Ethics for a Brave New World, Second Edition (Updated and Expanded) E-Book

John S. Feinberg

• Herausgeber: Crossway
• Kategorie: Religion und Spiritualität
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 1924

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2010

Beschreibung

Aldous Huxley's 1932 book Brave New World foresees a world in which technological advances have obliterated morality and freedom. John Feinberg and Paul Feinberg, in the first edition of Ethics for a Brave New World, noted how Huxley landed frighteningly close to the truth. Their book responded to ethical crises such as abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, and genetic engineering by looking to Scripture for principles to guide us through the moral quagmires of our time. Now dramatically updated and expanded, this edition of Ethics for a Brave New World seeks to maintain the relevance, rigorous scholarship, and biblical faithfulness of the first edition. While many of the topics covered in the book remain the same, John Feinberg has revised each chapter to keep it current with contemporary trends and to respond to the most recent scholarship. There is a new chapter on stem cell research and greatly expanded material on issues such as homosexuality and genetic engineering. This important resource will be a valuable guide for students and those seeking answers to ethical dilemmas.

Leseprobe

“This 2nd edition of Ethics for a Brave New World by John Feinberg and Paul Feinberg is a welcome updating and expansion of a text I have long considered essential for anyone wishing to engage the moral collapse of contemporary culture with biblically grounded truth. The Feinbergs provide a timely and effective resource for dealing with the most crucial issues of our day, and they do it in ways as appealing as they are compelling.”

Daniel R. Heimbach, Professor of Christian Ethics, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary; author, Truth, Sex, and Morality

“Since the first edition, changes in the world have only made this book’s title more apt. Again and again, science fiction has become science fact; and with masterful theological discernment, Ethics for a Brave New World helps us to make sense of what is happening. It does a tremendous service by gathering and interpreting an ocean of literature on key issues of our day. Readers will come away informed about the issues, conversant with the multi-faceted debates that swirl around these vital challenges, and equipped and inspired to engage them in a way that glorifies God.”

John Kilner, Forman Chair of Christian Ethics and Theology, Trinity International University

Ethics for a Brave New World, Second Edition

Copyright © 1993, 2010 by John S. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg

Published by Crossway

1300 Crescent Street

Wheaton, Illinois 60187

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher, except as provided for by USA copyright law.

First edition, 1993

Cover design: Tobias’ Outerwear for Books

Cover photo: iStock First printing 2010

Printed in the United States of America

Scripture quotations are generally taken from The Holy Bible, New International Version®.Copyright © 1973, 1978, 1984 Biblica. Used by permission of Zondervan. All rights reserved. The “NIV” and “New International Version” trademarks are registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office by Biblica. Use of either trademark requires the permission of Biblica.

The Scripture reference marked rsv is from The Revised Standard Version. Copyright © 1946, 1952, 1971, 1973 by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

Scripture quotations marked kjv are from the King James Version of the Bible.

Scripture quotations marked at are the author’s translation. Occasional single words and short phrases, though not marked as such, are also the author’s translation.

ISBN-13: 978-1-58134-712-8

ePub ISBN: 978-1-4335-2646-6

PDF ISBN: 978-1-4335-2644-2

Mobipocket ISBN: 978-1-4335-2645-9

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Feinberg, John S., 1946–Ethnics for a Brave new world / John S. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg.

— 2nd ed.

p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and indexes.

ISBN: 978-1-58134-712-8 (tpb)

1. Social ethics. 2. Christian ethics. I. Feinberg, Paul D. II. Huxley, Aldous, 1849–1963. Brave new world. III. Title.

HM216.F4 2010

2010023928

241—dc22

Crossway is a publishing ministry of Good News Publishers.

SH        20   19   18   17   16   15  14  13   12   11  10  15  14  13   12   11  10   9   8   7   6   5    4   3   2   1

To

our sister

Lois Anne Gonzenbach

CONTENTS

Abbreviations of Works Frequently Cited 9Preface to Second Edition 11Preface to First Edition 151Moral Decision Making and the Christian 212Abortion 633Abortion (II) 1094Euthanasia 1575Capital Punishment 2276Introduction to the Ethics of Human Sexuality: Sex and Birth Control2677Homosexuality 3078Homosexuality (II)3459Genetic Engineering—Reproductive Technologies38710Reproductive Technologies (II) 43311Genetic Engineering and Genes 46112Genetic Engineering and Genes (II): Gene Therapy and Stem Cell Technology52313Divorce and Remarriage58314The Christian and War: Christian Faith in a Nuclear Age 63515The Christian and the Secular State 697Notes 737General Index 821Scripture Index 839

ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS FREQUENTLY CITED

Angl Th R Ann Soc Chr Eth Ashl Theo J Bib Sac Bib Th Bul Breth Life Cambr Q Health CBQ Chi Trib Anglican Theological Review Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics Ashland Theological Journal Bibliotheca Sacra Biblical Theology Bulletin Brethren Life and Thought Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Catholic Biblical Quarterly Chicago TribuneChr Bio Chr Cent Chr Cris Chr Res J Chr Sch R Chr Soc Action Chr T Contemp Phil Curr Th Miss Christian Bioethics The Christian Century Christianity and Crisis Christian Research Journal Christian Scholar’s Review Christian Social Action Christianity Today Contemporary Philosophy Currents in Theology and MissionDialog Ec R E/SA Eth Med Eth Theor Moral Pract ExposT Faith Phil Fund J Hast Center Rep Hor Bib Theo Int Phil Q J Applied Phil J Ch St J Law Rel J Med Phil J Psych Chr Dialog: A Journal of Theology The Ecumenical Review Engage/Social Action Ethics & Medicine Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Expository Times Faith and Philosophy Fundamentalist Journal Hastings Center Report Horizons in Biblical Theology International Philosophical Quarterly Journal of Applied Philosophy Journal of Church and State The Journal of Law and Religion Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Journal of Psychology and ChristianityJ Rel Health J Relig Ethics J Soc Phil J Soc Chr Eth JAAR JBL JES JETS JSNT Ken Inst Eth J Luth Th J Mod Ch Monist NEJM Notre Dame J Law NTSt Journal of Religion and Health Journal of Religious Ethics Journal of Social Philosophy Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics Journal of American Academy of Religion Journal of Biblical Literature Journal of Ecumenical Studies Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society Journal for the Study of the New Testament Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal Lutheran Theological Journal The Modern Churchman The Monist New England Journal of Medicine Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, & Public Policy New Testament StudiesOther Side Per Rel St Per Sci Chr Faith Phil Phenomenol R Phil Pub Affairs Rel in Life Rel St R Rv Ex SJT The Other Side Perspectives in Religious Studies Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Philosophy and Public Affairs Religion in Life Religious Studies Review Review and Expositor Scottish Journal of TheologySt Luke J St Vlad Th Q Stud Theol Th St Th Today Thomist TynBul USNWR VigChr Witness Word World St. Luke’s Journal of Theology St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly Studia Theologica Theological Studies Theology Today The Thomist Tyndale Bulletin U.S. News & World Report Vigiliae Christianae The Witness Word and World

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

In 1993 Crossway published Ethics for a Brave New World. Though that first edition is still in print, for a long time it has needed an update. We knew that, but life got in the way. Three major events have happened to our family in the last twenty-six years, all of which made it virtually impossible even to envision revising this text, let alone actually to do it.

The first event occurred in August of 1995. Our father, Charles Lee Feinberg, went to be with the Lord after many years of declining health. Second, Paul had diabetes, and over the ensuing years the disease began to take its toll. The first major complication was heart problems, and that was followed some years later with kidney problems. Still, Paul “soldiered on” faithfully, teaching a full load at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School as well as traveling and serving the church around the world. But the increasing challenges of his disease made it unthinkable that we could together revise this book. Very sadly and unexpectedly, in February 2004, after Paul had hip surgery, his heart and kidneys gave out and he entered into the presence of our Lord.

Third, my wife Pat’s Huntington’s Disease has continued to develop over the years since we first wrote this book. In the last eight to ten years there have been major complications in her condition as the disease takes its toll. After many years of caring for her needs, it became increasingly clear that I no longer had the physical strength to do everything she needs. With great reluctance, in November 2007 we moved Pat into a skilled nursing home where she is now. Her condition continues to deteriorate; despite advances in research on her disease, there is still no known cure.

However, time and culture move on, and the great ethical challenges of our day haven’t gone away. After Paul’s passing, I decided to shoulder the task of revising this book. I originally underestimated the kind and amount of changes that needed to be reflected in a revision, and I underestimated the sheer volume of literature I needed to read in order to be current on each topic. The result is not just that the task took longer than expected but that it required much more rewriting and generating of completely new material. Part of the reason is that so much more information is available than when we first wrote. The Internet didn’t exist when we wrote the first edition. Because of data available through the Internet, I have found answers to good questions students have posed over the years. For many years I had no idea of how to find such information.

As is always the case, there is more to say than one can possibly include in a volume like this. Hard choices had to be made, and they included not only material to add but also parts of the first volume that needed to be left out. The chapters are configured a bit differently to make room for new information and to allow the inclusion of a completely new section (in chapter 12) on stem cell technology. As much as possible, I have attempted to maintain Paul’s “voice” in the chapters he originally wrote. To one degree or another I believe I have succeeded. I think Paul would be pleased with the whole book, even if he wouldn’t have made each of the changes I have made.

No one alone can complete a task as involved as revising a text of this sort. I have received help from many different quarters, and at least some should be acknowledged. I have been greatly helped by many able student assistants in the gathering of bibliography, the checking for accuracy of various bibliographical data that appear in endnotes, and even at times offering editorial comments on portions of the manuscript. Most noteworthy is Shawn Bawulski, who also gave much help with “computer matters.” Then, I have been greatly blessed and helped by the comments on various chapters by my colleague Ben Mitchell. I think I have accommodated most, if not all, of his suggestions, and the manuscript is better because of it. Mistakes that still remain, of course, belong to me.

A special word of appreciation is due to the administration of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School (TEDS) for granting a sabbatical and leave of absence during which much of the work was done. This coincided with the move of my wife into the nursing home; without the graciousness and support of TEDS I don’t know how either finding her a proper nursing home (and moving her in) or completing much of the revision of this text would have happened. Thanks are also very much due Crossway Books. Without their skillful handling of this book, it wouldn’t still be in print after all these years. They have been very excited and most supportive of this revised edition. Marvin Padgett and Allan Fisher have both greatly encouraged me to do this revised edition. And, a special word of thanks to Bill Deckard for his exceptional skills and care in editing the manuscript.

I also want to thank family members for their support of this new edition. Before asking Crossway about revising the text, I asked Iris, Paul’s wife, if she would be willing for me to do this. She has been unwaveringly positive about the project, as have other family members, and for that I am most appreciative.

Finally, I must thank God for giving me the strength and time to do this work. There have been many challenges along the way, and many of them could have completely derailed this project. That hasn’t happened, thanks to God’s graciousness! It is my hope and prayer that this edition will accurately reflect him and will allow his voice on matters of morality to be heard clearly at a time when anything remotely close to biblical ethics is increasingly drowned out by the growing immorality of our age. To the extent that this text helps readers to hear God’s voice on the great moral issues of our day, give him all the praise!

John S. Feinberg January 2010

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

Prospero, rightful Duke of Milan, was banished by his usurping brother Antonio to a deserted island. There Prospero lived and raised his daughter Miranda. As William Shakespeare’s The Tempest opens, Prospero uses his powers to stir up a storm that shipwrecks a number of dignitaries from Italy, including Antonio and Alonso, the King of Naples. As the play progresses, Miranda, who has never seen a man other than her father, meets Ferdinand, son of the King of Naples, and falls in love. Near the play’s end, Prospero confronts his brother Antonio along with the others who were shipwrecked in the tempest. Miranda, upon seeing this whole entourage of people, exclaims joyously, “O, wonder! How many goodly creatures are there here! O brave new world, that has such people in’t!”1 Miranda meant it seriously.

Several hundred years later Aldous Huxley entitled his vision of the future Brave New World. He meant those words ironically, because Brave New World is Huxley’s frightening vision of a world in which freedom is dead and all concepts of morality are forgotten. Life is manufactured and controlled from beginning to end by modern technology. Huxley acquired his copyright for this book in 1932. It is incredible to see how similar our world is today to many things Huxley only imagined for literary impact.

Within our lifetime developments in technology have brought staggering changes to the way people can be conceived, born, healed, or die. And prospects for the future are as mind-boggling as what has already happened. Ethics intends to set forth what ought to be, not what is. But it should help us evaluate the rightness or wrongness of what is and tell us how to act in light of it. Unfortunately, changes in what “is” in modern life have far outdistanced reflection upon how we ought to live in such a time. This seems to be especially true among Christian ethicists, though even secular ethicists disagree about how we should live in this changing world.

So much is changing today in regard to the control of life and death and the understanding of human sexuality. Most of the developments in technology could not have been foreseen or addressed by writers of Holy Scripture. Because of this, some may think it impossible to address these topics from a Christian perspective. We strongly disagree. Though Scripture never addresses directly many of the topics covered in this book, it sets forth enough principles about life and death, human sexuality and a citizen’s relation to government that it is possible to evaluate contemporary practices in light of biblical teaching. Moreover, it is not only possible to address these matters biblically—it is mandatory to do so. In our pluralistic societies, Christians can no longer assume that others, our children included, will be exposed to and adopt Judeo-Christian morals or will know how to apply them to concrete situations. Hence, as Christians we must speak to these topics lest we find out too late, as in the case of abortion, that a morality foreign to Scripture has not only won the day but has even been enacted as the law of the land.

The burden for this book grew over a period of years and through a set of developing circumstances. We both teach an introductory course in ethics at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. Frustrated in attempts to find textbooks from an evangelical Christian perspective that cover more than one or two of the topics handled in this book, Paul suggested there was a need for a book like this and that we write it. Convinced of that need for the classroom, deeply disturbed by the moral drift of our nation, and convinced as well that this information needed exposure in the local church, we decided to write this book.

Though this book began out of academic and intellectual interest, three events in our lives turned it into a project that had direct implications for our life situations. We could no longer write this book as disinterested observers trying to discourse dispassionately about issues and decisions foreign to us. So, yes, we do have a vested interest in the way many of these topics are discussed and practices evaluated. However, we have attempted as best as possible to let our judgments, though influenced by our experiences, be determined by Scripture and its application through reason.

The first of these life-changing experiences came in November 1987 when John’s wife was diagnosed as having Huntington’s Chorea, a genetically transmitted disease. The disease is a slowly debilitating disease that has both physical and psychological components, and it is eventually fatal. It is controlled by a dominant gene, so that each of John’s three children has a 50–50 chance of getting the disease. Symptoms do not begin to appear until around 30 years of age or later. Currently, there is no known cure for the disease.

The second event came in 1989. In April of that year, Paul’s eldest daughter, then a single college freshman, informed Paul and his wife that she was pregnant. Though there was never a question raised about abortion, many agonizing hours were spent wrestling over whether his daughter should keep her baby or give him up for adoption. After struggling deeply with this question, his daughter decided to keep the baby. He was born in November 1989 and is a great joy and delight to his immediate and extended family. Still, the memory of the circumstances of his conception is troubling, and only time will tell how he will handle the news that his stepfather is not his genetic father.

In the midst of dealing with these events, we were overwhelmed by another set of events. In late spring of 1988, our mother suffered a stroke as a result of complications from diabetes. By the end of that year she had suffered another stroke and had to be moved to a nursing home. As a result of the stroke, she was unable to feed herself, so a feeding tube was inserted into her stomach. Though she was not continually comatose, she fundamentally did not interact with the external world. At the same time, the aging process in our father was having a rather dramatic impact. By early 1990 it became clear that he no longer could care for himself. A decision was made after considering Dad’s wishes to move him and Mom to Northern California where they would be cared for by our sister. Mom’s condition improved somewhat, but in January of 1992 she went to be with the Lord. Dad is still in a nursing home, but his condition continues to deteriorate as the aging process takes its toll.

As one can imagine, these events have dramatically impacted our lives. They have also delayed the completion of this book, though we feel that as a result of these experiences we can better identify and empathize with others who face difficult ethical dilemmas and agonize over hard decisions.

As we began to work on this book, we very quickly realized that with each new chapter and each new topic, we were in essence starting over on our research. Moreover, we also found that within the last fifteen to twenty years there has been a veritable explosion of literature on these topics. It is impossible to cover everything; decisions must be made at every turn. Any of the chapters could easily be expanded into a separate book. One of the early decisions made was that we would try to cover these topics as they relate to individuals facing ethical decisions. Even the chapter on the Christian and the secular state attempts to focus on the Christian’s obligations to the state, not the state’s handling of its citizens. Though it would be instructive to reflect on ethical conduct for larger groups (for example, one’s community or nation), we simply could not get into matters of public policy. Such issues as whether the state should mandate and/or fund sterilizing the mentally retarded or should regulate (and how it should regulate) allocation of funds as well as procedures for genetic engineering really take the discussion into issues of social and political philosophy. These issues merit treatment, but they go beyond the focus of this book.

The writing of the chapters was divided between John and Paul. John wrote the chapters on decision making, euthanasia, capital punishment, birth control, genetic engineering, divorce and remarriage, and the Christian and the secular state. Paul wrote the chapters on abortion, sexual morality, homosexuality, and war, with John editing all of these and composing some of the first abortion chapter. Each of us read and commented on the chapters written by the other. Though we had not previously discussed our views on a number of the topics covered, we were pleased to find ourselves comfortable with the positions each espoused.

In order to complete a project like this, the help of many people is needed. We feel they should be acknowledged. First, our love and appreciation go to our families for their constant encouragement and their patience with us while we worked on this project. They have sacrificed time with us in order to allow us to write this book. We also want to express our appreciation to the administration and board of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School for granting us sabbatical time during which we worked on this project.

In addition, various student assistants have helped us. Some have gathered bibliography, others have proofread our chapters, and still others came to our rescue when there were computer problems. For all their help in these and many other ways, we express our gratitude to Gregg Allison, Matt Cook, Jim Dahl, Gary Nordick, Bruce Shauger, David Wegener and Steve Wellum. Then, a special word of appreciation is due to Crossway Books, and Jan Dennis, then editor-in-chief there, in particular. The Crossway personnel have been incredibly understanding and patient with us despite the delays in completing this book. In addition, Jan’s friendship and encouragement amid the difficult circumstances detailed has ministered tremendously to us both. We are deeply grateful to him and most appreciative to our Lord for such a friend.

Finally, a special expression of thanks and love is due to our sister Lois Anne Gonzenbach, to whom this volume is dedicated. Her tireless care of our parents has made it possible for us to have time to write this book and to carry on our other ministries. She has cared for their needs with exceptional expertise and diligence. Her life is a living example of what it means to honor one’s father and mother. Our family is eternally indebted to her for her service to all of us in serving our parents. She has experienced firsthand many of the difficult situations of which we write, and she has handled them exceptionally well!

Ours is, indeed, a brave new world. Prospects of living in it are both frightening and exciting. May God be pleased to use this book to give guidance to those seeking to live Christianly in our times as they await the new world that our Lord himself will establish at his coming! And as a result, may the name of our Lord, who alone deserves praise, be magnified!

John S. Feinberg Paul D. Feinberg October 1992

CHAPTER ONE

MORAL DECISION MAKING AND THE CHRISTIAN

What makes good acts good and evil acts evil? If Nazi soldiers ask if I am hiding Jews in my attic, is it immoral to lie in order to safeguard those I am protecting? How do I know my moral rules are correct? How would I prove that Christian ethics are binding on non-Christians?

At one time or another most of us have wrestled with questions like these. One could easily study such issues for a lifetime, and yet they are only a sample of the many concerns facing moralists as they try to construct a theory of ethics that will guide daily decision making.

In this chapter we want to isolate the major questions that arise in thinking about ethics and note various responses to them. Moreover, we want to set forth the theoretical framework for discussing the practical issues handled in the rest of the book. We turn first to definitions and distinctions used in discussions about decision making.

FOUNDATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS

Ethics and Morality

Terms like “ethics,” “morals,” and “morality” are often used synonymously. The same is true of “ethical” and “moral.” In this chapter (and the book as a whole), we shall frequently do the same. To act ethically or morally means to act in accord with accepted rules of conduct that cover moral (as opposed to non-moral) matters. To have ethics or a morality is to hold a set of beliefs about what is good and evil, commanded and forbidden. To “do” ethics or moral philosophy is to reflect on such issues as the meaning of terms such as “good” and “ought” and the method of justifying ethical rules.

On the other hand, “ethics,” “morality,” etc., are terms that are not always used interchangeably. For example, ethics is often defined as the branch of philosophy that reflects on such issues as the source of moral norms and how to justify one’s rules for governing action in moral matters. Morals or morality may refer simply to the specific set of norms or rules by which people should live.1

Some define ethics as the study of morals, but that does not explain what morality is per se. Typically, the concept of morality is understood in one of two ways. For some, the point of morality is to note those things that are good (i.e., valuable or beneficial) and even to define “good” itself. Others maintain that the focus of morality is what is right (moral as opposed to immoral) and what ought to be done (i.e., one’s duty). Each emphasis fits with a certain kind of ethical judgment that may be made. Judgments of value are judgments about what is good and bad, desirable or undesirable. Judgments of obligation focus on what is right and wrong and on what one must do or forgo.

Taken together, the theory of value and the theory of obligation comprise the whole field of ethics. Some theories of ethics focus more on value than on obligation, though each ethical theory usually addresses both issues at least implicitly.2 In this book, our focus will be more on matters of obligation than on matters of value. That is, our emphasis will be to answer what one is morally obligated to do or refrain from doing. Of course, as we address that question in regard to each topic, we shall frequently note the values that are upheld by fulfilling moral obligations. In fact, we shall often argue that a certain course of action is obligatory at least in part because it upholds a certain value (e.g., sanctity of life or justice).

Normative Ethics and Meta-Ethics

A second way to divide the field of ethics is to split it between normative ethics and meta-ethics. Normative ethics deals with which actions are morally right and obligatory. Normative theories about what is right and obligatory presuppose some notion about the meaning of concepts such as right and good. Determining their meaning, however, falls within the domain of meta-ethics. Meta-ethics itself can be subdivided as follows: (1) discussions about the meaning of ethical terms and concepts such as right, ought, and good; and (2) considerations of how ethical judgments (whether of value or of obligation) can be justified or established.

In this chapter we discuss both meta-ethical and normative concerns. In the book as a whole, we handle primarily normative questions as we delineate actions that are morally right and wrong in regard to the various topics discussed.

Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Language

Descriptive language tells what is the case and what is done. Prescriptive language commands what ought to be done; it sets forth moral obligation. Prescriptive language includes terms such as “must,” “should,” and “ought.” Prescriptions are often stated in the imperative mood (e.g., “thou shalt not steal”). Descriptive language includes terms such as “is,” “had,” and “happened.” When descriptive language is used, the intent is not normally to make moral judgments or commands.

The two kinds of language can be illustrated as follows: (1) John and Mary engaged in premarital sex; (2) John and Mary should not engage in premarital sex. Sentence (1) reports what John and Mary did. It makes no moral judgments about right or wrong, nor does it encourage or discourage any kind of action. On the other hand, sentence (2) states a moral duty (it prescribes a course of action), but it also implies an evaluation of a particular action. That is, whoever utters the sentence as a command presumably does so (at least in part) because he makes the judgment that premarital sex is not good (morally and/or otherwise).

We raise this distinction because sometimes it is assumed that an act is morally right and even obligatory just because it is being done. On the contrary, merely describing what is done does not in itself set forth moral obligation. In fact, ethicists debate whether it is possible to move from statements of fact to statements of value and vice versa. That is, can one derive statements of ought from statements of is?3 A detailed examination of that issue is beyond the scope of this work. However, we raise these issues to remind readers to take seriously the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive language in ethics.

Moral Responsibility and Freedom of Action

Moral philosophers commonly agree that in assessing moral praise or blame for an action, one must consider whether the agent acted freely or not. The principle involved is: no one is morally guilty for failing to do what he could not do or for doing what he could not fail to do. That is, moral responsibility presupposes freedom of action. Moral “oughts” imply that the agent can do his duty. Thus, if someone points a gun at me and says he will shoot me if I do not rob a bank, I am likely to rob the bank. It is my duty not to steal, but presumably there is also a prima facie duty to preserve my life. In this case, I apparently cannot obey both duties. I disobey the duty not to steal, but I do so under constraint, not freely. In neither law nor morality am I held responsible as I would be if I had robbed the bank without compulsion.4

Morally Permissible, Morally Obligatory, Morally Supererogatory

These three concepts are very important in determining what may or may not or should or should not be done in particular situations. These notions are especially helpful when actions are not covered by explicit (or even implicit) moral absolutes. Many of the practical issues covered in this book involve such actions.

To say that an action is morally permissible means one may do it or refrain from it without incurring any moral guilt because the action breaks no rule. Obviously, mandated acts are also permitted, and refraining is also allowed if the act is forbidden. However, the notion of morally permissible acts primarily refers to deeds neither mandated nor forbidden.

To say an action is morally obligatory means there is a moral command that mandates it or forbids it. The morally obligatory must be done (or avoided), and failure to fulfill moral obligation brings moral censure. While there is debate about which acts are morally required, it is agreed that moral duties may not be ignored without incurring moral rebuke.

Morally supererogatory deeds are not duties but are praiseworthy, because they produce good that goes beyond what duty demands. The concept may be illustrated as follows: it is a prima facie duty to preserve life, and that duty includes preserving one’s own life. If I can save someone else’s endangered life without jeopardizing my life, moral philosophers would usually say it is my duty to do so. On the other hand, if saving another’s life endangers my life or would cause me to lose my life, I am not morally obligated to try to save the other person’s life. If my life is endangered, but I try to rescue another person anyway, my attempt goes above and beyond the call of duty. My act is morally permissible but not morally obligatory. It is also a work of supererogation, an act beyond the call of duty. Suppose, then, that I do not know how to swim, but I see a child drowning in a river. If I try to save her, under those circumstances my act is not my duty but it is an act of supererogation. Even if I fail to rescue her, my attempt still goes beyond the call of duty (a supererogatory work). If I lose my life in the process (regardless of whether I save the drowning child), my sacrifice is supererogatory. What makes an act supererogatory is not whether the person doing it succeeds or fails to do what was intended. It is that the act goes above and beyond what duty demands.5

In recent years, there has been an interesting interchange in the literature over one’s duties to people at a distance (geographically). Am I morally obligated to help people in need who live far from me? That is, if I see a neighbor’s child apparently drowning in a pool, and I know how to swim, ethicists universally would say that I am obligated to help the child. On the other hand, there are people in Africa and Asia who are starving to death. I have resources that could be used to feed many of these people. Several questions arise: is it my duty to give money to feed them, or would my help be an act of supererogation? Regardless of the answer to that question, am I required to continue giving financial help to feed starving people even if doing so means I cannot feed my own family? While some might claim that it is my duty to do this, others, including ourselves, would say that giving financial aid to such people is morally permissible, but not morally obliged, as long as I use enough of those resources to meet the needs of my own family. Caring for my family’s needs is morally obligatory, and a case can be made that giving some help to feed the starving is, too. However, meeting my family’s needs and then using the rest of my resources to help feed the starving is an act of supererogation.

Those who think it is my duty to continue giving financial aid when I cannot meet my own financial needs often appeal to biblical teaching about sacrificing to help and serve others. In no way would we deny that biblical teaching encourages people to sacrifice. However, that doesn’t mean one is required to do every form of sacrifice and every sacrificial act possible. For example, suppose that I could free any prisoner who is scheduled to be executed by offering to take his place. It would be a great sacrifice for me to do so, but am I required to make this sacrifice? It is hard to imagine that either Christian or non-Christian ethicists would say I am obligated to do this. And, even if I were somehow obligated to intervene in this way, I could not be obligated to save more than one prisoner. One cannot be obligated to do what one is not free to do.

Similarly, while there is an obligation to give of our financial means so that starving people in our country and other parts of the world can be fed, the degree of financial sacrifice incumbent on one individual cannot require him or her to liquidate all of his or her financial holdings and give it to help feed the needy. The reason that such a sacrifice isn’t required is that to do it would insure that one couldn’t meet the financial obligations of oneself and one’s family. And, surely we are required to meet our financial obligations. So, if I give away all of my resources to feed the hungry, I won’t have enough to care for my family, but I am obligated to care for my family. Since I cannot meet both obligations, I can’t be required to make such a sacrifice. However, I can meet my family’s obligations and help some people who are starving, so I should. To do so may require that I have to forego a planned vacation or anticipated purchase. Such a sacrifice seems reasonable to expect. To give so much of my resources that I cannot meet my family’s needs might be judged by some as a work of supererogation. Others, however, would view it as a failure to meet my moral obligations to my family.

The net result is that while Scripture encourages us to sacrifice to help others in need, not every form of sacrifice is enjoined on everyone. This whole discussion should underscore the incredible generosity of Christ in sacrificing his life for everyone so that their sins might be forgiven. That was a total act of supererogation; dying for our sins was in no way Christ’s duty or obligation!6

In this book our concern is to discover moral obligation in regard to each topic discussed. In some cases it will be difficult to specify a moral absolute that covers the issue. In those instances our goal will be to present as carefully and clearly as possible the kinds of acts that are morally permissible. In discovering the morally obligatory and permissible, acts that are morally supererogatory become evident.

What Makes an Agent Moral in Doing an Act?

How does one know if he is being moral or immoral in his actions? Without an answer to this question, sinners may think they are saints, and saints may be tormented by doubts about their moral rectitude. The first step in addressing this issue is to distinguish it from the question of what makes an act moral or immoral (an issue for a later section). Even if one knows a particular act is morally good, it is still proper to ask if the one doing the act has acted morally.

Two answers, though often heard, are wrong. First, some answer that an agent is moral if he does an act that is morally good or refrains from doing a morally evil act. This answer does not emphasize motivations or intentions for doing an act, but merely notes that the agent did what the law demanded. If this sounds familiar, it should, for the Lord frequently rebuked the Pharisees for adopting this approach. They were very careful to conform their actions externally to the law, but Jesus was clear that mere external conformity to the law did not gain eternal reward, nor was it morally acceptable. Likewise, in the OT the Lord frequently stressed that he was not interested in mere outward conformity to the law; he wanted a proper heart attitude (cf. Hos 6:6). Scripture is not alone in rejecting mere external conformity to the law as the prerequisite for acting morally. Traditionally, philosophers and theologians have agreed that something else is required.

A second problematic answer is that one acts morally if good comes from what he does (consequences are the key). This may sound like utilitarianism, but it is not. For some utilitarians it is one’s duty to act so as to maximize the greatest good for the greatest number. So for them the results of an act determine whether the act is morally good or bad. However, even they would admit that what makes the agent moral in acting is not that good was maximized by his action, but that he intended to do his duty (in this case, the duty was to maximize good). Hence, for utilitarians and non-utilitarians alike, consequences are not what make the agent moral in his action.

Is it true that consequences are not the key for determining the morality of the agent? We think so. Our reasoning is best illustrated as follows. Suppose someone sees a child drowning in a swimming pool and tries to rescue him just because he needs help and because it is right to help. Suppose as well the attempt fails, and the child drowns. On this theory of what it means to be moral, the would-be rescuer did not act morally, because the child died. Surely that conclusion is unacceptable. Likewise, suppose someone robs a bank, and isn’t apprehended. Because of the attempted robbery, the bank installs a better security system. As a result, everyone who comes to the bank will be safer, and money deposited in the bank will be better protected. On this theory of what it means to be moral when acting, the thief did a harmful act, but he cannot be considered immoral, since good ultimately came from this incident. Examples like these should convince readers that what makes agents moral when they act is not the results of their action.

What, then, does make an agent moral in doing an act? We believe a combination of three factors is involved in assessing moral praise or blame. First, the agent must have acted freely, as already argued. If someone conforms to the moral law under compulsion, he is not considered moral. Likewise, if he disobeys the moral law, but is forced to do so, he should not be assessed moral blame. Moral responsibility involves freedom of action, so whether someone acts morally or immorally can be determined only when he acts freely.

Second, moral praise or blame depends heavily on the agent’s motives for doing what he did. There are many possible motivations for action, but we follow Immanuel Kant’s understanding of this matter. According to Kant, one may act from a desire to do one’s duty, or one may act to further one’s own interests. Acting from a sense of duty (i.e., solely because the act is right to do and is one’s obligation) is acting morally. Acting from self-interest is acting prudentially (wisely), but not morally. Consider the store owner who charges everyone the same price and does not overcharge an inexperienced customer. He may refrain from overcharging because it is right to do, but he might do so because it is to his own advantage in the long run to be fair in his dealings. If he is not fair, word will get around that he takes advantage of unwitting customers, and business will suffer.7 According to Kant, the merchant who charges fair prices out of a sense of duty acts morally. The one who has fair prices to achieve some further personal benefit acts prudentially (wisely), but not morally.8

Motivation, then, is crucial in determining whether someone acts morally, but finally, for an agent to act morally, he must do an act that is morally right to do. It is not enough to act from a sense of duty if one misjudges what his duty is. Even if an agent freely acts solely motivated by duty, he doesn’t act morally if he does an immoral act. Depending on one’s normative ethical theory, some acts will be prescribed as right and others forbidden as wrong. The list of right and wrong acts, obligatory and forbidden acts, may vary from theory to theory. Whatever deeds one’s theory stipulates as right and wrong, the agent can act morally only if he does an act that is right to do.

In sum, an agent acts morally if he acts freely, does an act that is right to do, and does it with the sole motivation of doing his duty.

SURVEY OF ETHICAL SYSTEMS

Though ethical theories generally agree about the matters already discussed, nothing said so far presents any actual system. In this section we survey the basic kinds of theories available. Ethicists often like to group individual theories into broad categories. This can help understanding, but it can also be very frustrating. Frustration arises because authors categorize theories differently. Confusion begins to lift, however, once one recognizes that each category scheme is structured to respond to some critical question in ethics.

To illustrate this point, Edward Long (A Survey of Christian Ethics), William Frankena (Ethics), and Norman Geisler (Ethics: Alternatives and Issues)9 each discuss and classify a variety of theories. Each scheme differs, and that can be confusing. However, each scheme responds to a specific ethical question. Long’s category scheme emphasizes answers to the question “What is the source of ethical norms?” Frankena’s organization addresses more the issue of what makes good actions good and evil actions evil. Geisler’s schema centers on how many ethical norms there are and how they relate. All three questions are very important, but they are not identical.10

Our desire is to discuss theories from the perspectives of the three questions mentioned. However, we must first note several other distinctions that form the bases for classifying ethical theories. The distinctions are between naturalistic and non-naturalistic theories and between cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories. Both distinctions relate to questions about meaning and justification of ethical terms and judgments.

Naturalism and Non-naturalism

Naturalistic ethical theories claim that ethical terms can be defined in terms of non-ethical ones and that ethical claims can be translated into factual ones. Thus, naturalistic theories hold that ethical sentences assert some fact (e.g., empirical or metaphysical) and that the terms in them can be defined in non-ethical terms. For example, one theory may define “good” as “being conducive to harmonious happiness,” while another understands “good” as referring to whatever God commands.11 Thus, “murder is evil” may simply be a veiled assertion (for a divine command theory) that “God commands us not to commit murder” or (on a different definition of “good”) that “murder is not conducive to harmonious happiness.” The claim about happiness is open to verification or falsification through empirical means, whereas the assertion about God’s commands is open to justification through what might be called metaphysical reasoning. As to justifying ethical claims, according to naturalistic theories, one should be able to justify them the same way one justifies any other statement of fact (by empirical investigation or by a priori reasoning).

Non-naturalists think ethical terms such as “good” and “ought” are not definable in non-ethical terms. In fact, they hold that some of these terms are indefinable or simple and unanalyzable, just as yellowness or pleasantness are. G. E. Moore thought this about “good”; Henry Sidgwick thought it about “ought.”12 In addition, for non-naturalists, ethical and value judgments are true or false, but they are not justified as such by empirical observation or metaphysical reasoning. Typically, non-naturalists say that basic judgments are self-evident and can be known only by intuition. Non-naturalists, then, are often intuitionists.

Cognitivism and Non-cognitivism

The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in ethics concerns the meaning of ethical terms and judgments, but beyond that it emphasizes the difference between theories that claim moral judgments are matters of knowledge and those that say they are not. Cognitivists think ethical judgments state facts that may be verified or falsified. Hence, ethical judgments are items of knowledge. Since cognitivists believe this about purported facts that are natural or non-natural, both ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism are cognitivist theories.

For non-cognitivists, ethical statements do not assert any kind of fact. They are meaningful, but not as raising items of knowledge. According to non-cognitivists, ethical judgments may be used in one of several ways. Emotivists hold that moral utterances merely vent an emotion or express an attitude. Thus, to say murder is wrong is to express a negative attitude toward it (“I don’t like murder”), but in so doing one is not asserting anything about whether murder really is or is not good or bad. Prescriptivists think ethical judgments do more than express emotions, but they do not regard them as statements of fact. Instead, they interpret them as expressing a command. Thus, “murder is wrong” means something like “you must not commit murder.” Of course, this says nothing about justifying this prescription as proper. Prescriptivism doesn’t even suggest whether commands are justifiable. It simply holds that moral utterances should be understood as merely giving a command.13 Finally, for non-cognitivists ethical claims may be used conatively. To do so “makes the primary use of a moral assertion that of expressing the intention of the utterer to act in a particular sort of way specified in the assertion.”14

Source of Ethical Norms

As already noted, ethical category schemes normally address some question in ethics. An initial schema focuses on the source of ethical norms. Both Christian and secular ethics address this issue in one of three ways: (1) reason, (2) prescription, and (3) relationship.

REASON-BASED SYSTEMS

Here the basic idea is that ethical norms are generated from and discernible by reason. For some theories, reason is also thought to justify the theory. Some Christian systems in this category also hold that revelation plays a role, but even if revelation provides some norms, reason alone could have generated those norms. In secular ethics one of the most famous reason-based systems is that of Immanuel Kant. Kant derived his categorical imperative (“act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”)15 from reason alone. Though it is a prescription, it is not a demand that someone makes just because he has power to command others to obey. Rather, by reason Kant thought all should conclude it necessary to act in accord with this imperative.16

Undoubtedly, the most significant Christian reason-based system is natural law ethics. Thomas Aquinas is the prime example of a Christian thinker who held this system. Stemming from him, natural law ethics has been especially associated with the Roman Catholic tradition. Though there are different forms of the theory, certain items typify natural law ethics generally. According to natural law theories, the end (the goal toward which it strives) of each thing in the natural order is built into the thing itself. Thus, by observing an object in nature, one can discern easily its intended purpose in the natural order. This end immediately indicates how the thing should act.

In addition, built into the structure of things is a set of laws governing conduct. Those laws will be closely related to each object’s intended end or goal. Natural law theories also hold that such laws of conduct are universally known by reason apart from special revelation. Moreover, since human nature and the natural order do not change, whatever ethical norms are derivable from nature do not change from time to time or place to place.

Finally, natural law theories typically claim that what reason discovers by reflecting on the natural order is consistent with what man intuitively knows through his conscience.17 As one writer claims, essential to the notion of natural moral law are the “features of universality, unwrittenness and intuitively perceived or rationally discoverable moral knowledge of the divine will apart from special historical Biblical revelation.”18 Proponents of natural law ethics use various Scriptures to support their views, but the central passages are Rom 1:18–32 and 2:14–16. Natural law ethicists think biblical revelation of moral norms is important, but they hold that even without that revelation everyone can know by reason alone the basic principles of right and wrong. Consequently, one need not be a Christian or even a theist to know the moral law.19

PRESCRIPTION-BASED SYSTEMS

For these theories, ethical norms originate from an authority figure who mandates them. This does not mean theories based on reason have no prescriptions, nor that theories based on prescription are irrational. The point is that commands in reason-based systems are determined by reason alone, whereas prescriptions in prescriptive theories come from an authority figure. That person may or may not choose rules on the basis of what seems rational, but that is not the key for prescriptive theories. The key is that someone or some group decides what is to be law and sets that forth.

Prescriptive theories often appeal to God as the prescriber, but not all theories do. For example, Brandt and Firth’s ideal observer theory holds that calling an act right just means that any ideal observer would approve the act (and most likely prescribe it as well). But what defines an ideal observer? Brandt and Firth fill in the background conditions that make an observer an ideal one. Firth emphasizes procedures normally considered rational for decision making. For example, one usually assumes that someone informed about the facts of a particular moral issue (for example, abortion) is better prepared to make a moral decision than someone not so informed. Hence, someone who qualifies as an ideal observer should be fully informed about all relevant facts for moral decision making. Likewise, in moral decision making, qualities such as impartiality are important; an ideal observer should have those qualities, too. By using this procedure, one can specify what would make an observer ideal. Then, one merely asks what moral norms that person would likely prescribe if he had the right to choose ethical rules. Those rules become prescriptive for all.20

Undoubtedly, the most influential prescriptive theories claim God as prescriber. Such theories are often labeled divine command theories, and there are varieties of them. The key, of course, is that God’s will determines the norms. The basis of his choice, however, is understood differently depending on the theory. Divine command theories can be roughly divided on this matter in terms of the question raised pointedly in Plato’s Euthyphro. That dialogue discusses whether an act is right because God wills it, or whether God wills it because he knows it is right. Divine command theories vary in their answer to Plato’s question, but during the Middle Ages divine command theorists typically chose the former option. A prime example of such a theory from medieval times is William of Ockham’s. According to Ockham, whatever God wills must be done simply because he says so.21 If God had wanted, he could have ordered men to obey the opposite of the Ten Commandments. Even now he can rescind those laws and will their opposite.22

In contemporary ethics there are proponents of the divine command theory. Some give the impression that God chooses his commands completely arbitrarily; others hold that God’s choices are not purely arbitrary, though they do not always explain God’s rationale for his choices.

In addition, some ethicists hold a modified divine command theory of some sort. Robert M. Adams is a well-known proponent of such a view. He follows divine command theories in that he claims that ethical prescriptions say something about God’s will and commands. On the other hand, Adams says every statement of ethical right and wrong presupposes that “certain conditions for the applicability of the believer’s concepts of ethical right and wrong are satisfied.”23 Among those conditions is that God is love. Thus, Adams’s theory amounts to the following: “x is ethically wrong” means “x is contrary to the commands of a loving God.”24 For Adams this implies that while it is logically possible for God to command cruelty for its own sake, it is unthinkable that he would do so.25

RELATION-BASED SYSTEMS

Here the key idea is that actions are shaped either (1) by the sense of excitement or gratitude one feels as a result of a relationship with some person or group, or (2) by how some crucial principle relates to each new situation. In relation-based systems the emphasis may be responding to a person and/or because of one’s relation to that person (e.g., God or Christ), or the focus may be responding to a situation (e.g., what is the loving thing to do in this situation?), or both (e.g., what would Jesus do in this situation?). This broad category of systems includes such diverse approaches as those set forth in Thomas à Kempis’s The Imitation of Christ, Karl Barth’s notion that one must simply obey whatever God commands when God encounters him, and Joseph Fletcher’s situation ethics, which instructs us to calculate the most loving thing to do in any situation and to consider it one’s duty. Each of these systems has a constant rule (do what Christ would do—à Kempis; do what God tells you to do—Barth; do whatever you calculate as the most loving thing to do—Fletcher). Nonetheless, the specific action following from this rule varies from situation to situation.

Criteria for Good and Bad Actions

A second category scheme for ethics addresses what makes good acts good and bad acts bad. Traditionally, there have been two main answers to this question and respectively two broad categories of theories. Those categories are teleological (consequentialist) theories and deontological (non-consequentialist) theories. In more recent years, various ethicists have argued for theories that mix deontological and teleological concerns.

TELEOLOGICAL THEORIES

According to these theories, what is morally good or bad, right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden is determined by the non-moral value produced when the act is done. If the deed generates more non-moral good than evil, the act is considered morally good. Consequences (results), then, determine which acts are good and which evil. For a teleologist, what is good in the non-moral sense may vary. Many teleologists have been hedonists, identifying good with pleasure and evil with pain. Others have identified good with power, knowledge, self-realization, or other non-moral goods. Despite this variation, whatever non-moral good is the key for a given theory, those acts are morally good that produce the greatest amount of that non-moral good, and those actions are morally evil that remove or reduce such non-moral good. Teleological theories are generally of two sorts. The first kind focuses on producing the greatest good for oneself (ethical egoism). The second type emphasizes producing the greatest good for the greatest number (ethical universalism).

The most commonly held teleological theories are utilitarian. Utilitarian theories are of two kinds: (1) act utilitarian theories and (2) rule utilitarian theories. For act utilitarianism, an act is morally right and obligatory if it would produce the most utility (the best consequences) under prevailing conditions. Since this means one must calculate the effects of his action in each situation, no general rules such as “telling the truth produces the greatest general good” should be stated. Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, claims that an act is right if it would be more beneficial to have a code of moral rules permitting that act than one which excluded it. Thus, rule utilitarianism looks for the rules that as a whole produce the greatest utility, and it prescribes them. With a rule utilitarian theory, like situations are handled in like ways, whereas with act utilitarianism, like situations are not necessarily treated in the same way.26

DEONTOLOGICAL THEORIES

Deontologists27 deny that the moral goodness of an act is determined by the non-moral consequences it produces. Other considerations make an act morally right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden. For example, an act is considered right because it keeps a promise, it is just, or God commands it. The key for deontological theories is that an act is right because it is one’s duty to do it, and it is one’s duty for some reason other than the consequences stemming from the act. Deontologists do not ignore consequences altogether. They only claim that consequences are not the basis for deciding the moral rightness or wrongness of an action. Examples of deontological theories include prescriptivist theories like divine command theories and reason-based systems like Kant’s.

MIXED THEORIES