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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
The indispensable guide to conflict resolution in a troubled world
Conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding have never been more important as priorities on the global agenda. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and tensions between the major powers in what is now a multi-polar world, require new conflict resolution responses. The fifth edition of this hugely popular text offers a commanding overview of today’s changing conflict landscape and the latest developments and new ideas in the field. Fluently written in an easy-to-follow style, it guides readers carefully through the key concepts, issues and debates, evaluates successes and failures, and assesses the main challenges for conflict resolution today.
Comprehensively updated and illustrated with new case studies, the fifth edition returns to its favoured twelve-chapter format. It remains the leading text for students of peace and security studies, conflict management and international politics, as well as policy-makers and those working in NGOs and think tanks.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024
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CONTENTS
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
Acknowledgements
Illustration Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Introduction
Conflict Resolution and the Arrow of History, 1991–2024
Successive Editions of Contemporary Conflict Resolution Compared
A Realist Critique: The Arrow of History as an Idealist Delusion
A Conflict Resolution Response: The Arrow of History and the Complexity of World Order
On Predicting the Future
Conclusion: Three Faces of Conflict Resolution and an Outline of Critiques
Notes
1 Conflict Resolution: History, Concepts and Models
Initial Definitions
Precursors: The First Generation, 1918–1939
Founders: The Second Generation, 1950s and 1960s
Consolidators: The Third Generation, 1970s and 1980s
The Hourglass Model
Conclusion
Discussion questions
Notes
2 Measuring Conflicts, Deadly Quarrels and Positive Peace
The Peace and Conflict Domain
Conflict Trends
Conflict Types
Conflict Distribution
Conflict Costs
Conflict Mapping and Conflict Tracking
Conclusion
Discussion questions
Notes
3 Understanding Contemporary Conflict
Theories and Frameworks
Edward Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)
From Protracted Social Conflict to Transnational Conflict
Case Study: The 2011 Arab Revolutions as a Regional Transnational Conflict
Case Study: The Russia–Ukraine War as a Transnational Conflict
The Analysis and Mapping of Complex Conflict Systems
Discussion questions
Note
4 Non-Violent Resistance and Conflict Resolution
History of Non-Violent Resistance
Theory of Non-Violent Resistance
Effectiveness of Non-Violent Direct Action
Comparing and Integrating Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation
Culture, Conflict and Non-Violent Resistance
Conclusion
Discussion questions
5 Preventing Violent Conflict
Emergent Conflict and Peaceful Change
Early Warning
Structural Prevention
Direct Prevention
Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities
The Adoption of Conflict Prevention by International Organizations
Case Study: Conflict Prevention in Taiwan
Conclusion
Discussion questions
6 Containing Violent Conflict: Peacekeeping
First- and Second-Generation UN Peacekeeping, 1956–1995
War Zones, War Economies and Cultures of Violence
Third-Generation Peacekeeping, 1995–2015
Case Study: Mali, 2012–2023
Peacekeeping and Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution, 2015–2024
Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution and the Ethics of Intervention
Conclusion
Discussion questions
Note
7 Ending Violent Conflict: Peacemaking
The Challenge of Ending Violent Conflict in Ukraine
A Survey of Peace Agreements, 2000–2021
Obstacles to War Ending and Conflict Transformers
The ‘Law of Peace’
Conditions for Ending Violent Conflict
Mediation and Third-Party Intervention
Negotiation
Turning Points, Sticking Points and Timing
Conclusion – Ukraine Revisited
Discussion questions
Notes
8 Postwar Reconstruction
Postwar Peace Support Operations, 1989–2005
Tensions and Trade-Offs in Postwar Reconstruction
Statebuilding and Stabilization Missions, 2005–2024
The Diversity of Postwar Reconstruction and the Challenge of Evaluation
Current Controversies
Conclusion
Discussion questions
9 Peacebuilding and Reconciliation
The Mainstreaming of Peacebuilding Models in International Policy
Contending Concepts of Peacebuilding
Peace Education and Peacebuilding
Evaluating Peacebuilding
Reconciliation as a Form of Deeper Peacebuilding
Dilemmas and Tensions in Reconciliation
Alternative Paths to Reconciliation
Conclusion
Discussion questions
10 Testing Conflict Resolution: Radical Disagreement
Intractable Conflicts
Radical Disagreement and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
How Traditional Communicative Conflict Resolution Does Not Address Radical Disagreement
Taking Radical Disagreement Seriously: Promoting Collective Strategic Thinking When Conflict Resolution is Premature
Conclusion
Discussion questions
Notes
11 Conflict Resolution, the Media and Cyberspace
The Mass Media and Conflict Resolution
Conflict in Cyberspace
Conflict Resolution in Cyberspace
PeaceTech in Cyberspace
Conclusion
Discussion questions
Note
12 Conflict Resolution in Art and Popular Culture
Creative Networks in Conflict Resolution
Sport and Conflict Resolution
Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution: Culture, Religion and Human Nature
Measuring Intercultural Dialogue for Peace
Conclusion
Discussion questions
Notes
Conclusion: Conflict Resolution and the Future
The Main Arguments of Contemporary Conflict Resolution
Conflict Resolution and the Legacy of Immanuel Kant
Conflict Resolution in a Multipolar World: Preventing a Third World War
Conflict Resolution and the International Order: (1) Preventing a US–China Conflict
Conflict Resolution and the International Order: (2) Responding to Climate Change
The Iraq and Ukraine Wars: Testing Pure and Partisan Realism
Critiques of Conflict Resolution Revisited
Transnational Conflict and Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution
Conclusion: On Defending and Extending the acquis cosmopolitain and Why Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution Must Not be Identified with the West
Notes
References
Index
End User License Agreement
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
Acknowledgements
Illustration Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Introduction
Begin Reading
Conclusion: Conflict Resolution and the Future
References
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1
Galtung’s models of conflict, violence and peace
Figure 1.2
Five approaches to conflict
Figure 1.3
Zero-sum and non-zero-sum outcomes
Figure 1.4
Positions, interests and needs
Figure 1.5
Coercive and non-coercive third-party intervention
Figure 1.6
William Ury’s third side roles
Figure 1.7
Actors and approaches to peacebuilding
Figure 1.8
Multitrack conflict resolution
Figure 1.9
Transforming asymmetric conflicts
Figure 1.10
The hourglass model: conflict containment, conflict settlement and conflict tran…
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1
Measuring peaceful change
Figure 2.2
The declining frequency of interstate war, 1500–2015
Figure 2.3
Number of armed conflicts by type and number of battle deaths, 1946–2022
Figure 2.4
Fatalities in armed conflicts by region, 1989–2022
Figure 2.5
Trends in non-violent and violent conflicts, 2013–2022
Figure 2.6
Deaths from terrorism, 2007–2022
Figure 2.7
One-sided violence by region, 1989–2022
Figure 2.8
Armed conflicts by region, 1946–2022
Figure 2.9
Forcible displacement worldwide, 1990–2022
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1
Internal, relational and contextual theories of conflict
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1
Number of non-violent and violent campaigns, by decade
Figure 4.2
Success rates (%) of non-violent and violent campaigns by decade, 1950–2019
Figure 4.3
Transforming asymmetric conflicts
Figure 4.4
Analysing the situation
Figure 4.5
Building support
Figure 4.6
Constructive programme
Figure 4.7
Máire Dugan’s nested theory of conflict
Figure 4.8
Lederach’s integrated framework for peacebuilding
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1
Prevention and the conflict cycle: a linear view
Figure 5.2
Prevention and the conflict cycle: a dynamic view
Figure 5.3
New armed conflicts and all armed conflicts, 1945–2022
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1
Personnel deployed in peacekeeping/peace support operations, 2023
Figure 6.2
Number of active UN peacekeeping missions, 1956–2022
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1
Negotiations, mediation and peace agreements in civil wars, 1975–2013
Figure 7.2
The gradient of conflict involvement
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1
Postwar reconstruction: nested tasks and phases
Figure 8.2
Varied experience of peace after peace operations
Figure 8.3
The eight-pillar model of positive peace in the Philippines
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1
Framework for peacebuilding from below
Figure 9.2
The eight pillars of positive peace
Chapter 10
Figure 10.1
The hexagon of radical disagreement
Figure 10.2
Extended conflict resolution
Chapter 11
Figure 11.1
The role of the media in conflict
List of Tables
Introduction
Table 0.1
The evolution of attempts to create a peaceful postwar international order
Table 0.2
The international collectivity: five aspects
Table 0.3
The long history of the modern state system
Table 0.4
The United Nations, international law and international intervention
Table 0.5
Three forms of power and three conflict resolution responses
Chapter 1
Table 1.1
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Table 1.2
Three faces of power
Chapter 2
Table 2.1
The proliferation of datasets
Table 2.2
A working conflict typology
Chapter 3
Table 3.1
Azar’s preconditions for protracted social conflict (PSC)
Table 3.2
An interpretative framework for transnational conflict (TNC)
Chapter 4
Table 4.1
Three conflict resolution answers to the culture question
Chapter 5
Table 5.1
Success and failure in conflict prevention
Chapter 6
Table 6.1
Conflict containment and peacekeeping
Table 6.2
The evolution of UN peacekeeping, 1988–2022
Table 6.3
Traditional peacekeeping, third-generation peacekeeping and war
Chapter 8
Table 8.1
Intervention/reconstruction operations, 1989–2005
Chapter 9
Table 9.1
Four dimensions of reconciliation
Table 9.2
From negative to positive peace via justice
Table 9.3
Justice: between amnesia and vengeance
Chapter 10
Table 10.1
Negotiation, problem-solving and dialogue
Chapter 12
Table 12.1
Visualizing peace
List of Boxes
Chapter 1
Box 1.1
Mary Parker Follett
Chapter 2
Box 2.1
Challenges of gathering and analysing conflict data
Box 2.2
Definitions of terrorism
Box 2.3
Gender and conflict resolution: case studies of women responding to conflict
Box 2.4
A conflict mapping guide
Box 2.5
The Ushahidi mapping platform
Box 2.6
Sources of information for peace and conflict tracking
Chapter 3
Box 3.1
Interpretations of the Cold War
Box 3.2
Interpretations of the Northern Ireland conflict
Box 3.3
The emergence of Islamic State, 2003–2014
Chapter 4
Box 4.1
Gandhi and the Salt March
Box 4.2
Tahrir Square: culture, religion and non-violence
Chapter 5
Box 5.1
Peaceful change in conditions of structural violence: the transformation of Kera…
Box 5.2
Prevention of social conflict: the crisis at Ådalen and the development of the S…
Box 5.3
Environmental conflict resolution as a means of preventing conflict
Box 5.4
Conflict prevention in Estonia
Box 5.5
Conflict prevention in Kenya
Box 5.6
Geheniya – an interfaith women’s peacebuilding project in Sri Lanka
Chapter 6
Box 6.1
‘Less peacekeeping will not make the world safer. It will only facilitate more v…
Box 6.2
2005 World Summit Outcome Document: The Responsibility to Protect
Chapter 7
Box 7.1
Selected peace agreements in armed conflicts, 2000–2021
Box 7.2
Peace agreements over Sudan
Box 7.3
Strategic dilemmas in peace processes
Chapter 8
Box 8.1
Components of the UN Transition Authority in Cambodia
Box 8.2
A postwar reconstruction matrix
Chapter 9
Box 9.1
The evolution of UN peacebuilding capacity, 2006–2023: the Peacebuilding Funding…
Box 9.2
Local barriers to effective peacebuilding in Sierra Leone
Box 9.3
Perpetual peacebuilding
Box 9.4
Everyday Peace Indicators – origins, case studies and process
Box 9.5
Case study: the Digital Peacebuilders Platform
Box 9.6
Case study: IEP Positive Peace Pillars and Peace 911 in Mindanao, Philippines
Box 9.7
Possibilities for reconciliation between Japan, South Korea and China
Box 9.8
Truth commissions in the 1990s
Chapter 10
Box 10.1
Hamas Charter, 1988: Articles 22 and 23
Box 10.2
The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002
Box 10.3
Palestine Strategy Group and Israeli Strategic Forum: participants’ comments
Box 10.4
A template for collective strategic thinking within identity groups
Chapter 11
Box 11.1
Principles for responsible journalism in conflicts
Box 11.2
The UN as cyberpeacemaker
Box 11.3
The PeaceTech landscape – promoting global and local peace objectives
Chapter 12
Box 12.1
Photography, photovoice and Everyday Peace Indicators in Colombia
Box 12.2
Music as a force for peace in Mali, 2012–2014
Box 12.3
Conflict resolution through the Olympic Truce
Box 12.4
Foundation of Barcelona Football Club: the Refugee and Migrant Programme
Box 12.5
Transforming our world: the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Conclusion
Box C.1
Selected examples of the existing ‘
acquis cosmopolitain
’
List of Maps
Chapter 2
Map 2.1
State-based violence, non-state-based violence and one-sided violence, 2021
Map 2.2
State-based, non-state and one-sided violence in the Middle East, 2021
Map 2.3
One-sided violence in Iraq, 2014–2018
Chapter 3
Map 3.1
The Arab revolutions after one year
Map 3.2
Spill-over from the war in Libya, 2011
Chapter 5
Map 5.1
Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait
Chapter 6
Map 6.1
Conflict positions in Mali, January 2013
Map 6.2
Jihadist groups in Mali and the Sahel region, 2022
Chapter 10
Map 10.1
Israel, Gaza and the West Bank
Map 10.2
Israeli settlements in the West Bank, 2015
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Contemporary Conflict Resolution
The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts
Fifth Edition
OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM, TOM WOODHOUSE, HUGH MIALL AND HARMONIE TOROS
polity
Copyright © Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Hugh Miall and Harmonie Toros 2024
The right of Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Hugh Miall and Harmonie Toros to be identified as Authors of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First edition first published in 1999 by Polity PressThis edition first published in 2024 by Polity Press
Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press111 River StreetHoboken, NJ 07030, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-5760-8
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2024932374
The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com
Acknowledgements
Writing the fifth edition of this book presented us with many challenges, most obviously in the form of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the devastating consequences of the attack by Hamas on Israel in October 2023 and Israel’s response. These events seem to mark out a changed geopolitical environment in which it is easy to envisage an interconnected complex of global emergencies presenting daunting challenges to world peace. We have been fortunate to be able to draw on the support of colleagues and friends and the work of many creative people in our field in discussing the response to these challenges.
We were delighted when Harmonie Toros accepted our invitation to become a co-author, adding energy and fresh perspectives to our endeavours. We thank Recep Onursal for his skilful assistance and care in the technical and academic integration of this edition. We owe thanks to our publishers at Polity, especially to Louise Knight who has supported us in all the previous editions of this book, and who encouraged, guided and advised us in the production of this fifth edition. We are grateful to Caroline Richmond for her excellent copyediting.
We would like to thank our colleagues and students at the Department of Peace Studies and International Development at the University of Bradford, the School of Politics and International Relations and the Conflict Analysis Research Centre at the University of Kent, the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Reading and the Toda Peace Institute (Tokyo). Thanks also to the officers and members of the Conflict Research Society, who gave us many opportunities to test out our thinking at the conferences of the society over the past five years. We are grateful to David Curran, Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Irene Santiago and Steve Killelea for feedback on sections of the book.
In previous editions of this book, we have acknowledged the example of the founders of the field who inspired us to undertake this work. In writing this fifth edition we have become even more convinced not only about the wisdom and prescience of the founders but also of the creative, innovative and rich knowledge generated by colleagues now working in the fields of conflict resolution and peace research worldwide. Closer to home, we could not have written this book without the understanding, forbearance and inspiration of our families and friends, our partners, children and grandchildren.
Illustration Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the following for permission to reproduce copyright material:
Figure 1.4 ‘Positions, interests and needs’ in Resolving Disputes without Going to Court by Andrew Floyer-Acland, Century, 1995, p. 50, copyright © Andrew Floyer-Acland. Reproduced by permission of the author; Figure 1.6 ‘William Ury’s third side roles’ in The Third Side: Harvard University Global Negotiation Project, www.thirdside.org, copyright © Dr William Ury. Reproduced by permission of the author; Figure 1.7 ‘Actors and approaches to peacebuilding’ in Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies by John Paul Lederach, Washington, DC: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 1997; Figure 1.9 ‘The progression of conflict’ from Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures by John Paul Lederach, Syracuse University Press, copyright © 1995. Reproduced with permission of the publisher; Figure 2.2 ‘The declining frequency of interstate war, 1500–2015’, Our World in Data, based on Pinker, 2011. Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0); Figure 2.4 ‘Fatalities in armed conflicts by region, 1989–2022’ based on The Uppsala Conflict Data Program Battledeaths Dataset by Shawn Davies, Therese Pettersson and Magnus Öberg, 2022, https://ucdp.uu.se/. Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0); Figure 2.6 ‘Deaths from terrorism, 2007–2022’ from Global Terrorism Index 2023: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Institute for Economics & Peace, March 2023, http://visionofhumanity.org/resources (accessed December 2023); Figures 2.7 ‘Institute for Economics & Peace’, 2.8 ‘Armed conflicts by region 1946–2022’, Map 2.1 ‘State-based violence, non-state-based violence and one-sided violence in 2022’, and Map 2.2 ‘State-based, non-state and one-sided violence in the Middle East, 2022’, The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0); Figure 2.9 ‘Forcible displacement, worldwide 1990–2022’ based on UNHCR Refugee Dataset. Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0); Map 2.3 ‘One-sided violence in Iraq, 2014–2018’ by Sigrid Weber based on UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset, 2023. Reproduced by kind permission of the author; Map 3.1 ‘The Arab Revolutions after one year’ from Conflict Barometer 2011, HIIK, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. Reproduced by kind permission; Figure 4.3 ‘Transforming asymmetric conflicts (II)’ by Diana Francis, from Faith, Power and Peace, Quaker Centre; www.quaker.org.uk/swathmore-lecture-2015. Reproduced by kind permission of the author; Figures 4.4 – 4.6 ‘Transforming asymmetric conflicts (II)’, ‘Building Support’, ‘Constructive programme’ by Diana Francis, from People, Peace and Power: Conflict Transformation in Action, Pluto Press, pp. 123–5. Reproduced by kind permission of the author; Figure 4.7 ‘A nested model of conflict’ by Dr Máire A. Dugan from ‘A Nested Theory of Conflicts’, A Leadership Journal:Women in Leadership, Vol 1. Center for Leadership, Columbia College, pp. 39–44, 1996, Fig 1. Reproduced by permission of Columbia College (South Carolina); Figure 4.8 ‘Lederach’s integrated framework for peacebuilding’ by John Paul Lederach from Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, United States Institute of Peace, 1997. Reproduced by kind permission of the author; Figure 5.3 ‘New armed conflicts and all armed conflicts, 1945–2022’ based on UCDP Armed Conflicts Dataset v23.1, by Davies et al., 2023; Gleditsch et al. 2002. Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0); Figure 6.1 ‘Personnel strength by organization’ from Dashboard Peace Operations 2024. Reproduced by permission of Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze; Figure 6.2 ‘Number of active UN peacekeeping missions 1956–2022’, from Our World in Data, July 2023, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/number-un-peacekeeping-missions?time=1956.Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0); Figure 7.1 ‘Negotiations, mediations and peace agreements in civil wars, 1975–2013’ by Ari Baris¸ in ‘Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts: A New Dataset’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 67 (1), 2022, pp. 150–77. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221111735, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License; Figure 7.2 ‘The gradient of conflict involvement’ from ‘The impact of concerned parties on the resolution of disputes’ by Teresa Encarnacion, Clem McCartney and Cristina Rosas, published in Peace Processes in the Third World eds Göran Lindgren, Peter Wallensteen, Kjell Åke Nordquist, Report from the 1991 Advanced International Programme, Conflict Resolution, Uppsala 1991, 42–96. Reproduced by kind permission of the authors and editors; Figures 8.2, 9.2 ‘The eight-pillar model of positive peace in the Philippines’ by Irene Santiago, Institute for Economics & Peace. Reproduced by permission of the publisher; Figure 8.3 ‘Trends in the Global Peace Index scores of countries following IRW operations, 2008–2023’, Institute for Economics & Peace; and Figure 9.1 ‘Framework for peace-building from below’ by Laina Reynolds Levy, 2004, developed from Lederach, 1995, 1997. Reproduced by kind permission of the author.
Abbreviations
A4P
Action for Peacekeeping
ACLED
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
AFISMA
African International Support Mission to Mali
AI
artificial intelligence
ANC
African National Congress
AQI
al-Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU
African Union
BCE
before the Common Era
CCP
Chinese Communist Party
CDA
critical discourse analysis
CIDCM
Center for International Development and Conflict Management
CNN
Cable News Network
CONIS
Conflict Information System
CSCE
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSO
conflict and stabilization operations
DPA
Department of Political Affairs
DPKO
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO
Department of Peace Operations
DPP
Democratic People’s Party (Taiwan)
DPPA
UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DRC
Democratic Republic of Congo
DUP
Democratic Unionist Party
ECOMOG
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
EEAS
European External Action Service
EIP
European Institute for Peace
EU
European Union
EUCAP
EU Assistance Capacity Mission
EUTM
EU Training Mission – Mali
FARC
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FCAC
fragile and conflict affected countries
FMLN
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
G8
Group of Eight
GCC
Gulf Cooperation Council
GDI
Gender Development Index
GDP
gross domestic product
GPI
Global Peace Index
HCNM
High Commissioner on National Minorities
HIIK
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
HIPPO
UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICD
intercultural dialogue
ICJ
International Court of Justice
ICT
information and communications technology
ICTR
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP
internally displaced person
IEP
Institute for Economics & Peace
IFOR
Implementation Force (NATO in Bosnia)
IGAD
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (East Africa)
IMAT
International Military Advisory Team
IMF
International Monetary Fund
INCORE
International Conflict Research Institute
INMP
International Network of Museums for Peace
INTERFET
International Force in East Timor
IOC
International Olympic Committee
IPRA
International Peace Research Association
IPS
international problem-solving
IS
Islamic State
ISF
Israeli Strategic Forum
ISI
Islamic State of Iraq
ISIL/ISIS
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria
JCR
Journal of Conflict Resolution
KFOR
Kosovo Force (NATO-led)
KLA
Kosova Liberation Army
KMT
Kuomintang
LTTE
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)
MDGs
Millennium Development Goals
MENA
Middle East and North Africa
MILF
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINURSO
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSMA
UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISAHEL
African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel
MNLA
Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (Mali)
MONUSCO
Mission de l’ONU pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo
MUJAO
Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO
non-governmental organization
NIWC
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
NP
National Party (South Africa)
NPA
National Peace Accord (South Africa)
NSAG
non-state armed group
OAS
Organization of American States
OAU
Organisation of African Unity
ODIHR
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
ONUC
UN Peacekeeping Force in Congo
ONUMOZ
UN Operation in Mozambique
OSCE
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OTC
Olympic Truce Center
OTF
Olympic Truce Foundation
PBC
United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
PBF
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
PBFD
UN Peacebuilding Funding Dashboard
PBSO
UN Peacebuilding Support Office
PfP
Partnership for Peace
PIRA
Provisional Irish Republican Army
PJC
NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council
PLA
People’s Liberation Army
PLO
Palestinian Liberation Organization
PPI
Positive Peace Index
PRC
People’s Republic of China
PRIO
Peace Research Institute Oslo
PSC
protracted social conflict
PSG
Palestine Strategy Group
PSO
Peace support operation
R2P
Responsibility to Protect
ROC
Republic of China
RTLM
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
SADC
Southern African Development Community
SARS
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SDGs
Sustainable Development Goals (UN)
SDLP
Social Democratic and Labour Party
SDP
Sport for Development and Peace
SFOR
Stabilization Force (Bosnia)
SIPRI
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SMS
short message service (text messaging)
TNC
transnational conflict
TRC
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCDP
Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UEFA
Union of European Football Associations
UN
United Nations
UNAMIR
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL
UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM
United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDOF
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UN DPPA
UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
UNEF
UN Emergency Force (Middle East)
UNESCO
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDR
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIFIL
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMEE
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNOSOM
United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPBC
United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
UNPI
United Nations Peace Initiatives
UNSC
UN Security Council
UNSCR
UN Security Council Resolution
UNTAC
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET
International Force in East Timor
UNTAG
United Nations Transition Assistance Group
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
USIP
United States Institute of Peace
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO
World Trade Organization
Introduction
As a defined field of study, conflict resolution started in the 1950s and 1960s. This was at the height of the Cold War, when the development of nuclear weapons and the conflict between the superpowers seemed to threaten human survival. A group of pioneers from different disciplines saw the value of studying conflict as a general phenomenon, with similar properties whether it occurs in international relations, domestic politics, industrial relations, communities or families, or between individuals. They saw the potential of applying approaches that were evolving in industrial relations and community mediation settings to conflicts in general, including civil and international conflicts. Chapter 1 gives an account of how the new field developed over the next fifty years to the point where, when the Cold War came to an abrupt end in the 1990s, many government ministries and international regional and global organizations were using the language and some of the concepts pioneered by conflict resolution in the expectation – or hope – that the Cold War could be succeeded by an era in which the original aspirations of the founders of the United Nations in 1945 might at last be realized.
The aim of the Introduction is to prepare the ground for our survey of contemporary conflict resolution today by looking briefly at what happened over the next thirty years or so since then – 1991 to 2024 – which roughly coincides with the publication of the five editions of this book. Certainly, the skies have darkened over the intervening period. As we write, the war in Ukraine continues, and the growing rivalry between China and the US adds to fears that old disputes over territorial status could trigger a new Cold War or something worse. In January 2023 the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the hands of its doomsday clock to ninety seconds to midnight, declaring humanity the closest it has come to the threat of destruction. In March 2023 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published a warning that this decade, up to 2030, would be the last chance for humanity to avoid irreversible environmental damage. On 7 October 2023 the attack by Hamas on Israel marked a new intensity in the unresolved Israeli–Palestinian conflict. At the same time social media are driving polarization and fragmentation, even in previously stable democracies, and new technologies are making existing conflicts more dangerous.
Are the challenges from contemporary conflicts so severe that they threaten to overwhelm the prospects for conflict resolution? Or do the statistics still suggest that the long-term trend overall is towards the possibility in the future of a more peaceful world in which the field of conflict resolution can rise to these new challenges?
Conflict Resolution and the Arrow of History, 1991–2024
To set the scene we have chosen a seminal book by Kalevi Holsti published in 1991 to frame this discussion. Holsti analyses successive attempts to create a peaceful post-war international order over the period 1648 to 1945 and looks at the main conditions that determine success or failure. We can then consider the years 1991 to 2024 against this background.
Looking at these epoch-making phases of war and peacemaking at great power level – after the Thirty Years’ War (Westphalia 1648), Louis XIV’s wars (Utrecht 1713), the Napoleonic wars (Vienna 1815), the First World War (Paris 1919) and the Second World War (San Francisco 1945) – Holsti identifies what he calls eight ‘prerequisites for peace’:
governance
(some system of responsibility for regulating behaviour in terms of the conditions of the agreement)
legitimacy
(a new order following war cannot be based on perceived injustice or repression, and principles of justice have to be embodied into the postwar settlement)
assimilation
(linked to legitimacy: the gains of living within the system are greater than the potential advantages of seeking to destroy it)
a deterrent system
(victors should create a coalition strong enough to deter defection, by force if necessary, to protect settlement norms, or to change them by peaceful means)
conflict resolution procedures and institutions
(the system of governance should include provision and capacity for identifying, monitoring, managing and resolving major conflict between members of the system, and the norms of the system would include willingness to use such institutions)
consensus on war
(a recognition that war is the fundamental problem, acknowledgement of the need to develop and foster strong norms against use of force and clear guiding principles for legitimate use of force)
procedures for peaceful change
(the need to review and adapt when agreements no longer relate to the reality of particular situations: peace agreements need to have built-in mechanisms for review and adaptation)
anticipation of future issues
(peacemakers need to incorporate some ability to anticipate what may constitute conflict causes in the future: institutions and system norms should include provision for identifying, monitoring and handling not just the problems that created the last conflict but future conflicts as well).
Table 0.1 The evolution of attempts to create a peaceful postwar international order
* short-lived governance mechanism in League of Nations
** failure to develop deterrent capacity such as proposed Military Staff Committee or UN Standing Forces
Source: Holsti (1991: ch. 13)
Holsti recognizes that the requirement to ‘enlarge the shadow of the future’ as specified in the last two prerequisites is highly demanding:
It may be asking too much for wartime leaders to cast their minds more to the future. The immediate war settlements are difficult enough. But insofar as the peacemakers were involved not just in settling a past war but also constructing the foundations of a new international order, foresight is mandatory. The peace system must not only resolve the old issues that gave rise to previous wars; it must anticipate new issues, new actors, and new problems and it must design institutions, norms, and procedures that are appropriate to them. (Holsti, 1991: 347)
From his vantage point in 1991, Holsti concluded that the more criteria that were met in each agreement the more stable and peaceful was the ensuing period. The San Francisco meeting that established the United Nations in October 1945 in his view did a great deal to stabilize interstate relations and provides one explanation at least for the subsequent decline of interstate war.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 – the year Holsti’s book was published – and the abrupt ending of the Cold War were seen by some at the time as an opportunity for agreement on a further expansion of the ‘postwar international order’ beyond the 1945 settlement. If so, how does the more than thirty years that have elapsed since then measure up to Holsti’s prerequisites for peace? If the post-1991 international order is seen to represent the interests and values of the victors in the Cold War, Holsti’s seventh and eighth ‘prerequisites for peace’ are complicated when the settlement is threatened by shifts of relative power among them. In 1945 the defeated powers – Germany, Italy, Japan – had surrendered unconditionally, were occupied, and were then integrated into the subsequent new postwar order by more powerful states. This did not happen in 1991. In 1991 the defeated power – the Soviet Union – had not surrendered, or even lost a battle, and was not occupied. But it ceased to exist and disintegrated into its constituent fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics – one of which, the Russian Federation, remained a great power. The subsequent Ukraine conflict was an aftershock of that seismic geopolitical earthquake. And all of this coincided with the economic rise of China, a decisive internal shift of power within that country, and its subsequent political (and military) challenge to US global hegemony. Conflict resolution has had to adapt accordingly – as it did in the years after 1945 in response to the sudden advent of the bipolar Cold War marked by the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons (1949), the communist victory in China (1949), and the Korean War (1950–3).
Successive Editions ofContemporary Conflict ResolutionCompared
Let us now compare successive editions of Contemporary Conflict Resolution with changing conditions at the time they were written over the 1991–2024 period. In each case we thought that the revision would involve little more than an update of policies, data and literature. Each time it required a fundamental rethink – such has been the pace of change. Above all, the bipolar Cold War period subsequently moved with remarkable rapidity through a unipolar moment, dominated by what some called the US ‘hyperpower’, to the current revival of great power rivalry and the emergence of a new multipolar world that is replacing it. The conflict resolution response has had to adapt accordingly.
The unipolar period of US dominance
At the time of the first edition of Contemporary Conflict Resolution in 1999, despite the catastrophes in the middle of the decade in Somalia, Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, international support for conflict resolution still seemed to be strong, with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) able to act in concert despite Russian objections to NATO’s involvement in Kosovo and the bombing of Belgrade in 1999. At the beginning of the decade, Iraq’s attempted takeover of Kuwait in 1990 had been reversed through concerted UNSC-endorsed action, described by US President George Bush, not given to rhetoric, as the defence of a ‘New World Order’. It seemed to many that the original UN Charter concept of collective defence against threats to international peace and security might, after all, become effective. Remarkable UN-led peacebuilding operations in Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti and Guatemala followed. The National Peace Accord (1991–4) and relatively non-violent end of Apartheid in South Africa formed a watershed. Hopes for a settlement to the Israel–Palestine conflict continued through to the end of Bill Clinton’s presidency in December/January 2000/1. The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland in 1998 was another major breakthrough.
Given the deep dismay from a conflict resolution perspective at the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, it is poignant to think back to the situation when the first edition of this book came out. In 1994 Russia had become the first country to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), a ‘programme of practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and partner countries’, while the ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security’ between NATO and the Russian Federation was announced on 14 May 1997 by Russian foreign minister Yevgeni Primakov and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana. According to the text, ‘NATO and Russia do not regard themselves as adversaries’, and the aim is to ‘build together a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe’. Stated plans covered mutual disarmament, commitment to ‘norms of international behaviour as reflected in the UN Charter and OSCE documents’,1 possibilities for shared ‘peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE’, and cooperation which included ‘preventing and settling conflicts, and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’. A new NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was to be set up to coordinate this (subsequently formalized in 2002). Such was the scale and ambition of the post-Cold War rules-based dispensation during its first decade, at least in declaratory terms.
More broadly, the supplement to An Agenda for Peace, approved by the UN General Assembly and Security Council in 1995, laid out ‘quantitative and qualitative changes’ to the panoply of UN ‘instruments for peace and security’, including preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding and disarmament, together with graded sanctions and enforcement action when required. The language of prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding in particular, which had been developed earlier within the conflict resolution community, now became accepted terminology in some government departments within states and in international politics. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in particular, despite criticism of aspects of UN practice, was an ardent spokesperson for solidarist values and was widely supported in his promotion of the ambitious ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs) that underpinned them. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, for example, signed in September 2000, committed world leaders to ‘combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women’.
Here was formal international endorsement of the broad conflict resolution ‘positive peace’ agenda, long seen within the field as essential in underpinning aspirations towards the ‘negative peace’ of war prevention. A number of conflict resolution scholars, however, critical of the way post-Cold War politics was being shaped according to Western and particularly US presumptions and interests, remained concerned about how seriously governments took these declarations and whether their agendas coincided with the norms and principles on which conflict resolution is based. From the perspective of many in the Global South, for example, the gap between Western admonition and Western action already showed the West violating its own rules, both in attempting to maintain its global dominance and control and in failing to follow through in tackling global problems when this required fundamental transformations in the unbalanced power and resource asymmetries from which richer countries continued to profit.
As it turned out, during the next two decades regular updates to Contemporary Conflict Resolution (2005, 2011, 2016) became increasingly more complicated – and the book expanded in length accordingly.
In the 2005 edition of Contemporary Conflict Resolution we argued that conflict resolution needed to defend its cosmopolitan values from being co-opted into the US ‘war on terror’ launched by the neo-conservative George W. Bush (junior) administration in response to the unexpected 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The US military backing for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban and eliminate the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 2001 by entering a civil war on one side, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to overthrow Saddam Hussain and effect regime change, were the opposite of conflict resolution, despite claims to such credentials in the wake of the military action under the rubric of postwar peacebuilding. The rapid collapse of the original US plan that the US Department of Defense would not only conduct the war in Iraq but also manage postwar peacebuilding (under the apparent delusion that this would be a repeat of US-led reconstruction in Germany and Japan after 1945) showed how central the conflict resolution principle of legitimacy is in peacebuilding and how this cannot be imposed by force of arms. Nevertheless, during this period, the relative absence of dissent in the UN Security Council still allowed endorsement for a number of conflict resolution approaches, albeit tempered by the priority of resisting being absorbed as an instrument of US foreign policy and being used as a ‘fire-fighter’ to preserve the privileges of those who gained most from the capitalist world order that accompanied it. There were many critics of the resulting ‘liberal peace’ within conflict resolution.
The emergence of the multipolar world order
By the time of the 2011 edition of Contemporary Conflict Resolution, it had become evident that the idea of the US ‘hyperpower’ no longer corresponded to the mounting reality of Russian and Chinese resistance, manifested in the rise to power of Vladimir Putin in Russia (2000–8 first presidency) and, later, of Xi Jinping in China (2013). The global financial crisis of 2008, in our view, represented the concomitant moment when the US economy could no longer on its own sustain the world’s financial transactions now that India (1 January 1995) and, above all, China (11 December 2001) (to be followed by Russia on 22 August 2012) also became members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). With breath-taking speed, the apparently unipolar US post-1989/1991 world order had become multipolar. With this came the prospect of renewed great power rivalry perhaps threatening the international consensus on which multilateral institutions from the UN downwards depend. Russian irredentism over former Soviet republics, above all Ukraine, and Chinese irredentism over Taiwan raised the possibility that war might draw in the great powers on either side and thus undermine the post-San Francisco 1945 international order itself.
In relation to Russia, we may note its incursion into Georgia in 2008 and fierce objection to what was seen as a flagrant breach of the 1997 Founding Act in the avalanche of subsequent NATO expansion that by now included all the former Warsaw Pact countries, the Baltic States, and even overtures from former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine (November 2004 to January 2005), in protest against what were widely seen as fraudulent elections, was a further mortal blow to President Putin’s plans to reverse 1991 and reintegrate Ukraine (for him the cradle of the great Kievan era of Russian history) back into the homeland. Although Russian speakers predominated in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas) (ethnic Russians make up about 17 per cent of the Ukrainian population as a whole), increasing numbers of predominantly Ukrainian speakers, particularly in Kyiv, were now coming to identify themselves more with the EU and NATO – including the largely Polish speakers in the west of the country centred around Lviv.
By 2016, when the fourth edition of Contemporary Conflict Resolution came out, the skies had darkened further, despite the advent of Barack Obama as US president between 2009 and 2016 with peacemaking credentials of such lustre that he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 9 October 2009 for his ‘extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples’ before he had achieved anything. Indeed, at great power level the opposite happened. The Russian seizure of Crimea in February/March 2014 – directly after the 18–23 February 2014 ‘Maidan’ uprising in Ukraine and deposition of Russophile President Viktor Yanukovych, followed by the widespread destruction of Soviet monuments and the beginning of pro-Russian counter-protests in Eastern Ukraine – together with its establishment of effective control over much of the Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk) – was seen as a turning point. And Chinese military expansion in the South China Sea and mounting rhetoric against Taiwan boded ill for attempts to reduce tension and find non-military ways of handling such crises. Meanwhile the extraordinary explosion of the Arab uprisings in 2011, centred on the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on 11 February, at first raised hopes among liberals for an Arab ‘democratic spring’, but in most cases these subsequently collapsed into a complex of turbulence, violence, civil war, and widespread virtual or actual reversion to autocratic rule (Tunisia for some time remained a beacon of light). The intense suffering of the most vulnerable, particularly in Syria and later in Yemen and, after Western intervention, in Libya, represented the opposite of conflict resolution. And in the middle of this came the offensive against Mosul and Takrit launched in June 2014 by the self-styled Islamic State, together with the rapid establishment of a ‘caliphate’ based on claimed Quranic foundations, in direct opposition to the international humanitarian norms that it openly disdained.
As a final example of the pace of change, in this case since publication of the fourth edition of Contemporary Conflict Resolution, has come an even greater sequence of major upheavals. This is what confronted us as we began to prepare for a fifth edition. First there has been the unanticipated Trump administration in the US, increasing internal political polarization and paralysis in the world’s leading democracy, including an unprecedented presidential attack on the workings of the US constitution, together with a combination of tough talk but practical withdrawal of American power both geographically and in its disengagement from the multilateral instruments that the country had itself created during a more confident epoch. The principle of ‘America first’ seemed reminiscent of an earlier age of American isolationism in the 1920s and 1930s. In August 2021, peacemaking efforts that had culminated on 29 February 2020 in the Doha agreement under Trump proved illusory in Afghanistan as the Taliban seized Kabul, the previous government fled, and the US-led international force pulled out amid scenes of chaos reminiscent of Vietnam on 29 March 1973. On 23 June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU, which had until then been an example of ‘ever closer union’ in Europe and is still regarded as a possible model for other parts of the world. The unexpected Covid pandemic of 2020–2, not foreseen by most governments despite previous warnings such as the 2002–4 SARS outbreak,2 led to a mixture of cooperation, rivalry and (particularly from the US government) mutual blame. On 24 February 2022 came the major blow, largely unanticipated, of the Russian invasion of Ukraine – as noted above, seen in the West as a direct challenge by a permanent member of the UN Security Council to the UN Charter itself. This was accompanied by worldwide inflation that threatened to throw millions back into poverty, with highly unpredictable consequences in terms of turbulence, conflict and violence – albeit apparently accompanied by a threat of long-term deflation in China. On 7 October 2023 came the unanticipated assault on Israel by Hamas and Islamic Jihad and Israel’s overwhelming response in its determination to eliminate these threats from Gaza permanently.
Is this a coup de grâce for the ‘New World Order’ announced by US President George Bush (senior) in 1990/1, together with its attendant hopes for a more peaceful era of international cooperation and non-violent conflict management? Has the ‘arrow of history’, which seemed to be pointing in the overall direction of what we call ‘cosmopolitan conflict resolution’ in the 1990s, now swung decisively in the opposite direction?
A Realist Critique: The Arrow of History as an Idealist Delusion
That is certainly what some realists think. For this discussion, let us set the scene by considering a direct realist critique of the conflict resolution enterprise. Here is Charles Krauthammer, writing in the Washington Post in 2016 towards the end of the Obama presidency:
How do you distinguish a foreign policy ‘idealist’ from a ‘realist,’ an optimist from a pessimist? Ask one question: Do you believe in the arrow of history? Or to put it another way, do you think history is cyclical or directional? Are we condemned to do the same damn thing over and over, generation after generation – or is there hope for some enduring progress in the world order?
For realists, generally conservative, history is an endless cycle of clashing power politics. The same patterns repeat. Only the names and places change. The best we can do in our own time is to defend ourselves, managing instability, and avoiding catastrophe. But expect nothing permanent, no essential alteration, in the course of human affairs.
The idealists believe otherwise. They believe that the international system can eventually evolve out of its Hobbesian state of nature into something more humane and hopeful. …
The policies that followed [during the Obama presidency] – appeasing Vladimir Putin, the Iranian mullahs, the butchers of Tiananmen Square and lately the Castros – have advanced neither justice nor peace. On the contrary. The consequent withdrawal of American power has yielded nothing but international chaos and immense human suffering. (See Syria.) (Krauthammer, 2016)
Krauthammer identifies conflict resolution with idealism and the disastrous policies of appeasement that follow. For him, what is required in the face of Russian and Chinese revisionism and aggression is, on the contrary, the ‘hard-headed, indeed cold-hearted’ policies of strong defence and deterrence, not appeasement – a renewal of the strategy of containment as in the late 1940s. If you want peace, prepare for war.
A Conflict Resolution Response: The Arrow of History and the Complexity of World Order
Conflict resolution does not deny the greater challenges accompanying the emergence of a multipolar world, as noted above. But it rejects the simplified dichotomy of defence or appeasement and sees the international order as much more complicated than traditional realism assumes.
To equate conflict resolution with appeasement or an ‘accommodation’ of aggression is a fundamental misreading of the field. Conflict resolution is not idealist in Krauthammer’s sense. As chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate, it has always been based on hard-headed analysis of the ‘statistics of deadly quarrels’, which it pioneered, as well as more recently on definitions and measurements of ‘positive peace’, on which permanent war mitigation and prevention depend. Conflict resolution has never had difficulty acknowledging the toughest aspects of direct, structural and cultural violence, and the underlying forces that generate them. In this sense conflict resolution is as ‘realist’ (as aware of the significance of power relations among states and elsewhere) as self-styled traditional realism. But its agenda reaches wider than the statist preoccupations of traditional realism. As shown in chapter 3, conflict resolution analysis of prevailing patterns of transnational conflict emphasizes the dynamic interconnections of intrastate, interstate, and global factors and levels of interpretation. From the beginning this has been seen as the essential basis for learning how to prevent, mitigate or remove their worst consequences.
Table 0.2 The international collectivity: five aspects
Aspect
Organizing Principle
Theory
1 Pre-state alternatives2 International system of states3 International society of states4 International community5 World community
(Charisma)PowerOrderLegitimacyJustice
(Traditionalist)RealistPluralistSolidaristCosmopolitan
So, is there an arrow of history? Or no arrow of history? Although necessarily critical and aspirational, given the multi-level complexity of current transnational reality conflict resolution sees many arrows of history pointing in different directions. For example, see table 0.2 for an indication of at least five aspects of the contemporary international scene, all of which are ‘real’ and coexist at different levels, in different parts of the world, and become less or more prominent at different times. History does not move in straight lines.
Post-colonial states and pre-state alternatives
In many parts of the world there is a preponderance of surviving ‘pre-state structures’ of great complexity, especially in so-called ‘weak’ or ‘fragile states’, where a greatly simplified state structure has been imposed by colonial powers on older, much more varied distributions of peoples. In 1945 there were fifty-one UN member states. Now there are 193. Sometimes older traditional forms of authority still survive within and across state borders. But often these are corroded by external exploitation and internal corruption – which is why the terms ‘charisma’ and ‘traditionalist’ are bracketed. Conflicts in these parts of the world vary hugely, are very difficult to resolve, and have been a major preoccupation of conflict resolution for a long time, and the field has built up a deep understanding and knowledge about the issues and how to respond to them.
The international system of states
The second coexisting aspect is the unregenerate state system in which state interest remains the political currency and militarized power the main organizing principle. This is more dominant in some parts of the world, at some levels, in some forms of government, and at some times, than others, although realists see it as an unchanging feature of international affairs in general. Perhaps it has now become more prevalent at great power level as US post-Cold War hegemony is challenged: although it is worth noting that leaders themselves (Biden, Putin, Xi at the time of writing) habitually insist (and perhaps believe) that they are acting not out of hard-headed state self-interest but out of higher principles of national destiny and in accordance with, and in defence of, the superordinate values that this implies.
The international society of states
Third, there is the international society of states (earlier identified particularly with ‘the English school of international studies’). Here a sufficient reciprocity and mutuality of interest underpins a reasonably ordered and predictable intercourse of nations. Relative power is acknowledged, but even the most powerful share an interest in mutual restraint in order to ‘maintain international peace and security’ and avoid a third world war, as expressed in the profoundly non-realist, if not anti-realist, UN Charter article 2(4):
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
This is the embodiment of Holsti’s still surviving San Francisco ‘peaceful post-war international’ dispensation in which all major states are still members, and none of whom yet show signs of leaving. Non-intervention and cultural pluralism are the presiding values and international order the organizing principle.
The international community
Fourth comes the international community – an informal term not defined by specialists but widely used by non-specialists.3 Here, for the first time, non-state actors move into prominence as well as states. The presiding values are solidarist, and the chief organizing principle is international legitimacy as determined not only through relevant international institutions, international organizations and international law but also, more informally and in principle, by adequate expressions of acceptance, if not positive involvement and approbation from below. Human rights feature prominently here – for example, in relation to ‘negative peace’ the 1948 Genocide Convention, and in relation to ‘positive peace’ the 17 September 2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (see chapter 12).
