Dethroning the King E-Book

Julie MacIntosh

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 690

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

Beschreibung

How the King of Beers collapsed without a fight and what it means for America's place in the post-Recession world How did InBev, a Belgian company controlled by Brazilians, take over one of America's most beloved brands with scarcely a whimper of opposition? Chalk it up to perfect timing--and some unexpected help from powerful members of the Busch dynasty, the very family that had run the company for more than a century. In Dethroning the King, Julie MacIntosh, the award-winning financial journalist who led coverage of the takeover for the Financial Times, details how the drama that unfolded at Anheuser-Busch in 2008 went largely unreported as the world tumbled into a global economic crisis second only to the Great Depression. Today, as the dust settles, questions are being asked about how the "King of Beers" was so easily captured by a foreign corporation, and whether the company's fall mirrors America's dwindling financial and political dominance as a nation. * Discusses how the takeover of Anheuser-Busch will be seen as a defining moment in U.S. business history * Reveals the critical missteps taken by the Busch family and the Anheuser-Busch board * Argues that Anheuser-Busch had a chance to save itself from InBev's clutches, but infighting and dysfunctionality behind the scenes forced it to capitulate From America's heartland to the European continent to Brazil, Dethroning the King is the ultimate corporate caper and a fascinating case study that's both wide reaching and profound.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication

Epigraph

Cast of Characters

Anheuser-Busch

InBev

Grupo Modelo

Author’s Note

Prologue

Chapter 1 - The Game Is Afoot

Chapter 2 - Crazy and Lazy at Loggerheads

Chapter 3 - The Colossus

Chapter 4 - Selling the American Dream

Chapter 5 - The Fourth Abides

Chapter 6 - The Hunter’s Frozen Trigger Finger

Chapter 7 - A Babe in the Woods

Chapter 8 - The Old Gobi Desert Trick

Chapter 9 - Mr. Brito Goes to Washington

Chapter 10 - Angry Bedfellows

Chapter 11 - The Board: August, August, and Augusta

Chapter 12 - The Montagues and the Busches

Chapter 13 - A Seller from “Hello”

Chapter 14 - Put Up or Shut Up

Chapter 15 - A Long Way from St. Louis

Chapter 16 - A Toast on Both Sides

Chapter 17 - Cash Out or Hunker Down

Epilogue

Notes

Acknowledgments

About the Author

Index

Praise for Dethroning the King

“A Foolish Book Recommendation for July.”

—The Motley Fool

“How the Busch clan lost control of an iconic American beer company. If ever an American company represented the land of milk and honey for corporate executives it was Anheuser-Busch . . . For decades a palace of well-paid vice presidents in cushy offices presided over the manufacture of Budweiser, America’s beer, in that most American of cities, St. Louis. ‘Few companies on earth were more evocative of America, with all of its history and iconography, than Anheuser-Busch,’ writes veteran Financial Times journalist Julie MacIntosh in her strenuously reported book, Dethroning the King: The Hostile Takeover of Anheuser-Busch, an American Icon. As the title suggests, the reign of the King of Beers ended in the summer of 2008, when the company merged with the Brazil-based brewing giant InBev, an outfit about as culturally different from Anheuser-Busch as one could imagine. At $70 a share, or $52 billion, it was the largest all-cash acquisition in history and even more noteworthy because it occurred during the gathering storm of a global financial collapse . . . When growth-hungry InBev arrives on the scene, a company so lean and cost-conscious that they’re called the Walmart of brewers, all hell breaks loose at the complacent Anheuser-Busch headquarters. The Brazilians make a pitch of $43 billion in what’s known on Wall Street as a “bear hug”—an offer so generous that the recipient can’t refuse. But A-B’s board does refuse, triggering weeks of moves and counter-moves and endless end-gaming by the two companies. Ms. MacIntosh relates every gambit in crisp, scene-by-scene detail.”

—The Wall Street Journal

“Ms. MacIntosh . . . earns extra credit for staying on the Anheuser-InBev case despite considerable macrocosmic distractions . . . The author’s persistence pays off in her account of the Busch family’s searing internecine strife . . . Dethroning the King makes for a fine yarn with a cautionary message about American business in the age of globalization. InBev began laying off workers less than a month after the deal formally closed, Ms. MacIntosh reports. Maybe the next time a foreign entity tries to acquire a major American family company, the public will take notice before it becomes a fait accompli.”

—The New York Times

“There’s a lesson for all in book on brewing . . . a great read.”

—Morning Advertiser

“Dethroning the King. . . . is the compelling play-by-play of InBev’s takeover of Anheuser-Busch. Give MacIntosh a Stella Artois for her excellent reporting.”

—Stltoday.com

“Dethroning the King is a brutally detailed look at the hostile takeover of Anheuser-Busch, the legendary icon that at one time was the epitome of American business success. It is a story that may well go down in American business history as one of the defining moments of this era. [An] insightful and brilliantly written work. As American business continues to dramatically change, this compelling book should be on every businessperson’s reading list.”

—Business Lexington

“In a narrative that reads as fast as any fiction thriller, Financial Times journalist MacIntosh details the 2008 takeover of the iconic Anheuser-Busch brewing company by Belgian corporation InBev, focusing particularly on the company’s importance to the St. Louis region; its management, or lack thereof, by the Busch family (particularly the August Busches III and IV); and the broader unsettled economic climate of 2008.”

—Library Journal, naming Dethroning the King one of the best business books of 2010

Copyright © 2011 by Julie MacIntosh. All rights reserved.

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey. Published simultaneously in Canada.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

MacIntosh, Julie.

Dethroning the king : the hostile takeover of Anheuser-Busch, an American icon / Julie MacIntosh.

p. cm.

Includes index.

ISBN 978-0-470-59270-0 (cloth); ISBN 978-1-118-15702-2 (pbk); ISBN 978-1-118-20281-4 (ebk); ISBN 978-1-118-20282-1 (ebk); ISBN 978-1-118-20283-8 (ebk)

1. Anheuser-Busch, inc. 2. Busch family. 3. Consolidation and merger of corporations—United States. I. Title.

HD9397.U6B87 2010

338.8’3663420973—dc22

2010032279

To my husband, Micah, for his limitless support and patience, and to Miller, for arriving at exactly the right time

“It behooves a father to be blameless if he expects his child to be.”

—Homer

Cast of Characters

Anheuser-Busch

Board of Directors

August A. Busch III: former Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer

August A. Busch IV: President and Chief Executive Officer

Carlos Fernández González: Chairman and CEO of Grupo Modelo

James J. Forese: former Chairman and CEO of IKON Office Solutions

Ambassador James R. Jones: former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico; former Chairman of the American Stock Exchange

Vernon R. Loucks Jr.: Chairman of The Aethena Group; former Chairman and CEO of Baxter International

Vilma S. Martinez: Partner, Munger, Tolles & Olson; later named U.S. Ambassador to Argentina

William Porter “Billy” Payne: Vice Chairman of Gleacher Partners; Chairman of Augusta National Golf Club

Joyce M. Roché: President and CEO of Girls Incorporated

General Henry Hugh Shelton: former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Patrick T. Stokes: Chairman of Anheuser-Busch, former President and CEO

Andrew C. Taylor: Chairman and CEO of Enterprise Rent-A-Car

Douglas A. “Sandy” Warner III: former Chairman of J.P. Morgan Chase

Edward E. Whitacre Jr.: Chairman Emeritus of AT&T; later named Chairman and CEO of General Motors

Executive Officers

W. Randolph “Randy” Baker: Chief Financial Officer

Robert Golden: head of Mergers and Acquisitions

Francine Katz: head of Communications and Consumer Affairs

Robert Lachky: head of Global Industry and Creative Development

Douglas Muhleman: head of Brewing Operations and Technology

David Peacock: head of Marketing

John “Jack” Purnell: former Chairman and CEO of Anheuser-Busch International

Gary Rutledge: head of Legal and Government Affairs

Thomas Santel: President and CEO of Anheuser-Busch International; head of Corporate Planning

Pedro Soares: aide to August Busch IV; former head of Anheuser-Busch Mexico

Other Key Players

Charles “Casey” Cogut: Partner, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett

Joseph Flom: Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom

Peter Gross: Managing Director, Goldman Sachs

Timothy Ingrassia: head of Americas Mergers and Acquisitions, Goldman Sachs

Leon Kalvaria: Global Head of Consumer and Health Care Banking, Citigroup

Kenneth Moelis; founder, Moelis & Company

Larry Rand: co-founder, Kekst & Company

Jeffrey Schackner: Managing Director, Citigroup

Paul Schnell: Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom

InBev

Executives and Board Members

Carlos Brito: Chief Executive Officer Jorge Paulo Lemann: Director and key shareholder Carlos Alberto da Veiga Sicupira: Director and key shareholder Marcel Herrmann Telles: Director and key shareholder

Other Key Players

Francis Aquila: Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell

Douglas Braunstein: head of Americas Investment Banking, J.P. Morgan

Steven Golub: Vice Chairman, Lazard

Steven Lipin: Senior Partner, Brunswick Group

George Sampas: Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell

Antonio Weiss: Vice Chairman of European Investment Banking, Lazard

Grupo Modelo

Executives and Board Members

María Asunción Aramburuzabala Larregui de Garza: Vice Chairman of the Board, granddaughter of one of the company’s founders

Carlos Fernández González: Chairman and CEO of Grupo Modelo; great-nephew of one of the company’s founders

Antonino Fernández Rodríguez: Honorary Life Chairman, former CEO

Other Key Players

Joele Frank: Managing Partner, Joele Frank, Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher

Robert Kindler: Vice Chairman of Investment Banking, Morgan Stanley

David Mercado: Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore

Author’s Note

Two months after this book first hit the shelves, a 27-year-old aspiring beer model was found dead of a drug overdose in August Busch IV’s bed. What had already been a rough two years for the former Anheuser-Busch CEO and notorious playboy became nearly unbearable, as hordes of reporters descended upon his mansion in St. Louis to investigate—alongside police—whether he was implicated in the woman’s death. The takeover of Anheuser-Busch during his tenure had already been of keen interest to many Americans. Then suddenly, August IV himself became television news’ hottest topic, and people were poking around in his brain in an attempt to understand why such a fortunate man continued to live a life so close to the edge.

The scandal rattled around the nation’s news cycle for months as St. Louis authorities released toxicology results, prosecutors weighed whether to charge August IV in the woman’s death, and members of her broken family fought over who had the right to sue him. August IV had already borne the emotional burden of the death of another young woman. He was now enmeshed in yet another highly public drama just two years after closing the sale of his family’s former company—an event that had sent him spiraling into severe depression and loneliness.

The summer of 2008, which marked the start of the downfall of August IV’s career at Anheuser-Busch, is one many people wish they could forget. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Bear Stearns in March, the global financial markets briefly looked as though they might stabilize. By the time legendary American brewer Anheuser-Busch received a takeover bid from foreign giant InBev in June, however, lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were teetering on the verge of insolvency and concern was mounting that U.S. taxpayers might end up holding the bag on $5 trillion in mortgage liabilities. The government stepped in to rescue both entities; but just a few months later Lehman Brothers and American International Group (AIG) failed, Merrill Lynch was taken over, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley came pounding on the U.S. Federal Reserve’s door in need of a life-saving favor. That New Year’s Eve marked the first time I can ever recall hearing a unanimous sigh of relief that the year was over.

I’m one of the lucky few who spent that nerve-wracking summer thinking about beer. I covered InBev’s takeover of Anheuser-Busch as the Financial Times’ U.S. mergers and acquisitions correspondent, and while the newspaper industry wasn’t exactly rolling in cash, I knew as the saga unfolded that I’d have a desk waiting for me in the newsroom as long as the two brewing rivals kept duking it out. Anheuser-Busch capitulated shockingly quickly, however, and since most of the world was distracted by the implosion of the U.S. housing sector and the disintegrating global financial markets, the companies’ battle in the press was short-lived. That’s one of the reasons I felt it warranted further treatment here.

Authors often attest that the books they write are nothing like what they first envisioned—that in the course of reporting one story, the undercurrent of a different tale emerged that spun them off in a new direction. That wasn’t the case for Dethroning the King. As the takeover fight unfolded that summer, it seemed as though each furtive conversation I had with a source hinted at a skeleton in someone’s closet, and hardly any of it went reported at the time. With so much fodder at my fingertips—notes of what went on in the boardrooms of both companies, warped tales about the Busch family, and details of the drama that unfolded behind the scenes on Wall Street—I had a strong suspicion when I pitched this book about where the story was the juiciest. I just wasn’t sure whether I’d be able to unearth enough details to make for a good read. The Busch family scions—and August Busch III in particular—don’t wield the paranoia-inducing power they once did in St. Louis, now that their once-proud family company has been subsumed. But I still worried that I might be cast off like a pariah once I landed in Missouri to start my reporting.

Those fears proved to be woefully misplaced. People were eager to talk about their experiences. Anheuser-Busch played a huge part in the lives of countless Americans, from the company’s employees, distributors, board members, and Wall Street advisors all the way down to the loyal drinkers of its Budweiser beer. Many of those people saw this book as their last chance to get something off their chests, a way to attain a level of catharsis and help lay the company to rest. Several said they’d been hoping someone would document Anheuser-Busch’s collapse, and a few had considered trying to write books themselves before deciding they were still too exposed to the newly-merged company or to former chief executives August Busch III and August Busch IV. People close to both companies told me separately that they had already cast the movie with help from their colleagues. One former Anheuser executive had struggled to decide whether the role of August Busch IV, tortured son and heir to the company’s throne, should be played by Jonathan Rhys Meyers or Robert Downey Jr.

Former employees of Anheuser-Busch met me for breakfast, in their offices and at their local coffee shops in St. Louis, and even graciously invited me into their homes. Each interview was fascinating and colorful, but the time I spent with Anheuser’s legendary marketing guru Michael Roarty tugged hardest at my heartstrings. Roarty had suffered a stroke a couple of years earlier, and I spoke with him in his living room, perched at the edge of his couch so I could hear him whispering from a reclining chair a few feet away. He labored to get the words out, but it was clear his recollections and sense of humor were as sharp as ever. After we finished, Roarty’s graceful wife, Lee, patiently guided me through the lower two floors of their home so I could pore over hundreds of priceless photographs on display showing the two of them standing with glitterati like Paul Newman, Frank Sinatra, Liza Minnelli, Lucille Ball, Joe DiMaggio, and former presidents George H.W. Bush and Ronald Reagan. It was an impressive display of the power big-spending Anheuser-Busch wielded in the United States. I drove away from the Roarty house grateful that I had decided to write this book, and remembering all the reasons I had decided to become a journalist in the first place.

Dozens of people close to both Anheuser-Busch and InBev spent as much as 10 hours apiece with me as I worked to form the structure of this story and to flesh out its intimate details. Some were happy to speak on the record, while others weren’t comfortable seeing their names in print. I’m grateful to them all for the generous donation of their time and for their enthusiasm about the subject matter. On the way to my hotel from the St. Louis airport, my cab driver even offered to escort me to a section of the perimeter of Grant’s Farm, the Busch family’s ancestral country estate, where she had heard the security was weak. The popular local attraction had just closed for the season when I hit town, but she said I could probably sneak in if I wanted to. I thanked her for her creativity and her eager complicity but politely declined.

My timing was slightly off in another respect as well, since I began researching this book while three months pregnant with my first child. Pregnancy and beer don’t exactly mesh—not in American culture, at least—and I wondered how many glasses of cranberry juice I’d end up swigging as brewing executives and bankers invited me to meet them at bars once they finished up at the office. I was playing against type to begin with, as a young(ish) pregnant woman writing a book about the hostile takeover of a male-dominated brewer. I’d covered other macho topics in my career as a journalist, though, including automotive companies and the futures markets in Chicago. If you can hack it as a woman on the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, I rationalized, you can certainly stay afloat at the Anheuser-Busch brewery in St. Louis. I quickly found that my pregnancy helped humanize me to some of my more cautious sources. It made me seem more relatable. And since the saying goes that writing a book is the next-closest thing to having a baby, I suppose I’ve nearly had two. This book was a labor of love that burgeoned on both U.S. coasts. I first put pen to paper in a rented office in Manhattan’s Financial District, right across Broad Street from the headquarters of Goldman Sachs. I penned the book’s last few sentences three blocks from the ocean in Santa Monica, California, after moving across the country with my husband when I was eight months along, cartons of clippings and notes in tow.

It’s easy to deal in superlatives when it comes to Anheuser-Busch, and the company gladly reinforced that image. It brewed the country’s favorite beer; its former chief, August III, was the most powerful brewer in the world; and its top staffers enjoyed only the best—sumptuous hotels, private jets laden with free Budweiser, and ritualistic gatherings studded with movie stars. Anheuser-Busch dubbed its flagship brand the “King of Beers” and spent more than half a billion dollars on marketing each year to make sure it became, and remained, an American institution.

The hostile takeover of Anheuser-Busch, which InBev attempted to make look friendly in the end, added two more superlatives to the pile. It represented the largest all-cash acquisition in history, and it marked the last giant merger that was inked before the global financial markets imploded. There were already indications that disaster loomed by the time the two companies first came together, and both sides made savvy moves that kept the deal alive when September hit and banks started collapsing around the world. Merger activity had already plunged by then, and people who depended on big deals to stay busy at work were stuck watching the boring tennis match of barbs slung back and forth between Microsoft and its failed takeover target, Yahoo!

I ended up growing quite attached to some of this book’s characters—even the ones I never had a chance to meet. Some were loyal to Anheuser-Busch, where one man’s imposing views made life seem black-and-white for decades, while others were tied to the stark, competitive InBev, where the bottom line always dictates. After living and breathing each of these people every day for a year, though, it became impossible not to see even their most indefensible actions in a dozen shades of gray. When two companies that are as diametrically different as Anheuser-Busch and InBev are driven together, even the most simple relationships and decisions—even histories and legacies that have already been written—can quickly grow messy and complicated.

Prologue

They don’t care what I think anymore.

—August Busch III

Some men golf when they’re looking to unwind. Others take their sports cars out for a drive or toss a few steaks on the grill. August A. Busch III liked to shoot things—ducks in the fall and quail in the winter.

He learned to love hunting from his father, who learned it from his father, and when he could take time away from the office, he would invite important guests to join him for a day of stalking waterfowl. He was a powerful man during the three decades when he ran Anheuser-Busch—powerful enough to compel some of his weaker-stomached subordinates to trudge into the marshes behind him, even though they’d have preferred throwing breadcrumbs to the birds rather than killing them.

The sun was slowly setting on August III’s career in the early spring of 2007, when he and several Anheuser-Busch executives flew down to a plantation in Leon County, in northern Florida’s Panhandle region, to hunt quail. He had retired as Anheuser’s chief executive four-and-a-half years prior, had just stepped down as chairman, and now, with his son August IV newly in charge, retained only his position as a member of the company’s board of directors. He was the most influential member of that group by far, but the transition to his son’s regime had been messy and contentious, and August III was feeling marginalized.

The hunting group was eager to blow off some steam that year following the all-important Super Bowl football game. Everything had gone according to plan for Anheuser-Busch: More than 93 million viewers tuned in on February 4 to watch the spectacle, college—turned-NFL phenomenon Peyton Manning was named its most valuable player, and for a record ninth year in a row, an Anheuser-Busch advertisement won the USA Today Ad Meter poll that ranks consumers’ favorite commercials. With their reign still firmly entrenched—thanks to an ad featuring beach crabs that worshipped in front of a Budweiser-filled cooler—the company’s crack team of marketers breathed a sigh of relief.

That moment of respite was brief, however, for August A. Busch IV. He had only been running the company for a few months, and his father took issue right from the start with some of his decisions. August III wasn’t the type to quietly voice his displeasure. He had torn so ferociously into his son that it had created an uncomfortable dynamic on the company’s board of directors. He didn’t approve of the alliances his son was striking with other companies, and he thought his new practice of inviting Wall Street bankers into confidential meetings was foolish. Anheuser-Busch had built itself from the ground up over the course of a century and a half. It didn’t need to ink risky merger deals and rub elbows with fee-hungry bankers to survive.

As the group of hunting companions emerged from their bedrooms the morning after their arrival in Florida and prepared to head outside, a racket erupted from the plantation’s formidable great room. August III, who had been using his cell phone to check in on things at the office, had hung up and exploded into a full-blown rage, ranting at no one in particular in front of the room’s giant picture window and its view of the lake below. As the decibel level of his voice boomed higher and higher, it became apparent that his fury was fixated on two things: a beer distributing partnership the company had recently signed with foreign rival InBev, and his son’s decision to invite a bunch of bankers down to an internal strategy session he had organized in Mexico just a week or two earlier.

Anheuser-Busch had been operating in a state of fear for months—everyone knew it was vulnerable to a takeover. By jumping into bed with the aggressive and growth-hungry InBev, even just on a deal to distribute its beers in the United States, he felt his son was asking for trouble.

“They’ve gone ahead and done this deal,” fumed August III, who had strenuously opposed the joint venture. Anheuser-Busch was slipping out of his control, even with his own namesake in charge. “We’re running scared, and here we are now doing a deal with these guys. We’ve let them inside the tent!” His hunting guests stared uncomfortably at their shoes, toeing the carpet, as the plantation’s wait staff looked on in astonishment from the kitchen.

August III then shifted tack and blasted his son’s courtship of Wall Street. By stocking what should have been a private meeting in Mexico with so many bankers, who had connections not just to each other but also to Anheuser’s competitors and investors and the media, August IV had chummed the waters in a way that was bound to attract sharks, he contended. His protestations were so forceful that it seemed they would be heard in nearby Tallahassee, where his daughter and her husband ran a beer distributorship.

The last time August III had become so unglued over a threat to Anheuser-Busch had been in 1991, when President George H.W. Bush violated his “no new taxes” pledge and raised the excise tax on alcohol. August III thought he had played all his cards right: It was a Republican administration, one Busch family knew the other set of Bushes, and he and George W. Bush, the president’s son, had even owned Major League baseball teams together. Those connections still weren’t enough to keep the president from doubling the tax on a six-pack of beer overnight.

“All you did by bringing those bankers in there was send a telegraph wire out to InBev that you’re ready to be taken over,” August III snapped that day in the plantation house, turning in contempt toward the executives who stood off to the side to distribute some of the blame.

“You’re putting up a FOR SALE sign. You’re giving away too much information. All you did was get everybody in the world to sharpen their knives!”

He finally cooled off enough to head into the plantation’s private reserve for the hunt, but the tirade had unnerved the group. They were already concerned that Anheuser-Busch had been left behind as its rivals ballooned in size. Life had been tense at headquarters for months, and everything came into stark relief that morning when they saw the worry and fear that flashed across August III’s face.

“His point was that this is the beginning of the end, because now you guys opened Pandora’s Box,” said one member of the hunting group. “So while we thought maybe we were doing our due diligence, and I’m sure companies do this all the time, he said, ‘You guys just brought this on yourselves.’ ”

Chapter 1

The Game Is Afoot

There’s a shark in the water, and the shark is InBev.

—Anheuser-Busch executive

Wednesday, June 11, 2008, was forecast to be hot and sticky in St. Louis, with afternoon temperatures rising well above 80 degrees. None of the Anheuser-Busch executives who pulled into the parking lot of the soccer park in Fenton that morning expected to see much sunlight for the next 48 hours, however. After several decades of overpowering domination of the U.S. beer market, and a history of independence that stretched back more than 150 years, the company was under attack.

Anheuser’s top staffers met often at the soccer park, one of several sites the company owned that were scattered around St. Louis. The Busch name was plastered all over town, in fact, on everything from the beer billboards that lined the city’s highways and bus shelters to the plaques that marked some of its best-loved recreational sites. The St. Louis Cardinals professional baseball team had called Busch Stadium home since 1953. Parents had been shuttling children for years to Grant’s Farm, the Busch family ancestral home turned free-admission zoo. Students at St. Louis University congregated at the Busch Student Center, and visitors to the August A. Busch Conservation Nature Center in St. Charles, just outside the city, could even blast shotguns at the August A. Busch Shooting Range.

Less than three weeks earlier, the newspapers had picked up on something that prompted Anheuser-Busch to draw its own arsenal. Global beer giant InBev, the papers said, was preparing to lay siege to Anheuser with an unwanted $46.3 billion takeover bid.

Nothing was clear yet; InBev hadn’t actually made a formal offer. The concept alone, however—and the fact that details in the newspaper reports were so explicit—set people afire at Anheuser’s headquarters. Few companies on earth were more evocative of America, with all of its history and iconography, than Anheuser-Busch. Despite the forces working against it, from brewing rivals to alcohol tax - wielding politicians, the company had somehow made itself—and its key brand, Budweiser—as ubiquitous a part of American life as firecrackers and apple pie. If InBev decided to pounce and its takeover effort was successful, the glittering shrines Anheuser had built to itself in St. Louis could come crashing down, along with its supremacy as America’s beer brewer of choice.

Most of America seemed to have never even heard of InBev. The company had grown from a tiny Brazilian brewing outfit into a globe-spanning megalith in an incredibly short period of time by normal business standards. InBev was now based in Belgium, but it was run by an intense, hard-charging group of Brazilians who had consistently gotten what they wanted as they pushed their company further and further up the list of global corporate powers. There could hardly be a more dramatic counterpoint to the gold-plated, history-laden Anheuser-Busch than cold, number-crunching InBev.

Arrogance and denial made some Anheuser-Busch executives believe that despite the missteps they had made over time, a takeover would never happen. The company—once the world’s top brewer—had slipped into fourth place because of the insular, America-centric strategy it had espoused in recent decades, and it now appeared vulnerable. Its corporate planning committee, though, had repeatedly run the numbers and determined that Anheuser-Busch was simply too expensive to buy. The concept seemed too illogical to entertain. How could Budweiser, a beer synonymous with American culture, ever be brewed by a Belgian juggernaut whose executives spoke Portuguese at the office? It was unthinkable.

As days ticked by with no official bid from InBev, sentiment among Anheuser staffers at headquarters arose that this was, yet again, just another one of the rumors that artificially boosted the company’s stock price every few months. It was summer lightning, they thought—all flash but no rain. Still, something felt different this time. One newspaper report had included not just the price InBev was planning to offer but even the code names its Wall Street bankers were using for the project. A few members of the strategy committee—the 17 executives who mapped out Anheuser-Busch’s future—were plagued by an ominous feeling about the whole thing.

Robert “Bob” Lachky, a well-liked executive who was famous in America’s marketing circles for green-lighting Anheuser’s “Wassup?!” ad and the Budweiser frogs, reacted at first to the takeover rumors with a defiant charge of energy. No bid from InBev had actually materialized, he reasoned, and even if one did, surely a company that pulled the kind of weight Anheuser-Busch did could fend it off. However, a conversation with one of his mentors—a former company executive—over the Memorial Day holiday weekend had abruptly spun him in the opposite direction.

“It’s done. You’re done,” his former colleague had said.

“Come on, man, we can fight this,” Lachky shot back, startled by the man’s conviction.

“You’re done,” his mentor repeated determinedly, explaining that much of Anheuser’s stock was owned by struggling pensions and hedge funds that would gladly take InBev’s money. The markets were in the tank, and a bid from InBev would lock in badly needed gains for anyone who owned the stock. “This is a real offer. There’s such sentiment right now that’s going to be used against us,” he said. “The fact that we’re going to be forced to listen to it means that we’re in, we’re done.”

In a way, some staffers were relieved to hear that InBev’s long-rumored bid was on its way. “Maybe this is actually a good thing,” they thought. “It’s finally out in the open. We’re in play now.” Anheuser-Busch had been rumored as a takeover target for years, and battling the persistent speculation had been frustratingly distracting. Now, the company would know exactly which shark in the water was scouting an attack and how much it thought the company was worth. The takeover reports had already boosted the price of Anheuser’s stock, which had gone nowhere since 2002, by more than 8 percent. If Anheuser could arm itself with the right data, it might even be able to convince investors it was worth more than InBev thought. The company was just starting to get back on its feet again after several rough years.

Positive thinking was only going to go so far, though, for a company that had done almost nothing to protect itself from the increasing threat of a takeover. Some sort of big change was starting to look inevitable. “The scenario you all hope for is that you can beat them off with a stick and be okay,” said Lachky. “But you knew darn well they were going to come back again. This is a matter of time. They’re either going to get us now or they’re going to get us later.”

Fear of the unknown had caused significant fissures within Anheuser-Busch since the reports of InBev’s interest first hit. Staffers had been huddling in each others’ offices at Anheuser’s headquarters, which were perched on a sloping hill just west of the Mississippi River, for muffled but fervent debates about whether they’d all still be standing there in a year’s time.

The company was refusing to comment on the rumors, in part because there was no actual bid on the table. How could it respond when InBev hadn’t actually stepped forward to confirm or deny its interest? Still, that wasn’t enough to appease the rank and file, who increasingly suspected that top executives knew more than they were letting on. The vacuum of information was causing a real credibility problem.

Douglas Muhleman, head of the company’s brewing operations, faced a particularly frustrating quandary. Brewery workers were looking to him for answers, as their boss and as a member of the agenda-setting strategy committee. The fact was, he and the rest of the committee had little more information than their subordinates did about whether they were actually being hunted.

During a routine visit to the company’s brewery down in Houston, Muhleman stood in front of several successive shifts of workers and did his best to calm the crowd as indignant employees ranted about the lack of information. The brewery’s frustrated floor staffers, who weren’t bound by the decorum that dampened criticism higher up the food chain, were getting hot under the collar. Hadn’t they already been slashing costs for a year to make the company more competitive? And what did the Busch family think about all this? Didn’t they control Anheuser-Busch?

“Guys, I’m down here and I’m trying, but I’m telling you I don’t know anything,” Muhleman said, looking out over a roomful of suspicious stares.

There had long been an unspoken assumption that it would be impossible for another company to buy Anheuser-Busch without the approval of Anheuser’s domineering patriarch, August Busch III. August III, who was often called “The Third,” was no longer CEO, having stepped down from active management six years earlier. His imposing presence on the company’s board of directors, however, was still seen as a significant deterrent to would-be buyers.

The notion that Anheuser-Busch was actually controlled by The Third and the rest of the Busch family, though, was a commonly held misperception. The Busches were all bark and no bite from a financial perspective. They owned only 4 percent of the company—less than billionaire investor Warren Buffett, Anheuser’s second-largest shareholder. The family still wielded a great deal of influence, and August III’s son, 43-year-old August A. Busch IV, was now the company’s chief executive, but they had nothing in their wallets to back themselves up.

“They were just the titular heads of this company,” said one former executive. “They didn’t have control. It was like a monarchy in Great Britain. These guys really didn’t have the authority to do anything.”

The people of St. Louis, where Anheuser-Busch had been based since it was founded, could be forgiven for forgetting that. Residents there were emotionally tethered to Anheuser-Busch despite how antiquated and paternalistic the company and its ruling family had started to look in comparison to the world’s other leading corporations. It wasn’t just August III and August IV whose names and faces wall-papered the town. There were so many Busches in the area that an online search of the city’s phone directory for the last name “Busch” elicited an exclamation from the computer: “Whoa! Over 100 results found.” Some Busches were more notable—or notorious—than others. All who were part of the brewing clan knew what it felt like to be important. “They’ve always considered themselves as part of a special class of people, and they were treated as such,” said one former Anheuser-Busch executive. “They were treated like royalty.”

When Anheuser’s top executives arrived at the soccer park that morning in June, they brought with them an electric current of fear and apprehension. They were scheduled to meet with chief executive August IV to put the finishing touches on a plan to slash and burn as many costs as possible. Their goal just a few months earlier had been $500 million, but with InBev now breathing down their necks, it might have to be double that. The whole world was watching to see whether InBev would make a move, and this was the best option Anheuser had for keeping its investors happy.

They had never been known for cost-consciousness. For decades, the aviation-loving Busch men and other staffers had hopscotched around the country on the company’s own fleet of sleek, leather-outfitted Dassault Falcon corporate jets. It got to the point for a while where even the wives of strategy committee members hadn’t flown commercial in years. To keep “Air Bud” running smoothly, the company had its own flight operations department with a staff of 20 pilots, plus mechanics and other workers, all operating out of a spotless private hangar at the Spirit of St. Louis Airport.

When they weren’t flying private, Anheuser staffers flew first-class. “I want my employees at the front of the bus everywhere they go,” August III used to say when he was CEO. “They should feel very important.” First-class flights were essentially company policy, and the perk stretched far down the pecking order. During The Third’s tenure, the company even bought first-class tickets for young staffers who traveled back and forth between St. Louis and top business schools in Philadelphia and other cities.

Trips to New York meant stays at the glitzy Pierre hotel and $1,000 dinners. Visitors to St. Louis were treated to suites at the Ritz-Carlton. Still, the money Anheuser-Busch spent wasn’t all for the home team’s personal enjoyment—it also spent copious amounts of cash on its breweries, its theme parks, and even its Clydesdale horse operations to ensure that it had the best beer-making technology, the cleanest bathrooms, and the freshest paint jobs and flower arrangements available. For the 27 years he served as CEO, all of these costly efforts were undertaken to meet The Third’s exacting standards, and many Anheuser executives were proud to work for a company that cared so much about quality.

The soccer park itself was a money pit. Anheuser-Busch helped build it in the early 1980s to house local youth players, and later bought it outright, spending two and a half years upgrading the facility to open it up to collegiate and professional teams. Because it was constructed on low ground, it was prone to flooding—and preventing and draining those floods was expensive. The irony was just too much. The Busches, who were avid duck hunters, would at points deliberately flood property on their massive farms to create the right environment for fowl during hunting season. However, the Anheuser—Busch—owned soccer park, which flooded on its own naturally, had to be pumped dry at significant cost.

August IV, who was known in aptly royal terms as “The Fourth,” had been trying to right Anheuser’s listing ship since becoming CEO a year and a half earlier in December of 2006. These weren’t easy changes to make after decades of excess, especially with his father still on the company’s board of directors. It was going to require real effort from his entire team.

Each executive showed up that day with a mental list of things he or she could offer up. Some were responsible for large segments of the company, like its brewing operations, its entertainment unit, or its giant marketing division. They weren’t accustomed to being asked to take a hacksaw to their budgets. Still, this was not the time for idle contributions. They weren’t panicked. They hadn’t actually seen a bid from InBev. Even if one never materialized, however, it seemed likely that they would now spend the next several years fighting back one assault or another, whether from other rivals or from shareholders. The company needed to get leaner and meaner, and the group had two days to figure out how.

They filtered into a large conference room at the soccer complex and grabbed eggs and pastries from the breakfast buffet, milling about and chatting until August IV strode in and set his materials down at the head of the table.

The Fourth was a loyal Bud dresser, often sporting Anheuser-Busch—themed cufflinks or shirts with the company’s logo embroidered on the front. He donned cowboy boots nearly every day, frequently in a preferred shade of green reptile skin, and on dressier business occasions he tended to pair them with an oddly tinged green suit. The boots afforded his five-foot-ten-inch frame an extra inch and a half or so, and he had Tony Lama, founder of his favorite boot maker, to thank for that—along, again, with Warren Buffett, who had owned Tony Lama’s namesake company for the past eight years. The boost in height tended to help his cause with women but failed to prompt similarly adoring gazes from his strategy committee. They knew The Fourth had picked up the boot trick from his height-challenged father, and they weren’t falling for it.

August IV had never liked coming in to his office at Anheuser headquarters downtown, but he had been skipping out even more frequently in recent months. He had set up an office and even a health room at the soccer park and preferred to work from there, citing construction on one of St. Louis’s major highways as an excuse. He, after all, didn’t pilot a helicopter to work every morning the way his father did. All the same, his decision to isolate himself from the rest of his troops illustrated how disjointed things had become for The Fourth at his own company, which, except for a brief stint, had boasted a Busch family member as CEO since its formation. The Fourth was feeling frustratingly ineffective and hamstrung by his father, and his increasingly distant attitude had rubbed off on the rest of the strategy committee. “The cat’s away, the mice will play,” one of them said.

“He increasingly was getting lazy about coming to the office,” this person added. “He said, ‘My war room is the soccer park.’ But not really. We’d do meetings at his house, we’d do meetings at the soccer park, and because he flew a lot, we’d meet at Spirit, at the hangar. We’d have a lot of meetings there.” It was reminiscent of times in the past when The Fourth, as the company’s marketing head, would disappear from the office for days and force his deputies to track him down if work needed to be done. “He just never went to the office,” the strategy committee member said. “He never did. And that was a shame, because I think that was one of his big mistakes.”

With The Fourth now situated at the head of the table, the group got down to work. The day was scheduled to start with a presentation from two bankers at Goldman Sachs who had been counseling Anheuser-Busch for a while: Tim Ingrassia, who had just been appointed Goldman’s head of Americas Mergers and Acquisitions at age 43, and Peter Gross, a top “relationship banker” who called upon Goldman’s highest-profile clients. The two had known each other for nearly two decades, from back when they were both M&A bankers at the firm, and had stayed good friends even after their career paths diverged. Gross had been asked at the mid-point of his career to assume responsibility for Goldman’s relationships with some of the world’s biggest companies, and had since become a top banker for lucrative clients such as tobacco giant Altria. While Goldman had once been on Anheuser-Busch’s black-list, Gross had gotten his firm back in the company’s good graces by doggedly making phone calls and knocking on doors in St. Louis. He and Ingrassia complemented each other well. Gross had the trust of August IV, whom he considered a friend. Ingrassia, the youngest of 10 children and a father of 4, didn’t know Anheuser-Busch as intimately but was considered one of the best merger bankers in the business and had the deal-making savvy and stature Anheuser-Busch would need if it came under attack.

After rumors of InBev’s interest had first hit in late May, Anheuser’s board of directors held a meeting at which they lobbed a bunch of questions at the two bankers. Their main concern was whether InBev could actually finance a deal in the current environment, given that the credit markets were starting to disintegrate and Anheuser-Busch could cost $40 billion or $50 billion. Just two months earlier, investment bank Bear Stearns had collapsed and been sold to rival J.P. Morgan at a fire-sale price. Could any company—even one as big as InBev—find enough banks to loan them that kind of money?

The bankers laid out half a dozen bullet points, all of which pointed to a clear answer: Yes, InBev probably had the capacity to make a bid. With that established, the board’s focus had immediately turned toward what it should do to prepare for that worst-case scenario. With any luck, they hoped, the situation wouldn’t devolve that far. InBev would get cold feet, and Anheuser-Busch would be left alone to fix itself.

Ingrassia and Gross were prepared to address that very issue—fixing the company—that morning at the soccer park. They stood up in front of the executive committee, their visual slides projected on screens behind them, and launched into a presentation on what Anheuser needed to do to thrive again and to protect its longstanding independence. The goal of the session was to work through the company from top to bottom, discipline by discipline, to see how many dollars they could come up with and how fast. Investors and analysts on Wall Street were waiting for Anheuser’s plan.

“If we don’t do it ourselves, somebody else is going to do it to us, and it’s likely going to be them,” Ingrassia told the group, referring to the InBev takeover rumors. “What can we do, and how quickly?”

“The topic of the day was ‘This is an emergency,’ ” one strategy committee member said. “ ‘We’ve got a problem here. We’re about to be taken over.’ ”

Still, it was going to be a challenge to get some Anheuser executives to change their entrenched views. The company had always made certain arguably frivolous expenditures without a second thought.

The night before, after Ingrassia had returned late to his room at the Ritz-Carlton, he flicked on the television and started aimlessly surfing through the channels. One of the ESPN sports networks caught his eye, and he paused on the station, blinking in disbelief. It was covering a tournament in some incredibly arcane sport—it could have been tiddlywinks for all he knew—and the competition was sponsored by Budweiser. He sat on the edge of the bed and stared at the screen for a few moments, shaking his head, before flipping to the next channel. Thanks to that incident, he had arrived that morning with an idea for at least one expenditure the group could cut.

The executives started to go around the table, one by one, detailing where they could eliminate costs. Marketing. Theme parks. Brewing. Packaging. Nothing was immune. The entire exercise felt surreal. They had been working to reduce spending for several years, but never on this level. This time, they were actually considering firing employees and cutting into retirement perks. It was going to hit St. Louis hard.

At mid-morning, with the Goldman team still plodding through its presentation, someone stepped in from outside the room and handed a note to August IV. He spent a brief moment reading it, his eyes darting across the paper, before rising from his chair and leaving abruptly. It wasn’t unusual for The Fourth to duck out of a meeting to take a quick phone call, but this seemed different—it looked urgent, and he was not a man who was particularly prone to urgency.

Anheuser’s other executives shot looks at each other from across the table, confirming that they weren’t alone in their uneasiness. Not long afterward, a security guard who had been milling around outside in the hallway validated their fears. August had, in fact, been summoned for an urgent phone call, and the man on the other end of the line was Carlos Brito, chief executive of InBev. Anheuser-Busch and InBev had a partnership agreement, the executives knew, and The Fourth and Brito occasionally spoke for that reason. Still, there was no need for them to be discussing it now. As the minutes ticked away, it seemed clearer and clearer that this could mean only one thing. The cohesion in the room started to dissolve, and the executives began making private phone calls and gathering in small groups for hushed pow-wows.

A few moments later, Gross and Ingrassia, along with a small coterie of Anheuser’s top staffers—men such as Chief Financial Officer W. Randolph “Randy” Baker, international head Thomas Santel, marketing chief David Peacock, chief legal officer Gary Rutledge, and internal M&A head Robert Golden—were summoned out of the room and asked to go join August IV in a back room a few steps away. They walked in to find The Fourth waiting for them, grave-faced.

Brito had just telephoned from Brussels to provide fair warning that he was about to send a letter proposing a takeover, The Fourth said quietly. Brito’s heads-up represented a queer bit of Wall Street decorum—a way of politely patting someone on the back just before slapping him in the face. The InBev letter, which would formally confirm details of the bid, was on its way by fax. However, from his conversation with Brito, The Fourth already knew enough. InBev was proposing to buy Anheuser-Busch for $65 per share, or $46.3 billion, the same price that had been rumored.

There were a few hiccups and conditions: InBev wanted access to Anheuser’s confidential financial information so it could be better-informed, and it hadn’t provided many specifics on how it planned to actually pay for the takeover. There was no mistaking it—one of the worst fears of each executive sequestered in that fluorescent-lit conference room was now a harsh reality. InBev’s bid qualified, in Wall Street parlance, as a typical “bear hug”—an attempt to make a hostile takeover by offering such a high price that the target simply can’t refuse to consider it. Anheuser-Busch was being smothered.

The Fourth was astute enough to know that InBev’s entreaty was a big deal. But he hadn’t handled a situation like this before.

“Tell me what to do now,” he instructed his advisors. “What do I do now?”

The group quickly hunkered down and started to map out a strategy, each staffer tossing in his ideas. They had to contact Anheuser’s board of directors to get them organized, since the board would need to meet within a few days to set a course of action. They needed to loop in Anheuser’s lawyers to set up a legal strategy, so they picked up the conference room phone to patch in Joseph Flom and Paul Schnell, two New York-based partners at the giant corporate law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, to brief them on the situation. Flom, a legend on Wall Street, had been Anheuser-Busch’s legal counsel for decades and had an incredibly close-knit professional relationship with August III.

Because InBev was a foreign brewer looking to gobble up an iconic American company, the executives also knew they needed to get cracking immediately on a public relations strategy. Randy Baker put in a call to Lawrence Rand, a longtime partner at New York public relations firm Kekst and Company, who had been working with Anheuser-Busch behind the scenes for years in preparation for just this sort of event. Kekst advised a high-powered roster of companies and investment firms on how to handle public exposure, and it specialized in takeovers. The firm would need to brief Anheuser’s internal PR staff on how to handle the situation, help them prepare materials for employees, shareholders, and the media, and start figuring out which buttons to push with politicians and community organizations.

Some of the men in that room, when they found a moment to catch a breath, decided that InBev’s overture seemed eerily well-timed. The Brazilians had lobbed in this grenade of an offer just as Anheuser-Busch was trying to get the components of its cost-savings plan in place to unveil it to analysts. Was it just a coincidence? Or did InBev somehow know what they were up to?

Half an hour after The Fourth pulled his deputies out of their brainstorming session, the soccer park’s fax machine sprang to life and spit out the offer letter from InBev, addressed to August IV. A few phrases jumped straight off the flimsy piece of paper. A merger of the two companies would be an “industry-transforming event,” Brito said. “InBev is prepared to pay $65 per share in cash.” Brito worked in a quick shout-out to Anheuser-Busch’s beer wholesalers and its employees, said the merged company’s North American headquarters would be in St. Louis, and said InBev would be renamed to reflect Anheuser-Busch’s heritage. He was clearly trying to dampen Anheuser’s ability to scuttle the deal by rallying popular sentiment.

International head Tom Santel, who had also been the company’s strategic planning chief for the past decade, had been tracking InBev at the request of Anheuser’s board of directors for nearly two years. Everybody knew that Anheuser was vulnerable and that InBev was a likely aggressor, but they hadn’t been able to agree on a way to defend themselves. With InBev’s fax now sitting there on the table, it felt as though the walls were closing in. “Seeing something like that in black and white, it suddenly becomes more real,” Santel said. “It was like, okay, here we go.”

The back room suddenly seemed stifling, so as a couple of the executives rejoined the larger group, several others stepped onto an outdoor deck alongside the building to continue their conversation. Another posse of Anheuser-Busch staffers who were congregated on a separate deck glanced over quizzically, trying to discern what was going on. After the men wrapped up their hushed discussions, they filtered back into the main conference room, hungry and scouting for lunch.

The rest of the angst—ridden strategy committee sat scattered around a few trays of food, picking over sandwiches and salads as they waited for the session to reconvene. It was obvious that something was up—August IV had disappeared, several other top executives had gone missing, and the two bankers who had been presenting to the group had vanished. They all knew what was coming. Their worlds were about to change. For those final few seconds before the boom actually hit, though, the uncertainty was still comforting.

“I do remember a fairly surreal feeling of being in this back room with August, knowing what was now definitively coming at us, and then walking back into this group of people who had no idea what was going on, who were sitting at a buffet getting food, with all the knowledge of what was coming their way that would change their lives forever,” said one person who had been summoned out of the room by The Fourth. “Knowing that and grabbing something to eat, and thinking about how much this could radically change their lives and the city of St. Louis . . . I do remember thinking it was fairly sur real.”

Roughly an hour after he left the conference room, The Fourth finally stepped back through the door. His agitated subordinates turned toward him and went silent in expectation.

“I just got a call,” he said, his eyes flashing around the room to gauge his deputies’ reactions. He briefly sketched out InBev’s offer, gripping the company’s fax in his hand, and then outlined what his team had planned so far in response. A few pockets of nervous chatter erupted as the group started to internalize what was happening.

“Are we going to fight this?” The Fourth asked, after giving the news a moment to sink in. He amplified his rhetoric a notch. “Are we going to stay together and fight this? What’s the vote?”

Everyone in the room said yes. Loudly. What else was there to say? At the same time, their shell-shocked minds started to silently race—to warp ahead six months or a year, trying to picture Anheuser-Busch’s future. They had put in 70-hour workweeks for decades. The company was their lives. What would it be like to no longer work for the most famous employer in St. Louis? To no longer feel quietly superior at Cardinals baseball games or to live in the only house on the block that was always stocked with free Budweiser? It was easy to bash The Third and The Fourth for their weaknesses, but they respected them, too.

“Most of these people are from St. Louis, and this is, like, the dream,” one of the executives said. “They’re the gentry class in their community. They grew up in south city with nothing, and here they are working at A-B. They’re giving beer to their friends on the weekends and are the heroes of the neighborhood. Give that up? I’m not trying to be trivial, but this is how the psyche is in this town.”

For many of the company’s top executives, there also raged a more complicated internal battle. InBev’s offer valued Anheuser-Busch at a much higher level than anyone else had in years. What would their piles of stock be worth at $65 per share, they wondered, running over the math in their heads. And what if Anheuser-Busch could get InBev to offer even more? That might mean a five-bedroom house in Vail rather than three, they thought—or maybe a 70-foot yacht rather than a 45-foot day cruiser.

“You’re kind of going, ‘Okay, at least we’re worth something,’ ” one of them said. “You have that little part of you that’s going ‘Geez, the valuation is good. I don’t like the way this plays out. The only way I’ll get my money is if this place goes away.’ ”

“Isn’t that terrible, though, and selfish?”