Democracy by Decree E-Book

Adis Merdzanovic

• Herausgeber: ibidem
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 986

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015

Beschreibung

The introduction of consociational power sharing as a post-war political system has become one of the international community´s preferred post-conflict devices. In situations where warring polities are internally divided by ethnic, religious, linguistic, or national identity, consociationalism guarantees the inclusion of all groups in the political process and prevents a ‘tyranny´ of the majority over one or more minorities. However, if international actors keep intervening in the political process, the advantages of consociationalism are turned upside down. In this exceptional book, Adis Merdzanovic develops a theoretical and empirical approach to understanding consociational democracies that include external intervention. Using the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the consociational Dayton Peace Agreement ended the three-year war between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks twenty years ago, it elaborates on the different approaches used in the past and gives practical recommendations for future state-building exercises by the international community.

Leseprobe

ibidemPress, Stuttgart

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

List of Acronyms

1 Introduction

1.1 Case Selection

1.2 Methodology

1.3 Structure

Part I:Nationalism

2 Theories of Nationalism—A Brief Survey

2.1 Nation and Nationalism

2.1.1 Modernists and Primordialists

2.1.2 The ‘Nation’

2.1.3 Nationalism

2.2 Analysing Nationalism in Contextual Terms

2.2.1 The geographical and historical contexts

2.2.2 The procedural context

3 A Comparative Look at Western Balkan Nationalisms

3.1 Elements of Commonality within Bosnian, Croat, and Serb Nationalisms

3.1.1 Ethnicity

3.1.2 Historical association

3.1.3 Religion

3.1.4 Language

3.2 Nationalism in Serbia—Martyrdom and Uprising

3.2.1 Before the uprisings: The ideological foundation of the Serbian uprising

3.2.2 From the revolution to the national state and beyond

3.3 Nationalism in Croatia—Historic Statehood Rights

3.3.1 The Illyrian movement

3.3.2 The Croat national movement

3.4 Yugoslavism—Two Forms of a Failed Idea

3.4.1 Yugoslavism—Jugoslovenstvo

3.4.2 Yugoslav ‘brotherhood and unity’

3.4.3 Renewed nationalism and the collapse of Yugoslavia

4 Nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina

4.1 Historical Roots of Bosnian Identity: Medieval Bosnia

4.2 Bosnia under Ottoman Rule

4.3 Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs

4.3.1 ‘National’ agitation under Ottoman rule

4.3.2 Nationalism in Habsburg Bosnia

4.3.3 Bosnian national identities in the two Yugoslavias

4.4 Conclusion

Part II:Consociationalism

5 A brief Introduction to Consociational Theory

5.1 Contemporary Consociationalism and its Critics

5.2 The Original Model and Elite Behaviour

5.3 The Origins of Cooperation

6 ‘Imposed Consociation’

6.1 Intervention and Imposition

6.2 Consociational Democracy and the International Context

6.3 The Concept of ‘Imposed Consociation’

6.3.1 Assumptions: minimal consensus and group cohesion

6.3.2 Elite behaviour in imposed and ordinary consociations compared

6.4 Anticipated Critique of the Concept of the ‘Imposed Consociation’

Part III:Bosnia and Herzegovina

7 Consociationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina

7.1 The central state

7.2 The Entities

7.3 People vs. Citizens

7.4 Brčko District

7.5 Bosnian Consociation

7.6 The High Representative

8 Political Elites and Political Quarrels In this and the following chapters, I shall quote extensively from my personal interviews with Bosnia’s political decision makers and former High Representatives. In order to avoid too many general references to these interviews, I shall use footnotes only when the interviewee is not clearly identifiable through the text, or when I refer to a statement that was not given within the context of these interviews. In all other cases, and as a general rule, the statements attributed to them are taken from my interviews.

8.1 The Historical Statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina

8.2 The People and the Society

8.3 Debating the State

8.3.1 The relationship between the state and the entities: more or less federalism?

8.3.2 The Croat Question

8.3.3 The misuse of the Sejdić and Finci verdict

9 The Office of the High Representative from 1996 to 2013

9.1 Carl Bildt (1996-1997)

9.1.1 The political landscape before the first post-war elections

9.1.2 Setting up the new state

9.1.3 The efforts of the High Representative

9.2 Carlos Westendorp (1997-1999)

9.2.1 The pre-Bonn phase

9.2.2 Towards the Bonn powers

9.2.3 The post-Bonn powers phase

9.3 Wolfgang Petritsch (1999-2002)

9.3.1 Dependency vs. ownership

9.3.2 The Alliance for Change

9.3.3 The Mrakovica-Sarajevo Agreement and its implications

9.4 Paddy Ashdown (2002-2006)

9.4.1 The end of ownership and the African chief approach

9.4.2 The push and pull of Euro-Atlantic integration

9.4.3 The assumption of full gubernatorial power

9.5 Christian Schwarz-Schilling (2006-2007)

9.5.1 Taking ownership seriously once again

9.5.2 The closure of the OHR

9.5.3 The April package and the 2006 elections

9.6 Miroslav Lajčák (2007-2009)

9.6.1 The doctrine of non-intervention

9.6.2 The showdown of 2007

9.6.3 International divisions and the 5+2 agenda

9.7 Valentin Inzko (2009-present)

9.7.1 The contemporary role of the OHR and the Bonn powers

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina as an ‘Imposed Consociation’

10.1 The Assumptions of ‘Imposed Consociation’ in the Bosnian Context

10.2 The OHR as the Prototypical International Regulating Body (IRB)

10.3 The Incentive Structures in Contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina

Part IV:Concluding Remarks

11 Conclusion

Epilogue

12 A Short Postscript on other Cases: Macedonia The findings in this postscript referring to Macedonia have previously been presented in the form of a paper at the UMD Global Conference in Skopje. Cf. Adis Merdzanovic, “Imposing Compromise. Consociational Arrangements in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina” (presented at the 4th Global Conference of the United Macedonian Diaspora, Skopje, 2013). and Kosovo

12.1 The historical context

12.2 The Assumptions of an ‘Imposed Consociation’ in Macedonia and Kosovo

12.3 The International Regulating Body

12.4 The incentive structure in post-conflict Macedonia and Kosovo

12.5 Conclusion

13 Annex

13.1 Topic guide for interviews with local political leaders

13.2 List of Interview Partners

13.3 List of OHR Decisions

14 Bibliography

Acknowledgements

Thisbook,which isbased on my PhD thesis at theDepartments of Political Science and Philosophy of theUniversity of Zurich,would never have been possible without the support of manypeople and institutions.My deepest gratitudebelongstomyprimary doctoral supervisor Josette BaerHilland my secondary supervisor Francis Cheneval for their support and encouragement.Thestudyfurthermorereceivedsubstantialfundingfromthe University of Zurich. Mythanks goto the commissions of theForschungskreditthat not only approved my initial grant proposal, but, when the project ran longer than expected, also extended the funding (Grant-Nr.FK-13-072).TheForschungskreditallowed me to finish mystudywithout financial worries, while being part of a stimulating academic communityand enjoying the benefits of institutional support.

As far as thecontentof thestudyis concerned, I would like to express my gratitude to the interview partnerswhoreadily accepted to meet me and patiently answered my questions. These include former High Representatives in BosniaandHerzegovina—Carlos Westendorp, Wolfgang Petritsch, Paddy Ashdown, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, and Miroslav Lajčák—who have given part of their time to me, and a much bigger part of it to Bosnia and Herzegovina. I cannot be anything but impressed by their commitment to help a countryto which, perhaps a decade before the war, many of them hadpresumablyno connection. Whatever one may think of their performances during their mandates, it is beyond doubt that coming to Bosniaand Herzegovinaand dealing with Bosnian politics isnoeasy job; it is not somethingjustanyone would happily agree to do. Rather, it takes a special kind of commitment and a particular kind of person to accept the task of rebuilding a state and unifying a society that has just comefroma bloody war. Having met and talked to them, I honestly believe that all former High Representatives included in this study implemented policies that they thought best for the country at the time. All of them had the best intentions and acted accordingly. Naturally, not all of theirpolicies fulfilled the expectations and some had rather serious unintended consequences. Even though it is the aim of this study to scientifically examine such consequences by putting them into a larger theoretical context, my intent is by no means to discredit the records of those fine individuals for whom I have the utmost respect.Furthermore,I am greatlythankfulto my Bosnian interview partners, to whom I will refer as Bosnia’s‘political elite’throughout thebook.I wish to thankHaris Silajdžić, Mladen Bosić, Mladen Ivanić, Dragan Čović, Božo Ljubić, Nebojša Radmanović, and Željko Komšić for their time and readiness to participatein the interviews. Their contribution helped me understand the problems of the contemporary Bosnianpolitical system, whereas theirpolitical stancesmade me realise how difficult it would be to achieve a real,post-conflict ‘solution’.

To be clear: In this study, my loyalties are not with a particular case and not with Bosnia and Herzegovina as such; rather, my goal is to present an academic contribution to existing literature on consociationalism and post-conflict state building. I am thus sincerely confined by respective standards when reviewing the collected material and, especially, when analysing the interviews with international and local decision makers. Almost by definition, my analysis will disagree with some of the views presented during these interviews and point to inconsistencies and false assumptions contained in some statements. I hope such critique is perceived as substantiated, i.e. founded on facts and trustworthy sources and presented in a comprehensible manner. I would like to thank my interview partners for their understanding in this regard.

On a more personal level, Iwishto thankcolleagues, with whom I had numerous occasions to discuss my theoreticalideasand empiricalthoughts.This list includes Anja Heidelberger, Sylvie Ramel, Sevan Pearson, Julianne Funk, as well as Nenad Stojanović and Daniel Bochsler. Special thanks are also in order for Donald L. Horowitz, who was kind enough to comment on my theoretical model during a seminar in Zurich, and Stefan Troebst, who did the same during a conference in New Orleans.Needless to say, all errors in the manuscript are my own.Finally, I owe the greatest amount of gratitude to my parents, Ibrahim and Senada,to whom this book is dedicatedfor their unbelievableand unconditionalsupport.

A.M.

Oxford/Zurich,April2015

List of Acronyms

ABiH

BiH / BH

Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina

BOSS

Bosanska Stranka, Bosnian Party

BPS

Bosanska Patriotska Stranka, Bosnian Patriotic Party

CD BiH

Koalicija za cjelovitu i demokratsku BiH, Coalition for aUnited andDemocratic BiH

DF

Demokratski Front, Democratic Front

DPA

Dayton Peace Agreement, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

EU

European Union

EUFOR

European Union Force

EUSR

European Union Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina

FBiH

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

GDS

Gradjanska demokratska stranka, Citizen's Democratic Party

HDZ

Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine, Croat Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina

HDZ1990

Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990, Croat Democratic Union 1990

HSS

Hrvatska SeljačkaStranka, Croat Peasants’Party

HVO

Hrvatskovijeće obrane,Croat Defence Council(Croatian military forcesin Bosnia)

HZ HB

Hrvatska Zajednica Herceg Bosna,Croatian Community of Herceg Bosna(aCroat parastate during the Bosnian war)

IFOR

NATOImplementation Force

LDS

Liberalno Demokratska Stranka, Liberal Democratic Party

NARS

Narodna skupština Republike Srpske,National Assemblyof theRepublic of Srpska

NHI

Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa, New Croat Initiative

OHR

Office of the High Representative of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina

PDP

Partija Demokratskog Progresa, Party of Democratic Progress

PIC

Peace Implementation Council

RBiH

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)

RS

SAA

Republika Srpska, Republic of Srpska

Stabilisation and Association Agreement

SB

Steering Board

SBB

Stranka za Bolju Budućnost, Party for a Better Future

SBiH

Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina

SDA

Stranka Demokratske Akcije, Party for Democratic Action

SDP

Socijaldemokratska StrankaBosne i Hercegovine, Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina

SDS

Srpska Demokratska Stranka, Serb Democratic Party

SFOR

NATOStabilisation Force

SNS

Srpski Narodni Savez, Serb NationalAlliance

SNSD

Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats

SPRS

Socijalistička Partija Republike Srpske,Socialist Party of the Republic of Srpska

SR BiH

Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina,Socialist Republic of Bosniaand Herzegovina(usedin thisbookfor the entireYugoslavperioduntil1992)

SRS

Srpska Radikalna Stranka, SerbianRadical Party

UDSB

Unija Bosanskih Socijaldemokrata, Union of Bosnian Social Democrats

UN SC

United NationsSecurity Council

1Introduction

As we approach the twentieth anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords—this fundamental set of treatiesthat ended the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina[1]as well as the battles between Croatia and thesignificantly shrunk Yugoslavia(i.e. Serbia)—we find ourselveswishingforalargerconclusion, some sort of athoroughassessment of theirmeritstwo decades after the fact.Whilethe Accordsare generally credited for the conclusion of military hostilities and thusforputting an end to the human suffering in the narrower region, especially the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (usually referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement, DPA) is often criticised for establishing asuboptimalpost-war state structure; the latter, it is said,institutionalises the ethno-national segregation of the society, discriminates against national minorities, makes the political system inefficient as well as prone to patronage politics, and isgenerallynot apt for the challenges of the centuryin which we live.Since the Bosnian political system reflects the philosophy of the so-called consociational power-sharing model that tries to integrate different groups into a common state through a particular set of political institutions, the failure to establish a self-sustaining democracy in this particularcountryhas become one of the major arguments fordiscrediting the model itself. Critics of consociationalism tend to point to Bosnia in order to emphasise the general inadequateness of this institutional solution for establishing stable democratic rule in dividedpost-warsocieties.

Whatsuch criticsoften fail to see, however, is that the Bosnian consociation did not develop autonomously or in a power vacuum, but as part of a larger international context. International actors heavily affected not only the negotiations of the peace treaty but also the post-war development of the political system.WhileI have no intentionto present a final judgement on the Bosnian case—that would be presumptuous–, Inevertheless wanttoemphasisethat any serious attempt to reflect on the benefits and failures of theDPAhas to account for external influence.In this respect, I wish to shine a light on a particular aspect of Bosnia’s post-war development that necessarily needs to form an integral part of any larger narrative.The internationals had a significant effect on how the consociational system worked in practice and theythereforealsoshare part of the responsibility for thecontemporary situation.

In a nutshell, this bookexplores the relationship between international actors and consociational democracy in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.But like Arend Lijphart’s first treatise on consociational politics in the Netherlands, itis not conceptualised ‘as a country study in the conventional sense’ but as ‘an extended theoretical argument based on a single case of particular interest’[2]for consociational theory. So even though the major part of the text deals with the case study, the research aim goes well beyond the understanding of this particular country. It is directed at what we may call a fundamental misconception of consociational theory. Especially in its contemporary form, consociationalism tends to argue that stable democratic rule is the necessary result of a post-war political system that includes the four consociationalinstitutions ofagrand coalition, proportional representation, veto powers, and group autonomy.

Against this background, I shall argue that power sharing worksin a different mannerin post-warsocieties than in other kinds of divided societies,sincethe formercannot be regarded and analysed independentlyofthe international contextsin which they are situated.Unfortunately, this hasindeedbeen done with some regularityin the past. In such studies,the performance of institutions as well as prevailing group dynamics and incentive structures are examined from an intra-state perspective while little attention is