Eagles over Gazala E-Book

Michele Palermo

• Herausgeber: IBN Editore
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2014

Beschreibung

palermo aviolibri records eagles africa gazala battles aviation military history 1942 ibn aviolibri

Leseprobe

ICARO MODERNO

Original Title: Le Streghe della notte

Translation by Stephen Richards

Copyright © IBN Istituto Bibliografico Napoleone 2014

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Cover & Page design: Marco Manni

Michele Palermo

Eagles over Gazala

The air battles in North Africa, May-June 1942

Translation by Stephen Richards

IBNEditore

SUMMARY

Foreword

Chapter 1. Introduction

Chapter 2. Orders of battle

Chapter 3. The preparations (22-25 May)

Chapter 4. The launching of the operations (26-30 May)

Chapter 5. ‘The Cauldron’ and Bir Hakeim (31 May-10 June)

Chapter 6. Knightsbridge (11-18 June)

Chapter 7. Tobruk and Egypt (19-30 June)

Chapter 8. Conclusions

Appendix 1. From Sidi El Barrani to El Alamein 1940-1942, a Strategic overview (Ernico Cernuschi)

Appendix 2. Performances of aircraft (Michele M. Gaetani)

Appendix 3. Availability of aircraft

Appendix 4. Sorties

Appendix 5. Losses

Appendix 6. Serial numbers of Macchi C.202s

Appendix 7. Investigation of Fighter Squadrons’ Results in the Western Desert as at 29th July 1942

Appendix 8. Naval Warfare and Intelligence along the North African Coasts, January - June 1942. (Enrico Cernuschi)

Glossary

Sources

Acknowledgements

Index of Pilots

FOREWORD

The events of the air war over the desert during World War II have been covered by a fair number of studies, mostly in the English language. The works range from author Roderick Owen’s pioneering ‘The Desert Air Force’ (1948) to the classic ‘Fighters over the Desert’ by Christopher Shores and Hans Ring.

All of these works have contributed over the years to a better understanding of that air campaign. However, out of necessity, they only give a partial view of the events that is generally linked to the nationality of the authors.

The accuracy of the data provided in these studies was also affected by the fact that, in the immediate years after the war’s end, much of the official documentation was kept secret or made available only to the authors of the so-called ‘official histories’ published by the air forces of the involved countries. Consequently, a complete historical reconstruction that draws directly from the analysis of the official documents from all the contenders, therefore allowing the reader to have a clear and complete picture of the actual course of events, has always been missing. Now that the official records have finally been made available to the researchers, new struggles have emerged. Attempts to provide such a framework clashed with the difficulty of describing with the right degree of precision the complexity of multiple aerial combats between contenders of half a dozen different air forces that often overlap in space and time. This problem has only been overcome through using a fair level of approximation or through limiting the scope of the study to a specific unit or air force.

Michele Palermo, in his work, finally offers us this long-awaited, fully-detailed reconstruction, covering short time intervals in multiple volumes, in a way that allows him to describe the events with the greatest possible accuracy.

The present volume deals with the so called ‘Battle of Gazala’ a period that has been of great importance for the war in North Africa as it rose from a seemingly stale situation. The Axis army was near to reaching Alexandria and the Suez Canal, which would be a significant blow to British Empire. At last, however, as the Author will unfold in detail in his next books, the Commonwealth was able to turn the tide and push back Rommel to Tripoli.

Thanks to his in-depth research approach, Michele Palermo is able to shed new light on many aspects of this important air campaign. He covers broader themes, such as the impact on the operations of the air forces and the balance of power between the contenders, but also included are more specific topics, such as the contribution of SAAF and the other forces of the Dominions to the Commonwealth effort, or the actual results obtained by the super-ace Marseille.

The air war over the Mediterranean is too often described as a clash between two contenders only, namely the Commonwealth air forces and the Luftwaffe. Readers already familiar with the history of this confrontation will finally be able to appreciate in full the significant contribution of the Regia Aeronautica. Aside from the review of the performance of the Allied and Luftwaffe pilots, the author examines in detail how the Italians truly fared in combat through analyzing the outcomes of the engagements: it becomes clear that the Italians consistently shot down more planes than they lost throughout the campaign and were in no way inferior to their adversaries. This conclusion defies the historical debate of their competence, declaring once and for all that pronouncements of the Italians’ ‘lack of determination or  stamina’ are merely a remnant of war time propaganda.

All the above is backed by interesting digressions, useful and timely summary tables and by what is probably the best chapter dealing with the technical aspects of the aircraft involved, ever provided in a study of this kind, making even more precious this innovative work.

Published seventy-one years after the battle of Gazala, this updated and original book will become the necessary starting point for a proper understanding of the critical air campaign that led to the battle of El Alamein.

Ludovico Slongo

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Backdrop

By May the two armed forces had been confronting each other over the Ain El Gazala front for three months. They both had the same objective: to accumulate sufficient resources to unleash the next move against the enemy.

They were both ready, or nearly, but this time, instead of a repeat of Crusader, the Axis was to move first.

Comfortable in the knowledge that he had an adequate quantity of vehicles and supplies available to him in comparison to the enemy’s, Rommel prepared his plan with the approval of the Italian High Command.

It was a simple plan, easy to implement and based on two simultaneous actions: a frontal attack by the Italian XXI and X Corps from the north between the coast and Mteifel El Kebir with the intent to engage the defensive formation of the Commonwealth, and an encircling manoeuvre by the armoured and motorised units (XX Corps, DAK and 90th Division) to the south of Bir Hakeim.

In this way, it was believed possible that the main body of the 8th Army would be crushed within two days. Tobruk would then immediately be besieged and the right moment and manner to attack would be evaluated.

The Commonwealth Army included the 13th Corps, which was stationed along the front line for about forty kilometres between Gazala and Bir B. Belafarit, and the 30th Corps, which was stationed over a wide strip to the south and east for the protection of the southern flank. The remaining forces were placed in depth to protect Tobruk.

The Commonwealth’s armoured forces included a total of 850 tanks at the front (divided between light, medium, and infantry support) in addition to 120 of all types kept ready in reserve. Axis operational tanks in their turn included 333 Panzers (53 Mk.IIs, 242 Mk.IIIs and 38 Mk.IVs, a small number of the latter with more powerful guns) and 228 medium-sized Italian tanks (M13s and M14s).

The Axis had 90,000 men that faced 100,000 of the Commonwealth.

The artillery was in favour of the Commonwealth by a ratio of 2:1. However, concerning anti-tank guns, the Axis was superior.

The operations began as planned, but not all of the forces were available for the encircling manoeuvre from the south. This was because Bir Hakeim proved to be a much harder nut to crack than expected. Therefore, the stronghold was besieged by only a part of the attacking forces. Still, the main body of the Italian-German armoured forces attacked the Commonwealth formation from behind and a series of important battles unfolded.

Finally, during the first week of June, the battle in ‘the Cauldron’ was won and Bir Hakeim fell on the 10th. As a consequence, all of the Commonwealth formations had to fall back into the Knightsbridge zone. There they were attacked and routed after a week of clashes. At this point the 8th Army was well and truly in a crisis and began its retreat to El Alamein.

In those same days, the air and sea battle in the Mediterranean took place with the double attempt made by two convoys to supply Malta, one from Gibraltar and one from Alessandria. The latter, called ‘Operation Vigorous’, involved the opposing air forces in North Africa.

Vickers Wellingtons escorted by a Spitfire; other theatre (San Diego Air and Space Museum)

Only the stronghold of Tobruk remained in the hands of the Commonwealth in Libya, but it was no longer the fortress it had been. After only two days of fighting, its garrison was forced to surrender. By then the way to Egypt was open and the pursuit of the surviving Commonwealth forces only stopped at the bottleneck of El Alamein.

In the end, therefore, the Axis’ plan had succeeded, but not within the planned timescale and with the consequence of a diminished offensive capability.

Opposing Air Forces

Commonwealth air forces (A.H.Q. Egypt and A.H.Q. Western Desert)

In North Africa, the Commonwealth Air Force Commands had in their strengths a little over 2,100 airplanes of all types. And yet, less than 43% of them were serviceable, amounting to fewer than 900.

About 120 of these were Blenheims (100) and Marylands (20) that were practically never used in offensive operations anymore. Another several dozen of various aircrafts were located in Sudan and Southern Egypt.

There were eleven squadrons of Hurricanes with about 275 serviceable aircrafts, ten of which were operational and five of which were in the front line. There were therefore about 130 Hurricanes operating in the battle.

All six Kittyhawk (about 160 aircrafts) and three Tomahawk (about 60) Squadrons were front line units.

The remaining bomber squadrons were also totally operational (Wellingtons, Bostons and Baltimores).

As a good number of planes were ‘serviceable within fourteen days’, more planes would become available to replace losses. In total, the Commonwealth had about 400 fighters and 170 bombers that were combat ready at the beginning of the offensive.

It seems strange that so many operationally effective planes were not used, but this would have had the effect of increasing logistical problems. We only need to think of the circumnavigation of Africa for supplies.

Luftwaffe (Fl. Fü. Afrika and X. Fl. Kps)

III./JG 27 had again been transferred from Sicily to reinforce the offensive and so the number of planes ready for action rose to about ninety Bf.109Fs as well as to about fifteen Bf.109 F fighter-bombers. This brought the availability of single-engined fighters to about 150 aircrafts, of which somewhat more than 100 were combat ready.

There was only a Staffel of LG 1 (eleven Ju.88s) based in Africa (subordinate to Fl. Fü. Afrika). However, the units based in Greece and Crete (subordinate to X. Fl. Kps), which totaled over 120 Ju.88s and He.111s (over 70 combat ready), would be able to take part in operations, operating from Athens.

As always, there was a considerable number of Stukas available — about 100 aircrafts at the beginning of June (about 70 estimated combat ready).

Even if their numbers were small, the Bf.110s continued to be present as reconnaissance and ground strafing planes.

Messerschmitt Bf.110 escorting Ju.52 transports (San Diego Air and Space Museum)

S.M.82 transports in Sicily (Archivio di Stato)

Regia Aeronautica (V Squadra Aerea)

Concerning front line units, the Italian fighter component was by May 1942 based exclusively on C.202s, even though its strength had not been much reinforced in comparison with the previous periods (four groups were present instead of three). This amounted to about 110 planes, of which about 80 were combat ready. Instead, the ground attack component was very much reinforced by transferring the obsolete fighter types into it, and also presumably because it was considered more effective and efficient than level bombing, and the strength of level bombers had been reduced to only about ten combat-ready aircrafts. The Italian ground attack force was composed of C.200s of 2° Stormo (about 45 were combat ready) and CR.42 fighter-bombers of 50° Stormo (about forty of which were combat ready). The torpedo-bomber component was also far from negligible, with twenty-three dedicated S.79s being combat ready. The remaining level bomber units were also used for reconnaissance while the torpedo S.79s were also used as convoy escort planes.Rear area protection of the supply centres of Tripoli and Benghazi was provided by two groups of G.50s and CR.42s and one of C.200s, respectively.

Therefore, as for front line combat ready aircrafts, about 400 Commonwealth fighters were opposed by about 180 Bf.109s and C.202s, a substantial decrease in superiority compared to the start of ‘Operation Crusader’. A part of the Commonwealth fighter force was used for ground attack, but these were fundamentally of the same type as the others used as pure fighters. In addition to pure fighters, about 100 Italian and German single engined fighter aircrafts were used only for ground attack. Some thirty Bf.110s were also available for reconnaissance and ground-attack.

About 140 Commonwealth bombers of various types were opposed by about 90 Axis long-range bombers in North Africa and Greece, most of them German, and about 70 Stukas.

The numerical superiority of the Commonwealth fighters was at least partially compensated for by the better performance of the Bf.109s and C.202s.

We have to highlight the situation of aircraft replacements. The Commonwealth had a number of planes in the backlines (Appendix 3) that in few days could be delivered to the units. The Luftwaffe had to fly replacements from Greece and the Regia Aeronautica from Italy. But while the flow of replacements enabled the Commonwealth to balance the losses, German and Italian fighter units had their strength constantly reduced. It is a fact that only two C.202s were replaced during the period.

It is well known that Hitler was not keen to weaken the Russian front on behalf of Rommel. At the same time Italian aircraft production, in particular of C.202s, was not sufficient to supply the African front together with the Malta front.

The Planes

The innovations regarding the Commonwealth forces were significant.

The Tomahawk IIB (P-40C) was gradually replaced by the Kittyhawk IA (P-40E); the Hurricane I practically disappeared. Therefore, Mark IIA and B (with eight and twelve .303 guns, respectively) were present together with Mark IIC armed with four 20 mm cannons. Finally Mark IID started to become operational with 40 mm anti-tank guns. It should be noted that in most of the units, the armament of Mark IIC was reduced to only two guns as it seemed that the plane tended to stall when its guns were firing. Unfortunately the pilots’ opinions do not appear frequently; nevertheless, it would appear that they were not exactly satisfied with what was all the same a powerful weapon. A study of the motivations that led the operational units to accept such modifications would be well worthwhile; it seems as if the operational units and the aircraft developers were frequently in disagreement about what was appropriate armament. Something similar had happened in the Regia Aeronautica with the removal of the C.202’s wing guns.

It should be noted that most of the units armed with Hurricanes and Kittyhawks were supplied with planes equipped with racks to transport bombs; therefore, they were fitted out for the role of fighter-bombers.

The Commonwealth had a Wing (239) with three squadrons armed with Kittybombers that could carry a 500-pound bomb, indicating that lessons had been learned from the experience of No. 80 Squadron which first flew Hurribombers in CRUSADER. These units were used in a double role even when involved in the very same action. Finally, the Spitfire began to appear.

As for the light bombers, the Maryland disappeared except in the strategic reconnaissance role, and the Baltimore was introduced to flank the Boston as a light bomber representing the backbone of the bomber force. The first American-operated B-24 Liberator made its appearance and supported the RAF bombers. The RAF Wellington medium sized bombers were supported in their night-time campaign by Blenheim light bombers, which by then were deemed to be obsolete in daylight action compared to the American light bombers, due to their inferior speed and armament.

There were not any significant innovations for the Germans, who in the main operated the same planes as during “Crusader”. There were however two German Staffel (Squadrons) of Bf.109 F4/Zs; these could carry a 250 kg bomb or four 50 kg ones.

The Italians did not introduce any new planes. The Macchi C.202 was confirmed in its role as the only front line interceptor fighter while the C.200 was in the main battle zone relegated to the role of ground attack aircraft along with the CR.42. The latter, armed with two 50 kg wing bombs and two machine guns, would in fact replace the Stuka in the Italian air force.

In total the Italians placed as many as four groups divided between CR.42s and C.200s in the field, including the rear area air defense units covering Benghazi and Tripoli.

We are somewhat puzzled by the comparison between the characteristics of the Italian ground attack planes and those of their Allies and their enemies: the bomb loads were very smaller and the fire power from the guns was four times less powerful than that of the American fighters or that of the German. This made a lot of difference on firing at targets on the ground. This is not to mention the difference in engine power. The difference with the Hurricane IID is still more astonishing. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that the radial engines were much less vulnerable than the in-line liquid cooled ones.

The C.200s and G.50s of the second line continued to carry out the role of interceptors and, numerically more important, of protection for the convoys and the important logistical bases.

The traditional bombing role the Regia Aeronautica had was continually being reduced, possibly to reduce logistical load in the theatre.

Quality and Availability of the Sources

In terms of availability, unfortunately, the height of the air war in Africa corresponded with the period in which the worst documentation was available. The documentation of several Commonwealth units has been lost and that which is available is often incomplete. This is, at least in part, due to the logistical crisis brought on by the intense air battles and the retreat itself. Further, the documentation continued to suffer from poor standardization and evident gaps. In short, the SAAF documentation is generally more than reasonable and that of the RAAF is also acceptable. In addition there are very good diaries of the 73 and 213 Squadrons, but they fall far short in other RAF units and in particular the 33, 260 and 274 Squadrons. 243 Wing’s diary was examined to make up for the short-coming, even though, obviously, the higher one rises in the hierarchy, the fewer details there are. It is interesting to note that the losses were not mentioned in the diary itself. Fortunately, a considerable number of gaps have been filled thanks to the ‘Report on operations during the withdrawal from Cyrenaica, 26 May- 6 July 1942’ (AIR 23/6481), provided by Andreas Biermann.

The daily operational reports transmitted to the R.A. by Oberbefehlshaber Süd (OBS, High Command South) were used for the Luftwaffe. However, they were less detailed than in 1941 and often not at all clear. These are specified for the benefit of the reader. The rest is drawn from several publications (see the bibliography), giving precedence to the most recent ones.

So as not to be left out, there are also more gaps in the Italian documents. The diaries of 4° Stormo, the key unit of the period, were lost. The only exception was the diary of 84a Squadriglia, which nevertheless is not the original one but has been reconstructed.

In terms of quality, in particular relating to claims, the R.A. as the other air forces reported enemy aircraft credited as shot down or probably shot down. It seems however that the damaged enemy aircraft should have been noted as effectively machine-gunned but this must have been somewhat confusing, because in most cases pilots only reported the enemy planes that were merely shot at, with no regard for effectiveness of the attack.

It has to be noted, however, that all achievements reported in any document or diary (such as destroyed/shot down, probably shot down, damaged) can be considered officially credited.

Another problem in terms of quality is that of the recognition of the enemy planes: Hurricanes, P-40s, and Spitfires were too often confused, making it hard to work out “who did what.” Nevertheless, the Commonwealth documentation allows us to clear up most of the cases. For the Bf.109 and C.202, however, things are very different. In the diaries of many Commonwealth units these two aircrafts are systematically seen together. This factor has led to some authors being convinced that this was a carefully planned tactic: the Italians, who were good at aerobatics, would joust with their enemies, scattering the formations, while the Germans, who were good marksmen, picked them off one by one. And yet, there is not the slightest evidence to uphold this theory. Therefore, except in some well-documented cases, the Macchis flew on their own account. On the other hand, their performances were similar and their number large enough, and so the need to create operational complications cannot even be understood. It had been different some months before when the C.200s and G.50s took responsibility for providing close cover of the German bombers, in particular the Stukas, while the Bf.109Fs did guard duty up high. In that period, the fighter formations were actually mixed over the desert as well as over Malta, but this is well documented from specific orders and clearly reported in the diaries. Moreover, the requirements in that theater were very different.

It has to be kept in mind that the Commonwealth adopted from March the Daylight Saving Time so their time was one hour ahead of Axis time.

Chapter 2

ORDERS OF BATTLE

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH (R.A.F. Middle East Command)

MAIN FRONT LINE UNITS

Fighters

233 Wing: 2 SAAF (

Kittyhawks

), 4 SAAF (

Tomahawks

), 5 SAAF (

Tomahawks

), 260 Sqn. (

Kittyhawks

); Gambut 2 (L.G.115).

239 Wing (fighters and fighter-bombers,

Kittyhawks

): 3 RAAF, 112, 250 SAAF, 450 Sqn.; Gambut 1 (L.G.102).

243 Wing: 33 (

Hurricane IIAs

and

Bs

), Gambut Main; 73 (

Hurricane IIA-B-Cs

), Gambut Main; 80 Sqn. (

Hurricane IICs

), Gambut Main; 213 Sqn. (

Hurricane IICs

), Gambut West; 274 (

Hurricane IIA-Bs

), Gambut Main; 145 (

Spitfire VC

), Gambut Main;

238 Sqn. (

Hurricane Is

) S. Haneish (102) Gambut M.

252 and 272 Sqn. (

Beaufighters

), coastal fighters, Qasaba (L.G.10).

Bombers

3 SAAF Wing: 12 SAAF Sqn. (Boston III), 24 SAAF Sqn. (Boston III), 223 Sqn. (Baltimore II).

231 Wing: 37 Sqn. (Wellington IC), Gabriya (L.G.09); 70 Sqn. (Wellington IC), Qotafiya (L.G.104); 108 Sqn. (Wellington IC), Gabriya (L.G.09).

236 Wing: 104 Sqn. and 148 Sqn. (Wellington II), Daba (L.G.106).

238 Wing: 38 Sqn. and 40 Sqn. (Wellington Ic), Shallufa (40 Sqn. also torpedo bombers).

39 Sqn. (Beaufort I and IIs), torpedo bombers, Sidi Barrani (L.G.5).

14 Sqn. (Blenheim IVs)

Reconnaissance

40 SAAF and 208 Sqn. (

Hurricanes I-IIs

and

Tomahawks

), army cooperation, Sidi Azeiz, El Adem.

2 Photo Reconnaissance Unit (P.R.U.) Heliopolis, detachment at Gambut (

Spitfire IVs

)

60 SAAF Sqn. (

Marylands

), Heliopolis

1437 Flt. (

Marylands

and

Baltimores

), strategical reconnaissance.

MAIN UNITS BEHIND THE FRONT LINE

Fighters

227 Sqn. (

Beaufighters

) nightfighters, Gianacalis.

335 (Hellenic) Sqn. (

Hurricane Is

) Qotafiya (L.G.20).

805 FAA Sqn. (

Martlets

) Qotafiya (L.G.20).

889 FAA Sqn. (

Fulmar IIs

) Fuka Sat. (L.G.16).

Alsace (Free French) Sqn. (

Hurricane Is

), Fuka Sat. (L.G.16).

94 Sqn. (

Kittyhawks

) Mariut.

1 SAAF Sqn. (

Hurricane IIA-Bs

), Port Said.

5 SAAF Sqn. (

Tomahawks

), Sidi Hineish (L.G.115).

69 Sqn. (

Beaufighters

) Abu Sueir N. (Night-fighters).

Others

Fleet Air Arm’s Squadrons: 815, 821, 826 (

Swordfishes

and

Albacores

).

230 Sqn. (

Sunderlands

), general reconnaissance, Aboukir.

459 Sqn. (

Hudson IIIs

), general reconnaissance, Burg El Arab (L.G.40).

249 Transport Wing: 117 Sqn. (

D.C.IIs

), Bilbeis; 216 Sqn. (

Bombays

), Khanka.

1 General Reconnaissance Unit (G.R.U.) (

Wellingtons

), Ismailia

162 Sqn. (

Wellingtons

), RCM and RDF, Bilbeis.

267 Sqn. Various Transports.

LUFTWAFFE (Fl. Fü. Afrika)

Fighters

In view of the spring’s offensive III./JG 27 was again transferred from Sicily, so combat ready Bf.109 F totalled about 90 planes, plus about fifteen Bf.109 F fighter-bombers.

I./JG 27 (

Bf.109 F-4s

) Tmimi, end of June Sidi Barrani, then Fuka.

II./JG 27 (

Bf.109 F-4s

) Tmimi, end of June Sidi Barrani, then Fuka.

III./JG 27 (

Bf.109 F-4s

) Tmimi, end of June Sidi Barrani, then Bir El Astas (Marsa Matruh).

III./JG 53 (

Bf.109 F-4

), Martuba (26 May), Gazala, end of June Sidi Barrani.

Jabo./JG 27 (

Bf.109 F-4/Bs

) Martuba.

Jabo./JG 53 (

Bf.109 F-4/Bs

) Martuba (26 May).

7./ZG 26 (

Bf.110 D-3s

) Derna.

2./NJG 2 (

Ju.88 C-6s

, night-fighters) Derna.

I./NJG 2 (

Ju.88 C-6s

, night-fighters) Iraklion from June.

Bombers

I./St.G 3 (

Ju.87 R-2s

,

R-2 trops

,

R-4s

;

Bf.110s

,

He.111s

) Derna-South, Tmimi, Bu Hania.

I./St.G 4 (

Ju.87s

), from June.

I./St.G 5 (

Ju.87s

), from June.

12./LG 1(

Ju.88 A-4s

), Barce

I./LG 1 (

Ju.88 A-4s

), Iraklion (X. Fl. Kps).

II./ LG 1 (

Ju.88 A-4s

), Iraklion from June (X. Fl. Kps).

I. / KG 54 (

Ju.88s

), Eleusis from June.

II./KG 100 (

He.111 H-6s

), Kalamaki (X. Fl. Kps).

Reconnaissance

4.(H)/12 (

Bf.110 C-4s

,

Bf.109 Fs

,

Hs.126s

) Tactical Reconnaissance, Martuba.

1.(F)/121 (

Ju.88 D-1s

,

Bf.109 Fs

) Long-range Reconnaissance, Derna.

REGIA AERONAUTICA (V Squadra Aerea)

Fighters

1° St. C.T. (

C.202s

): 6° Gr., 79

a

, 81

a

e 88

a

Sq.; 17° Gr., 71

a

, 72

a

e 80

a

Sq.; Martuba 4; from middle June remains only 88a Sq.

4° St. C.T. (

C.202s

): 9° Gr. C.T. 73

a

, 96

a

e 97

a

Sq.; 10° Gr. 84

a

, 90

a

, 91

a

Sq.; Martuba 4; from the end of June Sidi El Barrani, then Fuka.

Assalto (ground attack)

50° St. (

CR.42

-bombers): 158° Gr. (236a, 387a, 388a Sq.), 159° Gr. (389a Sq., 390a Sq., 391a Sq.), El Fetheia (Derna) 30.5; Sidi El Barrani 29.6.

2° St. (

C.200s

) Martuba 5: 8° Gr. (92a, 93a, 94a Sq.); 13° Gr. (77a, 78a, 82a Sq.), from 24.6 Ain El Gazala,

3° Gr. (153a, 154a, 155a Sq.;

CR.42s

) Martuba 5, up to 31st May.

Bombers and Reconnaissance

35° St. (

Cant.Z.1007bis

): 86° Gr. (190a and 191aSq.); 95° Gr. (230a and 231a Sq.) Barce and Derna.

UNITS BEHIND THE FRONT LINE

Fighters

150° Gr. C.T. (363a, 364a e 365a Sq.;

C.200s

), Bengasi.

160° Gr. C.T. (375

a

, 393

a

e 394

a

Sq.;

G.50s

and

CR.42s

), Tripoli.

12° Gr. C.T. (159

a

, 160a,165a Sq.;

G.50s

) Tripoli.

Torpedo Bombers

131° Gr. (279a and 284a Sq.); 133° Gr. 174

a

Sq. and 175a Sq.); (

S.79s

) Bengasi K.2.

Transports

145° Gr. (604a and 610a Sq.) (

S.81s

,

S.82s

,

S.73s

,

Ca.133s

,

S.75s

). A flight of

S.82s

was equipped as night-bombers.

Reconnaissance

196a Sq. R.S.M. (

Cant.Z.501s

)

145a Sq. R.S.M. (

Cant.Z.501s

)

103a Sq. (

Ca.311s

)

118a Sq. (

Ca.311s

)

123a Sq. (

Ca.311s

)

24a Sq. (

Ca.311s

)

33a Sq. (

Ca.311s

)

Aviazione Presidio Coloniale (A.P.C. - Colonial Aviation)

1° Gr. A.P.C. (

Ca.309s

)

12a Sq. A.P.C. (

Ca.309s

)

Chapter 3

THE PREPARATIONS (22-25 May)

In the days before the offense, the flying activity of both sides increased to a high level. In particular, the pounding of Axis aerodromes by 3 SAAF Bomber Wing’s attack formations began, heavily escorted by 233 and 239 Fighter Wings.

22 May 42

A) Nine Bostons of 24 SAAF were off from Baheira heading for Martuba (7.20-9.25). Over Gambut, they met with the fighter escort, which was particularly strong on this occasion: eight Kittyhawks of 450 Squadron provided top cover at 14,000 feet (three planes turned back because of engine trouble); nine Kittyhawks of 112 Squadron acted as medium cover at 12000 feet; and twelve Kittyhawks of 250 Squadron were close cover.

Twelve Kittyhawks of 3 RAAF were on a “freelance bomber escort” (two returned because of engine trouble); eight Kittyhawks of 260 Squadron and twelve Tomahawksof 4 SAAF took off a little later on a diversionary sweep to cover the return of the bombers.

At 8.43, bombs were dropped over the objective from an altitude of 14000 feet and four Bostons were slightly damaged by anti-aircraft fire. 24 SAAF was again able to report that two Bf.109s were shot down by fighters: one to the south of Martuba 3 in a head-to-head attack, and one in the sea in the Gulf of Bomba. A Tomahawk crashed in area (S) P5620 as well as a second unidentified fighter (S) P5244.

450 Squadron reported that it was attacked by two Bf.109s after crossing the coast, three miles south of Ras El Tin. A Kittyhawk, presumably that of Sgt. Williams (AK717), was shot down and caught fire upon hitting the ground. F.Lt. Rose (AK998) set off in pursuit of a Bf.109 and claimed a probable victory. The dropping of bombs over Martuba 5 was seen and caused two substantial fires; and then, five miles to the south of the target, a Kittyhawk was seen to come down helplessly in a spin.

Formation of 3 SAAF Bostons and Baltimores. An escorting P-40 can also be seen (Bouwer)

On the south-west route for the return, six enemy planes were seen taking off with four more soon after from the airfields to the south of Martuba. On the return, a Kittyhawk crash-landed due to enemy action; presumably its pilot was Sgt. Young (AL131), while Sgt. Quirk (AK634) went missing. F.Lt. Rose force-landed at Gambut main.

3 RAAF was flying in two sections of six and four, in fluid pairs, when it was attacked three times by four Bf.109s, two of which were destroyed by Gibbs and Barr.

F.Lt. Barr (AL199) was leading the section of four:

“...at 11000’ about 1500’ above the bombers on their port. Me.109s were reported at 9 o’clock, 2000’ above. When we were about 15 miles E of Bomba 2 109s attacked one section and 2 more attacked mine from 6 o’clock. I went down after one after Sgt. Kildey had given it a good burst and had got in a good astern attack when I had to evade an attack from behind. No results observed. ...saw one 109 climbing up in a spiral about 1000’ below. I dived on it and kept on it from beam to astern in a steep turn. It then rolled over and fell away on its’ back. I was attacked again and pulled away and did not observe results. Height about 4000’. As my guns had stopped firing, I returned to base and got front wheels down with auxiliary pump, damaging tail wheel and cowls in the landing. Own casualties: 3 rounds hit starboard side cutting the hydraulic line and puncturing the tyre. Another hit the voltage regulator. Enemy casualties: 1 Me.109 probable.”

112 Squadron reported that it had been attacked by five Bf.109s before reaching the coast about ten miles north of Bomba. There were no individual instances of combat but on the way home from the target, F.O. Knoll (AK.908) engaged a Bf.109 and was attacked from the rear and damaged, while F.O. Gundry (AK787) went missing.

250 Squadron reported seeing two and three squadrons of enemy aircraft on different occasions. S.L. Judd (AL157) stated:

“...On approaching Ras El Tin...one 109F attacked the section flying on the right of the Bostons without damaging any of our AC. The other escorting Squadrons were observed to be having combats with numerous 109s. On the return journey various 109s some fairly near to the rear of the Bombers, but I did not see any attack. This Squadron remained in position (one flight 3 AC on either side).”

F.Lt. Waddy (AK846):

“...After dropping the bombs the Bostons turned left and as we approached Tmimi, I observed one Me.109F, camouflaged light brown, with white spinner and white wing tips, flying on our starboard side, at the same height, about 1000 yards away. I called up and warned the formation to watch him. He suddenly pulled up above the formation turning slightly to the right and then made a rear quarter attack on a straggling Kitty. I started a right hand side turn to stop the attack, which he broke off and climbed away. I then saw him take the same position related to the formation as at first. ...as soon as I saw him pull up again to the right I went into a steep left hand turn and as he made his attack on the other Kitty again I met him head on and fired a good burst which hit him. He banked to the right and broke beneath me and then I saw the pilot bale out. The Kitty he attacked appeared to me to be hit but I only saw it dive away and could not see it again.”

Kittyhawk of 112 Sqn. (Aviation Heritage Museum of Western Australia)

Sgt. Seabrook (AK704) also hit a Bf.109 but only Waddy’s was confirmed. The pilot seen by Waddy must have been P.O. Rogerson (AL116), who was badly hit and crash-landed at Gambut.

260 Squadron witnessed the attack on the top cover and afterwards sighted and engaged four Bf.109s and two Macchis. Sgt. Carlisle fired at one of them, which made a half-roll and dived away with black smoke coming from it, but no claim was made. 4 SAAF failed to meet any enemy aircraft.

Four Schwarms of JG 27 had departed just after 7.00: one of 1./JG 27, on air-raid warning; one of 2./JG 27, also on air-raid warning; one of 4./JG 27 on free sweep; and one of III./JG 27, details lacking. II Gruppe was still at Martuba and about to be transferred to Tmimi. Eight P-40s were credited shot down:

Oblt. Franzisket (1./JG 27), 20 km E of Derna (7.41);

Fw. Steinhausen (1./JG 27), 20 km S of Martuba (7.50); a second one was damaged;

Lt. Arnold Stahlschmidt (2./JG 27), SW of Tmimi (7.50);

Lt. von Lieres u. Wilkau of (2./JG 27), S of Tmimi (7.51);

Ofw. Bendert (2) (4./JG 27), 30 km E of Tmimi (7.33); 2-3 km N of Ain El Gazala, 30-50 m (7.45);

Uffz. Steis (4./JG 27), 30 km E of Tmimi (7.36);

Ofw. Rosenburg (9./JG 27), 10 km S of Martuba, height 4500 m (7.55).

Initially Bendert’s second claim over the sea was not confirmed. There are also two more claims of I./JG 27 that were not confirmed.

During the day, Uffz. Sdun (8./JG 27, Bf.109 W.Nr. 10102) was shot down by enemy fighters and was wounded, possibly a victim of Waddy.

The first to attack must have been four Bf.109s of 4./JG 27 which clashed with 450 Squad-ron and 3 RAAF shooting down Williams. The Bf.109s of the other two groups subsequently intervened.

Six Macchis of 17° Gruppo (two of 71ª Sq. and four of 72ª Sq.) also took off on warning (7.45-8.25) to intercept the bomber’s raid over Martuba 5. Only Cap. Tomaselli (C.O.), at an altitude of 5000 m, managed to reach and damage a Boston (160 rounds). The action must have taken place during the return of the bombers; nevertheless, none of their pilots reported any attacks. 1° Stormo complained because the alarm was given too late.

Simultaneously, five Baltimores of 223 Squadron (7.01-8.48) attacked Derna (8.06, 18000 feet). Therefore the Boston escort also had to cover the Baltimores. It seems that German fighters took off when this raid was picked up by radar, while the Italians took off on the raid of 24 SAAF.

This attack caused the death of an Italian airman in addition to wounding three others. Two CR.42s were put out of use and two CR.42s were badly damaged. Eight C.200s, three CR.42s and one Ca.311 were also slightly damaged. On the German side, one Ju.87 was destroyed and a second was damaged.

B) Serg. Magg. Benati (C.202, 79ª Sq., 6° Gruppo) scrambled from Benghazi due to the sighting of a reconnaissance aircraft (10.05-10.45). After about twenty-five minutes of flying, it reached a Maryland at an altitude of 7500 m, 30 km from the coast. Eventually, thanks to radio contact, Benati managed to shoot it down into the sea (600 rounds). No evidence has been found to confirm this action, however.

Sgt/P. Alexopulos (335 Hellenic Squadron, Hurricane I Z.4101) was off at 11.40 on a false alarm over a convoy. Probably owing to engine failure he ditched near the ships but the plane sank almost immediately and he was not seen again.

Night of 22-23

Wellington IC BB484X (F.Sgt. Ward) of 38 Squadron was laying mines off Benghazi when it was badly damaged by anti-aircraft fire and crashed in the desert; one of the crew was killed.

At Berka Ju.88 A-4 W.Nr. 5728 was destroyed due to the bombing.

During a bombing on Martuba, an Italian airman was seriously wounded and a C.200 (M.M. 7678, 77ª Sq., 13° Gr.) was destroyed.

Ju.88 A-4 W.Nr. 5603, L1 + LN (5./L.G.1) was lost over the aerodrome of Abu Haggag, probably shot down by AA. Fw. Scharnowsky was KIA while the rest of the crew was taken prisoner.

23 May

A) 80 Squadron provided a cover patrol for Kittyhawks being refuelled at El Adem (8.15-9.45). It was jumped by six Bf.109s and in the ensuing dogfight, F.Sgt. Scott (BE339) and Sgt. Howard (BM974) were shot down. Both were seen to crash in flames near Tobruk. Sgt. Mc Cormack (BN354) was also hit but managed to land at El Adem (Cat.II). The Hurricane IICs hardly managed to fire a few rounds (60 Ball, 25 HE). 274 Squadron was also present in the mission but it had probably already landed at the time of the German attack.

A Schwarm of 5./JG 27 on a fighter sweep claimed three P-40s:

S.M.82 trans- ports of 609a Sq. (Archivio di Stato)

Fw. Reuter, 10 km NW of El Adem (8.35);

Lt. Jenisch (2) 10 km NW of El Adem (8.36) and 5 km NE of El Adem (8.39).

B) F.O. Sowrey (BN128) and Sgt. Stephenson (BM981) of 213 Squadron shot down a Ju.88 (Idku, 9.25-10.25). The results were dramatic according to Stephenson (Red II):

“...after another attack from Red I, I saw the starboard engine burst into flames. I gave him another burst and then saw flames inside the cockpit, whilst debris was flung around everywhere. The crew threw a dinghy out and the AC tried to gain height, but as I delivered my final attack, it blew up, rolled over, then half rolled and dived straight into the sea. No sign of survivors...”

The fury against a previously condemned enemy is difficult to explain. At that time there was the usual activity of reconnaissance Ju.88s and Oblt. Obernhuber with all his crew went missing (II./KLG 1, Ju.88 A-4, W.Nr. 5633 L1 + BP).

C) Five C.202s (81ª Sq., 6° Gruppo), commanded by Cap. Baldini, scrambled to intercept a formation of enemy bombers and fighters in the sky over the airfield (9.25-10.20).

No more than four Macchis managed to reach the enemy at an altitude of 6500 m over Gazala and clashed two times with an indeterminate number of Hurricanes and P-40s. It seems that only two pilots arrived within firing range: the first one was Serg. Magg. Morosi, who declared that after a long pursuit he shot down a Hurricane which fell into the sea, (430); the second one was Palazzeschi, who fired at another Hurricane (150).

It would appear that some Bf.109s of II./JG 27 also took off on warning from Tmimi, which claimed as many as five P-40s:

Oblt. Rödel (2) (Stab II./JG 27), 10 km N of Ras El Tin (9.40); 40 km NE of Ras El Tin, 200 m (9.47);

Ofhr. Kientsch (2) (Stab II./JG 27), 10 km NE of Ras El Tin, 5000 m (9.40); 3 km NE of Ain El Gazala (9.55);

Ofw. Bendert (4./JG 27), 5 km S of Ain El Gazala (10.05).

The long time intervals between the single claims might make us think of separate clashes and that Bendert scrambled at a different time (9.42-10.18).

Again 24 SAAF with nine Bostons was headed to Derna (9.15-11.10) with a large escort:

eleven Kittyhawks of 2 SAAF as top cover (one carried out an emergency landing straight after take-off and a second returned a little later); ten Tomahawks of 4 SAAF as medium cover (9.35-11.15); ten Tomahawks of 5 SAAF as close cover; and 112, 250 , and 260 Squadrons were indirectly covering the attack formation.

At 10.15, the bombers crossed the coast at an altitude of 12000 feet, still gaining height. At 10.25, they had reached an altitude of 14000 feet over Derna and started bombing, observing three direct hits on the Stukas. Then they sighted five enemy aircraft take off from Martuba main, while five fighters were flying over Derna main at 1000 feet.

2 SAAF was flying at 18000 feet and two minutes after the bombs had been dropped, twelve Bf.109 Fs attacked the Kittyhawks from 15000 feet, breaking into sections and delivering stern attacks. The Squadron was compelled to initiate a defensive action by turning towards the enemy, having a quick burst, and turning back towards the bombers. At 10.40 the enemy broke away climbing. 2 SAAF noted that the enemy had been unable to penetrate the fighter screen and so all the aircraft returned safely.

Lt. Bryant (AK963) was lagging behind the formation when he was attacked by four Bf.109s for twenty minutes. He was shot (Cat.II) but was able to return safely home.

On the way out, two pilots saw a Hurricane shot down by a Bf.109 (possibly one of 80 Squadron) (rounds: 0.5-1975).

Only one 4 SAAF Squadron pilot managed to fire at an attacking fighter. Furthermore, 4 SAAF reported that, notwithstanding the heavy anti-aircraft fire, the formation did not sustain any damage. And what is more, the bombardment, carried out between 13000 and 14000 feet, did not turn out to be accurate. Instead 5 SAAF would not have been involved.

Twelve Kittyhawk Is of 250 Squadron had to cover the return of the bombers. As many as six of these broke off from the mission because of high water temperature and low oil pressure. The remaining aircraft were attacked by about five Bf.109s coming down from a much higher altitude. Only Sgt. Webster (AL162 LD-I) suffered, however, when his plane was hit but not badly.

Also, 112 Squadron was flying over Gazala in order to protect the return of the bombers, when some Bf.109s were spotted. However, according to the war diary these would risk to attack the Kittyhawk. Obviously it must have been a humorous statement considering that the opponents never showed lack of courage and most of all the performances of the Bf.109 were so superior to those of the Kittyhawk that it made no sense to avoid the attack. 

Finally, seven Kittyhawks of 260 Squadron (9.35-11.00) accompanied the bombers to an altitude of 13000 feet up to Martuba. And then while these proceeded to Derna, they came down to attack the airfields in a diversionary action. At the same time they engaged a Bf.110 and damaged it.

Baltimore (Bouwer)

We can consider that overall there were about ten attacking fighters and so they were insufficient to get through to the bombers. In fact, they actually only clashed with the top cover.

D) During the day, 33 Squadron was over Tobruk employed in the escort of convoys. It is not known at what time, but presumably during the second mission over Tobruk, the two covering Hurricane IIBs were attacked by four Bf.109s. F.Lt. Desmond Wade (5654) was shot down and lost his life; his plane was seen slipping into the sea. The “Daily Resume of Air Operations” stated that two C.202s attacked two Hurricanes one of which was shot down into the sea. In its turn, Sgt. Laflamme’s plane (BG917) was badly damaged, even if it was able to come back to base. At the end of his first mission, Sgt. Belec’s (Hurricane BG884 RS-G) overturned on landing.

Therefore it is possible that this unit had been involved in the previous action against the Macchis, but it is also possible that it had clashed with 5./JG 27, which claimed three P-40s:

Fw. Reuter (2), 2 km NE of Tobruk (over the sea, 11.13); 10 km E of Tobruk (11.16);

Uffz. Gierster, 5 km SE of Tobruk (11.05).

Also 2./JG 27 headed to Tobruk, after an alarm warning (10.35-11.35). Of this unit Uffz. Beckmann claimed another Hurricane but it was not confirmed.

33 Squadron had been equipped with the Hurricane IIBs which, besides keeping the wing tanks, were armed with twelve .303 calibre guns.

E) At 10.32, a formation of four Baltimores of 223 Squadron also took off to attack the main airfield of Derna (probably during this raid was destroyed Ju.87 R-4/Trop, W.Nr. 6241 of 3./St.G.3). As there had been a delay of thirty minutes, the escort of 3 RAAF and 450 Squadron did not meet up with it, and this will prove very costly for the bombers. After the bombs were dropped from 18000 feet at 11.55, the planes were intercepted by three Bf.109s near Ras El Tin at an altitude of 15000 feet at 12.00:

“The first attack was made on one ac that was lagging behind. The pilot finding that the rear gunner was unable to use his rear guns on account of stoppage went down to sea level and successfully evaded them, returning to base badly shot up. He landed with his wheels down but the ac was classed Cat.II. The remainder of the formation then subjected to continual attacks and as the rear guns on all ac also jammed, the enemy, finding they had no opposition, closed in within 75 to 50 yards range and attacked from the rear. …they succeeded in flying as far as Tobruk, two of them spun in from height, killing both crews instantaneously. The remaining machine belly landed being badly shot up and was classified Cat.II.”

But nevertheless they managed to claim the destruction of a Bf.109with the guns fixed in the tail. AG708 (F.O. Bangley) and l’AG717 (Sgt. Horsfield) were shot down in flames with the loss of the entire crew. AG703 (P.O. Leake) was forced to make an emergency landing at Bir El Gobi while AG762 (Sgt. Mc Clure) returned at 12.25. The latter plane had been hit by 400 rounds and was SOC. Alltogether five members the crews were wounded.

This time the 223 Squadron had been particularly unfortunate because it came across two Schwarms of 3./JG 27 (take-off at 10.35), led by the two most dangerous enemy pilots: Marseille and Homuth. All four bombers were claimed destroyed to the south of Tobruk:

Oblt. Marseille (2), 3 km SE of the port of Tobruk (11.05, 11.06);

Ofw. Mentnich, SE of the port of Tobruk (11.08);

Hptm. Homuth shot down a plane north of Fort Acroma (11.18) after a tenacious pursuit, so it was probably AG762. Some sources reported that Homuth claimed it was damaged.

Following the disastrous raid 223 Squadron was withdrawn for a few days and an immediate inquire was instituted into the cause of the .300 rear gun stoppages. No solution was found so the gun so it was substituted with the .303 Browning.

F) Twenty miles south of Tmimi, seven Kittyhawks of 450 Squadron were acting as the escort for two Hurricane Is of 40 SAAF on a reconnaissance mission when they ran into four Bf.109s and possibly C.202s. In the ensuing clash, Sgt. Mc Burney (AK998) and Sgt. Nursey (AK606) claimed a Bf.109 each. And then the formation was scattered and they returned separately. Some motor transports were strafed.

Col. Biden (40 SAAF, 17.05-18.30) claimed a probable C.202.

“Whilst on a tac/r, with Capt. Blauuw, escorted by 7 Kittyhawks of 450 and 250 Sqns. (not reported), the formation was attacked by 6+ EA near Segnali. During my initial turn, I saw one AC crash into the ground in flames, and as I completed my turn to the East, I saw a Macchi 202 on the tail of a Kitty. I pulled my aircraft into a steep climb and fired a full deflection shot, and continued firing until I was about 40’ from the AC. I saw my tracer and incendiary entering the AC at the cockpit. At this stage my AC spun to the right and I lost contact. As I was heading for the ground, I saw an AC going down with white smoke issuing from it. I then led the fighters into a dust cloud and evaded the enemy.”

Uffz. Gierster (5./JG 27) claimed a P-40, 15 km south east of Gadd El Ahma, 600 m (16.52), but his plane was then hit and he was forced to parachute out; he saved himself even if he was slightly wounded (Bf.109 W.Nr. 7390 sw.5+).

It is interesting to note that during the day, the Germans claimed to have shot down twelve fighters in total. However, we are only able to confirm the shooting down of three of them. The discrepancy would seem to be explained (the probable excess of claims aside) by the lack of detail or incompleteness of some diaries of the Commonwealth units. On this day the CWGC reports the death of F.Sgt. Stammers of 33 Sqn.

Kittyhawk squadron (Aviation Heritage Museum of Western Australia)

Night of 23-24

Three Ju.88s attacked the landing grounds of Gambut (19.00-23.30); one aircraft force-landed (OBS).

Martuba was bombed: four C.200s were badly damaged and six others slightly.

24 May

A) S.Ten. Ferrari (C.200, 364ª Sq., 150° Gruppo) was on a standing patrol over Benghazi Harbor (13.10-15.10) when he intercepted and hit a Beaufighter. The latter was chased but was able to get away, possibly thanks to its higher speed (rounds: 360).

Lt. Scheid lost his life with his crew for unknown reasons during a transfer from Tripoli to Benghazi (III./Z.G.26, Bf.110 F-2 W.Nr. 4543, 3U + BD). A connection with the previous attack cannot be excluded.

Ju.52 W.Nr. 6809 (K.Gr.z.b.V. 102) was destroyed following an accident (100%).

Ju.88 A-4 W.Nr. 5727 (IV./L.G.1), crash-landed at Martuba due to lack of fuel (70%). A member of the crew lost his life.

1° Stormo Command tent at Martuba (Ufficio Storico SMA)

Night of 24-25

Ten Ju.88s attacked Bir El Abd aerodrome (2000-2312), two aircraft were set on fire, and many night-fighters were seen above Marsa Matruh. Ju.88 A-4 W.Nr. 5553, L1+GH, went missing (Lt. Hetterich).

Eight Ju.88s of LG 1 made a glide approach down to 300 m. over the aerodrome. One aircraft was driven off by fighters. Some fighters were attacking down to less than 300 m (ULTRA).

Martuba was bombed: an Italian airman was slightly wounded and two C.202s were burned out (M.M.7888, 71ª Sq.; M.M.7911, 97ª Sq.).