Digital Media Ethics E-Book

Charles Ess

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: DMS - Digital Media and Society
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 451

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2013

Beschreibung

This is the first textbook on the central ethical issues of digital media, ranging from computers and the Internet to mobile phones. It is also the first book of its kind to consider these issues from a global perspective, introducing ethical theories from multiple cultures. It further utilizes examples from around the world, such as the publication of “the Mohammed Cartoons”; diverse understandings of what “privacy” means in Facebook or MySpace; why pirating CDs and DVDs may be justified in developing countries; and culturally-variable perspectives on sexuality and what counts as “pornography.” Readers and students thus acquire a global perspective on the central ethical issues of digital media, including privacy, copyright, pornography and violence, and the ethics of cross-cultural communication online.

The book is designed for use across disciplines – media and communication studies, computer science and informatics, as well as philosophy. It is up-to-date, accessible and student- and classroom-friendly: each topic and theory is interwoven throughout the volume with detailed sets of questions that foster careful reflection, writing, and discussion into these issues and their possible resolutions. Each chapter further includes additional resources and suggestions for further research and writing.

Leseprobe

Digital Media Ethics

Digital Media and Society Series

New technologies are fundamentally altering the ways in which we communicate. This series from Polity aims to provide a set of books that make available to a broad readership cutting-edge research and thinking on digital media and their social contexts. Taken as a whole, the series will examine questions about the impact of network technology and digital media on society in all its facets, including economics, culture and politics.

Mark Deuze: Media Work

Charles Ess: Digital Media Ethics

Alexander Halavais: Search Engine Society

Robert Hassan: The Information Society

Tim Jordan: Hacking

Jill Walker Rettberg: Blogging

Digital Media Ethics

CHARLES ESS

polity

Copyright © Charles Ess 2009

The right of Charles Ess to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2009 by Polity Press

Polity Press

65 Bridge Street

Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press 350

Main Street Malden,

MA 02148, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-5500-0

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Typeset in 10.25 on 12.5 pt FF Scala

by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport,

Cheshire Printed and bound in the United States by Maple Vail Book Manufacturing

Group

Text design by Peter Ducker MISTD

The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.

Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.

For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.polity.co.uk

For Mom (1927–2008) and Dad, my first and most important ethics teachers.

For Conni, best beloved, wonderful mother, grace-ful minister.

For Joshua and Kathleen, our children, now young adults, who bring overwhelming joy and hope.

Contents

Foreword by Luciano Floridi

Preface: Why This Book?

Acknowledgements

Chapter Synopses

1    Central Issues in the Ethics of Digital Media

2    Privacy in the Electronic Global Metropolis?

3    Copying and Distributing via Digital Media: Copyright, Copyleft, Global Perspectives

4    Citizenship in the Global Metropolis

5    Still More Ethical Issues: Digital Sex and Games

6    Digital Media Ethics: Overview, Frameworks, Resources

Glossary

References

Index

Foreword

LUCIANO FLORIDI

A common risk, run by many Forewords, is to bother the reader by repeating, sometimes less accurately, what the table of contents of the book already specifies, or (and unfortunately this is often an inclusive ‘or’) by eulogizing the text and the author, plastering comments that look like semantic clones lifted from a myriad of other texts. It is in order to try to avoid both pitfalls that I shall skip here the usual hypes – which the book and its author do deserve, make no mistake – in order to speak to the reader a bit more frankly and hence, I hope, less uninformatively.

The book has all the usual virtues of a good textbook: it is carefully researched, clearly written, and argued intelligently. Yet these are basic features that we have come to expect from high-standard scholarship and do not make it special. That Charles Ess has written a good textbook is uninteresting. That he might have written an excellent one is what I would like to argue.

What the book offers, over and above its competitors, are some remarkable and, to my knowledge, unique features. Let me be schematic. The list is not exhaustive, nor do the listed features appear in order of importance, but there is a good narrative that keeps them together.

First, the topic. The book addresses the gray but crucial area of ethical concerns raised by digital media. Of course, it is flanked on the shelf by many other textbooks in Information and Computer Ethics but, as Charles Ess well explains, this is not one of them, and sticks out for its originality. For the book tackles that messy area of our ordinary lives where ethical issues are entangled with digital mass media, communication artifacts, information technologies of all sorts, computational processes, computer-mediated social interactions and so forth. Indeed, it is one of its virtues that it tries to clarify that “so forth” which I have just somewhat surreptitiously added in order to spare myself the embarrassment of a lack of a clear definition. As Schrödinger once said in a different context, this is a very sharp picture of a rather fuzzy subject.

Second, the approach. The book has all the required philosophical rigor but, once again, this is not its most impressive feature. It is also graced by a light touch, which means that Ess has avoided being either prescriptive or proscriptive (you will not be told what to do and what not to do), opting in favor of an enlightened (liberal, in his own words), critical description of the problems discussed. This is a noteworthy advantage, since the author empowers the reader, as should be (but often is not) the case with similar texts. Having said all this, the feature that I find absolutely unique and outstanding (in the sense that it makes this book stand out on the ideal shelf of other comparable books) is its capacity to combine a pluralistic approach – without the bitter aftertaste of some crypto-relativism – with a well-informed and timely look into non-Western views on the ethical issues it tackles. This is crucial. Following a remarkable tradition of German philosophers (Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Hegel), Ess makes a sustained and successful effort to bring together Eastern and Western ethical traditions in an enriching and fascinating synthesis. And he achieves all this thanks to his extended, international experiences with a variety of cultures. If you wish to see how masterfully Ess avoids syncretism, relativism, and dogmatism and succeeds in shaping an overview of the field which is both captivating and ethically robust, you need to read the book.

Third, the style. This is a reader-friendly book that teaches without patronizing, with a didactic style that can only be the result of decades of care and experience in guiding students and readers through difficult topics. Its degree of accessibility is as misleading as the ability of an acrobat to make his or her performance look effortless.

Someone once told me that digital media are like pornography: it is very difficult to define them, but you recognize them immediately when you see them. Because we all know what digital media are, even if it is hard to determine the boundaries of their nature, applications, evolutions, and effects on our lives, I am confident that the reader will understand why I would recommend this book not only inside but also outside the classroom. Given its topic, its approach and its style, this is a book for the educated public as well. It should be read by anyone interested in the development and future of the information society and our moral lives within it.

Preface

Why This Book?

There are many excellent textbooks in applied ethics as well as in Information and Computing Ethics (ICE). Indeed, I draw upon and refer to these throughout this text. But here I try to do three things a bit differently than in other textbooks. First, I try to address here a wider audience, and, thereby, a correlatively wider range of issues and problems, than those characteristically associated with ICE. Because I think that digital media ethics are important to anyone who uses a computer, a cellphone, videogames, and so forth, this text is designed for use in a wide range of classes, including media, communication, and information classes (e.g., related to computer science, librarianship, etc.), not solely classes in philosophy and applied ethics. To be sure, we explore here some of the most important problems and issues in ICE – privacy, copyright, pornography, as well as freedom of expression and cross-cultural communication online. But I leave out a number of additional and important topics (e.g., security, hacking, and the specific obligations of professional ethics) in favor of further including digital media such as cellphones and videogames and some of the ethical issues they likewise entail.

Second, I don’t try to be comprehensive. Rather, my simple thought is that less is sometimes more. Experience has taught me that this is often true in effective teaching, and this volume is designed primarily as a teaching text; this will be apparent from the outset in the manifold case-studies used in the beginning and then throughout each chapter, each accompanied by questions designed to foster individual and collaborative reflection, discussion, writing, and research.

In this way, the book is intended to serve as primer. The goal is to provide students and instructors in a wide range of disciplines with a first introduction to important ethical issues associated with digital media (chapters 1–5). This is conjoined with an initial exposure to the ethical and meta-ethical frameworks that are commonly used in applied ethics (chapter 6). I’m acutely aware that my introductions and discussions do not (usually) go into the level of detail, including important historical and conceptual backgrounds, that is necessary for more robust analyses and philosophical reflection. To be sure, each chapter includes more fine-grained reflection and research exercises and relevant resources intended to help students and instructors pursue these matters more fully. I hope that these – along with the further materials and research that instructors and their classes will want to explore – will thereby help readers develop more nuanced understandings and insights that build on necessarily basic introductions.

The book is driven by a basic recognition: given the rapid development and expansion of these media, within both developed and developing countries, it seems certain that more or less all of us – not solely those of us privileged to pursue philosophy – will only continue to encounter more and more new sorts of ethical issues and conundrums. By starting, in effect, with the basics, I hope that those who use this book will learn how to grapple effectively with contemporary and prevailing ethical issues, and thereby be better prepared to take on more effectively those new issues that will inevitably arise in the future.

The third difference between this and other textbooks is that this approach drives its primary pedagogical orientation and principles. Reflecting especially my commitments to liberal arts education (education for free –liber – people), I’m not here in the first instance to tell anyone what to think. Rather, I have tried to focus on the ethical issues as genuine questions – i.e., questions that admit of multiple, ethically justifiable responses, not (usually) a single right one. (As we will see, this approach is affiliated with the metaethical position of pluralism; see chapter 6 for further discussion.) To be sure, I certainly have some opinions about these issues; I will try to make these clear, so that readers are aware of my opinions and biases. But I hope what will be immediately striking is the effort to provide conceptual frameworks, relevant information, and sufficient examples to help you practice applying those frameworks to specific ethical issues. As I often repeat to my own students: I don’t care what you think (short of, say, affirming Neo-nazi racism, at least), but I very much care how you think, i.e., whether or not you can articulate and defend with sound logic and shared empathies your own views, while simultaneously understanding the views and arguments of those who disagree with you. I hope that, in exploring the diverse ethical frameworks that both we and Others use, we will become more informed and articulate regarding the ethical frameworks and larger cultural norms, traditions, and practices that shape both how we and Others draw our ethical conclusions.

Learning how to do so is critical, for a number of reasons. Some of these are prudential or self-interested. Again, it seems a given that more and more of us will encounter more and more ethical issues evoked by digital media; learning how to deal with these sorts of issues will hence better prepare us to respond in ethically informed and responsible ways to what is to come. Moreover, there is good evidence to suggest that as we learn to become more reflective and aware of our primary ethical commitments, we are thereby better able to “do the right thing” when the time comes. For example, as the famous Milgram experiments demonstrated, those best able to resist or refuse to follow orders by authority figures in lab coats are those who are most reflective and aware of why they hold to certain basic ethical principles or values.

Finally, in keeping with the liberal arts commitments and virtue ethics traditions (both Western and non-Western) represented here, developing our capacities for ethical reflection is central in two deeply human ways. First, we come to better understand our own ethical frameworks, alongside our own cultural norms and practices; but this also helps us better understand the frameworks, norms, and practices of Others – especially as these often lead to different, sometimes conflicting conclusions as to what the right thing to do may be in a particular instance. In other words, we better learn to understand the perspective of “the Other,” even (especially) when we disagree. As we will see, these disagreements are often rooted in the different ethical norms, traditions, and practices associated with specific cultures. And so I argue in chapter 4 that our learning to better understand the perspective of “the Other,” especially across different cultures, is increasingly essential for us as citizens of a global society – one ever more interwoven by the digital media we examine in this text.

At the same time, this deeper understanding of “the Other” does not mean we necessarily must change our own minds (or cultures). But, ideally, I hope this effort towards perspective-taking will lead to the experience that often we learn the most from those with whom we disagree. By opening ourselves up to the perspectives, experience, and cultures of the many Others around us, we often gain insights and understanding we would otherwise not acquire. Such understanding, moreover, is not only self-enriching; it is further crucial to our learning how to get along with one another in an increasingly interconnected world. Learning more about the perspectives and cultures of Others will not only help us move towards a more genuinely welcoming posture with regard to those who are (sometimes profoundly) different from us; our resulting understandings may further suggest how our differences can be resolved in more harmonious rather than conflict-driven ways.

A second central benefit of enhancing our capacities for ethical reflection is the development of what Socrates and Aristotle highlighted as phronesis: our ability to make well-informed judgments in specific and often novel contexts. The ability to judge in these ways is not only necessary if we are to make sound and responsible decisions; as philosophers and religious teachers in many traditions, East and West, have argued, such judgment is further central to our becoming more excellent human beings – i.e., human beings who practice and learn how to be good human beings, human beings good at practicing such human excellences or virtues as care and compassion, understanding, charity, forgiveness, and so forth. As we will explore more fully, the pursuit of such excellences is its own reward: philosophers and religious teachers, both West and East, have discerned that the disciplined pursuit and practice of ethical judgment and its affiliated virtues lead to a deep harmony – both a self-harmony and harmony with the larger community. Such harmony is felt in terms of a deep contentment and satisfaction with our lives, both as individuals and as members of larger communities.

Just to be clear: this is one of the viewpoints I’m personally most attracted to. Hence, it is at work throughout this volume. Indeed, as I occasionally suggest, pursuing these practices and excellences is no longer a luxury for a privileged few. Socrates, Aristotle, and Confucius presumed that these sorts of reflections and efforts to become an excellent human being were possible only for an intellectual and social elite – the “few,” not “the many.” But modern liberal democratic states are built on the assumption that “the many” are also capable of such understanding and ethical judgment. These are necessary, that is, if we are to regulate our own affairs and to engage with others in ways not defined solely by force and power – rather than being regulated instead by some sort of authoritarian regime. Such understanding and ethical judgment, in short, is necessary if we are to become and pursue our lives as free (in both ethical and political senses) human beings. Moreover, whatever sort of nation-state we may inhabit, in a world of networked digital media that increasingly interconnects our lives in ever-expanding webs of relationships with others throughout the diverse cultures of the globe, like it or not, we are all increasingly cosmopolitans, citizens of the world, not simply citizens of a given nation. For us as cosmopolitans, building and refining our capacity for responsible ethical judgments, as informed by a deep understanding of the ethical frameworks and cultural norms that shape those judgments in both ourselves and others, is a necessity.

I very much hope the material and exercises collected here in fact help in that endeavor.

Acknowledgements

As is mentioned frequently in this book, the rise of computer networks is leading many of us in the West to recognize something called “distributed responsibility” – the understanding that as these networks make us more and more interwoven with and interdependent upon one another, the ethical responsibility for a given act is distributed across a network of actors, not simply attached to a single individual. At the same time, this awareness of our absolute interdependence on others is ancient, as premodern ethics, both East and West, emphasize the importance of community. For me, this awareness is rarely more acute than when trying to properly recognize the numerous persons who have contributed to this volume. The web of relationships brought to a focus in this book begins with family, friends, my own teachers and colleagues – including John Lawrence, my first guru in the then (1980s) nascent field of humanities computing; Preston Covey (1942–2006), whose pioneering work and generous friendship in computing and applied ethics inspired and encouraged so many of us in these fields; and Henry Rosemont, Jr., whose patience in conveying the elements of Confucian thought has been exemplary indeed.

I am further very grateful to Andrea Drugan at Polity Press for initially suggesting the idea of putting together a book like this. She and her colleague Jonathan Skerrett have been consistently supportive and patient throughout the process. In particular, Andrea is an ideal editor: her sharp eye and excellent suggestions have improved this text throughout. I am equally grateful to two initially anonymous reviewers whose critically constructive comments on an early version of the text were extremely useful. I am delighted that I can now thank them by name for their help. Richard Volkman (University of Southern Connecticut) and Herman Tavani (Rivier College) pointed out embarrassing errors and shortcomings, made many excellent suggestions for improvement, and offered encouraging support for the bits they thought I got right. So far as I’ve managed to respond effectively to their critiques, this is a much better text.

Numerous friends and colleagues have offered helpful advice and suggestions along the way. It is a particular pleasure to thank my colleagues at the Institut for Informations-og Medievidenskab (Institute of Information and Media Studies), University of Aarhus, Denmark, beginning with Jakob Linaa Jensen, Niels Ole Finnemann, Niels Brügger, Finn Olesen, Randi Markussen, Poul Erik Nielsen, and Institute Head Steffen Ejnar Brandorff. The Danish flavor of this text – most apparent in some of the examples and case-studies – reflects the very productive and enjoyable fall semester, 2007, I spent at the Institute as a Visiting Professor. The research and writing that this stay made possible, along with my Danish colleagues’ generous support and suggestions, directly contributed to the first stages of this text. My Drury philosophy colleagues – Dr. Lisa Esposito, Dr. Chris Panza, and Dr. Ted Vaggalis – likewise provided invaluable insight and encouragement. Finally, Ms. Erin Marie Tracy, our fabulous student assistant in the Interdisciplinary Studies Center, diligently worked through the entire manuscript, pointing out especially where student readers, however intelligent and well motivated, would likely be derailed by my overuse of dashes and German-length sentences.

Several others have been particularly helpful with specific issues and chapters. Dr. Heather Johnson (Stevens Technical Institute) provided especially detailed criticisms and suggestions for chapters 2 and 3 on privacy; I am also grateful to her students for helping to “road test” portions of the text, including some of the pedagogical materials intended precisely for classroom and student use. Dr. Richard Schur (Drury University) was particularly helpful with chapter 3, bringing to bear his considerable expertise in matters of copyright law. Dr. Susanna Paasonen (University of Helsinki) provided invaluable guidance through the complicated and often murky waters of pornography (chapter 5). Dr. Mia Consalvo (Ohio University) and Dr. Miguel Sicart (I.T.-University, Copenhagen) were equally generous and helpful with the section on games (chapter 5).

Finally, my family played the most important roles – first of all, as their unending love and support make all of my work and play possible, meaningful, and occasionally even fun. My brother Robert (Director, I.T. Operations, Fujitsu Network Communications) provided most helpful technical insight as well as a professional’s perspective. My wife, the Reverend Conni Ess, put up with the brunt of the workaholic practices and schedules needed to bring a book like this to fruition. Our son Joshua, a computer geek now turned professional technical support person, helped especially with the more arcane technical details that often prove essential to digital media ethics. Our daughter Kathleen, pursuing her own academic career as a classics and religion scholar, provided very helpful assistance with both Greek philosophy and English style. My parents, Bob and Betty Ess, are to be thanked for the innumerable ways they fostered and encouraged this work.

My mom was especially pleased to see me working on this project. While her death on May 9, 2008 was in almost every conceivable way a good death, it’s a regret that she could not stay with us long enough to see this book in its final form. Like any mother, she was always pleased and proud of her children’s accomplishments – especially those that sought to help others. At the same time, in many ways she was the single person most responsible for my pursuing philosophy. I hope this book lives up to her spirit of enacting deep care for others. Insofar as it does, Mom, this one’s for you.

Chapter Synopses

Chapter 1: Central Issues in the Ethics of Digital Media

This chapter introduces us to some of the characteristics of digital media that give rise to both familiar and novel ethical challenges. We further examine in an initial way how popular media report in the form of “moral panics” – i.e., stories that highlight apparent risks and dangers of digital media; such reporting may entail ways of thinking that can obstruct or short-circuit the sorts of ethical reflection needed to resolve ethical problems more effectively. The chapter concludes with an overview of the organization of the book and its chief pedagogical approaches and apparatus.

Chapter 2: Privacy in the Electronic Global Metropolis?

This chapter addresses the challenges to modern Western notions of individual privacy presented by contemporary digital media, most especially networked communications media such as the Internet and the Web. It then explores diverse cultural attitudes towards and understandings of individual and collective privacy in non-Western cultures, in order to raise a central problem for contemporary digital media ethics – namely, is it possible to develop ethical frameworks for the use of digital media that conjoin norms shared globally along with the irreducible differences that define distinctive individual and cultural identities? The meta-theoretical approach of ethical pluralism is highlighted here, as contemporary intercultural dialogues show how such ethical pluralism resolves this central problem.

Chapter 3: Copying and Distributing via Digital Media: Copyright, Copyleft, Global Perspectives

Digital media make copying and distributing information – in the form of music, videos, or texts – far easier than with previous media. We explore some of the common ethical aspects of copying and distributing music and other forms through three main frameworks for interpreting and regulating these as intellectual property: current copyright law (especially in the U.S. and E.U.), various “copyleft” schemes, and Confucian tradition as shaping many non-Western approaches and attitudes.

Chapter 4: Citizenship in the Global Metropolis

The example of the “Muhammad cartoons” illustrates that contemporary digital media dramatically extend the scope and thus the ethically relevant consequences of our actions. We examine what ethical obligations we may have to avoid ethnocentrism (the assumption that our specific cultural norms, beliefs, and practices are somehow universal) and thereby cultural imperialism; how such cultural imperialism may be embedded in the technologies of digital communication media themselves; and what ethical guidelines there may be for cross-cultural communication online that seeks to respect and foster “the Otherness of the Other” – i.e., that seeks to recognize and respect the irreducible differences that define distinctive individual and cultural identities. The ethical frameworks of virtue ethics are emphasized here.

Chapter 5: Still More Ethical Issues: Digital Sex and Games

This chapter takes up two of the most likely topics of digital media ethics: pornography online and violence in videogames. It first expands on the discussion in chapter 1 on popular media and moral panics, in order to more extensively clarify how effective ethical reflection often requires us to move beyond the polarization and dualistic thinking characteristic of popular media accounts. We then examine the phenomenon of pornography online – in part, as a reflection, perhaps, of a larger “pornification” of society. Feminist ethics and post-feminist frameworks are emphasized in the analysis of online pornography. Virtue ethics are emphasized in the analysis of violence and videogames.

Chapter 6: Digital Media Ethics: Overview, Frameworks, Resources

This chapter introduces and illustrates by way of several examples the frameworks applied in the topics chapters (2–5). These include the widely used ethical frameworks of utilitarianism, deontology, feminist ethics/ethics of care, virtue ethics, and Confucian and African frameworks as prescribing distinctive approaches to analyzing and resolving ethical difficulties. Moreover, three major meta-theoretical frameworks – those of ethical relativism, ethical monism/absolutism, and ethical pluralism – are likewise introduced and examined with some care.

CHAPTER 1

Central Issues in the Ethics of Digital Media

Chapter overview

We begin with a case- study intended to introduce us to privacy as one of the most significant ethical issues brought about by digital media. This case- study is accompanied by one of the primary pedagogical/teaching elements of the book – questions designed to foster initial reflection and discussion (either for individuals, small groups, or a class at large), followed by additional questions that can be used for further reflection and writing.

Following an introduction to the main body of the chapter, the section “(Ethical) Life in the digital age?” provides a first overview of digital media and their ethical dimensions. I also highlight how more popular treatments of these, however, can become counterproductive to clear and careful ethical reflection. We then turn to some of the specific characteristics of digital media – convergence, digital information as “greased,” and digital media as communication technologies – that highlight specific ethical issues treated in this volume. We then take up initial considerations on how to “do” ethics in the age of digital media. Finally, I describe the pedagogical features of the book and provide some suggestions for how it is designed to be used – including specific suggestions for the order in which the chapters may be taken up.

Case- study: Facebook and Beacon – an introduction to issues in digital media ethics

In October 2007, the increasingly popular (for many, essential) social networking site Facebook introduced a new service, called Beacon. Following earlier software enhancements that automatically provided updates on various elements of the Facebook profiles of one’s Facebook friends, Beacon streamed into one’s homepage the recent purchases such friends had made – thus serving as a form of advertising for the products involved.

Facebook sold potential advertisers on Beacon in part by assuring them that Facebook users would be able to “opt- in” to the service – i.e., that they would have to explicitly agree to join the service. (This is in contrast with “opt- out” approaches that presume participation by default, and require the individual to explicitly initiate his or her removal from a given service, etc.)

In fact, Facebook only provided its users with notifications that Facebook would broadcast their purchases to their friends (a) when they made such a purchase on an external website and (b) when they returned from the external site to their Facebook account. When users generally ignored these, Facebook presumed that users had thereby consented to Beacon distributing information about their purchases to their friends.

After massive protest, Facebook changed its policy: if users ignored the warnings, Facebook will assume they are now saying “no” to Beacon. At the same time, however, Facebook will not offer the possibility of an opt- out from Beacon. (See Story 2007.)

Questions for discussion

1.  Why might users object to Facebook initiating the Beacon program? On what grounds – i.e., what values, principles, and/ or other reasons might support these objections?

2.  Is Facebook’s new policy – i.e., interpreting users’ ignoring of their notifications (that their purchase information will be broadcast to their friends’ homepages) as a “no” to this use of Beacon – a sufficient response to the objections you developed in (1)? Why and/or why not – i.e., what are your reasons and/or other grounds (including feelings, intuition, etc.) for your position here?

Additional reflection, informal writing exercises

1.  Review the “Terms of Use” agreement that every Facebook user must agree to before they are allowed to set up a homepage on Facebook. (You can get to this by clicking on the small link “terms.”)

Do you spot anything here that, upon reflection, you might not agree with? If so, identify this point, and explain as best you can your reasons (and/or other grounds, including feelings, intuition, etc.) for disagreeing with Facebook on this point.

2.  Review Facebook’s “Content Code of Conduct” (linked to from the “Terms of Use” document).

Are there elements of this code that you might not agree with? Why not?

Identify this element(s) carefully, and then:

A.  Articulate as clearly as you can (i) what Facebook requires that you disagree with, and (ii) what your own ethical claim/ position/view might be as an alternative to Facebook’s.

B.  Explain as fully as you can why you hold the ethical claim/ position/view that you articulate in (A) (ii), above – i.e., what grounds, reasons, values, norms, etc. would you appeal to in order to support your ethical position/claim?

C.  Articulate as clearly as you can the grounds, reasons, values, norms, etc., that might lie behind Facebook’s claim/ position/view (perspective- taking).

D.  Given what are now two different arguments – i.e., your argument for your particular ethical view, and the argument that you have reconstructed in (C) – respond to the conflict or disagreement between these two arguments and views.

3.  If you already use Facebook or a similar social networking site, did you read the “Terms of Use” and related policies prior to clicking on the “I agree” box?

If so, why? If not, why not?

Do you think most people don’t read such “Terms of Use” – along with, say, the End User License Agreement (EULA) that users must agree to when installing new software? If not, why not?

4.  Do you have any additional comments or observations on what you see as some of the ethical issues that emerge here?

Reflection/writing suggestions: media log

Develop a log – a description of what digital device you use, for how long, and for what purpose – for a given period (e.g., 24 hours/3 days/1 week).

Writing – class- discussion questions:

A.  As you review this log, any surprises – e.g., are you using a device(s) significantly more or less than you might have originally thought?

B.  Can you determine how you’re using these devices – specifically, what kinds of communication are you using them for?

C.  Are there any obvious ethical aspects and/or problems that you notice and/or encounter in your use of these technologies? Identify these as carefully as you can.

Class discussion: Collect the ethical aspects/problems of your uses of digital media onto a commonly shared list. These will be useful to refer to as examples as you work through this text – both as some of these are likely to be discussed in the following chapters, and as some may not be explicitly covered here. The latter will be especially interesting for further individual and class analysis, discussion, and writing – particularly as you and your colleagues develop greater skill and ability in grappling with such ethical issues and challenges.

D.  How does your use of digital media compare with:

(i)   your older and/or younger siblings (if you have any)?

(ii)  your parents and/or parents’ friends?

(iii) your grandparents and/or grandparents’ friends?

This question asks you to consider the demographics of digital media use – on the presumption that there will be striking differences, e.g., between the usage rates of adolescents and 20-somethings vis- à- vis1 people in their 40s and 50s, and then people in their 60s and 70s (and older).

E.  If there are such differences, what are your thoughts about the possible ethical implications of these differences?

(For example, we will explore in chapter 3 a suggestion that – at least some – younger people have ethical sensibilities very different from – at least some of – their elders regarding matters of copying digital media, including [illegal] downloading.)

Does it seem that our ethics indeed change from generation to generation? And if so, what does that imply regarding claims that ethics should be universal, i.e., applicable in all times and places to all people?

[Hint: we will take this up later on in terms of the meta- ethical positions of ethical absolutism, relativism, and pluralism – see chapter 6 for more discussion.]

Additional reflection suggestions: digital media and face- to- face communication

1.  It is often claimed and observed that online communication, because it offers anonymity, encourages greater openness and honesty than most face- to- face (F2F) communication. On the one hand, it is hoped that such freedom of expression will encourage, for example, subordinates in an organization to more openly express their views (including criticisms): presuming that these views and criticisms are then heard by their superiors, the thought is that this leads to a “flattening” of the traditional hierarchies.

On the other hand, anonymity also encourages less attractive forms of communication, including flaming, trolling, cyber - stalking, and cyber- bullying.

In your view, do you think/feel that these new possibilities of online communication have led to greater good than harm – or vice versa? Please be ready to justify your response with one or more examples, arguments, etc.

2.  It is commonly observed that the recent popularity of text-messaging (SMS) among young people in the United States is in part because we can use SMS to avoid face- to- face communication – e.g., some people have been known to break up with a girlfriend or boyfriend using a text- message.

Do you notice ways in which new digital communication technologies, while increasing our capabilities to communicate with one another in various ways, somewhat paradoxically thereby also make it possible to reduce our communication with one another, e.g., by not answering a phone call from a caller identified by name and number on our phone, by text - messaging instead of discussing important matters face to face, etc.?

Introduction

It is now commonplace to observe that in the industrialized world, we – especially young people – are thoroughly interconnected through, and thereby saturated with, what are sometimes called “New Media” or digital media. (We will explore the meaning of these terms more carefully in a bit.) Certainly, if we pay attention to contemporary media reports about digital media, these reports shout out important, often frightening, ethical issues.

So, for example, my local newspaper recently reported on a local pastor – and mayor of a small town – who was captured in an online sting operation. An “Internet detective” posing as a young girl in a chat room enticed the 62- year- old man, hoping to meet up with the “girl” for sex, into revealing his identity (O’Dell 2008).

Somewhat more subtly, the Danish tabloid newspaper Nyhedsavisen (which enjoys one of the largest circulations in Denmark) recently reported that two new words have been added to the dictionaries of mobile phones – fråderen (“foaming,” slang for “hungry”) and luder (slut). The sub- headline to the story read: ‘An expert wonders whether this means in the long run that young people’s language will develop in a negative direction’ (Mainz 2007: 14). (To be sure, an additional expert quoted in the story comments that this development is simply another reflection of how all languages change – and that such changes are not necessarily reasons for panic.)

What these examples illustrate is the tendency of popular media to call our attention to important ethical issues involved with digital media – but in ways that run the risk of fostering what are called “moral panics.” That is, in order to attract our attention, such media stories focus unduly on the sensational (if not the sexual). But thereby, they tend to appeal to a deep- seated fear that our new technologies are somehow getting out of control (a fear that has been expressed in the modern West since Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein ([1818] 1933) – in part, as these new technologies apparently threaten to corrupt our ethical and social sensibilities.

As we will see in subsequent chapters, this media approach is most pronounced (understandably enough) with regard to sex and violence – specifically, concerns about pornography online and violence in digital games (chapter 5). But here we can start to see how such a “moral panic” style of reporting both furthers and frustrates careful ethical reflection on digital media.

On the one hand, to be sure, such reporting succeeds in getting our attention – and thereby provides a useful service by catalyzing more careful reflection on important ethical issues evoked by digital media. On the other hand, by highlighting especially the potentially negative effects of digital media, such reporting fosters a polarized way of thinking – an approach that could be characterized as “technology good” (because it brings us important benefits) vs. “technology bad” (because it threatens the moral foundations of society, most especially the morality of young people). The problem is that such an approach to thinking about important ethical issues is simply misleading. As we will see – and as most of us probably already know full well – whatever truths may be discerned about the ethics of digital media often lie somewhere in the middle between these two extremes. But if we are only presented with the simple choice between “technology good” and “technology bad,” we may be tempted to think that these are indeed our only choices and get stuck in trying to choose between two compelling alternatives. Getting stuck in this way short- circuits what we need to do if we are to move beyond such either/or thinking–a movement that requires more careful and extensive reflection.

One way to see how to move beyond such polarities is first to examine more carefully some of the important characteristics of digital media, along with the specific sorts of ethical issues that these characteristics often raise for us.

(Ethical) life in the digital age?

“Digital media” are the subject of an extensive range of analyses in a number of disciplines (e.g., Lievrouw and Livingstone 2006). This book, however, takes the standpoint of an interest in digital media ethics; thereby, at least at the beginning, we are interested in seeing the distinctive features of digital media – what sets them apart from earlier media – that make them ethically challenging and interesting.

To be sure, digital media represent strong continuities with earlier forms of communication and information media such as printed books, journals, and newspapers, what we now call “hardcopy” letters, and, for example, traditional forms of mass media that include not only newspapers but also “one- to- many” broadcast media such as radio and TV. We will note and explore these continuities more fully in our efforts to evaluate one of the larger ethical questions we will confront – namely, do digital media present us with radically new kinds of ethical problems that thereby require absolutely new ethical approaches? (See Preliminary exercise, below, p. 11.) For now, we can note that these questions are driven in good measure by rather emphasizing the important differences between earlier media and digital media. (Such an emphasis, by the way, also drives the “either/or” approach underlying much popular media reporting.) In particular, these differences often are part of why new ethical issues come up in conjunction with digital media. Exploring these differences at the outset thus seems like a good starting point.

Here, then, we will consider three distinguishing characteristics of digital media (though others are important): how digital media (in contrast with analogue media) foster convergence; digital information as “greased”; and digital media as (global) communication media.

1. Digital media, analogue media, and convergence

To begin with, digital media work by transforming extant information (e.g., voices over a phone, texts written on a wordprocessor, pictures of an impressive landscape, videos recorded and broadcast, etc., etc.) into the basic informational elements of electronic computers and networks, including binary code (1’s and 0’s – bits on and off) and the definition of how such code is to be manipulated within a given application. Digital media contrast in this way with analogue media – such as an old- fashioned vinyl record – that capture, store, and make information accessible by producing specific artifacts that are like the original. In the case of music, recording equipment, beginning with microphones and concluding with a storage medium such as audiotape, translates the vibrations of an original sound into magnetically stored information, corresponding to specific sound pitches and volumes, which is then “written” onto a tape that passes by a recording head at a specific speed. These analogues of an original sound are then in turn transformed into further analogues, as they are mechanically carved onto the grooves of a vinyl record in the form of bumps and valleys that correspond to (i.e., are analogues of) the high and low frequencies and volumes of the original sound. These physical variations are further translated by a phonograph needle into electronic impulses that likewise mimic the original variations of a sound. Finally, these impulses are transformed into sound by an amplifier and speaker(s) – again, as an analogue or copy of the original that, if all goes well, is as close to the original as possible.

One way to think about analogue media is that they work by capturing, recording, and replaying information as a smooth, continuously variable content. That is, there are comparatively continuous variations as a series of musical notes, first low and soft and then high and loud, are captured and replayed as moving evenly from the one to the other. In this sense, the contents of analogue media are more or less infinitely variable. By contrast, digital media capture, store, and make accessible their contents based entirely on a binary code of 1’s and 0’s.

More importantly, analogue media always involve some loss of information across the various processes of collecting, recording, and storing it. This means – and this is particularly critical to the ethical discussions of copying – that each analogue copy of an original is always less true to the original; and the more copies made – e.g., a tape copy of a record as a copy of a tape of an original performance – the less faithful (and satisfying) the resulting copy will be. By contrast, once information is transcribed into digital form, each copy of the digital original will be (more or less) a perfect replica of the original. Copy an MP3 version of your favorite song a thousand times, and if your equipment is working properly, there will be no difference between the first copy and the thousandth copy.

Even more importantly, analogue media are strongly distinct systems: how information is captured and replayed in a vinyl record is not immediately compatible with – and thereby, easily exchangeable with – how information is captured and replayed in a newspaper or printed book. By contrast, once information is translated into digital form, such information – whether destined for an MP3 player as an audio recording, or a wordprocessor as text – can be stored on and transmitted through a shared medium. Hence the same computer, PDA, or even smartphone, for example, can hold digital photos and music, along with wordprocessing files, spreadsheet files, etc.

As once distinct forms of information are thus translated into a commonly shared digital form, it makes possible one of the most important distinguishing characteristics of digital media, namely, convergence (e.g., Briggs and Burke 2005: ch. 7; Jenkins 2006; Storsul and Stuedahl 2007). Such convergence can be (literally) seen in a rich webpage that contains text, video, and audio sources, as well as possibilities for sending email, remotely posting a comment, etc. These once distinct forms of information and communication are now conjoined in digital form, so that they can be transmitted entirely in the form of 1’s and 0’s via the Internet. Similarly, a contemporary cellphone further exemplifies such convergence: it is capable of not simply handling phone conversations, but also handling digital information used for a built- in camera (still and/or moving video), MP3 player, web browser capable of capturing text and other sorts of information, etc.

This means, then, that digital media bring together both traditional and sometimes new sorts of information sources. In particular, what were once distinct kinds of information in the analogue world (e.g., photographs, texts, music) are now no longer strongly distinct; rather, they share the same basic form of information. What does this mean, finally, for ethics? Here’s the key point: what were once distinct sets of ethical issues now likewise converge – sometimes creating new combinations of ethical challenges that we haven’t had to face before.

For example, societies have developed relatively stable codes and laws for the issue of consent as to whether or not someone can be photographed in public. (In the U.S., generally, one can photograph people in public without asking for their consent, while in Norway, consent is required.) Transmitting that photo to a larger public – e.g., through a newspaper or a book – would then require a different information system, and one whose ethical and legal dimensions are addressed (however well or poorly) in copyright law. But as many people have experienced to their regret, a contemporary cellphone can not only record their status and actions, but further (more or less immediately) transmit the photographic record to a distribution medium such as a Facebook profile or even more public website. The ethics of both consent in photography and copyright in publication are now conjoined in new ways that we simply have not had to think through before.

Preliminary exercise: do we really need a (new) digital media ethics?

In response to these sorts of new ethical challenges brought about by digital media (and new technologies more generally), two sorts of arguments have emerged:

1.  The new possibilities of photographing people in both public and more intimate situations, coupled with more or less immediately posting such photographs and/or videos to a forum such as a social networking site or more public webpage, means that people are now more vulnerable to violations of privacy.

That is, where privacy can be minimally defined as the capacity to control information about oneself, the new ability of others to record and quickly distribute potentially embarrassing information about oneself thereby decreases one’s control over such information (e.g., in the form of permission to take a photograph, much less permission to distribute the photograph in a semi- public or public forum).

A general guideline in many ethical systems, as we will see, is that increased vulnerability requires increased responsibility. So, for example, parents have increased responsibilities for their children as infants that they do not have for their children as young adults, because children as infants are vulnerable in many ways that young adults are not.

On this line of thinking, the fact that others around me are more vulnerable in the presence of my cellphone argues that I as the owner/operator of the device need to be more responsible for how I use it. This might mean, for example, paying increased attention to whether or not what I’m recording and distributing might harm the person in some way; increased attention to the need for others to have and maintain control of information about themselves, etc.

More generally, this line of argument suggests that we now face a pressing need for careful and systematic ethical reflection, so as to develop the sorts of guidelines, codes, and laws that can help us work through especially the new sorts of ethical issues that digital media evoke.

2.  Alternatively (but not necessarily to the exclusion of the first line of argument above), the history of technology is in part a history of people learning how to use new technologies in ethically appropriate ways – though often only after sometimes terrifically damaging (perhaps even fatal) experiences with them. On this view, we “muddle through” as a species, learning more from our experience than from careful reflection on how to utilize new technologies in ways that minimize harm, protect rights, etc.

From this perspective, there is no real need to undertake ethical reflection on the new situations confronting us as new technologies enter our individual and social lives. Rather, we can generally rely on people’s common sense and previous ethical experiences and judgment to help forge the new ethical guidelines that will become generally known and respected. For example, if I post an embarrassing photograph or video of a friend on the Web, thinking it’s all in good fun, but thereby manage only to make my friend really angry and upset with me, I’ll eventually figure out that I shouldn’t do such things.

While, with the advantage of hindsight, I may well look back on such an act as a mistake – at least I’ll avoid such errors in the future. There’s no need for extensive ethical reflection ahead of time; rather, we will simply learn from our mistakes.

Questions for reflection/discussion/writing

1.  Of the two positions outlined above, which better describes your approach to the ethical dilemmas that arise as you take up new technologies in your life?

Provide an example of this if you can.

2.  Do you have a reason or sense for why your approach might be better than the alternative? Explain your view here as fully as you can.

3.  Can you think of an instance or example – whether in relation to digital media technologies or to other new technologies – where your approach might not work as well as the alternative?

4.  Do you have other thoughts and suggestions for how we – both individually and as a society and species – might best approach the ethical dimensions of digital media (and/or other new technologies)?

2. Digital media and “greased information”

A second characteristic of digital media is that the information they capture, record, and transmit is “greased.” That is, as James Moor has observed, “When information is computerized, it is greased to slide easily and quickly to many ports of call” (Moor 1997: 27). As anyone who has hit the “send” button on an email too quickly knows all too well, information in digital form can spread more or less instantaneously and globally, whether we always want it to or not.

As the example of uploading potentially embarrassing photos or videos from a cellphone suggests, the capacity of digital information to move quickly from one place to another raises especially serious ethical issues surrounding privacy. That is, where it was once comparatively difficult to capture and then transmit information about a person that s/he might consider private, the advent of digital media, beginning with computer systems that can store and make easily accessible a wide range of information about persons, has resulted in a wide range of new threats to what was once clearly personal and private information. Moreover, digital information as “greased” likewise makes it easy to copy and distribute, say, one’s favorite songs, movies, or texts. To be sure, it has always been possible to copy and distribute copies of a given text – or, in the days of analogue media, of a given song or film. But the ease with which we can do so by way of digital media appears to be one factor that makes such copying and distribution an even more pressing ethical problem these days.

(We will examine the issues of privacy more fully in chapter 2, and the issues of copyright in chapter 3.)

3. Digital media as communication media: global scope and interactivity

The emergence of digital media – along with the Internet and the Web as ways of quickly transporting digitized information – thus gives rise to strikingly new ways of communicating with one another at every level. Emails, social networking sites (Facebook, MySpace, etc.),