M.S. Gafarly & V.F. Rass

PART THREE: TURKMENISTAN

A Post-Communist Authoritarian Regime

K.P. Dudarev

The Development of the Economy in the 1990s

L.N. Kalinichenko & N.N. Semenova

PART FOUR: TAJIKISTAN

The Causes and Lessons of the Civil War

A.I. Kuzmin

The Economic Crisis

M.S. Gafarly, V.D. Chernikov & N.N. Semenova

PART FIVE: KYRGHYZSTAN

Democratic Declarations and Political Realities

V.F. Kovalskii

The Transition to a Modern Market Economy

N.A. Volgina, M.S. Gafarly & N.N. Semenova

Conclusion

A.M. Vassiliev

Main Sources of Statistical Information

Index

The monograph has been produced by the Centre for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Head of the research team: I.V. Sledzevski

List of Contributors

A.M. Vassiliev

Russia and Central AsiaConclusion

N.A. Volgina

Kyrghyzstan (economy)

M.S. Gafarly

Kazakhstan (politics)Uzbekistan (economy)Tajikistan (economy)Kyrghyzstan (economy)

K.P. Dudarov

Turkmenistan (politics)

L.N. Kalinichenko

Kazakhstan (economy)Turkmenistan (economy)

V.F. Kovalski

Kyrghyzstan (politics)

A.I. Kuzmin

Tajikistan (politics)

N.I. Petrov

Kazakhstan (politics)Uzbekistan (politics)

V.F. Rass

Uzbekistan (economy)

N.N. Semenova

Kazakhstan (economy)Turkmenistan (economy)Tajikistan (economy)Kyrghyzstan (economy)

V.D. Chernikov

Tajikistan (economy)

Russia and Central Asia

A.M. Vassiliev

‘The Soviet empire collapsed.’ This expression has become a cliché in scholarly studies, in the media and in political slang.

Any empire implies the presence of a parent state and colonies. In the case of the Soviet Union, the role of the parent state may be allocated to Russia: the Central Asian countries should be viewed as colonies. The dominant and exploiting nature of the parent state contrasts with the oppression and exploitation of the colonies. This generally gives rise to national liberation movements, which can be manifested either in peaceful or violent forms. The goal of such struggles is the achievement of political independence. Leadership of and participation in such movements legitimizes the advent of new political elites with the power and ability to lead the liberated countries.

Why, then, with the exception of minor displays of nationalism, was there virtually no national liberation movement in the Central Asian ‘colonies’? Fear of reprisals? Perhaps, but reprisals did not prevent very different anti-colonial struggle in countries such as Algeria, Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Kenya or Mozambique.

Why did the leadership of the Central Asian republics resist the disintegration of the Soviet Union to the bitter end? Why were they last to leave the USSR, having to be practically pushed out of it, and why do they still preserve so many of the traditional ‘intra-imperial’ links? Why did the socio-political crisis occur first in the centre of the ‘empire’ – Russia (except for the Baltic region and Western Ukraine), and only then, with such grave consequences, in the ‘colonies’?

Some of these questions can be answered if one avoids taking a preconceived approach and being blinded by Russophobia, which is present in an overt or covert form in many discussions about the ‘Soviet empire’.

The truth and tragedy of history lies in the fact that the Russian people (together with the Ukrainians and Belorussians) were as much victims of the totalitarian Communist system as were the other Soviet peoples. Moreover, Russia suffered more losses and greater economic difficulties; its national culture was destroyed to a greater extent, and it lost more genetic stock compared with the other ethnic groups in the ‘empire’.

Any imperial structure implies the presence of dominant and privileged ethnos(es). In the Soviet Union the Russians, with their demographic weight and level of socio-political development, were the dominant ethnos. The question is, did they enjoy privileged positions in the republics of Central Asia to the same extent as the British and French did in their colonies?

Two social groups occupied the uppermost levels of the social ‘pyramid’ of the ‘proletarian state’ and the ‘state of the whole people’, namely, the party and state nomenklatura (officialdom), and trade employees. The former enjoyed privileges of power, status, influence, legal nomenklatura benefits (apartments, country cottages, health care, better food, holiday resorts and sanatoriums) and opportunities for illegally acquiring wealth. The latter also enriched themselves by illegal and criminal methods on a large scale. The Russians formed an absolute and sometimes even relative minority in both groups.

Appointment of Russians (Ukrainians, Belorussians) as the second secretaries of the republican Central Committees of the CPSU or heads of the local KGB in each republic did not change the general picture. The situation differed somewhat in Kazakhstan, where many first secretaries of the Central Committee were Russians. But even there, in spite of the demographic preponderance of Russians in the republic, they did not form the majority of either the party-state nomenklatura or trade employees.

The majority of the Russian and Russian-speaking population in the republics were workers, and included those employed in the more dangerous and often less prestigious industries, such as coal- and ore-mining. They were over-represented among the local technical intelligentsia, scientists and teachers. There were almost no Russians among the nomads or cotton growers, the most deprived part of the local population. Yet they were also under-represented in the socially most privileged strata of the population.

The local political elite found itself incorporated into the multinational Soviet nomenklatura to a much greater degree than was the case of, for example, the Georgian nobility during the all-Russian aristocracy period of Tsarism. However, though adhering to the traditional clan, ethnic, tribal or regional bias in the Central Asian republics, the local political elite nevertheless had to espouse the ideals of Communism in order to have any chance of progressing up the hierarchical ladder: this encompassed an open allegiance to Communist ideology, atheism, internationalism, and declarations of friendship with ‘big brother’, i.e. Russia. In the post-Stalin period the centre interfered only rarely with the internal power struggles going on between the local ruling elites.

The Central Asian political elites have not changed: they preserve the generic features of the Soviet nomenklatura, but it should be emphasized that their roots were and are in the local clans. They assumed the leading roles in the newly independent states not because they had fought for freedom, but because they were rejected by the victorious Russian anti-Communists who precipitated the break-up of the Soviet Union.

In their efforts to legitimize themselves under the new political conditions, these leaders have turned to nationalism and, to an extent, to Islam. Once Russifiers, leaders in these states now express anti-Russian attitudes and appeal for the revival of national, historical and cultural values; once preachers of atheism, the elites now demonstrate their religious devotion, takes oaths on the Qur’an and worship frequently at mosques.

All of them are aware that Russia, immersed in its own crisis, poses no threat to them. They have powerful positions in their local clans, and therefore are not challenged by their own people, either the professional classes or the downtrodden and silenced lower strata of the population. These authoritarian regimes, which have only changed their political colours, are in control of the security forces and the mass media, and therefore are in possession of sufficient power to manage the situation. Any challenges to their positions emanate only from rival clans, who aspire to the same levels of influence and wealth. They can turn to Islamic fundamentalism. The long civil war in Tajikistan was a struggle between clans, despite claims to the contrary. But the Islamists may form a ‘counter-elite’, and be able to resist the ruling clans. Therefore, while supporting the Islamic revival, it has begun to dawn on those in power that the slogans of Islam are a double-edged sword.

Threats may also emanate from the outside. Feudal-tribal conflicts could spread from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and then to Uzbekistan leading to the ‘Afghanization’ of the whole of Central Asia. Therefore, despite the anti-Russian nationalism within their countries, the local elites invariably turn to Russia for help in the protection of the former outer frontiers of the USSR, thus eliminating at least this threat to domestic stability.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed on the basis of the Belaya Vezha agreement between the three Slav republics of the former USSR, and signed on 8 December 1991. Dissolution of the USSR at the behest of the three leaders came as a total surprise to the Central Asian republics, and they hastened to join the alliance. At the meeting in Ashgabat (Ashkhabad) on 12 December the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan expressed their willingness to become equal co-founders of the CIS, but stressed the necessity to allow for the historical and socio-economic realities of Central Asia. After additional consultations, the heads of 11 former republics of the USSR (all except the Baltic republics and Georgia) adopted the Declaration in Almaty on 21 December 1991, proclaiming themselves members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The beginning of the next stage of the formation of the CIS took place at the Minsk summit held on 31 December 1991; among other things, agreements were adopted on the military forces and frontier troops. After a working meeting in Moscow on 16 January, the Minsk summit of 14 February 1992 adopted an agreement on the status of the strategic forces and appointed the commander-in-chief of the Commonwealth’s united armed forces (Turkmenistan and Moldova did not sign the document).

Yet it should be stressed that all these decisions and agreements of cooperation remained mere declarations: although the CIS existed, it had no real substance. Its Central Asian participants pushed Moscow towards closer cooperation.

The Kiev summit of 20 March 1992 adopted the Declaration on the following: the non-use of force or threat of force within the CIS; agreement on the division of the assets of the State Bank of the USSR among the central banks of the CIS countries; protocol on approval of the rules on the Council for Railway Transport; Decisions on the principles of price agreements for raw materials, fuel and food; and agreement on the status of all CIS countries as the legal successors of the USSR. Turkmenistan did not sign two documents on the defence powers of the CIS bodies.

On 15 May 1992 Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia and Tajikistan initialled the Collective Security Treaty in Tashkent, which was, however, liable to ratification by the respective parliaments. They also signed a statement on the reduction of the ex-USSR armed forces and agreements on chemical weapons (except Belorussia and Ukraine) and use of air space (without Moldova).

At this stage of the establishment of the CIS, problems began to emerge. On the one hand there were the questions arising out of the division of the Soviet heritage; on the other, there were the new principles of coexistence of the former republics to consider, encompassing various spheres such as economic, cultural, humanitarian, scientific, and communications.

By the second half of 1992 it was apparent that the lack of a clear mechanism to implement the adopted decisions was leading to various problems. Therefore, in the second half of 1992 and in 1993 the CIS summits addressed themselves not only to pressing global, political and economic questions, but also to clearly defined methods of ratification. More than three hundred documents were signed as the first steps towards the construction of such mechanisms.

The CIS Charter was signed by seven CIS states in Minsk in January 1993. Ukraine, Moldova and Turkmenistan did not sign it, opposing any moves which they saw as paving the way towards a confederation.

The most important result of the Moscow summit held on 29 September 1993 was the signing of the treaty on economic alliance, which presupposed the creation of a united economic space, free movement of goods, and standardized customs regimes. Ukraine and Turkmenistan joined as associate members, and Georgia expressed a similar intention. A step had thus been taken towards the materialization of the idea of a CIS common market. As well as initialling a series of economic documents, the participants at the summit also took an important decision on the creation of Commonwealth coalition peace-keeping forces.

The Ashgabat summit of 24 December 1993 completed the formation of an open, united economic space in the CIS. At the same time, questions relating to the realization of the collective security treaty were deleted from the agenda. However, one innovation was the establishment of a functional leading body of the Collective Security Council, elected for six months.

The obvious question which arises here is: if the Central Asian countries were unwilling ‘colonies’ during the Soviet period, why were they so insistent on the preservation of cooperation with Russia after the demise of the Soviet Union?

In the USSR the economic relationships between the centre and periphery, including those between Russia and Central Asia, did not meet the standard definition of ‘parent-state-colony’.

Over about six decades the national economy of the USSR developed as a single economic mechanism, or as a single giant ‘super-plant’ in which the economies of the regions and republics played the role of ‘workshops’: they could not exist in isolation, but were an integral part of the whole. Although in the final analysis this national economic structure proved to be doomed, it is clear that, at a certain historical stage, it paved the way for an economic upsurge in the Central Asian republics. In the 1920s and 1930s these republics were way behind the centre (and some other Soviet republics) in technical and cultural areas. However, according to Communist ideology, and in the name of universal equality, it is the duty of those who have forged ahead to help those who are lagging behind. The means for drawing the Soviet republics together in terms of levels of development were taken only from Russia, and the union budget was formed at the expense of this country.

Huge funds were directed towards the development of the Central Asian republics, accounting for three-quarters of their total budgets in some years. Russian workers and specialists, engineers and technicians were sent there, forming the backbone of the skilled manpower. As well as ordinary schools, cultural education colleges, technical colleges and higher education institutions were created, staffed chiefly by professors and teachers from outside the republics. Tens of thousands of young Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Tajiks, Kyrghyz were admitted to higher education institutions in Moscow, Leningrad and other Russian cities on favourable terms.

Yet the socio-economic upsurge of the republics met more than the requirements of Communist mythology and propaganda. The multinational ruling elite of the USSR considered their state to be a single country: the federal setup was merely the political garment of the strictly centralized economic system. Therefore, when the all-state problems were ‘solved’, the questions of ‘who exploits whom’ or ‘at whose expense is industrialization carried out’ were not even raised, though the debates surrounding such issues have become especially important in the post-Soviet period. The metallurgical and chemical industries, for example, were developed in Kazakhstan not simply as a means by which to raise the level of industrialization in the republic: it was advantageous to build metallurgical plants for the supply of products throughout the USSR close to the coal and phosphoritic ore deposits, and mineral fertilizer plants close to the phosphoric ore deposits. In this sense Kazakhstan did not differ from Texas in the USA, for example.

The accelerated industrialization of remote regions required huge material investment and led, in the opinion of some people, to a reduction in the rate of development in Central Russia: others saw it as bleeding Russia dry. A considerable number of Russians were forced from their homes and joined, as a result of compulsory or ‘voluntary’ enrolment, the ranks of ‘national minorities’ in the union republics, often suffering a great deal of hardship.

It is impossible to mention all the major enterprises, cities, or engineering works built in Central Asia with the active participation of Russia and other union republics, but an overview can be offered.

In 1985, when reforms were started in the Soviet industry, there were about 25,000 industrial enterprises in Kazakhstan, of which 2,000 were particularly important. The following, with the largest production capacities, might be mentioned:

The Karaganda metallurgical plant (now JSC Ispat-Karmet)

Balkhash and Zhezkazgan mining-metallurgical and Uskemen (Ust-Kamenogorsk) polymetallic plants

The large complex of coal producing enterprises in the region of Ekibastuz and oil producing enterprises near the Emba River and the peninsula of Mangystau (Mangyshlak)

The large chemical enterprises in Karatau, Shymkent (Chimkent), Aulie-Ata (Jambul), Atyrau (Guryev), Temirtau, and Aktyubinsk

Machine-building plants in Almaty (heavy engineering and electrical equipment), Aktyubinsk, Kokshetau (Kokchetav), and Uskemen (instrument building).

In Uzbekistan a series of high-capacity heat-power plants has been built in Angren, Navoi, Takhiatash and in the Syrdarya region. Large gasfields are functioning in the Bukhara and Kashkadarya regions, including the renowned Gazli gasfield. A ferrous metallurgical plant has been built in Bekabad; non-ferrous metallurgy is represented by the Almalyk mining and metallurgical plant. In addition there are the Chirchik plant for production of high-melting and heat-resistant metals and the Uzbekzoloto goldmines. There is a series of large chemical plants, such as the Samarkand superphosphate plant, Ferghana nitrogenous fertilizers plant, Almalyk ammophos plant and Navoi chemical plant. There are about 250 large- and medium-scale machine-building enterprises in the republic, including Tashselmash (agricultural equipment), Tashelektromash (electrical equipment), Uzbekkhlopkomash (cotton growing equipment), machine tool plants, refrigerator plants and a large aircraft-building plant.

More than 500 large industrial complexes have been built in Kyrghyzstan. They include a series of very large power-stations, such as the Toktogul plant on the Naryn River, with a capacity of 1.2 mln kW. The machine-building industries include an agricultural equipment plant, Tyazhelektromash (heavy engineering and electric equipment), vehicle-assembling plant, electric equipment plants in Przhevalsk, Maili-Sai and Kaji-Sai. Other newly built enterprises are a weaving factory, woollen-cloth, silk and knitting factories. Coal is produced in the south-west of the country.

Oil and gas are the leading industries in Turkmenistan. A series of high-capacity pipelines was built to transport hydrocarbons. Various chemicals and oil products are manufactured at plants in Turkmenbashi (Krasnovodsk), Neftezavodsk, Charjou and Gaurdak. The machine-building plants of the republic produce oil pumps, industrial fans, dough mixers, gas stoves and lighting equipment. The textile industry manufactures a variety of products.

In Tajikistan power production developed faster than other industries. The Nurek (capacity 2.7 mln kW), Golovnaya (210,000 kW) and Kara Kum (126,000 kW) power plants were built there. Non-ferrous metallurgy is well-developed. Lead, zinc, bismuth, antimony, mercury and molybdenum are extracted from ores at the Altyn-Topkan, Kansai, Azob and Sorukh-Dairon plants. One of the largest aluminium plants of the ex-USSR was built in Regar. The machine-building plants include Tajiktekstilmash (textile industry equipment), the Tajikkabel corporation (cables), refrigerator plants, the Kurgan-Tyube transformer plant, and the Isfara lighting equipment plant.

Prices of oil, gas, coal and non-ferrous metals supplied to other republics are known from the formal statistics. But all price proportions were so distorted under the administrative command system and prices had so little to do with the real value of the commodities that it is absolutely impossible to find out whether Central Asia gained or lost by supplying raw materials to Russia. On the whole, it is recognized that the subsidization of the Central Asian republics at Russia’s expense continued throughout the period of Soviet power and persists even today.

Another legacy of the single state is that the Central Asian republics are now closely interconnected through various transport and telecommunications networks.

At the beginning of the century, Kazakhstan had just 2,100 km of railways: they are now 15,000 km long. The most economically important of them are the Kzyl Zhar (Petropavlovsk)-Karaganda-Balkhash, Astana (Akmola)-Kartaly, Atyrau (Guryev)-Orsk and Makat-Aktau (Shevchenko)-Novy Uzen routes. The Ferghana-Kyzyl-Kiya-Charjou-Kungrad-Beineu, a line of major importance to European Russia and Caucasia, was built in Uzbekistan. Virtually the whole of the southern part of Turkmenistan is crossed by the Turkmenbashi (Krasnovodsk)-Tashkent line, with branches towards Kushka and Vyshka. 500 km long narrow gauge railways penetrate into the depths of the mountain regions of Tajikistan.

In the mountainous regions of the Central Asian countries, roads are the most important transportation links. In Kyrghyzstan, the most important route is the 592 km long Bishkek-Osh highway, which crosses a series of high mountain ranges – Kyrghyz, Ferghana and Talas Alatau. The Turkmenbashi-Mary-Charjou road played a major role in the economic development of Turkmenistan. The relatively developed network of mountain roads ensured that normal economic life was maintained in most of the Tajik regions: the most important are the Dushanbe-Ura-Tyube and Dushanbe-Khorog-Osh routes.

Until recently, most of the cities and many villages in the Central Asian republics were linked by plane or helicopter services. The crisis in the aviation transport industry of the CIS has limited the services considerably: flights on many routes, especially local ones, have been drastically reduced or cancelled altogether. However, flights outside the CIS have been expanded: Tashkent has become a large international airport, and services are also in operation from other Central Asian capitals.

Pipeline transport is well-developed in all Central Asian states. Oil and gas are transported to the central regions of the ex-USSR and the Urals, as well as to the local processing plants. High capacity gas pipelines connect Uzbekistan with Chelyabinsk, Ekaterinburg and the European part of Russia. Oil is supplied by pipelines from the Emba oilfields to Atyrau (Guryev) and Orsk and from Uzen to Aktau and Samara (the Volga region).

The overwhelming majority of the large modern industrial enterprises in the Central Asian states operate using Russian (in some fields, such as electric welding, also Ukrainian, Belorussian and Baltic) technologies and standards. This has come about as a result of many factors, including historical ones. In the pre-war years, ‘doubles’ of the major Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian industrial complexes were built in Central Asia, a long way from the dangerous western frontiers. During World War II, many industries were evacuated to the outlying republics for the same reason, and remained there even when the main complexes had returned to the original sites. Over the last twenty years, practices began to change: the Soviet ministries started to exercise more caution in deploying the most technologically advanced industries in the Central Asian republics. It was considered that such complexes should be located in the vicinity of related research institutions, usually in the ‘capital’ cities such as Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. There was also a certain mistrust in the local personnel, who did not have the same sort of experience in industrial production, and were allegedly unable to ensure the due quality of the products. This is the reason for there being almost no manufacture of radio electronics, computer hardware, cars, trucks, technical instruments, etc, in Central Asia. Certainly, there were exceptions when the location of industrial complexes was dictated by geographical or political considerations. The most modern equipment was supplied to the assembly shops of the Baikonur missile-space complex, the Semipalatinsk nuclear test ground, oil producing enterprises, and uranium ore-mines and enrichment plants in Uzbekistan.

Although they may be perceived as ‘subsidiaries’ of the Russian enterprises, the Central Asian plants and corporations are faced with the same problems and difficulties as those experienced by Russian industries: low efficiency of production, poor quality of products, and non-competitiveness of goods in world markets. Exports of machinery and equipment did not exceed 15% for many years, and still do not.

The difficulties experienced by the Central Asian republics in reaching the non-CIS markets are not helped by the almost total absence of their own international communications systems. For instance, Uzbekistan, the most populated country of the region with more than 23 mln inhabitants, has only one good road towards the frontiers of the ex-USSR. This leads to Afghanistan. But transport is not the only problem. Take Algeria as an example: the country has an excellent geographical location which allows it to maintain sea communications with the whole world; it has enormous oil and gas deposits. And yet it has found, after trying for 30 years, that its economy cannot function successfully without the traditional links with France.

The young Central Asian states lag behind Russia in economic development (2-4 times in some indices). However, this gap had reduced drastically during the Soviet period, compared to the situation at the beginning of the century: it started to widen again only after the beginning of perestroika. One point to remember is that no other ‘parent’ state (Britain, France, Portugal or the Netherlands) left such a developed economy in its colonies as did Russia in Central Asia.

The new republics are heavily dependent on Russia in economic terms, with a strong reliance on both exports and imports: a breakdown in the relationships between them and Russia would lead to economic catastrophe. Although elements of colonial-type economic dependence on Russia may exist, they should not be seen as determining factors. The trend over recent years has demonstrated Russia’s conscious or instinctive attempts to reduce its disadvantageous economic links with Central Asia, rather than to the contrary. Yet it is absolutely obvious that the future successful development of the Central Asian states is dependent on close economic links with Russia and most of the other former union republics, at least for the foreseeable future.

It is possible to argue that Russia alone might survive a sudden and complete breakdown in trading links in the CIS and Baltic countries: the Central Asian republics, on the other hand, would be isolated and their economies paralysed. They are heavily reliant on imported goods from within the ‘internal’ market; similarly, the vast majority of their export trade takes place with ex-USSR states. More than two thirds of heavy industrial equipment vital to the functioning of the economy in Central Asian republics is imported from the CIS, mainly from Russia and Ukraine.

In terms of domestic products, consumption exceeds 80% only in Russia and Ukraine (87.3% and 82.7% respectively). In practically all the other states this figures drops to between 70 and 80% or even lower: 70.2% in Tajikistan, 76.9% in Uzbekistan, 63.9% in Kyghyzstan.

These are the consequences of the course towards a united economic space pursued during the Soviet era. The USSR was a vast, rigid, closed system virtually devoid of self-regulation, divided into large branch and national-territorial subsystems, which were all inter-reliant in economic terms. Using the structure of stable (often ossified) inter-branch and inter-republican connections set up under orders from the centre, they formed the parts of an integrated economic whole. This all-union ‘mechanism’ was fundamentally different from a self-regulated market economic system, which in this context may be described as an ‘organism’. The naively criminal attempt to transform the ‘mechanism’ into an ‘organism’ in one stroke by the universal implantation of a totally new economic system made the destruction of the united space unavoidable, resulting in economic catastrophe in the CIS countries. The most serious effects were felt not in Russia but in the weaker parts of the ‘mechanism’, the Central Asian states. Recession of production has brought many of their citizens to the brink of physical survival.

There were also major difficulties in the fields of education, science and culture. There was some truth in the CPSU’s earlier boasts about the success of the Soviet educational system: the colonial periphery of tsarist Russia underwent far-reaching and impressive changes within the six decades of socialism. Before the revolution the local inhabitants were almost all illiterate, with only a small minority attending school: there were no higher education institutions in the republics. Six decades later Central Asia had been transformed into a region of almost universal literacy and had a developed system of educational institutions at different levels.

Kazakhstan today has 49 higher education institutions, Uzbekistan 42, Kyrghyzstan 9, Turkmenistan 6 and Tajikistan 9. The largest universities enjoyed all-union and even international prestige in some cases. Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzstan had more students per thousand inhabitants than, for example, Iran. There are no other colonies in the history of the world (with the possible exception of Hong Kong) that enjoyed such figures on reaching independence.

Yet at the same time critics of the national-cultural policy of the Soviet period point out such Russifying actions as the rejection of the Arabic alphabet, which was replaced first by the Roman and then the Cyrillic script. This signified a rupture with cultural traditions (even though only a handful of people were able to participate in the literary heritage), but similar steps (Latinization of the script) were also taken in Turkey and Indonesia. Another more substantial reproach to the centre was the almost complete Russification of higher education and a sizable part of secondary and primary schooling, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrghyztan. Claiming that a ‘new community’ called ‘the Soviet people’ was created in the USSR and voluntarily adopted Russian, the party mythology served as an additional incentive to Russification.

Before 1991 practically all higher education institutions, with the exception of some faculties at universities and paedagogical institutes, taught students in Russian. Now all institutions are trying to shift over to the indigenous languages. This is an extremely painful process, which has come about mainly as a result of pressure on the part of the local authorities, who play the nationalist card and causes numerous difficulties. The institutions have a high proportion of Russian teachers who do not know the local languages; virtually all textbooks and other resources were published in Russian alone for many years. The local teachers also taught in Russian. ‘De-russification’ of education under orders leads to its degradation, and the most sober politicians, scientists and intellectuals either doubt its expedience or believe that this process should be protracted for 10-20 years. To the present generation of the local scientific and technological intelligentsia Russian will probably remain the language of business and cultural intercourse.

The broad cooperation of the local plants, factories and corporations with those in Russia and other CIS countries requires the use of Russian alone in business correspondence and technical documents. Miscommunications and distortions of the sense by translators, especially in the field of technology, could lead to literally disastrous consequences. In high-tech enterprises such as the Tashkent aircraft-building plant, the Regar aluminium plant (Tajikistan), the Maili-Sai electric vacuum equipment plant – not to mention the Baikonur space complex – the overwhelming majority of technical documents will be of Russian origin for many years to come. Many industries, especially large and modern ones built in recent years, employ numerous Russian and Russian-speaking workers and engineers. They form the majority, especially among engineers, technicians and managers, in a series of key industries such as mining, metallurgy, coal production, textiles and machine-building. This situation will probably persist for a long period, in spite of the growing migration of Russian-speakers from Central Asia. Formal and hasty implantation of the local languages could also create chaos in many other everyday situations.

At the beginning of the century the Central Asian states had practically no indigenous scientists, and all serious research was carried out by Russian scientists over the years. For instance, prospecting and mining technology was developed in Kyrghyzstan in the 1920s by a group of Russian scientists. At the same time the Institute of Soil Science of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Moscow Zoocultural Institute conducted a geobotanical and zoocultural survey of the mountain regions of the republic. As early as in 1925 the so-called Scientific Commission was founded there to attract the local people to scientific research. In 1928 the Institute of Regional Studies was established, followed in 1930 by the Institute of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Studies. Other institutions were created from these later on.

The All-Union Institute of Cotton Growing, one of the first scientific research institutes in Uzbekistan, was founded in 1929 with aid from the centre, and consisted of five major experimental stations located in the republic, with more in other parts of the Soviet Union. During the same period the Central Asian Cotton Growing and Irrigation Institute, Silk Culture Institute and – later – the Geliotechnical Laboratory were created in Tashkent.

The ‘patronage’ of Russian scientists towards their colleagues from the former outskirts of the Russian empire quickly resulted in ‘two-way traffic’: in many fields the local scientists are equally respected members of the international scientific community.

For example, virtually all former union republics (along with institutes throughout the world) use the results of research carried out by the Academy of Sciences of Turkmenistan into the extremely important problems of the use of desert and semi-desert territories.

The Tajik astronomic school is widely known: this was established on the basis of the Hissar astronomic observatory, the world centre of research into meteorites and comets. Dozens of outstanding geologists (Kazakhs and Russians), many of whom enjoy international standing and are winners of prestigious prizes, work at the Satpaev Institute of Geological Sciences, the Atyrau Institute of Geology and Geophysics, etc. Research undertaken by Kazakh specialists in nuclear physics is also well-known within and outside the CIS: there are well-equipped academic institutes of nuclear and high-energy physics in the republic. It is easy to imagine the difficulties that might arise should the results of the work carried out by these scientists be available only in local languages. There are, of course, fields of research such as Oriental philology, theology, etc, where Russian takes second place to the indigenous languages.

The Central Asian republics and the Russian Federation share concerns that the disintegration of the USSR and the orgy of irrational nationalism that followed may lead to a real weakening or rupture in scientific, technological or educational links. Such a breakdown in communication would be an absolute tragedy in some fields of research, throwing whole areas of knowledge in science, technology or economics back decades. Demands to preserve and develop cooperation are heard everywhere.

This was the purpose of, for example, the agreement between the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan signed in February 1993 on cooperation in the production of uranous and precious metals. Russia had previously concluded similar agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan. It was clear to all parties that a breakdown or even reduction in scientific and technological links could lead to a total collapse in a key branch of the economy which is also, of course, closely connected with the defence complex. According to experts, the republics of the ex-USSR account for around 40% of the world deposits of natural uranium. It is produced mainly in Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan (30% each) and Ukraine (9-10%). Uranium is processed in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan, Tajikistan and Ukraine but enriched only in Russia. In other words, a single complex of enterprises connected with the production of uranium has been established in the USSR: its dismemberment would mean its destruction.

The most far-sighted politicians of the Central Asian countries are aware that scientific and technical cooperation with Russia is an absolute must. Speaking at the assembly of the International Congress of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Almaty, January 1993), the President of Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev, said: ‘Cooperation between the inter-state enterprises concerned with the atomic industry is vitally important to the future of our countries, and may strengthen international security and political stability.’

In the very first days of its separate existence Russia was faced with problems previously unknown in the USSR: the destiny of the Russian-speaking population who were based outside its frontiers. 25 mln Russians, millions of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Belorussians and others were de facto considered Russians outside their own republics.

In the first months the radical democrats who had won power in Moscow treated this problem as if it did not exist. Had not the leaders of the newly independent republics spoken about their intentions to observe the ‘human rights’ of all their citizens of non-indigenous nationalities? Was not everything going to be solved without any great difficulties?

But the failure to face the problems head-on quickly proved both unworkable and dangerous. Long-suppressed nationalist fervour was gaining ground rapidly in the republics outside Russia. The government simply did not know how to react to such situations as the introduction of elements of apartheid in the Baltic states, the murders of Russians in Tajikistan, the armed struggle of the Russian population of the Dniester region, and crippling discrimination in Kyrghyzstan or Kazakhstan.

The destiny of the Russian and Russian-speaking population was an important factor in Russia’s relationships with the Central Asian states and may evolve into the major focus of its policy towards some of them. Attitudes of the local populations and the ruling regimes towards Russians and the Russian-speaking populations in the republics were based on history, and heavily influenced by the character of the Slav migration to Central Asia, the fields of their activities, the identification of the Russians with the centre by the local population, and their alleged hostility to Islam (first as Christians and then as atheists).

During the Soviet period the flow of migrants from European Russia increased due to famine, ‘dekulakization’, collectivization and the moves towards accelerated industrialization of Central Asia. Russian migration did not begin to fall until late in the 1970s. In the two most recent decades the Russian population began to decrease.

Percentage of Russians (without Ukrainians and Belorussians) in the population of the Central Asian Republics, 1959-1989

More than half of the Russians in Central Asia (excluding Kazakhstan) were not born where they lived (1989 census). Most of them are concentrated in the cities, especially capitals.

In post-Soviet Central Asia the Russians and Russian-speakers have become increasingly worried. Not only are they concerned with their security in the case of inter-ethnic conflicts, but they see real limitations in their social and official promotion, in their earnings and in the possibilities of national-cultural development. In previous years it was not necessary for the Russians to learn the languages of the indigenous people. Now, however, the introduction of the local languages is seen as obligatory in clerical work, science and education: as far as the Russians are concerned, this is a discriminatory measure. In actual fact, they are being ousted from the prestigious and traditional spheres of their activities, and from government agencies. Russian young people who do not know the local language cannot enter higher education institutions.

In Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan and Turkmenistan some formal measures were taken to prevent discrimination of the Russians: amendments were made to the laws on state language and citizenship. Yet overt and covert discrimination still takes place.

The Russian-organized activities for the protection of their rights and for ensuring their security are of little practical use. The organizations, which are few in number, rely mainly on the Russian government. It may be seen therefore that the Russians are aware of their status as ‘secondary’ citizens in the republics. They have now lost all hope of putting down roots in Central Asia (except Kazakhstan). With an awareness that they are not fully equal members of the society they are now fearful of the threat of violence on the part of the local indigenous majority.

The behaviour and psychology of the Russians demonstrates that they would prefer to leave the republics rather than run the risk of conflict. The situation in Kazakhstan may prove different. The Russian-speakers form a majority there, and any prospect of a damaging split in the country has ensured flexibility on the part of the leadership.

The states of Central Asia did not possess even germs of their own national armies when the USSR broke up. The troops of the Turkestan military district and the 40th army (in Kazakhstan) along with other strategic forces were deployed in the territories.

Even formal elements of federalism did not spread to the Soviet army. There were no national units. There was the single army of the single country with one (Russian) language of military commands and documents, with common regulations. According to the official mythology, the armed forces were replete with ‘Soviet patriotism’, a readiness to ‘defend the socialist fatherland’ and to ‘fulfil their international duty’.

In reality, both World War II and the ‘expedition’ to Afghanistan demonstrated a marked reluctance on the part of a considerable number of Central Asians, not only to fight – but even to be mobilized in the Red (Soviet) Army. The Kazakhs and Kyrghyz showed more ‘Soviet’ patriotism than others, being most loyal in their cooperation with the Russians and fighting side by side with them.

In the course of time, as a result of the demographic explosion in Central Asia and the reduction in the birth rate in the Slav republics, most of the conscripts began to come from Central Asia and Azerbaijan (sometimes up to 35-40%), and most served under the command of Slav officers. Central Asians rarely assumed positions of high command in the armed forces. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the repudiation of Communist ideology and the myths of ‘Soviet patriotism’ were all determining factors in the future conflicts and decomposition of the armed forces. It was necessary for those in command to recall the Muslim soldiers from units which had seen service in Afghanistan, and replace them with Slav conscripts.

There was an increase in anti-army attitudes among the civilian population of the Central Asian republics. They were reluctant to serve a state that was fundamentally alien to them. These attitudes were stirred up by use and degradation of vast territories, especially in Kazakhstan, which were the sites for nuclear testing. The most well-known ones are the Semipalatinsk nuclear and Baikonur space testing grounds. Large-scale army manoeuvres were deployed between the Volga and Ural rivers. Nuclear, neutron, chemical and bacterial weapons were tested with extremely harmful consequences both to the environment and to the health of the population.

In practice, however, both the military command and the party and state leadership took the possibilities of inter-ethnic conflicts and anti-Russian attitudes among Central Asians into account. They had formed the backbone of the anti-profiteer detachments during World War II, with orders to shoot at retreating soldiers; they were also sent to guard prisoners in the Gulag and served in forces used for the dispersal of anti-government demonstrations, sometimes opening fire.

After the disintegration of the USSR, the relationships between the Central Asian states and Russia acquired a complexity which was difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, the republics began to establish their own national armed units; on the other, detachments of Soviet armed forces, now under direct Russian command, continued to be stationed in the territories. The new governments did not demand their withdrawal, but neither the terms of their stay nor their status were initially defined. Agreements as to their status took time to come into force.

It was clear that the local leaders believed that the Russian troops were a stabilizing factor. Russian officers began to serve in the republics’ national armies on a contractual basis without forfeiting their Russian citizenship. Military hardware and military property were transferred to the local armies, or stolen, or sold.

The establishment of its own armed forces was deliberately delayed in Kazakhstan. The unspoken apprehensions about such a move may have focused on questions surrounding the nationality issue. For example, if the army was to be comprised purely of Kazakh soldiers, it might antagonize the non-Kazakh population; if it was to be multinational, with a majority of the Russian-speaking population, could its loyalty to the nationalist government be counted on?

The President of Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev, opposed the disintegration of the USSR longer than any of the other heads of republics and advocated a confederative state. He also believed that it was a mistake to divide up the armed forces, and that they should be kept under united command. This position suited the Russian military: General Ryabtsev, Commander of the 40th Army deployed in Kazakhstan, said: ‘The army supports President Nazarbaev.’

However, the establishment of national armies was inevitable. The success in parliamentary elections of Russian ultra-nationalists and their territorial claims in Kazakhstan helped to push the country towards a ‘divorce’ with Russia. These claims centred on parts of the Ural, Kostanai and Pavlodar regions, almost the whole of Northern Kazakhstan, the Kokshetau and Eastern Kazakhstan regions, and even Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s statements about Russia’s southern frontiers. Certainly, the Kazakh advocates of the revision of frontiers give as good as they get: writing in newspapers, they proclaim the republic’s ‘rights’ to the territory limited by the Orenburg-Kurgan-Omsk line.

The problems surrounding nuclear armaments have acquired a special importance, not only locally but internationally. When Kazakhstan won independence, there were 1040 nuclear warheads and 370 nuclear bombs in its territory. Who did these nuclear armaments belong to, and who actually had control of them – the Russians or the Kazakhs? This is a complicated question. However, the leader of Kazakhstan was not slow to play the nuclear card. During his visit to Washington in May 1992, President Nazarbaev undertook to liquidate 104 SS-18 nuclear missiles deployed in the territory of the republic. He stated also that Kazakhstan would sign the 1968 nuclear armaments non-proliferation treaty, thus ‘assuming the obligation of not developing and not proliferating nuclear armaments – as soon as the parliament approves this decision.’ The treaty was quickly ratified, and Kazakhstan began fulfilling its obligations; it then agreed to join the revised version of the treaty on reduction of strategic nuclear armaments and get rid of the nuclear weapons deployed in its territory within seven years. Nazarbaev urged the US president to guarantee the security of Kazakhstan, a state surrounded by nuclear powers – Russia and China.

This situation probably suited all parties, but during their talks on nuclear armaments the leaders of Russia and the USA almost forgot about Kazakhstan. Yeltsin and Bush signed the treaty on strategic offensive armaments. The President of Kazakhstan then sent a telegram to Moscow. Welcoming the fact that the treaty was signed, he expressed his bewilderment in the failure to invite Kazakhstan to the negotiation process, as the republic had always insisted. A top-ranking Kazakh official said that Kazakhstan ‘did not delegate to Russia the right to act on its behalf.’ Moscow’s tactless acts – both major and minor – accelerated the divorce process between Russia and its immediate Central Asian neighbour.

Former units of the Soviet army, with the exception of those under direct Russian command, were gradually transformed into the national armies of Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan and Turkmenistan. Moves were made to staff them exclusively with young local nationals, and more and more officer positions were filled with local military men and women.

The nascent armed forces of Tajikistan split and became involved in the civil war. The ‘government’ forces, relying on the northern regions and the help of the Uzbeks, defeated the ‘opposition’, supported by the Tajik Diaspora in Afghanistan. The civil war in Tajikistan cost more than 20,000 lives, destroyed a third of the republic’s national wealth, practically paralyzed the economy, and led to the en masse migration of the Russian-speaking population. It highlighted a very important military-political problem, directly linked to the relationships between Russia and the Central Asian republics – the security of the CIS frontiers.

The Russian leadership proved unprepared to address this question. Proclaiming the principle of ‘non-intervention’, Moscow could not protect the Russian and Russian-speaking population of the republic. The ‘pro-government’ forces, supported by the Uzbeks, were led by a sizable part of former party nomenklatura, which alienated the radical democrats who surrounded Yeltsin; but neither did Moscow feel any sympathies for their enemies, the Islamists.

The victory of the ‘pro-government’ forces made the Tajik-Afghan border almost a front line, but it was guarded mainly by Russian troops. The independent Tajik government was unable to control it and was faced with the threat of the opposition, helped by the Afghan Mojaheds. But there were virtually no frontiers, even ‘transparent’ ones, between Tajikistan and other Central Asian republics. There were no frontiers at all between the southern frontiers of the ex-USSR and the Arctic Ocean. Russia was faced with a dilemma: to leave or to stay. If it were to quit, Tajikistan would be ‘Afghanized’, Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan would follow and, further to the north, the Russian-Kazakhstan border was not only not equipped nor fortified, but even not demarcated. The way to Russia for gangs, drugs and weapons was open. To stay meant an extremely unpopular step in a country that had not yet rid itself of the ‘Afghan syndrome’. It meant human losses, huge expenses, and additional contingents of border troops. The Russian leadership chose the second path, though unwillingly.

The total length of the frontiers of the Russian Federation is 58,562 km (that of the USSR was 64,000 km). The status of the frontiers with five Central Asian states differs considerably from that with other post-Soviet states. Whereas the regime at the frontiers with the Baltic countries corresponds to international standards and at least a sort of customs control exists at the borders with Ukraine, Belorussia and Transcaucasian states, the Central Asian republics still share a common customs space with Russia. Their frontiers with Russia and with each other retain full or relative ‘transparency’.

Russia always considered security of the frontiers a part of the protection of its vitally important interests and tried to inculcate the same approach in its CIS allies. On 30 December 1991 the CIS members signed an agreement in Minsk on the armed and border forces of the CIS and on the appointment of the commander-in-chief of the border forces. At the Council of Heads of States, agreements were signed on 20 March 1992 on security of state frontiers and naval economic zones, the status of the CIS border forces, staffing principles, procedures for their finance, and issues surrounding the united command of the forces. However, Turkmenistan did not sign some of these documents, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan suggested amendments to some articles, and Moldova and Ukraine did not sign anything. As a result, all agreements became non-working, and some CIS countries started to establish border forces of their own.

On 6 July 1992, in Moscow, the Council of the Heads of States decided to abolish the United Military Command and the post of the commander-in-chief of the border forces, and set up the Council of Commanders of Border Forces of the CIS. On 9 October an agreement was concluded in Bishkek on cooperation in ensuring stability at the outer frontiers. This was signed by Armenia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It was agreed that a permanent working body of the Council of Commanders of Border Forces Coordination Service should be created.

The agreement provided for a series of collective measures in the case of destabilization at a section of the outer frontiers of the CIS. They include all-round coordination of the activities of the border forces and respective services, concerted control of the situation in the destabilized zone, and mutual assistance in strengthening the security regime at the outer frontiers.

The principle fixed in the agreement that the outer frontiers of the signatories (i.e. the republics who were party to the agreement) shall be considered the common frontier of the CIS is extremely important. It enables Russia to take part in their security. Russia’s political, economic and military presence in several states in Central Asia has become, essentially, an important factor in the maintenance of peace and security. Withdrawal could lead to a rapid deterioration in the stability of the area, with catastrophic consequences, and the possibility of intervention by a third country.

On the basis of international treaties and agreements of the former USSR and bilateral arrangements, Russian border troops are also deployed in Kyrghyzstan and Turkmenistan.

In the future, security of the outer frontiers of the five Central Asian republics, as well as that of the other signatories to the Bishkek agreement (Russia concluded separate agreements on guarding the southern frontiers with them) will be ensured by their own border troops. For the time being, however, the Central Asian states accept the help of Russian forces.

The establishment of Russia’s state frontiers with the Central Asian states (actually with Kazakhstan alone) will take years. The realities of the present time have begun to push Moscow away from the principles of ‘transparency’ of the Russian borders and towards the introduction of customs controls.

In the future, it is likely that all five Central Asian states will establish their own national armed forces, and either give up the Russian military presence totally or at least minimize it. There are now no Russian troops at all in Uzbekistan, and only Russian border forces in Turkmenistan. However, if the states are to remain allies, military cooperation will continue. Most of the institutes where officers are trained are located in Russian territory. The bulk of the arms-producing industry is concentrated in Russia. Russian specialists will be needed for both the maintenance and operation of military hardware. The largest military testing grounds and complexes will probably remain under joint management. Agreements have been already concluded on Baikonur. Specialists deem it possible that young people from the heavily populated Central Asian regions will be invited to serve on a contractual basis in the Russian army, which has great difficulties in staffing the units.

Although the CIS countries signed the Collective Security Treaty in May 1992 in Tashkent, military cooperation among the former USSR republics has not developed particularly well since then. The Commonwealth countries, especially those in Central Asia, keep their distance from Russia in the development of their armed forces, preferring to use their connections with the USA, Turkey, Iran and Germany. Of all the Central Asian republics, only Tajikistan, where Russian border troops are deployed, is interested in dealing with Russia.

NATO has begun to offer active help to the Central Asian republics in the establishment of their armed forces. Centrasbat, a military exercise, is carried out on an annual basis in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan within the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. Military hardware is often provided by the USA, France and Germany.

All the Central Asian states continue to participate in the common air defence system of the CIS.

A lot will depend on the future economic and political development of the CIS states, which still has a long way to go. The President of Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev, believes that the ex-Soviet republics have failed to achieve the level of integration in the world that they had hoped for. According to him, they ‘wanted mutually advantageous integration, especially in the economy.’ However, this did not happen because of the shadow cast by the ‘Soviet mentality’ which prevents CIS republics from being perceived as equal states.

The future of the CIS today seems ever more dubious in the light of the emergence of regional organizations in the post-Soviet space such as the Central Asian Alliance (CAA) and the Alliance of Russia and Belorussia. Over the years of its existence, the CIS has never succeeded in proving its viability and, as many sceptics predicted, has served only to formalize the peaceful divorce of the former USSR republics. The perceived potential for disintegration in the CIS led to the creation of various regional organizations, the first of which was the CAA of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan. In its turn, Russia tried to unite the CIS countries around itself by creating a Customs Alliance with Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzstan: this, however, yielded no tangible results because of non-implementation of obligations by the parties concerned.

The Alliance of Slav Republics, which emerged in April 1996 and comprises Russia and Belorussia, does not appear to be conducive to Russia’s rapprochement with the Central Asian states, at least for the time being. The former Soviet republics consider the creation of this organization to be an attempt to reanimate the USSR. Nazarbaev claims that the Alliance of Belorussia and Russia not only hampers integration processes, but threatens the very existence of the CIS. Karimov, President of Uzbekistan, expressed an even more negative attitude, arguing that ‘President Lukashenko’s passionate speech on the occasion of the revival of the Soviet national anthem and its proclamation as the anthem of the Russo-Belorussian Alliance shows without any doubt the reason for the creation of this partnership.’ The President of Kyrghyzstan, Akaev, has also expressed his bewilderment over the move.

Development of the CIS in recent years has shown its future to be unpredictable, and there are good reasons for pessimism. Many leaders of the CIS states are reluctant to move towards further integration between the republics; because of this, no functioning political structures have materialized. All attempts to establish a CIS supranational body which would enhance the efficient coordination of the Commonwealth’s activities are denounced by many of its members as attempts to revive the USSR: that is why the necessary political mechanisms which could ratify decisions taken by heads of states and governments have not been created. As a result, 90% of more than 2000 documents signed within the CIS framework have not been implemented. The leaders of the CIS countries treat documents prepared for this organization with unconcealed indifference. The internal problems of the Commonwealth have therefore not been solved, and they continue to worsen. In addition, the creation of regional organizations such as the Customs Alliance of Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzstan, the Alliance of Russia and Belorussia, and the Central Asian Alliance of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan weakens the influence of the CIS.

Meanwhile, in the years of its existence (since 1 February 1994), the CAA has demonstrated some positive results. None of the leaders concerned accuses others in public of a failure to implement their obligations, as often happens in the Russia-Belorussia Alliance. The CAA has served to strengthen the relationship between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan, and future possibilities include the establishment of a military-political alliance. In 1996-97 the Ministries of Defence in each of the republics held regular joint meetings and military exercises.

However, there are problems: for example, the relationship between the CAA and Turkmenistan, which has not joined the Alliance, remains complex, and the rivalry between Nazarbaev and Karimov for the regional leadership precludes the creation of any vertical structures within the framework of the organization.

The CAA could also evolve into a military-political bloc: it is being pushed in this direction by the threat of the spread of the civil war in neighbouring Afghanistan to Tajikistan and then on to Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan and Kazakhstan. In conditions in which the collective security treaties among the CIS countries do not work properly, if at all, the leaders of the Central Asian countries are particularly concerned about security in their own republics. Whatever the current state of cooperation between the Central Asian states and Russia, the local ruling elites appear to believe that keeping their distance from Russia, at least openly, is a political necessity at the present time.

In such an environment, the Central Asian leaders have turned towards the wider world in their search for allies and protectors. Much work goes towards developing positive contacts with the USA, Japan, Western Europe and China.

Among the main new actors on the Central Asian political stage, Turkey and Iran are worth mentioning. The Turks see the protection of ‘younger Turkic brethren’ as fully in keeping with their culture: Turkish intellectuals and politicians display overt nostalgia for their imperial past. Claims on their leading role in the Turkic world have become common in political bargaining, and it has become fashionable to make high-sounding statements that ‘the twenty-first century will be the century of the Turkic peoples.’ Turkey afforded large-scale gestures, organizing summits of the Turkic states, claiming a new geopolitical role, allocating loans, appointing scholarships for Central Asian students, cooperating in the fields of TV, radio, culture. To the former Communists, now in power in the Central Asian states, the Turkish socio-political model, secular and pro-Western, with strong elements of authoritarianism but with a coating of democracy looks attractive. Yet even small-scale democratic experiments in some Central Asian republics were seen as a threat to the ruling regimes and were discontinued.