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With the terrorist attacks of 9/11, international attention has shifted to Afghanistan. This event also marked the beginning of a fundamental transformation in the country: It was and is target of an enormous military campaign that toppled the Taliban in a "War on Terror". With the previous government deposed, a new one had to be built. Guided by a multinational coalition, the Afghan state was quickly reformed, but instabilities and conflicts have not only been inherited but also unintentionally triggered. Even after more than 15 years of international intervention, neither peace nor political stability or security seem to have taken roots in the country. The book takes a closer look at the international state-building regime and evaluates the impact and outlook of such efforts in Afghanistan. In order to facilitate the analysis, the study concentrates on Security Sector Reform (SSR) with special emphasis on the reconstruction of the Afghan military and police. With this, the author presents critical insights into state-building prospects in Afghanistan and introduces an analytical approach that may also be transferred to other cases of state reconstruction. Auch 15 Jahre nach der internationalen Intervention ist Afghanistan weit davon entfernt, ein stabiler Staat zu sein. Mit besonderem Fokus auf den Sicherheitssektor analysiert Suchanek die bisherigen Maßnahmen und entwickelt zugleich eine allgemein anwendbare Analysemethode für staatlichen Wiederaufbau.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018
Christiane Suchanek
Digging into Chaos
Christiane Suchanek
Digging into Chaos
Security Sector Reconstruction and State-Building in Afghanistan
Tectum Verlag
Christiane Suchanek
Digging into Chaos. Security Sector Reconstruction and State-Building in Afghanistan
© Tectum – ein Verlag in der Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2018
E-Pub: 978-3-8288-7081-9
(Dieser Titel ist zugleich als gedrucktes Werk unter der ISBN 978-3-8288-4187-1 im Tectum Verlag erschienen.)
Umschlagabbildung: shutterstock.com © Nate Derrick
Besuchen Sie uns im Internet www.tectum-verlag.de
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Contents
List of Tables and Figures
List of Abbreviations
1. Introduction: Situation under Control?
2. Theoretical Framework of State Reconstruction
2.1. State Theories and Definitions
2.1.1. Central Principles of State Theory
2.1.2. Core Functions of the State
2.2. The “Art” of State-Building
2.2.1. State-Building on the International Agenda
2.2.2. Contrasting State-Building
2.3. Study Focus: Security Sector Reform in State-Building
2.4. Stopover: The Knowns and Unknowns of State-Building
3. Developing a Methodological Framework for Analysis
3.1. A Closer Look at Methodological Implications
3.2. Developing a Conceptual Framework for SSR Impact
4. Case Study Afghanistan
4.1. Conflict Portrait and State-Building Approach
4.2. The Afghan Police
4.2.1. The Police Reform Agenda Starting from Scratch
4.2.2. The Police under Transition to Full Responsibility
4.2.3. Assessing the Reconstruction of the Police
4.3. The Afghan Military
4.3.1. The Military Reform Agenda Starting from Scratch
4.3.2. The Military under Transition to Full Responsibility
4.3.3. Assessing the Reconstruction of the Military
4.4. Lessons Learned about SSR and State-Building in Afghanistan
5. Conclusion: Digging into Chaos
Literature
List of Tables and Figures
Table 1:SSR Evaluation Criteria
Table 2:Rating Levels for Project Evaluation
Figure 1:Security Risks in Afghanistan
Figure 2:ANP Ratings 2012-2013
Figure 3:Police Reform Rating
Figure 4:ANA Ratings 2012-2013
Figure 5:Military Reform Rating
Figure 6:State-Building Status of the Afghan Security Domain
List of Abbreviations
ANCOP
Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDSF
Afghan National Defence and Security Forces
ANP
Afghan National Police
APPS
Afghan Personnel Pay System
AHRIMS
Afghanistan Human Resources Management Information System
ANA
Afghanistan National Army
AREU
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
CSTC-A
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DOD
Department of Defense (U.S.)
DOS
Department of State (U.S.)
DAC
Development Assistance Committee
DDR
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ETT
Embedded Training Teams
EU
European Union
FDD
Focused District Development
GOOD
Gender Occupational Opportunity Programme
GAO
Government Accountability Office
ISAF
International Security Assistance Force
IS
Islamic State
IS-K
Islamic State-Khorasan
KfW
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Credit Institute)
MAT
Military Assistance Team
MCTF
Major Crimes Task Force
MPRI
Military Professional Resources, Incorporated
MOD
Ministry of Defence (Afghanistan)
MOI
Ministry of Interior (Afghanistan)
NUG
National Unity Government
NTM-A
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
NCO
Non-commissioned Officer
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OMC-A
Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan
OSC-A
Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan
OEF
Operation Enduring Freedom
OMLT
Operational Mentoring Liaison Team
OECD
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RS
Resolute Support
SFAAT
Security Force Assistance Advisory Team
SSR
Security Sector Reform
SALW
Small Arms and Light Weapons
SIGAR
U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
UNAMA
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
USA
United States of America
1. Introduction: Situation under Control?
The Taliban started out the year 2017 with a new offensive “Operation Mansouri” launching “the most devastating attacks on Afghan forces” (Mackenzie 2017) since the international intervention in 2001. The group announced to direct their offensive “on foreign forces, their military and intelligence infrastructure” (ibid.). The declared targets have been repeatedly under fire: In March 2017, a group of extremists disguised as doctors attacked the main military hospital in Kabul killing almost 50 people including medical staff and patients. Another grave attack was launched on April 21, 2017 when a group of at least 10 Taliban fighters attacked the Afghan army base in Masar-i-Sharif during the Friday Prayer. Disguised as soldiers, the invaders killed more than 140 Afghan soldiers (Webermann 2017).1 Since the termination of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by the end of 2014, the resurged Taliban has managed to expand its activities throughout Afghanistan (International Crisis Group 2017a, 5). At the same time, other militant groups such as the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), an affiliate organisation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS), as well as Al-Qaeda contribute to the deterioration of the situation (Otłowski 2014, 4-5).
Government officials try to calm the people. During the battles of May 2017, they explained to the residents of Kunduz “they had the situation under control” (Harooni 2017). The overall assessment of the United States’ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) indicates something different: In fact, by May 2017, the government controlled only 23.8 percent of the Afghan districts (SIGAR 2017, 88).2 After more than a decade of international engagement and state-building efforts in Afghanistan, the situation is far from being stabilized. Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the United States of America (USA) and the international coalition managed to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan within the first two months of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Shortly thereafter, the Afghan Interim Administration under Hamid Karzai was installed as a result of the Bonn Conference in 2001 (Hammes 2015, 278). Since then, international civilian and military assistance forces seek to advise, to assist and to reconstruct the administration system, hence the Afghan state itself. The ISAF operation and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), founded in 2002, are only two elements of the manifold international state-building and reconstruction efforts in the country (Stütz 2008, 251-253). When ISAF was terminated in 2014, signalling an end to all combat activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan, this was oftentimes associated with an “end of war” (Otłowski 2014, 2). Quite the opposite seems to be true given the rising number of civilian casualties recorded by UNAMA since 2009.3 Last year, the numbers reached their current all-time high with 3,498 deaths and 7,920 injured (UNAMA 2017, 3-4).4 The latest violent attacks, the resurgence of the Taliban, as well as rising numbers of internally displaced people and refugees indicate a deterioration of the security situation in the country – which was already the case before the completion of ISAF (Ruttig 2015). In the light of these developments, the general effectiveness and conception of international activities in Afghanistan, and, in a broader sense, state-building practices in international politics, are called into question.
The completion of ISAF was accompanied by a remarkable decline in international commitment in the country starting with the official handover of security responsibility to the Afghan government and subsequent withdrawal of substantial international troops (ibid.). Nevertheless, international forces did not leave completely due to the worsening situation. Yet the NATO’s follow-up mission Resolute Support (RS) and the separate U.S.-led antiterrorism-campaign “Freedom’s Sentinel” are of much smaller size (ibid.). Still, the RS mission indicates a similar strategic thrust as the former ISAF in training and mentoring Afghan security forces (Otłowski 2014, 4). The focus on the empowerment of Afghan National Security and Defence Forces (ANDSF), including the army, national police, police, and village police programme, evolved as a central pillar of international state-building pursued under the heading of security sector reform (SSR) (Hammes 2015, 277). In view of the ongoing violent conflict, the issue of (re-)building security in Afghanistan for the state and the people remains of central importance (Hänggi 2010, 97). Despite all research conducted in this field, the lacking capacity of the Afghan state and its institutions indicate the need for further assessments of national and international efforts to foster security and stability in the country. Therefore, this study aims to answer the question: What does security sector reconstruction contribute to state-building in Afghanistan?
Thinking beyond the regional dimension of the conflict, the concept of SSR within state-building has gained importance and recognition within the international community since the 1990s (Hänggi 2010, 77). Similar reform activities have been conducted in several countries, among them, Burundi, Liberia, and South Sudan (United Nations 2013, para. 30). Thus, investigating the contribution of security sector reform includes a global rationale, without implying to generalize Afghanistan-specific findings. As Sisk (2010, 72-73) points out, it is of central importance to understand the specific (local) context of transition efforts as there is no “one-size-fits-all”-concept to state-building (Debiel and Reinhardt 2004, 536). While the definitive actions are highly context-dependent, the overarching ideal of a participatory democratic state indicates the potential of comparable research (Debiel and Rinck, Statebuilding 2017, 411)5. At the same time, in the field of state-building and SSR, comparative research is lacking due to its complexity and missing applicable analytical frameworks (ibid., 412). Though this paper compiles a qualitative single case study of Afghanistan, it also aims to provide an analytical framework for SSR assessment in the context of state-building that can be applied to other settings in the future.
For a start, the impact evaluation of security reconstruction in state-building requires to define the concepts of state-building in general and, in particular, of security as a state function pursued under the banner of SSR. This requires a broad literature review that delineates conceptions of the state, state-building and SSR including their theoretical and practical foundations. As any state-building approach is based on an underlying idea(l) of the state, it is crucial to embark on fundamental theories of the state in order to assess their influence on specific practices and objectives. The development of theoretical foundations requires a revision and distinction of different but related discourses such as state formation, peace building and nation building. Furthermore, critique to state-building and SSR has to be revealed and taken into account for the analysis.
For the purpose of feasibility, the study of SSR activities in the country is conducted two-part, focusing on two major security state actors, the police and the military. These two research objects narrow down the scope of analysis, but again come with certain constraints that are acknowledged in the theoretical and methodological chapters. First, the military and the police need to be considered as two distinct organisations based on different tasks, goals and organisational needs. These institutional differences reconsidered while analysing international efforts to re-build them. The juxtaposition of two security agencies enables a comparison between related reconstruction agendas in the same regional, historical and temporal context, but originally led by different international stakeholders. In Afghanistan, the United States headed the military reconstruction, whereas Germany took the lead for police reform (Hammes 2015, 279). The basis of different lead nations facilitates a comparison of strategies, priorities, programming and normative frameworks, which will be incorporated in the conceptual analysis.
Based on these theoretical considerations, the methodological section discusses the chosen qualitative research approach followed by the development of the analytical framework for the case study of Afghanistan that will be conducted in a next step. For the purpose of this study, Afghanistan offers a well-researched example which has been of scientific interest even before the 9/11 attacks. The very roots of the current conflict can be traced back to the colonial era or the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979 to 1989 (Hirschmann 2016, 104, Knopf 2004). While this study is devoted to the developments of the ongoing conflict since 2001, the historical and societal circumstances are included in the conflict analysis.
The study of security sector reconstruction in Afghanistan does not come without certain limitations. First, the ongoing conflict in the country hampers the documentation and verification of events, internal developments, and politics. (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013, 2). This adds to general constraints of conflict analysis facing country specific complexities like the aforementioned historical and societal peculiarities. On the other hand, the international attention concerning Afghanistan since (at least) the late 1970s has prompted various individual researchers, think tanks, governmental and non-governmental organisations to dedicate their work to this case. The Afghanistan Evaluation Unit (AREU), for example, is supporting the monitoring, evaluation and public debate about Afghanistan by providing analysis on different governance issues based upon the UN’s 1998 Strategic Framework for Afghanistan (AREU 2017). As a result, there is comparably broadly available literature about Afghanistan including strategic policy analysis and first-hand field studies (e.g. by Wieker 2012 or Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013). The case study thus enables to research the impact of international SSR efforts within the framework of state-building while incorporating the most recent findings.6 In this way, it derives a critical assessment of the international agenda and the policy implications for future engagement. The last two chapters of the thesis will be assigned to the discussion and conclusion of the findings in order to draw together the main results, difficulties and prospects of the study.
1The number of casualties varies depending on the source of information.
2In addition, 35.9 percent of the districts were under government influence indicating a lack of authority in these districts while the central government is perceived as the dominating force (SIGAR 2017, 88).
3In 2009, UNAMA began documenting civilian casualties in Afghanistan making it difficult to compare and assess earlier figures and trends (UNAMA 2017, 3).
4This reflects the latest data available as of October 2017.
5This ideal continues to be highly contentious. Constantini (2015, 22) emphasises that the focus on this “Weberian” model neglects the evolution of alternative forms of governance (see chapter 2).
6This study was finalised in October 2017.
2. Theoretical Framework of State Reconstruction
In order to analyse the contribution of security sector reconstruction to state-building in Afghanistan, a theoretical framework is needed which defines the basic terminology and the current status of research. The state-building discourse, and beyond that the SSR-approach, consist of a theoretical and a practical dimension which are closely interconnected and imply normative considerations. In general, the theoretical pillar is based on the theory of state. This research area questions the evolution and role of the state (Stütz 2008, 33). It is crucial to first outline the theoretical foundation of the state itself as it affects the political direction of the international state-building approach and indicates the role of security (sector reconstruction). Additionally, an understanding of state theory is necessary in order to discern and assign diverging interpretations of state-building discourses, goals and practices. On the international level, the normative and practical framework for intervention and reconstruction is set out in guidelines and handbooks developed, among others, by the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) (e.g. OECD 2007, 2008).
Starting with the basic outline of state theory, the state-building discourse is reflected and contrasted to related, but different concepts such as state formation, peace building or nation building. Although they pose distinct presumptions about decisive procedures and intended results, a review of this literature offers cross-disciplinary insights and narrows down the scope and direction of state-building activities. Moreover, these discourses present central criticisms of the state-building approach. These remarks are taken into consideration while developing the analytical framework and studying the actual implementation in Afghanistan. This aspect reflects the practical dimension of the state-building concept that is composed of field research, monitoring and evaluation of actual projects. Beyond this, the literature provides a bridge between the theoretical (and normative) considerations and real-life implementation.
As a next step, the SSR discourse will be examined in order to provide an understanding of our specific area of interest within the broader state-building debate. Again, the literature consists of theoretical and practical dimensions. In contrast to the overarching state-building literature, the SSR-track focuses closely on the role of security, its domain, scope and implementation in reconstruction agendas (e.g. by Hänggi 2010).
The introduction of the different concepts and terminology provided in this chapter creates not only a basis for analysis, but integrates this study in the scientific debate. As described above, the study incorporates primary and secondary literature from various sources, including newspaper and scientific journal articles, multilateral handbooks, and research publications in order to provide sound analysis results and outline the current state of knowledge and discussion. The key findings of the review presented in this chapter will guide the subsequent analysis. Therefore, the last section of this chapter summarizes and outlines the main results relevant for the conceptual framework.
2.1. State Theories and Definitions
2.1.1. Central Principles of State Theory
The state as a polity is not a modern invention, but, as Fukuyama (2005, 1) puts it, dates back some 6,000 years to the first Mesopotamian societies. Hierarchical orders and trained bureaucracies have already existed for thousands of years in China or Egypt (ibid.). The political organisation described as a “state” covers a great variety of different structures and thus definitions and models (Nelson 2006, 7). In order to discuss the state-building approach in international politics, a common understanding of the state and its main characteristics is necessary.7 This section aims to provide a basic overview of common state definitions, hence attributed key functions and related controversies that translate into state-building discourses.
Starting into understanding the “state” as a concept, the Oxford Dictionary of English provides the definition that a state is “a nation or territory considered as an organized political community under one government” (Stevenson 2010, 1741). A similar definition is presented by the World Bank’s World Development Report of 1997:
“State, in its wider sense, refers to a set of institutions that possess the means of legitimate coercion, exercised over a defined territory and its population, referred to as society. The state monopolizes rulemaking within its territory through the medium of an organized government.” (World Bank 1997, 20)
Therefore, the state features some kind of organisation over a geographical entity (the territory) or people (the “nation”) led by the decisions of its central institution (the government). In order to enforce its rules, the government is fitted with the monopoly on legitimate8 use of force which indicates its superiority. Common state theories regularly comprise these elements of the modern state, though with different accentuations (Stütz 2008, 34-35).
Parallels to these characteristics of the state are found in the writings of state theorist Georg Jellinek. According to Jellinek (1914, Chapter 13), a state comprises three fundamental elements: a given territory (“Staatsgebiet”), a population (“Staatsvolk”) and authority over both9 (“Staatsgewalt”). In this view, the term “Staatsvolk” is inextricably linked to a common feeling of society, i.e. the nation (Jellinek and Jellinek 1914, 407). In contrast to this, the Oxford’s basic definition states “nation or territory” (Stevenson 2010, 1741). This illustrates Conrad Schetter’s (2005, 8) critical remark that the classical model of the nation state – referring to Jellinek – has been turned upside down. In today’s world, state borders and nations are not congruent anymore (ibid.). Still, the necessity of congruency between state, nation and territory remains an issue of discussion and leads to confusions between state building and nation building concepts.10 This stems from diverging interpretations of the nation-term itself. Even though there is no ultimate definition for a nation, it is in a broadly speaking sense constituted by a common identity of people which may derive from cultural, ethnical, religious or political affiliation (Stütz 2008, 43-45). These multiple sources of identity may be fraught with tension leading to violent conflicts of people within a certain territory and on the academic level, to the debate about the relation between the state and the nation.
Nevertheless, Georg Jellinek’s key elements of the state provide a basic understanding of state characteristics which can be related to the history of the “modern” state system. The evolution of today’s conception of statehood has been the result of a violent process which culminated in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (Hirschmann 2016, 19). That date represents from a political scientist’s view the codification of the main principles of contemporary international law around the globe. The principle of state sovereignty was contracted which established the internal and external self-determination of each nation state within its territory. It implies the legal application of force in the interest of the state and the equality of each state in the international system (ibid.). This aspect is explicitly emphasised by German sociologist Max Weber:
“Today, however, we have to say that state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence.” (Weber 1946, 77)
Similar to Jellinek, Weber includes the elements of territory, people, and authority in his definition, while he emphasises the legitimate use of violence as an exclusive right of the state (ibid.). He accentuates legitimacy as the belief in the rightful dominance of the superordinate state power which can be derived by traditions, charisma or accepted legal rules (ibid, 78-79). In a Weberian sense, the “legal domination” of the “modern state” represents the most advanced form of legitimate authority featuring a commitment to rational, law- and knowledge-oriented administration (Sisk 2013, 47-48).
Weber’s definition of the state constitutes a central reference for political sciences and sociology (Eabrasu 2012, 187-188). The Weberian model is of fundamental importance as an ideal type for institutions within the state-building agenda. When the literature discusses the Weberian state or bureaucracy, it means a certain set of features. In detail, it signifies a governmental organisation structured by a hierarchy of formally separated offices with specialised tasks. These offices operate impersonally while resting on rules and regulations. Furthermore, the Weberian state applies qualification-based selection and promotion processes of bureaucrats (OECD 2009, 38-39). However, Weber’s concept of legitimate rule does not read without criticism. On the one hand, the centrality of the state’s monopoly of legitimate use of force has the advantage to be applicable to the multifaceted manifestations of political organisations called states. On the other hand, this definition has an intrinsically normative notion, while the essential concept of legitimacy itself poses a contested concept (Eabrasu 2012, 207-208).
Legitimacy can be roughly divided into an external and internal notion. External legitimacy derives from the recognition of a state by other states in the international system. Internal legitimacy is based on the endemic belief of rightful governance which constitutes a quite challenging concept (Hirschmann 2016, 21, Rocha Menocal 2011, 1721). A state may enjoy international recognition, i.e. external legitimacy, without owning internal legitimacy in the sense of the approval of its citizens or even without being able to effectively govern its territory (Hirschmann 2016, 21). Sisk (2013, 50) observes, that a state constitutes “very much the product of constructed realities over the years” meaning that the international recognition of a state has never been revoked even in cases like Somalia where state-structures have been almost completely decayed. As Hirschmann (2016, 11) points out, the international assumption that there is a congruency between a certain territory and one responsible government is de facto not valid anymore – taking a similar stance as Conrad Schetter (2005, 8). The formal definition of the state (territory, population, government) does not capture the reasons for state formation and preservation in the sense of stability. Weber’s contentious concept of the state highlights legitimacy as a central clause to “the right to rule based on consent of the governed” (Sisk 2013, 46). This implies that a state needs to provide certain services and characteristics in order to prevail as a political form of human organisation.
2.1.2. Core Functions of the State
