Contemporary America E-Book

M. J. Heale

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 676

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

Beschreibung

This history of America’s recent past focuses on the importance of the United States’ interaction with the outside world and includes detailed accounts of the presidencies of Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush.

• Provides a substantial account of the dramatic history of America since 1980, covering the Reagan years, the Clinton presidency, the impact of 9/11, the War on Terror, and the election of Barack Obama
• Based on both secondary and primary resources, and includes research taken from newspapers, magazines, official documents, and memoirs
• Written by a distinguished contemporary historian and a leading historian of the United States
• Discusses the growing fragmentation of American society and the increasing distance between rich and poor under the impact of public policies and global forces

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

A HISTORY OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Title page

Copyright page

Dedication

Series Editor’s Preface

Preface

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1 Losing Control: The United States in 1980

Chapter 2 Borrowing as a Way of Life: A Dependent Economy and a Fragmenting Society

Chapter 3 Strangers in the Land: Open Borders and American Identity

Chapter 4 Glad Morning Again: A Reagan Revolution?

Chapter 5 Reviving and Winning the Cold War

Chapter 6 The Morning After: The Limitations of Conservatism

Chapter 7 Gentleman George, Culture Wars, and the Return of Malaise

Chapter 8 Groping for a New World Order

Chapter 9 The Era of Globalization

Chapter 10 Porous Borders and Global Warming

Chapter 11 The New Age of Bill Clinton

Chapter 12 Democracy for the World

Chapter 13 The Comeback Kid v. the Gringrich Who Stole Christmas

Chapter 14 Since 2001: Decade of Crises

Notes

Abbreviations

Select Bibliography

A. Introduction

B. The 1970s, the Carter Presidency, and the 1980 Election

C. Economics and Immigration

D. The Long 1980s (Reagan and Bush Sr.)

E. Environment

F. Globalization

G. Bill Clinton and the 1990s

H. Since 2000

Index

A HISTORY OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

General Editor: Keith Robbins

This series offers an historical perspective on the development of the contemporary world. Each of the books examines a particular region or a global theme as it has evolved in the recent past. The focus is primarily on the period since the 1980s but authors provide deeper context wherever necessary. While all the volumes offer an historical framework for analysis, the books are written for an interdisciplinary audience and assume no prior knowledge on the part of readers.

Published

Contemporary Japan

Jeff Kingston

Contemporary America

M.J. Heale

Contemporary Global Economy

Alfred E. Eckes, Jr.

In Preparation

Contemporary Latin America

Robert H. Holden & Rina Villars

Contemporary South Asia

David Hall Matthews

Contemporary Africa

Tom Lodge

Contemporary China

Yongnian Zheng

This edition first published 2011

© 2011 M.J. Heale

Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell’s publishing program has been merged with Wiley’s global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Heale, M. J.

 Contemporary America : power, dependency, and globalization since 1980 / M.J. Heale.

p. cm. – (A history of the contemporary world)

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 ISBN 978-1-4051-3640-2 (hardcover : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-1-4051-3641-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. United States–Politics and government–1945–1989. 2. United States–Politics and government–1989– 3. United States–Foreign relations–1945–1989. 4. United States–Foreign relations–1989– I. Title.

 E839.5.H43 2011

 973.92–dc22

2010043500

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

This book is published in the following electronic formats: ePDFs 9781444396867; ePub 9781444396874

For Lesley, again, with love

Series Editor’s Preface

The contemporary world frequently presents a baffling spectacle: “New world orders” come and go; “Clashes of civilizations” seem imminent if not actual; “Peace dividends” appear easily lost in the post; terrorism and “wars on terror” occupy the headlines. “Mature” states live alongside “failed” states in mutual apprehension. The “rules” of the international game, in these circumstances, are difficult to discern. What “international law” is, or is not, remains enduringly problematic. Certainly it is a world in which there are still frontiers, borders, and boundaries, but both metaphorically and in reality they are difficult to patrol and maintain. “Asylum” occupies the headlines as populations shift across continents, driven by fear. Other migrants simply seek a better standard of living. The organs of the “international community,” though frequently invoked, look inadequate to deal with the myriad problems confronting the world. Climate change, however induced, is not susceptible to national control. Famine seems endemic in certain countries. Population pressures threaten finite resources. It is in this context that globalization, however understood, is both demonized and lauded.

Such a list of contemporary problems could be amplified in detail and almost indefinitely extended. It is a complex world, ripe for investigation in this ambitious new series of books. “Contemporary,” of course, is always difficult to define. The focus in this series is on the evolution of the world since the 1980s. As time passes, and as the volumes appear, it no longer seems sensible to equate “the world since 1945” with “contemporary history.” The legacy of the “Cold War” lingers on but it is emphatically “in the background.” The fuzziness about “the 1980s” is deliberate. No single year ever carries the same significance across the globe. Authors are therefore establishing their own precise starting points, within the overall “contemporary” framework.

The series treats the history of particular regions, countries, or continents but does so in full awareness that such histories, for all their continuing distinctiveness, can only rarely be considered apart from the history of the world as a whole. Economic, demographic, environmental, and religious issues transcend state, regional, or continental boundaries. Just as the world itself struggles to reconcile diversity and individuality with unity and common purpose, so do the authors of these volumes. The concept is challenging. Authors have been selected who sit loosely on their disciplinary identity – whether that be as historians, political scientists, or students of international relations. The task is to integrate as many aspects of contemporary life as possible in an accessible manner. There is scarcely any aspect of contemporary world history which has not felt, in one way or another, the impress of the United States, whether perceived as champion of freedom or agent of oppression. In its interaction with the world beyond its borders it has experienced, in bewildering combination, both the advantage of military strength and its limitations. It has sometimes found itself operating in lonely eminence, both feared and admired, as the supposed arbiter of the universe. Yet, alongside displays of power, have come moments of self-doubt. Hope has had to be reborn in circumstances of economic uncertainty. It is this sometimes bewildering mixture which this volume captures. Moreover, it does not merely reflect on America’s place in the world. It captures the sense in which, as no other, the United States is itself a world of astonishing diversity. It is this combination that ensured for this book a central place in any consideration of “the contemporary world.”

Preface

The quarter-century after World War II is sometimes remembered as a “golden age” for the United States. Its power was without parallel in history and its economy was growing steadily and sometimes strongly. Most, if not all, Americans could avail themselves of the comforts of what J. Kenneth Galbraith called the “affluent society.” As a superpower very aware of its awesome responsibilities, the United States played a commanding role on the world stage. Yet in some respects a mightily armed America seemed to insulate its citizenry from foreign influences. In the middle years of the twentieth century the American economy was to a significant degree self-sufficient, and its success reinforced confidence in the American way. As it was purring along, largely oblivious to the wider world, the number of foreigners allowed to settle within American borders was limited. Americans mostly socialized and did business with one another. Ronald Reagan as an actor only once left American shores. Americans – like other peoples – have sometimes been accused of being parochial, of being relatively immune to outside influences, and if this was ever true there was some excuse for it in these years.

Yet the United States could never be truly isolationist, even in the 1950s, and the golden age did not last. By about 1980 it was clear to most Americans that they were part of a world that they could not wholly control, that they were not undisputed masters of their own destiny. The Vietnam War had already delivered a mighty psychological blow, rendering political leaders wary of succumbing again to what Senator William Fulbright had called “the arrogance of power,” and now Soviet influence seemed to be on the march. American economic might was also being challenged. Some companies, rendered complacent by their postwar profits, had failed to innovate sufficiently and were ill prepared for the foreign competition that was sending them reeling. Modern technology was increasingly allowing vast amounts of capital, images, and information to swill around the world at the touch of a button, largely outside the control of government. Immigrants from many lands were pouring into the country, simultaneously multiplying global connections while transforming the nature of the population. Major technological and natural disasters, in the United States and elsewhere, also carried the message that Americans were fellow passengers along with the rest of humanity aboard Spaceship Earth. It was during the 1980s that some American scientists began to issue serious warnings about global warming.

This is not to say that the United States was a hapless and innocent victim of these unsettling processes. The United States would exert more influence in this changing world, economically, militarily, and culturally, than any other country, though it could not act as if others did not exist. Ronald Reagan was elected to the presidency with the ambition of restoring American strength and freedom of action, but his policies tended to make the United States yet more dependent on others. When he entered the White House the United States was the largest creditor nation in the world; during his second term it became the largest debtor nation, and it stayed that way. In a variety of ways the United States found that it could not retreat into the haughty isolation that some Americans seemed to favor after Vietnam. While Reagan seemed to hanker for a lost autonomy, Bill Clinton as president tried to persuade his fellow Americans of the virtues of interdependence.

Increasing interaction with the world may have done something to enhance the importance of the presidency, in which national leadership resided. But incumbents, or at least their aides, had also learned how to manage the modern media, though good fortune played its part too. The last president to have served two full terms had been Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s, but after 1980 three managed to do so. Ronald Reagan was “the Great Communicator,” adept after a career in show business at speaking to camera. It was a role he approached with reverence, his respect for the presidency showing in the formal suit he invariably wore in the Oval Office. The son of a feckless shoe salesman and devout mother, Reagan was a true believer in the American dream, which he seemed to personify in his journey from modest Illinois origins via Hollywood to the White House. He was the only president to have been divorced, but traditionalists were reassured by his endorsement of family values and his unquestioning if unobtrusive religious faith – God was “the Man Upstairs.” He could swear when angry but he never blasphemed; at weekends he enjoyed watching old-fashioned movies with his wife. Confident, optimistic, amiable, Reagan often broke awkward moments by telling stories, and he liked to swap jokes with his visitors. His easy charm gave him greater popularity than his policies, which reflected deep ideological convictions not often seen in professional politicians. The elderly Reagan could not always command detail, but he knew what he wanted, and the limited number of his goals allowed him to drive toward them. He won public respect as a strong president, and his stubborn determination helped him secure one of the greatest foreign policy coups in American history. His successor, George Bush, served only one term, for which there was a range of reasons, among them his lack of interest in public relations and his downgrading of the White House’s celebrated speech-writing operation.

More sensitive to the public mood was Bill Clinton, whose acute antennae and ferocious ambition had lifted him while still a young man from a modest small-town background to a state governorship and then the presidency. He and his talented lawyer wife Hillary seemed to personify the arrival into American politics of the “yuppies,” young, upwardly mobile professionals who had attracted attention as a rising social class during the expansion of the Reagan era. A consummate campaigner, Clinton somehow contrived to combine a rare empathy for ordinary folk with a laid-back charm once illustrated by the playing of the saxophone in a late-night television show, complete with shades. A student during the 1960s, Clinton admitted that he had once smoked marijuana (“I didn’t inhale it”), and his reputation as a womanizer also associated him with permissive values. But the American public proved tolerant of such peccadilloes. African American writer Toni Morrison called him “our first black president,” with his fondness for jazz and junk food, someone that black Americans could identify with when affronted conservatives tried to put the upstart in his place. Clinton also possessed an intellect rarely equaled among American presidents, and he consumed contemporary studies of the state of the nation as avidly as he consumed hamburgers. White House discussions could become like academic seminars. If he never managed a foreign policy triumph to match Ronald Reagan’s, he reversed policies on the economy, which under his guidance achieved a dynamism it had not experienced in decades. The inheritor of this strong economy was George W. Bush, the easy-going son of Clinton’s predecessor, who was said to be the kind of man Americans would like to have a drink with, except that he himself had forsaken alcohol after the excesses of his youth. A canny enough politician, it was as a war president that Bush secured re-election, though before his term was over historians were debating whether he was the worst president ever. That discussion was premature, though it reflected something of the disenchantment that many Americans felt about the condition of the United States in the modern world.

By conventional measurements the United States grew considerably richer in the decades after 1980 – but periods of great social and economic change bring both winners and losers. Economic growth made some communities and individuals very rich; Americans of the 1980s could marvel at the life of the affluent in such television shows as Dynasty. However, partly because of the increasing immersion in a global economy, the distance between the richest and poorest Americans was growing. Continuing suburbanization, spurred on by an unquenchable consumer culture, tended to segment the population, as like settled with like and different social groups increasingly became strangers to one another, a feature exemplified by the emergence of “gated” communities. The unanticipated flood of Third World immigrants further undermined any sense of homogeneity, and, together with the heightened awareness of ethnicity unleashed by the civil rights movement, promoted perceptions of the United States as a multicultural society. The growing diversity of urban America was reflected in the host of crime shows on television, from Hill Street Blues to The Wire, with their mixed racial and ethnic casts. The eruption of the so-called “culture wars” moved historian Arthur Schlesinger in 1991 to warn of “the fragmentation, resegregation, and tribalization of American life.”

The social and cultural divisions, while deepened by economic and demographic transformation, were important though should not be exaggerated. The various culture wars attracted media attention, but were not the most fundamental forces shaping American society and politics. The “mood of the nation,” as captured in opinion polls as well as in presidential approval ratings, quite closely followed economic performance, though was also vitally affected by major international events. As had long been the case, American politics was primarily structured by economics, and there was some evidence in the decades after 1980 that economic considerations were coming to loom larger. “It’s the economy, stupid!” was famously said to explain the election of Bill Clinton as president in 1992, though it could equally be applied to the presidential elections of 1980 and 2008, and indeed to others in between. The film Falling Down, which focused on the plight of a white-collar worker rendered redundant in the “downsizing” of the 1990s, spoke to aspects of an America caught up in painful social and economic change. Such tensions periodically awakened the populist impulse in American politics, as established authorities were attacked in the name of the powerless.

The period since 1980 has often been treated as a predominantly conservative era, and so it was, though this characterization tends to overlook the degree to which American liberalism survived, albeit in new forms. Business pressure groups may have exerted disproportionate influence in Washington during these decades, but progressive and ethnic pressure groups carried some weight too. Environmentalism joined civil rights as the favored social movement of many liberals and became a force to be reckoned with. Conservatism had its limits, and liberals had successfully institutionalized many of their previous gains. While Ronald Reagan made it his mission to “take government off the backs of the people,” Americans were not prepared to forego some of the benefits that government brings. Government was still “big” 30 years after Reagan’s election, though no more popular.

Such features as massive immigration, increased international competition, and environmental crises tended to break down the boundaries between “domestic” and “foreign.” The mid-twentieth century had bequeathed a heritage of “big government,” and it was this government that was exposed to the strains associated with the interaction of a fragmented society and a volatile international milieu. Washington was the buffer between the two. It has often been noted that, notwithstanding the capacity of some presidents to secure re-election, the late twentieth century recorded a marked drop in the confidence of Americans in their leaders and in their political institutions. Some of this reflected the impact of these processes, since the federal government often seemed the helpless victim of forces it could not control. The American diplomat George Kennan once recalled of his early boyhood days in the Midwest that “when times were hard, as they often were, groans and lamentations went up to God, but never to Washington.” In the aftermath of the creation of the New Deal in the 1930s, the national security state in the 1940s, and the Great Society in the 1960s, however, when times were hard lamentations did go up to Washington, even from those committed to reducing federal power. When times are hard Washington gets blamed, though in a globalized world there are limits to what Washington can do. This would be one of the lessons of the decades that followed the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

Acknowledgments

Several friends and scholars have helped to make this book possible. John Ashworth and Iwan Morgan steadfastly read almost the entire typescript; Gareth Davies and John Thompson scrutinized a number of chapters; and Michael Coyne offered his expertise on film history. Their suggestions are greatly appreciated, as are those of the anonymous reviewers and of the series’ editor Keith Robbins. Playing important roles too have been the academic hospitality of the Rothermere American Institute, Oxford, and the financial assistance of the Leverhulme Trust.

Chapter 1

Losing Control: The United States in 1980

The Americans were not a happy people as the 1970s ended. The Gallup Poll in January 1979 reported that some 55 percent of respondents expected the coming year to be “worse” than the preceding one; only 33 percent anticipated something “better.” In March the same organization found that 69 percent of Americans were “dissatisfied” with “the way things are going in the United States”; by August the figure was up to a record 84 percent. That year Business Week published a special issue on the theme of “The Decline of US Power.” Another set of polls in 1980 found that Americans believed that their lives “five years ago” had been better than “at the present time,” and a Newsweek cover asked “Has America Lost Its Clout?” A few years later Ronald Reagan would be credited with restoring American self-confidence, but at the end of the 1970s pessimism rather than optimism was the prevailing sentiment among the public at large.1

The decade of the 1970s may not have witnessed the tumult of the “Sixties,” but these years had offered Americans scant reason to rejoice. The traumatic war in Vietnam had ended ingloriously, the most powerful nation on earth forced into shameful retreat. Not just the whole of Vietnam, but Cambodia too fell to the communists. International rebuffs to the United States had continued through the decade. There were pro-Soviet governments in Portugal’s former African colonies, and in 1979 left-wing groups seized power even in the Americas, in Nicaragua and Grenada. It was communism rather than capitalism that seemed to be winning the battle for the soul of humankind. The Soviet Union, believing that history was moving in its direction, was encouraging developing nations and nationalist forces around the world to join it in resisting capitalist imperialism. Only a generation earlier a victorious United States had seemed to have the globe at its feet.

In those happy years following World War II, too, the American economy had been truly redoubtable, and its managers were confident of maintaining full employment and an improving standard of living. But in the 1970s an exceptional inflation juddered upward through the decade, remorselessly eroding the savings and living standards of millions. For decades the United States had been able to rely largely on its own resources, but no longer. Bewildering events in the Middle East (together with rapidly increasing world demand) quadrupled the price of oil on the world markets in 1974 and sent it soaring again in 1979, and the consequent shortages forced motorists waiting in gas lines to contemplate the sobering truth that the United States was no longer self-sufficient in energy. The political system offered little comfort. Since the 1960s public confidence in Washington had generally been falling. Richard Nixon had exited the presidency gracelessly and in disgrace, the only president to have had to resign his high office. The Watergate scandal had rendered a massive blow to public confidence in government. As many as 70 persons, including cabinet members and White House aides, had pleaded guilty to or were convicted of crimes associated with Watergate. It was by no means irrational in 1979 to expect the worse of the future. John Updike caught the mood in his novel set in that year, Rabbit Is Rich, which begins with: “Running out of gas, Rabbit Angstrom thinks … The fucking world is running out of gas … the people out there are getting frantic, they know the great American ride is ending.”2

* * *

In 1941 Time publisher Henry Luce had spoken of “the American Century,” anticipating an era in which American values would pervade the world. While the Cold War soon destroyed the optimism of that vision, the postwar era in many ways proved a golden one for the United States, indeed a “Golden Age” in Eric Hobsbawm’s phrase for the developed capitalist world in general. In 1945, Norwegian scholar Geir Lundestad has written, that the United States “was really unique in history”: “In the overwhelming size of its economy, in its superior military strength, and in its popular message to the world, its soft power, the United States was in a league of its own.”