Ethnic Entrepreneurs Unmasked E-Book

Petar Cholakov

• Herausgeber: ibidem
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 348

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Beschreibung

Based on an institutional approach to ethnic conflict, Petar Cholakov highlights the idiosyncrasies of, and the challenges to, inter-ethnic relations in Bulgaria. He traces the emergence of the currently implemented Bulgarian ethnic model in its interconnection with the party system, and especially examines the ideology, political support, and mobilization tools employed by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party as well as the populist radical right. Cholakov presents findings from case studies on Bulgaria’s Roma, crime, and politics. He analyzes Bulgarian integration policies and assesses the role of Bulgaria’s judiciary as well as contemporary antidiscrimination legislation, in particular, of the 2004 Protection against Discrimination Act. The monograph peruses decisions of, among others, the European Court of Human Rights and uncovers patterns of discrimination against Roma. By reverse engineering the Bulgarian ethnic model, Cholakov reveals how the institutions operate and comes to the conclusion that inter-ethnic peace has been entrusted to a defective mechanism which institutionalizes ethnic cleavage and politicizes identity. On the basis of his in-depth analysis, the author makes a prognosis for the future of ethnic relations in Bulgaria and provides recommendations for reforms.

Leseprobe

ibidem Press, Stuttgart

Inhaltsverzeichnis

List of Figures and Tables

Abbreviations

Introduction

1. An Institutional Approach to Ethnic Conflicts

1.1 The debate—institutionalists and their opponents

1.2 A historical “autopsy”—explaining the demise of SFRY

1.3 The Bulgarian ethnic models

1.4 Contemporary challenges to ethnic relations

1.5 Strength of state institutions and ethnic conflicts

2. The Role of Political Parties

2.1 The contemporary party systems in Bulgaria

2.1.1 Bipolarity (1990–2001)

2.1.2 Polycentrism, populism, and nativism (2001 until present)

2.2 MRF—electoral support and ideology

2.3 The Bulgarian PRR

2.3.1 Representatives

2.3.2 Origins, ideology, development

2.3.3 The PRR and the Bulgarian ethnic model

2.3.4 A glimpse into the future of the PRR

2.4 Roma, crime and politics

3. Channeling Ethnic Conflicts

3.1 The integration policies of Bulgarian governments after 1989

3.2 The legislation and the judicial system

3.2.1 General framework for analysis

3.2.2 The PADA

3.2.2.1 Purpose and concept

3.2.2.2 Scope

3.2.2.3 Genuine and determining occupational requirements

3.2.2.4 Positive action

3.2.2.5 Minimum requirements and protection of rights

3.2.2.6 Burden of proof and victimization

3.2.2.7 Dissemination of information and social dialogue

3.2.2.8 Equality body

3.2.2.9 Compliance and sanctions

3.3 Discrimination against Roma ethnic group: case studies

3.3.1 Segregation

3.3.2 Use of excessive force by the police and lack of effective investigation

3.3.3 Hate crimes

Conclusion: A Story about Garbage Trucks

References

Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society

Copyright

To my daughter Elena

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

1. Discrimination against Roma here

2. The scope of state functions here

3. Strength of state institutions and scope of state functions here

4. Comparison between six states in 2013, based on WGI (Graph View) here

5. Votes for the MRF in the elections for BNA, 1991–2014 here

6. Fears of the MRF voters here

7. Votes for the main PRR parties here

8. Votes for Ataka, NFSB, and MRF in the parliamentary elections (2005, 2009, 2013, 2014) here

9. Social distances (2016) here

10. Social distances (2008 and 2016) here

11. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—thefts here

12. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—robberies here

13. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—premeditated murders here

14. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—batteries here

15. Criminal activities among the main ethnic groups—rapes here

16. Social distances. “Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?” here

Tables

1. Main ethnic groups in Bulgaria since 1878 here

2. Main sources of income for Roma households here

3. Comparison between six states in 2013, based on WGI here

4. Control of corruption in six states in 1996, 2003, 2008, 2013 here

5. Ethnic profile of the political parties in the Bulgarian National Assembly in 2009 here

6. Crimes and Roma suspects here

7. Number of complaints lodged with the Commission for Protection Against Discrimination per year here

8. Use of force by the Bulgarian police by years here

 

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of political parties and organizations

Abbreviation in English

Full name of the organization in English

Abbreviation in Bulgarian

Full name of the organization in Bulgarian

ABR

Alternative for Bulgarian Revival

АБВ

Алтернатива за българско възраждане

ASP

Alternative Socialist Party

АСП

Алтернативна социалистическа партия

BAPU

Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union

БЗНС

Български земеделски народен съюз

BAPU“Nikola Petkov”

Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union “Nikola Petkov”

БЗНС “Никола Петков”

Български земеделски народен съюз “Никола Петков”

BAPU “United”

Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union “United”

БЗНС “Обединен”

Български земеделски народен съюз “Обединен”

BDF

Bulgarian Democratic Forum

БДФ

Български демократичен форум

BEL

Bulgarian European Left

БЕЛ

Българска евролевица

BNRP

Bulgarian National Radical Party

БНРП

Българска национално-радикална партия

BNU

Bulgarian National Union

БНС

Български народен съюз

BSDP

Bulgarian Social Democratic Party

БСДП

Българска социалдемократическа партия

BSP

Bulgarian Socialist Party

БСП

Българска социалистическа партия

DLP

Democratic Labor Party

ДПП

Демократична партия на труда

DOST

Democrats for Responsibility Solidarity and Tolerance

ДОСТ

Демократи за отговорност свобода и толерантност

DROM

Movement for an Equal Public Model

ДРОМ

Движение за равноправен обществен модел

FF

Fatherland Front

ОФ

Отечествен фронт

IMRO–BNM

IMRO–Bulgarian National Movement

ВМРО–БНД

ВМРО–Българско Национално Движение

MBC

Movement “Bulgaria of the Citizens”

ДБГ

Движение “България на гражданите”

MRF

Movement for Rights and Freedoms

ДПС

Движение за права и свободи

NCPPI

National Committee for Protection of Peoples’ Interests

ОКЗНИ

Общонароден комитет за защита на националните интереси

NFSB

National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria

НФСБ

Национален фронт за спасение на България

NMSP

National Movement for Stability and Progress

НДСВ

Национално движение за стабилност и възход

ODS

United Democratic Forces

ОДС

Обединени демократични сили

OLJ

Order, Legality, and Justice

РЗС

Ред, законност и справедливост

PPFD

Peoples’ Party “Freedom and Dignity”

НПСД

Народна партия “свобода и достойнство”

PROUD

People for

Real, Open and

United Democracy

ГОРД

Гражданско обединение за реална демокрация

PU

People’s Union

НС

Народен Съюз

TNLMB

Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria

ТНОДБ

Турско национално-освободително движение в България

UBNL

Union of Bulgarian National Legions

СБНЛ

Съюз на българските национални легиони

UDF

United Democratic Forces

СДС

Съюз на демократичните сили

UDFCenter

Union of the Democratic Forces “Center”

СДС “Център”

Съюз на демократичните сили “Център”

UFD

Union of Free Democrats

ССД

Съюз на свободните демократи

UNPP

United National Progressive Party

ОНПП

Обединена национално прогресивна партия

UNS

Union forNational Salvation

ОНС

Обединение за национално спасение

UYNL

Union of Youth National Legions

СМНЛ

Съюз на младежките национални легиони

Other important abbreviations

Abbreviation in English

Full name in English

Abbreviation in Bulgarian

Full name in Bulgarian

BHC

Bulgarian Helsinki Committee

БХК

Български хелзинкски комитет

BNA

Bulgarian National Assembly

НС

Народно събрание на Република България

CEC

Central Electoral Commission

ЦИК

Централна избирателна комисия

CPAD

Commission for Protection against Discrimination

КЗД

Комисия за защита от дискриминация

ECHR

European Convention on Human Rights

ECHR

Европейска конвенция по правата на човека

ECtHR

European Court of Human Rights

ЕСПЧ

Европейски съд по правата на човека

FYROM

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

–

–

GSI

Global Slavery Index

–

–

NAP-DRI

National Action Plan for the pan-European Initiative “Decade of Roma Inclusion”

НПД-ДРВ

Национален план за действие по инициативата “Десетилетие на ромското включване”

NCCEDI

National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and Demographic Issues

НССЕДВ

Национален съвет за сътрудничество по етническите и демографските въпроси

NCCEII

National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and Integration Issues

НССЕИВ

Национален съвет за сътрудничество по етническите и интеграционните въпроси

NCEDI

National Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues

НСЕДВ

Национален съвет по етническите и демографските въпроси

PADA

Protection against Discrimination Act

ЗЗД

Закон за защита от дискриминация

PRR

Populist Radical Right

–

–

SAC

Supreme Administrative Court

ВАС

Върховен административен съд

SANS

State Agency National Security

ДАНС

Държавна агенция национална сигурност

SFRY

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

–

–

WGI

Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank)

–

–

 

Introduction

The relative ethnic peace which Bulgaria has enjoyed in the recent decades is among the few remaining bastions of national self-confidence. Amid bitter antagonism, bloodshed, and financial crises, which devastated many countries after the collapse of the Communist bloc, the sanctity of interethnic accord has, in general, been revered in Bulgaria. Its preservation is possible because the political system, despite its multiple drawbacks, is still able to tame the flashing sparks. Not only the limited comprehensive research on the topic but also the current affairs testify to the relevance of this book, dedicated to the role of political institutions in ethnic conflicts in Bulgaria after 1989. As I am writing these lines, Lyutvi Mestan, the leader of the newly formed ethnic party Democrats for Responsibility Solidarity and Tolerance (DOST),1 states that the amendment of the Election Code,2 which the majority in the Bulgarian National Assembly (BNA) approved on April 28, 2016, “is a continuation of the Revival Process.”3 The events in Katunitsa, Orlandovtsi, Garmen, and Radnevo indicate that the clashes and physical violence between Bulgarians and Romani, who remain subjected to social exclusion and marginalization, are on the raise. In addition, there are numerous other less visible and often ignored outbursts of hostility on ethnic grounds which happen on a daily basis. The issues discussed in the pages that follow are even more pertinent when we consider the international context. The principles and values on which the European Union (EU) is built are challenged by the constant migrant flow from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other failing states. At the same time, the increasingly menacing shadow of terrorism revealed its poisonous tentacles in the attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Burgas (2012), Paris (2015), Brussels, Istanbul, Nice, Würzburg, Ansbach, Munich, and Berlin (2016).

The subject of this study is the way the political institutions manipulate the ethnic conflicts during the past 27 years. Political institutions are relatively durable and sustainable social groupings or structures operating under statutory or common rules and regulatory systems that are responsible for the political process (March and Olsen 2008: 3).4 In a narrow sense, to them pertain the institutions forming the backbone of the state which are at the core of the political process and are empowered, whenever appropriate, to apply coercion—the parliament, the government, the judiciary bodies, the public administration, etc. In a broad sense to them must be added the political institutions-intermediaries5 as well as the institutions that postulate the norms of social behavior such as the constitution and electoral law. In order to achieve optimal heuristic value the analysis will be limited to the political parties, the parliament, the government, the judiciary, and the relevant legislative framework. I will not dwell on the role of the presidential institution or the media. The impact of the tidal wave of migrants from failed states and the threats to national security posed by terrorism are also not going to be examined. Furthermore, I have purposefully not included a full-blown geopolitical analysis. This does not mean that, for example, the neo-Ottoman doctrine of the Turkish President Recep Erdogan and the hybrid propaganda, employed by the Kremlin and the traditionalist values defended by the Russian diplomacy, in the concept of “Conservative Revolution” which seeks natural allies in the populist radical right (PRR) and left parties in the EU,6 are not relevant to this study (Koritarov 2016, Minchev 2016, Vasilev 2016). However, in order to make my task more realistic and manageable, I decided not to incorporate at length these issues in the project.7

I have also resisted the temptation to draw parallels between the Bulgarian case and the ethnic issues on the Balkan Peninsula as a whole or, even still, between the ethnic conflicts in this country and those in polities across Europe. At first glance, the reasons for such comparisons are compelling. For example, not unlike the ethnic formations in Bulgaria, the ethnic parties in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)8 play a significant role in its political system.9 To go even further, at present, journalists persistently bring forward the question of the rights of the “Bulgarian minority” in Albania; others, who discuss the dramatic events surrounding the Catalan independence referendum which took place on October 1, 2017, juxtapose the Revival Process in Bulgaria with the policies of “el Caudillo de la Última Cruzada y de la Hispanidad”10Francisco Franco (1892–1975) toward the Basques.11 Although I am familiar with the ethnic relations in other Balkan countries, as well as the ethnopolitical issues in EU in general, I have to admit that I am by no means a pundit in all of them. The real danger here is that, at the end, I could inadvertently open a can of worms. It could be detrimental to the project if I embark on the perilous journey of drawing such parallels throughout the book. For these reasons, the only in-depth comparison that I explore in detail is between the Bulgarian ethnic models and the former Yugoslav federation.12

I do not believe that conflicts are necessarily something “evil,” or that they should be avoided at all costs. As it was famously pointed out by Ralf Dahrendorf, they may be beneficial to society (Dahrendorf 1959, 2007). The latter could not survive without both consensus and conflict.13 In my view, however, conflicts become particularly dangerous and volatile whenever they stem from politicized ethnic identity14coupled with unsuccessful attempts at their institutionalization. My scientific curiosity has been provoked by such problematic cases and the consequences that they have for the Bulgarian political system and society. It is equally important to clarify (my take on) some other terms used in this study. Ethnic identity is the sense of belonging to a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland, and a sense of solidarity (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 4–6, Limenopoulou 2004: 2). A minority ethnic group is any ethnic group in a given society that forms an appreciable subsystem with limited access to roles and activities central to the economic and political institutions of the society (Shermerhorn 1996: 18). By “ethnic party,” I understand a political party, the majority of whose constituents belong to one or more ethnic minorities. An “ethnic entrepreneur” is a person (typically a politician) who voices and uses the interests, everyday challenges, and fears of a particular ethnic group (or groups) in order to mobilize political support for a certain cause.

The structure of the project corresponds to the facets of the subject. The first part necessarily begins with an adjustment of “the optics” through which the analysis will be performed. In a dynamic and interdisciplinary field, such as the study of ethnic conflicts, there is a lot of controversy regarding the notions and methods of investigation. There are, as well, disagreements on the use and content of the conceptual apparatus. The advantages of an institutional approach to conflicts, which I use in this work, are illustrated mainly through the means of the exploration of the tragic demise of the Yugoslav federation. The study of ethnic relations in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the mistakes of the political elites in particular, is an invaluable lesson stimulating the better understanding of our own country. Using this study as a starting point of the analysis of the Bulgarian case, I then pinpoint the specifics of contemporary challenges in front of ethnic relations in Bulgaria. The second part examines the role of political parties both outside and inside the parliament. I trace the developments of the ethnic model in its interconnection with the first and the second party systems. I highlight the particularities in ideology, political support, and mobilization of the main ethno-political formation—the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), as well as of the representatives of the PRR. Last but not least, I discuss various case studies on Roma, crime and politics. The third part of the book is devoted to the integration policies of Bulgarian governments after 1989, especially those that are targeted toward Roma. I assess the role of the judicial system and the antidiscrimination legislation.

There is a plethora of explanatory concepts about the nature and causes of ethnic conflicts. The “classic” schools of thought are the primordialist (Geertz 1973), the instrumentalist (A. Smith 1986), and the constructivist (Anderson 2006). Scholars of ethnic conflict and civil wars have introduced theories that draw insights from all of these schools. Significant approaches, some of which are influenced or related to the three fundamental paradigms, are the institutionalist (Lijphart 1968, 1977, McGarry and O’Leary 1993, Crawford and Lipschutz 1998, Hechter 2000, Osipov 2013),15 the environmental (or economic, which can be derived from, for example, Marxism), the ethnocultural (MG Smith 1969), and the theory of modernization (Horowitz 1985, Altermatt 1998).16 An “army” of scholars has examined ethnic relations in Bulgaria: political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, historians, ethnographers, economists, philosophers, and others. Nonetheless, there is a relative lack of comprehensive studies dedicated entirelyto the role of political institutions for deterrence and/or incitement of ethnic conflicts during the last 27 years. Instead, these issues are discussed in chapters or sections of monographs and compendiums (e.g., Kertikov et al. 1990, Makariev 1999, 2017, Hopken 2000, Dimitrov 2001, Dronzina 2004, Mizov 2008, Engström 2009,Karasimeonov 2010, Zlatanova 2013) and, above all articles that highlight specific aspects of the problem, for example, the link between political parties and ethnic conflicts (Smilov 2006, 2007, 2008, Kabakchieva 2008, Todorov 2012), the Bulgarian ethnic models (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002, 2003, Mitev 2005, Bosakov 2006, Pamporov 2008, Geiselmann and Karamelska 2010), the integration policies targeting minorities (Grekova 2008, Gulubov 2008, Ivanov 2008, Rechel 2008), etc. For example, although the important recent book by Plamen Makariev—The Public Legitimacy of Minority Claims—explores the Bulgarian case as well, its scope is much more ambitious and broader17 than the purpose of mine. Makariev’s work is a study of public policies concerning the national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it analyses these policies through the means of political philosophy, in particular through the prism of “the Habermasian version of the theory of public deliberation and the model of deliberative democracy” (Makariev 2017: 9).

Of importance for the better grasp of the questions that my work attempts to answer are studies of nationalism (Kabakchieva 2006), postcommunist politicization of the religious (Krasteva 2015), ethnic identity (Mizov 2003, Nedelcheva 2003, 2004, 2007, 2010, Bosakov 2004, Ahmed 2008, Nedelcheva and Topalova 2010) and ethnic relations (Mitev 1994, Zografova 1996, Genov 2004, 2005, Mantarova and Zaharieva 2007, Pamporov 2012), practices of controlled voting (Bezlov and Gounev 2012b, Stoychev 2016), economic dimensions of the Revival Process (Avramov 2017), public spheres in Bulgaria and Serbia (Dawson 2014), etc. An imposing amount of academic research illuminates the actions of political institutions in the conflicts that marked the breakup of former Yugoslavia and the constitutional crisis in Macedonia (Flere 1991, Vukovic 1997, Crawford and Lipschutz 1998, Hinkova 1998, Arsenova and Kertikov 2002, 2003, Todorov 2002, Dronzina 2004, Garabedian 2007, Detrez and Segaert 2008, Banchev 2009, Minchev 2009).

The precise meaning and place of the “Bulgarian ethnic model” in the political system has been a constant object of heated debates and discussions not only in the scientific community but also in the public sphere. In my opinion, although undoubtedly charged ideologically, the term is not void of content or a shallow description of a myth. In fact, several such models operated since the Liberation in 1878 (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002). Their apex has been in 1940s, when the decisive intervention of the institutions (the monarch, the parliament, and the Bulgarian Patriarchate) led to the Rescue of Bulgarian Jews from deportation (Bar Zohar 1998, Todorov 2001, Arsenova and Kertikov 2002). In my view, generally speaking, the model aims to guarantee the rights and freedoms of all ethnic and confessional communities. It has two elements, a dynamic one, as well as another which is much more stable. Its main building blocks are a legislative framework, which obviously changed through the years, and the specifics of Bulgarian political culture. I believe that the model not only reflects the idiosyncrasies of the latter but also influences it. The essence of the Bulgarian ethnic model(s) is not merely a combination of policy measures or a modus operandi of particular institutions. In fact it could be independent of or even “act” against the normative framework which the state imposes on society. This approach is confirmed by the fact that even during the Revival Process (1984–89),18 Bulgarian Turks and Roma, “manifesting wisdom and understanding,”19 accepted that this policy was not instigated or supported by the ethnic majority. Thus the amicable, neighborly relations between ethnic Bulgarians and minorities were, as a whole, preserved in spite of the discriminative and violent actions that the state undertook (Kertikov et al. 1990). The ambivalence of the term “ethnic model,” a phenomenon of the political culture and an institutional mechanism for the integration of ethnic communities, is expressed as well in the political rhetoric.20

When they discuss the political system, most scholars do not perceive or outline an immediate threat to the nonviolent relations between the ethnic groups. During the first decade after the beginning of transition to a democratic political system, in particular, there was a consensus among mainstream political parties, on the necessity of preserving the ethnic peace. This tacit agreement is enshrined in the Constitution of Bulgaria from July 13, 1991, as well as in the legislation as a whole. Using the examples of Bulgaria and Macedonia, Jenny Engström claims that democratization can prevent violent conflict in ethnically divided societies (Engström 2009, 2014). Engström’s analyses contain many indispensable insights into Bulgaria’s road to democracy. However she does not compare the current ethnic model with its “predecessors.” Engström paints an overly optimistic picture of the contemporary model that overlooks some of its important flaws, development, and deterioration.21

Many scientists and human rights activists hold that integration policies of Bulgarian government targeting minorities, especially those that relate to the Roma, failed to produce any significant outcomes (Grekova 2008, Rechel 2008). In addition to that, the inability of the state to combat crime has direct repercussions on ethnopolitics. The minorities, Roma and Turks in particular, are most vulnerable when it comes to the practices of control over voting (Stoychev 2016: 16, 25). Many political parties attempt to coerce and/or to manipulate constituencies to give them their unreserved support in the elections, but the ethnic formation MRF is a sui generis leader in these illegal practices (ibid.: 51, 54). Political parties work together with organized crime in order to place voters under control (ibid.: 24).

The analysis of the relationship between political institutions and ethnicity reveals that the state cannot be a source of ethnicity (Dronzina 2004: 136). In ethnically heterogeneous Balkan societies “ethnicity is a source of legitimacy of the state and a power resource”22 (ibid.). The relatively stable proportions between the variables related to ethnicity23 are conducive to the better accommodation of ethnic communities, even when the institutions are severely weakened and damaged, as was the case between 1992 and the spring of 1997 (Dronzina 2004: 134, 136). This conclusion, however, has been disputed by the PRR. In 2016, the presidential nominee of the United Patriots and leader of Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)—Krasimir Karakachanov—warned24 about the dangerous “Islamization of Bulgaria” and the potential for it to transform into a “Gipsy State” (Offnews.bg 2016). In response to such fears, skillfully ignited by politicians, scholars point to the fact that, for example, Bulgarian Turks have been loyal to Bulgarian state for decades (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002). The predominant majority of the ethnic Turks living in the country are Sunnis. Unlike Albanian Islamists in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania “most of them are not involved in large-scale criminal activities”; the MRF never had separatist ambitions nor it intended to make Bulgaria a “binational state”; Bulgarian Roma have relatively limited political claims—the problems and objectives that they voice are primarily economic (ibid.). For these reasons, the implementation of a “Kosovo scenario” on Bulgarian territory is highly unlikely (Arsenova and Kertikov 2002).

The beginning of the new millennium was marked by significant changes in Bulgaria’s party system that had repercussions on the ethnic relations (Smilov 2007, 2008). PRR parties such as Ataka, which entered the political scene in 2005, bluntly defied the unwritten rules of transition and started a fierce crusade against the “privileges” of minorities (Smilov 2008: 50). At present the party system is in the stage of cartel, a situation that can be observed in many European countries (ibid.: 39–40). Caught in an ideological vacuum, more parties may decide to mobilize the electorate through radicalization of their messages. An extreme radicalization can take the shape of an acute attack on “human rights and the rule of law, especially the protection of minorities” (Smilov 2008: 41). The contemporary Bulgarian nationalism, according to some scholars, is not aggressive (Nedelcheva 2007: 113). It does not rely on the condition that proponents must identify with the state—the individual vision for Bulgaria (i.e., what the country represents) is in fact mostly limited to family values, friends, and birthplace (ibid.). However a retreat in the family life, a barricading, or entrenchment in the home space pose the threat of re-ethnicizing of nationalism—such a trend is observed mostly among Bulgarians and Turks and, to a lesser extent, among Roma (Kabakchieva 2008: 94). From this perspective, under such circumstances, other ethnic groups may begin to look “foreign” and “dangerous,” and, ultimately, to become “enemies.” This process can lead to the resuscitation of “traumatic nationalism of survival,” which then will channel ethnic strife. Between 15% and 20% of Bulgarian citizens would support a patriotic party that bases its propaganda on constant reminders to the public of the glorious pages of Bulgarian history, the national ideals, and, possibly, a protectionist economic policy (ibid.: 94). Such a party would have to compete primarily with parties like GERB25 and Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), whose electorates share such values. It would neither endanger the niche of aggressive nationalism, occupied by parties like the Bulgarian National Union (BNU), nor threaten the existence of Ataka, since the latter is concerned mostly with a criticism of corrupt elites and the injustices brought by the transition to democracy rather than with purely nationalistic goals and values (Kabakchieva 2008: 94–5).

Several hypotheses lie at the heart of this work. The firstis thatthe contemporary Bulgarian ethnic model is not a fixed political construct, as it is often perceived, but underwent significant developments in the last 27 years. Thus far the political system is able to prevent the occurrence of serious ethnic conflicts. The integration measures undertook by the government notwithstanding, various studies bespeak that the social distances between the main ethnicities in Bulgaria are increasing (Pamporov 2008, 2016).26The second hypothesis reads that the political system reflects the interests of minority ethnic groups in a mostly superficial way that typically not only does not exceed but is below the minimal standards. Many of the Roma, for example, live in conditions that are often indistinguishable from modern forms of slavery. The political institutions are unwilling to commit to tangible, real integration measures due to the resistance toward distributive justice which the predominant part of Bulgarians display when the target or the beneficiaries of such measures are minorities.

The thirdhypothesispostulates that political populism thriving as a result of the impotence of the “old” ideologies and convergence of left and right can give birth to the greatest threat for ethnic peace. The low wages and pensions, especially compared to the EU average, strengthen even further the iron grip of populists and ethnic entrepreneurs. The radicalization of nationalist rhetoric and the policies influenced by it deepen the sclerosis of political system, clogging the channels of political participation—which is a ramification of, for example, the attempt to limit the social benefits for minorities. The result is that new, fervent outbreaks of interethnic tension emerge constantly.

This book has the following objectives: to verify the hypotheses and to promote a better understanding of the essence of the Bulgarian ethnic model, its mechanism, its building blocks, and its advantages and vulnerabilities. In order to achieve these objectives, I have used the following methods: legal and political analysis of laws and regulations, a secondary analysis of statistical information, party programs, slogans, political messages, etc. The project reveals the way the institutions function and interact in resolving or instigating ethnic conflicts. It provides an assessment of the performance of these institutions and helps to map the dynamics and outline the possible stages in the development of the Bulgarian ethnic model. On the basis of the findings I make recommendations and formulate future scenarios for the development of political institutions and ethnic relations.

1. An Institutional Approach to Ethnic Conflicts

1.1 The debate—institutionalists and their opponents

The contemporary violent conflicts have numerous idiosyncrasies, which distinguish them from their predecessors. Today they are more often based on cultural differences; most of the time, unlike their predominantly interstate character in the past, their fires are burning within the borders of political communities (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 5); they aremarked with ferocity, which leads to a drastic increase in the number of victims of the civilian population.27The interethnic conflicts occur more often in or between the states that once belonged to the Communist bloc (on the territories of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans)28in comparison to the Western liberal polities,29 but also in juxtaposition to other states with predominantly Muslim population, as well as to other less developed but well-consolidated democracies. Nowadays, more than ever, it is imperative to identify the causes of ethnic conflicts, which often predetermine the fate of entire nations. The institutional approach to these issues is part of the toolbox of a plethora of different theories. In this work, I refer to concepts coined and supported by leading institutionalists(e.g., Crawford and Lipschutz 1998). It would not be possible to represent and submit to a critical analysis the institutional approach to the study of conflicts in its entirety. The answers, which this approach provides, might be best understood in the context of the debate with rival interpretations.

According to the primordialists30(Geertz 1973, Van Den Berghe 1978, Vanhanen 1991, Grosby 1994), “the centuries of accumulated hatred” between ethnic groups are rooted within the very essence of humans (Grosby 1994: 168). Ethnocentrism and racism are forms of nepotism, which assumed monstrous proportions. They have a tendency to favor the blood relatives at the expense of the others, because altruism and cooperation are genetically programmed to be triggered by the biological code of the common origin.31 The moment the grip of government is weakened, people start to look for and find a mainstay in life in national identity or in what passes as such. Primordialism, however, fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the question why some ethnic groups manage to live together in a relative peace (e.g.,Bulgarians and Turks after 1989, French and Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, and Muslim Malays and Chinese Christians in Malaysia). The main disadvantage of primordialism is that it ignores the fact that differences in cultural identity do not necessarily lead to conflict. For this reason, at the center of the institutional approach lies the understanding that the conflict potential of the cultural, in particular, ethnic identity is unlocked only when it is politicized, that is when it becomes a criterion for discrimination and privileges in the struggle for the distribution of political and economic resources (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 11). Primordialists do not recognize the role of state institutions in the management of conflicts: in fact, the government can appease the latter (e.g., it can channel groups’ interests by means of legislative changes), legitimize, instigate, or even create and cultivate them.

The security dilemma approach (Butterfield 1951, Herz 1959, Jervis 1976) sometimes referred to also as “the spiral model,” developed by John Herz in his monograph Political Realism and Political Idealism (1951), offers an alternative explanation. Unlike primordialism, this approach accepts the importance of state institutions. When these institutions de facto cease to exist and anarchy prevails, security becomes a priority. Ironically, the measures that a group takes in this situation to ensure its safety (e.g., the development of new weapons and/or the modernization of the available arsenal and its expansion) provoke the fears of others. They now take similar actions, which are perceived as a threat by the first party. The result is, often, an arms race and a conflict escalation. In Herz’s own words, the security dilemma is a structural notion in which “the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening” (Herz 1950: 157). The security dilemma describes the mechanism of this vicious circle, which leads to a higher risk of using violence. The problem with this approach, according to institutionalists, is that, in the first place, it was developed originally for the needs of the theory of international relations and (tacitly and erroneously) puts on the same footing the interactions between countries with those between groups (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 12). In the second place, it accepts not unlike the primordialists that groups have a priori incompatible political interests and therefore the only question is under what conditions their clash will become of violent nature. Third, the security dilemma approach naively paints and supports a one-dimensional image of the role of institutions as a “good shepherd,” while their functions are much more complex. The institutions are guided by the “logic of the political game” (Levy et al. 1995) and, even if one of their tasks is to channel conflicts, they do not treat all conflicts equally. Institutions not only impose restrictions on the political actors, but can also provide incentives in order to influence political preferences. They could further prohibit discrimination and, instead, emphasize on competition between classes and ideologies or they could politicize ethnic identity. Fourth, Herz’s approach does not explain why interethnic strife and violence sometimes rage in political systems with strong and, in general, legitimate institutions neither it outlines the reasons for the failure or the demise of the latter.

The approach of liberal democracy and free market (Fukuyama 1992, Bhalla 1994, Whitehead 1995) affirms that they contribute to the aggregation and representation of all interests in society, by replacing conflicts based on ethnic identity with these, which stem from (economic) interests. The logic of this approach is that democratic polities and institutions are steered by individual rights rather than those of social collectivities. It is the individuals who are protected by the law and have the right of political participation. Wherever there are religious or ethnic conflicts, they can be successfully regulated and/or resolved, if the organizational principles of the political system recognize the necessity of tolerance and social cohesion. The theorists of consociational democracy32 (McGarry and O’Leary 1993, Lijphart 1968, 1977, 1994, 1999) and federalism (Stain 1968) support this view. Although this approach, which sees liberal democracy as a panacea for ethnic conflicts, is in its nature institutional, it is not unconditionally accepted even among the institutionalists.33 One well-known theory, which embraces this approach, is Francis Fukuyama’s concept of the “end of history” which was first formulated in an article for National Interest published in 1989.

Inspired by the “velvet revolutions” in Central and Eastern Europe, Fukuyama proclaims the triumph of liberal democracy. As an unlikely last stop in the “ideological evolution of mankind” and “last form of government,” it marks the “end of history” because it cultivates optimal conditions for the realization of human “desire for recognition,”34 scientific progress, and economic prosperity (Fukuyama 1992: xvii). It was, in a sense, “the VCRs [videocassette recorders] which actually won the Cold War” and led to the collapse of the communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain (Fukuyama 1992: xi, 98–108). One of the main arguments for the superiority of liberal democracy, according to the American political scientist, is that it forces the retreat of irrational forms of the desire for recognition such as nationalism; it soothes societies divided by ethnic cleavages and promotes consensus. The neoconservative project of Fukuyama was, however, met with considerable and, often, fierce criticisms. The “homogenizing,” “integrating,” and “pacifying” potential of the institutions of the liberal democracy is seen as particularly controversial. In response to Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington postulated the concept of the “clash of civilizations”35(Huntington 2011), while immediately after the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the American journalist Fareed Zakaria sarcastically declared “the end of the end of history.”

Following the Hegelian Alexandre Kojève,36 Fukuyama perceives the existence of the EU as compelling evidence that liberal democracies can overcome national, ethnic, or cultural differences, and build a working supranational political system. The Bulgarian case after 1989 seems to be particularly relevant for the viability of Fukuyama’s project. The country, which is an EU member, is often held up as an example of a stable multiethnic polity. The peaceful coexistence in close proximity in the center of the capital Sofia of four religious institutions (the Orthodox Church “St. Nedelya,” the Catholic cathedral “St. Joseph,” the mosque “Banya Bashi,” and the Sofia Synagogue) is even referred to as “a cliche of multiculturalism” (Detrez and Segaert 2008: 55). Notwithstanding, European leaders such as Chancellor Angela Merkel, Prime Minister David Cameron, and President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the fiasco of the policies and ideas of multiculturalism, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban defended the need to build an “illiberal state,” because liberalism is the god that failed (Traub 2015). Furthermore, the events in front of the same mosque “Banya Bashi” in 2011 unequivocally indicate that the interethnic tensions in Bulgaria are on the rise. I claim that the main thesis of Fukuyama cannot be supported because of its historicism and holistic zeal (in the sense of Karl Popper37). The institutions of liberal democracy in many cases are an effective means to control and overcome the tensions between ethnic groups. However, the economic inequalities caused by the policy of accelerated liberalization and the long-term effects of globalization can easily turn against the liberal political practices, undermining their foundations, while fanning and feeding the flames of ethnic conflict. This conclusion is supported by the analysis of the current Bulgarian ethnic model. In fact, Fukuyama himself, as we shall see, revised and reevaluated in his later writings the positions advocated in The End of History (Fukuyama 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2012, 2013).

Regardless of the many aspects of the institutional approach, we can outline several major points on which its proponents maintain relative consensus. They correspond to the questions raised in the debate with rival theories. First, as already mentioned, not the ethnic identity itself, but its politicization creates preconditions for conflict. Politicization traditionally became the path of colonization (as was, for example, in the Ottoman Empire through the institution of millet,38or in India, as part of the British Empire) or it was engineered within political systems by their elites (e.g., in the United States such a role had the segregation laws known as “Jim Crow,” while in Russia similar function had the temporary regulations regarding Jews—also known as the “May” anti-Semitic laws, introduced by Emperor Alexander III, in 1882–1914). The political importance of cultural cleavages will be strengthened or even “invented”—artificially created where existing “faults” in society are legitimated by state institutions. In particular, economic discrimination and preferential status based on ascribed (ethnic, religious, etc.) signs make cultural identity politically significant (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998: 26). Conversely, second, the political relevance of identity may be reduced if it is sanctioned by those in power (ibid.: 18). The stronger and more legitimate the institutions, the greater their chances to weaken the political significance of differences or to transform the volatile tensions between groups into nonviolent competition (we observe this situation in Adjara, an autonomous republic within Georgia; Malaysia, where political parties operate on the basis of ethnicity; another example is South Africa after the abolition of apartheid).

Third,if the institutionsareillegitimatein the eyes ofgroupsdeprived ofaccessto resources,but still can, nonetheless, effectively exercisecoercion, the discontentwill bekeptunder control(e.g., the Georgians inAbkhazia, or South Africabefore 1990). It followsthat, fourth,when the repressiveinstitutionsare weakenedor they collapse we can expect theeruptionof interethnicstrife(such as the violent conflicts that accompanied or followed the dissolution ofthe USSRandYugoslavia—inBosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, etc.). The collapse ofinstitutionscould be the result of the influence ofinternal or externalfactors, such as, in particular, the short-sightedeconomic policies or thenegative effects ofglobalization.39 Fifth,ethnicentrepreneurswill be facilitatedin their actionsand havemore chancesto mobilizesupportfortheir “programs”when the ethniccardwas previouslyused bythe erodedor nonexistingstate apparatus; whenminorities are, comparably, more affected than the rest of population byunfavorableeconomic conditions orliberalization; and when these “entrepreneurs” can offerpoliticalresources to the affected by the crisis40(e.g., Vladislav Ardzinba in Abkhazia, Slobodan MiloševićinSerbia, and Franjo TuđmaninCroatia).

These guiding points in the interpretation of conflicts can be illustrated and confirmed by comparing the political institutions of Republic of South Africa (RSA) before and after 1991, when the system of racial segregation, the apartheid,41 was abolished and denounced by the South African politicians. Racial segregation in South Africa already existed during the period of the Dutch and British colonial rule. Its foundations were laid in the seventeenth century. Apartheid became official state policy after the elections in 1948. It was conducted through several laws passed by the National Party, which were headed by Protestant priest Daniel François Malan (1874–1959). Legislation classified inhabitants into four racial groups—“black,” “white,” “colored,” and “Indian.” The last two groups were divided into several subclassifications.42 On the basis of this “distinction,” the residential areas were segregated.43 Apart from the white the other racial groups were not represented politically. The “black people” were deprived of citizenship. The government segregated public transport, hospitals, schools, universities, etc. The marriages and sexual contacts between the races were prohibited. The apartheid was the subject of fierce resistance of the oppressed ethnic groups and placed South Africa in international isolation, but because of the effective power of the repressive state institutions, it was maintained for decades.

The analyses and evaluations of the contemporary political system of South Africa, after the abolition of apartheid, are contradictory. Thanks to the country’s liberal constitution and, in particular, the positive role of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, initiated by President Nelson Mandela, the re-politicization of ethnic identity has so far been avoided. The role of ethnic cleavages as main generator of conflicts has been replaced, however, by fierce class polarization.44 Although the RSA has been ranked fifth in Africa in terms of income per capita, nearly one-quarter of the population of 58.9 million is unemployed. The country, which has 11official languages, is marked by growingxenophobia and violenceagainst immigrants(Crush and Pendleton2004).